Many things appear to exist, that do not consist of "physical energy". — Olivier5

I'm in agreement with this, and is what I basically maintained in the context of this thread in regard to the mind and its contents. That it's absurd to maintain that "the idea that a unicorn, being an existent thought, is a mass / physical energy endowed physical thing that is not real" is one of the (acknowledgedly minor) points I somewhere hereabouts previously made. The point wasn't addressed.

Well, for a layperson like me, it tells me not to confuse genius with sagacity or decency. A lesson we need to re-learn periodically. So I keep coming back to virtue as being a key element of enlightenment - if we are going to accept this loosely understood doctrine as a phenomenon we might encounter in the world. — Tom Storm

Aptly pointed out and well put.

Focusing on:

Does the word enlightenment hold any real meaning, or is it just a poetic umbrella term for a fully integrated and intelligent person? — Tom Storm

Haven’t read most of this thread but I’ll join the chorus and opinionate. To start with, I’m a fallibilist, so I can’t speak for some form of definitive evidence of anyone being or having ever been enlightened, this because I can’t think of any definitive proof (or, else, of any type of infallible experience or justification) in respect to there being (or of there not being) such a thing as ultimate reality - “The Real” as some have termed it.

But as far as the significance of the term “enlightened”, it seems reasonable to me that it is fully contingent on whether or not there ontically is such a thing as an ultimate reality. If and only if there is, then it stands to reason that it might be possible for some to have some epiphany whereby this ultimate reality becomes understood. Logically, given that truth in general is a conformity to what is real, this apprehension of ultimate reality would entail a psyche-filtered (likely even psyche-predispositioned and, hence, biased) awareness of Truth with a capital “T”. An awareness which then might govern their awareness of all other truths with a lower case "t". Then, for the roundabout reasons of why we all bicker with each other about what the nature of reality is on this website, it stands to reason that at least some such persons would then want to convey this understanding of the nature of reality to others. But such a person would likely be contextualized by differing cultures, languages, semantics, preestablished beliefs and norms, and so forth - this in conjunction to holding their own individual types of intelligences, perspectives, personal desires, and common knowledge: so their conveyance of this same, unitary ultimate reality would differ ... in part, so as to make it as understandable as possible by the language, norms, preestablished beliefs, etc. of the society they find themselves in.

Iff there is an ultimate reality, then I see no reason not to take a cross-cultural perennial-philosophy approach to enlightenment. As Plotinus says:

"There are," says Plotinus, "different roads by which this end [apprehension of the Infinite] may be reached. The love of beauty, which exalts the poet; that devotion to the One and that ascent of science which makes the ambition of the philosopher; and that love and those prayers by which some devout and ardent soul tends in its moral purity towards perfection. [...] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Real#In_philosophy

Yes, Socrates and Plato might have both been as enlightened as was the Buddha, or as was JC - each in different contexts; why not Kant, or even Hume?; why not so many others? This whole “deification” motif of being enlightened, to me at least, might be an utterly wrongminded approach to it. Iff there is an ultimate reality, that is.

Iff there is not an ultimate reality, then all such accounts - and not just those given by wannabes and charlatans looking for access to extra capital - are, at best, mistaken.

I used to be struck by this quote from Carl Jung. I am not a Jungian but he takes the idea into a different place. Illumination through darkness. Perhaps I hear Nietzsche calling.

"One does not become enlightened by imagining figures of light, but by making the darkness conscious. The latter procedure, however, is disagreeable and therefore not popular.”
― C.G. Jung — Tom Storm

To me at least, aesthetically reminiscent of William Blake’s “Auguries of Innocence”. Who also gives some inklings of having been enlightened. Maybe.

You had me as a reference but you did not quote the part you found pertinent. — god must be atheist

I thought the entire post was, in particular:

Socrates was totally wrong. [...] — god must be atheist

I don't see anything wrong with fallibly knowing that one knows nothing infallibly. As far as the supposed Socratic paradox goes, it makes logical sense of it and is in line with much of ancient skeptic reasoning ... this as far as I can tell.

I think we think too much into texts. If he wanted to say that you think Socrates really wanted to say, he could have said that. Not to disparage you, but you said that. Why could then Socrates not say that?

