Cheers.

Let me reflect back to you what I take you to have been saying, so that you can correct my error.

I had presented an argument that knowledge by acquaintance is ostension, and hence the very topic with which Wittgenstein begins the PI; and hence that the argument in the PI is indirectly about knowledge by acquaintance.

I happily acknowledge the variation in the use of "know"; and am explicitly advocating a certain use, that knowledge in the context being discussed is propositional. Further, we can acknowledge that there are other uses, and for out purposes here keep a keen eye on which we are using so as to keep track of our progress.

On this account, what you have called knowledge by acquaintance might be better termed belief based on ostension, so as to keep it distinct from propositional, justified knowledge.

Now, Wittgenstein presents a range of arguments against ostension being central to communication. This is explicitly an argument against the contrary view of building a language from logical simples, which he had himself set out in the Tractatus. If he is correct and ostension is as much a part of language as questioning or commanding, then one cannot use pointing to logical simples as the foundation of language.

SO what is in contention here is what you take as granted; that much of communication is contingent on ostension.

So where you say:

. How does one know that the orange juice one drinks tastes sweet to oneself if not via direct awareness, with no ostension required in this. Or, as a more extreme example, how does an animal know whether what they put into their mouths to taste tastes good to them and is thereby worth being eaten? — javra

What you are doing in recognising that the juice is sweet is precisely recognising that the right words to use are "juice" and "sweet". Using the words correctly is exactly what understanding that the juice is sweet consists in. Recognising that the juice is sweet is already embedded in language, already a public act.

The dog does not recognise that the food is tasty; it just eats the food. The judgement that the food tastes good and therefore is worth eating is, as it were, post hoc, and in this case made by us in setting out the actions of the dog.

I don't see how this relates to the PLA. — Janus

On that we can agree.

I wouldn't claim that the cup example is an example of knowledge by acquaintance, — Sam26

I agree; I was using the phrase in order to be clear with Javra. Knowledge by acquaintance is a furphy.

The dog does not recognise that the food is tasty; it just eats the food. — Banno

The dog does, however, enjoy the taste of the food; which is the foundation upon which recognizing that the food is tasty rests.

On this account, what you have called knowledge by acquaintance might be better termed belief based on ostension, so as to keep it distinct from propositional, justified knowledge. — Banno

Nope. No ostension involved in awareness of that which is directly experienced. Not to oneself and not to others. First awareness of and then, maybe, ostension so as to communicate that which one is directly aware of. This is what I call knowledge by acquaintance of X: direct awareness of X. Its also what a lot of other people call it, including Bertrand Russell. If you're so inclined check out the rest of this Wikipedia entry:

The distinction in its present form was first proposed by British philosopher Bertrand Russell in his famous 1905 paper, "On Denoting".[2] According to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is obtained exclusively through experience, and results from a direct causal interaction between a person and an object that the person is perceiving. In accordance with Russell's views on perception, sense-data from that object are the only things that people can ever become acquainted with; they can never truly be acquainted with the physical object itself. A person can also be acquainted with his own sense of self (cogito ergo sum) and his thoughts and ideas. However, other people could not become acquainted with another person's mind, for example. They have no way of directly interacting with it, since a mind is an internal object. They can only perceive that a mind could exist by observing that person's behaviour. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_by_acquaintance#%22On_Denoting%22

The dog does not recognise that the food is tasty; it just eats the food. The judgement that the food tastes good and therefore is worth eating is, as it were, post hoc, and in this case made by us in setting out the actions of the dog. — Banno

Animals would die quickly according to this reasoning. For an animal to not "hold awareness of" predator (non-food) from prey (food), or of that which is nutritious for it (food) from that which is toxic for it (non-food), would be deleterious to the animal.

But, thank you for actually replying to what I posted.

