I'm hesitant to invoke tales of what early human society must have been like and how that embedded itself in our DNA and that can then be used to explain our current behavior. Such tales are highly speculative and really not based on scientific evidence. I take them as "just so stories." — Hanover

In case this is of interest:

Setting aside tribal societies the world over, both ancient and modern - a fair enough portion of which are best inferred to either be matriarchal or, more commonly, of equivalent social power between male and female roles and abilities - there’s the longest standing society known to humankind: ancient Egypt. Its dynastic period lasted roughly three millennia; and one can deem that ancient Egypt society at large lasted six millennia if one includes ancient Egypt’s predynastic era. This early human society is certainly not an insignificant blimp on the screen of human history, nor is it a mere anomaly in terms of what our innate, genetically inherited human nature is capable of.

Though the number is disputed, it’s factually known that the ancient Egypt empire had several female pharaohs. This fact should be considered in concurrence with the following:

Women in ancient Egypt were accorded almost equal status with men in keeping with an ancient tale that, after the dawn of creation when Osiris and Isis reigned over the world, Isis made the sexes equal in power. — Love, Sex, and Marriage in Ancient Egypt - Joshua J. Mark

It wasn’t an idealized total equality between men and women in an advanced society, true. But meanwhile Anglo-Saxon cultures still have sometimes grave issues with electing female presidents. Then again, our primary religion(s) tends to place the value of maleness way above that of femaleness via the religion’s creation mythologies. God being a “he”; Eve being just a rib from Adam’s body and not (at least directly) endowed with the “breath of the Lord”; so forth. Then again, the acceptability of incest in ancient Egypt can also be traced back to its creation myths: Osiris and Isis where after all both lovers and siblings.

BTW, if the quality of references is wanting, couldn't find better ones for this post on a whim. But may I be fact-checked if needed.

That's what I mean by an actual human putting the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude. You just did it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

OK, yea. I can't express my beliefs regarding the cat without doing so. I was however aiming at the notion that the cat expresses its propositional attitude to the dog, sometimes quite successfully - this with both being languageless creatures.

But, yea, I know: in order to so express I need to put both the cat's and dog's beliefs into the form of a propositional attitude. If only the circularity of it all could be somehow done away with ...

As I have argued, a priori intuitions or any such introspection will not survive contact.

Everyone has a plan 'till they get punched in the mouth.
— Mike Tyson

Hence virtue ethics - but that's a longer story — Banno

:smirk: — 180 Proof

As Evander Holyfield can attest to, many do have a plan for when they are punched in the mouth – and can cope ethically enough even when their ears are unexpectedly bitten off by dumbass assholes. But we’re championing the dumbass’s affirmation as sound by placing it in boldface?

Question: What is “virtue”?
Answer: You know it when you see it.
Second Question: How so? For example: Why is Tyson’s boldfaced statement deemed virtuous, if it is?

[...] it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put things into the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Rascal that I sometimes am, I’ll question the weirdness of so doing. As a commonly known example: a snarling dog with hairs on end and bared fangs seems to me to be holding a propositional attitude in so manifesting: basically expressing to its interlocuter the following proposition “I am capable of inflicting gravely unwanted pain upon you” - which can either be true or false - and furthermore holding the conviction that what it is conveying is true. It’s the dog’s momentarily held belief that it can inflict injury, a belief which the dog furthermore conveys to interlocutors. Same then can be said of the cat cornered by a dog, with the cat hissing and spitting again with hairs on end and exposed teeth.

To my mind, then, here are quite plausible examples of languageless creatures actually holding propositional attitudes which they convey, communicate, to other(s).

These examples can be made all the more complex belief wise were we to entertain the possibility that the lesser animal is bluffing: here believing that they will make the other believe the languageless proposition they are conveying though they themselves are at best uncertain of it’s truth.

