You cannot tell me the mass of all the rocks in the Simpson Desert, therefore those rocks do not have mass. — Banno

Well with some empirical investigation and added resources I could give you at least a ball park figure.

How can one go about quantitatively approximating the mass of the theory of evolution in principle ... oh yea, one can't. :yikes:

But have it your way. — Banno

Alright.

Speaking for myself, preaching to the choir. I'm myself a diehard non-Cartesian, "Academic" skeptic (um...) falibiliist.

The certain, the eternal, the unchanging, were felt to be superior to the uncertain and mutable. [...] It may be the result of a psychological or religious need people have, I don't know. — Ciceronianus

Yup. Reminds me of hypotheses such as that of the block universe, of causal determinism, or of everything being physical, all of which are are so popular nowadays: each maintaining an absolutely certain, eternal, and immutable world, else grounding aspect of it. :smile:

Yes, the theory of evolution has a mass. But unfortunately that mass is mixed in with a whole lot of other stuff in such a way that it would not be calculable. — Banno

As to being mixed with other stuff, the same can be said of any physical thing, like a rock. You know, fields, quanta that fly in and out, and such. But we can nevertheless quantify the mass of a rock well enough for all given purposes.

You're basically saying thoughts are quantifiable energy that ain't quantifiable. A logical contradiction.

But have it your way.

In a culture with a long history of religion whose central point is the immateriality and immortality of the soul, if free will didn't exist, it would be more likely to arise and be supported as a concept. That doesn't lead to any necessary conclusions, but it is a factor that should be added to a Bayesian analysis. Make sense? — Reformed Nihilist

Yup. Thanks for the reply. No doubting what you say. At the same time, I'm one to believe that we ought not allow cultural prejudices to cloud our judgments. Its inevitable that they sometimes do to some extent, but its a good ideal to work toward: the ideal of objectivity. This to say, the issue of free will's reality ought to be judged independently of cultural biases and preconceptions: such as that of its association with a Creator Deity, or such as that of an emotive rejection of anything that can be associated with religion.

I don't see a problem. — Banno

OK, you. Given that you also find the premise true, let me know what the quantifiable mass of "the theory of evolution" is, or at least how to go about obtaining it. Next, is the physical mass of your average intention greater or smaller than the physical mass of the average percept?

But I grant, you are a dyed-in-the-wool physicalist. :smile:

This paragraph is not at all clear. — Banno

:lol: :ok: :cool:

If the mind is physical, then thoughts are physical. If a thought is physical, it consists of physical energy. If physical energy can be validly quantified as e = mc^2, then our physical thoughts, which consist of structured physical energy, then consist of physical mass multiplied by the speed of light squared. Ergo, our physical thoughts have physical mass.

Where's the logical fallacy in this?

I don't know if the question is meaningful to someone in china or someone living in a remote village in the amazon. I do know it is in the western world. — Reformed Nihilist

Couldn't the same be said of causal determinism, a block universe, and physicalism? (For what it's worth, from what I recall, materialism was addressed in the history of Eastern thought.)

The western world has nowadays had global influences, yes, but I don't find that this necessitates all different cultures of the world then center their existential questions - such as those regarding free will - around whether a Creator Deity is real.

For clarity, are you intending to say that belief in free will's reality entails belief in a Creator Deity?

While true, a good Bayesian analysis would consider factors such as the history of cultural myths or religions and how they might inform (or be informed by) common conceptions of things such as free will. — Reformed Nihilist

Sure, I agree. Not all cultural myths or religions subscribe to a Creator Deity, though.

Best I can tell is that free will is rejected solely because at some point it was understood to be a product of a creator God. Post enlightenment rejection of religion seems to be more appealing than dismissing the hollow argument that free will implies random action, so the game goes on. — Cheshire

:up:

So, what’s the answer? Does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is no free will? — T Clark

My two pennies worth: in short answer to the question: yes, it does.

