One thing engineers need to know is when to apply engineering standards and when not too. For me, art is one of the activities where that type of standard is not the right one. — T Clark

:grin: I tend to agree with you on this one. But, then, how else resolve the questions addressed within this thread? Namely, what "is and is not art" and "what is good art". At any rate, I have a suspicion that there's something wrong with my three variables, but I can't figure out what. Just saying.

Personal opinion and public acclaim do not make any art at all, any more than a stadium full of cheering fans make plays on the field.

[...]

The artist puts all that together. IF he or she is successful in putting it all together really well, there will be individual and public acclaim for 'a great work of art'. Probably -- it might take quite some time to appear, but it usually does, eventually.

People like good art. [...] — Bitter Crank

Didn't know who to pick on so I chose a quote form the thread's creator. But this proposal is freely given for anyone to rip to shreds ... if warranted:

As to what is and is not art, I propose an equation for it consisting of three variables in multiplicative relation to each other, each of which could take on the values of either 0 or 1.

A = the creator’s intent in expressing X
B = creator’s skill in expressing X so that (A) is understood by audience (where “audience” minimally includes the creator)
C = audience’s capacity to understand (A) via (B) (where “audience” minimally includes the creator)

If any variable is assigned the value of 0, the result necessarily is 0 artworks. If the product of these three variables is 1, the result necessarily is 1 artwork.

For quality of an artwork, use the same three variables and prefix “the quality of” to each, then assign some value between 0 and 10 to each variable.

If any variable is assigned the value of 0, the result again necessarily is 0 artwork; otherwise, the product of the three variables can range between 1 and 1,000, thereby quantifying the overall quality of the artwork – within what is a respectable spectrum.

Yes, quantifying of quality with any semblance of precision is, and has always been, problematic. But then I would think that this is what comparative degrees of quality in regard to artwork entail. And yes, it's still all subjective, but these tentatively proposed equations intend to define the parameters of the subjectivity involved.

Also, I figure this can apply from everything like “rhetoric being a form of art” to the Mona Lisa … or whatever one happens to most exalt in terms of artistic manifestation.

… for emphasis: criticisms are welcomed, if not blatantly expected

White light is an object in the world
I agree that white is not an object in the world, as it is an adjective, though I would still argue, as I wrote before, "white light is a physical object"

An object is white if it emits electromagnetic radiation composed of a fairly even distribution of all of the frequencies in the visible range of the spectrum, ranging from 750 to 400nm

Consider red light. Red light is electromagnetic radiation of 750nm. Red light is a physical thing that is visible, tangible and relatively stable in form.

White light is the set of violet light, blue light, cyan light, green light, yellow light, orange light and red light. Such a set is visible, tangible and relatively stable in form.

The definition of an object is anything that is visible or tangible and is relatively stable in form.

IE, it follows that white light fulfils the definition of an object. — RussellA

I wonder how you would account for the occurrence of extra-spectral colors in the purple-magenta range, for - not being part of the (visible) electromagnetic light spectrum - they don't seem to satisfy your requirement for being "objects in the world".


Color circle (RGB)
Crossover1370, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

In relativistic discourses, there can be subjectively generated and intersubjectively validated or invalidated goals based on pragmatic considerations. — Joshs

I get that, but ... Excuse me for this overused example, but it serves to illustrate why this in itself is incomplete: in relativistic discourses, is the intersubjectivity of current day neo-Nazis (maybe seeking absolute authority over all other as goal) any more right or wrong than the intersubjectivity of those antagoniztinc to neo-Nazis (maybe seeking the often derided notion of harmony among humankind, as in humanism, as goal)? Or consider the total intersubjectivity obtained by converging these two conflicting interests within a common society: does ethics boil down to a matter of "might makes right", such that regardless which faction might overtake the total intersubjectivity addressed, it would be the good faction strictly on grounds of having annulled the other faction's intents and, thereby, very being?

Same can be asked of whether slavery is a good. To bring things into a more modernized setting: if the slavery entailed by sex trafficking is a good. In both cases, the slave would be deemed a subhuman relative to the community addressed and - much like any lesser animal - would not be considered as holding any viable capacity to pertain to the given intersubjectivity of slave-owners. If these slave-ownership intending subjects were to wipe out all subjects antagonistic to the intent of slave-ownership, would that then make slave ownership and a good thing?

For such reasons, I associate moral relativism to "might (i.e., the successful implementation of power over other) makes (i.e., brings fourth the reality of) right (i.e., that which is ethically good)". And, personally, I can't abide by this. I'll currently leave my grounding for this to be affective.

You may not like my interpretations of Nietzsche's will to power, but "might makes right" need not be its only interpretation: Where "power" translates into "ability to accomplish", "will to power" could, at least hypothetically, translate into "will (driving impetus) to accomplish one's one's intent(s)". In which case:

Supposing that our intents all pivot around the affective end of an ideal imperturbable bliss (one which we'd all ideally like to obtain were it real and/or possible), and further momentarily supposing this affective end to be something akin to, say for example, a global actualization of Nirvana (or of Brahman, or of "the One"), then: Will to power would be a will to actualize this end as best one can - such that, for example, instead of implementing power-over-other (which leads to the supreme goal of cosmic autocracy) one implements things such as compassion and respect for the other's intrinsic value. The latter, in bringing us closer to the end of Nirvana or some such, wouldn't be an instant actualization of this end but, instead, would increase humanistic values amongst all, ideally in all cultures globally.

The inconsistency to this, of course, is the Nietzsche explicitly affirmed that there is no such thing as Truth, i.e. an accord to an ultimate reality. And, in this, I disagree with him. But I don't find his "will to power" to be nonsensical.

