I want to eat a cookie — litewave

A person can and often enough does have conflicting wants ... these then being the alternatives we choose between.

So to the extent our action is determined by our intentions it is not free. But to the extent it is NOT determined by our intentions it is unintended and therefore not free either. — litewave

No. Our actions would yet be "free" if we could choose otherwise in a selfsame situation - hence a situation wherein the same overarching intent (e.g., to increase one's own happiness) and the same alternative / conflicting wants (e.g., seeing a movie or reading a book) occur.

... will be taking a small break from the forum for now.

But how do I choose an intention without already having it? — litewave

By choosing between alternative potential intentions - like the intent to read a book or the intent to see a movie.

Even if what one will do next were [completely, rather than partly] determined, the choice remains. — Banno

Epistemologically, yes, of course. But this does not resolve the ontology of the world in which we dwell. We, in a sense, could be fated in a causal determinism to always hold the illusory sense of us having free will via our ontological nature of not being omniscient: the epistemological uncertainty as to which course of action is best then resulting in an epistemological sense of freedom in what we choose.

Hoping the terse aformentioned summation makes some sense.

Still, for one example, in this ontology of causal determinism, no degree of ontic uncertainty - no degree of "tychism" as Peirce would call it - could occur in the world. Rendering all that we do predetermined in full, ontologically.

The difference might not be important for every day applications, granted, but it does make a significant difference in terms of what can be infered about the world we live in. But I think this now is deviating too much from the thread's topic of interest.

Seems like a row of billiard balls. — litewave

Not quite. Intents are teleological processes, i.e. teloi, and not causal processes as the latter is understood in modernity via Hume's notion of causation and the notions of those who followed.

But, as to the issue of determinacy, if we do hold free will then we are only partly determined by determinants (teloi and antecedent causes included) in the choices we make, and thereby remain partly free to choose what we see fit (I have no idea what "absolute freedom" would be anyway). If we do not hold free will, then we are completely determined by determinants in all we do, including our choices.

This issue, however, cannot be resolved via feelings of what is either way.

As a heads up, if you want to argue against free will the best bet I currently know of is in research attempting to show that our unconscious mind chooses our choices before we are consciously aware of so choosing. That said, the issue of whether or not free will occurs is as of yet very much unresolved - very much despite all such research, which tmk so far is inconclusive.

Why would agents do that? Because they are driven by thoughts, including by thoughts to choose between thoughts. Or when they are not driven by thoughts, their choices are unintended, which precludes free will too. — litewave

If you take intents to be thoughts, then I might in this way alone agree: in so far as out choices are always in part determined by that which we intend to accomplish. Still, intents do not of themselves choose outcomes. We as agents so driven by our intents do.

Point taken. :grin:

If I’m presented with two options, A and B, I can choose between them. The question is, can I choose the thought which chooses between them? If not, do I have any control over what I choose? — Paul Michael

In slight difference to 's answer, I find this to be quite a misguided conceptualization. The “I” in these propositions is not a thought contemplated by a being which is itself a thought contemplated by a being, ad infinitum.

The “I” addressed is itself a being with agency.

Thoughts don’t choose between thoughts. Agents - such as one’s own conscious being - choose between thoughts. Hence the agency of choice as it pertains to beings / agents (and not to the thoughts which agents / beings think of).

This observation is apart from the issue of whether we as beings hold the ability choose otherwise in a selfsame situation, i.e. are endowed with free will. If we are not, then the choices we effect are themselves always completely determined by antecedent causes - making us as responsible for what we effect as would be a billiard ball. If we are, then in some way what we effect is not fully determined by antecedent causes - at the very least not when we actively choose - and our effects thereby originate with us in some meaningful sense.

Maybe getting closer to your concern:

In either perspective, we as conscious agents would have no choice in whether or not we hold free will: either being existentially fated by reality to have it whether we want it or not or, else, being existentially fated by reality to not have it regardless of what we’d want to be the case.

That we hold no free will in our existential condition of so having free will (were we to have it) does not, however, of itself invalidate the logical possibility of us having it.

Metaphysical concept Vs. Metaphysical worldview > Is the difference that concept is an abstract idea whereas worldview is an abstract idea in application to the real world and thus contextualized empirically? — ucarr

Well, the metaphysical ideas of identity and causality, for instance, are themselves abstracted from experience, and most (if not all) of these abstracted ideas of metaphysics are in application to the "real world" as we best interpret it.

As to the issue of normalization, I merely intended to evidence that there cannot be concepts in physics without a preestablished foundation of metaphysical concepts. Whereas the contrary is not true: one can work with metaphysical concepts abstracted from experience - however tacitly they might be held - without in any way entertaining concepts in physics: for one example, via a good measure of trial and error, a toddler will actively learn and apply metaphysical concepts such as those of identity/change and causation - this non-linguistically - without making use of concepts pertaining to physics, be it Newtonian physics or that of relativity.

That said, I in general do agree with the notion of normalization as your present it, which, if I’m not mistaking your position, can be express as follows: metaphysical worldviews ought to account for all the data which humans have accumulated in the span of our history.