I believe that people say what they mean. If Socrates said "I know nothing" he meant he knew nothing. — god must be atheist

For the historically accurate record, Socrates never said that he knew he knew nothing:

"I know that I know nothing" is a saying derived from Plato's account of the Greek philosopher Socrates. Socrates himself was never recorded as having said this phrase, and scholars generally agree that Socrates only ever asserted that he believed that he knew nothing, having never claimed that he knew that he knew nothing. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_that_I_know_nothing

That he believed he knew nothing is not a contradiction, and I don't see how anyone can evidence this proposition wrong - especially when knowledge is taken to be infallible by the principle of it being necessarily true, as in being "justified, true belief".


:

:up: :grin: Maybe a bit unfair to some Academic Skeptics (my first thought is of Cicero), but I do agree with the overall spiel.

... and:

Pyrrhonists view ataraxia as necessary for bringing about eudaimonia (happiness) for a person,[3] representing life's ultimate purpose.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ataraxia#Pyrrhonism

Now, while Pyrrhonism is different from Academic skepticism, there's no doubting that the latter was strongly influenced by the former.

This as there's no doubting that fallibilism does not translate into universal doubt. Which is to say, different degrees of fallible certainty are part and parcel of ancient skeptic thought: cf., Pyrrhonism's (fallible) certainty that eudaimonia is life's ultimate purpose.

OK, but all that kind'a flies in the face of their notion of ataraxia.

Why must the Academic skeptic be classified as "sad"? :gasp:

Skeptic: Someone who knows he knows nothing. — Agent Smith

Its only contradictory if no equivocation is involved. Importing some terms from the more modern notion of fallibilism, me thinks the statement nowadays ought to read: “I fallibly know that I infallibly know nothing” :razz: Here illustrating two distinct senses of the term “know”.

Skeptic: Knows one and only one thing viz. that he know nothing. — Agent Smith

Academic skeptics such as Cicero fallibly knew a plethora of things, including that they didn’t hold infallible knowledge. :smile:

To the Academic skeptic at least, he who believes himself endowed with infallible knowledge would be ignorant.

'Detachment' would be a better description than objectivity, I think. — Wayfarer

I’m certain that “detachment” makes perfect sense in the context of the Eastern languages where it is thus used. In Buddhism, to my best understanding, detachment intensifies compassion, for example. In English, at least, “detachment” connotes states such as that of apathy to the extent that it is interpreted as antithetical to compassion. Maybe more poignantly, in English, love - from interpersonal to universal - is nearly the opposite of being detached, for it implies attachment to other as that loved.

I get that objectivity has its issues: basically pivoting around objects being physical things - objectivity thereby implying physicality. But there is also the notion of objectivity being equivalent to impartiality, to a lack of bias. With some effort, one can then find that physical things are perfectly impartial, detached from any semblance of ego and its many properties, if one will: Perfectly selfless. Making that sensibly cohere to the notion of impartiality being a good to be pursued for all ego-endowed entities would take quite the shpeal. I know. All the same, I so far find objectivity – in it’s sense of impartiality - to be a suitable term within Western, at least English speaking, context. Think of the notion of blind love: a convenient way of metaphorically addressing an love impartial to - or, one could also say, detached from - outward appearances. Importantly, this while yet being partial / attached to the ideal good of being selfless, at least in relation to that loved.

Plus there’s the common western notion of perfect objectivity being an awareness devoid of a point of view (i.e., an ego or self) – this as is parodied in the statement “view from nowhere”.

Not saying “no”, but expressing why I so far find using the term “objectivity” preferable.

-------

Will soon be on my way to a New Year’s Eve event.

Happy New Year’s!!! May the new year bring about better things.

I think people can confuse the moment of the experience with some deep truth. — Manuel

I'm in full agreement. Happens all the time for all types of experiences, mirages as one example. But, to be fair, Neo-Platonism (or Buddhism, for that matter) isn't about "I've had an experience so there you have it". It's about attempts to coherently comprehend an entire cosmology in a manner that makes sense. This to say, I think way too much weight is placed on the experience factor in these or similar enough philosophies. But that's just me.

