lesser animals' abilities of awareness pale in comparison to our own — javra

Why do you consider this a matter of awareness, and not of something else? — baker

I take it that greater intelligence, for example, endows an animal with greater awareness regarding what is and could be. Conversely, in the absence of any awareness, no degree or type of intelligence could manifest.

Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic. — javra

If I claim that I am referring to something intrinsic by saying that I am in pain, what I mean is that there is a simple and direct relation between my words and a sensation. Wittgenstein argues that such an isolated association between word and thing doesn’t say anything at all, it is meaningless. In order for the expression ‘ I am in pain’ to mean something to others,, it has to
refer to a socially shared context of background presuppositions, and do something new with them that is recognizable to other speakers. If I am alone, and I think to myself ‘I am in pain’, then the thought is only meaningful to me if it refers to my own network of background presuppositions and carries them forward into a new context of sense. — Joshs

While acknowledging other’s rather complex interpretations of Wittgenstein, here’s what the guy actually said in his own words:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Philosophical Investigations, Sec. 293 by L. Wittgenstein

Note that the most primordial beetle of all beetles, so to speak, is conscious awareness itself. The question is asked, “Does conscious awareness occur in myself, in humans at large, in other lifeforms?” To which Witt replies, “It would be a beetle in a box, so who knows and who cares? It’s irrelevant.”

As always before, I, personally, am not satisfied by Wittgenstein's answer to this and like issues. This when reading Witt verbatim. Felt like mentioning that.

How do you know that animals aren't aware? — baker

Hm. I fallibly know that unicelled organisms are aware, as are fungi and plants. Needless to then add, as are all lesser animals. Interesting issue for me is whether individual somatic cells, including neurons, are to some degree aware - and I find no reason to conclude they’re not. In fact, I’ve in my life wondered how far animals like dolphins would have gone technologically had they acquired appendages with opposable thumbs (something that’s not going to happen for sea-dwelling life); as intelligent as they might be, they’re however stuck with the body they have, as are all of us. So, in short, you’ve misread my comment.


Thanks for that.

By this he didn’t mean animals didnt think, but that their social behavior constituted language games we couldn’t relate to. — Joshs

And yet when a lion does its thing and roars with a certain tonality in a certain context, we non-lions get the gist of what its conveying well enough: the rough English translation being, “I’m the boss”. Going by their behaviors, so too do zebras and gazelles - or else competitors such as hyenas.

For background, what is your stance on the proposition that lesser animals do not convey propositions?

The beetle in a box argument isnt about verbal language, it’s about social behavior, and a rejection of the idea that any meaning can be intrinsic (like qualia). — Joshs

Does the beetle in the box argument affirm that my honestly saying “I am in pain” has a relevant referent? Such that, though you might not instantly discern what it is, it is nevertheless that which I intend to refer to via the sigh of “my pain”. Last I read it affirms the opposite, that whether or not there is a referent to this phrase is irrelevant. Meaning being strictly attached to the abstractions of language rather than to intents, which are intrinsic.

Shoot. Any time.

What makes us better? — TiredThinker

Degrees of awareness rather than divisions between. But these degrees relative to our surviving closest evolutionary kin are so astronomical in magnitude that lesser animals' abilities of awareness pale in comparison to our own.

Otherwise, tool making, conceptualization, conveying info via species-specific signs, and so forth, all these are found in a cline.

So it's controversial to Wittgensteinians because it doesn't accord with a philosophical preference for language-centered epistemologies, cosmologies, etc? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Seems to me to be the case, yes.

Do you take issue with this (to my mind non-controversial) position? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Not one bit. I rather take issue with the notion that the linguistic expression of "my pain" has no relevant referent (this as per the beetle in a box argument).

Languageless creatures have languageless beliefs in the form of thought-patterns and emotional patterns that motivate behavior.

We only need to assume languageless creatures have thoughts and emotions and that these thoughts and emotions have the power to motivate behavior.

I don't see why it needs to be more complicated than that. — ZzzoneiroCosm

:up: Fully agree.

I don't want to say this due to the can of worms that it is, but I will anyway: the problem is one of other minds; in this case where we linguistic ones refuse to grant nonlinguistic beings any relevance. There of course is the evolutionary conundrum to this and like telltales (e.g., shared central nervous system anatomy) to dispel such a view ... but it's not historically uncommon.