The dog does not recognise that the food is tasty; it just eats the food. The judgement that the food tastes good and therefore is worth eating is, as it were, post hoc, and in this case made by us in setting out the actions of the dog. — Banno

Animals would die quickly according to this reasoning. For an animal to not "hold awareness of" predator (non-food) from prey (food), or of that which is nutritious for it (food) from that which is toxic for it (non-food), would be deleterious to the animal. — javra

Forgot to make this explicit. That which is deemed as food will be desirable, and thereby good tasting (as contrasted to pleasantly sounding or the like), when the animal is hungry. It's what animal taste buds are for, right?

Nope. No ostension involved in awareness of that which is directly experienced. Not to oneself and not to others — javra

Then it is awareness, not awareness of. An unpointed awareness is not an awareness of something.

To my eye, that closes it. In Quine's terms, observation - even down to awareness of a red cup - is embedded in theory.

That which is deemed as food... — javra

This is a pointing: That is a food.

Seems the we differ as to what is involved in pointing.

Then it is awareness, not awareness of. An unpointed awareness is not an awareness of something. — Banno

For someone who gives great emphasis to language use, you have a strange means of expressing yourself. While I think I happen get what you mean by "an unpointed awareness" I hope you know that linguistic use of the term is fully idiosyncratic. One points one's awareness at things ... no, I'm not understanding that. To me it's worse than a homunculus argument.

But OK.

You agree with Wittgenstein that the law of identity is - as you call it - "a useless statement"? — Luke

I don't agree that the law of identity is a useless statement. I agree with Wittgenstein that there is no criterion of identity by which we say that two things are the same. The law of identity states that one thing is the same as itself. It is not a criterion for judging two things as the same.

And this is what is discussed at 253, the possibility of a criterion for judging two things as the same. Since there is no such criterion, and people use "same" to refer to things which are obviously different, but are in some way similar, then it would make perfect sense to say that your pain is the same as my pain.

Furthermore, I am no more justified, or correct, in judging that one instance of my pain is the same as another instance of my pain, then I am in saying that your pain is the same as my pain. This is because we have no criteria by which we can judge two distinct things as the same, so any instance of doing such is just as absurd, and unjustified as any other.

Anyway, Wittgenstein didn't believe that the law of identity is useless, he just didn't like the way that it was stated, so he offered his own interpretation. If you read the rest of that passage, you'll see that he just preferred to offer his own way of stating it, as "every thing fits into its own shape" or something like that

You definitely have a unique way of interpreting Wittgenstein. — Sam26

So do you, so does Banno, and also Luke. In this sense we are all the same. Go figure.

My view is that another way we justify beliefs is by linguistic training, i.e., we learn how to use words. How do I know that that is a cup and that it's red? First, we learn to use the words in social contexts, so (as I point to a cup) it's what we mean by cup, red, etc. Whether it makes sense to say "I know this is a cup," depends on the context. If someone was learning a language, we could imagine where one might appropriately doubt whether X is a cup or something else. In other words, the doubt is about the use of that particular word, and its referent. — Sam26

You are making a big jump here, thereby avoiding the problem of justification which Wittgenstein is pointing at. We need to justify our use of words, as you say, demonstrate that we are correct in saying that X is a cup. This is the only way to quell the doubt about the use of that particular word. Now you cannot jump to "we justify beliefs...by linguistic training", as your answer to the problem of justification, because, 'this is how I learned to talk therefore it is correct', does not suffice as justification. It's an appeal to authority, and is really nothing more than circular logic. Why is this use of words correct? Because it's what we were taught to do. Why were we taught to do it? Because its correct. It's just a circle which really says nothing about justification. To understand what justification really is, we need to really look at why we use words the way that we do, rather than just saying that we use words the way that we do because we were taught to use them that way.

One points one's awareness at things — javra

That's not so idiosyncratic. Pointedly so. It is what we do. Awareness is not passive.

In that millisecond you are supposedly making a judgement - "Does that count as a pain?"

But do you want to go further and doubt that?


Where that is a act of pointing. — Banno

I'm not entirely clear what you mean here. If by 'that' you mean the sensation itself, then no, I don't think it makes sense to say "I doubt I had that sensation" as 'sensation' is term which covers pretty much anything that such a triggering event might be.

