I intend to be away for a while. Just wanted to take up @Harry Hindu's position a bit.

Evolution is not "goal-directed". The consequence (i.e. increased reproductive fitness) of adaptive mutations via natural selection is called "survival". — 180 Proof

If so, then "survival" would be the telos (goal) which governs (directs) the process of adaptive mutations via natural selection.

For the record, this moronic (?) view that natural selection is teleological is shared with folks such as Darwin himself, Thomas Huxley (Darwin's "bulldog"), and more recently folks such as Francisco Ayala, whom I once upon a time had the pleasure to meet:

Explanations in terms of final causes remain common in evolutionary biology.[17][32] Francisco J. Ayala has claimed that teleology is indispensable to biology since the concept of adaptation is inherently teleological.[32] In an appreciation of Charles Darwin published in Nature in 1874, Asa Gray noted "Darwin's great service to Natural Science" lies in bringing back Teleology "so that, instead of Morphology versus Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded to Teleology." Darwin quickly responded, "What you say about Teleology pleases me especially and I do not think anyone else has ever noticed the point."[17] Francis Darwin and T. H. Huxley reiterate this sentiment. The latter wrote that "the most remarkable service to the philosophy of Biology rendered by Mr. Darwin is the reconciliation of Teleology and Morphology, and the explanation of the facts of both, which his view offers."[17] James G. Lennox states that Darwin uses the term 'Final Cause' consistently in his Species Notebook, On the Origin of Species, and after.[17] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes#Biology

We're using the term "illusory" (or illusion) differently. I do not mean 'not real' by "illusion"; rather I mean something seeming to be something else. — 180 Proof

To clarify, if you mean something other than "conscious intentionality seems to be true but it is not", please further specify the way in which you are using the word. I can only understand this interpretation of "something seeming to be something else" as "a seeming that is not true and, thereby, not real as that which it seems to be". For example, the mirage of an oasis in the desert is "something [desert] seeming to be something else [oasis]" as is "not real as the oasis which is seems to be". So, my being conscious of things is - in how I so far interpret your position - a seeming that is discordant with what is real, or else really happening.

I ask this because I still don't understand what you might mean by "my being consciously aware of things (which is fact) is 'something seeming to be something else'". Adding the adjective "objectively" doesn't help any.

I'll translate: If, as you say, intentionality occurs in the unconscious mind, why then conclude that conscious intentionality must be illusory rather then real? Myself, I see no reason to deny that intentionality is equally real, non-illusory, in both aspects of mind. And, again, that I am conscious of things is fact.

Where's the tautology? — Daemon

Establishing the reality of first person conscious experience via tautological means, as in "if I am conscious of X then ipso facto I am conscious of X [...]". Thing is, there is no known inferential means of establishing the reality of first person conscious experience. See for example the problem of other minds, solipsism, and so forth. So @180 Proof is complaining about me not having made the currently impossible somehow possible, this by providing an inferential demonstration of me being consciously aware of things. So, that's that, me thinks. Besides, I'm guessing he has no answer to the question I asked him, hence the deliberate obfuscation. (So far no ad hominems, though.)

As I understand it, which is not well, Aristotle's ideas were developed in response to the conundrums posed by Parmenides and Zeno, which attempted to show that change must be illusory. — Wayfarer

I'm fascinated by teleology, especially as it applies to psyches, and have found little to no metaphysical investigation of its possibilities and mechanisms outside of what Aristotle had to say. That mentioned, I'm myself not an academic scholar of Aristotle, and I haven't read most of his works (skimmed through De Anima ((loved the way he addressed deities as "universal anima")) and some of his Physics - all else I know of his ideas is second hand). So, in short, I have no informed opinion on the topic you mention.



