In the context of modern ethical speciousness, your answer is glib and uncomfortable.
:scream:

his is the path we have to follow up! :flower: — javi2541997

Cannabis has a vast variety of chemical profiles, ranging from the hyper-stimulating effect of a pure Sativa, like Durban Poison, to the deeply sedative effect of a pure Indica, like Afghani Kush. Fortunately here in Canada, since legalization, it is becoming more and more feasible to identify and fine-tune these qualities through selective breeding and hybridization.

I can personally testify to the positive effects of a strain called Harlequin, which is 50/50 THC-CBD. It's amazing for reading; distracting thoughts fade and the text becomes all-encompassing.

I agree. The notion of a P-zombie is inherently contradictory. Consciousness seems more like a 'degree of freedom' that emerges from brain states.

What if there was no consciousness at T1, but consciousness later emerged at T2? Wouldn't the full description at T2, when there is consciousness, be longer than the consciousless description at T1? — RogueAI

Does consciousness of information constitute additional information?

I've attempted to summarize my points as concisely as possible with respect to the source text. I had wanted to explore the idea of the fundamentality of the idea of causality (in all of its aspects) and the cyclical project of analysis and synthesis, but this would have required several days, not hours, of work.

Quotations are from Continental Divide (CD - Harvard Press 2010) and The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms volume 2 (PSF2 - Routledge 2021)

Real-objectivity - the Realm of Reality

In its modern sense, physics is the science which studies matter in its most fundamental form. In other words, the properties of matter at the most abstract or general level. Science, as the collective knowledge about nature (phusis) has evolved into a myriad of unique and discrete sciences, wherein knowledge is pursued and validated through the use of the scientific method. Scientific progress and technical power derive from the application of general laws to specific cases. Understanding the general principles whereby (models of) neural networks operate facilitates the construction of simulated intelligences. Understanding the principles of evolutionary biology and organic chemistry facilitates techniques like gene splicing. Understanding the principles of general mechanics facilitates the use of levers and wheels. In each case, the power of the science of a domain is a function of the specificity of the domain. But each of these domains is the product of the formation of a complex system out of more basic elements. So while the face of modern science is best known in the miracles of gene-therapies, AI, and rocket engines, the overarching project of modern science is to understand what it is that connects the myriad of specifics in the most general way. Physical sciences can all be seen as specialized subsets of physics, the science of the most basic properties of matter.

Except that the apparent regularities of matter are entangled with the conceptualizing influence of the experiencing mind.

The earliest use of the term metaphysics was not by Aristotle, but by a later editor of his works, denoting those writings in his collection which came "after" (meta) physics. This purely positional identification quickly assimilated the additional apparently mystical sense of "beyond physics." In its earliest (pre-Socratic) usage, phusis (nature, becoming) contrasted with nomos (law, human convention). Thus Kant's observation of a fundamental mental orientation which is the "precondition for concept-formation" and hence structuring the conceptual regularities that characterize the becoming of nature (phusis), is adumbrated by the original sense in which nomos stands apart from phusis.

If the domain of nature (qua observed) is itself generalized to include the realm of the observer, then we have proceeded beyond physics to metaphysics. Reductive materialism sees the sciences of man as just further examples of highly specific theoretical realms. Culture emerging from psychology and biology just as chemistry emerges from physics. But is the mind, qua observer, a material product first? Or is it integrally involved in the construction of observed reality?

Insofar as the world is cognized, it is cognized in terms of regularities. In Kantian terms, "the world is intelligible...only thanks to certain conditions that we impose on it a priori." (CD, p7) Kant also identifies a mental orientation which is the "precondition for concept-formation although it is not itself conceptual." (CD, p.5) Peter Gordon suggests that "the orientations that lie at the very heart of conceptual argument seem...to precede thinking...at a level we might call preconceptual...[embracing] metaphor and affect. (CD 5-6)

I can do no better than cite Cassirer at length.

