However, from this perspective we only come to believe in "the present" as a logical conclusion. The present is not experiential, we experience the past, and anticipate the future, and since we understand a substantial difference between these two, we come to the logical conclusion that there must be a present which separates them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hm. We here hold different perspectives. I find that the separation of all experiences strictly into past and future is the product of a logical, rather than experiential, conclusion. I again find that the present is extended experientially, as in the experienced sound of a musical note. An interesting topic for debate, though I'm not sure it is pertinent to the issue of where goals are temporally located.

I really don't know what you mean when you suggest a difference between imagined truths and factual truths. — Metaphysician Undercover

Imaginary as in "existing only in the imagination (but not in reality)". For example, that Santa Claus gives presents to good kids would then be an imaginary truth, since this state of affairs exists only in the imagination. That no such being as Santa Claus exists in reality would, for most, be a (factual) truth. Maybe my word choice was poor, but I still find the connotations to "imaginary" to be problematic due to aforementioned reasons. I'm thinking we could get into notions of Maya where everything but Brahman is imaginary, but that wouldn't be much help in better understanding how goal-driven teleology operates ... kind of a thing. :smile:

In assuming as much of an ontological ignorance as possible, can we experientially agree that our goals reference a future that has not yet been actualized but which we want to see objectified, i.e. to see actualized? Furthermore, that it is this referenced unactualized future of which we are aware that then determines our present choices (regarding how to best actualize this as of yet unactualized future)? — javra

Yes, I'm in agreement with this. — Metaphysician Undercover

This to me points to goals having an important relation to the yet to be actualized - hence potential - future. I'm trying to see where our disagreements dwell and how we might, maybe, remedy them. If a goal is not, in and of itself, a potential future (of which we are aware and yearn to actualize), then, given the aforementioned agreement, how would you say a goal differs from a memory or a perception? This with agreement that all three (memories, percepts, and goals) in at least some sense also always occur in the present.

By "determinacy" here, do you mean that we, in a sense, determine the future, through our goal-driven acts? This is obviously different from "determinacy" in the sense of determinism. — Metaphysician Undercover

The short answer is "yes": determinacy as in "to fixate the boundaries or limits of, either in part or in whole". I can't use the Aristotelian term of causation, since today causation strictly signifies efficient causes. But, as you rightly point out, determinism is today understood to be a system wherein the boundaries or limits of everything is completely fixated in advance, with no possibility of ontological change. Again, I dislike introducing novel terms where they're not needed, so I'm sticking to "determinacy" for now.

Have you looked at Husserl’s notion of intentionality? He begins from a notion of the present as ‘thick’ or ‘specious’. This time consciousness underlies all of our experiences. The present is not a punctual now but a triad consisting of the just elapsed past ( called retention) , the immediate present and a protentional aspect anticipating into the future. — Joshs

Thank you for the well written post regarding Husserl's intentionality. In truth, I need to delve into Husserl's notions more than I have. In my view of ontology, I agree with this quote. The present isn't infinitesimal or else illusory but holds an extension, and part of that extension includes the very recent past and future. As I once discussed with MU, sounds stand out to make this point. A musical note can only be heard within an extended present. And, as you say, so too is a melody, reductionistically composed of various musical notes.

I've, for better or worse, shied away from Husserl due to, imo, his "intentionality" being significantly different from the more common sense of intentionality that stems from "intends", which basically describes a stretching out from here to there. When it comes to goals, a consciousness's stretching out from the current conditions it is in toward the goal as desired future conditions it wants to see objectified. E.g., one generally plays a competitive game with the intention of winning. One here intends to win, i.e. as psyche, stretches out from where one is in the game to a future state where one has won the game. This notion of a psyche's stretching out so far seems to me to be a different category than that of aboutness.

Your thoughts are very welcome on this subject. I'm especially intrigued by this conclusion, which I believe I understand from Husserl's pov, although too vaguely for my own tastes:

So every intention is teleologically oriented , every intention is both a prediction and a fulfillment , in the same act and same moment. And every intention produces novelty and the unexpected at least in some smalll measure. — Joshs

BTW, in an ultimate scheme of things, I very much agree that all aspects of the psyche are at least in some measure teleologically oriented.

Telos = the potential end toward which a given moves; e.g., a goal (that which one wants to accomplish)
Telosis = the movement of a given toward a potential end; e.g., a striving (what one does to so accomplish)
Endstate = the actual end; e.g., the outcome of the striving toward a goal — javra


I don't see how these are significantly different than my formulation. — T Clark

Hm. The telos is the objective that might or might not become a reality. The telosis is all the activities one engages in to make the objective a reality. And the endstate is the reality that unfolds at the end of one's telos-driven telosis, which might be accordant to the objective or might not be.

Telos = goal
Telosis = plan for achieving that goal
Endstate = intended future condition. — T Clark

So telosis includes planing but also incorporates movements toward the goal, as in the implementation of plans (if plans were made). And the endstate is the future condition that actually unfolds, not necessarily the future condition that was intended to unfold.

Everything occurs strictly in the present. Our memories of the past and thoughts about the future take place in the present. Ok, ok, I'm being tediously pedantic. — T Clark

I'm not disagreeing, but this can lead to a trivializing of past, present, and future such that no meaningful distinction obtains. Ontologically, presentism can make sense. But we nevertheless can only live by separating events into the past, the present, and the future.