What's the controversy? — ZzzoneiroCosm

In absence of @Banno's reply:

I believe it nullifies the importance of the beetle in a box argument - for, in this argument, if it isn’t linguistic it is irrelevant. Whereas to claim that nonlinguistic beliefs can occur is to claim the relevance of nonlinguistic givens. The two appear to stand in direct contradiction.

Again?

So a belief is a something stored in the mind of a Diplodocus? — Banno

Can a languageless animal experience uncertainty? In my experience at least some of them can. When in any way uncertain - such as when there is hesitation in proceeding a certain way - what else could such animal be possibly uncertain of if not issues regarding what ought and ought not be done in relation to what is or is not?

No proposition is being made yet there occur conflicting beliefs in relation to what is and ought be done for as long as the uncertainty occurs. This proposition-devoid conflict of beliefs* occurring in the mind of the respective languagleless animal.

* Belief as minimally understood to comprise trust in what is or ought to be done.

So if I see people applauding and cheering as a toreador sinks his blades into a bull's sides, that's not schadenfreude-like? These expressions actually represent remorse, love, pity, compassion. I thought these sentiments came with their own distinctive, dedicated physical correlates like :sad: :grimace: :cry:

:up: Next time you take a tumble and somebody laughs/sniggers (at you), you're gonna shake his/her hand, tip your hat, and thank him/her. — Agent Smith

Last I recall the toreador is supposed to bring about a clean kill in the lesser animal, rather than one of excruciating suffering.

That said, when have I ever denied the occurrence of sadistic assholes in the world? Your last sentence specifically leaves a lot to be desired in terms of coherence.

Ah, the vicarious pleasures of watching other life struggle, suffer, and die form a safe distance ... maybe with popcorn ready at hand. — javra

:sad: Oh well, let's not spoil the fun! This is the best the world has to offer by way of enjoyment! Schadenfreude is all we got, take it or leave it! — Agent Smith

Here’s a rephrasing of what I was saying: Mistaking the pleasure of watching well played-out combat sports for the pleasure of bloodlust is on par to mistaking the wails that occur during sexual orgasms for manifestations of suffering. That said, there of course are those who find fun in bloodlust’s fulfilment, this as they find fun the bringing about of others’ suffering via sex - neither of which were unheard of in the Colosseum, for example.



I was ignorant of the phrase's specific origins, so thanks for the reference.

What can be posited to exist without any perceptions or conceptualizations (for perceptions and conceptualizations are awareness-contingent and would in no way occur in the absence of all awareness)? — javra

I would say that absent percipients only what would be perceived if there were percipients could be posited. So, stars planets, mountains, rivers and so on. A cry long list if you include plants. — Janus

My first thought is, could anyone accomplish this positing without the use of their awareness? Take away awareness in general and the very possibility of this supposition seems to me to existentially vanish. What then?

But I grant that you, as with many others, deem it necessary that givens occur in manners fully independent of awareness in general, this in order to justify givens occurring independently of individual instantiations of awareness - the latter being something we all agree upon. In contrast, I’m thinking more along the lines of C.S. Peirce’s notions of idealism wherein “matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming natural laws”. Here, the physical (being effete mind) is contingent on the occurrence of awareness in general - but is not contingent on any individual instantiation of awareness. The former view - wherein matter is fully independent of mind - would seem to create a dualism between mind and matter if not for the supposition of physicalism. In at least this respect, the latter view does not.

At any rate, though we disagree on this point of ontology, thank you for the answer.

If all awareness in the cosmos were to somehow miraculously vanish [...] what, if anything, would remain of the world as we in any way know it? — javra

I would say everything bar percipients and their perceptions. — Janus

In other words, everything bar awareness and awareness-contingent givens. What would that be though?

One should minimally add to your reply conceptualizations - including those of the world past, present, or future; or even of possible worlds - for all conceptualizations are themselves contingent on some instantiation(s) of awareness. So it’s known, I find your answer in current form trivially true and hence uninformative. I can try to rephrase the question in this way: What can be posited to exist without any perceptions or conceptualizations (for perceptions and conceptualizations are awareness-contingent and would in no way occur in the absence of all awareness)?

Perhaps I'm thick, but I didn't understand what you were trying to convey in your first paragraph. — Janus

Or perhaps I haven't explained it well enough. If it's of help, to try to illustrate from a different angle; I’ll allude to what I find to be a parallel-enough metaphysics in this regard: Buddhism. It’s a non-physicalist ontology replete with its causal networks that affirms the lack of a creator psyche for the world. I uphold a like position in regard to the generalities just expressed. If this example is not of help, then it appears I'm currently not that capable of properly expressing myself. I'll work on it some for next time.

