Definitely read Heidegger, but I also recommend Levinas. — darthbarracuda
I actually tried reading Being and Time many years ago and found it utterly impenetrable. My thought recently has been that some of his shorter essays might be more approachable. I have a Basic Works of Heidegger on my list as well as the Safranski biography, so I do hope to have at least a baseline knowledge of him. I know nothing about Levinas, but he's another continental figure, so I'm a little wary of him, too. If I get into a PhD program, I'll be focusing on Schopenhauer, so my planned reading list won't be tackled for some time.
I will say that there is a continental philosopher I have liked, from what little I've read of him thus far, namely, Peter Sloterdijk. He has a knowledge of Schopenhauer and his prose is actually pretty readable, at least in comparison with other continental philosophers. He takes aim at scientism and the New Atheists.
Though it's sort of difficult for me to wrap my head around the notion that we can know that something exists without knowing hardly anything (if anything) about that which is said to exist. — darthbarracuda
It seems to be how physicists currently treat dark matter, for example. And it seems to me that I can know that I exist without knowing what I am. With God, I think the Scholastics would say that we can make true statements about what God is (e.g. God is being-itself) without fully understanding what they mean.
I thought it was that demonstrations only led the path to God for non-believers and did not establish his existence as some kind of indubitable fact, only as possible and perhaps even likely. — darthbarracuda
Well, they are presented as deductive, not inductive, arguments, so if the conclusion follows from the premises and the premises are true, then they would be indubitable in the way, 1) all men are mortal, 2) Socrates is a man, 3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal is indubitable.
I thought Aquinas did not think reason alone could establish that the universe did not extend temporally ad infinitum, for example, and that it's creation by a necessary being was a metaphysically coherent notion that was nevertheless taken on by faith. — darthbarracuda
It is true he thought that it could not be demonstrated either way that the world had a temporal beginning, unlike Bonaventure, for example, but this doesn't affect the doctrine of creation. Here is what Boethius says on the subject:
'God is eternal; in this judgment all rational beings agree. Let us, then, consider what eternity is. For this word carries with it a revelation alike of the Divine nature and of the Divine knowledge. Now, eternity is the possession of endless life whole and perfect at a single moment. What this is becomes more clear and manifest from a comparison with things temporal. For whatever lives in time is a present proceeding from the past to the future, and there is nothing set in time which can embrace the whole space of its life together. To-morrow's state it grasps not yet, while it has already lost yesterday's; nay, even in the life of to-day ye live no longer than one brief transitory moment. Whatever, therefore, is subject to the condition of time, although, as Aristotle deemed of the world, it never have either beginning or end, and its life be stretched to the whole extent of time's infinity, it yet is not such as rightly to be thought eternal. For it does not include and embrace the whole space of infinite life at once, but has no present hold on things to come, not yet accomplished. Accordingly, that which includes and possesses the whole fulness of unending life at once, from which nothing future is absent, from which nothing past has escaped, this is rightly called eternal; this must of necessity be ever present to itself in full self-possession, and hold the infinity of movable time in an abiding present. Wherefore they deem not rightly who imagine that on Plato's principles the created world is made co-eternal with the Creator, because they are told that he believed the world to have had no beginning in time, and to be destined never to come to an end. For it is one thing for existence to be endlessly prolonged, which was what Plato ascribed to the world, another for the whole of an endless life to be embraced in the present, which is manifestly a property peculiar to the Divine mind. Nor need God appear earlier in mere duration of time to created things, but only prior in the unique simplicity of His nature. For the infinite progression of things in time copies this immediate existence in the present of the changeless life, and when it cannot succeed in equalling it, declines from movelessness into motion, and falls away from the simplicity of a perpetual present to the infinite duration of the future and the past; and since it cannot possess the whole fulness of its life together, for the very reason that in a manner it never ceases to be, it seems, up to a certain point, to rival that which it cannot complete and express by attaching itself indifferently to any present moment of time, however swift and brief; and since this bears some resemblance to that ever-abiding present, it bestows on everything to which it is assigned the semblance of existence. But since it cannot abide, it hurries along the infinite path of time, and the result has been that it continues by ceaseless movement the life the completeness of which it could not embrace while it stood still. So, if we are minded to give things their right names, we shall follow Plato in saying that God indeed is eternal, but the world everlasting.