Even non-physical causation has to eventually lead to physical causation. — T Clark

Interesting hypothesis, though I'm not clear on what "non-physical causation" is meant to entail. I forget what ontology tickles your fancy. Would thoughts that cause other thoughts that eventually go nowhere and never get turned into observable behavior be an example of non-physical causation that doesn't get turned into physical causation?

I've been thinking for a while that causation is not a very useful concept. That is not a new thought. Bertrand Russell wrote about it extensively. Maybe I'll start a new thread. — T Clark

:grin: Yea, I'm somewhat familiar with Russell's take. If memory serves right, he also thought everything is mathematical and, hence, non-causal. Thing is, blame/credit would be impossible without the notion of causation. And its hard to live without figuring out who does what. To not mention what does what. Here I'm entertaining one of the reasons for why things get done.

There is a difference between the goal, and the fulfillment of the goal. The former is what exists in one's mind, at the present, as a determinate thing, the latter is indeterminate. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I agree. As much as I dislike introducing novel terminology, it's the difference between a goal one strives to achieve and a goal-accordant endstate in the terminology I'm proposing - as you initially mentioned. The first is determinate for as long as it persists, the second indeterminite until the time it becomes actualized, if it does become actualized.

I agree with this, but I would not say that our memories are necessarily our epistemological past, nor that our goals and anticipations are necessarily our epistemological future. I wouldn't even say that our perceptions are necessarily our epistemological present. This is because I think we use other conceptions to form our temporal conceptions, which serve as the base for our epistemological "time", therefore, past, present, and future. This is why we can have an epistemological "time" like eternalism, which removes past present and future from the experiential definitions which you give them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, agreed, and there are also false memories, hallucinations, and futile goals or incorrect predictions to add into the mix. There's more to comment on here, but it will likely deviate from the thread's theme.

I believe it is important to ground epistemology in solid ontology, so I think that going in the way which you do, referring to the ontology of time, for your epistemological definitions of past, present, and future, is the correct way. But I do not think that this is necessarily the way that epistemological definitions of past present and future, are formulated. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do have an ontology in mind, but I'm trying my best to approach the issue from a perspective where ignorance of ontology is (first) assumed.

You use "potential future", here, in a similar way to my "imaginary future". I think it's better that we use something like "imaginary", to maintain that this future is only in the mind, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I see where you're going with this. Still, connotations stand in the way for me. For instance, given the possibility of hallucinations, one could say that all our present perceptions constitute our "imaginary present", since our perceptions are only in the mind, and since there is a slim possibility that they could be wrong. In short, describing all our awareness of past, present, and future as imaginary on account of it taking place in the mind fails to distinguish between imagined truths and factual truths - for me at least.

In assuming as much of an ontological ignorance as possible, can we experientially agree that our goals reference a future that has not yet been actualized but which we want to see objectified, i.e. to see actualized? Furthermore, that it is this referenced unactualized future of which we are aware that then determines our present choices (regarding how to best actualize this as of yet unactualized future)?

There's something subtly difficult about goal-driven determinacy (whose occurrence I find is incontestable) and, as mentioned in a previous post, it as determinacy is a different category from that of causality as understood in modernity. To introduce other Aristotelian notions, also different from formal (top-down) and material (bottom-up) determinacies. Maybe noteworthy, to Aristotle, goal-driven determinacy was about the (potential) ends to present activities determining said present activities; hence the Aristotelian term of "final cause".

I don't think you can truthfully say that the goal is in the future. The goal always exists in the mind, at the present, and it is the intended fulfilment of the goal which is understood as in the future. The goal itself is in the present — Metaphysician Undercover

How is "the intended fulfillment of the goal" - which, as you say, is understood as in the future - not a redundant way of saying "the goal"? (e.g., Wiktionary defines "goal" as "a result one is attempting to achieve". To which I add that this result is not yet achieved, hence not of itself in the present.)

Also, as I mentioned in a previous post, memories, perceptions, and goals all occur, ontologically speaking, in the mind and in the present. Everything that we are consciously aware of does. Yet our memories are our epistemological past, our perceptions are our epistemological present, and our goals are part of our less than certain epistemological future. To say that a goal takes place in the present holds the same weight as saying that a memory takes place in the present. Yet the memory is our awareness of the past (of past present moments we have already lived through) just as a goal forms part of our awareness of the future (of future present moments we have yet to live through).

While this can make little sense in eternalism, it can fit in neatly into a system of presentism. Whereas this quote seems to presume eternalism as regards the future:

If the goal itself were in the future, then fulfilment of the goal would be necessitated, and telos-discordant endstates impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I'm maintaining is that the future is not fully fixed ontologically. A goal is as much of the future as a memory is of the past. But, if for no other reason, there are a multitude of goals in competition with each other, and only some can become actualized as future present moments. When a predator pursues some prey, the goals of the predator and prey conflict, and only one of these two goals can become actualized as an endstate. Yet the "result each is attempting to achieve" resides in the potential future and not in the present.

As an aside, do we agree that a goal partly determines one's present choices of how to best achieve given goal?

So:

Telos = goal
Telosis = plan for achieving that goal
Endstate = intended future condition. — T Clark

No. I'll try to re-describe the three concepts:

Telos = the potential end toward which a given moves; e.g., a goal (that which one wants to accomplish)
Telosis = the movement of a given toward a potential end; e.g., a striving (what one does to so accomplish)
Endstate = the actual end; e.g., the outcome of the striving toward a goal

If one's telos happens to be the taking to flight by the flapping of hands, one will start flapping ones hands as the telosis. The endstate of so doing is that one will not take to flight no matter how hard one tries. The goal determines what one chooses to do - is the motive for the activity one engages in - but the endstate of this might be opposite of ones intent, as per the example just given.

