Seems to me you have given your argument a self-inflicted injury. To maintain your definition of metaphysic you have to claim that a central, constituent part of physics is not physics. — Banno

To rephrase the - acknowledgedly poorly worded - claim I previously made: physics as empirical science is a specialized subset of metaphysics (as a philosophical study) at large.

As such, in a sense, "the (metaphysical) rules of the game" are always a part of the "game" which is played. In the sense I previously intended, however, the same game can be played with different rules: e.g. (American) tackle football and flag football are played by different rules while both are recognizable as the same general game: different versions of (American) football. In this latter sense alone, conservation laws are not that by which the empirical science of physics is necessarily defined, and so are not an intrinsic part of physics.

The empirical science of physics can and has been engaged in in manners devoid of conservation laws.
For instance, the empirical science of physics predates the closing of the eighteenth century, when conservation laws were first proposed, by a few centuries.

So conservation laws are not an inherent aspect of the empirical science of physics.

One can for example furthermore hypothesize a future science of physics wherein at least some conservation laws currently employed are done away with.

The same can then also apply to other metaphysical notions that serve as "rules to the game" of physics as an empirical science. As an example, the notions of causality and identity which we currently accept culturally as self-evident truths - despite, or else exactly because, there being a long philosophical history to their so being conceptualized today - could in time become modified ... so that what physics currently assumes could itself becomes modified - and this without in any way modifying the empirical science of physics as a method of knowledge acquisition. Again, one of hypothesis, test, data, and inference/conclusion.

In sum: As an empirical science, physics will always make use of foundational metaphysical concepts - and so will always be grounded in metaphysics in general. But, as an empirical science, physics is not contingent on any particular metaphysical notion being itself set in stone.

All this being a lot more verbose but also a far more correct interpretation of the view I hold.

The aforementioned should then better clarify this:

What I've posited is a reductio, that proceeds by assuming that we can differentiate between physics and metaphysics, taking the strongest example, falsification. I then show that this has as a consequence that stuff that is central to physics - conservation laws - are not actually part of physics. — Banno

Conservation laws are not central to physics as an empirical science for reasons previously provided.

What is central to physics as an empirical science is the notion of a physical world - which can itself be justified by any number of different metaphysical notions and perspectives. Those provided by Aristotle, by Peirce, and by many others aside.

so i am not convinced that we are even disagreeing. — Janus

:grin: Sounds about right from my side as well.

OK, then it does comes down to rhetorical posturing rather than substantive philosophical discussion. Sorry, not interested.

So we count the conservation laws not as physics but as metaphysics? Think on that for a bit. These are the core, fundamental rules of physics, and yet not part of physics? — Banno

Because they are not empirically falsifiable, they are not part of physics as an empirical science, no. As an empirical science, physics follows the precedent of hypothesis, test, results as data, and best inference of results as conclusion - and of inductive/abductive theory that best accounts for results and conclusions just mentioned.

Conservation laws are instead the empirically non-falsifiable, metaphysical "rules of the game" (to do my best to use Witt's vocabulary) which grounds this empirical science of physics (as it is currently applied).

It's common to claim that all scientific statements are falsifiable, and to add that the demarcation between physics and metaphysics is this falsifiability.

If that's so, then conservation rules are not part of physics, but of metaphysics. — Banno

That is so, and conservation rules are indeed metaphysics on which modern physics is founded.

This also demonstrates the absurdity of ↪javra
's attempting to force physics and metaphysics into a hierarchy. One does not "sit" on the other. — Banno

How so, given examples such as that you've just mentioned?

I don't see how my Peircean-Wittgensteinian "stance" relates in any (non-trivial) way to Joshs' p0m0. — 180 Proof

OK, granted. But that reply doesn't answer what the (non-trivial) differences are.

... or is all this boiling down to rhetorical stances devoid of substantive philosophical discussion?

So ... the ontic reality of any physical attribute is a reification of the abstract category of "physicality"? — javra

Your original question confusedly suggests so the way you'd formulated it. That's your fallacy, not mine. — 180 Proof

To the way your mind works? Fine, granted again. Glad you now get that's not what my "original question" intends. The issue remains unchanged: how does one justify anything physical without use of metaphysical notions?

Your original expression, javra, suggests 'reifying the abstract category' in the question raised which is nonsensical. — 180 Proof

So ... the ontic reality of any physical attribute is a reification of the abstract category of "physicality"?

By analogy, then, one could affirm that the ontic reality of any animal is the reification of the abstract category of "animals".

Not sure this is where you want to take things ...

What "justifies physicality's occurrence", in other words, are the discursive practices within which "physicality" is used. — 180 Proof

You sure you want to maintain this? How then do you distinguish your stance form what @Joshs maintains. Or, for that matter, from what you term p0m0isms?

How does one justify physicality’s occurrence, in and of itself, without use of metaphysical concepts and, thereby, without use of metaphysics? — javra

What do you mean here by "justify ... occurrence"? — 180 Proof

To justify:

(This where “to justify” is understood as “to make rational sense of via the provision of acceptable explanations”.) — javra

As to "occurrence" in the context specified:

-- The ontic reality of (in contrast to the illusory notion of) - in this case - physicality.

Put together:

"How does one make rational sense - via the provision of acceptable explanations - of physicality's ontic reality (and thereby, as one prominent example, establish that physicality is not an illusory aspect of consciousness) ... without use of metaphysical concepts and, thereby, without use of metaphysics?"

Well put. Yes, that's a good question. — Tom Storm

I'm still a little apprehensive of the potential replies I might get from the so called "skeptics", but thanks!

If you're saying metaphysical physics is the necessary pre-condition for physical physics, then how do you explain away the physical brain observing the physical earth being a ground for not only the discipline of physics, but also the ground for cerebration populated by metaphysical notions?

[...] I smell the presence of idealism herein. — ucarr

The concepts presented in this question are to me very muddled. They could be seen to equivocate between studies (that of metaphysics and of physics) and ontological worldviews. In attempts to clarify the underlying issue of the role metaphysics (as a philosophical study) plays in physics (as the study of that which is physical):

How would anyone, yourself included, justify physicality per se without use of metaphysical concepts? (This where “to justify” is understood as “to make rational sense of via the provision of acceptable explanations”.)

