If I can say "I understand X" and can at the same time say "X is incoherent," how does that play out? — ZzzoneiroCosm

If this wouldn’t entirely miss the point of the OP, maybe if the proposition is rephrased then the connection between understanding and coherency might be better expressed, this while better avoiding the possibility of equivocation. I’m thinking into something along the lines of: “That which is incoherent to S cannot be understood by S in due measure.” (This while granting that one can understand what is and is not incoherent to oneself.)

So, the sentence “this claim is false” (or “square circles exist”) can be understood as a grammatically correct sentence - because its syntax is coherent - while the sentence’s content remains not understood due to being incoherent.

Or, someone could understand the allegorical intentions to Ionesco’s play “Rhinoceros” without understanding the play’s underlying system of logic (granting that it has one and that it is nevertheless incoherent to the viewer).

Or, if the implications of dialetheism are found to be incoherent, then one cannot understand them - this despite understanding what dialetheism proposes via grammatically correct sentences.

... But no worries if this doesn't address the OP's concern.

In order for me to be happy you have to be unrestricted. The things that make me happy, means you must be restricted. QED. It is immoral to be happy. — schopenhauer1

In keeping with

We are social animals. We like to hang around with our friends and family. It's unavoidable. It's been in our DNA for millions of years. This entails restrictions on our, and their, freedom, which we all accept. Morality is the deal we make so that the whole thing will work. It's all about restrictions. In essence, you are saying morality is immoral. — T Clark

… but addressing the issue more generally:

Intent upon what is morally good by its very nature limits/binds/restricts our otherwise present freedom to engage in morally bad conduct. Hence, to claim that that which constrains our freedom is necessarily bad is to claim that anything morally good is necessarily morally bad.

-----

Also, to add this into the equation:

Victim or Victimizer; choose! — Agent Smith

And one can't do otherwise. Hence morally disqualifying system/existence. — schopenhauer1

In a relationship of earnest love, for one example, there is neither victim nor victimizer among the parties concerned; all parties concerned are nevertheless willingly restricted to not victimizing each other, and this while each gains greater happiness via such relationship. This, I think, in itself evidences the quoted strict dichotomy erroneous.

Good evidence for me would be something like my dad's thumb being brought back (he lost it 60 years ago). Or my mum coming back to life. Not repeatable or rigorous, scientific evidence, but it would do me. — Tom Storm

OK, but then it seems you'd be expecting the supernatural to not only be inexplicable given what's currently known about nature but to outright contradict what's already known about nature (distinct from the metaphysical supposition of materialism).

But the question for any such event is what precisely does it establish, apart from the extraordinary nature of the event? — Tom Storm

You mean, for example, what does an instance of clairvoyance establish if at all believed? It would establish that there's more to the universe than meets the eye; in this one case, that clairvoyance can occur.

We can attribute remarkable events to religion or some occult cosmology but there is no necessary connection. — Tom Storm

As contrasted to a necessary connection to an atheistic materialism in which no such events can occur. Of course if any such claims are real they then would debunk the reality of materialism - hence leading to, quote, "religion or some occult cosmology". Isn't that what the big hubbub against anything supernatural is based on?

I ask, "can you provide a viable test for anything supernatural?" — javra

You tell me. If you want to discuss science methods with someone I'm not your guy. — Tom Storm

As a reminder, I've already affirmed my position on this: no such tests are feasible.

Wrong question. — 180 Proof

Nope. Just one that has gone unanswered.

I’m not hung up on science, just good evidence. If something can’t be explained I am not afraid of 'don’t know', which seems better than ‘because magic or god/s.’

Yep - your 'clairvoyance' story has too many missing pieces to investigate. It’s an anecdote. — Tom Storm

You say, "good evidence can verify supernatural occurrences."

I ask, "what would 'good evidence' be?"

You answer, "tests."

I ask, "can you provide a viable test for anything supernatural?"

You reply with the just quoted. Which does not philosophically address any of the points.

