Gould is one of my favorite writers. — T Clark

It's easy to understand why.

It's hard to believe he's been gone for more than 20 years. — T Clark

I don't mean to suggest that I knew him personally; I didn't; still: “Only the good die young,” comes to mind in thinking about him. (different ways to interpret this; but in this context I interpret it as “pass away while yet being young at heart”) Or so it seems to me, at least.

How people ever talked themselves into something as nonsensical as eliminativism, I'll never understand, but thankfully it's well on its way to the ash heap of history. — RogueAI

Yes. But in @apokrisis's poignantly expressed questioning:

Does that sentence even make sense? And from what point of view? — apokrisis

:razz:

OK. I'll bugger off now.

An entertaining read.

Well … We will someday hold that horizon in our hands, by gosh! We just need to run faster toward it, that’s all.

BTW, I am here officially making a bet with anyone who so wishes on a case of wine (need not be expensive) that no one will ever hold the horizon in their hands, like ever. Any takers? (As to time-frames, maybe its best to make it within our own lifetimes.)

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Obviously, this bet would apply only for those of us who are not horizon-eliminativists, and thereby for those of us who maintain that the horizon does in fact occur.

You had no argument you could make. — apokrisis

The posturing guru speaketh. Bravo!

Stephen J Gould wrote, "In science, 'fact' can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.'" Does that agree with your position or disagree with it? — T Clark

It agrees quite well. BTW, I have fond memories of Gould's various takes on sociobiology - albeit with some disagreements in some of the details.

Going back to my previous comment including the example, even many (most?) of our empirical observations are inferences and not direct observations. That may have been less true in Pierce's time. — T Clark

I think you are here erroneously conflating, or maybe fully equating, science to physics. A category error.

Again, how much of what we know is a brute fact? — T Clark

This question is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the proposition it is in reply to. All the same, there is no metaphysics that is both consistent and does not utilize a brute fact. Matter for materialists, as one example of this.

One of these crucial, pivotal inferences is that others are like us in being endowed with this "first-person point of view". Our observations (not inferences) of what they do sure as hell evidence and validate that they are thus endowed. Nevertheless, we do not observe them as first-person points of view. — javra

Again - many of what you call "brute-facts," we do not observe from a first-person point of view. — T Clark

If I remember right, I've only called one's own conscious being a brute fact to one's own conscious self. What are you here referring to?

All the same - though I do have my reason for so calling one's own conscious being a brute fact - if possible, due to the complexities involved, I'll retract my so claiming it to be with a "my bad". While I hold that it's not explainable in terms of more fundamental facts, I very much know that it's occurrence and form is dependent on a physical substratum of body and (in animals) brain - together with environment. Hence, the complexities.

As I noted in my last post to Wayfarer, it is unlikely you and I will get any further with this discussion. I've participated in similar ones many times, I'm sure you have too, and it never goes any further than this. This is probably a good place to stop. — T Clark

Alright. Thanks for the heads up.

FWIW, I'm in agreement, as I hope is also evident from what I've said above.

Useful crib on scientific method: — Wayfarer

:up: Cool. Thanks

I can't follow your argument there. Science is the combination of theory and test, deductive prediction and inductive confirmation. — apokrisis

When so loosely understood, what then isn't?

Take metaphysics. It is inferred theory and it is tested against a rubric of reason, it has deductive predictions from postulates and inductive confirmations of these predictions. And, it must conform to the observable world to be taken in any way seriously.

So now metaphysics is a branch of science? Um, no, it is not. ... boring as this might be, again, because it is not empirically testable (to be lucidly clear, your metaphysics very much included), and this because it has no empirically falsifiable hypothesis to test.

I'll try to leave our disagreement at that.

A direct question: does the total self of mind and body which can be to whatever extent empirically observed by others which you (I would assume) deem yourself to be hold a first-person point of view which is now reading this text? — javra

Does that sentence even make sense? And from what point of view? — apokrisis

Good luck with that, apo. I'll for now just choose to believe yours is merely a stinginess of charity mixed with some degree of deception (be it self-deception or otherwise). But hell, I could be talking to a Chat GPT program after all. So who knows?

As I just wrote in my previous post to Wayfarer, most of what we know is not based on our own direct observations. — T Clark

Yes. In absolutely full agreement. (Ergo the importance of trust and the significance of betrayal (of trust), including that of willful deceptions.)

It is a commonplace of all philosophy, at least since Descartes, that all our observations are imperfect and might be anywhere from 99% right to 100% wrong. At the same time, if you and I are both people of good will and both interested in learning about how people think, you're reports of your experience of your mind are likely to be valid, if imperfect. — T Clark

OK to this. As a reminder, I'm a diehard fallibilist. But it equivocates between empirical observations (which, yes, could in principle could include hallucinations - hence being technically fallible) and inferences, with these being optimal conclusions drawn from that which is observed (and since no one is omniscient, everyone's inferences could be potentially mistaken at times - hence being technically fallible).

Now I maintain this too is a fallible observation (a rabit-hole of philosophy, kind of thing) but, pragmatically, something that we all immediately know as a brute fact that we cannot rationally - nor experientially - doubt: we are as that which apprehends observables (including our thoughts, with some of these being our conscious inferences). Long story short, this is a direct experiential awareness of our own occurrence (again, as, I'll for now say, "first-person observers") Here is made absolutely no claim as to what we, as such, in fact are - be it entities/substance, processes, both, or neither. It doesn't matter.

In contrast to this direct experience of what is, we have inferences we live by. One of these crucial, pivotal inferences is that others are like us in being endowed with this "first-person point of view". Our observations (not inferences) of what they do sure as hell evidence and validate that they are thus endowed. Nevertheless, we do not observe them as first-person points of view.

We, hence, cannot observe other's consciousness and its factual activities - such as, for one example, what the consciousness remembers via the workings of its total mind.

None of this needs to be appraised for day to day interactions. But we are philosophically debating this very point, so I've mentioned it.

I attribute memory; or thinking, or feeling, or seeing, or knowing; to people all the time just based on their self-reporting and other behavior I can observe. That's how we know the world. Mental processes are not special. — T Clark

I'll again propose and argue that his attribution is due to inference - much of it unconscious and hence automatic - and not due to (first-person) observation (which can only be direct - rather than, for example, hearsay). For instance:

Of course I can. Here I go. Watch me. Hey, Javra, what are you remembering right now? — T Clark

What if I answer "nothing" or "a pink dolphin" or something else and it happens to be a proposition that I'm fully aware doesn't conform to the reality of what my current recollections are. These examples are obvious, but then I could answer with a proposition that, thought false, would be easily believable by you - and one which you'd have no possible way of verifying: e.g., "I'm now remembering your last post before this one".