In a sense it's just putting it on the same footing as our other senses. We might doubt that we've seen an oasis ("is it just a mirage?"), but not that we've seen something. It's nothing but pragmatism, but I just think there's no good cause to go about thinking that nothing at all causes all these sensations we have. I do, however, find it useful to have a language in which I can talk about the difference between causes. The thing I'd say about pain is that it usually associated with tissue damage, or some negative thought (in terms of emotional pain), so it makes sense, in the absence of either to ask "have I got this right?".

When we name stuff we're not just labelling, we assigning a social role, a set of subsequent behaviours on our part, and expectations of others follow from the naming. If these don't work out as we expected them to, we need to change something about the model, and that usually means changing the name too. This makes everything with a name open to doubt, that doubt being "naming it such-and-such didn't work out as I expected, maybe I should try another".

In that millisecond you are supposedly making a judgement - "Does that count as a pain?"

But do you want to go further and doubt that?


Where that is a act of pointing. — Banno

I'm not entirely clear what you mean here. If by 'that' you mean the sensation itself, then no, I don't think it makes sense to say "I doubt I had that sensation" as 'sensation' is term which covers pretty much anything that such a triggering event might be.

In a sense it's just putting it on the same footing as our other senses. We might doubt that we've seen an oasis ("is it just a mirage?"), but not that we've seen something. It's nothing but pragmatism, but I just think there's no good cause to go about thinking that nothing at all causes all these sensations we have. I do, however, find it useful to have a language in which I can talk about the difference between causes. The thing I'd say about pain is that it usually associated with tissue damage, or some negative thought (in terms of emotional pain), so it makes sense, in the absence of either to ask "have I got this right?".

When we name stuff we're not just labelling, we assigning a social role, a set of subsequent behaviours on our part, and expectations of others follow from the naming. If these don't work out as we expected them to, we need to change something about the model, and that usually means changing the name too. This makes everything with a name open to doubt, that doubt being "naming it such-and-such didn't work out as I expected, maybe I should try another".

You would say that they were in pain even if they had no "unpleasant experience"? — Luke

I might not use the expression 'in pain'. It sounds messy "they're in pain but they don't know it". But something like "their body is being wracked by pains but they're unaware due to a malfunction of the thalamus" seems to make sense to me. At least I don't think I would be met with baffled failure to understand if I were to describe a person in those terms. There a condition in which increases the availability of 5-HT at the 5-HT3 receptors at a nerve ending, this results in a sensation of pain (or discomfort), but the rest of the pain pathway is absent. Some talk about this as not being in 'real pain'. Personally, I should stress, I disagree with that use of language, I think it undermines the felt pain of people who suffer from such a condition; but the point - as far as this discussion goes - is that people know what they mean, my disagreement is a psychological one, not a failure to understand what they mean.

I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. — Luke

Yes, I agree. But Wittgenstein was not privy to modern understandings of cognitive psychology, so whilst I'm completely on board with the idea that if something could not 'come to be known' there's be no sense in doubting it (The insight Wittgenstein is qualified to espouse), he's wrong in his examples of those somethings, simply because he didn't know then what we know now about how we come to judge the causes of our sensations, including interocepted ones like the activity of nociceptors.

I don't agree that the law of identity is a useless statement. I agree with Wittgenstein that there is no criterion of identity by which we say that two things are the same. The law of identity states that one thing is the same as itself. It is not a criterion for judging two things as the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then why did you say:

There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you understand PI 216 or much of anything that Wittgenstein says.

I might not use the expression 'in pain'. It sounds messy "they're in pain but they don't know it". — Isaac

Well, that was the question I originally asked you.