What is hard to explain is the growing back of a limb. It is interesting to note that no miracle healers ever seem to be able to do this one. And it would be fairly easy to demonstrate, right? — Tom Storm

Not if I were to adopt a stance of skepticism toward the evidence you'd have for it - and yes, eyes can deceive. Unless, of course, the evidence could be replicated by anyone anywhere. But then it wouldn't be evidence of the supernatural but of an ordinary/normal/commonplace process that has heretofore been undiscovered.

Sure, I can't prove anyone else – or myself – is conscious (or that the Sun's core is not a great dragon), but I also don't have any non-trivial grounds (yet) to doubt our manifest 'theory of mind'. I suspect, whether or not we humans are 'conscious', deluding ourselves that we are 'conscious' (i.e. not zombies) has had evolutionary adaptive advantages. Nothing "supernatural" about that — 180 Proof

Fair enough. Curious to know your reply to this. I might even agree with it.

If consciousness is not a delusion - such that the hard problem does occur - on what grounds would consciousness itself not pertain to the supernatural, this when the supernatural is contrasted with observable evidence?

Don't think I agree. If we stop talking about generalities and deal with specific claims, then we can look at evidence and assess it. — Tom Storm

I have addressed a specific claim of clairvoyance. No reply as to what evidence could possibly validate its reality.

Mind reading, spiritual healing, levitation, raising the dead, fortune telling - are all examples of supernatural claims that directly impact upon the physical world and therefore can be tested. — Tom Storm

Scientific tests require that they be replicable by anyone anywhere. Otherwise they are not considered to produce valid conclusions, and this for good reason.

To observe an instance or two of any of the above is not in and of itself a valid scientific test. One could be momentary psychotic in what one thinks one witnesses, after all. Others could deem that you are lying in what you claim. And if neither of these, one can always fall back on explanations such as that of coincidence. The guy did this, and by coincidence that happened. And any of this could happen toward one individual's claim, the claim of ten, or that of a hundred. This goes back to Marian apparitions.

How do you propose to validly test for the reality of any of the examples you mention such that the results are conclusive to all - rather than cable of being relegated to complex instances of psychosis, deception, or coincidence from the point of view of others?

It is also interesting that while god seems to allow people to 'walk again' for a minute or two, where are the examples of an amputated leg or arm which has regrown? — Tom Storm

You lost me with this question. Assuming the reality of inexplicable walking for a few moments necessitates that lost appendages be regrown as well?

Any "X" which completely lacks evident, or (directly / indirectly) observable, properties is indistinguishable from "X" which is not real in any discernible or intelligible sense, ergo impossible. — 180 Proof

Groovy. On what grounds do you then discern which human does and does not have consciousness? For consciousness "completely lacks evident or (directly / indirectly) observable, properties".

I forget if you deny the reality of consciousness, so I'm asking.

And what would those "grounds" be? — 180 Proof

Hm. Personally, I have no idea! But then again, I’m not the one affirming this:

By "supernatural" I understand imaginary and impossible; e.g. Woo-of-the-gaps ... — 180 Proof

BTW, my own views on the matter are in many a way unconventional, and I remain in many a way agnostic about the matter. I however take it that if there is the super-natural it by default would neither be that which is observable by all nor that which affects all in principle, if not also in practice - which I take all things physical, “natural” in this sense, to be … fully including natural laws. But then, if there is the so called “super-natural”, I, personally, can’t conceive of it as that which is beyond the naturally occurring cosmic order of things. The supernatural is “not natural” as in “not commonplace/ordinary/normal”, sure, but not as something that resides beyond the natural process of the cosmos. At any rate, not quite common place as a perspective, I would think. But, then again, I’m not here to investigate hypotheticals regarding the nature(s) in which the supernatural could manifest - much less justify them.

As to why I hold these largely agnostic perspectives? Precisely because I can’t find any philosophically substantiated reason why the supernatural would be impossible. As to shunning the very possibility by ridiculing it as “magic”, hell, the very reality of the universe’s being is magic regardless of how one views it: it just is (it’s an uncaused given), it was caused by a psyche, it was caused by nothingness, and so forth. None of these are non-magical occurrences. And if the universe's very occurrence is magic, I fail to comprehend why anything "magical" within it would be necessarily impossible. Again, agnosticism is my preferred position.