You can infer what I'm remembering - but you do not observe it. Hopefully that makes better sense?

I pointed out how it is failing the test in terms of being a generalisation that ought to contain supersymmetry as a particular feature. And in being thus currently tested, that makes it doubly a problem if you want to say it is currently untestable – the stronger claim that it can't even be tested in principle. — apokrisis

OK, to state what should be obvious to those science savvy, such as yourself, one does not - and cannot - empirically test a theory inferred from data via use of strict theory and still declare such test one of empirical science.

The historic complexities aside, the theory of evolution can, for instance, be empirically tested in the lab - with fruit flies as just one among many examples.

The physics theory of relativity only became empirical science when empirically tested, and it was thereby empirically found that gravity does in fact bend light.

One does not test a theoretical inference against another theoretical inference - regardless of what the latter might be, that of supersymmetry included (which has alternatives to boot) - and then declare this a scientific test. For there's nothing empirical about such a test.

Hence, there is no currently imaginable way to test M-theory empirically - although, with no one being omniscient, given a lack of dogma one can/should allow for the existential possibility that at some point in the distant future someone somewhere might figure out a way to empirically test it. Until then - if this "then" will ever occur - it is not a scientific theory exactly and solely on this count: it cannot be empirically tested one way or another other.

This potential confusion between theoretical abstractons that might or might not be valid (edit: which often enough compete against each other) and that which becomes empirically tested and thereby empirically verified is why I initially addressed in a tongue in cheek manner that "(purely) theoretical fartology" is not a valid scientific discipline.

Would Chat GPT make as many rookie errors? There are whole shelves on the social construction of the self that could be poured into its pattern-matching data bank. It would at least be familiar with the relevant social science. — apokrisis

A direct question: does the total self of mind and body which can be to whatever extent empirically observed by others which you (I would assume) deem yourself to be hold a first-person point of view which is now reading this text?

As to social constructions studied by social sciences, these will include comparative religions just as much as those relevant notions of self (and in fairness, of non-self). Leave cultural constructs aside for a moment and given an honest proposition regarding what factually is in therms of your consciousness: do you in any way occur as a first-person point of view that is now reading this text?

Is it an untested theory or the mathematical generalisation of tested theories? — apokrisis

I didn't say "currently untested". I said "currently untestable". A major difference for those science savy.

I find plenty of disagreement. But not much of importance. You articulate a cultural construct with a long social history. — apokrisis

Ah, I see. My occurrence as a first-person point of view is a "cultural construct with a long social history" - a proposition that thereby lacks a truthful correspondence to anything real, I then infer. Claims like this make one doubt one is talking to another human rather than some AI robot.

As for the rest, we all know that he who presents the most ostentatious posturing wins. Much like those chimp ancestors of ours. So, go for it.

I would define "mind" as the sum total of an entities mental processes which include thinking, feeling, perceiving, knowing, remembering, being aware, being self-aware, proprioception, and lots of stuff I'm leaving out. I think all of those things are observable from the outside (third person observation) and many are observable from the inside (introspection). — T Clark

So you're claiming that you (or anyone else) can observe what I'm remembering right now? I won't even push the issue by addressing those good or bad vibes of former days for which I currently can find no adequate words but, nevertheless, can still remember. I'm here simply addressing (maybe via use of brain scans) another's ability to observe that which I as a so called "mind's eye" can perceptually remember via the non-physiologial senses of one's mind (say, my perceiving the remembered smell of a particular rose).

This is certainly not true. There are more than seven billion human minds that are objects to us and only one you might argue isn't. — T Clark

Maybe, but this would be contingent on how one defines and thereby interprets "mind". So how do you define mind?

As two examples among many:

1) a body of sometimes disparate agencies of awareness and will - interacting at various levels of unconscious (with one's conscience as one example) - that can of themselves hold causal power and thereby affect or else form the causal abilities of consciousness (e.g., feeling an overwhelming unconscious urge to do something that one then does) that can fully unify into a singular awareness and will (such as when one is in the flow and effortlessly acts in manners devoid of any choice making or deliberative thought). In short, mind as a mostly unified bundle of agencies.

2) the strict, causal-power-devoid epiphenomenon of a physical brain's operatons that is thereby necessarily reducible to the purely deterministic, causal operations of a physical brain's components and, hence, of itself holds no causal power to alter any behavior - this such as via the activity of making choices or of thinking - here very much including the non-agency of consciousness ... which is one aspect of a human's total mind). In short, mind as the effete byproduct of a brain.

Just two options among many, but I so far find anything resembling (1) to be non-observable (instead only being inferable, typically unconsciously in day to day life, this via observable data regarding a total person's overt behaviors) - this even though a corporeal being's mind is here yet understood to be contingent on a corporeal, hence physical, body (and at the very least in mammals, on a physical central nervous system). And, since mind here is non directly observable (with MRIs and such, which are observable, being inferential understandings of such agency we term mind), mind in this interpretation cannot be an observable object. (albeit, one can via various inferences often enough predict what minds will do).

Whereas anything resembling (2) can then be easily expressed as an observable object - this since it here basically amounts to the occurrence of a brain - of whose illusory agency in the form of mind is fully, well, illusory.

(Personally, I find that satisfactorily defining mind is far more challenging than defining consciousness - esp. when attempting to remain consistent to the occurrence of consciousness itself. All the same, an interesting topic to explore via commonalities and differences of perspective.)

Thanks.

But how much neurobiology do you know to make such sweeping dismissals? What definition of “consciousness” can you present here such that it could be subject to experimental investigation?

Sure, you know what it feels like to feel like you. But where can you point to the failures of science to say something about that? Give us an example from psychophysics or cognitive neuroscience. — apokrisis

As to definitions:

Science: any conceivable field of knowledge, including that of theoretical fartology any field of study that is necessarily founded upon empirical observation (hence, observations via any of the physiological senses) and that employs the scientific method of a) falsifiable hypothesis regrading empirical observations, b) empirically observable test, and c) empirically observable results. (e.g., M-theory is currently an untestable theory and so is not of itself science)

Consciousness: the first-person point of view which empirically observes (again, hence observes via its physiological senses), as well as introspects (which is a non-empirical activity), while always finding itself as first-person point of view in non-empirical yet experiential states of being such as those of happiness, certainty, and their opposites, among numerous others. (E.g., I know I am psychologically certain when I am simply by so being as a first-person point of view – such that this certainty is in no way something other that I as a first-person point of view apprehend but, again, is simply an aspect of my momentary state of being as a consciousness.)

If you find any disagreement with either definition, it would be important that you then express your differences.