As to being and becoming, I sense that we're approaching the issue from maybe very different perspectives. The notions you mention are quite interesting. I have the hunch that this topic would require a lot of discussion, but then there are metaphysical pre-judgments involved, at least on my part. For instance, arguably, the Aristotelian notion of "the unmoved mover", the Neoplatonic notion of "the One", and the Buddhist notion of "Nirvana" would each be considered (maybe, pure) being, this within their own worldviews, rather than processes of becoming. This though all else could be seen as becoming. Not sure if this is worth exploring, but I am acknowledgedly prejudicial in my favoring of such, or similar enough, views.

Can such a principle even be communicated from myself to myself without reflection? And if not, then before reflection do we have a principle or law, or just a contingent experience of momentary sense? — Joshs

I acknowledge the answer to the first question is "no". The second question is tricky, in that it seems to me to be beyond the relevant point of "laws of thought". A law/principle of thought, if it ontically occurs, would be a universal principle - i.e., a universal - applicable not to "a (randomly salient) contingent experience of momentary sense" but to all possible thoughts pertaining to all beings that have ever been, are, and ever will be. It would be a natural law, in other words, one that minimally applies to awareness, if not to everything that is (the latter being easily conceivable in systems such as that of objective idealism). The main point being, if a principle/law of thought, then it is universally applicable to all cognition and - as with any other natural law or universal - occurs very much independently of anyone's awareness of it. Hence:

In other words, think about the difference between experiencing an event right now and thinking of this event as a law or principle. These are two different kinds of experiences. Making the first into the second (specifying it as a principle or law) requires a secondary act of thought. If the law or principle isnt in the actual experience of an object, it has a different purpose or use. — Joshs

Discovering laws of thought does require reflection (granting that they occur), but the law of thought - like any other law of nature of other type of universal - would be ubiquitously applicable ... in this case, even to the reflections by which they might be discovered. Its not that we construct these laws from our inferences but - again, if they do ontically occur - that they govern everything which we cognize, again, including the inferences via which they become discovered.

So yes, what you address are indeed two different kinds of experiences. But we don't make the first into the second and thereby instantiate a law of thought. Rather the law of thought would be applicable to all experiences without any exception, including the two kinds of experience which you address.

Back to the law of identity: if indeed a law of thought, its occurrence would be independent of anyone's awareness of its being (e.g., a dinosaur's thoughts would be just as governed by this law as would be any humans) and, hence, its occurrence would be in no way contingent on reflections or comparisons. Only our discovery of it's occurrence would be contingent in on reflective comparisons.

(Sorry, too tired right now to edit this into something shorter.)

Their claim is that rather than a dualism between being and becoming, becoming is prior to being. Put differently, the idea of being as encapsulated in its most ideal and exact form in A=A is an abstraction derived from a pragmatic act of reflective comparison. — Joshs

Suppose the law of identity intends to specify that that which appears, or stands out, or else is, cannot at that very juncture be anything else but itself. In so conceiving, there is no comparison involved in any instantiation of the law of identity—because there is no multiplicity involved in givens addressed. The tree I see (A) is the tree I see (A)—this without any multiplicity in the “tree that I see” that then facilitates comparison. Reflection, then, would only occur in thoughts intending to formulate this universal principle of thought—if not also ontology—into something communicable, such as “A=A”.

Also, becoming to me connotates teleology: This becomes that, such that “that into which this becomes” is the Aristotelian final cause of the becoming; the process of becoming moves toward its end. Within such perspective, “that into which this becomes” will not of itself be a becoming—such as can be claimed of that which is becoming—but will instead ontically be (here entailing being, which is self-identical at any given juncture) on account of its either relative or absolute finality. So—while I agree that being and becoming are not mutually exclusive—because the notion of “becoming” sans the notion of “that into which a given becomes” to me tends to ring hollow; and because I infer that “that into which a process becomes” is not itself a becoming on account of its finality (be it perceptual or ontic) but, instead, is something that is (being); I tend to believe that becoming sans being—at minimum, in the form of the finality toward which the becoming progresses—is not metaphysically feasible. Moreover, if the final cause (as being) is requisite for the becoming, then it will not be the case that becoming is prior to being.

p.s. I’m not intending to pester. Posting this on account of respecting many of your views. If I’m too far out in left field, no worries.