As off-the-wall as all this might be, maybe you can better see what I mean by an objective good: if, as multiple philosophical traditions have it, there is an ultimate reality that satisfies this envisioned affective end we all pursue in all that we think, believe, and do; then there is a real universal end/goal/telos which when pursues brings us closer to this good and which when deviated from - namely, by intending fictitious, hence incorrect, hence wrong intents - brings about bad.

Its a very heavy, loaded, topic to address and discuss, but there you have my shpiel. If I do err, I'll err on the side of the golden rule (on the side of an impartially, else independently, real right) and against the belief that might makes - hence, produces - right (which to me is innate to relativism).

Ever read Beckett's "Molloy". — Astrophel

I've only enjoyed his "Waiting for Godot", and I haven't read "Molloy" - though I do like theater of the absurd in general.

Anyway, a bit off point, but interesting, and it illustrates just how hard it is to find the guilty agency. — Astrophel

And yet at the end of the day, for one cliched example, the heartbroken individual who was cheated on by his/her lover and best friend (to not address worse occurrences) knows this to be the case quite directly, knows of both agency and of culpability as regards both self and other in concrete enough form … rather than, say, endlessly gazing into the ethereal near-nothingness of an undifferentiable cosmic process of becoming wherein no individuated agency seems to occur. Which is to say, it may be difficult to philosophically pinpoint but agency - along with its capacity to do wrongs - nonetheless is a pivotal aspect of the lives we live.

The whole point is happiness, isn't it? Is it really, as Mill put it, better to be a philosopher dissatisfied than a pig satisfied? There is a bit of cultural condescension in this, I would think, but the idea is important. I think we would have to consider if there is anything such as profound wisdom that carries an affectivity. — Astrophel

Happiness, yes, but it can mean different things to different folks. Moreover, happiness and virtue hold no easily discernable necessary relation. The gangster who massacres others and thereby gains greater respect in the form of fear (rather than the respect that accompanies forms of sincere love), he too obtains happiness in so accomplishing. But not states of being such as that of equanimity in a tumultuous world wherein fortunes can turn on a dime. A difficult topic indeed for, in accordance with what we both previously commented on, everything we do and intend is done not just affectively but, more importantly, for some kind of affective end.

If we seek knowledge for the sake of power-over-other (a common enough interpretation of the adage “knowledge is power”) then why is it that we seek such increased power to begin with? Only for its envisioned affective end. If we seek ignorance - as I’ve been told certain nihilists such as Cioran at times prescribed - here again it’s done for its envisioned affective end. Anything we actively intend is intended, at the end of the day, for its envisioned affective end. And this envisioned affective end can only be an intrinsic good to us – as “useless” (as some have described intrinsic value) as is our own being to our own being, and yet for whose sake everything that we engage in is done. So I uphold that so too should wisdom be intended: for its envisioned affective end.

Rather than describing this envisioned affective end as obtained happiness, which is fickle, I’d rather describe it as the obtainment of an unperturbable bliss … one relative to which we might either get closer to or further away from; one which in part brings about the equanimity previously mentioned. And you’re right, eastern traditions maintain this ultra-end of unperturbable bliss to be found in Nirvana, or Brahman; but then so too do certain western traditions uphold the reality of its being as a telos. Sophia as the principle which, as such western traditions would have it and as I’d like to believe, guides us toward it.

Then again, that which we envision could be mistaken. In a world of relativity there would be no objective truth to whether the envisioned affective end pursued by a mass-murder is right/correct/real and thereby obtainable or else wrong/incorrect/false and thereby a fictitious end to pursue - this in contrast to the envisioned affective end pursued by those who intend virtue as best they can. According to many a philosophical tradition, however, this is not the case: for such affirm the belief-independent reality of an envisioned affective end that is in fact real and thereby right, i.e. the correct aim. For example, the Platonic notion of "the Good".

Needless to add, this subject matter - as complex and convoluted as it can get - is to me very intimately associated with ethics and intrinsic value in general.

Innocence and guilt make no sense to me at all. I think when we refer to a child's innocence, we are really referring to her purity and uncluttered experiences. Free of guilt, yes, but what is guilt as a working ethical concept (not as, say, a psychological concept, about feelings of remorse, resentment, etc.)? — Astrophel

I strictly mean technical culpability; else phrased, responsibility for wrongdoing for which adequate amends has not been given. As in being innocent rather than guilty of a crime. When I mentioned that newly birthed infants are birthed perfectly innocent, I intended that they're birthed perfectly free of culpability. Various peoples' perspectives differ on this, but that's my take. Still, for the spiritual/religious: karma may have brought us into this world, else the sins of our ancestors or some such, but - even when entertaining such perspectives - once here, we start off with a blank-slate of culpability. The same applies for our being existentially "thrown into the world", if this happens to be one's perspective.

As far as "guilt as a working ethical concept" the aspiration to be ethical to me in large part translates into the aspiration to be as free as possible of non-amended wrongdoings, i.e. to be as free as possible from wrongdoings and to remedy as best one can those wrongs one is guilty/culpable of.

Going back to what I was previously mentioning:

Clear consciences tend to follow such ethical intents, or so I've been told. For that matter, I don't directly or indirectly know of anyone who glorifies wrongdoings while having much time for things such as (I'd like to say authentic) beauty, love, or wonder. That there might be exceptions in this and that, why not. But as a general rule, it doesn't occur. The experience of these and similar enough states of being does, however, occur in an early enough youth - which at least coincides with a time period when we have a far fewer quantity of wrongdoings by comparison to ourselves as adults: hence a time period when we had a far clearer conscience.