In terms of practical accountability, the ontic (un)reality of free will doesn’t make a bit of difference: If free will, then ontically valid accountability for that which is (freely) chosen (among available alternatives). If causal determinism, then – I think echoing your own views – by the fact that we’re not omniscient, we are ontically predetermined to not know everything about the past, present, or future; i.e., we’re predetermined to be ignorant of the fully predetermined causal system, or the block universe, as a whole; thereby making us ontically predetermined to epistemically live as though we freely choose at least some future outcomes, this on account of our ignorance regarding an otherwise fully fixed causal reality. In other words, in the latter, we are ontically predetermined to hold a strictly epistemic – but not ontic - freedom of choice … and, thereby, epistemic, but not ontic, responsibility for our actions.

I’m not saying the latter doesn’t have issues, but it can be argued, to my mind in a cogent enough manner.

The ontic reality, or unreality, of free will does, however, make a world of difference in the type of universe we inhabit. For instance, is the universe accurately described by physicalism, and are the innumerable consequences in respect to ourselves of the universe’s so being (or not being) thereby true (or untrue)? As a common example among mankind: if physicalism, as its currently known, then all conceivable possibilities of spirituality, such as that of an afterlife, are bogus. If free will is ontically real, then physicalism, as its currently known, is bogus. To me, all this irrespective of there being, or not being, a Creator Deity. But these are the types of differences that make a difference in relation to free will.

From where I stand, this cuts through the muck and gets to the core issue in respect to free will’s reality.

If the arm moves, a quantifiable amount of energy has been expended. — Banno

This edit of yours is irrelevant.

The issue is one of whether or not the mind itself is strictly constituted of quantitative energy - such that each conceivable thought (and intention, desire, emotion, perspective, percept, ect.) is part of the quantitative energy of the universe that is conserved. If so, and if e = mc^2, then an individual thought is equivalent to some physical mass multiplied by the speed of light squared that, via the law of conservation, removes energy from the non-mental aspects of the universe by virtue of the thought’s occurrence. Um … yea, I don’t think so. Though I’m sure some physicalists may want to endorse such a view.

This is the subject entailed by a mind making, hence causing, a hand to move: is a mind itself physical?

p.s. You may be wanting to argue for epiphenomenalism, wherein the mind has no causal powers.

I gave a link in that post to Aristotle's notion of energy, which is qualitative, and is where our modern notion of energy stems from. I'm guessing you're not interested in it, so I won't hand wave you to look.

GO back to this: if mind is something utterly different to the everyday objects around us, then how can your mind move your arm? — Banno

Preempting a possible question, don't know about Cartesian substance dualism, but something along the lines of objective idealism could well account for mind using energy to move physical things ... but, here, energy would be foundationally qualitative, rather that physically quantitative, such that the latter emerges from the former. — javra

How? — Banno

One cannot rely upon conservation laws to make successful predictions when no awareness of conservation laws occur. Therefore, if the trustworthiness of currently known conservation laws is requisite for making successful predictions, then beings unaware of these laws—as is the case for lesser animals and humans of former generations—cannot / could not make successful predictions.

No?

But I’m supposing that underlying this topic—as it relates to science—is the issue of predictions in relation to what?

Our modern knowledge of physics, chemistry, and biology (to the extent that neo-Darwinian biology relies upon chemistry) does indeed rely upon a worldview wherein physical energy is foundational, ubiquitous, and conserved—hence, they do rely on the presumptions of physicalism so as to optimally explain data. This said, two issues:

One, this does not thereby entail that physicalism is necessarily true: The pesky possibility of a future paradigm shift which would make sense of things physicalism addresses without itself being physicalism is not something that anyone can rule out … and it might likely hold advantages in explaining aspects of the world, such as ethics and value in general, that physicalism cannot cogently address (at least, imo) … but no one will bother exploring such possibility if it is virtually outlawed by scientism’s thought police, which nowadays seems rampant in much of society, on the one hand, and by the religious fundamentalists on the other.