It is one of the first and essential insights of critical philosophy that objects are not "given" to consciousness in a rigid, finished state, nakedly in themselves, but that the relation of representation to the object presupposes an independent, spontaneous act of consciousness. The object does not exist before and outside of synthetic unity but is rather constituted only through it - it is no shaped form that consciousness itself simply imposes and impresses, but rather, it is the result of a forming that takes place by virtue of the basic medium of consciousness, by virtue of the conditions of intuition and pure thinking....Every such worldview is possible only through specific acts of objectivization, the reshaping of mere "impressions" into intrinsically determinate and configured "representations." (PSF2, p. 37)

And

what we call the world of our perception is already not simply nor self-evidently given from the outset but "is" only insofar as it has passed through certain basic theoretical acts, grasped through the world, by which it is apprehended and determined....If we ascribe a certain size, a certain position, and a certain distance to things in space, we are not thereby speaking about a simple datum of sense impression but are situating the sensible data in an interconnection of relations and a coherent system, one that proves ultimately to be nothing other than a judgment-complex. Every organization in space presupposes an organization in judgement....The transition from the world of immediate sense impression to the mediated world of intuitive "representation"...is based on the fact that in the fleeting, always the same series of impressions, the constant relationships in which they stand and according to which they recur, must gradually be emphasized as something independent...These constant relationships now form the fixed structure and, as it were, the fixed framework of "objectivity"....for critical contemplation, [the naive] assertion of constant things and properties dissolves when one traces them back to their origins and to their ultimate logical grounds, to the certainty of such relationships....The being of the objects of experience is constituted in and through them....every apprehension of a particular empirical "thing"...contains within it an act of evaluation. The empirical "reality," the fixed core of "objective" being, in difference to the world of mere representation or imagination, stands out in that the permanent is more and more sharply and clearly distinguished over against the fluid, the constant against the variable. (PSF2, pp. 38-40)

And regarding holism, objective-validition being confirmed by the "entire system of general laws."

The individual sense impression is not simply taken for what it is and immediately gives; rather, it is questioned as to what extent it is confirmed by the whole of experience...Only if it can withstand this inquiry and this critical test is it considered to be included in the REALM OF REALITY....Thus, the boundaries between the "objective" and the merely "subjective" are not rigidly determined from the beginning but instead are formed and determined only in the continuing process of experience and its theoretical foundation....what we call objective being is constantly displaced in order to be restored in a modified and renewed shape. (PSF2, pp.40)

What we call objective being - i,e the logical form of experiential thinking which is science - is constantly displaced in order to be restored in a modified and renewed shape. This is the sense in which I have been linking science and metaphysics. In a way that is consistent with the notions of the metaphysical research project and the paradigm shift, as others have mentioned. And the confirmation of specific contents of consciousness by the whole of experience suggests that the relative concreteness of our experiences is a function of the comprehensiveness of our theory of reality in its most abstract scope.

There are a lot of interesting aspects to this. Progression through a cyclical dialectic of analysis and synthesis, which Cassirer discusses. This is one of my own core tenets, which I feel completely resolves the inherent antinomies that form the basis of so much philosophical dispute, expressible ultimately as the paradox of mind and matter. Also the notion of the fundamental category of causality, in both its material and teleological evidence. Metaphor, myth, magic. Lots of room for metaphysical analysis there.

:up:

I'm looking at a kind of foundational synthetic-intuitive apprehension that grasps the essence of what it means to be objectively-real, across the spectrum of the empirical and the ideal.

All I was asking about was a plain English account of what you have already written in 3-4 sentences. I'm not asking for any additional work. If you are unable to clarify it further, that's ok too, we can move on. — Tom Storm

As I said, I am working on it. An additional point that you might find engaging is the intuition of causality as a foundational element. Causality is certainly a plausible fundamental category for empirical consciousness. But remember that there are different kinds or modes of causality. Formal and final causes don't fit within a strictly materialist framework, but they do emerge in plain sight for a cultural consciousness. So our apprehension of reality is the overall causal-intuition supported by the 'system of general laws' (Cassirer identifies this to clarify that what we are seeing is not just one example of one law being instantiated, but rather, our sensory experience is always composite, so many laws of different types of universals and particulars are always involved) including the formal/final dimension which transcends the boundaries of science. I elaborate somewhat on Cassirer.

↪Pantagruel I'm afraid that doesn't help me - I have no idea what the words mean. — Tom Storm

Did you attempt to read the source text I supplied? I am working on a synopsis but it will take some time. I have about 15 excerpts noted but it will take some time to assemble those into a cohesive presentation.

