In agreement with what you wrote. Materialism is an ingrained aspect of our culture at large, with a lot of history to this.

I'm still thinking that it's, should I say "technically", distinct from the methodology and outcomes of the empirical sciences per se. In other words, I for example find that in a different possible world where the prevailing cultural view is that of idealism, the empirical sciences would still be indispensable for optimally appraising the truth of that which is universally observable by - and which universally affects - all in principle if not also in practice (hence, what we term the physical ... or what in Peircean philosophy of objective idealism is deemed effete mind).

Physicalism is a metaphysics. But they like to think it is not. — Jackson

Yes, agreed.

And science, or at any rate ‘modern’ science, operates from certain assumptions about what is real, what counts as evidence, and so on. It’s implicitly physicalist in outlook - ‘implicitly’ because physicalism may not be explicitly stated or defended as a philosophical tenet, but simply assumed. — Wayfarer

This got me thinking. According the Pew Research Center, about half of all scientists are neither atheists nor agnostics. This is much lower than the proportion of spirituality in the general population. And I haven't read the entire article. But still, to me this evidences that the empirical sciences do not require an assumption of physicalism in order to be successfully engaged in.

I rather see it as the empirical sciences tend to only hold efficacy regarding physicality - this excluding notable exceptions such as that of the cognitive sciences (which research cognition in empirical manners). So for the philosophical naturalist, if the only tool at one's disposal is a hammer ...

What I meant to say is that if we require science to require all theories to be empirically testable, then philosophical naturalism is not a scientific view, and further under the same arguments for why ID should be kept out of the classroom apply to naturalism as well.

Furthermore, the claim that all life came about by unguided evolution is therefore not scientific either, as it cannot be falsified. Assertions of teleology, and similarly, lack of teleology, would fall under this umbrella. — Paulm12

In a rational humanity devoid of hypocrisy, in a word, yes.

There are two typical understanding of "science": One is any branch of learning. Here mathematics can be construed a science, as can technology, archeology, etc. But then so too can mythology (it’s a branch of learning). Or, else, fartology as the branch of learning how and when to properly fart. The other understanding is that it is shorthand for the empirical sciences. Here, all conclusions are inductively obtained from empirical data that can be replicated by others - lest it be illusory or else outright deception - itself derived from falsifiable hypotheses which the data either evidences/verifies (but never conclusively proves) or else falsifies (thereby conclusively proving the one or more hypotheses false). Without this system/methodology that incorporates falsifiability, anything could go: including an in-depth theory/paradigm accounting for all aspects of the universe in terms of invisible unicorns with magical powers that surround.

Where there is confusion between the two understandings of science, the empirical sciences lose their efficacy and, in turn, their validity. At the very least in the public eye.

Since this is a philosophy forum, the methodology of the empirical sciences is itself founded upon philosophical principles. Nevertheless, in so far as these amount to the methodology of the empirical sciences, the empirical sciences will themselves be utterly distinct from the branch of learning termed philosophy at large. The empirical sciences are also greatly reliant upon non-empirical-science branches of learning, in particular that of mathematics (here first and foremost in terms of statistical analysis of data).

Because the empirical sciences are limited, in part, to data that can be replicated by any other, they by default cannot be applied to things such as the reality of anything spiritual - if there might be one - which by its very nature of so being (if it in fact to any extent occurs) is not ubiquitously profane and thereby equally observable by all in principle.

Gravity and natural selection are in and of themselves theories regarding broad spectrums of data obtained or else confirmed by the empirical sciences - but are not in and of themselves applied empirical sciences. Nonetheless, as theories they are falsifiable by potential empirical data (a replicable observation of apples that move upward into the skies or, else, a replicable observation of a lifeform in the fossil record devoid of any taxonomical lineage - like the discovery of a fossilized griffin), and as theories are furthermore evidenced/verified by all empirical data.

Not that this presents a complete picture, nevertheless:

Neither philosophical naturalism nor Intelligent Design can be empirically falsified via observable data that is necessarily replicable by all others. Neither are, nor can be, integral aspects of the empirical sciences proper. But both can be deemed sciences, by those who uphold them, in the generalized sense of “branches of learning”.