At any rate, my only - maybe so far implicit - affirmation in this thread is that the supernatural would be impossible to satisfactorily evidence in any empirical manner if it indeed in any way occurs - and this precisely because it is the supernatural, hence by default neither being observable to all in replicable manners nor affecting all at all times (such as natural laws do). Because the supernatural does not hold these properties, any accounts of it, be they personal or secondhand, could always be delegated to coincidence, deception, or psychosis. Such, I’m arguing, is the inherent nature of the supernatural if it is.

Care to show how your question is not a non sequitur? — 180 Proof

Sure, it aims at producing grounds for the otherwise unsupported claim that the supernatural is impossible.

I do not trivialize imaginary, except where what is imagined (e.g. "the supernatural") is also impossible (rather than merely "implausible"). — 180 Proof

And how can the supernatural be justified as impossible other than via the metaphysical worldview of materialism?

I'd say we have to look at an individual claim and assess the evidence for it rather than posit an abstract and overarching, 'what evidence is there for the supernatural'. We need a for instance to investigate. — Tom Storm

In hoping not to be talking past each other, my question concerns the epistemic. I can’t conceive of any type of evidence that can convince an adamant materialist or atheist of the occurrence of anything supernatural - and so I’m asking for examples of what this might be given sufficient investigation.

Even if one for example happens to see a ghost with one’s own eyes, one can always be humble and uphold that one has had a hallucination - hence resulting in no evidence to speak of.

Or to illustrate via a different example: If there is a person’s claim of having had a dream that gives the person a clear depiction of what will happen, or else of what has happened on another part of the world, of which the person has no way of directly knowing about and this event indeed unfolds as envisioned in the dream - not an unheard-of claim - what evidence is required to not deem this overall occurrence a mere coincidence, an instance of deception, or related to a momentary psychosis? (To make this example more concrete: One of my grandmas, who lived in Romania at the time, claimed that a dream informed her that a friend, who lived in the USA, who was otherwise healthy just passed away; when she called to inquire about the friend after explaining the dream to us, we acknowledged that this person just passed away. She had, or at least appears to have had, such premonition-laden dreams throughout her lifetime.)

Again, what evidence is required to rule out such claims being either coincidence, deception, or momentary psychosis? I can’t myself think of any.

(That said, if it were neither mere coincidence, nor deception, nor psychosis (nor aliens’ technological voodoo, to address even this), this same claim of having had a direct insight into an otherwise unknown present or future state of affairs would then imply an instance of clairvoyance, which at the very least in today’s world is deemed supernatural.)

I will emphasize that this isn’t about convincing anyone about there being or not being anything supernatural. It’s simply a philosophical question regarding the epistemology of possible evidence for the supernatural among those who have a predisposed disbelief in the matter.

Yes, my presupposition would be that there be robust, testable physical evidence. I don't generally accept anecdote, stories, feelings or claims as proof.

I generally hold to 'good evidence' as opposed to just evidence. There is the 1967 Roger Patterson film footage of Bigfoot which is clearly evidence of Bigfoot. But is it good evidence? Is it ultimately persuasive, or does it look like some person in a monkey suit? Is there anything more than testimony and blurred 8mm film to demonstrate the existence of this creature? The Bible is evidence of god. But it is good evidence, or just one of many contradictory old books which exist for disparate faiths? — Tom Storm

While I don’t have a bias toward Abrahamic religions, they tend to predominate - and so are better known to most of us. As a fairly well-known aspect of Catholicism, there are Marian apparitions. A fair share of Marian apparitions where reportedly witnesses by a plurality of people, in at least one case reportedly by hundreds of thousands. (see below)

The materialist and/or atheist will always be unimpressed, either finding materialist/atheist-accordant justifications for these occurrences - which tmk are most often quite forced - or else affirming that such must exist even though not now available. Personally, I don’t take Marian apparitions to be proof for or against any religion. What interests me is that despite not being replicable, this for maybe obvious reasons, many were nevertheless reportedly witnesses by multiple observers. And to me collective hallucinations wherein the same supposed hallucination is being witnessed by a plurality of individuals defeats the entire purpose of calling such “hallucinations”. (This being different from mass hysteria in that the latter concerns delusions, i.e. false beliefs of what is, rather than hallucinations, i.e. false perceptions of what is.)