I would only add the understanding that our so far established inferences from said data do not equate with the data itself - hence making possible paradigm shifts (taking the form of novel metaphysical understandings) that better account for today’s data than today's inferences (paradigms) do.

1. If one can do otherwise, then one can do either A or not-A at the time of action.
2. If one can do either A or not-A at the time of action, then A and not-A are both possible in the same sense at the same time, which is a contradiction.
3. Therefore, one cannot do otherwise. — Paul Michael

Possibly subtle, but important: One cannot do both A and not-A at the same time of action in the same respect. Instead, one can only do either A or not-A at the time of action. It's not an issue of both occurring at the same time in the same respect. It's an issue of either one occurring at the expense of the other or vice versa.

This "at the time of action" stipulation seems to be implicitly equivocated with "before the time of action (before the choice is made)". Before the time of action two or more alternatives are present at the same time but in different respects: each alternative presenting its own unique possible outcome. The alternatives are not deemed to be identical to each other - hence to occur in the same respect. The don't have the same features of details.

Unless one can evidence how what I've addressed is wrong or misconceived, then what I've mentioned will make the argument invalid. But I'm always open to being wrong.

‘To choose’ implies that a set of options exists *from which one chooses*. I don’t see how else ‘to choose’ could be understood. So in order for one to be able to choose their thoughts, they would have to be able to *think* of several options and choose one of them to be their next thought *without thinking their next thought in the process*, which is of course impossible.

If this is correct, does this automatically rule out the possibility of free will? — Paul Michael

In agreement, no, we don't and can't consciously think up the alternatives we choose between at each juncture wherein we sense ourselves to choose between alternatives (an ad infinitum regress of thought would result, tmk). Instead, our unconscious mind does this for us.

We don't choose our thoughts-as-alternatives; we only choose between what is given to us by our unconscious mind as thoughts-as-alternatives.

The possibility of free will merely stipulates that we as conscious agents can choose among these unconsciously emergent alternatives such that, in principle, the one choice we end up making is not necessarily the only one choice that we could have made.

So while the issue remains open-ended, the fact that we as conscious agents do not bring into being those alternatives we choose between doesn't rule out the possibility of us conscious agents being endowed with free will.

While I agree that all humans necessarily share a set of commonly held experience in order for human language to be of any use to us, linguistics might not be the best way to justify this. More specifically:

It must be the case that identical form has identical content, such that the proposition A "the bird is blue" has the same content as proposition B "the bird is blue". — RussellA

Identical form does not always have identical content. The form of propositions sentences A and B can well be identical as forms go while nevertheless being endowed with the following, differing, propositional contents:

A: the bird is of a certain color termed "blue"
B: the bird is of a certain emotive state termed "blue"

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If the meaning of a word changed with context, language would have no foundation, and there would be the problem of circularity. I wouldn't know what a word meant if I didn't know the context, and I wouldn't know the context unless I knew the meaning of the word.

A stone may be used as a hammer. A stone may be used as a door stop. The meaning of "stone" is independent of any use it is put to. A stone being used as a hammer means that the nail will be driven into the wood. A stone being used as a door stop means that the door will remain open.

The way that the word is being used has a meaning and changes with context. The meaning of the word doesn't change with context. — RussellA

One way to make sense of this is to infer that use is purposeful and, in at least some sense, is synonymous to purpose ... and that all words have intersubjective meanings / purposes relative to some cohort as top-level context. When viewed as such, words can then be further fine-tuned in meaning / purpose via the subcontext-situated intents of some individual(s) within the cohort

For example: The intersubjective purpose of the either visual or auditory symbol "stone" among the cohort of all English speakers is to reference a hard earthen object whose parameters allow for some leeway in terms of what the material object might be: e.g. a rock, a pebble, a large formation of marble, etc. This is the meaning relative to all English speakers as generalized, top-level context. Whereas, as one example, the purpose of this same symbol can among a subset of English speakers, here jewelers, be that of referencing diamonds. This being a subcontext of the former.

The only way it is possible as a literal reality is in idealist views of reality in which the non material fell into matter because that might allow for time to be outside of the material universe as some form of eternal cycles. — Jack Cummins

In case you're not familiar with it, there is this:

The Big Bounce is a hypothesized cosmological model for the origin of the known universe. It was originally suggested as a phase of the cyclic model or oscillatory universe interpretation of the Big Bang, where the first cosmological event was the result of the collapse of a previous universe. It receded from serious consideration in the early 1980s after inflation theory emerged as a solution to the horizon problem, which had arisen from advances in observations revealing the large-scale structure of the universe. In the early 2000s, inflation was found by some theorists to be problematic and unfalsifiable in that its various parameters could be adjusted to fit any observations, so that the properties of the observable universe are a matter of chance. Alternative pictures including a Big Bounce may provide a predictive and falsifiable possible solution to the horizon problem, and are under active investigation as of 2017.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Bounce

So it's said, this model can be accommodated for by both physicalism and at least certain types of idealism or neutral monism. And it is one of "eternal return" / "circular time".

EDIT: wanting to preempt this just in case it might come up: to use certain terminology commonly enough used on this forum: if - for example - a panpsychistic objective idealism, then the Big Bounce can be accommodated by such system of idealism.