So no, Intelligent Design is not a valid scientific theory (if one is addressing the empirical sciences).

What are those? — Hillary

Never mind.

A Chimera (from Greek mythology) can magically teleport itself or it cannot. — javra

A quantum particle hops non-locally between different position, within the bounds of the wavefunction. — Hillary

Seems like a bit of a non sequitur ... Can you either cite references of this being "the magical teleportation of quantum particles which they willfully enact" or else independently provide rational evidence for the same?

For instance, why would self-imposed/willed magical teleportation logically need to be bounded by anything physical, wave-functions included? Its magic, after all.

Secondly, your reply doesn't seem to address the logical necessities of identity, of noncontradiction, and of the excluded middle. Last I recall, QM is riddled with what appear to us to be logical inconsistencies. The delayed-choice quantum erasure as just one example which I'm personally astounded by.

Give me one example of a logical necessity. I can point to a natural process corresponding to it. — Hillary

A proposition containing logical necessities whose subject matter does not correspond to any natural processes or entities:

A Chimera (from Greek mythology) can magically teleport itself or it cannot.

The principle of identity stipulates the following logical necessity: “A Chimera that can magically teleport itself” is equivalent to “a Chimera that can magically teleport itself”.

The principle of noncontradiction stipulates the following logical necessity: A Chimera cannot both be capable of magically teleporting itself and incapable of magically teleporting itself at the same time and in the same respect.

The principle of the excluded middle stipulates the following logical necessity: there cannot be a medial state of being in-between those of “can magically teleport itself” and “cannot magically teleport itself”.

------

I don't see the epistemic cut between physical causation and logical necessity in the aforementioned.

Then again, some such as myself will claim that these same three laws of thought are natural laws. Such that they govern not only all of thought (some of which has little to nothing to do with natural process and entities) but all of nature.

To be clearer:

evolution: natural selection upon mutations ... and further details related to this
biology: the study of life

If the argument is that the occurrence of life explains the occurrence of consciousness ... I'll be parting from the debate. My intuitive gut belief is that life and consciousness are correlated. But I can't provide you with a proof of this.

You can't talk about evolution without the biology. — L'éléphant

Hey, never claimed you can. But evolution is what happens to biological beings. They're not the same thing.

We can't say that computing is the same as thinking. — L'éléphant

I agree. As different examples, plants and even ameba exhibit intelligent behavior. Are they intelligent? They are alive; and some, such as myself, deem them to have awareness, hence some measure of consciousness.

At any rate, I still hold these questions to not be answerable via biological evolution per se.

Maybe we can agree to disagree ... this with gratitude for your answers.

I need to revisit those articles, as I'm not sure if they're adequate as sources of how intelligence (hence consciousness) developed. — L'éléphant

OK. Yet one can have intelligence in the absence of consciousness. Current AI as example. They're not the same.

So, we can proceed then to discuss how biology is the reason why consciousness exists -- as a start. — L'éléphant

This is a significant change in argument. The OP, to which I responded, addresses evolution as explanation for consciousness - not biology. There's a very distinct difference between the two.

What is lacking in our accepted definition/description of consciousness? Because I'm good with it. But if you're not, what's your definition of consciousness in humans, in animals? — L'éléphant

I've missed our agreed upon definition of consciousness. By common standard, it can be deemed equivelent to awareness, hence to a first person point of view, hence to firsthand experience.

Is this something we agree upon?

BTW, my personal take - which I find not possible to definitively prove - is that consciousness is a staple factor of all lifeforms.

They do. Let's cite some studies from the medical community. For example, the consciousness of babies is defined as that recognizing the mother's voice and face, then later awareness of body parts, etc. As adults we are aware of our own mortality and what is death. So, we are aware of the future and what happened in the past.

Tell me, what is it that's inadequate as explanation in your opinion? Let's start there. — L'éléphant

What you provide is not an explanation of how consciousness comes about via the mechanisms of biological evolution - in brief, natural selection acting upon mutations.