Secondly, as I previously mentioned, science does not equate to physics but, instead, to an epistemic approach toward gaining, always fallible, knowledge regarding the empirical world we all share: for instance, social sciences such as those of anthropology and psychology are as much empirical sciences as are the natural sciences, and the former can make successful predictions without relying on conservation laws of energy just fine. If this seems dubious, as one measly example, check out advertising’s predictive success. This advertising has become insidiously omnipresent nowadays (again, imo) and, more to the point, is historically informed by behaviorist schools of psychology—this without giving a hoot as to whether the conservation of physical energy holds.

In short, again, what I'm arguing is that the potential downfall of physicalism does not in any way equate to the downfall of science (or, else, of successful predictions).

Presuming a lack of equivocation, your arguments are a tad bit circular, but this goes deep into foundational theories of physics that today are so commonplace they’re taken to be infallible: The energy you reference is purely physical and thereby quantitative (contrast this to the qualitative Aristotelian notions of energy from which modern notions of physical energy evolved) and, in substance dualism, minds are not physical - thereby being endowed with Aristotelian notions of energy but not our modern notions of physical energy. The law (more accurately, theory) of conservation of physical energy can only apply to the physical substance in substance dualism, but does not apply to psychical substance. So, as far as I can currently make out, your argument in sum: given that everything is contingent upon the ubiquitous presence of physical energy, hence given that physicalism is true, substance dualism is false, for it would contradict the tenets of physicalism, thereby demonstrating physicalism to be true.

Preempting a possible question, don't know about Cartesian substance dualism, but something along the lines of objective idealism could well account for mind using energy to move physical things ... but, here, energy would be foundationally qualitative, rather that physically quantitative, such that the latter emerges from the former.

If energy can be introduced into the world from outside, then the world is no longer predictable.

The impact here needs iteration. If the conservation laws cannot be relied on, it would not simply be the case that we need to extend the explanation to take the appearance of energy into account. Rather, the way energy functions would cease to be consistent with any laws. — Banno

Your assertion that the world becomes unpredictable in the absence of our upholding the theory/law of the conservation of (physical) energy runs into at least one issue: it amounts to the assertion that all lesser animals and those human beings existing prior to the 17th century are and were unable to successfully predict anything. Which is patently false.

Also, how might the law of identity be necessarily contingent on “the way [physical] energy functions”? (Other than by presupposing physicalism.)

Yes, I wonder what the answer to that might be. People seem to need to worship things and this cast of mind necessarily turns science into the flip side and vanquisher of religion. An old criticism. — Tom Storm

We’re in agreement. For my part, I find that those who uphold scientism then throw babies out together with the bathwater, so to speak: e.g., allowing for even the possibility of any kind of objective purpose in life—which reeks of spiritualism to many of a scientism ilk—becomes viewed as an opening of floodgates for religious fanaticism. Most humans on earth are however not on board with nihilism, and will reject this metaphysical claim—be they religious or not—thereby becoming mistrustful of science when science is deemed equivalent to, or else necessarily resulting in, scientism (this as those who uphold scientism maintain).

As to answers, I don’t have any ready at hand that I find to be meaningful.

Your impromptu definition of empirical science is nicely done. — Tom Storm

Thank you.

So science doesn't necessarily collapse if the mind at least in part exists outside of the physical as we know it? — TiredThinker

Absolutely not! All scientism would necessarily collapse—not all of science, if any.

The article linked to in the OP espouses an opinion founded on a popularized but, imo, unlearned understandings of what empirical science is. (Prejudicially speaking, might have something to do with the author being an M.D. rather than a PhD.)

Empirical science equates to neither physicalism nor to physics—no more than it equates to theoretical mathematics. Or to technology for that matter.