As for the idea of "the One", perhaps this can be illuminating in certain instances for the individual capable of having these experiences. — Manuel

Personally, I'm doubtful that anyone can. Ecstatic experiences that get close to it, maybe, sure, but - as a personal belief grounded in, granted, imperfect reasoning - not full identity as "an awareness devoid of selfhood, hence literally devoid of ego, hence any type or degree of point of view, hence any conceivable boundary or limit". Experiences are, after all, bounded or limited. That mentioned, to me the idea has a certain logical ring, or appeal. In part having something to do with the ancient Greek notion of logos, as in an anima mundi rather than a literal word. But I'll let that can of worms be.

Which is why we always keep asking "why" questions. — Manuel

:up:

There’s lots of, I'll go ahead and say, inferential content in your latest post to me. Some of which I agree with; some of which I don’t.

Trying to keep this focused on the OP’s intent:

The way I'd say it is that there might or might not be forces that "govern" [...] — Millard J Melnyk

Correct me if you find I’m mistaken, but the semantics to this can fluently translate into: “natural laws might or might not exist”. Natural laws are "forces that 'govern'" and to exist is "to be". If you do correct me, please make the correction semantically coherent, but maybe this goes without saying.

At any rate. Here, there is a possibility that they do exist and a possibility that they don’t. To be nitty-gritty, this then makes the possibility that they might exist semantically cogent to us. Otherwise, the former sentence would be utterly nonsensical.

We’re addressing the semantic differences, or lack thereof, between “exists” and “is somewhere now”.

Conceptually, or else semantically, if a natural law exists, then it – by definition of what a natural law is understood to be - would not be somewhere now, but everywhere at all times.

Therefore, the semantics of “a natural law might exist” is not equivalent to the semantics of "a natural law might be somewhere now”. Hence, here is concluded that the semantics of “exists” is not equivalent to the semantics of “is somewhere now”.

To be clear, here we’re addressing the actuality of semantics; not the actuality of natural laws.

I just don't see how we could even go about trying to find a perspective-less view to see things as they are in a natural state, not affected by any representations. But then are there "things" left at all?

It's very obscure territory. — Manuel

I take this quote to be referring to the notion of objectivity, and it's in regard to this notion that I'm replying.

Well, first off, being myself biased by my own inclinations of thought, the notion of objectivity as "an awareness devoid of a point of view (hence, devoid of selfhood)" for me sort’a converges with the Neo-Platonic notion of “the One” or the Buddhist notion of “Nirvana”. Focusing on the Neo-Platonic notion of “the One”, it is taken to be the (absolute) Good and, as a derivative of this, to embody (for lack of better terms) absolute fairness. Again, not as a deity, for here there is selfhood, but as a completely selfless awareness.

At any rate, my own uncommon metaphysical proclivities aside, here’s my main point:

Complete objectivity for us shouldn’t be interpreted as the practical impossibility (but maybe not impossibility in principle) of obtaining “awareness devoid of perspective or point of view” but as the ideal of an absolute, completely unbiased fairness in one’s judgments - this regarding anything that is judged: issues of human justice (e.g., law), issues of what is and is not real (e.g., science), and so forth.

If this ideal of objectivity, i.e. of nonprejudicial fairness, would be forsaken … well, our relative fairness toward each other (ethics) and in respect to truths (epistemic appraisals of what is real) would go out the window.

Mentioning this because I am, um, biased in favor of objectivity as something which there ought to be more of. Again, not in the absolute sense - which to me would equate to being identical to “the One” or some such - but in the relative sense of the term … Come to think of it, as can equally be said for the ideal of goodness, i.e. of being good.

Basically don't like the bashing of objectivity. :grin: But I'm not saying you were doing this.

Check out my comment to Raymond, I cover this in what I wrote there, the one beginning with:

I'm aware of two fundamental domains: actuality (whatever is really going on) and narrative. — Millard J Melnyk

Yes, I saw that. A natural law, as with a basic law of thought, are taken to be actual if in fact existent. My bad for not clarifying that in my post. As to natural laws being narrative rather than actual, I can see the argument. So to you all natural laws are narrative and, thereby, not "existent". Fair enough.

What about gravity? Like any natural law, it's (taken to be) omnipresent, omni-durational, a governing factor for all mass, and actual rather than narrative. So gravity is not "something that is somewhere now" and yet is something actual, hence existent.

Now, gravity is an inference, true, and as such could be construed as a narrative. But if we go down this line of thought, would not all inferences whatsoever be narratives?

