Abortion may be a crime against *some* societies, but not all. In the U.S., for instance, it is not a crime against society. — James Riley

A crime within some societies, yea, OK; but a crime against society? How so? Off the top of my head as source, the movie “Freakonomics” makes the case that having a pro-life-quality mentality (my term for freedom of choice to abort fetuses) leads to the improved quality of a society.

3. It's Not Always a Wonderful Life : Narrated by Melvin Van Peebles and directed by Eugene Jarecki, this segment explores the question of what led to a decline in the urban crime rate in the US during the mid- to late 1990s. The authors of Freakonomics suggest that a substantial factor was the 1973 US Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade, which permitted women to have legal abortions, leading to more wanted children with better upbringings. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freakonomics_(film)#Segments

And this turns the tables into something like, “the illegalization of abortion is detrimental to society and, thereby, a crime* against society’s wellbeing”.

* Crime as in “iniquity” rather than “violations of law”. To illustrate with a simplistic example, Nazis were law-abiding citizens within their own society, but their society's laws were often criminal … and violations of these criminal laws moral.

unless the global warming thing actually is someone's hoax — javra

Not a hoax. We're totally screwed. — Bitter Crank

Just caught that edit of yours. "Totally" might be too much. Cheap enough carbon recapture technology might be on the horizon. The catch is that we'd need to be investing into research for it in order for it to come about. To my knowledge, currently, not so much is being invested.

:smile:

I've never been cool. — Bitter Crank

Only cool people have the nerve to say this of themselves.

To clarify: ... unless the global warming thing actually is someone's hoax. I doubt that, though.

I know, right? — Hanover

Does this have anything to do with the "Who's the fairest of them all?" cat pic? :grin:

The evolution of humanity is toward greater life expectancy, less hunger, less strife, less war. I extrapolate from what I see a trajectory toward perfection, not destruction. — Hanover

I'd replace the "is" with "should be". The less hunger, strife, and war part might be questionable, as might be life expectancy in upcoming years.

Don't be clouded by the apocalyptic visions of Christianity, That is but one vision, which lacks the unrestrained positivity inherent in other traditions.

In the end everything will be perfect. If things aren't perfect, it must not be the end — Hanover

Man, Hanover’s stuff hasn’t received any credit. As we all kind’a know, apocalypse is the Ancient Greek term for “uncovering or disclosure (naturally, regarding what is)” - and, as such, is closely related to the Ancient Greek term for truth, “aletheia”, which literally means “that which is not hidden/covered/closed off to one's notice”. Soooo … the religious interpretation of an/the apocalypse is that of, to paraphrase (I think), a disclosure to all of that all elusive absolute truth that some talk of.

Christianity interprets this uncovering of absolute truth to be linked to lots of suffering prior to its full realization (except, of course, for those who’ll be beamed up to divinity as a shortcut … not giving a hoot about the suffering of those that aren’t, angelic as beamed up ones are (sarcasm)); other cultures do not so interpret. But, as Hanover said, the so envisioned cosmic apocalypse is supposed to lead to a complete perfection of being, not to demise and destruction, as an end of affairs.

Always wanted to partake in giving rise to a new slang: rather than “that’s radical” as I grew up with, “that’s apocalyptic!” as in mind-blowing in what is revealed. But, alas, I’ve never been that cool to start new slang.

At any rate, there’s nothing apocalyptic I can think of about the new mass-extinction we’re currently living through and the related de-evolutions of civilized culture. Other than reinforcing that we humans are not as intelligent as we often like to think we are.

As to readings, Stoicism has tended to help me out. I’m thinking Marcus Aurelius’ “Meditations” might be a good start.

Strange as it may sound, there are those who secretly relish apocalyptic fantasies, who want to hear nothing but tragic news (one could call it ‘doom porn’) . — Joshs

:100:

Hey, who isn't slow sometimes? :razz: Reminds me of a song lyric: "slow like honey, strong like music" :wink:

As to the resolution, I do wish the world worked in that way. It hasn't been my experience in life, at least so far.

I would say that one should treat a janitor and a president with the same amount of respect, even if the real world doesn't work that way. — john27

Yea, I agree that this is the ideal which we ought to be striving for. Unfortunately for those who hold such perspectives, the world is currently becoming ever more autocracy yearning; the growth of fascism's popularity (be it implicit or explicit) is one evidence of this. How to turn the tides back to a democracy yearning world, is the question I'm posing.