But something like "their body is being wracked by pains but they're unaware due to a malfunction of the thalamus" seems to make sense to me. At least I don't think I would be met with baffled failure to understand if I were to describe a person in those terms. There a condition in which increases the availability of 5-HT at the 5-HT3 receptors at a nerve ending, this results in a sensation of pain (or discomfort), but the rest of the pain pathway is absent. Some talk about this as not being in 'real pain'. Personally, I should stress, I disagree with that use of language, I think it undermines the felt pain of people who suffer from such a condition; but the point - as far as this discussion goes - is that people know what they mean, my disagreement is a psychological one, not a failure to understand what they mean. — Isaac

This reasoning would commit you to saying that patients under anaesthetic are in pain (or equivalent), whereas the entire reason for anaesthetic is to eliminate pain. I think it is a matter of you using these words incorrectly. You have not addressed the point I made about the definition you provided: you completely ignore that pain is defined in terms of an "unpleasant experience".

Yes, I agree. But Wittgenstein was not privy to modern understandings of cognitive psychology, so whilst I'm completely on board with the idea that if something could not 'come to be known' there's be no sense in doubting it (The insight Wittgenstein is qualified to espouse), he's wrong in his examples of those somethings, simply because he didn't know then what we know now about how we come to judge the causes of our sensations, including interocepted ones like the activity of nociceptors. — Isaac

What are you claiming Wittgenstein is wrong about? He says (at PI 246): "it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself."

Speaking In Tongues (Glossolalia)

Speaking in tongues, also known as glossolalia, is a practice in which people utter words or speech-like sounds, often thought by believers to be languages unknown to the speaker. — Wikipedia

In a strange reversal of conditions, a person who simply repeats (oh! Talking Birds) a sentence in a language fae doesn't understand, is kinda like the mirror image of a private linguist. In one case the language is public, in the other it's private but in both situations, comprehension is nil!

Talking birds are birds that can mimic the speech of humans. There is debate within the scientific community over whether some talking parrots also have some cognitive understanding of the language. — Wikipedia

This reasoning would commit you to saying that patients under anaesthetic are in pain (or equivalent), whereas the entire reason for anaesthetic is to eliminate pain. — Luke

No, because anaesthetic acts differently. It might reduce conscious awareness of pain, reduce memory of pain (amnesiac effects) , it might reduce the signalling of pain at the nerve ending, or it might reduce the transmission of those signals at the brain stem or thalamus. At each point in this chain we can sensibly talk about 'the pain' and be perfectly well understood. If I say, "the pain reaches the thalamus but the the drug interferes with the communication between neurons from there on", no-one says "what do you mean 'the pain' - the patient isn't in any pain because they're anaesthetised? I've no idea what you're talking about". It's perfectly clear what I'm talking about.

What are you claiming Wittgenstein is wrong about? He says (at PI 246): "it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself." — Luke

Exactly as I explained previously. There is no such thing as 'pain' (the experienced sensation) in physiological terms. It simply doesn't exist. It's a constructed experience, we interpret interocepted signals using socially constructed models of the meaning of those signals, one of which is 'pain'. Most of that modelling is done subconsciously (which it makes no sense to doubt, since we've no access to it), but the evidence is (evidence which Wittgenstein obviously didn't have access to) that a very small part of that model-fitting is done consciously milliseconds after a shift in attention. The cortico-limbic-striatal circuits use the descending pain modulatory system to modulate pain signalling in line with models of pain at higher cortical hierarchies. You literally decide if you're in pain.

If by 'that' you mean the sensation itself, then no, I don't think it makes sense to say "I doubt I had that sensation" as 'sensation' is term which covers pretty much anything that such a triggering event might be. — Isaac

Than I'm lost. It seems it is not possible to doubt a pain.

In a sense it's just putting it on the same footing as our other senses. — Isaac

Here's the thing: with the other senses there is a public item at the source. See the house? SO can I. Hear the bird? So can I. Touch the wall? So can I.

But with pain, not so much. When you assign a social role to the house, the bird, the wall, there is a public confirmation that is absent with pain.