I'm not sure what this means. Can you restate it in simple or clearer language? — Tom Storm

Cassirer also describes how this functions through a cyclical dialectic of analysis and synthesis. It is from the first few pages of the first chapter of Volume 2, Mythical Thinking. I can put together a more comprehensive synopsis, but you can read the source text in the meantime if you are interested.

https://monoskop.org/images/f/f3/Cassirer_Ernst_The_Philosophy_of_Symbolic_Forms_2_Mythical_Thought.pdf

Pages 29 to 32.

Is there an example of such a thing you can identify? Is there anything that couldn't be justified by using such an intuitive approach? — Tom Storm

The Cassirer I'm just reading talks about how the inherent non-self-evidentiality of perception means that the perception of the real-objective must be a function of the apprehension of the entire "system of general laws", which he clearly demarcates as separate from science. This would be a good example of a kind of foundational certainty, which is conveyed holistically, as it were.

Have at it. :up:

Some kind of "intellectual intuition?"

Maybe we can instinctively 'get a feel' for the nature of things, but as soon as we try to render that feel into discursive terms the confusions, inconsistencies and aporias emerge. — Janus

Perhaps there is a mode of certainty that transcends discursive understanding.

Logic doesn't necessarily come from someone who theorized idea mechanics. BCE there was an unjust civilization and logic is the deconstruction of evil stupidities that serve as warnings for possible dystopic regimes. — introbert

I see. So you don't really want to discuss the epistemological validity of authority from the perspective of rationality?

The functionary makes compositon fallacy that the whole of doctors /medicine have the knowledge of only some. — introbert

Meaning what? Are you saying that only some doctors are qualified? Are you saying no doctors are qualified? I already discounted the cross-domain specialization case (or at least brought it up for discussion). Where are you saying that this appeal to authority fails?

The argument you have made about a physician being a specialization is not relevant in that my argument implies the doctor is assumed to have knowledge. — introbert

But isn't your argument also specifically about the fact that the doctor's knowledge is inadequate because of a lack of expertise in chemistry?

Don Quixote by Miguel de Cervantes — Maw

Nice. Watch out for the windmills.

Sentimental Education
by Gustave Flaubert

After reading about the 1848 revolutions a few months back this went on the list. I like to round out my understanding of events with source material; I think period literature counts as such.

Let's assume a "deterministic expectation" is a cornerstone of modernist thought. Are you criticizing modernism? Or implying some kind of functional role and imperative to deterministic expectation?

In your amplification of the ideal rationalism you say is implied in the acceptance of authority, you say that "a physician is not a chemical engineer." However the essence of authority is specialization, and specialists complement one another within an overarching framework of scientific legitimacy. You seem to be saying that the only true authority would be one with a universal compass, the ideal of the Renaissance man. Now I believe that sentiment has validity, especially when it comes to the extension of knowledge past its current empirical limits. But I don't think it is necessarily a valid criticism of authority. Certainly not of medical authority. Doctors know as much about the actions of drugs as they need to know in order to prescribe them effectively.

I'm not quite following. Are you saying that certain beliefs are ideally rationalistic because they are based on an appeal to authority? However (in some cases) that appeal to authority is misplaced, hence "really irrational"? Why is a deterministic expectation a cornerstone of modernist thought?

As I said earlier I agree with Popper that metaphysical speculation can inspire scientific investigation, but I think this would only apply to metaphysical speculation which is informed by science and takes off from places where current scientific knowledge reaches its limits. — Janus

Yes, insofar as we reach the limits of current scientific capabilities. I think that the science of the mind is hitting a wall now, and that quantum physics is coming up on that same wall as far as the link between the observer and the observed.

I don't lump in basic decency, kindness, the social contract, manners and any number of such things into the umbrella of morality — Judaka

What else is morality but a basic act of goodwill? Yes, like Rawls' basic duty of civility. Certainly manners are expressive of a moral perspective and would have to be included in any descriptive morality. It's hard to see how you could construe a normative morality that by definition excluded such things. Manners are just a "manner of treating somebody" which essentially what morality is.

If we take an example of a moral system you don't like, an Islamist or ultra-nationalistic perspective, then you'll happily call those same elements coercive — Judaka

Yes, this is an example of exactly what I am saying. Except I never called anything coercive.

It occurs to me that the best way to construe morality is to look at it as exemplified by a stranger making a request of you. Shelves in stores are designed for average height people. A very short person asks you to reach up and get something off the top shelf for him. Most moral situations are a lot like that. Except that the question is often implicit within the context. And I for one believe that for a lot of problems, there are usually certain people for whom solutions are a relatively easy matter. Instrumental capacity is often about the right person being in the right place at the right time.