Response - All the factors we are considering - goal, intended final condition, and plan - exist in the present. They are not in the future. Therefore, we are talking about just normal old everyday causation. — T Clark

Causation, as typically understood, does not occur strictly in the present. The cause is not simultaneous to the effect, but precedes the effect in time. If the effect occurs in the present, the cause occurred in the past and no longer occurs in the present. If the cause occurs in the present, the effect will occur in the future after the present cause. This, in and of itself, does not adequately specify the nature of goal-driven determinacy: The goal, while being a potential future end, is always present for as long as that which it determines - viz, the striving toward it - persists.

Or maybe I should ask, how do you define causation?

That said, because a goal is always a potential future which one strives to make objectively real (here placing goals found in fantasies and dreams aside), a goal as telos is always found in the future. — javra

I kind of have to disagree with this. The intent of a deed is never found in the world. The deed in itself is a means to achieve the intent but never really "wanted", in the sense of being the primary intent or will of the subject. What is objectively found in the future are consequences of deeds, not intents. Consequences are concrete and detailed while intents are abstract and general. — Heiko

Thanks for the disagreement. I assume you are approaching this from an eternalism pov. If not, the future is not yet objectified and so is also never found in the world in the sense I believe you're using, in so far as the future is never objectified until it becomes the objective present. I find that this applies both in presentism and in the growing block theory.

But even for an eternalist theory of time, would it make sense to then say that intents don't exist since they're never found in the world?

Is telos in the kind of examples given facing the same direction as cause because it starts in your mind and crytallises or concretises later. — Fine Doubter

Though it takes place in the mind, in the mind it takes place in the future - and from this mentally established potential future is determined what one chooses to do in the present. Contrast this with a memory, which takes place in the past, or a perception, which takes place in the metal present, both of which determine one's mental states and activities in different ways from that of goals.

You may be intuiting the examples you said you wouldn't cite: the late S J Gould believed that at after a time of maximum mutations the form of many of which contained apparently useless features, after a contingent elimination episode had occurred some of the later surviving species found some of their features contingently matched the new environment they had to survive in. — Fine Doubter

I'm focusing on goals because while non-sentient "ends toward which things move" in biology are contestable, and much more so in physics (despite the mathematical notion of attractors), I don't know of any that would contest the reality of consciously held goals determining at least some behavior. This, however, doesn't make me want to be dogmatic about goals being the only type of "ends toward which things move".

But if he cannot be represented as an individual, then where does he fit?

Of course some theologian will argue that he is in some way special, but that's just special pleading - When logic shows the notion of god to be problematic, they claim that logic does not apply to god. — Banno

In alluding to your interchange with @Wayfarer so far:

I too find the OP's proposition is relative to what one interprets by the term “God”. If, for example, God is the ground of being, aka being-itself, then in what possible world would the ground of being, or being-itself, not be? (An absolute nonbeing, even if someone claims such a thing imaginable, does not constitute a world.) Again, in this example God is not "a being" but "being-itself" and, as such, is necessary in all possible worlds, and is furthermore beyond the principle of sufficient reason.

As to the common Abrahamic notion of God, where in God is "a being", He is omniscient, omnipotent, etc., and, thereby, was fully knowledgeable of and fully responsible for that serpent incident in the garden which He then got upset about, cursing everyone left and right. That self-contradictory God can well be envisioned absent from some worlds, much including the one we live in.

13. G v ~G is exactly what skepticism is. A skeptic doesn't commit to either p or ~p for any proposition p. — TheMadFool

Don't want to derail the thread, but this in no way describes Academic skeptics such as Cicero, who committed himself to a multitude of, some would say, very important propositions. And even Pyrrho, founder of Pyrrhonism, committed himself to the proposition that skepticism leads to eudaimonia. Which is to say, something's amiss. For my part, I'll leave it at that.

Groovy. What abouts this part heres:

My point, again, is that the issue is not death, but suffering in life (much including the suffering caused by the death of loved ones, and the like). — javra

Or do you find no correlation between increased global warming and increased human suffering?

No, the given is not extinction. But that all humans are mortal, with or without extinction.

My point, again, is that the issue is not death, but suffering in life (much including the suffering caused by the death of loved ones, and the like).

As you may recall from a former conversation a while back, that all humans die is a given. So the issue is not one of whether or not humans will die.

The issue, at least as some of us see it, is the degree of suffering experienced by us and other humans - including that which is to be experienced by future generations - while alive.

And, while others will speak for themselves, I for one don't find overall positions such as that of @Xtrix's in any way discordant to the issue I've just addressed.

All this intended in good sport:

1. If good justifications exist, Agrippa's trilemma doesn't matter — TheMadFool

To start with premise (1), how do you figure its verity? For: If good justifications exist, then Agrippa’s trilemma indeed matters, this because it is of itself concluded from good justifications. And until the trilemma is solved, it presents the fallibly proven truth (fallible because the trilemma can be applied to the trilemma’s own justification) that no infallibly proven truth can be obtained as far as we (fallibly) know. Which, apropos, is the only rational way I can make sense of Nietzsche’s mindset of there being no (infallible) truth.

