By no means, the supposition that being "the ground of being" makes God irrelevant or impotent or both (or somehow absolutely nothing like "God") was made by many posters in this thread. I wasn't even thinking of anything you mentioned. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Alright. Got it. Slightly embarrassingly, my bad presumption, then.

I wouldn't call this arational though, [...]" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hmm, I call the Good arational because it is the only actuality for which there is no sufficient reason - thereby being the only one actuality which is of itself beyond any reason, thereby being neither rational nor irrational. Being of itself is in this sense alone absurd - but by no means random or meaningless - for there is no reason for being's being. Yet it is, occurs, all the same; and, as the Good, Being is the ground of all existence and existents, the latter alone being subject to the principle of sufficient reason and, thereby, not being absurdist (but again, this only in the extremely restricted sense of absurdism just specified).

All this might just be a different perspective regarding the same inexplicable ontic actuality which I term the Good and which can just as cogently be termed God

[...] and at any rate God is not a "brute fact" in the sense the term is often employed today, although the term is fitting if it only implies "not referred to anything else." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this latter being in keeping with the meaning I intended to express by the term, "brute fact" in the sense of: "a thing that [here, a concept whose referent ...] is undeniably the case, but which is impervious to reasoned explication".

As to why it is so, this would be a very, very long shpeal on my part - and I'm here assuming we're both taking "the Good's being an actual ontic facet of all which can be in any way considered real" for granted (in so far as the Good is that ultimate reality upon which all others are dependent).

I'm not really sure what "I-ness" is supposed to mean here, or why a "deity" is defined by it. To refer to my earlier point, these notions have long been theological orthodoxy in the traditional churches, but have not been seen as precluding that God is God. God is impassible, eternal, immutable, not a being, simple, unlimited, etc. and this is precisely why God is God. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm of course here engaging in philosophical discourse, attempting to be as rational as I can be about the matter at hand, but am not addressing traditions of interpretation.

I-ness is a term whose referent is difficult to demarcate, and can thus be demarcated in different ways. I find notions such as that generally adopted by Kant, Husserl, and William James to be of great benefit to this issue: To use James’s terminology: where “ego” equates to “I-ness”, there is a pure ego, which is the subject of the experienced self, and then there is the empirical ego, which is that full scope of I-ness or self experienced by the pure ego. In presuming you are familiar with this basic notion, I’ll here skip the details and justifications.

The Good, then, will consist of an infinite pure ego devoid of any duality wherein the subject of experience - pivotally, the subject of understanding - of itself becomes that which is understood and thereby known (this, maybe obviously, in non-spatiotemporal manners, these of themselves requiring some measure of duality).

A deity, on the other hand (be it a supposed omni-creator deity which would by entailment be singular or else a deity of pagan polytheistic understanding which would by entailment then not be omni-anything, this irrespective of its powers) entails a pure ego embedded in an empirical ego (be the latter either utterly non-corporeal or otherwise - for the deity knows itself to be other than X, Y, and Z, this then being the pure ego's knowledge of its empirical ego) which, as such, is furthermore other in respect to, for example, those who pray or else worship it: For the deity to in any way answer a prayer, there must logically be some form of duality between a) the deity, b) the prayer it becomes aware of (the prayer being other than the deity), and c) the response which the deity gives (the deity-generated effect as response again being other than the deity's subjectivity (i.e., empirical-ego-embedded pure-ego) itself).

Hence, a deity’s occurrence entails some form of duality between the deity as I-ness (as an empirical-ego-embedded pure-ego) and that which is not this I-ness (e.g. the communication of which the deity becomes aware and this communication’s source – both of which are then other than the deity itself).

Some of the comments in this thread seem to suggest that if "God is being itself," then God is impotent vis-á-vis creatures, insensate, irrational, etc., instead of possessing the fullness of knowledge, the fullness of rationality—as Dionysius the Areopagite says, being super-rational, super-essential, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As a suggestion, you might want to then address the previously made arguments of these numbskulls or else shmucks head on, rather than talk behind their backs without giving any mention. (Here presuming this numbskull shmuck was I.)