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Once justified, physicality can then be applied to a number of mutually exclusive, ontological worldviews, each of them being in turn further metaphysically justified: physicalism, Cartesian dualism, neutral monism, and Peircean-like notions of objective idealism all being examples of such mutually exclusive ontologies that each acknowledge and make use of physicality.

Yet other ontological worldviews, such as Berkeleyan immaterialism, make use of metaphysical concepts to denounce the notion of physicality (more correctly worded in the case exemplified, materiality) as invalid.

It bears note that all these mentioned perspectives can in their own ways justify - however imperfectly - the relation between what is commonly termed mind and body which you make mention of.

So again: How does one justify physicality’s occurrence, in and of itself, without use of metaphysical concepts and, thereby, without use of metaphysics?

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I’m asking this with the perspective that were this to not be possible (and I currently find that it is indeed not possible), then the very notion of physicality would be founded upon the study we term metaphysics – rather than on the study we term physics – such that the study of physics is itself contingent upon the study of metaphysics. This in order to be justified and thereby not be a bundle of “just-so” stories.

(Explicitly stated: This to not even get into the issue of physicalism’s relation to metaphysics.)

I don't know what you mean by "no moving image", because it seems obvious to me that we do see moving images, or if you want to phrase it differently, that our seeing consists in moving images. I also don't know what you mean by "freestanding visual data" since it seems obvious to me that there is nothing at all "freestanding" ( if I've understood what you meant with this term).

And again I'm not sure what you mean by "facts known from direct observation in the absence of awareness which observes". I do know we can drive on "autopilot"; that is, we seem to be able to process and respond to visual data without conscious awareness of doing so. — Janus

A lot of miscommunication here; always tedious, and sometimes unresolvable, but I’ll try to better explain where I'm coming from.

In the context of our discussion regarding the possibility of homunculi in relation to the workings of eyes and brain, your latest affirmation was:

the physiological study of vision tells us that there processes involving the eye the optic nerve and the visual cortex, and that like a camera the image formed is upside-down (which is "corrected" by the brain. This suggests that there is a "moving image" or visual data there prior to what we call conscious seeing. — Janus

As we both appear to agree, there can be no data in the absence of observation, which in turn does not occur in the absence of awareness. So the notion of visual data occurring prior to it being seen is misplaced. The last quoted sentence could well be interpreted to affirm this very misplaced notion just addressed. That said, in this interpretation consciousness would then be inferred to observe images that are produced by the camera-like apparatus of eyes an brain.

The alternative is to affirm that - as evidenced by blindsight and other examples - there occurs in us an "unconscious seeing of visual data" from which our functional conscious seeing of visual data is constituted. In this interpretation, there is no camera-like image produced by eyes and brain that is in turn seen by consciousness but, instead, visual consciousness is the very activity of seeing the external world. Such that visual consciousness is a unified compound of multiple instantiations of unconscious visual awareness, i.e. is a unified compound of multiple instantiations of unconscious seeing.

Recall that "an image" is commonly defined as a visual re-presentation of an actual object: in the sense of a picture, a painting, or a drawing; wheres seeing - be it conscious or unconscious - is understood to be a direct presentation of actual objects. We don't consciously see images unless we're looking at something like pictures, paintings, or drawings. What we consciously see is our personal truth of what the external world is visually.

Now, I very much acknowledge this can easily become very complicated by issues of indirect realism (where it's often enough worded that "we create images in our mind which represent some possibly noumenal reality") but if we take care not to equivocate our terms, the same issue would yet remain. We either consciously see a representational image of noumena constructed by the eyes and brain, such that there here are two items in relation to each other (that of a) image and of b) consciousness which sees the image) or, alternatively, the very activity of seeing - be it conscious seeing or unconscious seeing - is identical to the activity of visually representing noumena, such that here there is only one item concerned (the representational visual awareness which looks out at the world). But I don't want to enter into discussions/debates regarding indirect realism. The issues of indirect realism and of homunculi are to me utterly separate.

Perhaps the "unconscious non-visual awareness" in people with blindsight is the counterpart to the pre-conscious visual awareness in sighted people. Is the 'visuality" of awareness, or the consciousness of seeing, a step in the process of seeing that comes after the unconscious non-visual awareness? In other words do sighted people share this step with blindsight people, and blind sight people lack the next step of visual awareness? I don't know, but it seems possible. — Janus

I was addressing "unconscious visual awareness" not "unconscious non-visual awareness".

But in answer, it to me seems like the best inference to make given all the data we have.

This suggests that there is a "moving image" or visual data there prior to what we call conscious seeing. — Janus

To some, yes. Yet to others the working of the brain can be interpreted to suggest the presence of unconscious awareness of the external world which works (in obviously very complex ways) more or less in concurrence to conscious awareness – this in a parts-to-whole relation. Such that there arguably is no “moving image” (else, freestanding visual data that occurs independently of being witnessed) anywhere to be found, but only visual awareness at different levels of mind.

Can there be data ("facts know from direct observation" else "recorded observations") in the absence of awareness which observes? To me the answer is so far "no".

Have you heard of blindsight? — Janus

But of course I’ve heard of it. I find it very much in line with the inference of unconscious awareness just mentioned. As just one of many examples wherein the notion of “unconscious vision” can be found in relation to blindsight, see here. To me by far the most interesting cases are studies of split-brain patients in relation to conscious awareness. There’s the Wikipedia page, but also research findings such as this one, whose abstract nicely sums up some of what's going on in such cases and also interestingly maintains a “divided perception but undivided consciousness.”

Much of the info on split-brain patients, as one example, can be deemed to support the inference of different loci of unconscious awareness working in an overall mind (which in a healthy mind would thereby converge into a coherent consciousness).

Just so its said: The issue of how awareness – be it conscious or unconscious – manifests is nevertheless just as pertinent from this vantage point regarding unconscious awareness of the mind.

By in large agreed.