Like blindsight in particular, intentionality in general is, mostly if not completely, an unconscious, subpersonal, reaction to environmental stimuli (including one's own behavioral effects). 'Consciousness is secondary – much more veto than volo – and confabulatory' [...] — 180 Proof

The illusion is that intentionality (i.e. "to be conscious about") its seems a conscious process when in fact (mostly and most often) it is not. — 180 Proof

If I am conscious of X then ipso facto I am conscious of X - i.e., my conscious intentionality regarding X is not illusory, nor a mere seeming, but brute reality - this even if my being conscious of X is itself a result of unconscious agencies/processes converging and thereby bringing about a unitary first person point of view. Where do you find a benefit for a near complete either-or approach to the reality of intentionality in respect to consciousness and the unconscious? I find that intentionality can readily be non-illusory for both.

To me, blindsight evidences that one’s awareness as a total self (i.e., a total mind/psyche—if not also a total mind-endowed body) is not always unitary, thought it at times can be. The blindsight endowed person, as a conscious self, is unaware of visual information while, the same person as a total psyche, is (at least to some extent) aware of said visual information. The conscious agent is visually unaware while the unconscious agency(ies) of the same (total) person are visually aware.

In parallel, an example I find both illustrative and relatively common to all people: a conscious self and its conscience will both be aware of the same basic facts but will hold different agencies each with its own perspectives (of awareness) regarding the facts concerned—with each of these two agencies momentarily intending different outcomes. One is consciously aware of one’s conscience’s occurrence but is not unitary with it—this at the times one is aware of one’s conscience—and, furthermore, is often consciously unaware of the nuances of reasoning for one’s conscience desiring you to act or behave as it does.

I say this in hopes of illustrating that there is such a thing as un/not-conscious awareness pertaining to unconscious agency(ies) which the conscious self is at times disassociated with, or is other in relation to, which operate in parallel to consciousness.

As another example of this, when one has forgotten where one’s keys are, asks of oneself “where on earth did I leave my keys”, and received an intuition that answers the enquiry placed by the conscious self to its total psyche as self, the mental agency which responds with the info is other in relation to the conscious agency: both are aspects of the same total person, but whereas the former knows (and is aware of) where the lost item is, the latter momentarily is unknowing (and unaware) of this same information.

None of this is to deny that conscious agency/awareness is constituted of unconscious agency/awareness and that, therefore, there is a “spectrum of meaningfulness” between the two. But it is to point out that there are times when this formation of the conscious self—formed from unconscious agencies—operates in parallel to some of said unconscious agencies.

As to blindsight, again, I’m arguing that here the conscious agent is visually unaware while the unconscious agency(ies) of the same (total) person are visually aware. In short, that blindsight is not conscious sight.

If you were to disagree with the aforementioned, by what do you distinguish the conscious mind from the unconscious mind? (If you do so distinguish.)

The obvious point is that either "favourable" is not the same as "good" - and that "hence" is misplaced; or you are using "favourable" and "good" for the exact same thing, and so saying what is good is hat is favourable achieves nothing but a change in wording. — Banno

For what its worth, it the second option, a change of wording, which can serve to clarify what is semantically intended.

That's why they are so damn hard to find out in the world, and why Plato was wrong.

But another thread...? — Banno

The "Plato was wrong" gave me a good friendly laugh. Not planning on staying long on the forum, but maybe I'd partake of another thread.

Out of fun, though, can you think of any awareness-endowed life that doesn't move toward what it find's favorable, hence good? If you can, then the good would not be cosmically applicable to all beings, hence would not be universal as Plato claimed.

Lightly touching upon this topic, I can see this argument working for what I discern to be non-universal universals, like redness, but not for cosmically applicable universals, like goodness (again, this in terms of that which is favorable).

Then again, I know that it requires a comparison of very different metaphysical approaches in order to even consider things such as goodness to be a universal.