How are you not here equivocating between good justification (in the sense of beneficial - implicitly given, beneficial to those subjects that utilize it) and perfect justification (in the sense of being completely absent of any actual or potential fault)? For one thing, a good justification is comparative, i.e. can be a better or worse justification relative to other good justifications – and a best justification is always so deemed by comparison to other justifications. On the other hand, a perfect justification, in the sense “perfect” is here used, is superlative rather than comparable, thereby absolute, thereby necessarily infallible.

[...] the skeptic will reply, "I'm not sure." — TheMadFool

And as a side note: I’m currently quite certain/sure (psychologically) of my position on fallibilism being (fallibly) true. :razz:

When someone asks me a question along the lines of "are you sure?" or "are you certain?" I very rarely say "yes". I always reply by saying "I think this is what I saw" or "it's likely", but I cannot for the life of me say "I'm certain" or "I'm sure". — Manuel


Also same. I find it very hard to say I “believe” something. Rather, I say I “think.” But I’m also really indecisive, so it may just be a personality quirk. I’m usually just too apathetic to make up my mind. — Pinprick

I’ve been a self-proclaimed philosophical (aka, anti-Cartesian-skepticism) skeptic since at least my late teens. Due to feedback from this forum and more so from its predecessor, more recently the term’s been updated to “fallibilist” so as to minimize confusion. Same thing to me. As such, I’ve never had problems in saying “yup, I’m certain” because I’ve always equated it to psychological certainty, this rather than epistemic certainty. The latter is for me cognitive (a certainty justified to the highest degree); the former is a kind of wager that your belief is in fact true despite your inability to evidence the belief’s claim to be epistemically certain.

Just in case it might be of interest: Taking a step back, when I say “I believe X” I see myself as choosing to endow X with the property of being real, this irrespective of the degree of conscious justification I may have for X, if any. So to me it connotes a less stanch position than that of “I think that X”. “I believe X” allows me the leeway of being wrong in what I believe, because beliefs are readily understood to be fallible. “I think that X”, however, is sterner: it to me claims that not only do I believe X but I’ve given this same belief thought wherein I’ve justified its verity to myself. Being wrong in the latter is more embarrassing, because to me it shows that my thought processes are not trustworthy to others or to myself. But “I believe” is more whimsical, so not as embarrassing when what I believe (without much if any conscious consideration) is wrong.

Then, to say “I’m certain that X” is to say that a) I believe that X (i.e., I choose to endow X with the property of being real), which is on its own flimsy, and b) that I wager my belief of X to be in fact true, typically because I find good enough justifications for it to so wager. But it to my mind is never the claim of infallible certainty.

Interesting for me to see others’ takes on this.

------

More in line with the OP, here's a philosophical compulsion I once had in everyday life: Years back, due to my contemplations at the time, I had problems in proclaiming anything to be perfect. As in, a perfect cat, or a more typical "perfect storm". Thought it to be a misapplication of language. Nothing in space and time could be completely without faults, and hence perfect. Much like cognitive objectivity, perfection was for me strictly an abstract ideal to be aspired for that can’t be obtained in anything concrete or spatiotemporal (akin to this Sting lyric: To search for perfection is all very well, but to look for heaven is to live in hell.). Then a former colleague humorously exclaimed that what someone or other did was “better than perfect!”. In its context, it made emotive sense, but at the moment not cognitive sense. Afterwards, I came to the conclusion that it referenced X being better than what was required of it to fully suit its purpose. The person, in other words, outdid themselves. Since then, I’ve become a lot more easygoing in saying of something, “perfect”: as in, the given suits the purpose(s) in question fully; rather than it having obtained a metaphysical status of perfection. So, nowadays, in the right context, I can make sense of things such as perfect cats (cats that completely suit the purposes in question), as well as of cats that are better than perfect (at things like catching mice). :wink:

Cool post, thanks.

As a sign I once saw on a math prof's door said: Good sense about trivialities is better than nonsense about things that matter! — fishfry

:up:

Cantor himself was a very religious man, and believed that after his endless hierarchy of infinities, the ultimate infinity was God. He called it the Absolute infinite, and denoted it Ω. Cantor's mathematics is universally accepted now, while his theological ideas are forgotten by everyone except historians — fishfry

An idea regarding infinity I’d like your feedback on, since you’re far more knowledgeable regarding mathematics:

“Infinity” is fully synonymous to “unlimitedness”. All mathematical infinities (e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3, … infinity) are bounded by being other than what they are not (e.g., 0, -1, -2, -3, … infinity) and so are bounded infinities, or infinities limited to that subject of contemplation addressed. There is always something other relative to such infinities which demarcates them as such. Here, infinities are quantitative.

Boundless, or complete, or absolute infinity, however, (though I’m not certain if this is in line with Cantor’s works) is not limited nor bound by anything; it is the same as absolute unlimitedness. It is therefore nondual in every conceivable sense of the word: there is nothing other relative to it. Hence it is not, nor can it be, numerical, for it is not quantitative. Nor can it be a quantitative understanding of “greatest” for this always stands in contrast to that which is lesser as other, as can be exemplified by X > Y, which limits the greater to X by excluding Y as the lesser other.

(In terms of the overall thread: Other than boundless infinity’s possible correlation to the notion of omnipresence, I don’t see how this can make the case for God as typically conceived: e.g., the greatest being among all other beings.)

That long-winded rant was really good. 10/10 — Kasperanza

Thanks. So no corrections to what I posted, then?

You can't have economics if you take away people's freedom. — Kasperanza

To my mind already answered this aptly. My post on freedom which you gave 10 out of 10 to ought to have indicated via its satire that freedom, while being an all-around feel-good term, is not a good thing in all conceivable cases. The freedom to pursue happiness via the mass murder of others is an example most take to be a bad freedom. Going by this example, a proposed truism: freedom is good only in so far as it doesn’t unfairly harm others.