Going a little further:

Empirical sciences are founded upon metaphysical notions such as those of causality and of identity. The extent to which empirical sciences are effective is fully equivalent to the extent to which these (as of yet still obscure) metaphysical notions (aka, just-so stories of crack-smoking folk) are effective. Everything we gain from empirical science is then an added on, specialized category of story inevitably dependent on making use of “the just-so stories of crack-smoking folk” - with the latter serving as the former's quintessential foundation.

To invalidate this proposed state of affairs, simply present an empirical science in which no tacit use of effects or of identities take place. If not in practice, then in principle - taking into account that empirical sciences by definition make use of human awareness regarding the external world which, as such, is tmk not realizable in the absence of a presumed reality to causation and identity.

Yes, there is truth in what you've written. I would just say that for most decisions, it doesn't really matter what you decide, as long as any possible negative consequences are minor. Save your stomach aches for decisions that really matter and do what you can to recognize which ones really do and which ones don't. I have a default setting - if I don't have strong feelings, I decide no. I never get the extras - extended warrantees, extra buttons on the washing machine, a moon roof. When I vote on initiative petitions or referenda, if I don't really understand the possible consequences of the law and agree they are worthwhile, I don't vote on it at all. You have the power to limit the number of choices you have to make. — T Clark

I appended something to my last post before seeing your latest. If you’re interested; to clarify: The notion that actual (rather then intended) consequences ought to determine the rightness or wrongness of a decision made runs into difficult problems – problems I think @Andrew4Handel had in mind when writing the OP. For instance, a guy decides to do X for the good of all humanity; having so done, a sociopath gets pissed and kills off all of the guy’s family. Here, the intended outcome is “improved benefit to all of humanity” and the actual outcome is “the murder of all of one’s family”. Judging by the consequences of the choice alone, this choice was therefore wrong/bad/malevolent … and the person ought not have so chosen. But since there's always some risk of some sociopath doing something bad to someone who makes a virtuous decision, should no virtuous decision then be ever made?

One could argue along the lines of “the path to hell is paved with good intentions”. Here, more explicitly, the intentions intending to do good don’t take into account all the practical repercussions/consequences of so intending. But then, is one to be held accountable for one’s particular limitations of mind? As one extreme, does one hold a lesser animal accountable for it lacking the capacity of abstract thought as we humans know it. Or, among humans, does one blame, hold responsible, someone with a mental handicap for so being mentally handicapped? Currently, the only two possible answers seem to me to be:

Yes: in which case we can hold all sentient beings responsible for not being closer to omniscience than they are. In which case, we can use the saying of “the path to hell is paved with good intentions” as a genuine principle of ethics. (As though those with bad intentions never get to go to (this imaginary realm of) hell.)

No: in which case we cannot then judge choices based on how much a person knows before hand of all possible, actual, unintended outcomes resulting from the choice. In which case, we then only judge a choice based on what the person intended the outcome to be and their reasons for choosing the one alternative among many as the best means to so fulfill this intent.

Mostly thinking my thoughts out-loud while trying to work through the issue: I deem your example of not voting on something that you don’t understand the consequences to as a noteworthy counter example.

I suppose in sum: To what extent should a person be held accountable for not having taken into better consideration all the possible implications of each alternative one chooses amongst? This in the choice one makes … considering the choice to be of relative importance.

The ad absurdum is saving baby Hitler from drowning which seems admirable but saving his life would doom others. But my general point is that every choice we make is done in a situation of infinite possibilities and without anyway to know we have done the best or correct thing.

It is something that can lead to an existential crisis. — Andrew4Handel

If this helps:

Choice requires intent; it is intentional (rather than unintentional). We always choose one of multiple alternatives for the sake of fulfilling some goal (some as of yet unactualized outcome we aim to actualize). This goal can well be subconscious or unconscious – with that of optimal self-preservation as one possible candidate; others can well be fathomed – but it will nevertheless be a goal one pursues.

Secondly, choices are infinite only is some metacognitive conceptualization or other. In practice, choices are always limited to the finite alternatives one's finite mind can conceive of. Not being omniscient, our knowledge will always be limited.

Thirdly, who’s judging what you chose? You, others, some angels or devils? Whomever it may be for you, think of it this way:

If you can justify why you choose what you choose (as one possibility: "I deemed it the best means to accomplish goal X given what I honestly knew at the time, and I stand by goal X regardless") then you empower yourself to be responsible for your choices irrespective of what may befall. Like: to hell with what the judgers judge if they condemn me for rescuing a baby from drowning given what I knew at the time about it and what I held to be a noble goal (here, maybe, improving other’s lives even at risk to your own). So, the baby turned out to grow into Hitler/Stalin. You are not responsible for the outcome of the adult he became, for this was not of your choice; you are only responsible for saving the life an anonymous baby for a humanitarian reason/goal (rather than for money, for the vanity of fame, so as to sabotage some enemy, or some such).

So, if you can justify your choices based on what you knew at the time and your intents in so making them, this might be all that’s needed to break free of this angst you talk about. You could then in principle hold your own against your future self (given that the future-you judges the past-you fairly, I would think), others in society, and even some all-mighty being if that happens to be up your alley.

Then again, fact is bad things sometimes happen to good people. If one regrets one’s choices strictly based on outcomes rather than on former reasons for having so once made them, then this enters into a completely different ballpark. One where a person will then come to regret the most virtuous of deeds merely on grounds that they weren’t justly compensated, such that the person might then come to curse all virtuous deeds, choosing anything but. I’d disagree with this notion of ethics, and though I find the issues intertwined, its still a completely different matter.

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p.s.: In case this might otherwise lead to confusion, the “ethics” I was addressing in the last paragraph is that of consequentialism: in this case, a subspecies that upholds that the rightness or wrongness of one’s choices is determined by the consequences (outcomes) that result from one's choices.

Overall I agree with your comments.

Better: "It seems that via the eyes and brain an ever-moving sight (else seeing) of the "external" is formed." — javra

I'm not seeing any significant difference in the way you've formulated it. I don't see it as an inference, but as an experience. — Janus

As to the distinction I wanted to make:

That the eyes and brain make the activity of seeing possible is in and of itself an inference, and a very good one at that given all our empirical data. Nevertheless, the activity of seeing is not contingent upon this conceptual understanding that “eyes and brain are required for seeing”: the experience of seeing can well occur without this understanding, as per toddlers and lesser animals for example.