Are occurrences such as Marian apparitions good evidence for spiritual realm(s)? Not if one is a materialist/atheist seeking to confirm one’s own worldview; they certainly don’t concern the material world and so cannot be scientifically tested by default. But, short of a physically spiritual occurrence - whatever this might be - what could possibly amount to good evidence for spirituality’s existence for the materialist or atheist – this, again, when the spiritual, or supernatural, is deemed distinct from the physical?

Some Marian apparitions have only one purported seer, such as that of Our Lady of Lourdes. Other apparitions have multiple seers; in the case of Our Lady of Fatima, there were only three seers of the apparition itself, but miraculous phenomena were reported by a crowd of approximately 70,000 people, and even by others located miles away.[3] In other cases, the entirety of a large group of people claims to see Mary, as in the case of Our Lady of La Vang. Some modern mass apparitions, witnessed by hundreds of thousands, have also been photographed, such as Our Lady of Zeitoun.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marian_apparition#Examples

There's a brand of philosophy which has as a tenet the belief that language & culture produce distinctive worldviews. In a sense people with different languages inhabit different realms, literally. — Agent Smith

Yes, I'm familiar with it. To a large extent I'm in agreement. Reminds me of Aikido philosophy which, from my readings, in part affirms that each of us are the center of our own world, so to speak (i.e., hold unique understandings of the world that surrounds). Yet I nevertheless find there's still a universal reality that binds, or else tethers, all these different cultures and languages and worldviews to a common set of truths. It's why science works so well when it comes to the empirical stuff.

In the US there is a belief that art and appreciating beauty is a feminine quality. Like being sensitive. — Jackson

Even so, I say, bullocks. What effective advertisement does not incorporate some form of art? One doesn't need sensitivity to be affected by advertisement. As to the appreciation of beauty, plenty of rough and calloused men who can and do appreciate beauty, as in that which can be found among women.

But yes, there's the prejudice toward so called artsy-fartsy folk. Granted.

I think I understand this, but have trouble with "feminine attributes." For example, a beautiful sunset. How are its properties feminine? — Jackson

What comes to my mind: soft, delicate, translucent ... not what one typically attributes to the state of being handsome but, instead, being (at least modern day) archetypal aspects of femininity.

As an aside: In Romanian, which as a Latin language is heavily gendered, there is no equivalent to either "beautiful" or "handsome" - which are gendered terms - but instead all aspects of these attributes are described by one word: "frumusețe" which can take on either a masculine or feminine form. This tends to produce a different semantic understanding, imv. In English, because there's the dichotomy between "beautiful" and "handsome", there's a lot more ambiguities as to what "beauty" denotes. This even though, if you go by definition alone, all cases of "handsome" should be subsets of that which is "beautiful". But again, its not a good idea to say to a heterosexual guy that he looks beautiful.

A painting is a perception; an image. Any work of art is a perception. Not perception of something, but a physical form of perception. So the artists puts things together to form a single perception. — Jackson

Agreed.

This, right? — Jackson

Yes.

Not bad — Jackson

Cool. Nice to hear.

I would talk more about perception, but not disagreeing. — Jackson

Yes, but perception is its own minefield, to my mind. Still, if you have opinions you want to share ...

Will you explain each term, beauty and aesthetic? — Jackson

The aesthetic I did my best to define in this post. The beautiful, as I previously addressed, to me typically indicates in today's world a subcategory of the aesthetic that addresses its more feminine attributes. Ugliness can thereby be aesthetic, though not beautiful.