Do you agree with this premise? If not, on what grounds should a person’s freedom to pursue happiness via mass murder be prohibited by others? Or should it not be?

If you do agree, then by what consistent reasoning should freedom to devastate the world and the humans that inhabit it in the name of personal happiness not be prohibited?

Please note, I ask from a philosophical perspective in respect to the generalized notion of freedom. Whether or not global warming is real, is human caused, is a means of devastating the world, etc., is not the issue I’m presently addressing here.

Nick Cave anyone? — Tom Storm

Yes to some of his works being close to timeless for me, but not all. Personal tastes though.

Waits is one of the few artists who became less accessible and more difficult with age. — Tom Storm

I'd say sharper as well. But again, tastes.

1. Is the breadth of an artists work indicative of the quality of their work? Or no? — Noble Dust

I'd say "no". I've got folk that only made on album in my library that I don't get tired of enjoying. Good quality, little breadth.

Or, consequently, is it possible for an artist to maintain such a deep tap on their creative potential that they always are evolving and never sitting still, even up until their death? If yes, who is an example? — Noble Dust

Assuming one shares minimal tastes with mine, Leonard Cohen comes to mind (now deceased), as well as Tom Waits and Tori Amos (not deceased but fairly well blossomed by now). There might well be others but this is what I think of first. All these have gone through a creative evolution with sustained quality that hasn't slowed down with age.

Mitigation and adaptation. The former requires worldwide commitments. The latter can be dealt with by individual nations. Which do you think has the better chance of succeeding? — jgill

Why pit one against the other? Last I checked economy is dependent upon resources. When resources vanish, economy plummets. Our economy is now global. Individual nations won't be able to adapt acclimate economically when our resources become unsustainable due to lack of mitigation. To address this in only economic terms.

I might be wrong on this, and may I be corrected if I am, but I think you’re missing @Kasperanza's crucial background issue of us not being deprived of our freedoms on account of mitigating a global calamity. Like one’s freedom to benefit from all that society has provided without the taxing requirement that one contributes back to it in return. Or maybe the freedom to grab vaginas non-consensually as one pleases on account of it being empowering, with recently elected presidents as our role model in so doing. To keep this short, last but not least, our right to freedom from the despotism of nature, be this from the evils of a corporeal death, from the tyranny of gravity in not allowing us to spontaneously fly by sheer will, or, most importantly to this discussion, our freedom from nature’s absurd injunction that we need a sustainable environment in order to continue living. We are free in our isolationist individualism to not give a damn about the rest of humankind; their present or future plight is their problem, not ours, and our helping them out in their plight as best we can is our own self-enslavement. As I said, I might be wrong about this, but the concern of losing freedoms in the name of mitigating global warming has been brought up more than once. And I deem it to be a widespread concern.

It’s like parents losing their lifelong freedoms once the kids are birthed. Its not just! So, to hell with the kids’ well-being; our freedoms to do as we please come first.

Thinking of Johnathan Swift, this is my little "modest proposal" for the day.

Some highlights:

[*] "Civility discourse enforces a false equation between incivility and violence that works to mask everyday violence as a civic norm. The violence that is polite is thrice as damaging as the direct attack because it gaslights as it wounds".
[*] "Calls for civility seek to evade our calls for change. The accusation of incivility is a technique of depoliticization aimed at undoing collectivity... When they tell us to be more civil, we need to go bigger, ask for more, come back harder".
[*] "Civility is a political aesthetic that obscures its politicity by asserting that it is “only” an aesthetic or a style. It is thus an aesthetic that is served by the assertion that aesthetics and politics are separate realms". — StreetlightX

One can be aggressive toward powers that be while being fully civil (reasonable and not rude). Tree huggers and water protectors, as only two examples, do it all the time. Aggression and civility are not mutually exclusive, especially when the aggression is defensive. Where propaganda enters is when tree huggers and water protectors are deemed uncivil strictly on grounds that they violate the prevailing status quo.

And that leads us to deeming war-mongers civil and pacifists uncivil. Only here do your three highlights begin to make sense.

The movements started by Gandhi or MLK, both of which violated the prevailing authoritarian norms of the day, would have gone nowhere in the absence of their civility.

Is it already too late? — Xtrix

Since I’m not big on defeatism: Too late relative to what? Too late for us to live as we’ve so far lived in relation to the climate? But of course it is! (At the very least, we should have taken the Kyoto Protocol a bit more seriously, but its too late for that now.) Is it too late for future generations to not have it as bad as it would be were humanity to go about its business as usual. Nope, not at all. One interesting fact I’ve so far learned in life, no matter how bad things get, things can always get worse.*

This however pivots on how much most of us care about future generations. At the very least the kids we're related to.

Is there ANYONE out there who still doesn't consider this the issue of our times? — Xtrix

Yes. Most of the people I’m surrounded by, for starters. Then there is a fair sum of the same in government. Also in the media …

---------

* Doctor calls up a guy saying, “Your tests are in. I’ve got bad news and worse news. Which do you want to hear first?” Guy replies, “The bad news”. Doc: “The tests are conclusive in you having only 24 hours left to live.” Guy: “What the hell can possibly be worse?” Doc: “I forgot to tell you yesterday.”

… kind of thing.