This inference that “eyes and brain are required for seeing” can, then, take the conceptual form – such as via analogy to the workings of a camera – that the eyes and brain make possible an image that we then witness via our sight. Alternatively, we can conclude that eyes and brain make possible our very capacity of sight.

The distinction between these two inferences might be subtle, but it’s important, for the former (eyes and brain make possible a moving image which we then see) introduces a conceptual differentiation between consciousness and body wherein the body has its own distinct agency whose outcomes (in this case the "ever-moving image" which the body produces) are then witnessed by the separate agency of consciousness – and, here, a homunculus argument results: a “little person” within the person.

Whereas in the latter inference (eyes and brain make possible our capacity of sight, our seeing per se) no such distinction between consciousness and body results in relation to our ability to see stuff. Here, where the issue is that of physiological sight of the external world, the agency of consciousness and the agency of body are one and the same. Remove a human’s eyes or brain and the human’s capacity to see ceases to occur. With functional eyes and brain in place, the human’s capacity to see occurs. Here, there is no homunculus that sees the outcomes of what the body does. Instead, here physiological sight and body are concurrent and interdependent – in at least one sense, such that physiological sight as process is the whole that is being addressed and the body’s functional eyes and brain are themselves complex process that serve as parts from which the whole is constituted.

Now, this speaks neither in favor of physicalism, neutral monism, nor objective idealism – to list just three worldviews – instead simply addressing the relation between a) our awareness via physiological sight and b) our body’s workings. Biased thought this may be on my part, I’m maintaining that the latter inference addressed ought to be maintained regardless of worldview held – and that the former ought to be done away with.

At any rate, the aforementioned is in attempts to clarify my previous post in terms of differences that, as apo would put it, make a difference.

It seems that via the eyes and brain an ever-moving image of the "external" is formed. — Janus

This in itself is a conceptual inference given a) the occurrence of our awareness in general and b) our empirically gained awareness regarding the mechanisms via which our visual awareness is formed, and I disagree with its wording. Hence, with what the inference is saying.

Better: "It seems that via the eyes and brain an ever-moving sight (else seeing) of the "external" is formed."

What we consciously hold is not a movie ("an ever-moving image") we are looking at but, instead, an innate activity of seeing, this activity being termed by us sight. And this activity of physiological sight that pertains to us as conscious beings is as unified with our body as is the activity of physiological tactile feel.

To my mind, imaginations - e.g., the sight we hold via the mind's eye (or the hearing of ourselves inwardly think/question via the mind's ear; etc.) - get weirder, but we are here addressing our awareness of the external world.

Who is it that sees this image? — Janus

This then becomes, "Who is it to which the sight/seeing pertains?" ... doing away with a question already set up so as to be responded to only in terms of homunculi looking at images.

If we cannot get our heads around the act of seeing, then how could we feel justified in purporting to use the fact of the act to support some preferred worldview or other? — Janus

For my part, I'm not getting into preferred ontological worldviews here, although physicalism isn't it. I'm only disagreeing with the inference that a seeing agent/consciousness entails the occurrence of a homunculus. Here concluding that the first in no way entails the second ... and that the notion of homunculi is a fallacy.

But maybe that's part of the issue: homunculi are conceptually palpable ideas that one can with some ease mentally manipulate; whereas consciousness is not.

Of course there is no "homunculus' inside the camera to view the image. — Janus

Couldn’t the camera have a blind homunculus? :joke:

Couldn’t resist - and the question is not to be taken seriously, other than to illustrate the absurdity of the homunculus argument.

Or does the quoted statement mean to affirm that the occurrence of a consciousness is in and of itself equivalent to the occurrence of a homunculus? Just in case: if so, I'd like to understand on what grounds.

Got it. Thanks for the background info. I think I agree with the case you've just made, because ...

I am looking to use the a priori analytic truth: "If A is necessary for B (and B is not necessary for A), then A is necessarily either logically prior or both logically and temporally prior to B in time (in terms of the absolute first possible occurrence of B), as a foundation for a new modal method which is based, not in the concepts of necessity and possibility (as antitheses), but the concepts of necessity and contingency (antitheses). — TheGreatArcanum

Since you use "or both" I so far don't find any problems in this a priori analytic truth as expressed.

Good luck to you.

If entity A is necessary for the existence of entity B (and B is not necessary for A), then does it necessarily follow that that entity A is also logically prior to entity B, and if entity A is logically prior to entity B, does that not also mean that it is temporally prior to entity B as well (in terms of the first possible occurrence of entity B), or does logical necessity not necessarily also imply temporal priority? — TheGreatArcanum

If mathematics are not illusory, and if the occurrence of geometric points is necessary for the occurrence of geometric figures, then this would be one example of logical necessity devoid of temporal priority: the geometric figure logically necessitates geometric points thought both are fully concurrent.

I believe other examples of conceivable relations wherein temporal priority is not implied in the given logical necessity are possible, but nowhere as easy to articulate. Backward causation is one such (and it presumes a block universe). Even more complexly would be “top-down” and “bottom-up” constraints (as they’ve been often enough termed on this forum). Were Aristotle's causes to be viewed as metaphysically occurring rather than as merely being "explanations to why questions", the same could be argued to apply to some such, like material causes.

Out of curiosity, if this happens to make a difference: Are you addressing this issue in regard to what does or can ontically occur or, else, in regard to our human capacity to conceptualize various forms of logical necessity (whether or not our conceptions be illusory)?

Wait a second. My take so far is that, as of yet, there isn't a settled philosophical definition of what "rational" means. Mine fully included.

Thanks, though, for the tentative approbation.

Again, it's not my sense of what it means, [the description of "rationality" which T Clark previously posted is] what it actually does mean. — T Clark

For the record: Best I could do in finding a good reference for what “rationality” means is this. The SEP section of this article lists seven possible meanings of rationality (without claiming them to be exhaustive), none of which appear to me to coincide with what you claim the official, or formal, meaning of “rationality” is. Particularly, your claim that it be "a systematic search for knowledge and understanding following a formal system such as logic, the rules of which are specified in advance".