From my vantage, autocracy feeds of the conviction that different humans hold different innate importance. Democracy, on the other hand, feeds on the conviction that different humans will hold the same innate importance despite their differences.

Hm... Well I did say we are of different value, but I never said we are of different importance. Are they correlated? — john27

One prominent definition of "value" is "the degree of importance given to something". Within the context addressed, as I tried to previously explain, the two are synonymous.

In which case, I'll point back to this post.

Hey, seems like you're a decent person, so good luck with your endeavors of figuring out what equality of rights should be based on. But, from where I stand, vague affirmations that are acknowledged to further require as of yet undiscovered conditions will not on their own go very far in preventing one group of humans from trampling all over some other group of humans.

It started with "equality of value" ... not of mathematical notions of value, but of "degrees of importance" ... not being deemed by you a proper grounds for the basing of equality of rights. As in:

Im my opinion you shouldn't base equality of rights on value. — john27

Notice that this statement isn't about the semantics of sameness v. equality, as mentioned here:

Er...not exactly. I was trying to describe how same ≠ equal. — john27

But about the virtue of value - again, as in "the degree of innate importance pertaining to something".

In sum, the debate between us centers around whether or not all humans ought to be deemed to be of equal value, i.e. to hold the same degree of innate importance.

(Hey, if equal and same were synonymous to the writers of the US declaration of independence, I'll choose to be of the same mindset as far as semantics go.)

OK, but if different humans (which will be different by definition) will be deemed to have different degrees of importance, how does one prevent justifying things such as slave ownership?

In the wheelchair example you previously provided, one affords an exception to people on wheelchairs with - I assume - the implicit conviction that their lives are as important as the lives of non-handicaped peoples.

On the other hand, if a category of humans are deemed to be of less intrinsic importance, on what grounds would they not be implicitly considered "sub-human" by those of so-called normal importance? Thereby not meriting the same rights to life, to not mention things such as the same rights to pursue happiness and such.

Well, I'm referring to state sanctioned laws. As in, what aspects of the US constitution should apply to only some USA citizens but not to others?

Some malleability is built into the US constitution by default, btw. Yes to free speech but no to falsely claiming fire in a crowded theater, kind of thing. But its laws are still intended to apply to every citizen, not just some.

(i.e, I don't believe in codified consequence). — john27

Should I gather from this that you don't believe in democratic principles? All variations of autocratic systems will not have all humans of that system subjected to the same laws, i.e. codified consequences to conduct.

You still haven't answered my question.

How would equality in value translate into equality in rights? For example, I could have 1+3=4, and 2+2=4. Two identical values but with blaring differences. In this case both individuals, even though they bring the same value would have to be treated differently. — john27

This is equivocating "the degree of importance given to something" with mathematical notions of value.

Im my opinion you shouldn't base equality of rights on value. — john27

To then rephrase, on what grounds should all humans be subjected to the same codified consequences to conduct if not the grounds that all types of humans (types differing in things such as average skin color, and so forth) nevertheless are granted to have the same degree of inherent importance?

I think you should base equality on the equal differential/personalization of rights, e.g because we are all different we are all equal (in that regard). — john27

This doesn't seem to suffice. Humans are different from rocks, but the fact that the two are different does not thereby make humans and rocks equal - else, the same - in any regard relevant to equal rights.

Haven’t read the entire thread, but equal in what sense? Equal in height, in gait … I suspect that “equality” is here shorthand for “equal in value” … which would translate into “equality of rights” or “equality of justice” or some such. In which case, taking my cue from the US’s declaration of independence, from George Orwell’s “Animal Farm”, and from the present state of affairs in the USA, to not mention the world:

It is a self-evident truth that all humans are created equal, and that some humans are being created increasingly more equal than others, with this dichotomy between equals growing exponentially as the days pass.

Soon enough we might be reinstating slaves and slave-owners, just that in this future the two will be officially decreed equals, with the latter being vastly more equal in value than the far less equal slaves they’ll own.

---------

Well, my dark-humored chuckles aside (better to laugh than cry I say) ...

On what grounds should all humans be governed by the same laws if all humans are not equal in value?

Else, for example, should some group A be lawfully allowed to murder while some group B receives capital punishment for doing the same?