At least this is my current best understanding.

Though I think @T Clark does have a very good point in that the experiences of the aesthetic can always be deemed beautiful as experiences per se.

The more I look at it the more I like it. — Jackson

Yea, I like it too. (Though, again, I don't consider it a depiction of beauty, I find it aesthetic.)

Alright, but it's in the eye of the beholder. To me it's not grotesque - or else viscerally revolting - but simply ugly, in both technique and depiction of subject mater. To each their own, though.

I previously mentioned some of Goya's later works. Here's an example (if I can get the image to show):



(Two Old Men Eating Soup)

Edit: OK, that didn't work, but here's the link:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Viejos_comiendo_sopa.jpg#/media/File:Viejos_comiendo_sopa.jpg

It's not necessarily the picture that's beautiful, it's the experience. — T Clark

OK, but isn't the artwork nevertheless aesthetic to the beholder(s) even if not beautiful?

BTW, : I'll try my best to laconically define the aesthetic: that which draws one in, this conceptually and emotively, into a realm of truths/realities that intrigue but are not yet fully understood.

To me, this can be applied to biological beauty (what differentiates plain ol' sexual attraction to big boobs, as an example for some, from the aesthetic attraction toward another's appearance, even if they are over a hundred years old) just as much as to abstract art, or to a mathematical model, or to a particular soul/psyche, so to speak.

Debatable, I know, but I thought I'd give it a shot. Can't now think of anything I find aesthetic that doesn't. Don't know if its an over-generalization.

At any rate, though what is beautiful is always aesthetic, what is aesthetic is not always beautiful. — javra

I intend this as a serious comment. I don't think it's just a quibble.

Every definition of "aesthetic" I can find defines the word in relation to beauty, so if it's aesthetic, it's beautiful. I think that means we have to expand the definition of "beauty" beyond just what is pleasant to experience. — T Clark

I noticed that about the definitions. But, then, definitions can be imperfect, and the cultural significance of terms is malleable.

More to the point, in my neck of the woods, to call a heterosexual, good looking guy beautiful is most always to insult the guy, this by deeming him feminine - despite the guy having an aesthetically pleasing appearance, i.e. being handsome. (Be this semantic something that ought to be or not, it in practice is.) Which to me is one indication that the English term "beauty" is lopsided toward describing that which is of feminine attributes.

Then again, what of the ugly in art which is nevertheless attractive, captivating, and pleasing? Isn't it a contradiction in semantics to affirm that a painting is both beautiful and ugly?

One that comes to mind is "Painted Bird" by Jerzy Kosinski. — T Clark

Great book by the way.

Beauty can be a misleading word. It often connotes prettiness at the expense of numerous other attributes. At any rate, though what is beautiful is always aesthetic, what is aesthetic is not always beautiful. An aesthetic looking - i.e., handsome - man is not deemed beautiful by the typical woman, nor by the typical man for that matter. The grotesque, the morbid, and the horrid can be quite aesthetic for many (e.g., Salvador Dali as one well known example who often explores the grotesque), but rarely if ever can these attributes be deemed to depict beauty.

I’m currently no more inclined to try to define “the aesthetic” than I am to define either “beauty” or “art”. Doubt that I could. But, notwithstanding, my sense is that for art to in any way captivate an audience or even the artist him/herself it will need to be found aesthetic by the same - even if it is deemed ugly (e.g., some of Goya’s later works - I at least find them ugly but very aesthetic), nonsensical (e.g., many a Dadaist’s), or so forth. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be deemed of worth to the beholder.

So, from this I conclude that for art to be effective it needs to be aesthetic - though not necessarily beautiful.

That's one interpretation, sure. Do you see any relation between the quantum vacuum and wisdom? or virtue? or anything else that directly or indirectly governs all human behaviors? It is deemed to be an "absolute governing force" after all.