Yes, but it is oriented around a more 'expansive' understanding of what consciousness is. There is a long tradition of consciousness as an interior movie, an interior monologue, things going on "in the head." The whole layer of intelligence involved in the micro-coordination of our overt actions and behaviours is ignored by many people.

Is your only complaint that you'd prefer it if I used glowing and positive language to describe morality? I have a neutral view of morality, neither particularly liking nor disliking it. Whenever I don't use glowing language, I'm reprimanded just as now, and it reinforces my idea that I am completely correct to call it coercion. I suppose it only makes sense that moral zealots see this coercion as a purely positive thing. — Judaka

I don't know, you say you are neutral, but coercion isn't a neutral description. Morality gives direction, it doesn't coerce. It is a person's choice to interpret a direction as coercion.

As for living in harmony with one's nature, that leaves much hanging. Should one live in harmony with one's nature, as a Stoic might say, or stand against it, as Nietzsche, Sartre, Kierkegaard &c. would have it... And if we were to discuss these chaps, then we would be doing philosophy. — Banno

But can you ever ignore the empirical evidence and fact that we are fundamentally, essentially, components of a collective, which to that extent defines our nature?

Morality is socially coercive, it involves often heightened emotions and is utilised as the logic of the mob. Compliance can be selected because of duty, honour and empathy, as you say, but it can also be selected out of fear of ostracisation or disapproval.

By unrealistic, I mean that decisions made in the real world include a variety of considerations that aren't applicable in the moral context. — Judaka

Yes, morality is socially coercive, which is to say, socially motivated and socially motivating. As I have been pointing out, this is an empirical fact. You are interpreting it as a (negative) value judgement.

How can anything not be applicable in a moral context? The essence of morality is to be contextually definitive.

Bottom line: the goal of metaphysics is to describe the nature of reality. Specifically, in domains that at the present time are not amenable to scientific investigation. Metaphysical inquiries however can, through conceptual analysis, reveal facts about reality leading to paradigm shifts which can broaden the possibilities of scientific investigation. Popper describes this as a 'metaphysical research program.' Dark matter is a perfect example. It isn't an observed phenomenon, it is the value of an inferred variable balancing the equations of a specific theoretical model. The Ptolemaic universe wasn't just an inaccurate physical model, it was an anthropocentric view of reality. When heliocentrism finally prevailed, it altered fundamental beliefs about the nature of man. That's why the Church opposed it so violently.

morality is coercive and unrealistic — Judaka

If by morality being coercive you mean that it indicates a course of action, this would be accurate. You might just as well say that "desire is coercive." Once could just as easily say "Morality is corrective." Yes, the entire purpose of morality is to shape actions, in some cases to choose a moral reason for acting instead of one's own desire. Some people don't view this as coercion, but as guidance. Freud identically characterizes the superego as functioning in this coercive, externalized fashion. Up to the point where it is reintegrated into the mature personality. Essentially, you are characterizing the moral perspective of an infantile ego.

The point is, there is a certain governing standard of social behaviour and action, which is essential for the creation of shared meaning. Minds are collective creatures.

I agree that what might be classed as metaphysical speculation (abductive reasoning or extrapolating imaginable possibilities) certainly plays a role in science, but I can think of no examples of metaphysics becoming science. — Janus

Metaphysics is the outside borders of science. It's an epistemological distinction. The idea that reality consists of four elements is completely erroneous. But the concept of the four elements was a metaphysical characterization of the nature of being. Just as science itself consists of metaphysical presuppositions. That metaphysical characterization was displaced when scientific understanding revealed the underlying atomic nature of all such physical phenomena. And the boundaries of metaphysics were pushed back further. Paradigm-shifting, as you described. Science more replaces metaphysics or perhaps validates a certain set of metaphysical presuppositions, I guess you would say. Then the metaphysical question gets asked at a higher level of abstraction.

In other words, we're talking either about hypothetical explanations for physical systems¹ or about categorical interpretations² of those explanations, respectively; the latter (metaphysics) says nothing about the objects¹ of the former (physics) but only about how to construct² a 'coherent, presuppositional / systematic synopsis' of the former. — 180 Proof

The object of metaphysics is not to synopsize science. Rather, to link what is unlinked. It is the boundary of knowledge at the current limits of abstraction. Increasing technical and epistemic expertise results in a practical expansion of domains of enacted knowledge. What once was alchemy and religion and folklore becomes organic chemistry and medicine. A grand unified theory would unite the quantum and cosmic domains. It's metaphysics until it isn't.