You might be interested in this comment. — Wayfarer

I don’t find anything disagreeable in the comment linked to. Thanks for it. I’m just struck by, I’ll call it the awkwardness, of physicalism being in this instance in part defined by the occurrence of awareness that is irreducible to nonawareness. Don’t know if you got a chance to visit the wiki page I linked to: though disagreements are many, turns out panpsychism as concept can nevertheless be deemed amiable to most any system of ontology, depending on who you ask. The only stringent exception being that of emergentism as it regards awareness per se. But when it comes to physicalism - irrespective of what future refinements, if any, might be made to the notion of “panpsychist physicalism”- it seem to completely evaporate the semantics by which physicalism is currently understood. For instance, taken from the first page of the manuscript @Manuel linked to:

What does physicalism involve? What is it, really, to be a physicalist? What is it to be a realistic physicalist, or, more simply, a real physicalist? Well, one thing is absolutely clear. You’re certainly not a realistic physicalist, you’re not a real physicalist, if you deny the existence of the phenomenon whose existence is more certain than the existence of anything else: experience, ‘consciousness’, conscious experience, ‘phenomenology’, experiential ‘what-it’s-likeness’, feeling, sensation, explicit conscious thought as we have it and know it at almost every waking moment. — Galen Strawson -- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism

This statement, of itself, runs counter to what many a physicalist on this website tend to affirm.

Are you positing a collective psyche or something like that? — Janus

As the "creator of the world" you mean? No. Tried to simplistically illustrate what I'm positing via the analogy to geometric points. More concretely, yet still simplistically, replace "geometric points" with "first-person points of view (conscious or otherwise)" and "geometric space" with "physical space". Lots of details to go through for which this forum isn't ideally suited. But the conclusion: physical space is a necessary correlate of there co-occuring two or more first-person points of view - and occurs independently of what these might individually or collectively desire in regard to space's existence. Just as there would be no geometric space in the absence of two or more geometric points, so too would there be no physical space in the absence of two or more instantiations of awareness. As physical space is contingent on there being two or more instantiations of awareness, so too will the physical world in totality of complexity be. But I really don't want to drag this into "my views". In short, though, the answer to the question you posed is "no": there is no creator psyche of the world from where I stand.

In fairness, though, you have so far not directly answered the question I've posed:

If all awareness in the cosmos were to somehow miraculously vanish [...] what, if anything, would remain of the world as we in any way know it? — javra

Regardless of that, what it means to say things exist independently of percipients, is that they are there to be perceived, and there regardless of whether or not they are perceived. — Janus

Right. Of course. Independently of me, or of you, or of any other individual sentience. But would they in any way occur in the complete absence of any and all awareness?

As an analogy, one single geometric point is indefinite, volumeless, and in this sense nonexistent. There must be two or more geometric points to establish any kind of space whatsoever - a space which the two or more geometric points inhabit with location. Now, given that space already is, this entails that a plurality of geometric points occurs. Take any one geometric point away and the given space yet remains due to there yet occurring two or more geometric points to define it. So, relative to individual geometric points, the space they occupy occurs independently of them. Yet, relative to all geometric points, the occurrence of the space they occupy will be dependent on the geometric points' primacy of being.

In like enough manner, the physical world (to not even mention individual objects in it) occurs fully independently of me, or you, of any other individual psyche. But in the absence of all awareness, including that pertaining to psyches, there would be no such thing as a world.

Like an ocean that is made up of water drops. The ocean is in one way fully independent of the individual water drops it consist of: taking a buck of water away makes no difference. Yet, there would be no ocean in the complete absence of all water drops.

This not with an intention to convince but to explain. I agree that the physical world is mind-independent (or indifferent) when addressing individual minds or individual mind cohorts. But I uphold that it is mind-dependent (or at least awareness-dependent) when addressing the occurrence of all coexisting instantiations of awareness.

Its an alternative view to yours - but it does account for why the moon is irrespective of whether I, or you, or some lesser animal somewhere, happens to be mindful of it or not. For one thing, the moon is thoroughly enmeshed in a cosmic causal matrix, the same we're all embedded in, and will thus remain long after we no longer are in this world.