But, to be frank, my basic point was, and remains, that I don't see the point to wisdom if its about misery, bitterness, self-flagellation, control-mongering, or something of this ilk. If, however, wisdom where to in part bring about eudemonia (with emphasis that eudemonia does not equate to ignorance) despite all the wrongs one has committed and which were committed by other(s) against oneself and one's loved ones, then I can find value in the ideal.

Or maybe I should ask (to be honest, in a semi-rhetorical fashion): Why should wisdom be considered a good by a so-called "lover of wisdom"? For example, is it supposed to hold some instrumental value, such as that of allowing one far greater manipulative control over others for the sake of increased capital; else, are all the understandings that it reputedly entails supposed to hold some intrinsic value that forsakes eudemonia (i.e., being of good spirit/daemon; hence, of a healthy and flourishing mind)?

OK, thanks for the reply.

As I said, animals can recognize kinds of things. — Janus

Again, my perspective accounts for this. But maybe this would be too far of topic.

Again, you have affirmed that my perspective is intellectually lazy or dishonest. The affirmation was yours. Its up to you to cogently justify it. — javra

I've stated my case several times. I don't feel like doing it again. — T Clark

You stated your statement (repeatedly at that) and provide no cogent justification for it. In a world of relativism I don't know, but in the world I inhabit, that is intellectually lazy or dishonest.

Speaking on behalf of myself, apology accepted.

Again, you have affirmed that my perspective is intellectually lazy or dishonest. The affirmation was yours. Its up to you to cogently justify it.

:up:

Anyway, what I suspect at back of all this, is that ‘nous’ has a meaning which modernity, generally, literally can’t understand. It’s something that was lost in the transition to modernity, to understand it requires a shift in perspective — Wayfarer

:grin: Yes, I suspect the same thing.

So, for me identification is not identity; it is more primordial than the abstracted concept of identity, the idea of something being itself. — Janus

Ok, but to me that's what the metaphysical law of identity, as with all other laws of thought, intends to capture: our inescapable, predetermined, "primordial" limitations / boundaries of thought.

What is primordial, in my view, is difference. — Janus

I don't get how there can be difference discerned without there being discerned difference between identified givens. Could you elaborate?

This is where my accusation comes in - you use science when it fits with your worldview and ignore it when it doesn't. — T Clark

And pray tell, where does scientism and/or physicalism any empirical science contradict my propositions?

Or maybe objectivity is not a good?

The basic idea behind all of this is that of hylomorphic dualism - that the psyche (soul) has two aspects, sensory and intellectual. Intellect is what sees the forms/essence/ideas and it does that by in some sense becoming one with it. Obviously there is no such union on the level of sensory interaction but there is on the level of the intellect. — Wayfarer

Thanks for the references. I'll check them out. I'm familiar with hylomorphic dualism. I do prefer the term "anima" to "soul" due their differing connotations, thought they can end up meaning the same thing. But yes, I'm in agreement with this perspective.

Still, I grant that I haven't familiarized myself with Thomism very well.

I don't even know what that means. — T Clark

Ah, well that then explains things well enough for me. The sentence you're addressing is, after all, the summation of the longer passage you just quoted. I'll simplify my questions:

Q: Is evolution randomness devoid of any selective forces?

If you answer "yes" I'll not so humbly disagree with such an ignorant stance. If you answer "no" then:

Q: Do these selective forces select for that which is most accordant to what is objectively real?

If you have no idea of what "accordance (in the sense of "agreement; harmony; conformity; compliance")" is or else of what "objective reality" is, do let me know. But I might not be of great help in explaining.

But to however illustrate, just as a human who presumes he can fly and thereby jumps off a tall building dies and is thus selected against by evolution for not being accordant with objective reality, so too will a species whose manners of life are discordant to the ever changing, objectively real ecosystem(s) it inhabits be selected against by evolution - be it the dodo bird, or any other of innumerable species that have become extinct.

Considering that comprehension of what I've written occurs, where is the intellectual laziness or dishonesty in this, um, perspective lets call it?

BTW, if you queasiness has to do with "metaphysical objectivity", I can of course understand the relativist's pov. Still, I did mention both physical and metaphysical objectivity as the telos/purpose of evolution. Moreover I blatantly disagree with the relativist - which would embark us on a different course of enquiry. For instance, if no metaphysical objectivity, then are all metaphysical laws/principles of thought fully relative and thereby subjective - such that the law of identity differs from individual to individual?

You guys just want to pick and choose those aspects of science that jibe with your magic-realistic world view and reject those that don't. That's intellectually lazy at best, intellectually dishonest at worst. — T Clark

You picked on me, so I'll ask of you: how is "the process of evolution selects for that which is most conformant to objectivity via variations" intellectually lazy or dishonest. You mean to say evolution doesn't do that?

If you were to have no conception of what a house is, and you where to see what others know to be a house, would you perceive a house when looking at the raw image(s)? Same can be asked of an apple or orange.

My inclination is to conclude that without holding acquaintance of the idea (eidos: form / concept / abstraction ... and also the (epistemic) essence of that addressed) of X, one cannot perceive the X in the raw percepts.

How we gain various concepts from percepts converged with thoughts together with cultural transmission (I’ll personally add, together with some degree of biological inheritance … far more applicable to lesser animals than to us) is a very complex thing regardless how it’s addressed. But it doesn’t seem to diminish what I’ve just proposed. We identify by forms, and this speaks to the law of identity in that it can only be a form that is self-identical relative to us - be the form an entity, a specific/identified process (the process of running), or something else. And without any identification of anything, we cannot establish any relations between ... well, again, forms/eidoi.