If you could provide some reference for the meaning of rationality as you've specified it, I could then learn something new and be more in the know, so to speak.

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ps. If interested, a different SEP article on rationality that touches on the topic of this thread. From the first paragraph of the article:

"This thesis appears to threaten the “rational authority” of morality. It seems possible that acting morally on some occasion might not be a suitable means to an agent’s ends. If so, then according to this thesis, it would not be irrational for her to refuse to act morally on such an occasion."

[...] we never did define what "rational" means back at the beginning. For me, it means a systematic search for knowledge and understanding following a formal system such as logic, the rules of which are specified in advance. — T Clark

To be forthright: First off, as a matter of opinion, we disagree on what the term rational ought to refer to. I for one believe it should be roughly described as “the ability to discern and apply reasons (like causes and motives) and comparisons (with ratios as one example among humans) for the sake of optimally fulfilling goals, be these needs (like physical sustenance so as to maintain physical health) or desires (with improved eudemonia as one example sometimes spoken of by philosophers)”. But, I grant, my definition does not need to be strictly applicable to only humans, and I get that many don’t want to ascribe rationality to any lesser life form. Be this as it may.

An observation based on the quoted definition of “rational”:

So called primitive people that lack rationality as just defined (and which have not been intruded nor in any other significant way influenced by westerners: certain people in the Amazonian forests and Inuit people as two examples) have lived in mutual benefit with their natural environment for as long as they’ve been known to be, resulting in the preservation of a healthy ecology in which they subsist.

We westerners, who as a grouping arguably represent the apex of this rationality as defined, are deteriorating our natural environment to the point of causing the sixth mass extinction, environmental collapse, and our own demise as a people - and this, for the most part, without giving a hoot.

I know there’s bound to be (this from at least some person somewhere), but in assuming no indignantly emotive attempts to rationalize these two just stated facts:

If the cultures in which (your sense of) rationality prevails happen to callously and obliviously bring about the steady obliteration of the inhabitable planet - and, via rational inference, of themselves as a peoples in the process - while those cultures devoid of rationality (as you've defined it) do no such thing, what’s one to make of rationality’s value?

I don’t know, your present definition leaves me with a topsy-turvy feel in this context.

You know what they say: careful what you wish for. — Mww

No regrets so far. Thanks for the reply.

I also view both empiricism and rationalism equally essential for empirical knowledge, or knowledge of the empirical content of our cognitions. But I think we have just as much capacity for pure rational thought in the form of logical relations, which have no empirical content. But, if I want to prove that logical relation, I must subject it to empirical conditions, let Mother Nature be the judge. — Mww

For what its worth, here we differ a little. What you term "pure rational thought" I would understand as (very) abstract thought ... which, as abstraction, is abstracted by us from experience (of the world, of our thoughts' workings, and so forth). As one example, our modern knowledge of formal logic(s) is, to my mind, then governed by a long history of axiomatic stances which more or less correlate with our experience and which, for the most part, have been improved with time; axioms that would themselves not be conceivable in the hypothetical absence of, again, what Hume terms "impressions". Nevertheless, I concur (it at least so far seems) with the idea that at least the most basic aspects of logic of which our reasoning makes use of are not empirically - nor for that matter evolutionarily - developed in us. Instead being, for lack of better phrasing, existentially fixed aspects of the world; existentially fixed aspects we have biologically evolved to make much better use of, via our far more abstract understanding, then any other species of living being known to us.

I know. Lots to potentially disagree with in this point of view. But I'll leave this in even though its not paramount to the discussion. Thanks again for the previous post.

On the right-hand side, we want to take the in-world perspective, and leverage that to define a term in our world, on the left-hand side. In Middle Earth, we want to say, Frodo is a person; in our world, he's a fictional character. Is this the same 'entity' we're talking about? Has it a dual existence, in one 'world' as one sort of thing and in ours as another? Is this no different from saying that chocolate can exist as something yummy for one person and something repulsive for another? — Srap Tasmaner

In thinking this might help, perspective might be the crucial link. “Real” from whose perspective?

Fiction as a genre of story (fantasy, sci-fi, or any other) will intend to successfully present fictional realities, wherein fictional sentient beings are real to themselves and to those other fictional sentient beings with which they interact (as will be their activities and behaviors). We understand that these sentient beings are real from their own perspective, as is the world they communally inhabit - but that all these are fictional from our own perspective, in which we presumably know in advance that these are characters which pertain to fictional realities as presented by real sentient beings.

This play on perspective can then make use of fictions within fictions, such as can be found in “The Neverending Story”. Here, the fictional character who is real from his own perspective immerses himself in a story that is fictional from his own perspective. Complex as this sounds, it is readily understood by the readership of the book at large – which has no problem in empathizing with the fictional character who, in the reality that is real relative to his fictional being, reads what is to him a fictional story.

I in part say this with the understanding that in our modern lexicon “real” and “actual” are taken to be synonyms.

I also say this as one who maintains that our individual first-person point of view is the central reality, or actuality, from which all other realities, or actualities, become discerned by us. Very much including that reality which we take to be equally applicable to all other sentient beings whose first person point of view is as real, actual, as is our own. The latter then being what we term and conceptualize as non-qualified reality proper.

the very faculty of reason is again ascribed to natural impulses, instincts; such that it is as inescapable (and I’ll add, a-rational) as is the natural impulse to breath: A toddler does not reason that one breaths in order to live and thereby breaths; nor does it reason that it is using its faculties of reason to develop its reasoning skills in order to better live; yet it inevitably engages in both activities a-rationally - this, the argument would then go, just as much as we adult humans do. — javra

Overall, a well-thought post. Nothing in it to counter-argue conclusively. That being said, it might be worthwhile to consider the different between reason the faculty, which the infant hasn’t developed, and reason the innate human condition, by which development of the faculty is possible. — Mww

As to your comments on my post, thanks. It can happen now and then. :smile:

Words can be ambiguous. So as to clarify what I had intended: by “faculty of reason” I intended “ability or capacity to reason” rather than “reasoning skills” … equating the former to what you’ve termed “reason the innate human condition”. It then was this “capacity to reason / reason the innate human condition” which was claimed to be a “natural impulse or instinct” in my last post. If its warranted, my bad for lack of clarity in the expression.