It is of course adequate as an explanation. But, again, it is not an explanation via biological evolution. Biological evolution does not address at which stage of an embryo does the species-specific consciousness takes hold. Nor does it address if gametes are themselves conscious But note that a sperm is well recorded as recognizing direction toward the egg and, furthermore, contact with the egg, at which point the sperm attempts to penetrate the egg. Whether or not this evidences some degree of consciousness on the part of sperm is again not something that biological evolution in any way addresses, much less explains.

Whether all life requires some degree of consciousness (firsthand experience) in order to function or else whether consciousness appears at some point in life's evolution is not something that evolution of itself explains.

Again the issue I'm addressing is biological evolution explaining the how of consciousness. Just that.

To be clear, my question was that of “how does biological evolution explain how consciousness comes about, this when biological evolution (as theory we employ for explanations and predictions) does not of itself provide us with an explanation of what is conscious and what is not conscious."

This has to do with the limitations of biological evolution as a system of explanation, and not with our firsthand experiential knowledge of so being conscious.

What does and does not have consciousness is an inter-disciplinary topic covered by biology, psychology, and specialized areas such as neurology. — L'éléphant

You're not mentioning philosophy, which I think is of greater importance than the disciplines you've mentioned. The cogito comes to mind on one side of the spectrum. Philosophies such as that of autopoiesis in respect to non-human minds on the other.

It's hard to have a discussion when one starts with "what does and does not have consciousness", because we know humans have consciousness. — L'éléphant

Sure, but we don't know this via our inferential knowledge of biological evolution, right?

Philosophically, we cannot answer why humans have sensations, consciousness, and feelings. We can only answer the how humans became this way -- through mutation, evolution, etc. — L'éléphant

Yep, I agree. — schopenhauer1

Maybe I'm misinterpreting or else missing something. So I'll ask: How can the mechanics of biological evolution explain how consciousness comes about when it cannot provide an explanation of what does and does not have consciousness?

Assuming that a dolphin has firsthand experience of its species-specific senses, what is it like for the dolphin to perceive its surroundings via echolocation? Or for the homing pigeon to perceive the skies via magnetoception? And so forth. It converges the experience of sense-dependent phenomena we ourselves do not experience with the experience of understanding these phenomena in manners that allow the organism to function. This as occurs in firsthand experience.

That’s my understanding of the phrase.

For instance, assuming that a homing pigeon has firsthand experiences of the world, I have no idea what a homing pigeon's awareness of the Earth's magnetic field is like. But I know it wouldn't be visual in the way that I visually perceive the world - for I don't have perceptual awareness of the Earth's magnetic field, be it visually or in any other manner.

How does one actually get the point across why this is not an acceptable answer as far as the hard problem is concerned? — schopenhauer1

As something different from the answers already provided, that biological evolution has taken place in no way specifies what does, and does not, have consciousness. First off, we know we have consciousness because we experientially know we are conscious (and not because biological evolution tells us so). Secondly, we infer that we acquired the specific forms of our consciousness via evolution. To which I say of course. But how can evolution explain if nematodes (which have a nervous system) have, or don’t have, consciousness? The same question can be asked of any other non-human lifeform, ameba included. Note: all I mean by “consciousness” here is “firsthand experience”.

The occurrence of evolution no more explains the occurrence of consciousness than does the occurrence of change: as in, consciousness occurs because change occurs. Which is to say, it holds no satisfactory explanations regarding the matter. Because it does not explain what does, and does not, have consciousness, it does not explain why consciousness is nor how consciousness comes to be wherever it does.

I don't want to bicker either. It was just what I hoped to be a helpful clarification. — Benkei

Thanks. :smile:

I'm not sure this is particular to current markets. All market transactions, even before capitalism, aim at that short term goal: profit.

[...]

So I think there's just more of it rather than that we've become more shortsighted than in the past. — Benkei

To my mind, there is such a thing as the delayed gratification of profiting more from long-term investments. Which requires more forethought. Short-term investments do not require the long-term sustainability of the business, or even of the business model for that matter. It's what populates the world with pyramid schemes - be these hidden or out in the open.

Then again, to me, an economic model axiomatically founded on infinite growth and resources which unfolds in a finite world is, simplistically addressed, itself a large scale kind of pyramid scheme.