Was just doing online research on the topic and, as you can guess, Wikipedia has an entry on it. Here's what it says:

In some societies, cannibalism is a cultural norm. Consumption of a person from within the same community is called endocannibalism; ritual cannibalism of the recently deceased can be part of the grieving process[19] or be seen as a way of guiding the souls of the dead into the bodies of living descendants.[20] Exocannibalism is the consumption of a person from outside the community, usually as a celebration of victory against a rival tribe.[20] Both types of cannibalism can also be fueled by the belief that eating a person's flesh or internal organs will endow the cannibal with some of the characteristics of the deceased.[21] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_cannibalism#Reasons

Neither endocannibalism nor exocannibalism can be classified as murder per se: the first is a sign of respect/love for the already deceased; the latter usually follows warfare, and homicide during warfare is not considered to be murder (deliberate homicide without justification). There might be other examples that you could use, but, tmk, cannibalism as an accepted form of murder among some cultures is not it. "Female circumcision" however does come to mind.

Example: Murder. In cannibalistic societies the available meat protein is scanty. You capture and kill members of OTHER tribes and eat their flesh. — god must be atheist

From my former studies, the rarity of protein doesn't play a major role. Their spirituality however does. It bears heavy on the notion of consuming - both in the sense of devouring and annihilating - one's enemies: this both in terms of body and soul. But I grant, it's been a while since I've read up on the issue.

Abolition is a dreadful idea. Folk need to drink. :wink: — Banno

:razz: For the record, I was addressing it in terms of slavery.

Hence virtue ethics - but that's a longer story. — Banno

Doesn't that beg the question, though: how does anyone discern virtue from vice, kind of thing.

But OK.

One might know oneself best by looking in at one's reflection on the eyes of another. — Banno

:grin: Yes. I find a deeper truth in this then might many others. Needless to add, if one takes it metaphorically rather than physically. Something to do with self in other and other in self: value in that which is universal to all.

Introspection is fine, but it will not tell you how to treat the homeless, or what abortion laws should be in place, or how much to donate to charity.

Ethics is inherently concerned with action, not introspection. Indeed self-reflection is so often an excuse for not acting. — Banno

Issue being asked is what makes ethics existent in the philosophical sense wherein we contemplate and infer a rational answer to the question. Theory regarding the idea/ideal rather than practice wherein this idea/ideal is imperfectly implemented. Or at least so I take the OP to ask.

What, for example, makes abolition ethical even when most, if not all, those who surround you despise you for your intents?

My own hunch is that in order to know how one ought to act one must first know - intuitively if not at a level of conscious understanding - the ideal one is in pursuit of by so acting. To me at least such can only be discovered via reflection regrading what the self (as in both oneself and others) is.

Is contempt for death (or maybe bravery in the face of death) a virtue? — Ciceronianus

Nicely worded. I find it hard to envision how it would not be. From patients with terminal cancer, to risks incurred in sports/activities such as rock-climbing, to the expected professional altruism of firefighters, and the like. Looking the prospect of death in the face and not being afraid come what may seems to be a virtue universal to all cultures and times. I find that it was certainly present as a virtue to be admired in respect to gladiatorial sports.

The "most accessible possible examination" is your interaction with others, which is there for all to see.

An attempt to base ethics on private self-reflection will lead to nonsense. And does.

Ethics isn't an armchair self-examination. It's about getting out in the world, being amongst others, interacting. — Banno

Take away the reality of emotive, consciousness endowed subjects that interact. What remains of ethics? Nothing. Ethics is thus contingent upon this reality. What of this reality brings about the occurrence of ethics? The only possible answer - were one in search for it - can only be found in that which is universal to such subjects: something like "hinge rules" by which all subjects play regardless of their wants and choices. And this cannot be ascertained by looking at what is perceivable in the external world - but only via self-reflection into the universal properties applicable to the cohort of all such subjects, a cohort which one oneself is a constituent of.

Same for the occurrence of aesthetics, or of value in general.

Were interacting with others to of itself be that which defines the ethical, mass murders would then qualify without reserve, for such are known by their interaction with others. Humans, however, don’t typically deem mass murders to be ethical.

I'm not here to try to provide answers to the OP, but I disagree that self-reflection - the notion of knowing oneself - can only be a wrong-minded approach to the matter.