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As to the quoted issue of impotency:

Where the priority-monism based ground-of-being as “the Good” to be a non-deity unmoved-mover of everything that is (this as I previously expressed here and here in this thread) it would be the exact opposite of impotent. It would, instead, be that which in one way or another endows potency to all agencies that occur, be these agencies deemed good or bad – very much including the agency of deities (or else of all celestial beings, e.g. archangels and lesser angels), were the latter to occur.

While it is true that such non-deity unmoved-mover could make a deity of superlative power (else agency) utterly superfluous to metaphysical considerations regarding reality at large – indeed, not necessitating the occurrence of any so called “celestial beings” whatsoever – it does not by any means then deny the possibility of the existence of such (and if they do in fact occur, prayers to such celestial beings will then have their effects). Instead, such an understanding of the a non-deity unmoved-mover of all that exists as “the Good” will entail that, were celestial beings to occur, all these will be inescapably subject to this same non-deity unmoved-mover which goes by the term “the Good” – such that, in considering those celestial beings that are far closer to the Good than any of us are, they gain their power from their very proximity to this same “unmoved-mover of all that exists” which is of itself not a deity.

To sum: the Good as the non-deity unmoved-mover of all that is can by no means be rationally concluded impotent but, instead, can then only be the source of all potency which occurs among agencies—for it is then that which in one way or another moves all these free-will endowed agencies, without exception (e.g., via such agencies affinities toward the Good or else their fear and resultant aversions in respect to it).

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As to the quoted issue of the Good thus understood being "insensate, irrational, etc.":

By its very definitions, the Good / the One, while not being a deity, would be the non-temporal juncture wherein a) no duality whatsoever between the subject of understanding and the object of its understanding will remain and b) it will be (as it has always been) qualitatively infinite (limitless) and, hence, devoid of any quantity in so being divinely simple. This thereby entailing an infinite understanding which is of itself infinite and nondualistic awareness, one which is the source of all rationalizations but which supersedes any and all duality involved in reasoning.

And, as to its reason for being, the Good / the One as actuality here becomes the sole brute fact there is, in so being being the only a-rational reality there is. (With arational being beyond that which can be either rational or irrational, thereby in no way being of itself irrational.)

And, again, the Good thus understood cannot in any way be a deity, if for no other reason because a deity entails an occurring I-ness and that which is not this I-ness, thereby entailing a necessary duality, of which the Good is utterly devoid of.

Gestapo/KGB tactics on the streets, abuse of law - abuse of everything and everybody - disappearing people, destroying lives, delivering a steady stream of lies and "alternate facts" as justification. — tim wood

How is that in any way different from the way the establishment used to run things? :chin: — Tzeentch

The question is not one of when were humans noncorrupt – the answer here is never – but, instead, that of whether corruption is increasing or else decreasing.

My worst fear is that I will die before enough people understand what I am saying to spread these ideas and give our young a chance of having a good future. — Athena

I very much get that. It’s why our voices matter. To become voiceless in a time of conflict – this when speaking up does not lead to dire perils with any significant degree of certainty (as it would in full-blown fascism) – is to in effect empower the extremist factions which see no value in democratic principles and the heuristics which bring these democratic principles into practice.

It’s not quite trust, nor belief, so I’ll say that I have faith in the younger generations at large. Their lives are just beginning to undergo the calamities of an ever-increasing climate change which they’ll have to live the entirety of their lives through. And while some of the old farts amongst us might adopt a “que sera sera” attitude toward the future, the young are for the most part experiencing a wakeup call. But they’re up against power-hording, authoritarian institutions (economic as much as political) which nowadays have surveillance capacities that the Nazis and the Stalinist Commies could have only dreamt of.

And this, again, is why voices – such as yours – matter.