What critiques would you have for these definitions (all leading up to those of “cause” and “causation”):

• A given (n.): a term serving as generalized placeholder for any conceivable entity, process, event, situation, or indefinite state of being (e.g., generalized existence or inexistence)
• Effect (n.): an outcome; a result; can consist of one or more givens
• Effect (v.): to bring about; to generate; to produce
• Cause (n.): a source - consisting of one or more givens - to an effect; that which effects a result
• Cause (v.): a process in which a specified cause effects, or brings about, an effect.
• Causation (n.): a generalized process in which one or more unspecified causes bring about effects

Here keeping things as simple as possible but no simpler, I’m hoping.

If the dynamite stick was hit by lightning, then it is safe to say that the lightning caused (was the source of) the dynamite’s explosion (as outcome, aka effect). If the dynamite stick had a fuse that was lit by a human, then it is safe to conclude that the human caused (was the source of) the dynamite’s explosion (as outcome). And so forth, depending on scenario.

Yes, there is the conceivable metaphysical possibility that no causation – as here defined – occurs. To be brief, living by upholding this metaphysical possibility to be reality in non-hypocritical manners would quickly lead to death. That (what we cognize as) outcomes have (what we cognize to be) sources is indispensable to life as we know it. Hence, if we desire to live, we will assume, if not know, that causation occurs in the world.

As to probabilistic causality, I find that it shares many merits, as well as many logical detriments, with the Buddhist notion of dependent origination. But this likely furthers the subject from the OP. Interesting topic to me though.



To my mind, this is fully contingent on the types of causes that are being contemplated. Not merely on definitions but on the type or reality we deem ourselves to live in.

In a system of causal (hard) determinism, all causes will by default be transitive without exception. In the murky realms of what nowadays gets the blanket label of causal indeterminism, things can logically vary a lot more in terms of types of causes but, in short, not all causes here will be transitive (depending on indeterministic system assumed, if any).

Still, I'll argue that regardless of further conceptualization, all causes, regardless of system, will be sources to outcomes, i.e. to effects.

Then it is awareness, not awareness of. An unpointed awareness is not an awareness of something. — Banno

For someone who gives great emphasis to language use, you have a strange means of expressing yourself. While I think I happen get what you mean by "an unpointed awareness" I hope you know that linguistic use of the term is fully idiosyncratic. One points one's awareness at things ... no, I'm not understanding that. To me it's worse than a homunculus argument.

But OK.

The dog does not recognise that the food is tasty; it just eats the food. The judgement that the food tastes good and therefore is worth eating is, as it were, post hoc, and in this case made by us in setting out the actions of the dog. — Banno

Animals would die quickly according to this reasoning. For an animal to not "hold awareness of" predator (non-food) from prey (food), or of that which is nutritious for it (food) from that which is toxic for it (non-food), would be deleterious to the animal. — javra

Forgot to make this explicit. That which is deemed as food will be desirable, and thereby good tasting (as contrasted to pleasantly sounding or the like), when the animal is hungry. It's what animal taste buds are for, right?

On this account, what you have called knowledge by acquaintance might be better termed belief based on ostension, so as to keep it distinct from propositional, justified knowledge. — Banno

Nope. No ostension involved in awareness of that which is directly experienced. Not to oneself and not to others. First awareness of and then, maybe, ostension so as to communicate that which one is directly aware of. This is what I call knowledge by acquaintance of X: direct awareness of X. Its also what a lot of other people call it, including Bertrand Russell. If you're so inclined check out the rest of this Wikipedia entry:

The distinction in its present form was first proposed by British philosopher Bertrand Russell in his famous 1905 paper, "On Denoting".[2] According to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is obtained exclusively through experience, and results from a direct causal interaction between a person and an object that the person is perceiving. In accordance with Russell's views on perception, sense-data from that object are the only things that people can ever become acquainted with; they can never truly be acquainted with the physical object itself. A person can also be acquainted with his own sense of self (cogito ergo sum) and his thoughts and ideas. However, other people could not become acquainted with another person's mind, for example. They have no way of directly interacting with it, since a mind is an internal object. They can only perceive that a mind could exist by observing that person's behaviour. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_by_acquaintance#%22On_Denoting%22

The dog does not recognise that the food is tasty; it just eats the food. The judgement that the food tastes good and therefore is worth eating is, as it were, post hoc, and in this case made by us in setting out the actions of the dog. — Banno

Animals would die quickly according to this reasoning. For an animal to not "hold awareness of" predator (non-food) from prey (food), or of that which is nutritious for it (food) from that which is toxic for it (non-food), would be deleterious to the animal.

But, thank you for actually replying to what I posted.