Here, an impromptu working definition: Empirical science is knowledge consisting of inferred fallible conclusions derived from empirical evidence—i.e., from observations: be these the results from tests of falsifiable hypotheses (c.f., the results of any scientific test), of reoccurring processes in nature (e.g., the theory of evolution via natural selection), of one unique items found in the world (e.g., certain fossils), etc.—whose verity as empirical evidence is confirmed via consensus, such as via replication and peer review. I know this definition is imperfect but I wager that there is nothing in this definition that any empirical science lacks or does without.

If substance dualism (or any other number of non-physicalist paradigms), then some of the fallibly inferred conclusions currently maintained by the empirical sciences will be mistaken—especially those which by now have become amongst the most generalized conclusions which contextualize all others: as an example I'm keen on, such as the currently maintained fallible conclusion that teleology is a metaphysical impossibility or else is simply unreal. However, that said, absolutely none of the empirical evidence obtained via the empirical sciences would become invalid. All the data obtained by the empirical sciences would still need to be cogently explainable, at least in principle, by the non-physicalist paradigm.

Check out this statement of the author for example:

Spiritual believers often accuse scientists of being closed-minded or dogmatic, for being so definite in their rejection of mind-brain dualism and a spiritual realm. So, how is it that scientists are so certain that dualism is false? Quite simply, because for dualism to be true, all of science would have to be false.

But wait a minute, you say. There have been many scientific theories overturned in the past by better theories and new evidence, producing paradigm-shifts. Isn't it possible that dualism will replace monism just as surely as Einstein's Theory of Relativity superseded Newtonian physics? The analogy is misleading. Paradigm shifts do sometimes occur, but overturning the foundations of science is quite another matter, the likelihood of which is astronomically small.

Dualism so fundamentally contradicts the foundations and entire accumulated evidence of modern science that in order for it to be true, we would have to start rebuilding modern science from the ground up. — Ralph Lewis M.D.

(Boldface mine.) No, substance dualism (and many other non-physicalist paradigms) does not contradict the “entire accumulated evidence of modern science”—all of which is empirical observations, i.e. empirical data. It in fact contradicts none of it, but instead only contradicts the “[metaphysical] foundations” of modern science, which are all conceptual rather than empirical raw data. Only the latter would need to be successfully reworked. But succeeding in so doing, “astronomically small” as the possibility might be, does not then entail that “all of science is false”—for fallible conclusions are part and parcel of what science is (part and parcel of empirical science's philosophical foundations as an epistemological endeavor)!

I really wish people would have a better understanding of what empirical science is and consists of. Scientism is destroying science's credibility in society the world over. :shade:

… acknowledgedly, this being just one person’s opinionated point of view. I’ll try to leave it at that.

I intend to be away for a while. Just wanted to take up @Harry Hindu's position a bit.

Evolution is not "goal-directed". The consequence (i.e. increased reproductive fitness) of adaptive mutations via natural selection is called "survival". — 180 Proof

If so, then "survival" would be the telos (goal) which governs (directs) the process of adaptive mutations via natural selection.

For the record, this moronic (?) view that natural selection is teleological is shared with folks such as Darwin himself, Thomas Huxley (Darwin's "bulldog"), and more recently folks such as Francisco Ayala, whom I once upon a time had the pleasure to meet:

Explanations in terms of final causes remain common in evolutionary biology.[17][32] Francisco J. Ayala has claimed that teleology is indispensable to biology since the concept of adaptation is inherently teleological.[32] In an appreciation of Charles Darwin published in Nature in 1874, Asa Gray noted "Darwin's great service to Natural Science" lies in bringing back Teleology "so that, instead of Morphology versus Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded to Teleology." Darwin quickly responded, "What you say about Teleology pleases me especially and I do not think anyone else has ever noticed the point."[17] Francis Darwin and T. H. Huxley reiterate this sentiment. The latter wrote that "the most remarkable service to the philosophy of Biology rendered by Mr. Darwin is the reconciliation of Teleology and Morphology, and the explanation of the facts of both, which his view offers."[17] James G. Lennox states that Darwin uses the term 'Final Cause' consistently in his Species Notebook, On the Origin of Species, and after.[17] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes#Biology