Edit: Panpsychism of some form would then need to be to account for a life-devoid cosmos from which life evolved, this within such a system pivoting on a primacy of awareness.

:up: Thanks a bunch. I'll check it out.

If we believe the science it tells us that the universe did indeed exist before any organisms appeared on the scene. — Janus

I believe I've already accounted for this in my post via some, as of yet to be clarified, form of panpsychism.



I do see where you're coming from. My own view has nowadays come to take the primacy of awareness nearly for granted. However, due to my own views - liken them maybe to those of a logos operated anima mundi when it comes to the physical world we all share - this does entail that what we discover of the anima mundi (else, what the anima mundi informs us of) is, for lack of a better wording, our closest proximity to an absolute objective truth. A view easily shunned in multiple ways, I'm sure, but in this view, fully granting the primacy of awareness, we are being informed by the world that we sapient beings evolved from beings of lesser sentience which themselves somehow evolved out of nonlife. My degree of understanding may not be good enough to understand how, yet due to the very premises I hold - including that of awareness's primacy - I cannot find myself denying the data that life evolved out of nonlife. If not on our planet then in the cosmos at large.

In parallel to the issue of whether the Sun rises or else the Earth's axis spins, I personally find that on one hand life's evolution form nonlife really doesn't much matter in the context of the lives we live. On the other hand, I do believe its were deeper truths about the world in large, together with those pertaining to our own being, are to be uncovered.

But yes, regardless of any differences we might have, at the end of the day I do agree with this:

The empiricist view is that the universe exists irrespective of whether it is observed or not. In one sense that is true, but the empiricist overlooks the role of the observing mind in the representation of the Universe and so what it means to say the universe exists. — Wayfarer

Sure! If you are interested, I can see if I can find you an article - or a part of an article - in which Strawson talks about the problem of life in relation to panpsychism. — Manuel

I am interested. Cheers.

The gist of it was (if I remember correctly) that all of "life" could be explained by our physics, chemistry and biology, but this still does not touch on the topic of experience at all. — Manuel

Right, I'd say. Nor does it yet seem to me to touch on the quantum leap, to so speak, between a bundle of inanimate molecules (like a bundle of individual lipids, proteins, and nucleic acids in a pastry dish) and the homeostatically metabolizing process operating on these otherwise inanimate constituents which is (sentience-endowed) corporeal life per se (tmk, even the most rudimentary bacterium can sense its environment and act/react accordingly).

Strawson postulates panpsychism as necessary because emergence cannot be brute or "radical": there must be something in the phenomena by which new properties arise as they do (in this case consciousness or experience), otherwise it would be a miracle every time a new property arises in nature. [...] — Manuel

Awesome. Thank you much for the explanation. I guess I'll be needing to read into the physicalist version of panpsychism, then. This with primary interest in the dichotomy between life and nonlife, which to me still seems rather brute/radical in terms of evolutionary developments (here in the generalized sense of change over time).

But what about relativity? Isn't it built on thought experiments that were later verified? At least some of our native reason works? — frank

I'll add the following: It works quite well, true. As does QM. But because there are disparities between the two, we know that at least one of the two is not accurately representing what is - if not both.

But, Chomsky doesn't agree with Panpsychism, because he believes "radical emergence" to be part of normal science. — Manuel

Maybe I'm not as well versed on this topic matter; still, I don't find a necessary conflict between the idea of panpsychism and the idea of radical emergence: e.g., even if panpsychism, there would yet be a radical enough emergence of life from nonlife. Any idea of why the two would need to be contradictory?

That's the opposite of what happened, Newton overthrew materialism, and it has only gotten stranger since - further removed from common sense. — Manuel

To further illustrate this point:

Strawson, on the other hand, describes panpsychism as a form of physicalism, on his view the only viable form.[26] Panpsychism can be combined with reductive materialism but cannot be combined with eliminative materialism because the latter denies the existence of the relevant mental attributes.[8] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Physicalism_and_materialism

emphasis is mine

So, you believe that if you as an observer ceased to exist, the world would go with you? — Janus

Picking up on this: Its utterly reasonable to me to claim that when the unique self which I am will cease existing, all my personal loves and idiosyncratic perspectives will end with me - but not yours or those of the eight billion and counting, to not mention the far greater quantity of unique selves of lesser sentient beings.