Art shows rather than says. That's part of the value of art: that with it we see things that are difficult, if not impossible, to say. — Banno

True. I was in part thinking of things like poetry, which is all words and therefore saying. But I can see how one could argue that poetry shows as well.

Yeah, on second thoughts I'll leave that for some other time. — Wayfarer

While that sounds like a good idea, I'll comment anyways.

It strikes me that so termed universals can range from being cosmically applicable - thinking of things like goodness - or else be, well, not technically universal, instead being limited to a cohort of beings that communally shares the given so-called universal. While examples can get cumbersome and arguable, redness (when allowed to be a universal) is limited to only those beings capable of experiencing it; this while something like goodness (as in that which is favorable, rather than strictly moral) can be argued to be cosmically applicable to all beings in existence.

If you know of literature that addresses this disparity, or else have thoughts regarding non-univeral universals, please let me know.

I see no problem with that as it stands. Issues arise when folk make attempts to talk about what is private., to treat it as if it were public. — Banno

Ah. Pacifies me a bit. As to the latter, isn't that what a majority of art does (... well, at least historically)?

Though I'm trying to avoid directly addressing issues regarding nuances of perception, cogitations, emotions, and the like, art when affective / effective can touch on most of these topics - in essence making the strictly private public to some community.



I agree with the quote you give. Though, to be honest, the issue of universals still gives me headaches sometimes. I guess it depends on which types of universals are addressed.

It's a cumbersome, disjointed view that divides the world into internal and external [...] — Banno

Off the top of my head, a question to all who disagree with the validity or utility of an internal-external divide:

That which is accessible to a single person, i.e. private, is internal to the person in question; that which is accessible to everyone in principle, i.e. public, is external to all persons.

Where’s the fallacy in this?

Q: Why are idealists, optimists and people with "hope" so depressing?

A: For the same reason that sad songs say so much to so many … this at least some of the time.

Example: when you’re devastated from a broken heart being told to cheer up on account of there being more fish in the sea brings you down, not up. But being told the situation is awful helps to relieve the pain, making you feel better.

I think there is here, an unnecessary tripping-up over terminology. Potayto-potahto. — James Riley

Could be.

So to you individuals have no say within a society? To me, societies don't decide or feel; individuals do. And when the decisions and feelings of individuals interrelate, that's when a society forms.

In any even, I think it is subjective to determine that eliminating crime (through abortion or otherwise) is entirely a pro-societal marker, and that increasing crime is de facto anti-societal. There are grey areas and we (individually) don't get to choose what is pro or anti-society. Society does that. — James Riley

As a counter, if crime is injurious, and if the individuals that make up a society don't like getting injured, then reducing crime can only be pro-societal - i.e. pro the cohesion of individuals that make up the given society. Also, societies are nothing else but groups of individuals that voluntarily interrelate; so individuals, to me, do have their say; its in part how societies change over time.

But yea, I do agree its a murky area. As a topic related to the OP, there's such a thing as honor among thieves. Here, the thieves form a society within a larger society and perpetuate crime against the larger society but, within their own sub-society, live by often stringent moral codes. To ask, "are the thieves then moral" is, it seems, too simplistic a question.

To be transparent, though, in my previous post I was mainly intending to intimate that freedom of abortion cannot be an iniquity (a crime in this sense) against a society, though it can be a violation of the society's laws (a crime in this sense) if the society does outlaw abortion. But I gather there's other threads for this were I to care to debate it.

Loosely, a population or a group of people with structured or ordered existence bound by morality (whether religious or secular or both). Structured in the sense that they perform economic, educational, and social activities. — L'éléphant

OK, Nazi Germany had the structure you speak of with the iffy point being that of "bounded by morality". The Nazis certainly viewed themselves as moral, noble even. So this will likely wind down into what the nature of morality actually consists of - thereby allowing some distinction between true morality and false notions of morality. Although I strongly lean on the objective morality side of things, this isn't something I'm currently interested in debating. The added caveat that a society is bounded by morality is new to me, though. Thanks for sharing.