But to address an overarching theme in Hume the empiricist that was previously addressed: Take the nonrealistic hypothetical of a human who is completely deprived of all present and past “impressions” as Hume terms them; be these what we moderners term perceptions, memories, the experience of physical pain, or anything other which could quality. I for instance disagree with Hume’s definition of ideas as “faint images” of impression – instead understanding ideas to be concepts and, thereby, abstractions which are a) abstracted from “impressions” and b) are of themselves perfectly devoid of imagery in so being concepts/abstractions. E.g., the idea/concept of animal does not have a “faint image” – and to ascribe an image to this concept (e.g., the image of a cat) is to at the same time exclude a plethora of other possible images that the concept encapsulates (dogs, whales, insects, etc). Neither does the concept of cat, for – for one example – to see the “faint image” of a white cat is to exclude all the different colors which cats can take. Yet, be this as it may, a question for the non-empiricist:

In the absence of all present and past impressions, what reasoning might such a hypothetical human yet engage in? And this via what content?

More concretely, in Kantian terms, to paraphrase, we innately endow our perceptions with time and space. Yet, in the complete absence of all present and past perceptions, is it to be assumed that we’d yet hold the ideas of time as space as contents to reasoning?

(BTW, so it’s said, I personally neither agree with empiricists nor rationalists, instead viewing both experience and reasoning as essential to epistemological content. But I’m here addressing the issue in what I take to be Hume’s favor: where it's argued that reasoning is brought about by impressions - such that there can be no reasoning in the complete absence of impressions and of that which is derived from impressions.)

I’m currently more interested in your point of view regarding these questions than to engage in debate.

Holy Crap, Batman!!! We cannot grant the existence of bodies to sensations, where it belongs as a seemingly “first appearance”, because impressions are not reasonings, but the existence of bodies is granted to ideas, because it is reasoning, but impressions cause those ideas, so….sensation of an object cannot be so low as to be the same as its idea, impression of an object causes our reasoning to an idea of that object……the very reasoning of which we have already been shown we should be skeptical of.

We’ve been granted the very thing we’ve no warrant to trust. The skeptic cannot defend his reason by reason, so how does he defend it, or does he not bother defending the very thing by which he acquires his ideas? — Mww

Addressing your question with the presumption it addresses (non-Cartesian) skeptics in general:

Unless the skeptic is Pyrrhonian - whom I so far gather would claim to suspend all reasoning (though I am very dubious of this being actualizable in practice) - I take the skeptic to not be capable of finding any rational alternative to so trusting. And, due to this reason alone, the skeptic thereby trusts. Despite the mistakes we can on occasion make in our reasoning.

In Hume’s case, the very faculty of reason is again ascribed to natural impulses, instincts; such that it is as inescapable (and I’ll add, a-rational) as is the natural impulse to breath: A toddler does not reason that one breaths in order to live and thereby breaths; nor does it reason that it is using its faculties of reason to develop its reasoning skills in order to better live; yet it inevitably engages in both activities a-rationally - this, the argument would then go, just as much as we adult humans do.

But this issue isn’t one confined to the particular worldview(s) of skeptics. The provision of a reason for the trustworthiness of reason squarely lands one into Agrippa’s trilemma: circularity or reasons (a is so because a; as in: reason's trustworthiness is so because x, y, z, etc ... all of which are to be deemed valid because reason is trustworthy), ad infinitum regression or reasons (which never provides a foundational reason), or axiomatic dogma (which would here translate into “it is so because I/you/they so state”). None of which are deemed rationally satisfactory by most. And, despite this irking a good deal of rationalists among others, no human in the history of mankind has been able to envision any alternative than the three just provided.

But one can abductively infer that reason of itself is a natural impulse in us … whose trustability as impulse can neither be rationally supported not rationally renounced.

In reference to the first quoted paragraph of yours, I’m not claiming to not find problems in Hume’s arguments. But I so far do agree with Hume’s general perspectives on this point, as I so far best interpret them, and as they would likely stand in relation to your question regarding trust: our trust of reason as a faculty can of itself only be instinctive and in this means unavoidable. And to this I’ll add foundationally a-rational (i.e., neither rational nor irrational).

While I can’t support all of the just stated by Hume’s writings, nothing in Hume’s writings regarding reason being an instinct will to my mind contradict this affirmed stance being one that a skeptic can take. To re-quote this, one such writing is from Part III Section XVI of the Treatise:

“To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls,”

------

As an afterthought: One cannot rationally doubt the faculty of reasoning without trust in the very faculty of reasoning one claims to doubt. Which to me only further evidences the claim I've intended to make.

countably infinite — TonesInDeepFreeze

What I have said is "countable infinity" ... not "countably infinite".

Sorry, but I have better things to do that to spend more time in addressing such replies.

Free speech can be "self-destructive" if you will, because it allows speech against itself, and, more directly, might incite harm or violence — then it becomes real.
As of typing, there are places where such freedom is stomped out to a wretched degree, and other places where it's abused ("weaponized" dis/mal/misinformation, whatever).
Middle grounds? — jorndoe

Words can harm. Intentionally shout “fire” in a crowded gathering so that a stampede results due to the lie, prank, or whatever it might be, such that the stampede leads to people getting trampled on and even dying … and that word was the cause of perceptible, physical harm. (This leaving the emotional harm which words can cause out of the issue. Sometimes serious enough to add to increasing suicide rate, imo) Arguably, in at least some sense regarding intent and outcome, this person is as culpable of the resulting physical harm as they would be if the person were to physically assault those harmed. And yet so falsely shouting is considered perfectly legal in the USA.

Your topic is akin to equally difficult topic of tolerance: when there is tolerance of intolerance, what results is the disappearance of tolerance and the universalization of intolerance among a people.