You are again addressing the issue in terms of metaphysical worldviews rather than, as I specifically asked for, metaphysical concepts. So as to try to be on the same page, metaphysical concepts include those of ontology - which is what you so far are strictly focused on - but also very much include those of identity and change, space and time, causation, and necessity and possibility. A reference for this is the non-exotic, standard fare, Wikipedia page on metaphysics.

Asking the same question I previously asked in greater detail: How can one justify physicality in manners that make no use of identity or change, space or time, causation, and necessity or possibility? All these being subjects of metaphysics and most of these not being topics of investigation in physics.

Notice I specifically said:

How would anyone, yourself included, justify physicality per se without use of metaphysical concepts?

... rather than "metaphysical worldviews". And I know that in my many posts in this thread I've repeatedly made explicit mention of identity and causation as metaphysical concepts requisite for the study of physics.

A foundational plank in the edifice of my concept of ontology says, "Material objects cannot be justified." — ucarr

This is clearly not the case. One noteworthy example to refute the affirmation is that of materialism as metaphysical worldview, i.e. as ontology. But then the same can also be said for non-physicalist ontologies such as Peirce's objective idealism, which also justifies the reality of material objects. ... Unless one assumes that ("true") justification produces infallible results, which I for one don't find in any way warranted.

I am here to learn and discuss, so being forceful is not a bad thing. The very aspect of choosing a form of idealism for the reasons you give, is interesting, so at least I got to see that. — Manuel

I'm glad to hear. Thanks for the meaningful discussion.

I don't think intentions or purpose are touched by physicalism for good or ill. We have intentions and give purposes, I don't see any contradiction. — Manuel

Can you point out any physicalist philosopher that accepts even so much as the possibility of teleological processes in the world? I so far can't. Rather, from to my knowledge, physicalism denies the very reality of teleological processes in the world - such as any that might occur in biology. Hence, it very much does address the issue.

The contradiction I see is in considering the teleological processes we term intentions to either be a) illusory aspects of the world (this being inline to considering our own mental faculties acknowledged in "folk-psychology" to be illusory aspects of the world via epiphenomenalism or else eliminative materialism) or b) real aspects of the world, in which case the world at least in part consists of teleological processes.

The two options are in direct contradiction and result in different ontological perspectives - this having virtually nothing to do with the reality of the physical world as we know it.

But I don't mean to be too forceful on this issue. Just wanted to affirm that, to me, there is a substantial underlying contradiction, as I attempted to illustrate.

Ah. I see. It's an interesting perspective though the question soon arises, is mind alone without anything else (meaning beside the minimum conceivable experience) sufficient to make evaluative claims about morality? I mean, if non-mental (physical) stuff is primary, does it make morality less important even if its a subjective thing? I don't think so.

But to your point: we see plenty of examples in animals that don't seem to have such moral notions when they act. It kind of begins to arise somewhat vaguely in higher mammals, some evidence hints at a kind of moral instinct, in certain apes. Maybe dolphins too, but it's hard to evaluate the evidence.

It's harder to say that ants or meerkats, by acting in a group, have these notions in mind. — Manuel

It’s funny to me how the far more instinct-driven lesser animals are outcompeting us humans in terms of ethics regarding environmental sustenance, leaving aside the fact that no lesser animal has ever come close to producing any of the myriad atrocities we humans have (cf. Hitler and Stalin, as just two examples). But this fact can serve one view of this issue just as much as the other.

Be that as it may, it may not be of philosophical interest to you, but the issue isn’t one of culture-based morality so much as that of what our terms of “good” and “bad” existentially reference for one and all - if anything at all. This issue exceeds morality. For it can apply to which flavor of ice-cream one deems good and addresses the motivational reasons for why one deems the notion of a physical world to be good - this just as much as it applies to the reasons why saving another life might be deemed good. It addresses the very notion of value, as @Constance has mentioned.

At any rate, the empirically known physical world and its study via physics - which so far seems to be your primary interest - indeed has nothing to say on this matter. Whereas materialism can well be argued to imply an existential value-nihilism via its stance of fundamental purposelessness in the world. (As I previously said, materialism / physicalism cannot allow for the reality of intentions - hence, the reality of purpose - in the world without undermining its own stance.)

In short, non-physicalism might not be a sufficient condition for the existential reality of the good as a universal applicable to all particulars that so intend, but it is a necessary condition.

Apropos, as (mutually) altruistic as they are, meerkats are mammals with complex cognitions that require a lot of learning to be functional, and biologically shouldn’t be grouped in the same category with ants any more than primates should.

I'm unclear on what you mean. We attribute identities to rocks, but when we speak of rocks usually, we tend to speak of "rocks" and related common-sense uses, not of the properties that make it up. Like if we see a sheet of limestone, we don't speak of "calcium carbonate", unless we are geologists speaking about limestones from a technical perspective. — Manuel

What I meant was that every physical entity we know of we deem to be constituted of other physical entities. I can’t think of any example to the contrary (other than the quantum vacuum, but this is an exotic issue). Changing the examples in a more common parlance way, a rock is constituted of rock fragments which we could obtain by hitting it with a hammer. In turn, if we’d grind these down, we’d get very small fragments, like grains of sand. We pulverize these, we get powder. Thereon out, we use microscopes and theory to figure out what the physical constituent stuff of the powder is. But we always infer before inspection that it’s made up of something that’s smaller yet still physical. So when we look at a rock, we know that it is made up of other physical things, and this without breaking the rock open so as to validate our inferences.