We're using the term "illusory" (or illusion) differently. I do not mean 'not real' by "illusion"; rather I mean something seeming to be something else. — 180 Proof

To clarify, if you mean something other than "conscious intentionality seems to be true but it is not", please further specify the way in which you are using the word. I can only understand this interpretation of "something seeming to be something else" as "a seeming that is not true and, thereby, not real as that which it seems to be". For example, the mirage of an oasis in the desert is "something [desert] seeming to be something else [oasis]" as is "not real as the oasis which is seems to be". So, my being conscious of things is - in how I so far interpret your position - a seeming that is discordant with what is real, or else really happening.

I ask this because I still don't understand what you might mean by "my being consciously aware of things (which is fact) is 'something seeming to be something else'". Adding the adjective "objectively" doesn't help any.

I'll translate: If, as you say, intentionality occurs in the unconscious mind, why then conclude that conscious intentionality must be illusory rather then real? Myself, I see no reason to deny that intentionality is equally real, non-illusory, in both aspects of mind. And, again, that I am conscious of things is fact.

Where's the tautology? — Daemon

Establishing the reality of first person conscious experience via tautological means, as in "if I am conscious of X then ipso facto I am conscious of X [...]". Thing is, there is no known inferential means of establishing the reality of first person conscious experience. See for example the problem of other minds, solipsism, and so forth. So @180 Proof is complaining about me not having made the currently impossible somehow possible, this by providing an inferential demonstration of me being consciously aware of things. So, that's that, me thinks. Besides, I'm guessing he has no answer to the question I asked him, hence the deliberate obfuscation. (So far no ad hominems, though.)

As I understand it, which is not well, Aristotle's ideas were developed in response to the conundrums posed by Parmenides and Zeno, which attempted to show that change must be illusory. — Wayfarer

I'm fascinated by teleology, especially as it applies to psyches, and have found little to no metaphysical investigation of its possibilities and mechanisms outside of what Aristotle had to say. That mentioned, I'm myself not an academic scholar of Aristotle, and I haven't read most of his works (skimmed through De Anima ((loved the way he addressed deities as "universal anima")) and some of his Physics - all else I know of his ideas is second hand). So, in short, I have no informed opinion on the topic you mention.



As to being and becoming, I sense that we're approaching the issue from maybe very different perspectives. The notions you mention are quite interesting. I have the hunch that this topic would require a lot of discussion, but then there are metaphysical pre-judgments involved, at least on my part. For instance, arguably, the Aristotelian notion of "the unmoved mover", the Neoplatonic notion of "the One", and the Buddhist notion of "Nirvana" would each be considered (maybe, pure) being, this within their own worldviews, rather than processes of becoming. This though all else could be seen as becoming. Not sure if this is worth exploring, but I am acknowledgedly prejudicial in my favoring of such, or similar enough, views.

Can such a principle even be communicated from myself to myself without reflection? And if not, then before reflection do we have a principle or law, or just a contingent experience of momentary sense? — Joshs

I acknowledge the answer to the first question is "no". The second question is tricky, in that it seems to me to be beyond the relevant point of "laws of thought". A law/principle of thought, if it ontically occurs, would be a universal principle - i.e., a universal - applicable not to "a (randomly salient) contingent experience of momentary sense" but to all possible thoughts pertaining to all beings that have ever been, are, and ever will be. It would be a natural law, in other words, one that minimally applies to awareness, if not to everything that is (the latter being easily conceivable in systems such as that of objective idealism). The main point being, if a principle/law of thought, then it is universally applicable to all cognition and - as with any other natural law or universal - occurs very much independently of anyone's awareness of it. Hence:

In other words, think about the difference between experiencing an event right now and thinking of this event as a law or principle. These are two different kinds of experiences. Making the first into the second (specifying it as a principle or law) requires a secondary act of thought. If the law or principle isnt in the actual experience of an object, it has a different purpose or use. — Joshs

Discovering laws of thought does require reflection (granting that they occur), but the law of thought - like any other law of nature of other type of universal - would be ubiquitously applicable ... in this case, even to the reflections by which they might be discovered. Its not that we construct these laws from our inferences but - again, if they do ontically occur - that they govern everything which we cognize, again, including the inferences via which they become discovered.