For Spir the principle of identity is not only the fundamental law of knowledge, it is also an ontological principle, expression of the unconditioned essence of reality (Realität=Identität mit sich), which is opposed to the empirical reality (Wirklichkeit), which in turn is evolution (Geschehen). The principle of identity displays the essence of reality: only that which is identical to itself is real, the empirical world is ever-changing, therefore it is not real. Thus the empirical world has an illusory character, because phenomena are ever-changing, and empirical reality is unknowable. — Afrikan Spir, Ontology

(I've found a well-formatted translation of his major work, which I'm going to try and get around to studying.) — Wayfarer

Interesting stuff. I do greatly like the boldfaced part of this quote from the same Wikipedia page:

[…] the principle of identity, which is the characteristic of the supreme being, of the absolute, of God. God is not the creator deity of the universe and mankind, but man's true nature and the norm of all things, in general. [...] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afrikan_Spir#Religion_and_morality

While I don’t want to take away from the want to read him …

I myself differ in what I take the quote to be saying (further reinforced by the Wikipedia page) in that I don’t find identity to entail absolute permanence but, instead, relative permanence. This to me touches upon an old conundrum: Flux of what is (akin to a wave or a process) vs. permanency of what is (akin to a particle or an entity) - and, to my mind, taking into account that we and our mental faculties are intrinsic aspects of nature, this imo results in a kind of flux/permanency duality intrinsic to nature at large. To me, somewhat like what I take to be the more traditional version of the Buddhism mantra that neither is there a self (hence, a fixed personal identity) nor is there not a self (hence, lack of personal identity over time). Even if one adopts the more extreme view of process philosophies wherein nothing is absolute, one would still be untruthful if one where to state that one does not immediately apprehend the world in terms of entities - which I’d again say are relatively permanent - and the processes these engage in (like an immediate perceptual observation that the cat (entity) is running up a tree (process)). The identity of the Absolute, to my mind, would be divinely simple/partless and limitless in all ways … hence in my view not being that which we commonly associate with identity (I'm hoping that makes sense). But as “the principle of identity” … I’d need to read the guy to better understand.

On a somewhat related note, as you’ve yourself expressed over the years if I remember right, there can be deemed to be different types and gradations of reality - with “the Real” as their pinnacle, this being the only absolutely permanent reality that there is. The dream I had last night was real (unless I’m lying about having had one); as is the intersubjective culture(s) I pertain to; as is the empirical reality of a solid earth beneath our feet; as is - or so some of us maintain - the Real, i.e. the singular Absolute state of being (of which “the One”, Brahman, Nirvana, and so forth might be different visages of, understandings of the exact same given that emerge through different human and cultural perspectives). And the Absolute might well be neither entity nor process, yet still be being per se. So even in granting that the empirical world is Maya, illusion, this in an ultimate sense when contrasted with “the Real”, I’ll say that it nevertheless constitutes an important type of reality of which we do know a plethora of things about (to be clear, this in non-infallible ways).

I’ve probably rambled, and I get that all this might be overly opinionated. All the same.

A worthwhile mention while I’m at it: Heraclitus, despite his philosophy of cosmic flux - and despite his fragments being open to interpretation - held a belief in a singular, absolute governing force that stands apart from all else - what we could nowadays label a belief in “the Real” or the Absolute.

In the fragments, Heraclitus describes a single force that stands apart from all else and guides the universe according to a set purpose. Heraclitus calls this force 'the god', 'the wise', 'the one', Zeus, and the thunderbolt, and he explicitly connects these four words with each other in the fragments. Fragment 41 identifies this controlling force as 'the wise' and 'the one', showing that these two names stand for the same concept in Heraclitus' thought: — https://www.swarthmore.edu/classics/heraclitus-and-divine

Alright. Cool. thanks

I'm an electron! :wink: — Hillary

Alright you. Enough said.

Out of curiosity, what do you make of the particle-wave duality? Do you take electrons to be both particles and waves at the same time and in the same respect? (Just remembered that many organic molecules - which are big - exhibit the same particle-wave duality. But that aside.)