Still, in ordinary understandings of "society", one could say that the German society underwent massive transitions from pre-WWII times, though WWII times, to post-WWII times .. all the while remaining "the German society". If I understand you correctly, you're saying that Germany lacked society during WWII times? What did they instead have during this time period?

First off, my bad; just double-checked and I misspoke:

Although the Nazis won the greatest share of the popular vote in the two Reichstag general elections of 1932, they did not have a majority. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi_Germany#Nazi_seizure_of_power

They were still pretty popular among voters, though.

Did the German society die, or the Nazi party died? — L'éléphant

"Died" doesn't seem to be an adequate term for the Nazis. There's quite the resurgence going on. In Germany, in the US, I'm sure in other places as well. And, among the resurgent neo-Nazi folk, there's a fairly strong societal bond.

How do you define society, exactly? I'm myself thinking of the typical dictionary senses when I use the term.

That military arrangement or whatnot was democratically voted into power (this by the majority of the people). So your argument doesn't hold.

The question is, Did the Nazis have a society or something else? — L'éléphant

A society.

Abortion may be a crime against *some* societies, but not all. In the U.S., for instance, it is not a crime against society. — James Riley

A crime within some societies, yea, OK; but a crime against society? How so? Off the top of my head as source, the movie “Freakonomics” makes the case that having a pro-life-quality mentality (my term for freedom of choice to abort fetuses) leads to the improved quality of a society.

3. It's Not Always a Wonderful Life : Narrated by Melvin Van Peebles and directed by Eugene Jarecki, this segment explores the question of what led to a decline in the urban crime rate in the US during the mid- to late 1990s. The authors of Freakonomics suggest that a substantial factor was the 1973 US Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade, which permitted women to have legal abortions, leading to more wanted children with better upbringings. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freakonomics_(film)#Segments

And this turns the tables into something like, “the illegalization of abortion is detrimental to society and, thereby, a crime* against society’s wellbeing”.

* Crime as in “iniquity” rather than “violations of law”. To illustrate with a simplistic example, Nazis were law-abiding citizens within their own society, but their society's laws were often criminal … and violations of these criminal laws moral.

unless the global warming thing actually is someone's hoax — javra

Not a hoax. We're totally screwed. — Bitter Crank

Just caught that edit of yours. "Totally" might be too much. Cheap enough carbon recapture technology might be on the horizon. The catch is that we'd need to be investing into research for it in order for it to come about. To my knowledge, currently, not so much is being invested.

:smile:

I've never been cool. — Bitter Crank

Only cool people have the nerve to say this of themselves.

To clarify: ... unless the global warming thing actually is someone's hoax. I doubt that, though.

I know, right? — Hanover

Does this have anything to do with the "Who's the fairest of them all?" cat pic? :grin:

The evolution of humanity is toward greater life expectancy, less hunger, less strife, less war. I extrapolate from what I see a trajectory toward perfection, not destruction. — Hanover

I'd replace the "is" with "should be". The less hunger, strife, and war part might be questionable, as might be life expectancy in upcoming years.

Don't be clouded by the apocalyptic visions of Christianity, That is but one vision, which lacks the unrestrained positivity inherent in other traditions.

In the end everything will be perfect. If things aren't perfect, it must not be the end — Hanover

Man, Hanover’s stuff hasn’t received any credit. As we all kind’a know, apocalypse is the Ancient Greek term for “uncovering or disclosure (naturally, regarding what is)” - and, as such, is closely related to the Ancient Greek term for truth, “aletheia”, which literally means “that which is not hidden/covered/closed off to one's notice”. Soooo … the religious interpretation of an/the apocalypse is that of, to paraphrase (I think), a disclosure to all of that all elusive absolute truth that some talk of.