For instance, such that the very inferential notion of "actuality" which we ascribe to some either empirically or introspectively experienced givens would itself become a measly narrative we tell ourselves ... thereby possibly leading to the absurd conclusion that all actualities are nonexistent.

So at what spatiotemporal location can a natural law be found? Or do natural laws not exist?

Edit: I take it that "somewhere" cannot be omnipresent, and that "now" cannot be omni-durational ... this as natural laws are inferred to be.

I'd one day maybe smell flesh burning, turn my head around, and see my arm on fire. Or, maybe, even worse: see a loved one's arm on fire.

No physical pain either way. But there would yet be suffering. And I find it easy to conclude more suffering on account of there being no physical pain.

If I did, it was facetious. But you didn't get the joke. — Banno

Really. Now that is a joke.

Care to have another go? — Banno

Not after reading about you sense of facetiousness.

The confusion is your own. — Banno

No, Banno. It's yours.

You've claimed thoughts have physical mass. Now your evading and, worse, projecting your confusion onto me.

Your question is like asking what the mass is of democracy, and using the lack of an answer to argue that since democracy does not have a mass, it doesn't exist. — Banno

And what duck-rabbit hole did you pull that out of?

I’m not the one claiming that if thoughts don’t have mass they then don’t exist, remember. As a reminder, you're the one upholding a physicalism wherein epistemically nonphysical things - such as thoughts - are ontically physical and thereby composed of physical mass. And I’m the one saying this is utter and complete bullshit. Next thing you’ll tell me is that unicorns, being existent thoughts, are mass endowed physical things that aren't real. Tough you got me, I’m now feeling ridiculous in even needing to express this.

What does the theory of evolution visually look like?

How can one quantify its mass in principle? — javra

The obvious answers to these two questions are “it has no visual appearance” and “no one can” respectively. You can’t quantify the mass of a thought like the theory of evolution even in principle because, if for no other reason, you can’t empirically observe it in practice, and empirical data is requisite for the quantification of any physical thing’s mass.

Talk about rhetorical bulshitology.

What does the theory of evolution visually look like?

How can one quantify its mass in principle?

Your answer: "I'm agreeing with you". This due to gestalt principles of awareness no less.

No.

In brief, the neural binding problem is that neuroscience can find no functional area of the brain which can account for this unified sense of self. — Wayfarer

Yup.

Same way you did for the rocks. — Banno

You can empirically investigate - such as by visually seeing, touching, or smelling - thoughts such as the theory of evolution? Because empirical investigation is part and parcel of how I'd quantify the rocks' mass. No empirical data about them, no quantification of their mass.

I wager you can't. So your answer is, well, wrong.

Given the exchange rate, no more than a fraction of a gram. — Banno

Yes, maybe, but how do you quantitatively obtain that approximation?

You cannot tell me the mass of all the rocks in the Simpson Desert, therefore those rocks do not have mass. — Banno

Well with some empirical investigation and added resources I could give you at least a ball park figure.

How can one go about quantitatively approximating the mass of the theory of evolution in principle ... oh yea, one can't. :yikes:

But have it your way. — Banno

Alright.

Speaking for myself, preaching to the choir. I'm myself a diehard non-Cartesian, "Academic" skeptic (um...) falibiliist.

The certain, the eternal, the unchanging, were felt to be superior to the uncertain and mutable. [...] It may be the result of a psychological or religious need people have, I don't know. — Ciceronianus

Yup. Reminds me of hypotheses such as that of the block universe, of causal determinism, or of everything being physical, all of which are are so popular nowadays: each maintaining an absolutely certain, eternal, and immutable world, else grounding aspect of it. :smile:

Yes, the theory of evolution has a mass. But unfortunately that mass is mixed in with a whole lot of other stuff in such a way that it would not be calculable. — Banno

As to being mixed with other stuff, the same can be said of any physical thing, like a rock. You know, fields, quanta that fly in and out, and such. But we can nevertheless quantify the mass of a rock well enough for all given purposes.

You're basically saying thoughts are quantifiable energy that ain't quantifiable. A logical contradiction.

But have it your way.