What I find to be a more interesting question in respect to the thread: If all awareness in the cosmos were to somehow miraculously vanish - from that of the lowly bacteria to us, to that occurring in any other place in the universe irrespective of its degree of development; even that applicable to panpsychism if one so maintains the world to be - what, if anything, would remain of the world as we in any way know it?

While I take this to be an open-ended issue, I can’t fathom any type of envisioned world occurring in the absence of any awareness to envision it.

(As to the issue of life evolving out of nonlife, some as of yet nebulous system of panpsychism could potentially account for this just as well as, if not better then, the metaphysical stance of physicalism does. But, here, the world would be primordially constituted of awareness, thereby entailing that no world occurs if no awareness occurs.)

From my POV, respectfully, you have not demonstrated an understanding of my point. That may be my fault, for not finding the right words. My point is not about consciousness denial at all, but only about the phoniness of the hard problem (which can be understood as a denial of the utility or intelligibility of a certain metaphysical use of 'consciousness' or 'qualia.') — ajar

Then why oh why reply to me this way: I.e., What was it in my initial post to you that you disagree with?

But I guess like I previously said, never mind.

Well, in that case, never mind. I can only then presume you in fact agree that such a thing as fist-person points of view occur in the world, hence actually happen, this rather than being illusions. And that it’s absurd to conclude otherwise. This in contrast to some of us assuming that they occur due to being "trapped in the grammar of a word".

Ah, the vicarious pleasures of watching other life struggle, suffer, and die form a safe distance ... maybe with popcorn ready at hand. Not so taboo nowadays, I think. For those who are into it, there’s quite a resurgence of enacting the Ancient Roman dictum of “bread (like fast food for those who can’t afford better) and circus (like the both literal and figurative bloodsports that surround)” … this in our oh so civilized society, so as to keep the vast majority of us appeased in times of ever-increasing want. Always was and always will be so no point in being opposed to this, the attributes of the so called “real world”. Besides, no such thing as the vicarious pleasure of seeing others well off while one is in suffering; and if there is, it doesn’t pertain to the real world anyway.

Am I getting things generally right here? My bad for the tonality if not.

I can enjoy a well played out physical contact sport. I’ve seen quite good, and brutally intense, kickboxing where the competitors gave each other long, earnest fraternal hugs when the match ended. This hugging thing is deemed uncomfortable, un-male-like behavior by many of us. But this same portion of us are not thus uncomforted when a boxer bites off the ear of another.

I take many a competitive sport to be mock-aggression, with or without bodily contact, much like a good portion of childhood play is. Something we engage in as practice for the real thing, but not the real thing itself; certainly not something wherein we must become the victor at any and all costs. I assume there has to be some mock-aggression in the stereotype of girls playing with barbies if there is to be had any fun to begin with in such play. More social than physical, but again serving as practice for the real deal in terms of conflicts.

Generally asking: What has bloodlust to do with this? Well, other than a resurgence in the general populace's desire for it.

No doubting that.

'First person point of view' is potentially just as innocent as 'conscious experience,' such as a novel being written in the first person point of view. — ajar

You’ve managed to spur my interests.

And how is a fictional first-person point of view an innocent ignorant assemblage of words? That we can all understand what a novel, fiction, written in the first-person point of view entails directly contradicts your affirmation.

Besides, I was addressing an "occurring (i.e., actually happening) first person point of view". You were saying this assemblage of words has an unclear referent. Again, how?

Psychopathology turned into an artform. This artform affectively speaking only to … psychopaths. Not inscrutable by a long shot. Still, this gives no contribution to the thread's question of what art is, never mind good art.

The context would be your own being in the world, for it addresses that which is "first-person". But I too am getting tired of this rather dull subject. I'll do my best to let you further discuss this with others without butting in.

Alright. What about "an occurring first-person point of view"? Do you deem that phrase to be reified or paradoxical? If so, I'm curious to find out how.

Respectfully, from my POV, you 'mysterions' (I dub thee such playfully) are trapped in the grammar of a word. — ajar

You sound as though to say that words can't, or at least don't, refer to real givens.

Consciousness is a word, yes. So is Earth, no?

On what experiential or rational ground do you grant the first word no referent when, I presume, you do the second?

yet insisting that the existence of such an entity is beyond question. (If philosophers do question it, they are monsters who can't be serious.) — ajar

If you - or anybody else - as an occurring first-person point of view want to question the reality of your own occurrence as a first-person point of view, I say knock yourself out.