Then, I cannot see myself as a first-person point of view in the mirror - I can instead only see the body through which I as a first-person point of view operate (e.g., neither of the two physiological eyes through which I see is the I which I am as a first-person point of view (i.e., a consciousness). Nor can I touch, smell, taste, hear, or proprioceive (etc.) myself as that which apprehends touch, smell, taste, auditory information, and proprioception (etc.).

In short, I as a consciousness – i.e. as a first person point of view – know myself to be 100% non-empirical - to in no way whatsoever stand out to anyone anywhere, my own self very much included - and to nevertheless yet be.

Science – including psychophysics and cognitive neuroscience – can only address empirical givens by definition.

Ergo, to presume that anyone now or ever can obtain scientific knowledge of what consciousness is is a massive category mistake. It’s right up there with believing one can catch the horizon if one chases it fast enough.

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Of important note: here is being strictly addresses the issue of consciousness – and in no way that of mind (which as a definite given among humans always pertains to a given consciousness; e.g. “my mind” or "his mind") This in no way denying the interplay between consciousness and the unconscious mind. And it in no way addresses metaphysics.

A theory of “consciousness” is just the pursuit of a ghostly spirit stuff. Or can you frame the task in a way that is scientific rather than a search for immaterial being? — apokrisis

Science should be able to explain something as fundamental as consciousness, shouldn't it? — RogueAI

Why should it?

It’s not like this ultimate beetle in the box called “consciousness”, aka lived experience, in any way matters - all the more so were it be immaterial - not ethically and certainty not substantially (neither of the latter - ethics or substance - being in any way scientifically testable anyways).

For instance, pragmatically speaking, we can contemplate mathematical systems and work with empirical knowledge just fine without it.

Plus, socio-politically speaking, all those people the world over that have learned to detest science exactly due to attitudes such as the two just expressed are morons – this for having the nerve to maintain that their lived experience (which, needless to add, is first-person), and those of others they care about, should be in any way valued, this either by other individuals or by cultural institutions. Telling them that they're idiots on this count should get them to finally take science seriously - rather than thumb their noses at global warming and the like.

And why is "consciousness" in quotes? — RogueAI

Because it is one of them illusions? After all, it is neither tangible nor explainable mathematically and, thus, cannot possibly be real.

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Hey, devil’s advocate at work here. :naughty: Because while I know I am, I can’t conclusively prove that individual others are.

(BTW, the advocacy provided is directed primarily at @apokrisis's comments.)

I know it's already been suggested that crows can count, but try explaining the concept of prime to them. — Wayfarer

To try clarify what was suggested, by me at least: If crows can count, then crows (as with apes and other lesser animals) obviously cannot count the way humans do: via use of language and its conceptual constructs. But then crows can't understand a rock as object the same way we do either - e.g., that it consists of minerals, subatomic particles, etc. Still, crows can hold awareness of some rudimentary properties of rocks well enough to intentionally make use of some rocks as tools - not like us, they can't build a skyrocketing pyramid from them, but they can drop them on things in attempts to crack these things open.

In parallel to their, by comparison, minuscule understanding of physical objects in the world, crows might well be able to apprehend rudimentary aspects of definite quantities existing in the world which we humans linguistically refer to by the term "numbers".

This teeny-weeny aptitude of apprehension will quite obviously differ by great magnitudes in comparison to an average human's. But this does not mandate that there is an absolute on/off switch in-between.

That our human psyches are leaps and bounds more awareness-endowed than those of all lesser animals does not of itself then indicate that there was no evolutionary cline in awareness and the intelligence that accompanies it.

As another parallel, that one can't explain calculus to a five-year-old doesn't then imply that the five-year-old has no awareness of specific quantity whatsoever.

Not claiming to know that lesser animals do or don't count. But if they do, this does not then make their aptitudes of understanding on par to our own. Its why we term them "lesser" animals - due to us being the most evolved (here strictly meaning, developed) animal we know of by far.

In the Philebus Plato addresses the question of the relation between language and world.
It raises the problem of what Aristotle called the “indeterminate dyad” . — Fooloso4

Interesting. But I find that a distinction can be made between necessary dyads and unnecessary dyads (however it would be best to lignuistically distinguish them). As an example of this distinction:

Left and right form what I've termed a necessary dyad. It is impossible in all cases and at all times to have one devoid of the other's occurrence (same with up and down and many other dyads).

On the other hand, love and hate give an example of what I've tentatively termed "an unnecessary dyad": yes, they stand in direct opposition to each other as a dichotomy and therefore comprise one set, but: while one cannot ever hate in manners fully devoid of love - namely, of love for that which is valued, typically one's own self - a person can potentially experience love in manners fully devoid of hate for anything (at least transiently). So, unlike left and right, while hate necessitates love in all cases, love will not likewise necessitate hate.

Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. — Fooloso4

Getting back into cosmology :razz: , in cosmological models wherein some the absolute state of being is equated to pure (cosmic) love - maybe such as the Neo-platonic notion of "the One"? - the unnecessary dyad of love-hate terminates in manners where only love remains at the expense of all hate. So that the Whole here can be theoretically reducible to One - this due to not all dyads being a matter of "this and that" (some in fact being "this or that"). [Other possible cases of unnecessary dyads might also be potentially discerned.]

p.s., yes, deep down, I'm sincerely philosophically minded about this issue of opposites. Though I'm not sure that if fits in with the thread's theme.

Thanks for engaging with what I've previously asked!

To go back to Bateson's initial quote, what would a numberless measurement of length, for example, be? - javra

Couldn't this be accomplished by simply referencing objects' extension in relation to one another? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, you are quite right. (Realized this after posting, but deemed that editing it would be a bit much ... in any case, my bad here.) I would however better reword the concern I have in this way:

-- Can one have any measurement that is devoid of any discrete givens which we - either thinkingly or unthinkingly - enumerate (i.e., determine the amount of) via numbers?

If not, then it currently seems to me that measurement necessitates number in some way or another.

Notice that in the very quoted sentence number (a definite amount; i.e., a definite quantity) is necessarily specified in order for cogent semantics to obtain (what I've boldfaced). Likewise, while a ratio might not be itself interpreted as a number (debatable) it will yet, I so far find, necessarily consist of a relation between numbers - at the very least between quantities (the plurality of which is itself a quantity) which we hold the potential to enumerate. Else, in measurements that strictly concern relations, such as greater than or lesser than, there will always be an at the very least implicitly addressed number of givens to which the relations applies. I'm for example weak on pure theoretical mathematics, but I so far can't find any exception to this.