Yet, at each stage, there is a unique identity of what is observed and of its inferred constituents. Each identity being other than its makeup's identity.

I mean, what difference is there between effete or "ineffectual" mind and matter as discussed by current physics? If all is mind as opposed to physical stuff, what's the difference? The reason I use "matter" and not "mind", is because I think there is a world out there, independent of us, not dependent on mind. — Manuel

In addressing the first question: none whatsoever (but see the parenthetical caveat below).

In addressing the second question: If all is mind then, for one example, it's conceivable and logically coherent that good and bad could existentially be objective attributes of reality (rather than whatever anyone says they are) - bringing to mind possibilities such the Neo-platonic notions of "the Good/the One". If all is physical stuff, then the reverse holds true: good and bad are relative to just about whatever individuals and collectives care to think about - but they have not existentially objective standing. Point being, there are quite significant differences between the two worldviews, but they have nothing to do with what the empirical science of physics says about the world (This when one excludes certain un-testable hypotheses which current physicists often enough make, such as, for example, that the universe will end in a heat death (also called the Big Freeze) ... these hypotheses being utterly different from the data gathered from physics as empirical science; and they hold alternative, competing, physicist-produced, non-testable hypotheses to boot: e.g. the Big Bounce, the Big Crunch, and the Big Rip).

In addressing the third sentence: Sure, from this vantage, both worldviews work equally well. It's why I make the distinction between mind and matter as well, even though I can best describe myself as a non-physicalist monist.

we persons are nothing more than our constituency of this and that material causes which, as material causes, efficiently cause things — javra


Yeah, I mean, I do it sometimes too, I try not to, but using the term "nothing more", or "merely" or "just" is very misleading and can be taken to imply one is playing something down. I do do this at times, but one should be careful. — Manuel

Well, from my pov, we persons are more than our constituency of this and that material cause. Again, this going back to the theme of the OP. But yes, one could reword the statement to read “we persons are identical to these and those material causes which constitute us” and thereby remove the implication previously provided via the words “nothing more than".

I question that this can make sense in any immediate sense of experience. A seen rock is thereby conceptually identical to a bunch of unseen subatomic particles, themselves constituted from an amorphous quantum vacuum, this in the vantage of materialism. But, experientially, we don’t inhabit that world which this material-cause concept of identity entails; we inhabit this world wherein we both agree that the seen rock is only identical with itself as rock, its constituents holding their own unique identities. No?

EDIT:

Yes but, according to Peirce's idealism, he says that "matter is effete mind", rendering the distinction between mind and matter kind of moot. — Manuel

In terms of physicality's reality, yes. In terms of ontology, certainly not. If matter is effete mind then all is mind in various layers of complexity: our own individual minds being themselves constituted of what would then be aspects of a universal effete mind which, as per Peirce, itself manifests via the interactions of individual minds as global habits ... here having paraphrased a bit and possibly made the issue simpler than it ought to be. Point is, here, all is mind. In so being, this thesis then holds possible implications which materialism / physicalism (everything we take to be mental is in fact fine tuned physicality) outright rejects as metaphsycially possible. Confer, for example, with Peirce's notion of agapism.

Again, you can label the world whatever, it's a monist postulate, not more. The idea that experience is physical was mind-boggling to me. But as he says clearly, his physicalism is not physicSalism. These are very different.

[...]

What something "really" is, is honorific. You can say I want the "real truth" or the "real deal", that doesn't mean there are two kinds of truth, the truth and the real truth nor the deal and the real deal.

[...] — Manuel

What position would you hold in relation to this view intending a more precise, philosophical definition of materialism?

In sum: In metaphysical essence, materialism is Aristotelian thought when fully divorced from formal and teleological causes.

In so being, it only acknowledges material causes and, as a subsidiary of these, efficient causes - such that it is not forms (like a person as an Aristotelian form) which engage in efficient causes (e.g., we persons as forms do not here efficiently cause things) but, instead, it being matter itself which so does (e.g., we persons are nothing more than our constituency of this and that material causes which, as material causes, efficiently cause things).

This differentiation between Aristotelian notions of formal cause (the uncle as person) and material cause (the uncle as a plethora of central nervous system cells) to my mind being of direct pertinence to the OP.

Again, the idea is that the implications of this absence of formal and teleological causes in a world strictly comprised of material causes and their efficient effects thereby results in materialism / physicalism as its currently known.

(Btw: Here acknowledging that the scientific method - which in truth historically emerged in rough parallel to this change in metaphysical perspectives - can be founded upon the metaphysics of materialism but that, if we agree as your former writing seems to suggest, it can just as validly be applied within non-physicalist worldviews such as Peirce's notion of objective idealism.)

Ya, OK, recommendation still stands.