I've embarked on Wittgenstein discussions before. While what you say makes sense, it to me runs counter to Wittgenstein's own words which I'll re-post, boldface mine:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293 by L. Wittgenstein

... not redundant, but irrelevant. To generalize from the one case of one's own being to other people is to be irresponsible. And so forth.

Phenomenologists like Husserl doesn’t think such questions are irrelevant , but his method of answering of them I think has much in common with Wittgenstein’s. That is, consciousness would not be an object but a relational, synthetic activity organized by pragmatic use. — Joshs

Yes to Husserl and cohort not finding such questions irrelevant.

In this context, “object” can have numerous equivocations. One’s own consciousness can be deemed an object of one’s own awareness (not to be confused with “object” in the sense of a physical entity), for it can be that of which one is aware of; i.e., that which one’s awareness is about. Yet, in so being the object of one’s awareness, it likewise need not be deemed to ontically be an object (here, “object” in the sense of an existent entity) - but, this object of one’s awareness (what one’s awareness is about) can well be appraised to be a process: a be-ing. If it needs saying, I of course reject the notion that consciousness is an entity rather than a process. Either way, however, it remains a beetle in a box in terms of Witt’s philosophy.

Edit: In case one is unfamiliar with the terminology, please check out definition #2 in the APA dictionary for "object of consciousness". Namely: "2. anything of which the mind is conscious, including perceptions, mental images, emotions, and so forth, as well as the observing ego, or “I,” of subjective experience. Compare subject of consciousness."

Mistaking the pleasure of watching well played-out combat sports for the pleasure of bloodlust — javra

Why else would one watch combat sports, if not for the pleasure of bloodlust? — baker

For the admiration of skill and stamina within a context that safeguards against what would occur in real life combat where nothing is barred. For example, when someone falls to the ground in a boxing match they're left alone and helped out after a few seconds - rather than having their skull pounded into the hard ground by the opponent (which, for example, happened to a friend of mine in high school when I wasn't there; fortunately resulted in nothing worse than a broken nose). Wanting to see the latter would be bloodlust. Not wanting to see it occur would be an absence of bloodlust.

lesser animals' abilities of awareness pale in comparison to our own — javra

Why do you consider this a matter of awareness, and not of something else? — baker

I take it that greater intelligence, for example, endows an animal with greater awareness regarding what is and could be. Conversely, in the absence of any awareness, no degree or type of intelligence could manifest.

Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic. — javra

If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to
refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense. — Joshs

While acknowledging other’s rather complex interpretations of Wittgenstein, here’s what the guy actually said in his own words:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293 by L. Wittgenstein

Note that the most primordial beetle of all beetles, so to speak, is conscious awareness itself. The question is asked, “Does conscious awareness occur in myself, in humans at large, in other lifeforms?” To which Witt replies, “It would be a beetle in a box, so who knows and who cares? It’s irrelevant.”

As always before, I, personally, am not satisfied by Wittgenstein's answer to this and like issues. This when reading Witt verbatim. Felt like mentioning that.

How do you know that animals aren't aware? — baker

Hm. I fallibly know that unicelled organisms are aware, as are fungi and plants. Needless to then add, as are all lesser animals. Interesting issue for me is whether individual somatic cells, including neurons, are to some degree aware - and I find no reason to conclude they’re not. In fact, I’ve in my life wondered how far animals like dolphins would have gone technologically had they acquired appendages with opposable thumbs (something that’s not going to happen for sea-dwelling life); as intelligent as they might be, they’re however stuck with the body they have, as are all of us. So, in short, you’ve misread my comment.


Thanks for that.

By this he didn’t mean animals didnt think, but that their social behavior constituted language games we couldn’t relate to. — Joshs

And yet when a lion does its thing and roars with a certain tonality in a certain context, we non-lions get the gist of what its conveying well enough: the rough English translation being, “I’m the boss”. Going by their behaviors, so too do zebras and gazelles - or else competitors such as hyenas.