So yes, what you address are indeed two different kinds of experiences. But we don't make the first into the second and thereby instantiate a law of thought. Rather the law of thought would be applicable to all experiences without any exception, including the two kinds of experience which you address.

Back to the law of identity: if indeed a law of thought, its occurrence would be independent of anyone's awareness of its being (e.g., a dinosaur's thoughts would be just as governed by this law as would be any humans) and, hence, its occurrence would be in no way contingent on reflections or comparisons. Only our discovery of it's occurrence would be contingent in on reflective comparisons.

(Sorry, too tired right now to edit this into something shorter.)

Their claim is that rather than a dualism between being and becoming, becoming is prior to being. Put differently, the idea of being as encapsulated in its most ideal and exact form in A=A is an abstraction derived from a pragmatic act of reflective comparison. — Joshs

Suppose the law of identity intends to specify that that which appears, or stands out, or else is, cannot at that very juncture be anything else but itself. In so conceiving, there is no comparison involved in any instantiation of the law of identity—because there is no multiplicity involved in givens addressed. The tree I see (A) is the tree I see (A)—this without any multiplicity in the “tree that I see” that then facilitates comparison. Reflection, then, would only occur in thoughts intending to formulate this universal principle of thought—if not also ontology—into something communicable, such as “A=A”.

Also, becoming to me connotates teleology: This becomes that, such that “that into which this becomes” is the Aristotelian final cause of the becoming; the process of becoming moves toward its end. Within such perspective, “that into which this becomes” will not of itself be a becoming—such as can be claimed of that which is becoming—but will instead ontically be (here entailing being, which is self-identical at any given juncture) on account of its either relative or absolute finality. So—while I agree that being and becoming are not mutually exclusive—because the notion of “becoming” sans the notion of “that into which a given becomes” to me tends to ring hollow; and because I infer that “that into which a process becomes” is not itself a becoming on account of its finality (be it perceptual or ontic) but, instead, is something that is (being); I tend to believe that becoming sans being—at minimum, in the form of the finality toward which the becoming progresses—is not metaphysically feasible. Moreover, if the final cause (as being) is requisite for the becoming, then it will not be the case that becoming is prior to being.

p.s. I’m not intending to pester. Posting this on account of respecting many of your views. If I’m too far out in left field, no worries.

Like blindsight in particular, intentionality in general is, mostly if not completely, an unconscious, subpersonal, reaction to environmental stimuli (including one's own behavioral effects). 'Consciousness is secondary – much more veto than volo – and confabulatory' [...] — 180 Proof

The illusion is that intentionality (i.e. "to be conscious about") its seems a conscious process when in fact (mostly and most often) it is not. — 180 Proof

If I am conscious of X then ipso facto I am conscious of X - i.e., my conscious intentionality regarding X is not illusory, nor a mere seeming, but brute reality - this even if my being conscious of X is itself a result of unconscious agencies/processes converging and thereby bringing about a unitary first person point of view. Where do you find a benefit for a near complete either-or approach to the reality of intentionality in respect to consciousness and the unconscious? I find that intentionality can readily be non-illusory for both.

To me, blindsight evidences that one’s awareness as a total self (i.e., a total mind/psyche—if not also a total mind-endowed body) is not always unitary, thought it at times can be. The blindsight endowed person, as a conscious self, is unaware of visual information while, the same person as a total psyche, is (at least to some extent) aware of said visual information. The conscious agent is visually unaware while the unconscious agency(ies) of the same (total) person are visually aware.