Point me to it. — Banno

OK: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/598040

Do you find a metaphysical divide between humans and lesser animals? I don't, and, as such, I see no reason to deny generalized innate behaviors, such as that of imprinting, in the human species. No I don't hold definitive proof of it. But such is my view.

Without. imprinting, how would social relations be different? — Joshs

A complex topic were one were to get into it. I'm not Freudian leaning, no Oedipus or Electra complexes for me (!), but I do hold that we as adults, for example, tend to be attracted to partners that (for heterosexuals) embody the characteristics we saw our parent of the opposite sex hold during our formative years. This, again, due to what I believe to be our imprinting what a relationship ought to be from out parents. And it does explain the data that Freudian BS often makes use of.

How would social relations be different without imprinting? I imagine we wouldn't hold any subconscious preferences in who we find attractive. These often stubborn and sometimes unhealthy subconscious preferences are far more tedious to adequately explain via the assumption of blank-slate, sense-making creatures. But again, I do hold an absence of metaphysical division between humans and lesser animals, and I think we can agree the latter are not "blank-slates".

edited for mistypes

Knowing by acquaintance that the cup is red is nothing more than knowing how to make use of the words "cup" and "red" in a sentence. — Banno

You've overlooked what I said. Not very interesting, as you say.

From our innate ability to engage in basic perception (e.g. of a basic behavior) to our innate imprinting on caregivers (e.g. of a complex instinctive behavior), innate activities in humans still play an important part of our behavior as a species. — javra

Are you arguing that pre-wired innate structures play a central role in the most complex kinds of adult human interactions? Could you give examples of this? — Joshs

Examples were give in the statement you quoted. Some of the most complex kinds of adult human interaction are in large part built upon them: perception and infant/child imprinting on caregivers (and the characteristics of such). We don't learn to perceive and we don't learn that we need to become attached to specific caregivers as young children (and, thereby, to their system of values which we tend to grow up with as individual humans).

knowledge by acquaintance — javra

This is interesting.

But this is a major theme: knowledge by acquaintance is problematic.

From the start of PI Wittgenstein examines ostension. He starts with a critique of Augustin's idea that pointing is fundamental to language. Pointing is as much a linguistic act as is asking a question, so it cannot stand as fundamental to language.

And knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge by ostension. — Banno

I can understand that it can be problematic. I think this is primarily because it is a rather vague and thereby ambiguous term. We’re accustomed to abstracting. But the most concrete of knowns are simply that which we are directly aware of. And this devoid of communication, such that at least most of what we are directly aware of is not contingent upon our communicating it to others or to ourselves. I double checked the definition of “know” and “knowledge” to confirm common usage and, as I anticipated, some definitions rely on “to be aware of” or some such.

So while much of communication is contingent on ostension (communication of emotions via facial expressions as one example that isn’t), our direct awareness of givens is not. Furthermore, that which one is directly aware of is, as a percept, and via common usage of the term, known to oneself. How does one know that the orange juice one drinks tastes sweet to oneself if not via direct awareness, with no ostension required in this. Or, as a more extreme example, how does an animal know whether what they put into their mouths to taste tastes good to them and is thereby worth being eaten?

This is the form of “knowledge by acquaintance” which I have in mind. And, here, knowledge by acquaintance is not knowledge by ostension.

That I see a red cup is neither contingent on claims that I might make nor is it a reality I need to place my faith or trust in. It simply is. — javra

It's based on your use of "Red" "Cup" "I" and "See". It already embeds you in a language community. — Banno

I don't fully disagree. Language can and does shape our awareness to an extent. What might a wine connoisseur be devoid of the language that conveys the different subtleties of taste? Without this language, including the understanding of what it conveys, one would be clueless as to what a connoisseur knows. Nevertheless, a lesser animal with color vision can discern a red object from a non-red object too via its sight - without any language community required for this discernment. I don't find that we are so different from lesser animals that we'd be unable to so discern in the absence of our holding a language. After all, pre-linguistic children do. Here, again, both the lesser animal and human would know what is and is not red via acquaintance. So in this chicken and egg issue, I find that knowledge by acquaintance is prior to language, or even communication in general - though sometimes language can, for example, focus our perceptions so that they become more finely tuned.

So, again, there's disagreement with this:

But further, if "the cup is red" were to count as knowledge by acquaintance, it must be justified by appeal to our common use of those words. — Banno

Embrace the suck! — James Riley

This may be a wee bit off topic, but I agree. Who in their right mind, male or female, would want to date someone who doesn't?!