I get you. And there's something of what was saying regarding ignorance to all this. And I'd rather step on a bug than release fishes into the ocean which hooks or hook holes in their mouths. For one thing, to me fishes are higher up in the, I'll say, sentience (rather than ecological) pyramid of life.

But in terms of why one is frowned upon by some and the other generally isn't, I again think its because stepping on bugs that do no harm to you tends to express the intention of cruelty whereas sport fishing is, after all, a sport, and sports tend to express intentions such as comradely. Now, of course, there's cruelty toward fish in sport fishing, but those that do engage in sport fishing don't do so with willfully cruel intentions toward the fish (as is often ascribed to those who step on bugs for the fun of it, rather than for reasons such as you've ascribed). Reminds me of Cobain lyric taken out of context, "It's OK to eat fish, because fish don't have any feelings."

Iff that is granted, then an interesting hypothetical: sport bug-squashing. It's obviously not an official sport we're indoctrinated into. Whether this would be frowned upon or not I still think would be dependent on what we take the participants' intentions to be in partaking in the sport. If we find they do it for the pleasure of cruelty, then frowned upon (by those who don't value cruelty). If we appraise that they don't, then we may think them ignorant and so on, but we don't hold the same type of aversion to the participants.

No?

The difference is in the intention behind the act. At least, the intention that is assumed to be the cause of each act.

As one alternative example, it's the difference between killing a snail by covering it in salt for the kicks of it and putting salt on escargot because it tastes better that way. The snail gets killed either way, but the intentions are different.

Personally, I can't stomach even so much as watching another put salt on snails for the mirth of it (and, in all honesty, feel like becoming aggressive toward that human; why, because I disdain their sadistic pleasures), but I have no significant qualms in personally eradicating an excess of snails from my backyard by poisoning them, which is second best to using carnivorous snail species for the same purpose.

Same can be said to feeding seagulls alkaseltzer tablets so as to see them blow up ... its a long list.

Edit: don't mean to be harsh on you. (yet, at least :wink: ) Stepping on a bug kills them quickly, unlike burning them alive with a magnifying glass.

Democracy is where people vote directly on issues of concern to them. — Banno

Yes to your overall post. I however take democracy to be pivoted on a checks and balances of political power among citizens. This either via direct democracy (as one example I find remarkable, in later ancient Athens many public offices were elected by lottery, presupposing the requisite that all citizens in the lottery were capable of holding the given office for the allotted time, with all such citizens holding the potential to exert the same degree of political power) or via representative democracy, wherein - at least as the USA was envisioned to be by its founders - checks and balances are meant to occur both between a) representative factions themselves as well as between b) representatives and those they represent. A voting citizenry would then be a necessary consequence of “a checks and balances of political power among citizens”, but democracy seems to me to be defined by the latter and not the former. Voting could for example occur in oligarchies, but to me this does not make them democratic.

Curious if you’d disagree and, if so, on what count.

I think what was getting at is that the yin/yang is rooted in the notion of nondualism:

Taoism's wu wei (Chinese wu, not; wei, doing) is a term with various translations[note 21] and interpretations designed to distinguish it from passivity. The concept of Yin and Yang, often mistakenly conceived of as a symbol of dualism, is actually meant to convey the notion that all apparent opposites are complementary parts of a non-dual whole.[229] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nondualism#Taoism

(boldface mine)

If states could agree globally on effectively including all costs in the prices than that would already be one step in the right direction. Other such agreement could be made as needed... — ChatteringMonkey

I'm not in disagreement with this "if". And I've heard of other concrete proposals regarding improvements in general, that of a universal property/death tax to level the playing field where nothing is taxed under 1 million USD or equivalent and that of having CEO profits capped off at roughly 200% of the company's mean employer income, as two examples that come to mind. Both these ideas I'm acquainted with sound good to me. But without such laws being global, those that would subscribe to them would suffer due to global competition. And without the general agreement to so globally implement there is no political will for it. So stagnation in the form of business as usual results.

I'm questioning how an agreement could result among the powers that be in the absence of there being a common cause among them which all intend in the name of respective self-interests?

I know this is idealistic (in the common sense of the word), and I have cognizance of just how difficult it would be to bring it about, but I so far don't understand how concrete progress can be made in the absence of a goal that is agreed upon and toward which all/most relevant parties progress.

For starters, currently, not even the earnest goal of mitigating climate change is shared by most worldwide. I hope this is a warped perspective, but I so far see no evidence for it being so.

You know what, I'll bite a little.

Rationality, for better or worse, is the self-proclaimed infallible authority. — TheMadFool

It can't be, since reason evidences itself to be fallible, rather than infallible. See the previously arrived at conclusion that justification for justification cannot be obtained which we both agree upon.

Still, you got references for this proclaimed belief of yours? I ask because, as explained justified above, it strikes me as glaringly incorrect: as it being an erroneous belief regarding reasoning, and not anything which reasoning itself evidences.

Can rationality justify itself? No! It can't! — TheMadFool

Yes, yes. Agreed in full. And the point to this is?

Differently asked, we both appear to fallibilistically know that we infallibly know nothing. All well and good. I do believe this state of affairs regarding the human condition was discovered by schmucks millennia before we came along. Back then they went by the label of "thoughtful enquirers" or some such.

So what bearing can this fallible knowledge - of which we both appear to be quite certain/sure of (i.e., not a shred of doubt involved ... we're not skeptical about it) - possibly have on the experientially verified reality that what is true can be justified (yes, fallibilistically) without inconsistencies ever appearing, whereas what is false can always be found to suffer from inconsistencies?