I feel like there is support for the supposition that the illusion of discreteness is just a useful survival trick as much as for the idea that innate numeracy denotes the existence of numbers "out there, sans mind." — Count Timothy von Icarus

As to whether lesser animals can count, as philosophy it's right up there with whether lesser animals are in fact conscious - to which might as well be appended the issue of other minds. In short, I'm convinced that they do, but, as with those who'd disagree, can't provide conclusive philosophical evidence of it - at least not in a forum format. So, I won't debate the issue.

Still, the pivotal issue I was addressing is that, as I currently find it, discreteness is contingent on the occurrence of awareness - such that if awareness then discreteness (and as an important meta-example: the occurrence of one awareness or more will each be a discrete given). And, furthermore, that numbers are only then contingent on the occurrence of discreteness. This irrespective of one's metaphysical interpretation(s) regarding the consequent significance in respect to the cosmos we inhabit. (e.g., a materialists' view that an awareness-devoid cosmos is possible or, else, an idealist's view that such is impossible - as two among other metaphysical perspectives)

So I'm here in full agreement that "numbers 'out there, sans minds' [by which I here understand, tersely stated, "a plurality of discrete awareness"]'" can only be a fallacy.

how can one have numbers in the complete absence of discrete amounts of givens - i.e., of quantities? - javra

Imagine a continuum, for example a line, of finite length. Our line has an uncountably infinite number of points but also a finite length. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right here, in the very semantics of what a line is, is the occurrence of quantity in the form of "points" - such that this quantity minimally consists of more than one point. In addressing "a" continuum one is likewise specifying a quantity - not two or three continuums but one. So the occurrence of quantity is a requite aspect of any continuum - be it real or strictly conceptual.

ake some section of the line, arbitrarily, and compare how many lengths of the section fit within the whole. There are sections of the line that exist such that the line can be broken into n segments of equal length, where n is a natural number. No initial discreteness required, right? All that is required is that the points of the line differ from each other in some way; — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe the "discreteness" here addressed by you has a specialized mathematical meaning? But in the ordinary sense I've addressed it it specifies something being separate, distinct, individual. Hence, in the sense I intend the very sections of the line that are compared are thereby discrete (to our awareness of them as such - otherwise no comparison could be made).

BTW, one could then address point-free topology as another example to be provided - but, here too, tmk there will be discerned some form of separateness somewhere (e.g., sets), such that discreteness (and hence quantity) yet obtains.

So, I again find that the (maybe I should specify, cosmic) occurrence of quantity is requisite for the occurrence of numbers (be the latter's occurrence also cosmic or, else, strictly located in individual minds as some would have it).

I've always found the reverse argument more interesting, the claim that numbers are essential for reality, or at least our understanding of it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This in fact isn't too different from my own personal metaphysical views. Only that I maintain quantity - as in "discrete givens" - to be essential to existence rather than to reality (with "existence" here roughly understood as all which "stands out" in any way) and, thereby, to physical reality (which exists); this, thereby, concurrently necessitating the ontic occurence of numbers in the cosmos (however sentience might represent them symbolically; e.g. as "IV", as "4", or as "four"). But I don't want to digress into my own metaphysical views concerning this.

All the same, of main interest here is the issue of how numbers could be had in the complete absence of quantity.

Anyhow, if some hitherto unformulated version of logicalism is true, and numbers are reducible to logos, it seems to me like this argument is moot (and that the concept of logos spermatikos ends up beating out divine nous as a better explanation of "how things are," IMHO.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

:grin: I could go with that. (but then these touchy terms hold different connotations to different people, for instance, that of "spermatikos" say by compassion to the terms "in-fluence" or even that of "inspiration (aka, to breath in or, more archaically, roughly, to be breathed into psychically)") But yes, a Heraclitean-like, cosmic logos of the type addressed stands in direct logical contradiction to an omnipotent and omniscient creator deity whose "words" make up the world.

I'm not sure what you are saying or asking there. I'll attempt an answer if you care to clarify. — Janus

That's OK. Thanks

That something stands out perceptually is not that it is actually separate from its environment; it is just that we can distinguish it. — Janus

I'm not getting this. Edit: A predator's perceived prey that stands out perceptually isn't separate from the prey's environment?

When we distinguish a single tomato, there is not an "indefinite quantity of something" in the sense that you were using the term 'quantity', that is as number: on the contrary there is an exact number of tomatoes; in this case one. — Janus

"A quantity" is an unspecified amount. "A number" is a specified quantity. Q: "What is the quantity of tomatoes you've purchased from the store?" A: "One." Conceptually, quantities consist of numbers - whether or not the latter are specified. To go back to Bateson's initial quote, what would a numberless measurement of length, for example, be?

As to Bateson's latest quote, interesting as it is to read, it only speculates without evidencing what is speculated.

Just found this on line:

https://www.quantamagazine.org/animals-can-count-and-use-zero-how-far-does-their-number-sense-go-20210809/

it starts:

An understanding of numbers is often viewed as a distinctly human faculty — a hallmark of our intelligence that, along with language, sets us apart from all other animals.

But that couldn’t be further from the truth. Honeybees count landmarks when navigating toward sources of nectar. Lionesses tally the number of roars they hear from an intruding pride before deciding whether to attack or retreat. Some ants keep track of their steps; some spiders keep track of how many prey are caught in their web. One species of frog bases its entire mating ritual on number: If a male calls out — a whining pew followed by a brief pulsing note called a chuck — his rival responds by placing two chucks at the end of his own call. The first frog then responds with three, the other with four, and so on up to around six, when they run out of breath.

Practically every animal that scientists have studied — insects and cephalopods, amphibians and reptiles, birds and mammals — can distinguish between different numbers of objects in a set or sounds in a sequence. They don’t just have a sense of “greater than” or “less than,” but an approximate sense of quantity: that two is distinct from three, that 15 is distinct from 20. This mental representation of set size, called numerosity, seems to be “a general ability,” and an ancient one, said Giorgio Vallortigara, a neuroscientist at the University of Trento in Italy.

And it gets better as you read the article.

But wait, what if all this is not counting but "pattern or rhythm recognition"? I'll skip on this debate.

Instead, you could reply to what I initially asked.

Either via the idealism of Platonic Realism or the materialism of today's mainstream views, how can one have numbers in the complete absence of discrete amounts of givens - i.e., of quantities? (if nothing else, there would yet be a quantity of numbers by the shear presence of the number(s) addressed) — javra

So, we can have exactly three tomatoes, but we cannot have exactly three kilograms or cubic centimeters of tomatoes. — Janus

I of course accept this, but so far fail to see its significance.

Rather than focusing on the absolute exactitude of things in the physical world (which I would grant does not exist, all of it being in flux and such - tomatoes very much included), I'd instead focus on the discreetness of physical givens as discerned by awareness. Something which, as an indefinite amount of something, we commonly term quantity in the English language. Which we then use numbers to more precisely quantify in definite manners.