In a culture with a long history of religion whose central point is the immateriality and immortality of the soul, if free will didn't exist, it would be more likely to arise and be supported as a concept. That doesn't lead to any necessary conclusions, but it is a factor that should be added to a Bayesian analysis. Make sense? — Reformed Nihilist

Yup. Thanks for the reply. No doubting what you say. At the same time, I'm one to believe that we ought not allow cultural prejudices to cloud our judgments. Its inevitable that they sometimes do to some extent, but its a good ideal to work toward: the ideal of objectivity. This to say, the issue of free will's reality ought to be judged independently of cultural biases and preconceptions: such as that of its association with a Creator Deity, or such as that of an emotive rejection of anything that can be associated with religion.

I don't see a problem. — Banno

OK, you. Given that you also find the premise true, let me know what the quantifiable mass of "the theory of evolution" is, or at least how to go about obtaining it. Next, is the physical mass of your average intention greater or smaller than the physical mass of the average percept?

But I grant, you are a dyed-in-the-wool physicalist. :smile:

This paragraph is not at all clear. — Banno

:lol: :ok: :cool:

If the mind is physical, then thoughts are physical. If a thought is physical, it consists of physical energy. If physical energy can be validly quantified as e = mc^2, then our physical thoughts, which consist of structured physical energy, then consist of physical mass multiplied by the speed of light squared. Ergo, our physical thoughts have physical mass.

Where's the logical fallacy in this?

I don't know if the question is meaningful to someone in china or someone living in a remote village in the amazon. I do know it is in the western world. — Reformed Nihilist

Couldn't the same be said of causal determinism, a block universe, and physicalism? (For what it's worth, from what I recall, materialism was addressed in the history of Eastern thought.)

The western world has nowadays had global influences, yes, but I don't find that this necessitates all different cultures of the world then center their existential questions - such as those regarding free will - around whether a Creator Deity is real.

For clarity, are you intending to say that belief in free will's reality entails belief in a Creator Deity?

While true, a good Bayesian analysis would consider factors such as the history of cultural myths or religions and how they might inform (or be informed by) common conceptions of things such as free will. — Reformed Nihilist

Sure, I agree. Not all cultural myths or religions subscribe to a Creator Deity, though.

Best I can tell is that free will is rejected solely because at some point it was understood to be a product of a creator God. Post enlightenment rejection of religion seems to be more appealing than dismissing the hollow argument that free will implies random action, so the game goes on. — Cheshire

:up:

So, what’s the answer? Does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is no free will? — T Clark

My two pennies worth: in short answer to the question: yes, it does.

In terms of practical accountability, the ontic (un)reality of free will doesn’t make a bit of difference: If free will, then ontically valid accountability for that which is (freely) chosen (among available alternatives). If causal determinism, then – I think echoing your own views – by the fact that we’re not omniscient, we are ontically predetermined to not know everything about the past, present, or future; i.e., we’re predetermined to be ignorant of the fully predetermined causal system, or the block universe, as a whole; thereby making us ontically predetermined to epistemically live as though we freely choose at least some future outcomes, this on account of our ignorance regarding an otherwise fully fixed causal reality. In other words, in the latter, we are ontically predetermined to hold a strictly epistemic – but not ontic - freedom of choice … and, thereby, epistemic, but not ontic, responsibility for our actions.

I’m not saying the latter doesn’t have issues, but it can be argued, to my mind in a cogent enough manner.

The ontic reality, or unreality, of free will does, however, make a world of difference in the type of universe we inhabit. For instance, is the universe accurately described by physicalism, and are the innumerable consequences in respect to ourselves of the universe’s so being (or not being) thereby true (or untrue)? As a common example among mankind: if physicalism, as its currently known, then all conceivable possibilities of spirituality, such as that of an afterlife, are bogus. If free will is ontically real, then physicalism, as its currently known, is bogus. To me, all this irrespective of there being, or not being, a Creator Deity. But these are the types of differences that make a difference in relation to free will.

From where I stand, this cuts through the muck and gets to the core issue in respect to free will’s reality.

If the arm moves, a quantifiable amount of energy has been expended. — Banno

This edit of yours is irrelevant.

The issue is one of whether or not the mind itself is strictly constituted of quantitative energy - such that each conceivable thought (and intention, desire, emotion, perspective, percept, ect.) is part of the quantitative energy of the universe that is conserved. If so, and if e = mc^2, then an individual thought is equivalent to some physical mass multiplied by the speed of light squared that, via the law of conservation, removes energy from the non-mental aspects of the universe by virtue of the thought’s occurrence. Um … yea, I don’t think so. Though I’m sure some physicalists may want to endorse such a view.