Violence is a behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something. How can it be ethical??? — Alkis Piskas

When it is done to prevent something worse from taking place. Who are you, Gandhi? :wink: — Tom Storm

Gandhi used physical force in the form of public physical resistance against the, at the time, British empire’s ownership of India - thereby harming, damaging, and in a sense even provoking the death of the British empire as a force. Sorry, couldn’t resist. :grin: But yes, in agreement with many of the previous posts, conflict in general is always a wrong in an ultimate sense, if there is such a thing, but sometimes is a far less wrong that the wrong of not willfully engaging in conflict – and this applies to conflict in the form of physical violence. As one example, you are a guy of average enough heft and you come upon another guy that intends to rape and/or kill a child in some back alley. In an ultimate sense, as per Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”*, it’s best to win the battle before ever even engaging in it. You’re not momentarily of enough wits to know how to do so. So then, is it a greater wrong to not engage in any violence and allow the perpetrator to rape and kill the child, or a greater wrong to at least attempt to spill some of the perpetrator’s blood so as to prevent the child from being raped/killed?

* “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” – Sun Tzu

In a humble enough way, thanks. Interesting for me is that if our consciousness can dismantle/diffuse itself upon falling asleep, then by the same token our consciousness can reassemble itself into a unified whole upon awakening. Its clear that a person as body can hold different first-person points of view as the culminating awareness of the body: multiple personality disorder as example. It's also relatively clear that we all deem a singular unified, hence unitary, awareness (re: a culminating awareness of the body) to be indicative of psychological health. Also evident is that our total, relatively healthy minds are constituted of a plurality of first-person points of view: that of ourselves as a conscious self and those pertaining to our unconscious. Our conscience as one example of such sub/unconscious first-person point of view: it holds the same awareness of facts as we consciously do despite holding different perspectives and intentions in relation to said facts - and we in some ways interact with it at times when it occurs. The background noise of the mind that some people attest to as another example of different agencies co-operating within the same, relatively healthy mind - for the conscious self doesn't will the background noise to be nor its intricate details of manifesting. At our best, when we’re “in the zone”, all these unconscious first-person points of view are fully unified with that of our conscious self. We become one in relation to our total being as persons. To me this is in many a way reminiscent of the Latin saying, “e pluribus unum” - and I find it an interesting interpretation of consciousness's etymology "together knowing" (however inaccurate this interpretation might be historically).

All this to propose that if consciousness holds the capacity to divide into lesser parts, it can also the hold the capacity unify from lesser parts. For instance, in a split-brain scenario, supposing the knowhow to re-bridge the two hemispheres and the implementation of this, one then would obtain two conscious parts (be they multiple personalities that operate the body at different times or, else, two first-person points of view that operate the body simultaneously) that become unified into one conscious whole.

[...] Aristotle does seem to reject the immortality of the lower part of the soul (psyche), but not of the higher part called “intellect” (nous). On this point he is in agreement with Plato who holds that less evolved souls are subject to rebirth but that in evolved souls what remains after the death of the physical body is the intellectual or spiritual part which is the seat of consciousness. — Apollodorus

[...] and we begin to understand statements to the effect that “intellect thinks itself”, “intellect (nous) and intelligible object (noeton) are identical”, etc. (Metaphysics.1072b21). — Apollodorus

Before you take off, I’d be grateful if you could to whatever extent confer or else repudiate this interpretation of Ancient Greek thought:

Regarding contexts such as those just quoted: We nowadays best interpret nous as intellect. Intellect to us most always connotes thought as reasoning, which by its nature ratios givens into differences. I associate this with Ancient Greek logos. However, in the context of “an intellect/nous holding its very self as the object of focus”, intellect/nous seems to me to be more primarily addressing what we nowadays would call the faculty of understanding - rather than the faculty of rational thinking - such that, while we humans gain most of our understandings through reasoning/logos, there yet remains a fundamental difference between “a reasoning” and “an understanding”, the latter for example being the aim of the former. Hence, in the context of God is a thinker thinking him/her/itself, instead of translating Aristotle to say that God is a reasoner reasoning him/her/itself, I’m currently persuaded to think it more accurate to translate this as God is an understander understanding him/her/itself. Knowledge of self in the sense of gnosis rather than JTB … gnosis being more akin to our understanding of “understanding” rather than JTB which, due to having justification as part of it, will always in part address reasoning/ratio-ing/logos (something not necessitated of gnosis).

In this same vein, all animals use reasoning/ratio-ing/logos to some extent so as to live their lives but humans are worlds apart from all other animals in our qualitative magnitude regarding the capacity of understanding/nous. Here again, "intellect" in the sense of "understanding".

What if the subject that you're talking about is not an atomic thing? What if it can be divided into multiple parts? Some studies suggest that if we split the two halves of the brain, each half will act independently from another. Do we end up with two subjects, or still one subject, or perhaps no subject at all? — pfirefry

Consciousness - as in that conscious awareness of our own selves we’re inimitably acquainted with via memories, beliefs, values, intentions, and so forth - is neither atomic nor indivisible. As to its being non-atomic, it wouldn’t dismantle/diffuse upon descent into sleep if it were atomic. As to its being divisible, another rather complex exemplification of its fragmentation is that of multiple personality disorder. That the conscious us which we know ourselves to be via direct acquaintance with our multiple memories, beliefs, values, intentions, etc. is atomic and indivisible can well be expressed as a delusion maintained for the pragmatic purposes of going about life as best we can. And, in this respect, this understanding of our own conscious self’s nature as being permanent is an illusion.