For me the telos rests with what I see as simply without doubt, the most salient part of our existence, which is value. I've said it before, but it always bears repeating: value is by far the strangest thing in all there is. — Constance

Yea, my thoughts precisely. You hit the nail on its head.

So "zombies" would say too. Again, merely anecdotal. The 'problem of other minds' remains. — 180 Proof

Dude, like, in your decent into Cartesian doubts regarding other minds (given that the belief in other minds is not infallible on grounds of it all being anecdotal to you), do you then presume yourself to thee solipsist? (Because if what you wrote is sincere that's the only logically alternative to "other minds".)

One, how does this - logically, coherently - evidence the unreality and/or physicality of consciousness again?

Two, if indeed it is you that is responsible for the simulation of the world the rest of us “zombies” inhabit, some of us zombies might get displeased with you on account of the unpleasant conditions we’re living in … then one might get into a zombie apocalypse scenario. A one against all kind of picture. Not saying you wouldn’t survive but it might be an altogether unpleasant experience for you – this solipsistic nightmare you might precipitate upon yourself. So, in conclusion, stop it with suggesting that we’re all numbskull zombies on account of your inability to accept that we’re not!

Don’t worry about 180. I hold a non-infallible but inexpressibly strong justified-true-belief that you are conscious. And there’s a whole bunch of others that also know it as well as I do. Just saying. :smile:

Thus, the coordinated communication among brain, body and environment constitute what consciousness is. — Joshs

I fully agree with this statement and your argument for in, but find that it pertains to only one of two equally valid interpretations of what consciousness is. The other equally valid, but inconsistent, sense of consciousness being linguistically represented by the "I" in statements such as "I perceived X (in my environment)" and "I chose X (this irrespective of whether choice is illusory, for it would yet be an aspect of consciousness). In the latter sense, consciousness stands apart from percepts (etc.) which are experienced by consciousness, whereas in the former consciousness and percepts (etc.) are necessarily entwined and codependent in order for either to be.

For me these are two disparate possibilities in respect to what consciousness is. Curious to know how you'd address the distinction between these two senses of consciousness.

It's not easy to talk about something that can't be expressed in words. Good luck. — jgill

Perhaps it's the denizens of philosophy forums, as opposed to philosophers, who perform such wonders.

The problem with claiming that something is ineffable is, of course, the liar-paradox-like consequence that one has thereby said something about it. — Banno

On a hunch, are you trying to distill the semantic difference between “God” (effable by one and all) and “G-d” (written so as to not be effable) via analysis of ineffability?

If so, my best hunch so far is that “God” presumes the rational human intelligibility of the referent specified via certain qualifications; whereas “G-d” presumes that the referent intended is beyond rational human intelligibility despite being endowed with same said qualifications. One can describe its qualifications - but not that referenced as endowed with these qualifications, other than by saying that it is beyond intelligibility, hence indescribable, hence inexpressible.

It’s not that one can’t say “Gd” or describe the referent by asserting that it’s not a rock or dog; it’s the human unintelligibility of the referent as specified by its descriptions that the term “ineffable” intends to those who use it. At least as I so far best interpret the term’s use in this context.

But maybe this thread has nothing to do with the context in which the term is tmk most often employed … In which case, never mind then.

Instead, to change subjects: Any instantiation of beauty as direct experience is ineffable in its emotive particulars, but can only be described indirectly via conceptual generalities and perceptual details of that to which the beauty applies - which of themselves do not ever identify the instantiated experience of the aesthetic. One can say the words “this is beautiful”, but without a commonly shared experience - which can only be verified via back-and-forth interactions regarding that referenced as beautiful - the word “beautiful” is utterly meaningless. (When a certain Trump declares that “coal is beautiful” I for one don’t have any idea as to what he’s referring to. And it’s not too hard for me to presume that neither does he – other than that the term can hold some instrumental value or other.)

But instantiated experiences of the aesthetic - though impossible to accurately articulate (other than by poetic language such as metaphor to so indirectly describe) - are not nonsense. Else no one would sense their reality, instead being a beetle in the box that no box contains. Nor are they irrational. Beyond the scope of reason, sure, but not irrational. Those concrete instantiations from which the abstraction of “beauty/the aesthetic” is formed are nevertheless ineffable. And quite clearly dwell beyond the rational intelligibility of humans … with over two millennia of ineffective investigations into the matter as evidence.

Making this more concrete, Faith No More had a song, Epic, which addresses something ineffable.

The ineffable which the song addresses is described in myriad ways but not linguistically identified, other than by the nonspecific statement, “it’s it”.

But, judging by the song’s former popularity, a ton of people were able to relate to - to get - what the song was about. Which goes to show that not everything needs to be articulated - nor be rationally intelligible to us - in order for a sensible, shared cognizance of it to occur.

But then, “What is it?”

“It’s it.”