Christianity interprets this uncovering of absolute truth to be linked to lots of suffering prior to its full realization (except, of course, for those who’ll be beamed up to divinity as a shortcut … not giving a hoot about the suffering of those that aren’t, angelic as beamed up ones are (sarcasm)); other cultures do not so interpret. But, as Hanover said, the so envisioned cosmic apocalypse is supposed to lead to a complete perfection of being, not to demise and destruction, as an end of affairs.

Always wanted to partake in giving rise to a new slang: rather than “that’s radical” as I grew up with, “that’s apocalyptic!” as in mind-blowing in what is revealed. But, alas, I’ve never been that cool to start new slang.

At any rate, there’s nothing apocalyptic I can think of about the new mass-extinction we’re currently living through and the related de-evolutions of civilized culture. Other than reinforcing that we humans are not as intelligent as we often like to think we are.

As to readings, Stoicism has tended to help me out. I’m thinking Marcus Aurelius’ “Meditations” might be a good start.

Strange as it may sound, there are those who secretly relish apocalyptic fantasies, who want to hear nothing but tragic news (one could call it ‘doom porn’) . — Joshs

:100:

Hey, who isn't slow sometimes? :razz: Reminds me of a song lyric: "slow like honey, strong like music" :wink:

As to the resolution, I do wish the world worked in that way. It hasn't been my experience in life, at least so far.

I would say that one should treat a janitor and a president with the same amount of respect, even if the real world doesn't work that way. — john27

Yea, I agree that this is the ideal which we ought to be striving for. Unfortunately for those who hold such perspectives, the world is currently becoming ever more autocracy yearning; the growth of fascism's popularity (be it implicit or explicit) is one evidence of this. How to turn the tides back to a democracy yearning world, is the question I'm posing.

From my vantage, autocracy feeds of the conviction that different humans hold different innate importance. Democracy, on the other hand, feeds on the conviction that different humans will hold the same innate importance despite their differences.

Hm... Well I did say we are of different value, but I never said we are of different importance. Are they correlated? — john27

One prominent definition of "value" is "the degree of importance given to something". Within the context addressed, as I tried to previously explain, the two are synonymous.

In which case, I'll point back to this post.

Hey, seems like you're a decent person, so good luck with your endeavors of figuring out what equality of rights should be based on. But, from where I stand, vague affirmations that are acknowledged to further require as of yet undiscovered conditions will not on their own go very far in preventing one group of humans from trampling all over some other group of humans.

It started with "equality of value" ... not of mathematical notions of value, but of "degrees of importance" ... not being deemed by you a proper grounds for the basing of equality of rights. As in:

Im my opinion you shouldn't base equality of rights on value. — john27

Notice that this statement isn't about the semantics of sameness v. equality, as mentioned here:

Er...not exactly. I was trying to describe how same ≠ equal. — john27

But about the virtue of value - again, as in "the degree of innate importance pertaining to something".

In sum, the debate between us centers around whether or not all humans ought to be deemed to be of equal value, i.e. to hold the same degree of innate importance.

(Hey, if equal and same were synonymous to the writers of the US declaration of independence, I'll choose to be of the same mindset as far as semantics go.)

OK, but if different humans (which will be different by definition) will be deemed to have different degrees of importance, how does one prevent justifying things such as slave ownership?

In the wheelchair example you previously provided, one affords an exception to people on wheelchairs with - I assume - the implicit conviction that their lives are as important as the lives of non-handicaped peoples.

On the other hand, if a category of humans are deemed to be of less intrinsic importance, on what grounds would they not be implicitly considered "sub-human" by those of so-called normal importance? Thereby not meriting the same rights to life, to not mention things such as the same rights to pursue happiness and such.

Well, I'm referring to state sanctioned laws. As in, what aspects of the US constitution should apply to only some USA citizens but not to others?

Some malleability is built into the US constitution by default, btw. Yes to free speech but no to falsely claiming fire in a crowded theater, kind of thing. But its laws are still intended to apply to every citizen, not just some.