I'm not going to unpack everything, and I'm not here to debate the nature of QM, but this:

A vase can't change into a fork because then the vase is not the vase anymore, unless the fork is a vase in disguise. — Hillary

... is not what the law of identity states. See my previous post again. A vase can change into a fork ... maybe as can occur in a cartoon. But a vase cannot be a fork at the same time and in the same respect (... unless, of course, one considers the implausibility of a hybrid: something one can use as a vase at one time and as a fork at another. But, then, this hybrid's identity would itself be different from either that of a strict vase or that of a strict fork. The law of identity remains intact.)

One can postulate that QM operates beyond the laws of thought all one pleases, but this does not in any way evidence that we can ourselves think in manners that are not governed by the laws of thought.

Weieieird.... — Hillary

Trying out my luck at explaining the law of identity in a manner that might be understood.

That which is (A) is not and cannot be that which it is not (not-A). This being a more long-winded way of saying that “each given is identical with itself”, or “A = A”. Which is what the law of identity stipulates to be an innate and determinate aspect of our awareness and, derivatively, of how we think. Hence being deemed "a law of thought" - since it is deemed to govern all thought without exception.

This can be falsified by some given A being cognized as not-A at the same time and in the same respect.

So, if A = “two electrons in superposition” then A is and can only be “two electrons in superposition” - but not “four electrons in superposition” or else “strawberry cake” etc.

In agreement with what you wrote. Materialism is an ingrained aspect of our culture at large, with a lot of history to this.

I'm still thinking that it's, should I say "technically", distinct from the methodology and outcomes of the empirical sciences per se. In other words, I for example find that in a different possible world where the prevailing cultural view is that of idealism, the empirical sciences would still be indispensable for optimally appraising the truth of that which is universally observable by - and which universally affects - all in principle if not also in practice (hence, what we term the physical ... or what in Peircean philosophy of objective idealism is deemed effete mind).

Physicalism is a metaphysics. But they like to think it is not. — Jackson

Yes, agreed.

And science, or at any rate ‘modern’ science, operates from certain assumptions about what is real, what counts as evidence, and so on. It’s implicitly physicalist in outlook - ‘implicitly’ because physicalism may not be explicitly stated or defended as a philosophical tenet, but simply assumed. — Wayfarer

This got me thinking. According the Pew Research Center, about half of all scientists are neither atheists nor agnostics. This is much lower than the proportion of spirituality in the general population. And I haven't read the entire article. But still, to me this evidences that the empirical sciences do not require an assumption of physicalism in order to be successfully engaged in.

I rather see it as the empirical sciences tend to only hold efficacy regarding physicality - this excluding notable exceptions such as that of the cognitive sciences (which research cognition in empirical manners). So for the philosophical naturalist, if the only tool at one's disposal is a hammer ...

What I meant to say is that if we require science to require all theories to be empirically testable, then philosophical naturalism is not a scientific view, and further under the same arguments for why ID should be kept out of the classroom apply to naturalism as well.

Furthermore, the claim that all life came about by unguided evolution is therefore not scientific either, as it cannot be falsified. Assertions of teleology, and similarly, lack of teleology, would fall under this umbrella. — Paulm12

In a rational humanity devoid of hypocrisy, in a word, yes.

There are two typical understanding of "science": One is any branch of learning. Here mathematics can be construed a science, as can technology, archeology, etc. But then so too can mythology (it’s a branch of learning). Or, else, fartology as the branch of learning how and when to properly fart. The other understanding is that it is shorthand for the empirical sciences. Here, all conclusions are inductively obtained from empirical data that can be replicated by others - lest it be illusory or else outright deception - itself derived from falsifiable hypotheses which the data either evidences/verifies (but never conclusively proves) or else falsifies (thereby conclusively proving the one or more hypotheses false). Without this system/methodology that incorporates falsifiability, anything could go: including an in-depth theory/paradigm accounting for all aspects of the universe in terms of invisible unicorns with magical powers that surround.

Where there is confusion between the two understandings of science, the empirical sciences lose their efficacy and, in turn, their validity. At the very least in the public eye.