I never fully related pantheism to Hinduism simply because they seemed like polar opposited. — Michael McMahon

Though I acknowledge this will all be somewhat biased, in hopes of somewhat clarifying this issue philosophically:

Some premises first. If granting the occurrence of Divinity, either:

a) Divinity = Nature (i.e., anything stipulating that Divinity is natural and that Nature is divine)
b) Divinity ≠ Nature (i.e., anything stipulating any kind of substance dualism between Divinity and Nature)

Pan-theism (all-theism) can then be deemed defined by category (a). If there’s agreement, then:

Polytheistic animism, Hellenism. and Hinduism are just three examples of polytheistic systems in which Nature is identified with Divinity. To my knowledge, all polytheisms are (unless one plays around with words and thereby comes to conclude that a plurality of archangels and lesser angels constitutes a polytheism). If so, then all polytheisms would by default fall into a more generalized category of pantheism (which also includes "naturalistic pantheism" wherein nothing we think of as spiritual occurs, as can be exemplified by Spinoza's philosophy).

This distinction between (a) and (b) can then differentiate between subtly contradictory notions, such as that of the super-natural: If entertained within (a), the supra/super-natural is by definition that aspect of Nature which supersedes the aspects of Nature we experience in everyday life - including both known and unknown natural laws and, here relative to cosmology, deities when they are all interpreted/understood as “non-omni-this-and-that”. If the notion is however entertained within (b), then the supra/super-natural is anything that doesn’t pertain to Nature.

Interrelated with the aforementioned, as one example, Aristotle’s notion of a first (teleological) cause can easily enough be argued to itself be fully part of Nature at large in Aristotle's worldview; whereas, to most, the Abrahamic God, as the first (efficient) cause of all that is, is not deemed in any way a part of Nature or the natural world.

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But then, to unfortunately make things complex again for the sake of an honest appraisal, to my knowledge neither “divinity” nor “nature” has any precise definition that is beyond question. So, when granting the reality of divinity, the distinction between (a) and (b) might simply be a matter of looking at the same thing from discordant perspectives.

As one example pertinent to Hinduism, Brahman can be understood to be beyond space and time and, hence, can be seen as being beyond Nature; i.e., can be understood as transcendent relative to Nature. On the other hand - since, for example, Brahman is taken to be the material, efficient, formal, and final cause of all that is - all reality/Nature could be understood as the manifestations of an imminent, rather than the creation of a transcendent, Brahman. This would thereby make Nature an aspect of - rather than that which stand in opposition to - Divinity. Point being, here both categories (a) and (b) could be argued for Brahman depending on perspectives taken - and this without changing the essential properties ascribed to the metaphysical concept of Brahman.

you are not entitled to anything by virtue of being in this world — introbert


Universal basic income provided by the state? Is this part of the "truth"? — jgill

As to entitlements:

A man said to the universe:
“Sir, I exist!”
“However,” replied the universe,
“The fact has not created in me
A sense of obligation.” — Stephen Crane

This too can be deemed to depict a fundamental truth of existing. Personally, I duly acknowledge this truth. But it must be taken universally in order to be honestly held, neither the autocrat nor the democrat being exempted. The richest of the rich is thereby on the same standing as the poorest of the poor. And in so seeing the nature of things, we all bring into being - individually and collectively - our own sense of what we are and are not entitled to: property, free water to drink, understanding, rulership over lesser beings including other humans, the rights to pursue eudemonia and truth … whatever entitlements we might be capable to conceive of. These entitlements aren’t the universe’s obligation toward us but, rather, our own obligation toward ourselves - always manifesting with some conscious and/or unconscious goal whose fulfillment is, again individually and/or collectively, wanted. As one example of this, there can occur the personal goal of a) becoming as supreme a being as possible relative to all else (other humans, nature at large, etc.) which then would become inferior to one’s own being or, else, the contradictory goal of b) becoming in harmony with as much of the world as is feasible (other humans, nature at large, etc.). Here, goals (a) and (b) result in different values held in respect to what oneself and others are to be entitled to.

All this, though, results form the inference that no one is intrinsically entitled to anything … by the universe, by God, or by anything other. Corny truisms but they work: “The All is fair in both love (any form of harmony) and war (any form of conflict)”, and “our freedoms are never free”.

So, were the above to hold, one could then inquire: When questioning that all people should be entitled to, in this case, universal basic income (could also be universal healthcare or something else), given that no one is intrinsically entitled to anything, on what constructed sense of entitlement would this questioning rest?

At any rate, from my pov, this issue of entitled rights is a complex (one might say, metaphysical :wink: ) issue.

Not clear as to why the notion of teleology helps this here. I mean, to me, it makes the matter complicated, as if now one has to reconcile the world with, not just impossible epistemological relationships, but an overarching logos that underlies all things.
Perhaps I am missing something? — Constance

Missing something in relation to the overall worldview that I hold? Nah, you got it about right.

Wasn’t aiming to argue for a particular worldview, though, so much as aiming to evidence one additional inconsistency of physicalism - this so as to further support the thread’s main thesis that there’s something wrong with physicalism. For instance, by pointing out the … well, inconsistency … in someone engaging in arguments for the sake of - hence, with the intent of - preserving the status quo of physicalism which, as worldview, upholds the nonoccurrence of teloi (such as those which take the form of the very intents to uphold the worldview).

It's a bit like placing the cart before the horse in truth-ville.

