Is there an external material world ?
Good explanation.
Of course this all depends on your theory of selfhood (what is 'me'?) but that's probably a whole 'nother can of worms we don't want to open here.
That’s an important point.
If one expands “the network doing the inference” to include the sensorimotor systems, what happens to the hidden state?
It troubles me because every single “network doing the inference” appears to be the organism itself. By their own admission, and our own, organisms infer.
Maybe this is partly a problem of systems theory in biology, the idea that this or that group of organs can be considered its own system, while other parts and other systems remain outside of it, different nodes so to speak. While this may be a decent abstract model of biological function, empirically this isn’t the case because whenever such a system is isolated, or otherwise taken out of the system, it no longer performs the functions it is supposed to and is known for. A brain sitting on a chair, for example, could not be said to be thinking. It’s only function as a system at this point is to rot.
So can an activity that only organisms can be shown to perform—experiencing, thinking, inferring, believing, seeing—be isolated to a single part of it?