For background, what is your stance on the proposition that lesser animals do not convey propositions?

The beetle in a box argument isnt about verbal language, it’s about social behavior, and a rejection of the idea that any meaning can be intrinsic (like qualia). — Joshs

Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic.

Shoot. Any time.

What makes us better? — TiredThinker

Degrees of awareness rather than divisions between. But these degrees relative to our surviving closest evolutionary kin are so astronomical in magnitude that lesser animals' abilities of awareness pale in comparison to our own.

Otherwise, tool making, conceptualization, conveying info via species-specific signs, and so forth, all these are found in a cline.

So it's controversial to Wittgensteinians because it doesn't accord with a philosophical preference for language-centered epistemologies, cosmologies, etc? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Seems to me to be the case, yes.

Do you take issue with this (to my mind non-controversial) position? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Not one bit. I rather take issue with the notion that the linguistic expression of "my pain" has no relevant referent (this as per the beetle in a box argument).

Languageless creatures have languageless beliefs in the form of thought-patterns and emotional patterns that motivate behavior.

We only need to assume languageless creatures have thoughts and emotions and that these thoughts and emotions have the power to motivate behavior.

I don't see why it needs to be more complicated than that. — ZzzoneiroCosm

:up: Fully agree.

I don't want to say this due to the can of worms that it is, but I will anyway: the problem is one of other minds; in this case where we linguistic ones refuse to grant nonlinguistic beings any relevance. There of course is the evolutionary conundrum to this and like telltales (e.g., shared central nervous system anatomy) to dispel such a view ... but it's not historically uncommon.

What's the controversy? — ZzzoneiroCosm

In absence of @Banno's reply:

I believe it nullifies the importance of the beetle in a box argument - for, in this argument, if it isn’t linguistic it is irrelevant. Whereas to claim that nonlinguistic beliefs can occur is to claim the relevance of nonlinguistic givens. The two appear to stand in direct contradiction.

Again?

So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diplodocus? — Banno

Can a languageless animal experience uncertainty? In my experience at least some of them can. When in any way uncertain - such as when there is hesitation in proceeding a certain way - what else could such animal be possibly uncertain of if not issues regarding what ought and ought not be done in relation to what is or is not?

No proposition is being made yet there occur conflicting beliefs in relation to what is and ought be done for as long as the uncertainty occurs. This proposition-devoid conflict of beliefs* occurring in the mind of the respective languagleless animal.

* Belief as minimally understood to comprise trust in what is or ought to be done.

So if I see people applauding and cheering as a toreador sinks his blades into a bull's sides, that's not schadenfreude-like? These expressions actually represent remorse, love, pity, compassion. I thought these sentiments came with their own distinctive, dedicated physical correlates like :sad: :grimace: :cry:

:up: Next time you take a tumble and somebody laughs/sniggers (at you), you're gonna shake his/her hand, tip your hat, and thank him/her. — Agent Smith

Last I recall the toreador is supposed to bring about a clean kill in the lesser animal, rather than one of excruciating suffering.

That said, when have I ever denied the occurrence of sadistic assholes in the world? Your last sentence specifically leaves a lot to be desired in terms of coherence.

Ah, the vicarious pleasures of watching other life struggle, suffer, and die form a safe distance ... maybe with popcorn ready at hand. — javra

:sad: Oh well, let's not spoil the fun! This is the best the world has to offer by way of enjoyment! Schadenfreude is all we got, take it or leave it! — Agent Smith

Here’s a rephrasing of what I was saying: Mistaking the pleasure of watching well played-out combat sports for the pleasure of bloodlust is on par to mistaking the wails that occur during sexual orgasms for manifestations of suffering. That said, there of course are those who find fun in bloodlust’s fulfilment, this as they find fun the bringing about of others’ suffering via sex - neither of which were unheard of in the Colosseum, for example.



I was ignorant of the phrase's specific origins, so thanks for the reference.