But whether addressing split-brain patients, patients with multiple personality disorder, patients with schizophrenia, or other examples, the question remains: can there be anything experienced without there being a first-person point of view that experiences – irrespective of how diffused or acute this point of view might be? Experientially for you and me, the answer, I presume, is a resounding no. Split-brain patients will in many a way exhibit different personalities pertaining to the same body, very differently so from patients of multiple personality disorder. I can’t definitively answer for whether split-brain patients have two first-person points of view that simultaneously operate; I can find this conceivable but, so far, noncredible. I find it more likely that the condition is more akin to multiple personality disorder with two personalities which, as condition, comes about via physical damage to the brain - rather then via what can be at least presumed to be resultant of psychological coping mechanisms in response to severe stressors during onset in people with certain innate mental predispositions, this as can be argued to be the case for multiple personality disorder.

In all these cases, however, the same issue remains: Can the occurrence of a first-person point of view be an illusion to the very first-person point of view in question? The question isn’t if it’s atomic or indivisible but, instead, whether a first-person point of view can be wrong about its own ontic being as such while it occurs. Thereby resulting in the conclusion that the very occurrence of a first-person point of view is illusory; i.e., that no first-person point of view in fact occurs.

Don’t know about Dennett, I haven’t read him, but when I hear that “consciousness is an illusion” I interpret the statement to affirm that “an occurring first-person point of view holds the illusion of its own occurrence and, thereby, in fact does not occur”. An absurdity to me, rationally if not also experientially. If all that Dennett intends to affirm is that “a permanent conscious self is an illusion”, Buddhist for example had beaten him to the punch many ages ago: nothing new and nothing shocking.

Edit: Come to think of it, yes, atomic means indivisible. My bad for that. I'll leave the post as is, though.

We want to have our cake and eat it, too. But these militate against each other, don't they. The more you return to innocence, the more you have to forget. One one knows solidly the tonnage of suffering of the world, and has the requisite compassion (some do not, clearly) there is no turning back, pulling the covers over the head and going back to sleep. — Astrophel

Innocence for me is defined by blamelessness. Ignorance is instead defined by lack of understanding (maybe we might both agree that knowledge does not entail understanding, though to understand is to know that which is understood; as one example, to know what someone said without understanding what the person said). Yes, as infants we’re birthed with both and loose both over time.

I however strongly question that a return to innocence, if at all possible, necessitates a forgetting of the understandings gained.

Hence the possibility of returning to innocence with a more awakened awareness than that first held in such state – rather than a going back to sleep.

Of course, all this is contingent on whether one believes that innocence, in the strict sense of blamelessness, can be regained once lost.

Here is an odd but provocative idea: suffering and joy, the two dimensions of our ethical/aesthetic world. Do these not tell us by their own natures that only one of these is "intrinsically" desirable? I tend to think suffering is an instruction: Don't do that! And it is not culture of principles telling us this. — Astrophel

I agree with this in large.

Did I say generational?? I meant 'generative'. — Astrophel

I like that as well: generative grounding.

By the way, when I mentioned "young at heart" I had in mind that this ought to be part and parcel of eudemonia: etymologically, being in "good spirit(s)" (or more literally, of a "good daemon"), which I can only see entailing having a light heart rather than a heavy one - again, despite all the sh*t one undergoes. Maybe this gets wound up with having/gaining a relatively clear conscience despite the hardships and loses and mistakes. There's no questioning that life happens and along with it the bad that jades, which deprives us of yesteryear's more vivid abilities to experience beauty or love, even a sense of wonder. For me, though, wisdom - the type philosophers were once upon a time reputed to pursue - ought be something like the song "Return to Innocence" in theme. Not a return to the ignorances of youth (never found the two equivalent), but to the affects that accompany unjaded souls. Now get reminded of Nietzsche parable of the camel, turned predator fighting the monster of thou shalts and shalt nots, then, at last, turned into a newly birthed babe in the same world as before.

Wisdom as a generative, even regenerative, grounding of such sort, that I'll go for. Intrinsic value to the max. Sounds like something worth attaining, at any rate. Next issue: how does one find it? :razz:

I’m glad you found my take to be of interest, though I am a bit surprised. :smile: As far as support by scientific arguments, it does to my mind speak well enough for what evolutionary adaptation is: in short, a conformity to objectivity. But I get you, it’s not a scientific explanation. Agreed.

Since you’re attracted to such ideas of purpose in evolution, here’s two thinkers I’ve come across who hold similar enough views:

Teilhard made sense of the universe by assuming it had a vitalist evolutionary process.[19][20] He interprets complexity as the axis of evolution of matter into a geosphere, a biosphere, into consciousness (in man), and then to supreme consciousness (the Omega Point). — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Teilhard_de_Chardin#Teachings

If one take’s Teilhard’s “Omega Point” to be one and the same with ultimate reality, and ultimate reality to be synonymous with “metaphysically objective reality”, one can then find parallels between evolution’s will to “be/become conformant to (both metaphysical and physical) objective reality” with what Teilhard writes about evolution as process toward the Omega Point as ultimate reality. He spoke to a Christian audience; in so doing he expressed this as a teleological process toward union with the Godhead.