I don't know the background of the guy you've quoted. Is the guy trying to conceive of what reality is like, or would be like, in the complete absence of all awareness in the cosmos? As one avenue of enquiry into this: under the a materialist's reductionist microscope where everything material (i.e., everything) is reducible to the quantum vacuum, in the absence of awareness discreteness would be hard to specify, if at all present. Sure. But then in a world devoid of all awareness so too would numbers not be present.

The exactitude of numbers has everything to do with awareness's aptitudes - especially here addressing that of humans - the very same awareness which discerns discreteness, and hence quantity, in the physical world (to not mention in is own thoughts, in its own emotions, in it own perceptions, etc.).

Take that meter I previously addressed: its composed of ever moving quantum parts; it, as a physical meter stick, has no absolute exactitude. And yet it is not simply an absolutely precise, abstract, free floating number; it instead is a discrete amount of something, a quantity - which we address in definite terms via use of numbers. Hence, "there is one meter stick there".

At any rate, in reference to what seems to be your disagreement with my stance that you've previously quoted:

Either via the idealism of Platonic Realism or the materialism of today's mainstream views, how can one have numbers in the complete absence of discrete amounts of givens - i.e., of quantities? (if nothing else, there would yet be a quantity of numbers by the shear presence of the number(s) addressed)

Again, in reference to what I initially said, the physical reality we know of entails the presence of quantity and, due to this, of number, (the later at least for us linguistic animals). (As an apropos, ravens and other animals are known to be able to count, obviously this without the use of language, via which numbers are specified).

Between two and three, there is a jump. In the case of quantity, there is no such jump; and because jump is missing in the world of quantity, it is impossible for any quantity to be exact. You can have exactly three tomatoes. You can never have exactly three gallons of water. — Janus

Alright, so you're saying (via your quote) that tomatoes are not quantifiable?

As to the "exactness" of what a gallon consists of, this applies to all measurements in general, doesn't it? As in "exactly 1 yard or meter" doesn't quite exist in every day physical reality - other than good enough approximations - but only occurs as an abstracted concept ... much the same as a (perfect) circle doesn't occur in physical reality. Take the standard meter by which all measuring devices (say, a tape measure) are measured and built, place this very standard on any flat surface: which molecules pertain to the meter and which don't? And then there's smaller constituents of the physical. Its exactness doesn't occur in physicality.

Till shown otherwise, I'm calling BS on the quote's contents. One can't have numbers (such that they mean anything) in the absence of quantity, I still say.

My belief is that our every rational act is suffused with such judgements of sameness and difference, is/is not, equals/unequal. And because it structures our cognition, these are also inherent in reality as experienced by us. — Wayfarer

I'm in agreement. Could try to splurge on the idea a little, but am thinking this would only muddle matters.

However, in relation to what has been so far discussed by me, on one hand there is the issue of whether the law of identity is immutable for all awareness and, thus, for all consequent thought. Then, on the other hand, there is the issue of whether physical reality in fact does conform to this same principle: that what is X at time t cannot in the same respect be non-X at time t - not just epistemically but also onticaly.

Since we're all quite familiar with introductory notions of quantum mechanics, this issue, for instance, can then apply to the wave-particle duality of quantum particles: Is a particle a particle at time t when its so measured to be? Is this so called "measurement" only a best inference - rather than an immediate percept of what is - that can thereby be mistaken (due to mistaken reasoning) in the identity of what is being measured - such that what's measured is neither strictly particle nor wave, but something different? Or is it, in physical reality, both a strict particle and a strict wave simultaneously and in the same respect - contradictory though this is? But the latter can then signify that a chair can ontically be a swimming pool at the same time and in the same way - and so so much for reasoning.

For those of us who don't know how to "shut up and just do the math", how one address the law of identity as an existential given - one that might be applicable to physical reality at large as well as all our awareness - will directly impact one's possible choices in perspective regarding this issue of particle-wave duality just mentioned.

I don't have a ready answer for this issue up my sleeve - just my convictions. And this subject is probably a distraction for the thread's primary theme. All the same, it's interesting stuff to me - ontologically speaking.

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Edit: BTW, thanks for the head's up as to the historic background to the law of identity. I misspoke in that previous post you quoted from: the principle was known of prior to Aristotle.

Is there some other sense in which the logic we imbue these artifacts with is eternal and unchanging? If so, it's something different from what we've been talking about. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes to the first; no to the second.

That said, thanks for the informative reply. What you say of logic makes sense, but then, it also unintentionally equivocates what is at issue – this at least in terms of the dilemma I’ve repeatedly presented.

It hence equivocats between logic proper and that which it necessarily depends upon: the basic laws of thought, of which I exemplified the most fundamental of these: the law of identity.

Logic – here presuming we’re addressing formal logic and not informal logic – is largely axiomatically founded. With most of these axioms being creations which we for whatever reason (a best inference, a shot in the dark, and so forth) thereby fabricate and then build logical systems upon. It is because of this that different systems of (formal) logic can be obtained (consistent, paraconsistent, etc.). In comparison, informal logic is simply the process of solving problems in linear, step-by-step manners of thought – irrespective of how this might come about – and so is for the most part equivalent to rationality and reasoning.

Either type, however, would not be able to be engaged in in any manner whatsoever if not for our utterly fundamental manner of being aware – this in respect to anything, including of empirical givens (e.g., the sky’s color), of introspective givens (e.g., a felt emotion), of proprioceptive givens (a felt pain), and so forth. Fully innate to all aspects of our awareness is something that is so utterly basic, so utterly necessary, that quite a few might be at a loss for why it should be presented as a law that we follow to begin with. Namely: Anything (e.g., an entity, a process, a quality, a property, etc.; else, a set of any of the aforementioned or mixture of these; and so forth) one is aware of at time t can only be at time t the very same given one is aware of – this in comparison to being both itself and something other at the same time and in the same respect. E.g., when one (consciously) strictly focuses on X at time t one does not – cannot - then strictly focus (consciously) on Y at time t (needless to add, this in the same respect).

This is (of if one prefers, appears to be) a property of all awareness – hence, derivatively, of all possible conscious thought (one cannot think without being aware of one’s thought(s)). It is not something that some person decided one day to concoct as an axiom thinking that, upon its being so axiomatized, it might then be put to use as foundation for further reasoning by him/herself and others. It is not something that can be invented by some awareness that, at some initial time of its creation, lacked the very ability addressed.

It is then termed a law – not because some individual or cohort decided to make it a law for others to follow – but because it is deemed to be an immutable governing factor of all possible awareness (and, hence, of all possible thought).