Certainly, a theory of everything might not be at hand at any point in our lifetime, but I take it that a philosopher should be honest with themselves in terms of what occurs in the world (e.g., they occur in the world, as do their intents). And then try to work out a coherent worldview from there. A quirk of mine maybe.

But yes, you're right, getting into what the implication are for intentions being real in the world would certainly complicate matters. Not what I intended to do, though.

[...] This acausal access between objects, like a brain and a sofa? — Constance

Nicely said!

In parallel to the issue of knowledge you address, one of my takes on this issue is that were physicalism to be reformulated to allow for the ontic (rather than the illusory) reality of intentions - such as one’s own and one’s uncle’s in any interaction between - then physicalism as worldview would inherently contain the reality of teleological processes. This would in turn entail that physicalism as worldview would then allow for possibilities such as Aristotle’s unmoved mover as ultimate telos. Which would in turn entail that this reformulated physicalism would then consist of a bunch of concepts that are outright rejected by, and contradictory to, the principles of physicalism as we currently know them.

Muddled reasoning in the just expressed (maybe all too implicit) physicalist stance that intentions are all illusory on account of teleology in no way occurring, yes. Then again, I’m not a physicalist.

Do you really think that whether the universe is deterministic or not can be solved by philosophers - not scientists - debating? — jgill

What I think is that the issue can neither be resolved by philosophers ignorant of science nor by scientists ignorant of philosophy.

But, place a whole bunch of philosophers knowledgeable of science and scientists knowledgeable of philosophy in the same room, and one might stand a chance.

... at any rate, not an issue strictly applicable to physicists.

The argument you've adopted is that physics in the eighteenth century did not rely on conservation laws therefore they are not essential to physics. — Banno

No, that wasn't the argument. That was one example of the argument.

Yet another example was how future physics might not rely on conservation laws and yet remain physics - (adding to what was previously said) this in a more advanced format via some novel paradigm shift.

But I won't be repeating everything I previous said.

But this discussion is a bit of a sideline to my main point, which is that what have been characterised as metaphysical assumptions or presumptions are better understood as methodological or social characteristics of physics. — Banno

Holding the "methodological characteristics of physics" as its rules of operation would presume that modern physics in all its complexity "just is" as a grouping of methods - this in manners devoid of a background in which these methods developed, and might yet develop still. On the other hand, presuming that the "social characteristics of physics" are its rules of operation appears to be, as you might say, language gone on holiday?

Though I hold very different views, I'll do my best to leave you to your own.

As an empirical science, physics will always make use of foundational metaphysical concepts - and so will always be grounded in metaphysics in general. — javra


As practiced by physicists, themselves. Without a lot of help from metaphysicians outside the science. — jgill

Because it is due to physicists that we hold our modern notions of causality and identity on which modern physics is contingent? Or else, is the issue of “God doesn’t/does play dice with the universe (translated as the choice between determinism and indeterminism)” constrained to how physicists interpret the metaphysical nature of reality?

Seems to me you have given your argument a self-inflicted injury. To maintain your definition of metaphysic you have to claim that a central, constituent part of physics is not physics. — Banno

To rephrase the - acknowledgedly poorly worded - claim I previously made: physics as empirical science is a specialized subset of metaphysics (as a philosophical study) at large.

As such, in a sense, "the (metaphysical) rules of the game" are always a part of the "game" which is played. In the sense I previously intended, however, the same game can be played with different rules: e.g. (American) tackle football and flag football are played by different rules while both are recognizable as the same general game: different versions of (American) football. In this latter sense alone, conservation laws are not that by which the empirical science of physics is necessarily defined, and so are not an intrinsic part of physics.

The empirical science of physics can and has been engaged in in manners devoid of conservation laws.
For instance, the empirical science of physics predates the closing of the eighteenth century, when conservation laws were first proposed, by a few centuries.

So conservation laws are not an inherent aspect of the empirical science of physics.

One can for example furthermore hypothesize a future science of physics wherein at least some conservation laws currently employed are done away with.

The same can then also apply to other metaphysical notions that serve as "rules to the game" of physics as an empirical science. As an example, the notions of causality and identity which we currently accept culturally as self-evident truths - despite, or else exactly because, there being a long philosophical history to their so being conceptualized today - could in time become modified ... so that what physics currently assumes could itself becomes modified - and this without in any way modifying the empirical science of physics as a method of knowledge acquisition. Again, one of hypothesis, test, data, and inference/conclusion.

In sum: As an empirical science, physics will always make use of foundational metaphysical concepts - and so will always be grounded in metaphysics in general. But, as an empirical science, physics is not contingent on any particular metaphysical notion being itself set in stone.

All this being a lot more verbose but also a far more correct interpretation of the view I hold.

The aforementioned should then better clarify this:

What I've posited is a reductio, that proceeds by assuming that we can differentiate between physics and metaphysics, taking the strongest example, falsification. I then show that this has as a consequence that stuff that is central to physics - conservation laws - are not actually part of physics. — Banno

Conservation laws are not central to physics as an empirical science for reasons previously provided.

What is central to physics as an empirical science is the notion of a physical world - which can itself be justified by any number of different metaphysical notions and perspectives. Those provided by Aristotle, by Peirce, and by many others aside.

so i am not convinced that we are even disagreeing. — Janus

:grin: Sounds about right from my side as well.