Since this is a philosophy forum, the methodology of the empirical sciences is itself founded upon philosophical principles. Nevertheless, in so far as these amount to the methodology of the empirical sciences, the empirical sciences will themselves be utterly distinct from the branch of learning termed philosophy at large. The empirical sciences are also greatly reliant upon non-empirical-science branches of learning, in particular that of mathematics (here first and foremost in terms of statistical analysis of data).

Because the empirical sciences are limited, in part, to data that can be replicated by any other, they by default cannot be applied to things such as the reality of anything spiritual - if there might be one - which by its very nature of so being (if it in fact to any extent occurs) is not ubiquitously profane and thereby equally observable by all in principle.

Gravity and natural selection are in and of themselves theories regarding broad spectrums of data obtained or else confirmed by the empirical sciences - but are not in and of themselves applied empirical sciences. Nonetheless, as theories they are falsifiable by potential empirical data (a replicable observation of apples that move upward into the skies or, else, a replicable observation of a lifeform in the fossil record devoid of any taxonomical lineage - like the discovery of a fossilized griffin), and as theories are furthermore evidenced/verified by all empirical data.

Not that this presents a complete picture, nevertheless:

Neither philosophical naturalism nor Intelligent Design can be empirically falsified via observable data that is necessarily replicable by all others. Neither are, nor can be, integral aspects of the empirical sciences proper. But both can be deemed sciences, by those who uphold them, in the generalized sense of “branches of learning”.

So no, Intelligent Design is not a valid scientific theory (if one is addressing the empirical sciences).

What are those? — Hillary

Never mind.

A Chimera (from Greek mythology) can magically teleport itself or it cannot. — javra

A quantum particle hops non-locally between different position, within the bounds of the wavefunction. — Hillary

Seems like a bit of a non sequitur ... Can you either cite references of this being "the magical teleportation of quantum particles which they willfully enact" or else independently provide rational evidence for the same?

For instance, why would self-imposed/willed magical teleportation logically need to be bounded by anything physical, wave-functions included? Its magic, after all.

Secondly, your reply doesn't seem to address the logical necessities of identity, of noncontradiction, and of the excluded middle. Last I recall, QM is riddled with what appear to us to be logical inconsistencies. The delayed-choice quantum erasure as just one example which I'm personally astounded by.

Give me one example of a logical necessity. I can point to a natural process corresponding to it. — Hillary

A proposition containing logical necessities whose subject matter does not correspond to any natural processes or entities:

A Chimera (from Greek mythology) can magically teleport itself or it cannot.

The principle of identity stipulates the following logical necessity: “A Chimera that can magically teleport itself” is equivalent to “a Chimera that can magically teleport itself”.

The principle of noncontradiction stipulates the following logical necessity: A Chimera cannot both be capable of magically teleporting itself and incapable of magically teleporting itself at the same time and in the same respect.

The principle of the excluded middle stipulates the following logical necessity: there cannot be a medial state of being in-between those of “can magically teleport itself” and “cannot magically teleport itself”.

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I don't see the epistemic cut between physical causation and logical necessity in the aforementioned.

Then again, some such as myself will claim that these same three laws of thought are natural laws. Such that they govern not only all of thought (some of which has little to nothing to do with natural process and entities) but all of nature.

To be clearer:

evolution: natural selection upon mutations ... and further details related to this
biology: the study of life

If the argument is that the occurrence of life explains the occurrence of consciousness ... I'll be parting from the debate. My intuitive gut belief is that life and consciousness are correlated. But I can't provide you with a proof of this.

You can't talk about evolution without the biology. — L'éléphant

Hey, never claimed you can. But evolution is what happens to biological beings. They're not the same thing.

We can't say that computing is the same as thinking. — L'éléphant

I agree. As different examples, plants and even ameba exhibit intelligent behavior. Are they intelligent? They are alive; and some, such as myself, deem them to have awareness, hence some measure of consciousness.

At any rate, I still hold these questions to not be answerable via biological evolution per se.

Maybe we can agree to disagree ... this with gratitude for your answers.