Don't know about you, but beliefs riddled with inconsistencies are to me a red flag.

Spot on! I agree whole-heartedly but that opens Pandora's box. Now, we can't be sure of anything at all. We were smug about deductive justification - conclusions were certain given true premises - but now, all bets are off. — TheMadFool

Only when one's temperament is driven toward infallibility, much as Descartes' was. This doesn't apply for the fallibilist. But trying for a simple approach to a complex issue:

Is justification justified (J) or is justification unjustfied (~J)? — TheMadFool

Neither. One cannot obtain justification for justification, much in the same way the eye cannot see itself. But this does not demonstrate, nor even insinuate, that justification does not do its job properly; in parallel, the eye still sees.

If you personally disagree and find justification to not be trustworthy, why continue in justifying anything at all, ever?

What's the situation here? — TheMadFool

I take the situation to be in line with what @Pantagruel just said.

What you evidence is that normative reasons cannot be used to justify the use of normative reasons. This is rationally justified by use of normative reasons. Yes.

In my previous post, though, I was trying to detail how the use of normative reasons can nevertheless be itself justified by our motivating reasons. We are motivated to use normative reasons not because it is an infallible means of evidencing truths but because it is the best means we have at our disposal of so doing. There's no viable alternative to so doing that we know of. And, when it comes to motivating reasons, the buck stops with the nature of our will.

The conclusion that

The Bad news: We can't use justifications with ~J. — TheMadFool

is evidently not true, as is evidenced by all the justifications going on. Dare I say, you will need to justify this bare affirmation if you want to establish it as just (correct). But in so doing you'll evidence it false.

Thus, justificationism has no leg to stand on. — TheMadFool

Seems like you’re nearing the threshold of (global/radical) fallibilism. :smile:

Yes to the quote, but, all the same, eppur si muove - as evidenced by the justification you’ve provided in your post.

So as to simplify matters, speaking here only for when we justify beliefs in good faith (rather than to bolster our attempts at successful deception, as one counterexample that occurs often enough in the world): Why do we justify our beliefs, because we want our beliefs to be accordant to what is real - and justification is the best way we can find of so establishing. And why do we want our beliefs to be true rather than false, because this best safeguards our eudemonia, so to speak. We first hold this impetus innately/instinctively before knowing how to speak, and then it becomes fortified by experience.

So there’s one alternative avenue for justifying justification.

The big problem for global governance that I see though, is bureaucracy. If structures get that big, you get a whole new layer of logistic and administrative problems. — ChatteringMonkey

The only thing I can currently think of in regard to this is that for it to stand a chance of working there must first be an ideal that is aimed at; one that most folks are not opposed to. Headaches will occur one way or another. But in the absence of such ideal that serves as a common cause for most, I can't foresee the possibility of good results. And I think this is where @Xtrix's notion of a global awakening comes into play. Still, in seeing how many have had big problems with the wearing of face masks during the current pandemic, it will take considerable effort to bring such global ideal about.

Just saw that Banno beat me to it. I'll post this all the same

Charted below are the survey results from 20 countries, and they illustrate some startling beliefs — not least that 73% of Chinese consider China to be democratic, whereas only 49% of Americans believe the same about the U.S." — ltlee1

If memory serves me right, paraphrasing a comment once made by Darwin to the captain of The Beagle (the captain being vociferous about the benefits of slavery) as was recorded in Darwin's autobiography:

When a slave-master asks his slaves if they are happy, of course most will answer "yes". Even though, one would be tempted to believe, they answer "yes" because it is the only rational thing to do to avoid grave reprisals from the slave-master. And not because they are in fact happy being slaves.

Side note: Darwin was either incredibly courageous or stupid in so saying to the captain of a ship out in the middle of nowhere who staunchly disagree with Darwin's take on slavery. I readily choose to believe the former. At any rate, as it happens, young Darwin didn't accidentally drown on this voyage after so expressing to the captain.

At any rate, my question: Why should the self-reported happiness and the self-reported trust of a people be taken into consideration when appraising the question of "when is a democracy not a democracy". For instance, if such self-reports are to be deemed indicative of the truth regarding what is reported, then this would definitively prove that the majority of USA slaves in pre-Abolition days were exceedingly happy in so being slaves. Which history evidences is patently false.

And BTW, I'm all for the notion that "democracy" is nowadays becoming an Orwellian propaganda term which is in the process of losing nearly all meaning in, at least, the USA. Much like the "communism" (you know, a great big kibbutz-like loving community of comrades where fraternity rules) which never was in Europe, here pointing to a place I know best, except in places where the term had nothing to do with the reality.

Also note that China is again the biggest offender here. They subsidise everything, there isn't even a real difference between private and public sector there, to the point that 'free competition' with them is not a real possibility from the beginning. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, it's why I think that the solution can only be via some form of global governance, toward which we are already inching our way toward. Brings to mind the - acknowledged toothless - global 15% minimum corporate tax that was recently in the news. If laws are not universally applied, those who don't pollute (as much) will be economically destroyed by those who do. Still, the devil is in the details. For instance, given all the surveillance that we have and the economic oligarchy that is largely in charge, it could just as easily turn into a global totalitarianism. But, paraphrasing what I think by now is an adage, if we prepare ourselves with the worst in mind we may well be pleasantly surprised.

Thanks. I'm relieved it didn't fall on deaf ears as it usually has.