Becoming, if you’d like, meta-aware of this innate aspect of all awareness is a discovery of what is and has always been – but an awareness does not need to be endowed with this meta-awareness in order to be aware and, thus, to be governed by this, so traditionally termed, law of identity.

I know of those who doubt the reality of the LNC. I have yet to learn of any philosopher or non-philosopher who in any way doubts the law of identity as just specified.

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Hopefully I’ve addressed the law of identity more clearly this time around than I did when I was replying to the issue of infants’ lack of recognition of object identity (which, again, is a complex concept which we likely learned as infants via trial and error and which we adults entertain habitually in mostly unthinking manners – but which could not be obtained in the absence of that property of awareness just specified, i.e. in the absence of the law of identity).

If so, then the question should be addressed not in terms of logic but, again, in terms of the basic laws of thought upon which all forms of logic are contingent. To further simplify things, I'll here strictly address the law of identity (as it was just described):

Can – or, better asked, does – this utterly innate law of identity change over time?

If so, on what grounds can we consider any aspect of our current thought process to arrive at any existential truth – such as that of materialism (for example)?

If not, how can materialism account for this utterly immutable governing principle of all awareness?

I’m currently tired, so my bad if I’m reading you wrong. You reply as though I’m pushing you into buying something and you’re not yet prepared to buy it – but I have nothing to sell. I’ve simply presented my fallible perspective. I’ve by now expressed my views repeatedly, and at this point find the prospect of doing so once more to likely not be beneficial for anyone. So I’ll now ask you in turn for your own perspective:

Do you find that the basic laws of thought are fixed for everyone today, yesterday, and tomorrow?

If so, on what coherent materialism-based grounds do you so conclude?

If not, on what coherent grounds do you find that reasoning and logic can serve as means for discerning what is real?

although I do wonder why the problem with angels is that they're not physical and the problem with numbers is nothing at all. — Srap Tasmaner

Yea, one way to tersely address this is that the cogency of scientific knowledge is in many ways contingent on the occurrence of numbers but couldn't care less about the occurrence or non-occurrence of angels. Numbers - more accurately, quantity - is something the occurrence of a physical reality essentially entails (otherwise one would have a quantity-devoid, partless, etc. reality - which is not what the physical presents itself to be). Angels, on the other hand, are not essentially entailed by the physical reality we all share.

And naturalism gets around this, on your view, by countenancing laws of thought as "natural, though immaterial, givens," that is, you get to rely on logical inference and the materialist does not. Is that your position? — Srap Tasmaner

No, it is not. My position - which I think I've repeated one too many times already in this thread - is that the logical inferences of materialists when it comes to their metaphysics result in the conclusion that all logical inferences are relative - such that one might as well declare that "to each their own equally valid logic and reasoning". In contrast, maybe there is some impartial, nonfabricated set of rules, laws, or principles that we all must adhere to when it comes to logic and reasoning if we are to pragmatically survive - immaterial thought these might be - such that 2 + 2 does not equal 5 no matter how much one tries to make it happen.

That makes such a law a fact about the universe (if I understand "ontic occurrence" as you intended). — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, its an accurate interpretation of my view.

(1) What is the real difference between such a law and other natural laws, such as the laws of thermodynamics?

(2) How can we tell whether such a law happens to hold in our universe, or whether it must hold? What would make it necessary, and how could we know? — Srap Tasmaner

As apokrisis illustrates, these questions will be contingent on one's - hopefully self-consistent and explanatory power endowed - metaphysical worldview. (I'm myself still working on expressing the worldview I have in mind. It's a very long ways from being finalized, but it's what the website in my profile points to - this to be transparent and not seem to be posturing. Rather than trying to engage in detailed explanations of my, sometimes unorthodox, metaphysical perspectives in a forum format, I'll just point to that website and leave it at that.)

As to (1), I follow Peirce's view and hold that the former is existentially fixed while the later is in a perpetual process of (very gradual) development - such that the latter depends on the former, but while I take both to be fully natural.

As to (2), as I've previously expressed, the optimal explanatory power that will result from such a worldview would in this case evidence (always fallibly) that the law must and does hold in our the universe (or in the cosmos, if one prefers).

Whatever the correct, reality-conformant answer to these questions might in fact be, however, in relation to this thread, the pivotal issue remains: how can materialism and physicalism uphold their own rational validity when their rational validity is (for reasons so far discussed) undermined by the very metaphysical stance they maintain?

Your version of naturalism countenances immaterial entities so long as -- what exactly? They are not traditionally identified as supernatural? — Srap Tasmaner

Can you better explain what you mean by "immaterial entities" in this context? Would these include things like numbers, natural laws, and teloi (e.g., intentions)? Or do you by the term intend things like angels, deities, and forest fairies? As to the latter, they would again not be consistent with what I take naturalism to be - this due to not being explicable in terms of the physical and what the physical essentially entails. However, as to the former, tmk they are not amenable to scientific investigation - by which I understand the empirical sciences' use of the scientific method - but are nevertheless aspects of reality writ large upon which all at least modern scientific investigation depends. And, personally, I do take the former set to consist of natural, though immaterial, givens - hence to quality as natural aspects of the nature which naturalism demarcates.

Can they reason yet? Hard to say, but they express surprise when there's no object where they expect one, so the predictive machinery is certainly running already, it just doesn't need object identity to get going. — Srap Tasmaner

Object identity is not an identical property to that of what the law of identity stipulates. I'd like to rephrase the latter (for better clarity) in this way: every X that we can be in any way aware of - be it an abstract given, a concrete given, a percept, or anything else - can only be X, this at the same time and in the same respect. This whether or not one is consciously aware of this property of thought (quite arguably as most, if not all, philosophers prior to Aristotle were consciously ignorant of this property - to give just one example). As far as we can fathom, lesser animals, though not consciously aware of this property of thought as a concept, can only think via its occurrence (e.g., unless one considers them to be automatons, a predator thinks, aka reasons - forethought included - in terms of how to best capture prey that is evading and holds the potential to injure the predator, either singularly or by working cooperatively as a team - obviously this without use of language; apes however give the best known examples, including of holding "eureka moments" that occur after strict contemplation in respect to a problem. I know its arguable to philosophers, but I'll uphold this.)

So understood, the law of identity's operation (its praxis, not its theory) is required for an understanding of what an object's identity is, but does not necessitate the latter. The latter is a complex concept and, thus, abstraction regarding what is. So, for those lifeforms that don't recognize the object identity of relevant objects instinctively (unthinkingly, this via genetic inheritance), it only makes sense that the aptitude is learned.

All this, I know, can be debated. But is by no means contradictory to either reason or empirical evidence. Back to the quote above: the "predictive machinery" which is surprised at there not being an object where an object is expected could not function in the absence of the law of identity as praxis. For then there would not be any "X" to be expected in the awareness of the infant.