There are a lot of capacities that we learn much more effectively in early childhood than in adulthood, such as a foreign accent and perceptual skills. . This would seem to be more a matter of the neural plasticity of a young brain rather than the effect of innate structures. — Joshs

I grant the explanation, but it leaves me, personally, far from convinced. We are by far the most behaviorally plastic species that we know of. Yes. But I don't find this fact to in any way dispel the reality that we too hold genetically innate behaviors. From our innate ability to engage in basic perception (e.g. of a basic behavior) to our innate imprinting on caregivers (e.g. of a complex instinctive behavior), innate activities in humans still play an important part of our behavior as a species. And I can find no reason not to include universal grammar in the list.

There are also other questions that could be asked, such as an explanation for creole languages:

The system used by the original speakers is typically an inconsistent mix of vocabulary items, known as a pidgin. As these speakers' children begin to acquire their first language, they use the pidgin input to effectively create their own original language, known as a creole. Unlike pidgins, creoles have native speakers (those with acquisition from early childhood) and make use of a full, systematic grammar. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_grammar#Presence_of_creole_languages

How does increased neural plasticity in youth in and of itself account for why creole develops from pidgin when pidgin is all that children are exposed to and when pidgin works well enough for the adult original speakers?

But to sum, I grant your explanation, but I find it very wanting.

If you fail to develop your language skills at an early age, they don't develop correctly. What other explanation is there? — Hanover

Hey, I agree! But being the fallibilist that I am, I asked out of curiosity.

Language formation occurs as the result of a priori rules hard wired into our DNA. I — Hanover

There are plenty of approaches within psycholinguistics that offer alternatives to this Chomskyesque view of language. Embodied and enactivist models embrace the later Wittgenstein while rejecting innatist and representationalist theoreis of language. — Joshs

Haven't read much of these alternative accounts in relation to language. Can these alternative accounts reasonably explain why humans which were not exposed to language in their preadolescent years cannot learn to speak grammatically correct language?

TMK, a belief is primarily understood as either a mental acceptance of a claim as true or, else, faith or trust in the reality of something. Add to this if you're thinking of something different.

That I see a red cup is neither contingent on claims that I might make nor is it a reality I need to place my faith or trust in. It simply is. That I see a red cup is a datum, a fact, one that remains such irrespective of whether it is a hallucination or not, etc. If doubting whether what is seen is in fact real, then belief is involved. But that what is seen is seen is, again, a brute fact - that I neither express as a claim nor that I place faith or trust in in order for it to so be.

A belief might then be that the cup has a backside that is also red. Yes. But this does not dispel the datum on which this belief is based.

Where do we disagree with this?

Well, I would take issue with "that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified," because if we know it, then by definition it's a belief ... — Sam26

This is what I am contesting.

My view is that we justify our beliefs in a variety of ways, including sensory experiences, which directly relates to knowledge by acquaintance. For example, you might ask me after I say the orange juice is sweet, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" my justification is, "I tasted it." I think it's clear that we use sensory experience as a justification for many of our beliefs. — Sam26

Right, we can use knowledge by acquaintance to justify our beliefs, but that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified. That one sees a pink tree - be it illusory or not - is not a belief at the moment experienced. Hence:

but justifying the belief that one is in pain seems way out of place. Why? — Sam26

Awareness of being in pain is not of itself a belief. Its a datum, for lack of better words.

Haven't read the entire thread, so excuse me if I've overlooked where the case was made for the contrary, if it was.

I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. If it makes no sense to doubt whether you are having pain (when you are having pain), then it makes no sense to be certain of it, either. — Luke

Agreed, and this is the whole point of this thread. — Sam26

There is such a thing as knowledge by acquaintance: knowledge of what one is familiar with strictly via direct experience. Others can doubt your knowledge by acquaintance (you could be fibbing). You can, with some extensive effort, come to doubt that your knowledge by acquaintance is not illusory (is it a hallucination?). But one can never doubt that one is acquainted with that which one is acquainted with (that I see a pink tree might be a trick of the mind but the pink tree momentarily seen is seen by me all the same, and I know what it looks like: pink, for starters; in this example, one knows of the pink tree strictly by acquaintance).