What can be posited to exist without any perceptions or conceptualizations (for perceptions and conceptualizations are awareness-contingent and would in no way occur in the absence of all awareness)? — javra

I would say that absent percipients only what would be perceived if there were percipients could be posited. So, stars planets, mountains, rivers and so on. A cry long list if you include plants. — Janus

My first thought is, could anyone accomplish this positing without the use of their awareness? Take away awareness in general and the very possibility of this supposition seems to me to existentially vanish. What then?

But I grant that you, as with many others, deem it necessary that givens occur in manners fully independent of awareness in general, this in order to justify givens occurring independently of individual instantiations of awareness - the latter being something we all agree upon. In contrast, I’m thinking more along the lines of C.S. Peirce’s notions of idealism wherein “matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming natural laws”. Here, the physical (being effete mind) is contingent on the occurrence of awareness in general - but is not contingent on any individual instantiation of awareness. The former view - wherein matter is fully independent of mind - would seem to create a dualism between mind and matter if not for the supposition of physicalism. In at least this respect, the latter view does not.

At any rate, though we disagree on this point of ontology, thank you for the answer.

If all awareness in the cosmos were to somehow miraculously vanish [...] what, if anything, would remain of the world as we in any way know it? — javra

I would say everything bar percipients and their perceptions. — Janus

In other words, everything bar awareness and awareness-contingent givens. What would that be though?

One should minimally add to your reply conceptualizations - including those of the world past, present, or future; or even of possible worlds - for all conceptualizations are themselves contingent on some instantiation(s) of awareness. So it’s known, I find your answer in current form trivially true and hence uninformative. I can try to rephrase the question in this way: What can be posited to exist without any perceptions or conceptualizations (for perceptions and conceptualizations are awareness-contingent and would in no way occur in the absence of all awareness)?

Perhaps I'm thick, but I didn't understand what you were trying to convey in your first paragraph. — Janus

Or perhaps I haven't explained it well enough. If it's of help, to try to illustrate from a different angle; I’ll allude to what I find to be a parallel-enough metaphysics in this regard: Buddhism. It’s a non-physicalist ontology replete with its causal networks that affirms the lack of a creator psyche for the world. I uphold a like position in regard to the generalities just expressed. If this example is not of help, then it appears I'm currently not that capable of properly expressing myself. I'll work on it some for next time.

You might be interested in this comment. — Wayfarer

I don’t find anything disagreeable in the comment linked to. Thanks for it. I’m just struck by, I’ll call it the awkwardness, of physicalism being in this instance in part defined by the occurrence of awareness that is irreducible to nonawareness. Don’t know if you got a chance to visit the wiki page I linked to: though disagreements are many, turns out panpsychism as concept can nevertheless be deemed amiable to most any system of ontology, depending on who you ask. The only stringent exception being that of emergentism as it regards awareness per se. But when it comes to physicalism - irrespective of what future refinements, if any, might be made to the notion of “panpsychist physicalism”- it seem to completely evaporate the semantics by which physicalism is currently understood. For instance, taken from the first page of the manuscript @Manuel linked to:

What does physicalism involve? What is it, really, to be a physicalist? What is it to be a realistic physicalist, or, more simply, a real physicalist? Well, one thing is absolutely clear. You’re certainly not a realistic physicalist, you’re not a real physicalist, if you deny the existence of the phenomenon whose existence is more certain than the existence of anything else: experience, ‘consciousness’, conscious experience, ‘phenomenology’, experiential ‘what-it’s-likeness’, feeling, sensation, explicit conscious thought as we have it and know it at almost every waking moment. — Galen Strawson -- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism

This statement, of itself, runs counter to what many a physicalist on this website tend to affirm.

Are you positing a collective psyche or something like that? — Janus

As the "creator of the world" you mean? No. Tried to simplistically illustrate what I'm positing via the analogy to geometric points. More concretely, yet still simplistically, replace "geometric points" with "first-person points of view (conscious or otherwise)" and "geometric space" with "physical space". Lots of details to go through for which this forum isn't ideally suited. But the conclusion: physical space is a necessary correlate of there co-occuring two or more first-person points of view - and occurs independently of what these might individually or collectively desire in regard to space's existence. Just as there would be no geometric space in the absence of two or more geometric points, so too would there be no physical space in the absence of two or more instantiations of awareness. As physical space is contingent on there being two or more instantiations of awareness, so too will the physical world in totality of complexity be. But I really don't want to drag this into "my views". In short, though, the answer to the question you posed is "no": there is no creator psyche of the world from where I stand.