It's when the conclusion is made by an occurring first-person point of view that their own occurrence as a first-person point of view is a falsity (an illusion or whatnot: basically, not real) that the "cannot be taken seriously" issue comes into play.

And where was it ever claimed that a first-person point of view (of which consciousness cannot be devoid) is "an entity"? Last I heard, it's addressed as a "be-ing": a verb, if not an outright process.

And so artifacts are always meaningful in so being artifacts in this sense which is intrinsic to our very notion of what an artifact is. — javra

If I understand what you're saying, and it is very possible I don't, I disagree. — T Clark

Fair enough. To try to clarify my meaning: “artifact” as word to us means/signifies the following concept: “an object that was made by some person(s) hand or labor intentionally (this rather than accidentally, or else not as a byproduct of some other process(es) the person engages in)” If this word “artifact” has real-life references, then that which the word references will be concrete instantiations of “an object that was intentionally made by persons' hands or labor”. Hence, all concrete instantiations of artifacts are discerned to so be because we find them to mean that somebody made them with intent by hand or labor. I might be going in circles, my bad if I am, so here’s an example: You’re in a desert and you come upon a watch on top of a rock. Naturally, the watch you deem to be an artifact; the rock you don’t. When you see the watch, your implicit thought is, “someone made this thing with intention (rather than accidentally or as a byproduct of some other activity) by hand or labor”. The rock you deem to not be made by anybody, intentionally or otherwise, irrespective of the means available to them. Therein lies the watch’s pivotal meaning to you as an artifact: it’s something that someone intentionally made by hand or labor. And even devoid of an audience, the artifact would have this same meaning to its creator(s). Devoid of this meaning it holds relative to us, no one would be able to discern it as an artifact. The watch would just be a more intricate rock.

If this doesn’t make my position clearer, bummer, but so be it. I get your intention to head off.

As I noted before, I'm reading Collingwood's "Principles of Art" and I'm really enjoying it. — T Clark

Sounds good. Hope you enjoy it through to the end.

I addressed my uncertainty about this issue in a recent post addressed to Tom Storm. I don't know if you saw it.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/642426 — T Clark

Saw it, and I've re-read it. Here's my own current take. All (created; human made) form follows function - with "function" being in this context a fancy word for "intent, purpose, hence, in this way, use (i.e. the purpose for which something is employed)". Maybe debatable but I'll uphold it. When it comes to fine art, the product, or artifact, as form is a result of the designer's/producer's functional/intentional usage of what is to become the artistic form as vehicle to express something more or less personal, if not idiosyncratic, so that a community might understand it. So all fine art as product is there because it was deemed useful in this sense: it, as form, is supposed to be a vehicle for conveying that which the artist intents to communicate.

Let me know the extent to which we might disagree on this.

I don't understand how the fact that something was made intentionally gives it meaning. I think we may be about to fall into the "What does 'meaning' mean" abyss." — T Clark

But then, any artifact as form follows function - its intended usage. So I figure that any artifact, by shear virtue of so being a form that is resultant of some function, or intended use, carries as part of it this very meaning to anyone who discerns it to be an artifact: an artifact, of itself, in part means "some thing that was intended to be for some usage, hence purpose, and thereby is".

You were saying it is possible for artifacts to have no meaning outside of a viewing audience - which I implicitly take to not be the artifact's creators. Yet artifacts as forms always are due to the intent, purpose, usage ascribed to them by those who create them. And so artifacts are always meaningful in so being artifacts in this sense which is intrinsic to our very notion of what an artifact is. Hence, they have meaning outside of the viewing audience's particular attribution of meaning to them: they always signify, minimally but then also necessarily, "a form that follows the function assigned to it by its creator(s)"; i.e., a person-caused, hence made, functional form.

Then, given that we recognize artifacts as "forms that follow the functions given to them by their creators" we can then assume they were given functions that they in fact were not. Thereby unintentionally forsaking their original intent, hence their original meaning*, and imbuing them with novel meanings based on the functionality we attribute to them.

Nevertheless, the task of distinguishing non-art from art and craft and fine-art is the task of figuring out if the object, firstly, occurs due to an intended usage and, if so, secondly, determining what its intended usage as object originally was.

At least that's what I'm currently entertaining.

* Footnote: as to meanings' meaning, it always pivots around intent, hence purpose, hence function - this either literally or metaphorically. Or so I'm thinking. E.g., A sign's significance, or meaning, is that which is intended by the sign. An example of it being metaphorical: when the sign is heavy clouds, the sign's significance is probable rain - heavy clouds can mean probable rain - in so far as heavy clouds (metaphorically) intend for there to be rain. But if this gets debatable, I understand what you mean by "the abyss".