(i.e, I don't believe in codified consequence). — john27

Should I gather from this that you don't believe in democratic principles? All variations of autocratic systems will not have all humans of that system subjected to the same laws, i.e. codified consequences to conduct.

You still haven't answered my question.

How would equality in value translate into equality in rights? For example, I could have 1+3=4, and 2+2=4. Two identical values but with blaring differences. In this case both individuals, even though they bring the same value would have to be treated differently. — john27

This is equivocating "the degree of importance given to something" with mathematical notions of value.

Im my opinion you shouldn't base equality of rights on value. — john27

To then rephrase, on what grounds should all humans be subjected to the same codified consequences to conduct if not the grounds that all types of humans (types differing in things such as average skin color, and so forth) nevertheless are granted to have the same degree of inherent importance?

I think you should base equality on the equal differential/personalization of rights, e.g because we are all different we are all equal (in that regard). — john27

This doesn't seem to suffice. Humans are different from rocks, but the fact that the two are different does not thereby make humans and rocks equal - else, the same - in any regard relevant to equal rights.

Haven’t read the entire thread, but equal in what sense? Equal in height, in gait … I suspect that “equality” is here shorthand for “equal in value” … which would translate into “equality of rights” or “equality of justice” or some such. In which case, taking my cue from the US’s declaration of independence, from George Orwell’s “Animal Farm”, and from the present state of affairs in the USA, to not mention the world:

It is a self-evident truth that all humans are created equal, and that some humans are being created increasingly more equal than others, with this dichotomy between equals growing exponentially as the days pass.

Soon enough we might be reinstating slaves and slave-owners, just that in this future the two will be officially decreed equals, with the latter being vastly more equal in value than the far less equal slaves they’ll own.

---------

Well, my dark-humored chuckles aside (better to laugh than cry I say) ...

On what grounds should all humans be governed by the same laws if all humans are not equal in value?

Else, for example, should some group A be lawfully allowed to murder while some group B receives capital punishment for doing the same?

What critiques would you have for these definitions (all leading up to those of “cause” and “causation”):

• A given (n.): a term serving as generalized placeholder for any conceivable entity, process, event, situation, or indefinite state of being (e.g., generalized existence or inexistence)
• Effect (n.): an outcome; a result; can consist of one or more givens
• Effect (v.): to bring about; to generate; to produce
• Cause (n.): a source - consisting of one or more givens - to an effect; that which effects a result
• Cause (v.): a process in which a specified cause effects, or brings about, an effect.
• Causation (n.): a generalized process in which one or more unspecified causes bring about effects

Here keeping things as simple as possible but no simpler, I’m hoping.

If the dynamite stick was hit by lightning, then it is safe to say that the lightning caused (was the source of) the dynamite’s explosion (as outcome, aka effect). If the dynamite stick had a fuse that was lit by a human, then it is safe to conclude that the human caused (was the source of) the dynamite’s explosion (as outcome). And so forth, depending on scenario.

Yes, there is the conceivable metaphysical possibility that no causation – as here defined – occurs. To be brief, living by upholding this metaphysical possibility to be reality in non-hypocritical manners would quickly lead to death. That (what we cognize as) outcomes have (what we cognize to be) sources is indispensable to life as we know it. Hence, if we desire to live, we will assume, if not know, that causation occurs in the world.

As to probabilistic causality, I find that it shares many merits, as well as many logical detriments, with the Buddhist notion of dependent origination. But this likely furthers the subject from the OP. Interesting topic to me though.



To my mind, this is fully contingent on the types of causes that are being contemplated. Not merely on definitions but on the type or reality we deem ourselves to live in.

In a system of causal (hard) determinism, all causes will by default be transitive without exception. In the murky realms of what nowadays gets the blanket label of causal indeterminism, things can logically vary a lot more in terms of types of causes but, in short, not all causes here will be transitive (depending on indeterministic system assumed, if any).

Still, I'll argue that regardless of further conceptualization, all causes, regardless of system, will be sources to outcomes, i.e. to effects.