I don't know enough about the subject to explore the nuances of how things have changed over the span of decades and centuries, but I do find this to be the current state of affairs. And, in so being, to be detrimental to our long-term benefit.

Hence my opinion that forethought, such as in the form of long-sighted interests in regard to profit, is not something which is selected for via optimal profits in our - at least - currently held, global economy.

As I initially commented, I'm all for a meritocratic economy of competition, but am opposed to the current, by now almost ingrained, outcome of those who are greedy being most deserving of the greatest profits (and along with these, of greatest financial power over others). Again, though - other than the vague, sophomoric, and overly idealistic notion of "raising human consciousness" or some such - I don't know how this problem could be corrected via the implementation of a different economic model in a democratic system.

The materialism-antimaterialism debate no longer holds much interest for me. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Were it to be so for most. Who knows? Time will tell.

Materialism tells a good part of the story - but any kind of extremism is, to my view, ill-advised. — ZzzoneiroCosm

also

What I mean to say is there is some kind of relationship (link, connection) between mystical and schizophrenic phenomena and experience. It's a complex relationship (link, connection) and this thread is designed to increase my understanding of it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

To be clear, I acknowledge the often occurring commonalities between mysticism and madness so far presented. That said, do you have a working thesis on what distinguishes mysticism from madness that is more philosophically precise than the metaphor of how one deals with waters one is surrounded by?

To me, mystics (that are not madmen self-appraised as mystics) hold insights into (non-materialist) existential truths. At least, that's the best working thesis I have on a whim. At any rate, this to me signifies that materialism/physicalism as a doctrine (and not the presence of the material/physical) is in some way false.

Now you want to revise my phraseology. I said links and I meant links. — ZzzoneiroCosm

As in there can't be mysticism devoid of schizophrenia, bi-polarity, or the like? We may have different understandings of the term "link".

Alright. Got it. Thanks for the clarification.

Not only wrong for so assuming but wrong in methodology as apparently your approach is to make a wild, baseless assumption and then ask if it's wrong. I don't get that. Why do that? — ZzzoneiroCosm

It's a conclusion that materialists are likely to make ... if not the only logically necessitated conclusion which materialism allows. Oh, and materialists are prevalent on this forum.

ought the Dalai Lama be given medications till he holds no more belief in Nirvana and related and/or derivative Buddhist ideas - this on grounds that mysticism is linked to madness? — javra

I never said anything remotely like the above.

Keep reading the thread if you want to learn more about the link. I'll be posting more soon. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I’ve done my fair share of research into psychology and psychiatry. What you and express are nothing novel to me. I could probably further stoke this fire, so to speak, with other similar observations. So what conclusions do you draw from the links/connections correlations you’ve presented - and likely will further express - between the experiences of some mystics and the experiences of some madmen?

More concretely asked: Are all insights from the vast array of mystics to be considered the delusional insights of madmen - and, in so being delusional, thereby devoid of any existential truths? Taoism as just one example among many.

I know that the default answer of materialism is “yes”. Nothing novel in this either. Here, any and all spiritual/non-materialist experiences/insights and related reasoning are at best delusional. I’m so far assuming this is your stance - and, if so, so be it.

I’m asking you so as to find out if I’m wrong in so assuming.

Which also in no way answers the question.

BTW, https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/697780

To clarify my just asked question by example:

A Buddhist mystic with insight into Nirvana will neither talk to Nirvana nor have Nirvana talk back to him/her, yet will be a mystic nonetheless.

The Dalai Lama is likely a case of swimming. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which doesn't answer any of the questions posed.

So much for challenges being fun, I guess. OK, then.

And how does that quote address there being a link between mysticism and madness?

I said that I’m not getting it and that it’s OK by me, and I stand by that. But in speaking to someone aiming for the mental health professions, where choices are made in who is and is not insane:

If some set of cars are linked to some set of red things, there is an analyzable link between said set of cars and said set of red things. — ZzzoneiroCosm

The only link between cars and red things I can find is that some cars will be red things and vice versa - which of itself doesn’t say much regarding the link between cars and red things. One could abstract that both are objects but, again, can't find the importance to this in terms of links. What other significant “links” between these two categories can you think of?