In fairness, though, you have so far not directly answered the question I've posed:

If all awareness in the cosmos were to somehow miraculously vanish [...] what, if anything, would remain of the world as we in any way know it? — javra

Regardless of that, what it means to say things exist independently of percipients, is that they are there to be perceived, and there regardless of whether or not they are perceived. — Janus

Right. Of course. Independently of me, or of you, or of any other individual sentience. But would they in any way occur in the complete absence of any and all awareness?

As an analogy, one single geometric point is indefinite, volumeless, and in this sense nonexistent. There must be two or more geometric points to establish any kind of space whatsoever - a space which the two or more geometric points inhabit with location. Now, given that space already is, this entails that a plurality of geometric points occurs. Take any one geometric point away and the given space yet remains due to there yet occurring two or more geometric points to define it. So, relative to individual geometric points, the space they occupy occurs independently of them. Yet, relative to all geometric points, the occurrence of the space they occupy will be dependent on the geometric points' primacy of being.

In like enough manner, the physical world (to not even mention individual objects in it) occurs fully independently of me, or you, of any other individual psyche. But in the absence of all awareness, including that pertaining to psyches, there would be no such thing as a world.

Like an ocean that is made up of water drops. The ocean is in one way fully independent of the individual water drops it consist of: taking a buck of water away makes no difference. Yet, there would be no ocean in the complete absence of all water drops.

This not with an intention to convince but to explain. I agree that the physical world is mind-independent (or indifferent) when addressing individual minds or individual mind cohorts. But I uphold that it is mind-dependent (or at least awareness-dependent) when addressing the occurrence of all coexisting instantiations of awareness.

Its an alternative view to yours - but it does account for why the moon is irrespective of whether I, or you, or some lesser animal somewhere, happens to be mindful of it or not. For one thing, the moon is thoroughly enmeshed in a cosmic causal matrix, the same we're all embedded in, and will thus remain long after we no longer are in this world.

Edit: Panpsychism of some form would then need to be to account for a life-devoid cosmos from which life evolved, this within such a system pivoting on a primacy of awareness.

:up: Thanks a bunch. I'll check it out.

If we believe the science it tells us that the universe did indeed exist before any organisms appeared on the scene. — Janus

I believe I've already accounted for this in my post via some, as of yet to be clarified, form of panpsychism.



I do see where you're coming from. My own view has nowadays come to take the primacy of awareness nearly for granted. However, due to my own views - liken them maybe to those of a logos operated anima mundi when it comes to the physical world we all share - this does entail that what we discover of the anima mundi (else, what the anima mundi informs us of) is, for lack of a better wording, our closest proximity to an absolute objective truth. A view easily shunned in multiple ways, I'm sure, but in this view, fully granting the primacy of awareness, we are being informed by the world that we sapient beings evolved from beings of lesser sentience which themselves somehow evolved out of nonlife. My degree of understanding may not be good enough to understand how, yet due to the very premises I hold - including that of awareness's primacy - I cannot find myself denying the data that life evolved out of nonlife. If not on our planet then in the cosmos at large.

In parallel to the issue of whether the Sun rises or else the Earth's axis spins, I personally find that on one hand life's evolution form nonlife really doesn't much matter in the context of the lives we live. On the other hand, I do believe its were deeper truths about the world in large, together with those pertaining to our own being, are to be uncovered.

But yes, regardless of any differences we might have, at the end of the day I do agree with this:

The empiricist view is that the universe exists irrespective of whether it is observed or not. In one sense that is true, but the empiricist overlooks the role of the observing mind in the representation of the Universe and so what it means to say the universe exists. — Wayfarer

Sure! If you are interested, I can see if I can find you an article - or a part of an article - in which Strawson talks about the problem of life in relation to panpsychism. — Manuel

I am interested. Cheers.