As to laws, they’re as good as those who make them. Get corrupt or tyrannical lawmakers in charge - say, which are elected by corrupt or tyrannical voters - and laws will be implemented against those who might otherwise be deemed ethical in what they desire to freely speak about. In turn giving more power to the corrupt/tyrannical voices only.

Btw, as a distantly related apropos, a working sustainable democracy is typically envisioned dependent on an informed, educated, and civil society. This being the principal reason why, for example, public education was once introduced. I figure whether a democratic republic remains or perishes is mostly, if not fully, up to the constituents. On whether, for example, individual constituents come to be accepting of, or even in some way emotively endorse, the shouting of “fire” in crowded gatherings when no such fire occurs (so its said, for no sensible reason). In sum, to my mind its an issue of individual and cultural ethics. Laws can only follow suit.

Don’t have a ready solution to the issue. Just chimed in with this post because I do feel the issue’s importance is one worth endorsing.

You keep coming back to a line as being "constrained" in one dimension but not another. Are you aware that a plane consists of an uncountably infinite set of lines? And 3D space consists of an uncountably infinite set of planes? Now, by your understanding, is 3D space "constrained"?

Finally, it can be shown that the cardinality of the set of points in 3D space is equal to the cardinality of points in a line. I.e., the line can be mapped onto 3D space (and vice versa). So how is the line constrained again?

Before accusing another of nonsense, try picking up a math book. — Real Gone Cat

Don’t know why but not answering these questions bothers me. Might be your added in snide insult.

Yes: 3D space is by its very demarcation constrained to three dimensions – rather than to two, one, zero (cf. geometric points), or else more than tree dimensions (cf. the ten dimensions of space in string theory).

I grant my non-mathematician mind doesn’t comprehend how the first sentence entails the second, but yes: lines will still be constrained to individual units that can be numerated. Else we wouldn’t be able to discern them as lines.

It's a category error because you're judging mathematical notions of infinity by some dubious metaphysical standard. — Real Gone Cat

In your mind this sure seems to be the case. In reality as written in all of my posts, I have only differentiated between the two - without in any way judging one by the other.

This is how mathematics makes the infinite comprehensible. No human being will ever have the opportunity to observe a one-dimensional line of any length, much less of infinite length; but any human being is capable of understanding the rule that defines such a line.

Of course, one can say, that's not really infinity; or one can say, that really is infinity and thus no one really understands such a rule, they only know how to work with it formally, as a bit of symbolism. (I think I've now alluded to all the principle schools of the philosophy of mathematics: realism, intuitionism, and formalism, for what that's worth.)

Not sure how this fits your thing, but there it is. — Srap Tasmaner

Right. In general agreement. Thoughts go back to Cantor's popularization of actual infinities.

As I've previously mentioned, I've learned that this issue - that of how determinacy (or constraint) applies to infinities - is so esoteric (such as to most of the posters on this thread) that I need not concern myself with addressing it directly. For what its worth, I've at least gained an understanding - fallible though it is - regarding the issue which the OP addressed - in part, due to the interactions in this thread.

Honestly, apokrisis is the only guy I know around here who's comfortable with this sort of metaphysics, and I learned the habit of looking for constraints from him. He'll mainly tell you that whatever system you're cooking up is a partial reconstruction of his own, but he'll understand what you're up to. You know the drill. — Srap Tasmaner

Actually, it in fact is a partial reconstruction of Aristotelian causes (predating apokrisis and his system by some time). Instead of addressing these causes as "explanations to why questions", I'm addressing them (in short) as distinct determinacy types.

Hope some of this has been helpful. — Srap Tasmaner

It has, and thanks for it.

I stand by my assertion : it's a category error. — Real Gone Cat

The category implicitly addressed is that of "infinity". Do tell: how is the distinction between metaphysical infinity and quantifiable/mathematical infinity of itself a "category error" of the concept of infinity?

Your assertion is a bit nonsensical at it stands.

There is one other little hitch though: a line, for example, not only can or may contain all the points in a plane colinear with it (that is, with any two of the points on the line), but it must and does. — Srap Tasmaner

By definition, of course. This will be the determinate aspect of it. But then

Do we still call it freedom, absence of constraint, if you must actualize every open possibility? — Srap Tasmaner

Even in the concept of "actual" or complete or whole infinity, can every open possibility be actualized?

I'm very open to learning otherwise, by what I currently understand by infinite length is that actualizing every open possibility would entail a limit/boundary/end of open possibilities ... thereby negating its affirmed infinitude. Am I misinterpreting something in the terminology?

I've been speaking of a line as embedded in a plane, because it's simpler to visualize that way, and you can contrast a line to the other possible figures in a plane, but a line is, by itself, simply a dimension. It is one sense a result of constraining a plane, but in another sense a constituent of an infinite number of planes, whether seen as an infinite collection of zero-dimensional points, or — more importantly here, I think — seen as a formal constituent of the plane, as representing one of its dimensions. And here's the kicker: any line can itself be considered a constraint that partially determines a plane, as can any point. — Srap Tasmaner

Hm. Not disagreeing.

I've been intending to keep the topic as simple as possible, but I am personally recognizing at least four distinct types of determinacy: including two which could be here termed "top-down" determinacy or "constraint" (e.g., a line's occurrence can be deemed to of itself concurrently determine the placement of all points that constitute the line) and "bottom-up" determinacy or "constraint" (e.g., two points concurrently determine a line) - neither of which are causal. And via this somewhat simple understanding, things can get complex very quickly - especially when taking into account all four determinacy types I'm entertaining (the other two being causal determinacy and teleological determinacy). But maybe this is neither here nor there.

If you think of the possible figures you could draw in a plane, you're constrained to the plane, but otherwise have complete freedom. If you compress and channel that freedom in a particular way, you can get a line: completely constrained in one dimension, but completely unconstrained in the other.

Is this the sort of thing you had in mind? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. Precisely.

Here understanding "constraints" as being determined or else determining factors (again, when it comes to maths, for one example, this not in causal ways - such as, per previous posts, how determinants can be addressed in maths; e.g., two geometric points can determine a geometric line ... this in non-causal manners).