This is the subject entailed by a mind making, hence causing, a hand to move: is a mind itself physical?

p.s. You may be wanting to argue for epiphenomenalism, wherein the mind has no causal powers.

I gave a link in that post to Aristotle's notion of energy, which is qualitative, and is where our modern notion of energy stems from. I'm guessing you're not interested in it, so I won't hand wave you to look.

GO back to this: if mind is something utterly different to the everyday objects around us, then how can your mind move your arm? — Banno

Preempting a possible question, don't know about Cartesian substance dualism, but something along the lines of objective idealism could well account for mind using energy to move physical things ... but, here, energy would be foundationally qualitative, rather that physically quantitative, such that the latter emerges from the former. — javra

How? — Banno

One cannot rely upon conservation laws to make successful predictions when no awareness of conservation laws occur. Therefore, if the trustworthiness of currently known conservation laws is requisite for making successful predictions, then beings unaware of these laws—as is the case for lesser animals and humans of former generations—cannot / could not make successful predictions.

No?

But I’m supposing that underlying this topic—as it relates to science—is the issue of predictions in relation to what?

Our modern knowledge of physics, chemistry, and biology (to the extent that neo-Darwinian biology relies upon chemistry) does indeed rely upon a worldview wherein physical energy is foundational, ubiquitous, and conserved—hence, they do rely on the presumptions of physicalism so as to optimally explain data. This said, two issues:

One, this does not thereby entail that physicalism is necessarily true: The pesky possibility of a future paradigm shift which would make sense of things physicalism addresses without itself being physicalism is not something that anyone can rule out … and it might likely hold advantages in explaining aspects of the world, such as ethics and value in general, that physicalism cannot cogently address (at least, imo) … but no one will bother exploring such possibility if it is virtually outlawed by scientism’s thought police, which nowadays seems rampant in much of society, on the one hand, and by the religious fundamentalists on the other.

Secondly, as I previously mentioned, science does not equate to physics but, instead, to an epistemic approach toward gaining, always fallible, knowledge regarding the empirical world we all share: for instance, social sciences such as those of anthropology and psychology are as much empirical sciences as are the natural sciences, and the former can make successful predictions without relying on conservation laws of energy just fine. If this seems dubious, as one measly example, check out advertising’s predictive success. This advertising has become insidiously omnipresent nowadays (again, imo) and, more to the point, is historically informed by behaviorist schools of psychology—this without giving a hoot as to whether the conservation of physical energy holds.

In short, again, what I'm arguing is that the potential downfall of physicalism does not in any way equate to the downfall of science (or, else, of successful predictions).

Presuming a lack of equivocation, your arguments are a tad bit circular, but this goes deep into foundational theories of physics that today are so commonplace they’re taken to be infallible: The energy you reference is purely physical and thereby quantitative (contrast this to the qualitative Aristotelian notions of energy from which modern notions of physical energy evolved) and, in substance dualism, minds are not physical - thereby being endowed with Aristotelian notions of energy but not our modern notions of physical energy. The law (more accurately, theory) of conservation of physical energy can only apply to the physical substance in substance dualism, but does not apply to psychical substance. So, as far as I can currently make out, your argument in sum: given that everything is contingent upon the ubiquitous presence of physical energy, hence given that physicalism is true, substance dualism is false, for it would contradict the tenets of physicalism, thereby demonstrating physicalism to be true.

Preempting a possible question, don't know about Cartesian substance dualism, but something along the lines of objective idealism could well account for mind using energy to move physical things ... but, here, energy would be foundationally qualitative, rather that physically quantitative, such that the latter emerges from the former.

If energy can be introduced into the world from outside, then the world is no longer predictable.

The impact here needs iteration. If the conservation laws cannot be relied on, it would not simply be the case that we need to extend the explanation to take the appearance of energy into account. Rather, the way energy functions would cease to be consistent with any laws. — Banno

Your assertion that the world becomes unpredictable in the absence of our upholding the theory/law of the conservation of (physical) energy runs into at least one issue: it amounts to the assertion that all lesser animals and those human beings existing prior to the 17th century are and were unable to successfully predict anything. Which is patently false.