As a compliment to this, there’s C.S. Peirce, who upheld the notion of agapism or “evolutionary love”:

What he called Agapism or Evolutionary Love he saw as the nature of reality. This love is the fundamental energy that drives all of creation and it has two seemingly opposing aspects that work together. One aspect of this impulse projects new creations into independent existence and the other draws these creations into harmonious union. — https://philosophyisnotaluxury.com/2011/12/evolutionary-love/

Putting some interpretive spin on this: One can interpret what Peirce expresses as agapism being the purpose of evolution. If agape/love is evolution's telos/goal, then with a little stretch of the imagination: where one entertains what some religious folk affirm that G-d = Love and understands this absolute love to be ultimate reality … then one again can begin to accommodate the perspective wherein absolute love, which might also be interpreted as absolute good, is the ultimate reality which serves as "goal" for evolution's processes.

Lots of questions to be addressed in such perspectives (with or without my interpretations of them), and clearly they will fall under the category of mysticism for most. But if you are interested in further exploring such notions regarding evolution’s purpose, these two thinkers’ perspectives might be of help. (Sorry, didn't have the time to find better references for them.)

It's like being in love. [...] I want to be a 'teenager in love" but it's just that I don't want to be a teenager, unaware, blind, driven rather than driving. — Astrophel

Hey, if the pinnacle of wisdom isn't about being young at heart, in spite of all the suffering and such, then I don't want it. Said emotionally, rationally, both.

Just curious. I'm raised in a society that stimulates curiosity.. — Raymond

Hey, no worries! No, they certainly look different to me. But its as if I cognitively - sometimes and only to some extent - separate the meaning I intend from the phenomena that serves as a vehicle for the meaning’s expression. Like in a slip of the tongue where one knows what one is actively meaning to say, says something that doesn’t convey the meaning one intends, and recognizes this only after the fact. It’s weird and interesting to me at the same time, though I’ve had my entire lifetime to get used to it: has a lot to do with notions of metacognition such as the knowing of knowing (like knowing a word that’s on the tip of one’s tongue whose phenomenal form one momentarily doesn’t known … but knowing that one knows the word all the same). So when I immediately reread a “d” when I in fact wrote a “b” (say rereading dog when the written word is bog) I’m grasping the meaning I intended to impart into the writing (dog) without becoming consciously aware that the phenomena which conveys this meaning is different from what it ought to have been. It’s by no means constant or else debilitating in general, but, yea, happens every now and then.

Every living creature despite how simple or complex is (from bacteria to humans) does exactly the same thing. Wants to keep existing. Survive. Evolution is absolutely connected to survival also. The main purpose of evolution is survival. — dimosthenis9

This doesn’t answer the questions posed in the OP, but instead addresses these premises to the questions posed: I know that self-preservation as narrative is in many a way nearly integral to the subject of evolution, but evolution is far more complex than this. As unpleasant a topic as it is for most of us, death (namely, the death of self) is a requisite aspect of evolution. No death, no evolution of life. Period. As far as the will to survive or exist on behalf of all living things, this is directly contradicted by things such as apoptosis (programed cell death or “cellular suicide” as it's called by some) – which is requisite for the health of any multicellular organism. One could then view the death of multicellular organisms within their own species as serving the same function as the apoptosis of individual cells within a multicellular organism, and so forth.

I grant that there is a will to [something] in respect to the process of evolution, but, given the aforementioned, it can’t be a will to survive/exist [for clarity: as a selfhood-endowed being/entity]

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Though I doubt this will be much of a contender, I’ll add to the mix of ideas as regards possible answers: my own presumption is that evolution in some way works with the will to “be/become conformant to objective reality - both metaphysical and physical”. Those changes (mutations, etc.) or properties that deviate the being/entity (e.g., species) from objective reality to a sufficient extent tend to cause the being/entity to cease to be. Those changes or properties that conform the being/entity to objective reality to a sufficient extent tend to cause the being/entity to continue remaining - albeit, often in changed form. Mere poetics as is, but I like it: shares certain attributes with "truth being a conformity with that which is real". Again, I acknowledge the mystical-ish poeticism to much of this. But in the absence of something more logically cogent given what I previously mentioned about evolution, I’m biased toward maintaining this point of view. This for whatever it might be worth.

After all, there is only one bottom line to all this, and it is not cognitive. It is affective. — Astrophel

I find this statement beautiful.

... which isn't to diminish from the rest of the post.

He misses an essential part of reality. My reality, that is. — Raymond

:up: :cool:

I don’t in any way consider myself intelligent in mathematics. I’ve got a weird kind of dyslexia, mistaking p’s with b’s or b’s with d’s in what I handwrite so that – unless I reread what I’ve written say weeks later – I don’t register these mistakes even after repeated re-readings of what I’ve written. Well, its sometimes better and sometimes worse. Spellchecks help. But re: mathematics. In my high school AP calculus class I’d place +’s instead of -‘s and vice versa in proofs and have no idea of how I got the proof wrong even after repeated reappraisals of it. Didn’t flunk but I got a measly C-. Terrible. I’m only OK with maths when it comes to certain abstractions regarding them, but by no means all.

Long story short, I’m not mathematically savvy. I say this because I notice that your savviness in at least this respect far exceeds mine.

That said, from my simpleton view, all maths are static, non-motional. I’m familiar with there being maths such as causal calculus. But as far as I can tell, these maths are fully static as well. If you or any other mathematically savvy person know of any exception to maths being non-motional, I’d be very wanting to be familiarized with them.

To shift the subject slightly to something that has traditionally irked me, music. Its rhythms and, when applicable, its rhymes. I know it can be represented by maths, such as octaves. But I’ve always been bothered when people say that music is mathematical - i.e., that its equivalent to the maths it is constituted of. Its of course a metaphysical issue, and my reaction has always been that it’s not. There’s a lot that could be argued either way in this. But here going back to what I’ve previously expressed, the maths lack the motion that is requisite for the music to be. Ergo, I’m thinking, the maths that can describe music cannot be equated to the music itself. Music has that “extra [?] stuff” that the maths lack.