What's relevant to a law of thought's occurrence is not our conceptual grasp of it as such but that it ontically occurs. It is only in this manner that laws of thought can be discovered - rather then invented - by us.

Might help me make sense of them if you compared your use of the terms "materialism" and "naturalism". (I've never been very comfortable arguing the merits of isms, hence my reliance on whales and infants and play-writing hominids.) — Srap Tasmaner

In brief, to my mind, materialism specifies that everything that is or can be is fully reducible to, and emergent from, insentient material constituents. Naturalism, on the other hand, specifies that all which does and can occur is that which is natural - thereby nature at large - this in contrast to that which is deemed to not be natural (again, for example, angels, deities, forest fairies, etc.). Materialism mandates naturalism of a certain kind, but naturalism is not limited to the possibility of materialism.

something in javra's phrasing really crystallized the choice for me, a heaven of eternal logic versus naturalism — Srap Tasmaner

Ha! But then on what grounds would - needless to add, insentient - global constraints on what is and can be (the Heraclitean logos, so to speak, since it would occur in the so called heavens just as much as in the bowels of the earth and in everything in-between) then be validly defined as unnatural? Else expressed, as "non-naturalistic"?

This "heaven of eternal logic versus naturalism" (if I interpret the expression right) so far seems to me a false choice, since to me the two are not mutually exclusive by necessity. Such Heraclitean logos of sorts, if in fact existent, then being part and parcel of nature - the very same by which naturalism is defined.

If I'm missing out on something - other than the implicit status quo stance of materialism/physicalism - I'd like to be made aware of it.

I’ve noticed that Apokrisis tends to acknowledge only those aspects of Peirce’s philosophy which are pragmatically useful for modelling semiotic relationships whilst often disavowing his broader idealism. — Wayfarer

Yea, I very much noticed that too. :smile:

Thomas Nagel put it, 'Even without God, the idea of a natural sympathy between the deepest truths of nature and the deepest layers of the human mind, which can be exploited to allow gradual development of a truer and truer conception of reality, makes us more at home in the universe than is secularly comfortable'. — Wayfarer

I find this quote quite beautiful. :up:

If you have further thoughts, do post, and I'll try to give better responses later. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, OK. Maybe this is nothing worthy of debate. All the same:

As a fallibilist, I'm as confident as one can be that no one can ever infallibly settle this (or any other) issue - namely, that of it being possible to have a world devoid of ontically fixed laws of thought (or, at the very least, some ontically fixed law(s) to the like). Laws that therefore don't emerge out of constituent stuff, whatever this "stuff" might be - but instead "just are" and thus govern what is.

So - in keeping with the pragmatism that I myself uphold - the previously mentioned issue regarding laws of thought can then only be satisfactorily resolved via (not infallible proof, but) optimal explanatory power. Then:

If no inconsistencies are found in the dilemma I've provided, the claim that materialism (at least as its currently understood by most, and as it was addressed in my first post today) is a sound metaphysics can only end up being a self-refuting logical, or rational, proposal - for it results in a nihilism in relation to logic and reason (and/or rationality) which then negates its own logical, or rational, validity as a metaphysics. In short, materialism does not present a self-consistent explanation for the way things are - and, due to this, lacks cogent explanatory power.

Pragmatically, the following holds: optimal explanatory power evidences the, always fallible, and always to be improved, truth of theories.

By this I then conclude on pragmatic grounds the following: materialism must then be an erroneous stance.

Hence, in sum: ontic reality could only validly be non-materialist (else here expressed, non-physicalist, this again as physicalism is typically understood).

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Note that I'm not one to equate either pragmatism or, more importantly, naturalism to materialism. So I maintain that both the former can be viably held in a non-materialist (else, non-physicalist) world view.

But, as a maybe important caveat to this given for the sake of frankness: Yes, the latter specified world view can also - not validate, but - logically allow for the possibility of the supernal (a view that is contradicted by naturalism). This possibility, however, would clearly remain outside the purview of the empirical sciences ... which as study can only address that which is objectively manifest and so equally apparent to all (this in principle if not also in practice). So, just as it currently is, the possibility of the supernal would remain an empirically unverifiable belief at best (or worst?) consisting of unverifiable personal experiences ... or, otherwise, an impossible to infallibly validate disbelief, this in cases where naturalism is being maintained.

That said, personally, I couldn't give a hoot as to whether or not anything supernal (e.g., angels, deities, forest fairies, etc.) might ontically be, same with the possible occurrence of extraterrestrial aliens. What I deem most important is unbiased reasoning and, maybe more importantly than this, ethical conduct. Well, just saying.

So I'll put my chips on what seems to me a naturalist and pragmatist view, and find some way to fight off the threat of nihilism. — Srap Tasmaner

:grin: :up: Fair enough.

And since you're at work, I won't push too much in this direction. All the same, even if what you say might be true in regard to alternative worlds, it would still remain a reality that we - here, in the world we inhabit - could only fathom any such alternative world only if it were to abide by the law of identity, and then other laws of thought that could be argued derivatives of this one.

At any rate, thanks for the compliment! (Re: it being a good question :razz: )

apokrisis would have me say that even logic is just habitual, patterns of inference that have proved their worth, but he's got a whole metaphysics that makes that the natural move, and I'm not there yet. — Srap Tasmaner

BTW, while I can't speak for apokrisis's metaphysical outlook, Peirce would have it that laws of nature evolve as global habits exactly via globally fixed laws, else expressed, principles - hence, via metaphysically fixed global principles that supersede natural laws and which are not themselves emergent from the latter: Peirce has a trifold system to this effect and - something that apo so far has disallowed in my conversations with him - the principle of Agapism as ultimate cosmic goal. Such that neither of these are emergent habits of the cosmos but, instead, are the immutable global principles via which the habits of effete mind (i.e., of physicality and its natural laws) evolve.

Short answer is that I wouldn't write these with a slash between them. Logic is a system of relations among propositions; reasoning is something people do, and they can do it well ("logically") or poorly ("illogically"). — Srap Tasmaner

I've addressed both of them, with a slash for concision of expression, in that the occurrence of both are dependent on basic laws of thought. (edit: this irrespective of how either term might be interpreted, given both terms' multiple meanings)

So the dilemma I've presented remains: namely, either the soundness of materialism's position which inevitably results in a nihilism of both reasoning and logic (that, I'll add, can then be applied to materialism itself) or, else, the necessity that materialistic metaphysics is, in some way, erroneous.

Here in reference to the OP’s basic contention:

Do you uphold that the basic principles/laws of thought which Aristotle brought to light are emergent properties of ever-reducible matter that, thereby, can then change with changes in the ordering of their underlying constituents of matter?