I think it would be a matter of simplistic thinking to assert either consciousness comes from the whole body, XOR consciousness comes from the brain. The brain plays a central role, but other parts of the body play a role in how the brain is functioning as well. Hormones, blood flow, and the oxygen and glucose content of the blood, are some of the aspects of how parts of the body outside the brain have an impact on consciousness. Then of course there are the sensory and motor nerves, with paths all over the body, which play a big role in how our consciousness develops. — wonderer1

Additionally, the embodied consciousness thesis is often bundled with that of embedded cognition (environmental factors are also integral to cognition). And there is extensive experimental evidence to that effect. If cognition isn't construed narrowly as just thinking, but is understood as a kind of enaction, then the theory of embodied consciousness really isn't that far-fetched. After all, think about how intimately the nature of our thoughts is entwined with the nuances of our physical form, the dexterity of our fingers, the nature of our other senses. Knowledge is the result of a "hunger" which is then satisfied. Imagine how different our thoughts would be if we were instead squid-like creatures who absorbed sunlight through an algae-symbiote living in our skin.

There is also the question of the well-being of the individual versus the well-being of the species. Diseases can also be the product of an interaction between a species population and an environment. In the case of severe overpopulation, diseases can proliferate. Have you considered the possibility that some disease may be instructive from this perspective, not so much to require a cure as a response?

Morality mandates a perspective be taken as one member of a group, with an interest in the group's wellbeing, and any views that fall outside of this context are invalid. In a philosophical context, that "group" is unlikely to be of your choosing, and instead might be the citizens of a nation or just the whole of humanity. Any motivation that would clearly be contrary to the group's cannot be reasonably used as part of an argument for a moral position, without explaining why that is fair or justified within the context of the entire group, or as the best solution to the situation.

The moral perspective forces someone to take an unnatural position to how one would usually. One's thinking factors in one's priorities, values, goals, philosophy, and how one interprets and characterises things and other factors that don't fit into the moral context. Moreover, smaller perspectives might be excluded, as you're to take the position of the group in question. — Judaka

The whole premise is flawed and biased. Morality can equally be seen as an individual rising above a deficient cultural moral code. Kierkegaard's knight of faith. Jung's Answer to Job. Carlyle's study on Heros, Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History.

Some people voluntarily embrace morality out of a sense of empathy or, more to the point, out a sense of duty (Kant). This is a very debased and cynical perspective on the nature and motivation of morality, and certainly not one that is widely embraced (thank goodness).

The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 2: Mythical Thought
by Ernst Cassirer

My takeaway from volume one is that language (and derivatively concept-formation and logic) is inextricable from the historical project of human existence, in all of its regional varieties. Objectivity, as Cassirer puts it, coincides with "an active interest in the world and its configuration."

Oration on the Dignity of Man
by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola
so called "Manifesto of the Renaissance"

The Warlord of Mars
by Edgar Rice Burroughs

None of this has anything to do with destroying capitalism, really — only a psychotic and vicious variation of capitalism, one that’s dedicated to destroying the normal functioning of human life to serve the interests of Exxon. — Mikie

I'm ok with capitalism. But it clearly requires stricter regulation. A socialistically-managed capitalism could work.

The reason indigenous governance and harmonious living with nature won't save us should be clear, we are with 8 billion people living in a globalised high tech world... that is a totally different world from the one in which indigenous people developed their ideas. — ChatteringMonkey

The idea that the environment needs to be safeguarded because it is essential to life scales up just fine as far as I can see.

think if you want something to become real, you have to imagine it. You can't bring about change by wagging an index finger. You know? — frank

One-hundred percent. Presumably there will be an increase in the general level of social awareness, out of which consensus emerges the forms of governance we deem acceptable. In Canada, there is a growing trend where the government sponsors and supports indigenous-led environmental initiatives.
e.g. Natural Climate Solutions
Area-based Conservation

I'd go one better, and get behind indigenous-led governance. Our indigenous groups have always attempted to live in harmony with nature. It's an attitude whose time is long overdue. If you look at the real numbers of politicians involved criminal self-promotion in violation of the public trust, the need for a really new approach seems clear.