The gist of it was (if I remember correctly) that all of "life" could be explained by our physics, chemistry and biology, but this still does not touch on the topic of experience at all. — Manuel

Right, I'd say. Nor does it yet seem to me to touch on the quantum leap, to so speak, between a bundle of inanimate molecules (like a bundle of individual lipids, proteins, and nucleic acids in a pastry dish) and the homeostatically metabolizing process operating on these otherwise inanimate constituents which is (sentience-endowed) corporeal life per se (tmk, even the most rudimentary bacterium can sense its environment and act/react accordingly).

Strawson postulates panpsychism as necessary because emergence cannot be brute or "radical": there must be something in the phenomena by which new properties arise as they do (in this case consciousness or experience), otherwise it would be a miracle every time a new property arises in nature. [...] — Manuel

Awesome. Thank you much for the explanation. I guess I'll be needing to read into the physicalist version of panpsychism, then. This with primary interest in the dichotomy between life and nonlife, which to me still seems rather brute/radical in terms of evolutionary developments (here in the generalized sense of change over time).

But what about relativity? Isn't it built on thought experiments that were later verified? At least some of our native reason works? — frank

I'll add the following: It works quite well, true. As does QM. But because there are disparities between the two, we know that at least one of the two is not accurately representing what is - if not both.

But, Chomsky doesn't agree with Panpsychism, because he believes "radical emergence" to be part of normal science. — Manuel

Maybe I'm not as well versed on this topic matter; still, I don't find a necessary conflict between the idea of panpsychism and the idea of radical emergence: e.g., even if panpsychism, there would yet be a radical enough emergence of life from nonlife. Any idea of why the two would need to be contradictory?

That's the opposite of what happened, Newton overthrew materialism, and it has only gotten stranger since - further removed from common sense. — Manuel

To further illustrate this point:

Strawson, on the other hand, describes panpsychism as a form of physicalism, on his view the only viable form.[26] Panpsychism can be combined with reductive materialism but cannot be combined with eliminative materialism because the latter denies the existence of the relevant mental attributes.[8] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Physicalism_and_materialism

emphasis is mine

So, you believe that if you as an observer ceased to exist, the world would go with you? — Janus

Picking up on this: Its utterly reasonable to me to claim that when the unique self which I am will cease existing, all my personal loves and idiosyncratic perspectives will end with me - but not yours or those of the eight billion and counting, to not mention the far greater quantity of unique selves of lesser sentient beings.

What I find to be a more interesting question in respect to the thread: If all awareness in the cosmos were to somehow miraculously vanish - from that of the lowly bacteria to us, to that occurring in any other place in the universe irrespective of its degree of development; even that applicable to panpsychism if one so maintains the world to be - what, if anything, would remain of the world as we in any way know it?

While I take this to be an open-ended issue, I can’t fathom any type of envisioned world occurring in the absence of any awareness to envision it.

(As to the issue of life evolving out of nonlife, some as of yet nebulous system of panpsychism could potentially account for this just as well as, if not better then, the metaphysical stance of physicalism does. But, here, the world would be primordially constituted of awareness, thereby entailing that no world occurs if no awareness occurs.)

From my POV, respectfully, you have not demonstrated an understanding of my point. That may be my fault, for not finding the right words. My point is not about consciousness denial at all, but only about the phoniness of the hard problem (which can be understood as a denial of the utility or intelligibility of a certain metaphysical use of 'consciousness' or 'qualia.') — ajar

Then why oh why reply to me this way: I.e., What was it in my initial post to you that you disagree with?

But I guess like I previously said, never mind.

Well, in that case, never mind. I can only then presume you in fact agree that such a thing as fist-person points of view occur in the world, hence actually happen, this rather than being illusions. And that it’s absurd to conclude otherwise. This in contrast to some of us assuming that they occur due to being "trapped in the grammar of a word".