No, because anaesthetic acts differently. It might reduce conscious awareness of pain, reduce memory of pain (amnesiac effects) , it might reduce the signalling of pain at the nerve ending, or it might reduce the transmission of those signals at the brain stem or thalamus. At each point in this chain we can sensibly talk about 'the pain' and be perfectly well understood. If I say, "the pain reaches the thalamus but the the drug interferes with the communication between neurons from there on", no-one says "what do you mean 'the pain' - the patient isn't in any pain because they're anaesthetised? I've no idea what you're talking about". It's perfectly clear what I'm talking about. — Isaac

You're not actually talking about pain. You are talking about the physiological functions that are known to be correlated with pain, and calling it "the pain" as shorthand. There is no "unpleasant experience" in these examples, so you are arguing against the definition of "pain" that you provided.

You literally decide if you're in pain. — Isaac

That's beside the point. It only matters that we are either in pain or not.

Briefly, as I have a meeting to get to.

a public confirmation... is absent with pain. — Banno

FMRI scans. What I'm saying is that the lack of a public shared referant for pain is a consequence of our technology, not a restriction about the way the world is. As we've discussed before, I think, different sub-cultures require languages in which to talk about their particular models. We're not 'wrong' for using language that way, only context-specific.

Notwithstanding that, I think constructed experience models do provide us with a public confirmation of pain in the way I described earlier. If I go about saying I'm 'in pain' in response to some particular set of physiological signals and it doesn't have the effect I expect it to have I might well conclude that I'm wrong, maybe I'm not in pain afterall, maybe this is something else. As I said to @Luke above, 'pain' is a socially constructed model, the physiology causing it is overlapping and non-exhaustive so there is definitely an element of 'deciding' you're in pain. There's disagreement about whether any part of that decision is conscious - and if none, then your position would be right; but if any, then your position would be wrong. It hinges on the psychological facts of the matter.

You're not actually talking about pain. — Luke

If I use the word 'pain' and I'm understood by a reasonable community of language users, then I am 'actually' talking about pain. There's no objective definition, that's why I brought up the standard one, to show it's ambiguity, not to set it up as a gospel.

If I use the word 'pain' and I'm understood by a reasonable community of language users, then I am 'actually' talking about pain. There's no objective definition, that's why I brought up the standard one, to show it's ambiguity, not to set it up as a gospel. — Isaac

Okay, but you're no longer talking about the sensation of pain, like Wittgenstein is.

When a doctor asks where the pain is they pay attention to the gesture that indicates the location; a flat hands indicates a surface pain, a finger a stabbing pain, a fist a deep ache, and so on. That these indicators are expressions rather than referrals is strongly suggested by the fact that most patients are unaware of their having any significance. Body language, except when learned by actors, is almost all expression, I would think.

The 7-38-55 rule indicates that only 7% of all communication is done through verbal communication, whereas the nonverbal component of our daily communication, such as the tonality of our voice and body language, make up 38% and 55% respectively. — Google

Philosophy is toneless and bodiless, and that is why it goes astray so often.

*Gives long hard scanning silent stare to audience.*

Speaking of tone, the antipodean intonation that turns every sentence into a question perhaps expresses in its origins the roots of the largely uneducated convicts in a strange land? Uncertain of almost anything? D'ya know what I mean?

The latter question, which philosophers agonise over for centuries, is an expression more or less equivalent to "um," but occurs at the end of the speech more than the middle.

The rising terminal is most likely of New Zealand origin, rather than Australian, and indicates a continuation - "But wait, there's more...".

Foreigners don't get it. But they copy it. It's now in California, Canada and other parts.

We got way off topic, but that's fine.

Then why did you say:

There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same. Luke supports this above with the quote from 216, the law of identity is a useless statement.
— Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you understand PI 216 or much of anything that Wittgenstein says. — Luke

I don't think you understand the law of identity. According to this law it is impossible for two things to be the same. Only one thing can be the same as itself. Calling one thing, "two things", is contradictory. That's why I said "There is no criterion of identity (rule) by which we say that two things are the same", "Two things are the same" is a violation of the law of identity, and no new law has been proposed to take its place. So there is no other rule, or law which provides us a principle, or criterion, by which we can say "two things are the same", even though we commonly use "same" like this, in the vernacular.