In parallel, an example I find both illustrative and relatively common to all people: a conscious self and its conscience will both be aware of the same basic facts but will hold different agencies each with its own perspectives (of awareness) regarding the facts concerned—with each of these two agencies momentarily intending different outcomes. One is consciously aware of one’s conscience’s occurrence but is not unitary with it—this at the times one is aware of one’s conscience—and, furthermore, is often consciously unaware of the nuances of reasoning for one’s conscience desiring you to act or behave as it does.

I say this in hopes of illustrating that there is such a thing as un/not-conscious awareness pertaining to unconscious agency(ies) which the conscious self is at times disassociated with, or is other in relation to, which operate in parallel to consciousness.

As another example of this, when one has forgotten where one’s keys are, asks of oneself “where on earth did I leave my keys”, and received an intuition that answers the enquiry placed by the conscious self to its total psyche as self, the mental agency which responds with the info is other in relation to the conscious agency: both are aspects of the same total person, but whereas the former knows (and is aware of) where the lost item is, the latter momentarily is unknowing (and unaware) of this same information.

None of this is to deny that conscious agency/awareness is constituted of unconscious agency/awareness and that, therefore, there is a “spectrum of meaningfulness” between the two. But it is to point out that there are times when this formation of the conscious self—formed from unconscious agencies—operates in parallel to some of said unconscious agencies.

As to blindsight, again, I’m arguing that here the conscious agent is visually unaware while the unconscious agency(ies) of the same (total) person are visually aware. In short, that blindsight is not conscious sight.

If you were to disagree with the aforementioned, by what do you distinguish the conscious mind from the unconscious mind? (If you do so distinguish.)

The obvious point is that either "favourable" is not the same as "good" - and that "hence" is misplaced; or you are using "favourable" and "good" for the exact same thing, and so saying what is good is hat is favourable achieves nothing but a change in wording. — Banno

For what its worth, it the second option, a change of wording, which can serve to clarify what is semantically intended.

That's why they are so damn hard to find out in the world, and why Plato was wrong.

But another thread...? — Banno

The "Plato was wrong" gave me a good friendly laugh. Not planning on staying long on the forum, but maybe I'd partake of another thread.

Out of fun, though, can you think of any awareness-endowed life that doesn't move toward what it find's favorable, hence good? If you can, then the good would not be cosmically applicable to all beings, hence would not be universal as Plato claimed.

Lightly touching upon this topic, I can see this argument working for what I discern to be non-universal universals, like redness, but not for cosmically applicable universals, like goodness (again, this in terms of that which is favorable).

Then again, I know that it requires a comparison of very different metaphysical approaches in order to even consider things such as goodness to be a universal.

Art shows rather than says. That's part of the value of art: that with it we see things that are difficult, if not impossible, to say. — Banno

True. I was in part thinking of things like poetry, which is all words and therefore saying. But I can see how one could argue that poetry shows as well.

Yeah, on second thoughts I'll leave that for some other time. — Wayfarer

While that sounds like a good idea, I'll comment anyways.

It strikes me that so termed universals can range from being cosmically applicable - thinking of things like goodness - or else be, well, not technically universal, instead being limited to a cohort of beings that communally shares the given so-called universal. While examples can get cumbersome and arguable, redness (when allowed to be a universal) is limited to only those beings capable of experiencing it; this while something like goodness (as in that which is favorable, rather than strictly moral) can be argued to be cosmically applicable to all beings in existence.

If you know of literature that addresses this disparity, or else have thoughts regarding non-univeral universals, please let me know.

I see no problem with that as it stands. Issues arise when folk make attempts to talk about what is private., to treat it as if it were public. — Banno

Ah. Pacifies me a bit. As to the latter, isn't that what a majority of art does (... well, at least historically)?