Also, want to point out that the Platonic notion of forms does not translate into shapes. Physical forms, for example, do have shapes. Yet, for example, the forms that cultures can take are shape-devoid. More Platonically addressed, the form of “the good”, for example, is shapeless. But maybe this isn’t central to the issue.

I think Hawking referred to the fire of charge. — Raymond

Could of course be. My thought is that he was referring to fire in the Heraclitan sense: flux, change, becoming, the philosophical notion of motion.

Which would be in line with the as of yet unanswered question I posed in regard to this subject.

If there exists an approximation only, then what's the real, exact structure? — Raymond

You're talking to one who is a mysterianist in relation to any self's understanding of awareness's core essence while also upholding this same core essence of awareness to be ontically primary. :wink: It's not a mainstream view, and other views of course abound. From any such point of view, however, I'd think your question here is quite complex.

For instance, if Platonic realism in relation to at least the most basic of mathematical ideas/forms, then basic mathematical ideas/forms such as that of a circle and of Pi are the real, exact structure in an of themselves ... with empirically perceived circles being the approximation of these ideas/forms. But even here, what is it that gives these real ideas/forms the motion/becoming/change/flux of the world we know?

Then there's the view that all maths are only human concoctions ... and, hence, approximations of what in fact is real. This view however has nothing to do with the topic this thread addresses.

At any rate, I don't find it an easy question to answer. But I do what to emphasize: E pur si muove.

Edit: Just in case I need to clarify this: the ideas/forms of a circle and of Pi - as with all other mathematics that I know of, be it math's rules, its eqasions, its relations, and so forth - are perfectly static of themselves. So, for example, when granting their Platonic realism, the reality of these static forms does not in and of itself explain the dynamic nature of the world which we know and live in.

I agree with the absurdity of it:

Where is there motion (in the philosophical sense of change - such as causation requires) within maths themselves? Without mathematics consisting of the causation by which we live - or, at the very least, accounting for why we hold the illusion of constantly changing, in a temporally unidirectional manner at that, within a mathematical 4D block universe - mathematics cannot be equivalent to the world.

Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe? — Stephen Hawking

... or, in this case, the universe as we know it.

I wonder that if in some way a phenomenological approach and its wholesale 'dissolution' of totalizing metanarratives is not in itself a form of metanarrative. Can one make the claim that what we experience are intersubjective agreements between localized communities of narrative (and the personal, subjective location), without this coming from a totalizing viewpoint? — Tom Storm

I’m not one to believe that one can. To be more to the point, at least as I currently see things:

I’ve so far found totalizing meta-narratives to apply to all forms of supposed relativism that attempt to deny any kind of objective reality - the latter being itself presumed by such to be just one more relativistic narrative. So denying manifests a logical contradiction wherein an objective reality both does and does not occur at the same time and in the same respect: namely, the objective reality of the relativism proposed - which is itself a totalizing meta-narrative.

So that it’s said, I mention this with the firm understanding that objective reality is not logically necessitated to strictly pertain to the physical; as one example of this which I find relatively easy to express and understand: that “I am / we are (currently)” can well be argued to be an objective, rather than subjective, reality - this including even within the most funky interpretations of Berkeleyan idealism, wherein nothing material/physical occurs - for the nature of this offered reality is, or at least can well be argued to be, fully independent of my/our beliefs, justifications, biases, etc., for or against.

Since I find this relevant, as one example: Einstein’s ToR does depend on certain “totalizing meta-narratives” for its implementation: the constant speed of light and the occurrence of observers (however “an observer” is therein interpreted) as two elements of it that I think could serve as adequate examples. More directly from my pov: It is a relativistic system grounded in, or else governed by, a list of objective realities which we at least presume to be. To the extent that the ToR in its current form is mistaken (say, because the variable speed of light theory happens to be true and thereby correct), the objective realities it is currently dependent on will then be themselves evidenced to be mistaken … hence at that point being evidenced to be mere narratives. Yet this does not take away from that fact that whatever then takes their place will yet be our best inference of what is in fact objectively real … which, again, will ground or else govern the system of relativity in the ToR.

I can see the relativist’s take on this … that all our best current assumptions of objective reality are narratives. But I don’t concede to there being no objective reality in actuality on account of the logical contradiction previously mentioned that this brings about. (Yes, here upholding the law/principle of noncontradiction.)

Though your question didn't directly address objectivity, I hope that I've satisfactorily addressed the underlying issue posed. Well, at least tentatively so ...

More importantly, how ought I make sense of this statement:

I think the kinds of suppositions that would make a ‘meta’ useful or even coherent [in relation to meta-ethics] have been unraveled by phenomenological approaches. — Joshs

... given that phenomenology disavows there being a "meta" in relation to ethics / values?

Just seems to illustrate what I initially affirmed: phenomenology does not address meta-ethics.

And you believe there are such things as meta-ethical
givens, right? — Joshs

Apparently just as much as you believe there aren't. Moral objectivity v. moral relativism in a nutshell.

Just wanted to through this into the game: a contradiction, as per Aristotle, specifies contradictory givens (propositions, states of affair, experiences, etc.) that occur at the same time and in the same respect.