Edit: "If there is a link, then there is a link," is a bit tautological, imo, and doesn't of itself evidence there being a link to begin with.

I think you're concocting difficulties where none are obvious. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which I’m in obvious disagreement with.

At any rate, this thread isn't interrogating the existence of a link between mysticism and madness. I begin with the premise - the assumption, if you like - more accurately, the hypothesis, grounded in lifelong more or less scholarly interest in and research of both phenomena - that a link exists between mysticism and madness. — ZzzoneiroCosm

So, granting that the present Dalai Lama is sincere in his views and thereby a mystic, what would link the present Dalai Lama to madness? And, more concretely: in your view, ought the Dalai Lama be given medications till he holds no more belief in Nirvana and related and/or derivative Buddhist ideas - this on grounds that mysticism is linked to madness?

I appreciate your challenge, challenges are fun. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Consider me here to please.

This suggests shares trading affects investment but that's not how it works. — Benkei

I don't want to bicker on the details of how things work; it's not a field I deem myself to be sufficiently knowledgeable about.

But I am curious to know if you disagree with the overall conclusion that current markets by and large select for short-sighted / short-term interests at the expense of long-sighted / long-term interests.

The gas prices of tomorrow verses the global economic insecurity of global warming as one, granted simplistic, example.

If some Xs are linked to some Ys - but we grant that not all Xs are linked to all Ys - there is still a link, an analyzable link, between X and Y. — ZzzoneiroCosm

If some cars are linked to some red things - but we grant that not all cars are linked to all red things - there is still a link, an analyzable link, between car and red thing.

I'm not getting it, but OK.

I'd like to take a look at the link between madness and mysticism. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Since this is a philosophy forum, what I take to be commonsense reasoning: That some X’s are Y’s and some Y’s are X’s does not imply that all X’s are Y’s and vice versa, thereby requiring a linkage between the two.

Not all mystics are schizophrenics, and not all schizophrenics are mystics.

Treating the two as though they are linked is as irrational, to not say irresponsible, as would be the prejudicial conviction that there is a linkage between materialists and idiocy - to address an example that a materialist might better grasp.

The fact of life that some materialists are idiots, and that some idiots are materialists, does not then rationally imply that there is a linkage between idiocy and materialism. Same with any contrived linkage between madness and mysticism.

Unless, of course, one assumes that (intelligent?) materialist platform from which any spiritual insight or experience is indicative of unhealth - this by sheer fact of not being accordant to a materialistic world view of reality.

It wouldn’t be “profit over everything”, there would be less short term thinking, more investment in communities and general welfare. — Xtrix

I know you're using shorthand in the statement "profit over everything" but to try to spell out what I find to be pivotal to this: profit for whom?

I think most will agree that it ought to be “profit for those deserving of it”, harkening back to what initially was the satirical term “meritocracy”.

Current global economy works by selecting for, as you mention, short-sighted interests profiting over long-sighted interests. Pithily expressed in the dictum “greed is good”. So those who are most greedy then gain most profits and, in tandem, most power over the way things should and will be - selecting against most all non-greedy interests, this in the long term at least.

For instance, you have 10 corporations with stocks that compete. As it currently stands in the world we have, if one of these ten corporations desires to invest some of its profits in being non-toxic to the environment, it will make less profits in the short term. Stock owners will then tend to invest in any of the other 9 corporations, resulting in this one environmentally sound corporation loosing out and, quite possibly, going out of existence. The corporations with short-sighted interest profit at the expense of those with long-sighted interests, as so too profit those investors in stocks who don’t care about long-term consequences but about their short-term profits.