Though I'm trying to avoid directly addressing issues regarding nuances of perception, cogitations, emotions, and the like, art when affective / effective can touch on most of these topics - in essence making the strictly private public to some community.



I agree with the quote you give. Though, to be honest, the issue of universals still gives me headaches sometimes. I guess it depends on which types of universals are addressed.

It's a cumbersome, disjointed view that divides the world into internal and external [...] — Banno

Off the top of my head, a question to all who disagree with the validity or utility of an internal-external divide:

That which is accessible to a single person, i.e. private, is internal to the person in question; that which is accessible to everyone in principle, i.e. public, is external to all persons.

Where’s the fallacy in this?

Q: Why are idealists, optimists and people with "hope" so depressing?

A: For the same reason that sad songs say so much to so many … this at least some of the time.

Example: when you’re devastated from a broken heart being told to cheer up on account of there being more fish in the sea brings you down, not up. But being told the situation is awful helps to relieve the pain, making you feel better.

I think there is here, an unnecessary tripping-up over terminology. Potayto-potahto. — James Riley

Could be.

So to you individuals have no say within a society? To me, societies don't decide or feel; individuals do. And when the decisions and feelings of individuals interrelate, that's when a society forms.

In any even, I think it is subjective to determine that eliminating crime (through abortion or otherwise) is entirely a pro-societal marker, and that increasing crime is de facto anti-societal. There are grey areas and we (individually) don't get to choose what is pro or anti-society. Society does that. — James Riley

As a counter, if crime is injurious, and if the individuals that make up a society don't like getting injured, then reducing crime can only be pro-societal - i.e. pro the cohesion of individuals that make up the given society. Also, societies are nothing else but groups of individuals that voluntarily interrelate; so individuals, to me, do have their say; its in part how societies change over time.

But yea, I do agree its a murky area. As a topic related to the OP, there's such a thing as honor among thieves. Here, the thieves form a society within a larger society and perpetuate crime against the larger society but, within their own sub-society, live by often stringent moral codes. To ask, "are the thieves then moral" is, it seems, too simplistic a question.

To be transparent, though, in my previous post I was mainly intending to intimate that freedom of abortion cannot be an iniquity (a crime in this sense) against a society, though it can be a violation of the society's laws (a crime in this sense) if the society does outlaw abortion. But I gather there's other threads for this were I to care to debate it.

Loosely, a population or a group of people with structured or ordered existence bound by morality (whether religious or secular or both). Structured in the sense that they perform economic, educational, and social activities. — L'éléphant

OK, Nazi Germany had the structure you speak of with the iffy point being that of "bounded by morality". The Nazis certainly viewed themselves as moral, noble even. So this will likely wind down into what the nature of morality actually consists of - thereby allowing some distinction between true morality and false notions of morality. Although I strongly lean on the objective morality side of things, this isn't something I'm currently interested in debating. The added caveat that a society is bounded by morality is new to me, though. Thanks for sharing.

Still, in ordinary understandings of "society", one could say that the German society underwent massive transitions from pre-WWII times, though WWII times, to post-WWII times .. all the while remaining "the German society". If I understand you correctly, you're saying that Germany lacked society during WWII times? What did they instead have during this time period?

First off, my bad; just double-checked and I misspoke:

Although the Nazis won the greatest share of the popular vote in the two Reichstag general elections of 1932, they did not have a majority. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi_Germany#Nazi_seizure_of_power

They were still pretty popular among voters, though.

Did the German society die, or the Nazi party died? — L'éléphant

"Died" doesn't seem to be an adequate term for the Nazis. There's quite the resurgence going on. In Germany, in the US, I'm sure in other places as well. And, among the resurgent neo-Nazi folk, there's a fairly strong societal bond.

How do you define society, exactly? I'm myself thinking of the typical dictionary senses when I use the term.

That military arrangement or whatnot was democratically voted into power (this by the majority of the people). So your argument doesn't hold.

The question is, Did the Nazis have a society or something else? — L'éléphant

A society.