All questions pre-suppose the conditions of their possibility. So your question pre-supposes the coherence of the idea of something being able to be thought that is beyond all conditions and contingencies, and it also assumes the coherence of the universal. But for phenomenology both of these. it is are derived abstractions generated from a subjectivity that is radically contingent and temporal — Joshs

I get that, but then how can I interpret this in any other way than affirming that there are no (objective, if one wills) meta-ethical givens?

You mean you haven’t found in Thompson a satisfactorily meta-ethics? — Joshs

Or in any of my second-hand readings regarding phenomenology as an established philosophy, such as in its established distinction between noesis and noema.

I think the kinds of suppositions that would make a ‘meta’ useful or even coherent have been unraveled by phenomenological approaches. — Joshs

OK, I'm definitely curious. What is the non-conditional good that is universally applicable to all value judgments that anyone can make (to be clear, from Saint Teresa to Jack the Ripper) as described by phenomenology? If it is a long argument that you'd rather not engage in, can you point me toward where such exposition is given.

Edit: On second thought, in case I've misinterpreted this quoted statement, I of course agree that subjective experience needs to be analyzed - this as systematically as needed - so as to facilitate any hope of discovering that which is the "non-conditional good" of meta-ethics. And, my bad if my possible misinterpretation irked you.

Anyway, as I see it, if you are looking for ways to talk about ultimacy, you have to go "to the things themselves" and here, you have to discover the "Otherness" of the world. In my thought, this begins with Husserl. See his Ideas I, and prior (or contemporaneously) the last books of Logical Investigations which I am just reading now for the first time. Husserl gets very intimate with the intuitive disclosure of the world and gives the whole affair ground breaking language. One cannot SAY the world, but one can approach it, negatively (apophatically) go into it. Husserl's phenomenological reduction is like this: a method, not unlike meditation! — Astrophel

I have affinities to this branch of philosophy. Very much enjoyed reading Thompson's Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, for example. Haven't yet read Husserl, though. Still, I've so far not found in it a satisfactory exposition of meta-ethics. And meta-ethics naturally addresses issues of value such as those we've been discussing. If you, @Joshs, or someone else disagree and knows of such, please inform me of them / point me toward the reading.

That's an exceedingly nice analogy. Bravo! for it.

But in relation to my previous argument, I would suggest that while consciousness might be put forward as the unique attribute of a player, thought is very much a mechanical process of 0s and 1s. — unenlightened

One issue that can be raised: Might not an individual consciousness ontically create some of the mechanical process of its own thought? In so thinking, the issue becomes one of whether there is any degree of mind over matter involved in our existence. If we are to any small degree masters of our fate. If free will, then the answer becomes "yes" - with many details remaining to be worked out. If no free will, then there is a resounding "no" to these questions.

This is a bit tangental, but might give another perspective on the source of freedom ...

http://accountability.qwriting.qc.cuny.edu/files/2016/08/Philosophy-of-Education-Chapter-2_-Pedagogy-of-the-Oppressed.pdf — unenlightened

Skimmed through the chapter. I find myself in agreement with what I've read. Such as (taken from the concluding paragraph):

Problem-­posing education does not and cannot serve the interests of the oppressor. No
oppressive order could permit the oppressed to begin to question: Why? — Paulo Freire

In which ways do you find this relevant to the topics of this thread?

:grin: Hey, thanks for the reply. Iffy about this post since I don’t want to take away from the OP, but I’ll post it as a minor sidenote regarding alternative views.

Supposing consciousness to be a different substance — javra

Consciousness is not a substance (Re: Substance ia particular kind of matter with uniform properties.).

[...]

I would rather say "substance - non-substance" dualism . — Alkis Piskas

In the way you are using “substance”, I would tend to agree with your notion of a duality between “information as substance” and “consciousness/awareness as non-substance”. So it’s known, I wrote substance in the substance-theory sense of that which is an ontically independent and non-contingent given, and which ontically occurs before changes, during changes, and after changes - that which undergoes changes without being itself changed - in a sense, as that which “stands beneath” all attributes and changes and thereby serves as a primary ontological foundation to all else that occurs.

To however share a different perspective - this where “substance” is understood as I’ve just described it - if a) we take information to be something that can be both ontically created and eradicated (as one example, when a person dies some of the persons unique psychical information, like hopes and dreams, can be argued to disappear forever from the physical world; conversely, with a person’s birth new psychical information can come into being), b) further presume a metaphysical primacy of awareness (to include all forms of unconscious awareness in addition to our conscious awareness), and c) then further premise that all existent information is in one way or another and in some ultimate sense contingent upon awareness, then we obtain the following: in a topsy-turvy manner to what was first mentioned, there here is a duality between “awareness as substance” and “information as non-substance”. This without in any way taking away from awareness being “in-formed” by the information it is bound to, very much including the physical information of the body and, hence, brain. Mentioned in part because this latter phrasing is accordant to my own current metaphysical beliefs. If any of this strikes you as a wrongheaded mindset, please let me know.

for its identity as ego or self — javra

Now here we are moving here into a quite controversial area! :smile: — Alkis Piskas

Very true. But awareness devoid of any information could then not be limited or bounded (else expressed, ratioed in relation to anything else) and so could then not have an ego or self, for the latter is always bounded/limited in some sense to itself, entailing a psyche and its relation to other. Instead, the awareness would be concluded to be limitless or boundless, hence with no subject-object divide (in part because no information would occur for this to happen). On the upside, being literally limitless, awareness would then be literally infinite. Something like the actualization of (not just inference of) Nirvana, or some such, as an ultimate reality that consists of a literally selfless/egoless awareness. But yea, a very controversial area indeed.

At any rate, I do find that our selfhood (but not awareness) is contingent on the information that surrounds.