Just as it makes sense to say when someone else doubts, “I know what I saw”, so too can it make sense in some such cases to affirm, “I know I’m in pain”. For instance, “I get you want to move the sofa, but are you forgetting that your sciatic nerves went out and that you’ve been in a lot of pain,” retorted with, “I know I’m in pain, but I’m going to move the sofa anyway.”

And this knowledge of “being in pain” isn’t JTB or some variant but, instead, one’s direct awareness of oneself being in pain; hence, a variant of knowledge by acquaintance.

Fair enough. :wink:

I’m pretty sure that most Buddhists don’t claim to be their bodies. — praxis

Such an astute observation … like point out that water is not dry. And what does this have to do with what I've written?

But for the record, nor have I yet encountered any Buddhist who claims that they are inexistent. If you’ve come across any such in your readings, please point them out to me.

The butterfly tattoe on my left arm is a pretty unchanging essence. — Thunderballs

Unless the tattoo is brand new, it has faded a bit over time, hasn't it? Hence, it has changed. You may be referring to the tattoos overall form, but given sufficient time that too will change.

and its doctrine of no-self. — praxis

A convoluted topic. There is good reason to affirm that anatta does not deny the self, at the very least in early Buddhism. But, maybe more importantly, anatta signifies an absence of unchanging essence in any phenomena … much including bodies. Hence, to the same degree one were to interpret anatta to signify absence of selves, one would likewise need to affirm an absence of bodies, this so as to be consistent. Thereby implying the Eastern notion of emptiness. As in "form is emptiness".

To affirm “you are your body” can thereby be as contrary to anatta as something like “you are your soul”. As to bodies not having an unchanging essence, neither do selves (or even souls) require an existentially unchanging essence in order to be.

I get you but don't know what a BIV-scenario is. Sounds kinda naughty... — Thunderballs

:lol: Ay, that it is.

If I'm to take you seriously, BIV is short for "brain in a vat" hypothesis. Hence the naughtiness factor.

Love is as real as the dick in my pants. — Thunderballs

I think one can stipulate that love is even more real than genitalia. Haven’t fully thought this through yet, but, as an example, in a BIV scenario the reality of one’s dick would be illusory whereas the reality of one’s love would remain unscathed. Would take some unpacking but an, “I think love, therefore I am” kind of thing. (From some degree of self-love that keeps us kicking, to love of truth or of reality that gets us to question things in the first place, etc., if not love for another.) Cheeky, but I think it might work.

Getting racy around these parts. :blush:

Real love of the amorous kind. To trade notes, I liken it to a dance driven by a common ethos between two selves which make a well enough fit in both their techne and pathos. And, barring grave mishaps that can ruin the dance along the way, these two find increased convergence into one via the inter-path/course they partake in. All this conditional on both being there for each other when it counts. Or something along these lines.

Still curious to hear @Benj96's take on what real love would consist of.

Evolution has no need for love. Well no need for love between partners at least, maybe maternal and paternal love towards offspring yes, but as for partners all that is called for is sexual attraction/ lust. — Benj96

When it comes to the heuristics of biological evolution there are in large two strategies that apply to most species consisting of sexes. When viewed from the vantage of males, colloquially expressed, one heuristic is to fuck anything that moves without giving a shit about the offspring. Some, even most, will die and some will live, but the greater the quantity of offspring the greater the number of offspring that survive and the greater one’s acquired biological fitness. The other is to invest in the welfare of one’s offspring so as to maximize the survival of all, thereby increasing one’s biological fitness. Here, one as male cares about what female one mates with, this so as to produce optimal offspring. And this caring about the other which one also finds attractive correlates with what we often identify as the emotion of romantic love.

Lust/sexual attraction applies to both types of males, just differently.

Needless to add, this is an (over?)simplification. And it does ignore what type of male females choose and the whys to these choices in terms of female biological fitness. But it generally holds for humans. So called players almost always fall into the characteristics of the first heuristic; whereas those who lose an important part of themselves with the loss of their partner tend to fall into the characteristics of the second. Most humans, of course, are a mix between these two biological extremes.

As was expressed by @Hermeticus, many wild animals have evolved toward the second heuristic; this, naturally, hence without there being “social constraints or contracts” in need of upholding. Wild canids all tend toward monogamy, often life long, in the form of Alpha Mates of equal value around which extended families or packs pivot. Geese are another notable, commonly known example. At any rate, there is a place in biological evolution for romantic love: again simplistically expressed, it on average results in quality of offspring - rather than quantity with lesser quality.

That aside, here taking my cue from the title, what does the phrase “real love” signify to you?