Fyi, since the begining of this thread, I think I've figured the issue out. In the logical trichotomy of metaphysical possibilities regarding determinacy - namely: a) being completely determined, b) being completely nondetermined, and c) being semi-determined - quantifiable infinities will then be categorized by (c). Importantly though, when regarding quantifiable infinities as specified by maths, this semi-determinacy will always be devoid of causal determinacy.

Unless you find reason to disagree with this generalization regarding the determinacy of such infinities, I think I'm good to go.

Oh, you've been comparing math to woo all along. Seems like a category error to me. Carry on. — Real Gone Cat

That stubborn reading comprehension problem again. Have I not termed the type of non-finitude you address as “woo” as “metaphysical” from the very commencement of this thread?

You don’t strike me as the type of person who takes metaphysical enquiries and topics seriously, hence considering them to be woo. But correct me if I'm wrong.

At any rate, glad to see you find readings such as A Universe from Nothing to be “woo” - despite this notion being proposed by a well-established physicist.

Pleroma? — Srap Tasmaner

Wasn’t familiar with the Pleroma. Don’t yet know how this is intended but, as Carl Jung’s Gnostic understanding, sure, the Pleroma qualifies as nonquantifiable infinity.

Other possible candidates include certain understandings of God, Moksha, Nirvana, the Ein Sof, Brahman, and what some claim to be the ineffable (as in G-d) … with all of these being traditionally understood as being the form which perfect Being takes. Then, again, there’s the concept of nothingness as the absence of all being, which also qualifies as a possible candidate.

Whether or not any of these concepts are anything else but vacuous is irrelevant to the issue. The issue being that such type of infinity can and has been conceptualized by humans at large for a good sum of human history … and that it differs from types of infinity that can be quantified and thereby numerated.

And, again, this thread was not supposed to be about such type of infinity, but about those infinities that can be numerated. As in two infinite lines on a plane can either intersect or be parallel.

But then, what on earth would “the ‘non-mathematical’ countably of infinity” signify to a general audience?! — javra

Indeed! You are the one who claims to represent a layman's non-mathematical notion. It's a safe bet that no one unfamiliar with set theory or upper division mathematics has any notion of all of a countably infinite set. There is no layman's notion of this. So it's silly trying to represent it. — TonesInDeepFreeze

You again blatantly misunderstand what I was saying.

Curious to see if you might comprehend what I’ve been intending from the commencement of this thread if I were to use the rather pompous term “numeration”:

One can numerate geometric lines and infinite sets. Therefore, these and like infinities are capable of being numerated. As in 2 infinite lines or 2 infinite sets.

In contrast, the infinity of - for one example - a complete nothingness cannot be numerated for, if there were such a thing (linguistic problems in so saying aside), the infinity referenced would have no limits by which to be discerned nor, for that matter, would there occur any sentient being to psychologically delimit or define its presence.

In a similar vein, a “non-mathematical numeration” is a conceptual contradiction, this because to numerate is a mathematical faculty of mind.

Also, “countability” as it is defined in mathematics cannot occur in the complete absence of numeration - and can be viewed as a specialized format of numeration.

(Yes, though, “to numerate” is defined as “to count”.)

And although this thread is not intended to debate the properties of infinities as defined by mathematics,

“mathematical” notion of “countability” — javra


Whatever your questions about it, it would be best to start with knowing exactly what it is.

df. x is countable iff (x is one-to-one with a natural number of x is one-to-one with the set of natural numbers).

As far as I can tell, that is different from the everyday sense, since the everyday sense would be that one can, at least in principle, finish counting all the items, but in the mathematical sense there is no requirement that such a finished count is made. — TonesInDeepFreeze

No, not in my neck of the woods. The everyday sense would be that one could, in principle only, count an infinite series of elements/units/items for all of eternity yet to come and still never get to finish. This then addresses the notion of a "potential infinity" as first coined by Aristotle - in contrast to the Aristotelian notion of "actual infinity" which Cantor played a major role in making mainstream in part via use of the one-to-one correspondence you address.

In regard to this, from a previous post:

If there are no infinite sets, then there is no set of all the integers nor set of all the reals.

But the observation about them could still hold in the sense of recouching, "If there is a set of all the integers and a set of all the reals, then the cardinality of the former is less than the cardinality of the latter.'

Moreover, in any case, even without having those sets, we can show that there is an algorithm such that for every natural number, that natural number will be listed; but there is no such algorithm for real numbers. — TonesInDeepFreeze

So, when the conceptual grouping (to not irk mathematicians by saying "set") of all natural numbers is taken to be a potential infinity it is still taken to be an infinity - else an infinite grouping - just not one that claims to be complete or else whole. Here, one can contrast the conceptual grouping of all natural numbers with - to keep thing as simple as possible - with the conceptual grouping all natural numbers that are even. There will be a one-to-two correspondence between them: for every one even natural number in the grouping of even natural numbers there will be two natural numbers in the grouping of all natural numbers. When both groupings are taken to be compete wholes, then the grouping of even natural numbers will contain a lesser cardinality than (more precisely, half the cardinality of) the grouping of all natural numbers contains - with both groupings yet being infinite. But when both groupings are taken to be never-complete, then for ever one item added to one grouping there will likewise be one item added to the other, and this without end. Such that one cannot compare the cardinality of infinities in each grouping, other than by affirming that they are both infinite in the same way.

Actual infinities can nowadays be very easily expressed and manipulated - and, so, have become of great mathematical use. But that it makes sense to conceive of any infinity composed of discrete items as "actual" rather than as "potential" (this in Aristotle's usage of these terms within this context - rather than what we understand by these term today) is not something that, for example, is amicable to mathematical proofs. Opinions can differ. This though, yes, the mathematics which Cantor introduced is nowadays mainstream.

Then again

But then you'd do well to leave mathematics out of it if you don't know anything about the mathematics. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I may not be a mathematician but I can take care of my own bank-account via numerations of various sorts just fine, and still have the occasional leisure to philosophically contemplate issues regarding quantities.