Wittgenstein clearly understands the law of identity (216), and explains how he will use the word "same" in the vernacular way, which violates the law of identity (253-255), He even emphasizes this usage at 254 with "The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance) is another typical expedient in philosophy." By this substitution, two "identical" things are said to be "the same" (in disregard for the law of identity).

He also alludes to the consequence of this action, that with this use of "same" which he has chosen, there is no criterion of identity by which the two things are said to be the same. Clearly, he is implying that since he has dismissed the law of identity, in favour of the vernacular use of "same", there is now no rule governing his use of "same".

253 In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is
also possible for us both to have the same pain.

IN the case of a private sensation, yes. — Banno

Does he discuss private language without private sensation?

Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all. — TLP 5.5303

You don't get it.

Clearly, he is implying that since he has dismissed the law of identity, in favour of the vernacular use of "same", there is now no rule governing his use of "same".

253 In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is
also possible for us both to have the same pain — Metaphysician Undercover

You quote Wittgenstein saying that it is "possible for us both to have the same pain", but it could not be possible if there were no rule governing his use of "same". You seem to think that "same" must mean identical per the law of identity, otherwise it can have no meaning.

Okay, but you're no longer talking about the sensation of pain, like Wittgenstein is. — Luke

True, but in my first case (the social construction of natural kinds like 'pain') I am talking about the sensation of pain Wittgenstein is referring to. It is neither something we 'learn' of ourselves, nor is it something which it would make no sense to doubt. If it is something we construct, then we can doubt the appropriateness and/or utility of the construction. We can't doubt the triggering sensations, but they were not (in Wittgenstein's use) 'pain' in the first place, they're just physiological activity.

Image you've six physiological signals (a, b, c, d, e, and f) you generally model any combination of four or more as 'pain' (by model I mean things like a tendency to use the word 'pain', a tendency to say 'ouch', a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source...etc). The six signals are obviously not themselves 'pain' (again, in the way Wittgenstein is using the term), so it must be the model. But if it's the model, we do doubt it because those six triggering physiological signals overlap with some of the triggering physiological signal for other state/emotion models. Just as we might say "I wasn't hungry, I was just nervous" (misinterpreting the overlapping signals from the digestive system in those two models), we might be able to say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross". That we don't actually say that is not necessarily a reflection on what is the case so much a cultural artefact of the belief that things like emotions and pains are natural kinds (a belief I believe modern cognitive sciences shows to be unfounded).

You quote Wittgenstein saying that it is "possible for us both to have the same pain", but it could not be possible if there were no rule governing his use of "same". You seem to think that "same" must mean identical per the law of identity, otherwise it can have no meaning. — Luke

I don't see where you derive "it could not be possible if there were no rule governing his use of 'same'". That's utter nonsense. I can't believe that after so much time discussing this issue with me, you are still arguing such a lame point.

Anyway, I do not think that "same" has "no meaning" as you suggest. I think that it could have any meaning, depending on the context of usage, as Wittgenstein suggests. Do you apprehend the difference between having no meaning (meaningless), and having a vast array of different meanings depending on the context of usage? The latter is what Wittgenstein suggests happens to "same" when we reject the law of identity.

The vast array of different meanings is the result of the rejection of the rule (law of identity), i.e. it is the consequence of there being no rule. So the meaning in any particular instance of use is dependent on that particular context of use, not some sort of rule. Meaning is a feature of the particular context of use, not a feature of some universal rule. A rule might restrict the meaning, in the sense of providing a boundary, as a part of the context, but a rule is not a necessary part of the context. Therefore meaning is not dependent on rules. When you come to grasp this fact, you will see that context may provide all the restrictions necessary for the existence of meaning, without the requirement of any rules.