Also, how might the law of identity be necessarily contingent on “the way [physical] energy functions”? (Other than by presupposing physicalism.)

Yes, I wonder what the answer to that might be. People seem to need to worship things and this cast of mind necessarily turns science into the flip side and vanquisher of religion. An old criticism. — Tom Storm

We’re in agreement. For my part, I find that those who uphold scientism then throw babies out together with the bathwater, so to speak: e.g., allowing for even the possibility of any kind of objective purpose in life—which reeks of spiritualism to many of a scientism ilk—becomes viewed as an opening of floodgates for religious fanaticism. Most humans on earth are however not on board with nihilism, and will reject this metaphysical claim—be they religious or not—thereby becoming mistrustful of science when science is deemed equivalent to, or else necessarily resulting in, scientism (this as those who uphold scientism maintain).

As to answers, I don’t have any ready at hand that I find to be meaningful.

Your impromptu definition of empirical science is nicely done. — Tom Storm

Thank you.

So science doesn't necessarily collapse if the mind at least in part exists outside of the physical as we know it? — TiredThinker

Absolutely not! All scientism would necessarily collapse—not all of science, if any.

The article linked to in the OP espouses an opinion founded on a popularized but, imo, unlearned understandings of what empirical science is. (Prejudicially speaking, might have something to do with the author being an M.D. rather than a PhD.)

Empirical science equates to neither physicalism nor to physics—no more than it equates to theoretical mathematics. Or to technology for that matter.

Here, an impromptu working definition: Empirical science is knowledge consisting of inferred fallible conclusions derived from empirical evidence—i.e., from observations: be these the results from tests of falsifiable hypotheses (c.f., the results of any scientific test), of reoccurring processes in nature (e.g., the theory of evolution via natural selection), of one unique items found in the world (e.g., certain fossils), etc.—whose verity as empirical evidence is confirmed via consensus, such as via replication and peer review. I know this definition is imperfect but I wager that there is nothing in this definition that any empirical science lacks or does without.

If substance dualism (or any other number of non-physicalist paradigms), then some of the fallibly inferred conclusions currently maintained by the empirical sciences will be mistaken—especially those which by now have become amongst the most generalized conclusions which contextualize all others: as an example I'm keen on, such as the currently maintained fallible conclusion that teleology is a metaphysical impossibility or else is simply unreal. However, that said, absolutely none of the empirical evidence obtained via the empirical sciences would become invalid. All the data obtained by the empirical sciences would still need to be cogently explainable, at least in principle, by the non-physicalist paradigm.

Check out this statement of the author for example:

Spiritual believers often accuse scientists of being closed-minded or dogmatic, for being so definite in their rejection of mind-brain dualism and a spiritual realm. So, how is it that scientists are so certain that dualism is false? Quite simply, because for dualism to be true, all of science would have to be false.

But wait a minute, you say. There have been many scientific theories overturned in the past by better theories and new evidence, producing paradigm-shifts. Isn't it possible that dualism will replace monism just as surely as Einstein's Theory of Relativity superseded Newtonian physics? The analogy is misleading. Paradigm shifts do sometimes occur, but overturning the foundations of science is quite another matter, the likelihood of which is astronomically small.

Dualism so fundamentally contradicts the foundations and entire accumulated evidence of modern science that in order for it to be true, we would have to start rebuilding modern science from the ground up. — Ralph Lewis M.D.

(Boldface mine.) No, substance dualism (and many other non-physicalist paradigms) does not contradict the “entire accumulated evidence of modern science”—all of which is empirical observations, i.e. empirical data. It in fact contradicts none of it, but instead only contradicts the “[metaphysical] foundations” of modern science, which are all conceptual rather than empirical raw data. Only the latter would need to be successfully reworked. But succeeding in so doing, “astronomically small” as the possibility might be, does not then entail that “all of science is false”—for fallible conclusions are part and parcel of what science is (part and parcel of empirical science's philosophical foundations as an epistemological endeavor)!

I really wish people would have a better understanding of what empirical science is and consists of. Scientism is destroying science's credibility in society the world over. :shade:

… acknowledgedly, this being just one person’s opinionated point of view. I’ll try to leave it at that.