I find that governance - here tersely read as intent regarding future outcomes - of some kind is always in some way in control of economics - here tersely read as what resources are appropriated to whom. And never the other way around. As a more concrete example, the state always governs who has what in some way - taxation laws as one example - regardless of how de-regulative it claims to be. This in order for the state to maintain itself. Trouble is, there of as yet is no (one would hope democratic) global governance regarding things such as a globally uniform taxation policy, despite there being a quite global economy. Which results in those countries that are more long-sighted in their governance of economy tending to lose out economically to those countries that value short-sighted profits. Simplistically, any country that increases the taxes of ultra-rich corporations, for example, will have these same corporations migrating as best they can to countries where these taxations don’t occur (the same can be said of individual states in the USA), and so will lose out on profits from taxes - inevitably impoverishing its citizens. Globally, this general problem to me is most apparent in terms of corporations’ migration to countries with little to no labor rights, hence where corporations maximize their profits via exploitation of workers … leading to a global race toward minimizing labor rights.

At any rate, I tend to agree with you. But I don’t find the problem to be that of profit over everything per se (to the extent I'm interpreting you properly) but, again, that of the human-devised system we currently have (which will inevitably select for profit being realized for some human traits at the expense of some other human traits) such that what is selected for nowadays is short-sighted interests at the expense of long-sighted interests. Which those who seek to become wealthy must incorporate to so become.

For the record, I can’t discern any easy fix to the problem I see in current economics. Still mentioning it because I find there can be no resolutions if problems aren’t identified. Maybe tangential to OP, but still...

Hey, I agree with you. I'll be reading to see if others see it differently.

Computer processes things. If the universe is a process then where do its inputs come from. A difference machine which has randomness in it. — Jackson

(I should have articulated "an uncreated cosmic computer that feeds off itself" rather than simply say "computer ..."; it's what I intended at any rate.)

So, if the universe is an uncreated cosmic computer with randomness as inputs for its processes, would it then be properly conceived of as alive/animate/organic, dead, inanimate and perfectly fixed (as per the block cosmos), or something other? Can't figure out what the other could be in this scenario.

Cheers, mate.

Leibniz was to the first of think of the entire universe as a computer. Feeding off itself. — Jackson

Interesting: can a computer that feeds off itself - reminiscent to me of the Ouroboros symbol's significance - not be conceived of as organic? And, if organic, to what extent can it be conceived of as a computer?

... trying to work through some semantics.

Conclusion: The cosmos is not like a machine but like an uncreated being. Of course, this would welcome in concepts of pantheism and panentheism as God. Is the cosmos evil? “In part; in part not,” seems to be the most appropriate answer.

Or can one have a machine devoid of design?

Not that I find your reply addressed my questions in regard to truth, good, and beauty/fairness (I'm living with it just fine), but OK. Yup, monkeys (and other animals) - can not only communicate but also intentionally deceive - thereby evidencing innate awareness not only of what is true and what is false but of what is termed a theory of mind.

But then establishing the truth of it? Some of us are still trying to establish the truth of “I am”. — javra

Very sensible. First is it true? then, (if I am), am I good? and am i beautiful? can be considered. — unenlightened

I can work with your appraisal.

How would you respond to the claim that “even primordial sentience needs to be innately aware of truths (conformities to what is real) in order to survive; that only more developed sentience will become in any way aware of notions of ethical good; and that the awareness of beauty is relegated only to the most developed of sentience,” this as we know of sentience on planet Earth … say from monocellular organisms (granting their being sentient) to humans?

This addresses “awareness of”, be it consciously reasoned or not. But, then again, why care at all about truth (lower case “t”) if it is neither a good to be pursued nor something just and, thereby, an aspect of what is fair? This at least for us humans that can discern and contemplate all three.

(For instance, your reply to 180 Proof seems to indicate that truth is both good and fair (in the sense of just).)

the reality of X or any of its properties — javra

Properties and relations are where correspondence gets too grand for me. They are too much like verbs and adjectives to be plausible as contenders for ontological commitment along with X, Y and Z. And they aren't required for asserting truths about X, Y and Z. — bongo fury

I kind of want to ask, though a bit off topic: a property of liquid water (not ice or steam) is that it's wet. I can sort of see the argument that wetness is subjectivity dependent, hence mind-dependent, hence not "objective" in the sense of mind-independence. Still, would you be arguing that the wetness of water does not correspond to reality? If so, on the grounds that I've just mentioned? (Probably won't argue with your answer; just curious.)