OK, then it does comes down to rhetorical posturing rather than substantive philosophical discussion. Sorry, not interested.

So we count the conservation laws not as physics but as metaphysics? Think on that for a bit. These are the core, fundamental rules of physics, and yet not part of physics? — Banno

Because they are not empirically falsifiable, they are not part of physics as an empirical science, no. As an empirical science, physics follows the precedent of hypothesis, test, results as data, and best inference of results as conclusion - and of inductive/abductive theory that best accounts for results and conclusions just mentioned.

Conservation laws are instead the empirically non-falsifiable, metaphysical "rules of the game" (to do my best to use Witt's vocabulary) which grounds this empirical science of physics (as it is currently applied).

It's common to claim that all scientific statements are falsifiable, and to add that the demarcation between physics and metaphysics is this falsifiability.

If that's so, then conservation rules are not part of physics, but of metaphysics. — Banno

That is so, and conservation rules are indeed metaphysics on which modern physics is founded.

This also demonstrates the absurdity of ↪javra
's attempting to force physics and metaphysics into a hierarchy. One does not "sit" on the other. — Banno

How so, given examples such as that you've just mentioned?

I don't see how my Peircean-Wittgensteinian "stance" relates in any (non-trivial) way to Joshs' p0m0. — 180 Proof

OK, granted. But that reply doesn't answer what the (non-trivial) differences are.

... or is all this boiling down to rhetorical stances devoid of substantive philosophical discussion?

So ... the ontic reality of any physical attribute is a reification of the abstract category of "physicality"? — javra

Your original question confusedly suggests so the way you'd formulated it. That's your fallacy, not mine. — 180 Proof

To the way your mind works? Fine, granted again. Glad you now get that's not what my "original question" intends. The issue remains unchanged: how does one justify anything physical without use of metaphysical notions?

Your original expression, javra, suggests 'reifying the abstract category' in the question raised which is nonsensical. — 180 Proof

So ... the ontic reality of any physical attribute is a reification of the abstract category of "physicality"?

By analogy, then, one could affirm that the ontic reality of any animal is the reification of the abstract category of "animals".

Not sure this is where you want to take things ...

What "justifies physicality's occurrence", in other words, are the discursive practices within which "physicality" is used. — 180 Proof

You sure you want to maintain this? How then do you distinguish your stance form what @Joshs maintains. Or, for that matter, from what you term p0m0isms?

How does one justify physicality’s occurrence, in and of itself, without use of metaphysical concepts and, thereby, without use of metaphysics? — javra

What do you mean here by "justify ... occurrence"? — 180 Proof

To justify:

(This where “to justify” is understood as “to make rational sense of via the provision of acceptable explanations”.) — javra

As to "occurrence" in the context specified:

-- The ontic reality of (in contrast to the illusory notion of) - in this case - physicality.

Put together:

"How does one make rational sense - via the provision of acceptable explanations - of physicality's ontic reality (and thereby, as one prominent example, establish that physicality is not an illusory aspect of consciousness) ... without use of metaphysical concepts and, thereby, without use of metaphysics?"

Well put. Yes, that's a good question. — Tom Storm

I'm still a little apprehensive of the potential replies I might get from the so called "skeptics", but thanks!

If you're saying metaphysical physics is the necessary pre-condition for physical physics, then how do you explain away the physical brain observing the physical earth being a ground for not only the discipline of physics, but also the ground for cerebration populated by metaphysical notions?

[...] I smell the presence of idealism herein. — ucarr

The concepts presented in this question are to me very muddled. They could be seen to equivocate between studies (that of metaphysics and of physics) and ontological worldviews. In attempts to clarify the underlying issue of the role metaphysics (as a philosophical study) plays in physics (as the study of that which is physical):

How would anyone, yourself included, justify physicality per se without use of metaphysical concepts? (This where “to justify” is understood as “to make rational sense of via the provision of acceptable explanations”.)

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Once justified, physicality can then be applied to a number of mutually exclusive, ontological worldviews, each of them being in turn further metaphysically justified: physicalism, Cartesian dualism, neutral monism, and Peircean-like notions of objective idealism all being examples of such mutually exclusive ontologies that each acknowledge and make use of physicality.

Yet other ontological worldviews, such as Berkeleyan immaterialism, make use of metaphysical concepts to denounce the notion of physicality (more correctly worded in the case exemplified, materiality) as invalid.

It bears note that all these mentioned perspectives can in their own ways justify - however imperfectly - the relation between what is commonly termed mind and body which you make mention of.

So again: How does one justify physicality’s occurrence, in and of itself, without use of metaphysical concepts and, thereby, without use of metaphysics?

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I’m asking this with the perspective that were this to not be possible (and I currently find that it is indeed not possible), then the very notion of physicality would be founded upon the study we term metaphysics – rather than on the study we term physics – such that the study of physics is itself contingent upon the study of metaphysics. This in order to be justified and thereby not be a bundle of “just-so” stories.

(Explicitly stated: This to not even get into the issue of physicalism’s relation to metaphysics.)