This would be in line with materialism: that laws of thought are the mutable constructs of purely material constituents. But it would also logically entail that all principles of logic/reasoning are, when ontologically addressed, a relativistic free for all—this relativity existing in relation to the order of underlying material constituents from which these principles of thought emerge—a relativism that, again, is thereby devoid of any impartial, existentially fixed standards (in the form of principles or laws) by which all variants of logic/reasoning manifest. This then being a conclusion that I take to be at the very least an unnerving suggestion; one could express it as inevitably leading into a nihilism or reasoning—i.e., in respect to logic as an authoritative means of discerning what is real or true and what is not.

The alternative doesn’t then necessitate that biology, genotypical evolution, and a concurrent phenotypical evolution of behavior (with the generality of “behavior” including that of (reason-adherent) cognition) are in any way bogus. (I, for one, uphold that lesser animal can and do utilize reasoning to various lesser degrees). Instead, it would only necessitate that the materialist paradigm (including its just aforementioned entailment of relativity in relation to laws of thought) is mistaken as a metaphysical outlook.

Yes, I suppose the issue is to me fully metaphysical regardless of the perspectives one may hold in relation to it. All the same, no worries. I was just passing through.

“Reason” to me is a fairly ambiguous concept, and so then too is the notion of “rationality”. As one minor hint of this: The irrational argument is yet engaged in reasoning, albeit in false or wrong or inaccurate ways, and so it is not arational—for it yet makes use of the laws of thought to obtain its conclusions. On the other hand, to add to this ambiguity, and with a pointer to Janus’s comments, I don’t see rationality as distinct from emotions—finding emotions to hold their sub/unconscious reasoning and, conversely, finding all conscious reasoning to be hewed, if not governed, by emotive dispositions, ranging from overt forms like animosity or compassion to more subtle forms like sereneness, or wonder, or curiosity.

At any rate, due to the just mentioned, I would present what I take to be the OP’s underlying stance differently, this by addressing the issue of truth. (intending to come full circle at the end)

For lack of equivocation, by truth I’m referring to the generalized sum of all individual truths regardless of their type (e.g., abstract or concrete), such that an individual truth is understood to be an instance of conformity to that which is actual, aka that which is real. If this is too abstract in its given terse form, then I’ll here yield to the correspondence theory of truth. Given this:

Is all truth thus understood a fabricated creation or, otherwise, is it a brute aspect of the world that is thereby uncreated?

Of note, when we willfully fabricate what others then accept to be a truth, we as a society term this a deception, aka a lie. So, then, for the theistically minded, are all the mundane truths we accept and live by the fabrication—one can here technically say, the deception—of an omnipotent psyche (thus, an omnipotent deceiver)? On the other hand, for the atheistically minded, is truth an emergent condition fabricated from, i.e. created by, mindless subatomic particles and forces that themselves emerge from a quantum vacuum field as these engage in an emergent process of biological evolution—such that the referent to the term “truth” changes (evolves) with time, never holding any definitive existential property but, instead, only being (often enough, the changing) fabricated stories we tell ourselves about it?

Plenty from both camps will answer “yes, all truths are fabricated/created”, but then the relativism that unfolds either way becomes detrimental to human welfare. The deceptions of the despotically minded become the lived, incarnate truths of the populous—and opposition to these created truths become collectively condemned at the long-term expense of all. As one example, that climate change is a global hoax becomes truth because some autocrats so state (in large part to keep their wallets fat) and because others so choose to believe. And yet, the nonfabricated truth that it is not a hoax yet pulls us into the inevitable.

On the other hand, if one answers that truth is not a created fabrication, then there will be something more to existence than what physicalism proposes, as the OP suggests. And yes, this can be characterized as Platonism or Neoplatonism wherein the Good is the ultimate truth (and vice versa), and can be furthermore shunned on account of this presently unorthodox view.

But if truth where to be metaphysically uncreated, then this will resonate with the basic laws of thought: what is true can only be itself; it will thereby be impossible that two contradictory truths cooccur at the same time and in the same way; and in it will likewise be impossible that a proposition be both true and false at the same time and in the same way, entailing that the proposition can either be one or the other.

These basic, universal laws of thought will then form the foundations of all rationality. Here, then, rationality becomes a metaphysical derivative of the existential occurrence of (uncreated, rather than fabricated) truth. Nevertheless, truth and rationality can well be deemed in such an interpretation to be staple aspects of existence—this in line to a globally pervading logos—aspects toward whose greater comprehension the increased intelligence that occasionally gets selected for by evolutionary mechanisms develops toward.

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I’m still relatively short on time so I’ll likely not participate for long, and I know this post has some gaps in it. But I wanted to chime in a bit all the same, this in my support of the OP. Even if our perspectives might differ somewhat.

There's also this more recent study from 2019: Neural precursors of decisions that matter—an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice. In summation of the abstract:

Our results and drift-diffusion model are congruent with the RP representing accumulation of noisy, random fluctuations that drive arbitrary—but not deliberate—decisions. They further point to different neural mechanisms underlying deliberate and arbitrary decisions, challenging the generalizability of studies that argue for no causal role for consciousness in decision-making to real-life decisions.

My take: no deliberation, no consciously made choice, and a significant Readiness Potential to evidence this; conversely, where there is conscious deliberation, there is no significant RP in the choice made, implying the possibility of free will. (there are interesting editorial notes affixed to the study, but this conclusion seems to me to stand)

I found the study online, but there might be more recent relevant research as well.

Well actually, this perfectly encapsulates the "shutting off" or rather "grappling of being" that humans must deal with. You see, we are not "there" (whatever we are aiming for with Nirvana and meditative practices) so we have to get "there". But why aren't we "there"? I'm sure you can use some tricky language and say, we are "there" we just don't realize it, but it is just inverting the same thing. We "don't realize it". So we aren't there. So yeah, we have the burden of not being there. Other animals are there. — schopenhauer1

No, I certainly don't believe we are there either. I should say, if there is such a "there" to begin with. And I think I see what you mean to convey in a roundabout way. But as to other animals already being there ... say, to add just one slant to things, that this "there" is (among other things) the zenith experience of beauty which in some way equates to the zenith of being in the zone; other animals have no cognizance of the beauty we humans can experience - with the experience of beauty being one possible instance of flow - much less of this experience's potential zenith. So, here, saying that other animals are already "there" would be a romanticized misnomer. There is a massive qualitative difference between a) what lesser animals experience by flow, b) what humans experience during moments of flow, and c) what this "there" of actualized, perfect, literally limitless flow could be.

Don't think this might change your perspective much, but I wanted to offer this alternative interpretation.