I've been endorsing two meanings of the word "art." 1) Something artificial without meaning beyond the viewers experience and 2) Something offered for aesthetic judgement or, as you expressed it, intended by some being to be art. I think they both work and I don't think they contradict each other. — T Clark

I don't mean to pester but to better understand: How do you discern artificial from non-artificial in definition (1) if not by that which is artificial occurring (necessarily but not sufficiently) on account of a persons' (or cohort's commonly shared) intent that it occurs? In other words, if you can't discern whether it was intended to be by one or more persons, how can you discern it to be an artifact?

I ask because if intent is inherent to what artifacts are, then all artifacts would yet have a meaning in so being: they all signify being the outcome of some intent. And this again gets to the issue of how an artifact can be devoid of all meaning outside of the viewer's experience - if meaning of "being a creation" is innate to being an artifact.

In which case, some might not help but wonder why the creator(s) of the artifact bothered to create it - for it then is factual that it was the result of intentions - which again speaks to the intentions of those who produced it.

I'm probably missing something, but I'm not getting what that is. ... You're of an engineering background, so I'm thinking of buildings, which are functional artifacts. Can you find it possible that an engineer could design a building in manners perfectly devoid of aesthetic properties? I'm here thinking of the proverbial notion that form follows function: when this occurs, the end result would be aesthetic in the sense of elegant (or something to that effect).

I've been pushing the definition of art as something without meaning beyond the viewer's experience. — T Clark

Think back to what we were all discussing in terms of differentiating art from non-art - this irrespective of its aesthetic standing. In order to be art some being must have intended it to be art and, in so intending, that being must have meant it to so be - thereby imparting it with this meaning. Hence, even in this basic facet of it, for X to be art it must have the minimal meaning of having been intended to so be by someone - and this fully independent of any viewer's experience of it.

Otherwise:

How do I turn that personal, idiosyncratic standard into something a community can share? — T Clark

Though taken a bit out of context here: That's the rub of it all, I think. Even in assuming that the prototypical artist intends to convey some affective state to other(s) - something I myself champion - the same question holds.

[...] Quality of art is a measure of the extent to which a specific community consistently has positive experiences [...] — T Clark

I'd embellish this by saying that quality of art is a measure of the extent to which a specific community consistently is brought closer to eudemonia - to a flourishing of being - by said artwork (regardless of whether its pretty or morbidly grotesque, initially appealing or revolting, and so forth). How would that work?

I hear you. — Tom Storm

Cool. Glad I didn’t come off as too much of a jerk in saying what I said.

Only by exposing yourself to new things and sticking with them and, perhaps reading about them, can one come to appreciate their subtleties or lack there of. This means sticking with things you are not drawn to and possibly dislike. Subjectivity is something we can overcome. I gradually 'discovered' a lot of music, novels and movies by doing this. — Tom Storm

Got to understand and appreciate traditional African artwork that way. More recently also contemporary minimalism, which I wanted nothing to do with before understanding what others saw in it as a genre. So, yea.

The challenge with an overly personal or subjective account of art is it tends to render Citizen Kane equivalent with an Adam Sandler movie (or insert piece of shit of your choice). I guess a criterion of value is usually established by a community of shared understanding. Which kind of leaves us to talk inside to our bubbles. — Tom Storm

Going back a bit to what I was saying about commonly shared tastes in relation to food and the exception of some humans somewhere finding human shit to be a delicacy: if what is shit (in terms of art out there) to the vast majority of us is deemed a sublime delicacy by some select few, this doesn’t change the fact that it doesn’t serve the vast majority’s affective appetites any. (I know. I'll try to fully stop my chastising of much of modern art with this last comment on it. :smile: ) But could we in any way address this and like issues outside of our intersubjective bubbles?

I'd really like to hear a few choice navigation points from a phenomenological approach to artistic value. — Tom Storm

As regards art's aesthetic rather than monetary value (the two often do not coincide) as a generalized topic for philosophy: I think any phenomenological approach would have to first find the universalizing principle to aesthetics in all of us, in all beings capable of the experience for that matter, this just as much as it does with the principle of aboutness. Then again, I'm not a phenomenologist, just have certain affinities to some of it.