Maybe I need to look into it some more (feel free to share sources that could educate me on this), but I don't think you get around the fact that green energy is just more expensive... — ChatteringMonkey

In case it wasn’t known, the IMF reports that over 6% of the global GDP is spent in providing welfare … oops, the correct term for this when concerning corporations is “subsidies” … to the fossil fuel industry. Without this corporate welfare, fossil fuels would not be as inexpensive as they are relative to renewables. And a laissez faire attitude would be taken to competition among energy producers (quite likely resulting in both greater innovation in the production of and lesser prices for renewables). But the latter is not the type of capitalism we live in.

Also worth considering:

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) phasing out fossil fuel subsidies would benefit energy markets, climate change mitigation and government budgets.[25] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_subsidy#IEA_position_on_subsidies

We shouldn't take it seriously, except when reading Nietzsche or having academic conversations. It's like debating about whether the earth is spherical or gravity exists. Can be fun and interesting, but we'll still walk out the door and not the window (to paraphrase Hume I think). — Xtrix

I thought myself to be aiming for tact there. Speaking for myself, just because something was said by Mr. Nietzsche or some other great doesn’t automatically make that something worth being taken seriously, nor, I’ll say it, true - lest one succumbs to authoritarianism. The ubiquitous truth of there being no ubiquitous truth being one such. I’ll add to the examples you’ve given that of the proverbial ostrich who finds the predator disappears as soon as it places its head in the sand, and then gets gobbled up by the predator. Inaccurate predictive capacity, that. My main point being that truth, which is of itself immaterial, matters more than the material stuff that so many claim to be all there is. But, in guessing your thoughts, I agree that I’m likely digressing.

I’ve heard so called truths from people claiming that the planet is cooling, that global warming is caused by more recent occurrences in the sun making humans not culpable, and so on.

So, in regard to truth, global warming, value schemes, and such, a simple argument for human caused global warming:

P1) The greater the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the greater the planet’s greenhouse effect and the warmer the planet (T/F)
P2) Carbon dioxide is the most prevalent greenhouse gas next to water vapor (T/F).
P3) The burning of organic matter releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere (T/F)
P4) Humans require the burning of organic matter to comfortably live (minimally, to cook, to keep warm, and so forth) (T/F)
P5) In the last 200 years, human population has increased nearly eightfold, thereby increasing the burning of organic matter by, minimally, eightfold. (T/F)

Now, in keeping this simple, no mention will be here made of things such as human caused deforestation* and its effects on carbon dioxide. Simply using premises 1-5:

C) In the last 200 years, humans have singlehandedly increased the second most prevalent greenhouse gas by at least eightfold, thereby causing a respective increase in the greenhouse effect, thereby causing an increase in the planet's total heat.

For anyone iffy about human caused global warming: Which of the premises are not sound or how is the conclusion not valid?

-----
* For which quotes such as this can be found:

According to a study published in Scientific Reports if deforestation continue in current rate in the next 20 – 40 years, it can trigger a full or almost full extinction of humanity. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deforestation#Recent_history_(1970_onwards)

Maybe it won't be that bad, but it certainly won't be good.
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As for those who think such claims are alarmist nonsense, the proverbial ostrich comes to mind. Don't know the extent to which I'm preaching to the choir, but I guess I'll find out.

Yes, I'm in agreement that something about public consciousness needs to change.

“The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (Nietzsche 1901/1967 Will to Power) — Joshs

Without taking him to be a demigod, I like much of Nietzsche. But this I think is either flat wrong or else points to deeper truths via equivocation, which Nietzsche was fond of (cf. his notion of virtue).

Either there is a ubiquitous reality we will or will not conform to, or there is no ubiquitous reality: no uni-verse, no cosmos, no reality proper.

Only in the latter case can there be no truth toward which we can approach. And this latter option wherein there is no ubiquitous reality of anything needs some explaining if it is to be taken seriously.

I am asking the question what if reality is not linear, a plane. And we exist in a singularity and our perspective is merely psychological. And Time is merely conceptual a form of metric system. Not an actual element of reality. — SteveMinjares

Don’t know if this post will be of help, and it will come out from the left field. But it intends to illustrate that space and time being contingent on mind in general does not logically dispel objective space and time as being illusions.

First off, space too can be deemed interrelated with mind. For example, directionality (up/down; left/right; forward/backward) is observer relative and hence observer dependent, as can also be said of proximity/furtherance. One cannot have an observer sans observer-relative directionality. When two or more observers interact, that directionality which is commonly shared among all observers simultaneously becomes a fourth-person spatial configuration, pertaining to no individual observer, one that remains despite possible deviations from it by individuals. As a concrete example of this, that the sky is objectively above the earth can be appraised to so be due to such a reason. Now, I take this to be hinting at a possible metaphysical interpretation of space in large, rather than expounding on how space in general can be construed to be contingent on observers. Nevertheless, within this pseudo-interpretation, objective space is itself the construct of a multiplicity of interacting observers. In such interpretation of space, objective (fourth-person) space would nevertheless be real to all observers, despite being the product of a multiplicity of observers.

The same can be conceived for time: that which occurs before I act/react and that which occurs as a consequence of my action/reaction would entail a before and after relative to the present moment of the action/reaction I engage in. Two or more observers interacting will then entail a commonly held before and after relative to all, a common time that emerges from all relevant observers; an objective (fourth-person) time that will occur despite possible deviations from it by individual observers. Here, again, objective time could become construed to be observer-dependent and yet utterly real, rather than illusory.

In short, whether or not time is deemed contingent on mind, it can nevertheless yet be objectively real. And, hence, not illusory.