The way to escape the prisoners' dilemma in geo-politics is negotiation and coming to some kind of supra-national agreement.... you create incentives so the prisoners don't choose the default bad option. — ChatteringMonkey

In agreement with this, to give a relatively simple parallel to it:

In the early 2000’s, Bill Gates Sr. and Chuck Collins – both relatively well off people, to say the least – campaigned for an estate/death/inheritance tax in America to the following effect:

MOYERS: And do I understand correctly that you’re not advocating that the government take everything that somebody passes on to children?

GATES: On the contrary. No, we’re not. We’re saying, for example, that if the exemption were three and a half million dollars or $7 million for a family, that…. And the rate was say, 50 percent just as a for instance, then whatever dad and mom leave in excess of $7 million, and half of the rest, still there for the children. — billmoyers.com

The corporate media didn’t give this campaign much if any coverage – we wonder why – and I was only exposed to it via a Bill Moyers episode of NOW, which aired on PBS (which is currently dying).

It makes a lot of sense: For a family, everything under 7 million dollars does not get taxed a penny. And everything over 7 million would be taxed an approximate 50% - uniformly across the board. (With the same applying to the cap of 3.5 million for any one individual.) Taxes then go back into the system: for infrastructure, for education, for research, etc. – all of which serve the public good and make society stronger. And meritocratic competition would be preserved for all: the richest person on Earth would yet have the greatest sum of inheritance to give to their own children to start them off with in life.

But, even if this campaign would have been given more coverage and would have picked up steam, it wouldn’t have worked. American millionaires would have been at a loss in respect to non-American millionaires world over. Such that the offspring of non-American millionaires would then have had substantially greater capital to start them off in life then their American counterparts. Thereby nullifying the meritocratic competition previously addressed on a global scale. So it then only makes sense that most American millionaires (obviously excluding Gates Sr. and Collins) were contra this campaign and its proposals.

The only way to make such an estate tax viable (whose implementation should make a lot of sense to at least most of us) would be to make it globally applicable – this without any exceptions. But, maybe obviously, this would then require a global governance.

I'm thinking this or similar understandings might help alleviate this:

It think even before the physical effects get to us, the psychological effects might bring us down. If you wipe away the horizon... you get nihilism. — ChatteringMonkey

There you go. Automatons. What's the line between automatons and ... not automotive? — Patterner

Under panpsychism, nothing would be an automaton, right? - for everything would in one way or another be endowed with psyche (rather than being a psyche-less mechanism).

How about single-celled organisms? I don't think archaea or bacteria have a sense of self. — Patterner

Microbial intelligence (known as bacterial intelligence) is the intelligence shown by microorganisms. This includes complex adaptive behavior shown by single cells, and altruistic or cooperative behavior in populations of like or unlike cells. It is often mediated by chemical signalling that induces physiological or behavioral changes in cells and influences colony structures.[1]

[...]

Even bacteria can display more behavior as a population. These behaviors occur in single species populations, or mixed species populations. Examples are colonies or swarms of myxobacteria, quorum sensing, and biofilms.[1][3]

[...]

Bacteria communication and self-organization in the context of network theory has been investigated by Eshel Ben-Jacob research group at Tel Aviv University which developed a fractal model of bacterial colony and identified linguistic and social patterns in colony lifecycle.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microbial_intelligence

By in large, if not in full, none of which would be possible in the complete absence of any discernment between friend and foe relative to one’s own being, aka self. Then there is the notion of autopoiesis which seems ubiquitous to all lifeforms - differentiating life from non-life (e.g. prions and viroids, this among other simpler structures of organic molecules).

Even sperm (which are not self-sustaining organisms) can be readily seen to sense and react to their environment – and thereby exhibit some sentience (via which one’s own being is discerned from that which is not) - all the while somehow innately knowing how to move via variable environments toward that which they deem to be the goal, this being the egg. (And, arguably, the egg itself seems to exhibit sentience in selecting which of the many sperm attached to it it is to unify with.)

But I really don't know what you mean by "non-conceptual sense of self", so not sure where we agree and disagree. — Patterner

Fair enough. All the same, irrespective of this:

If one entertains some form of proto-experience for subatomic particles and the like (this proto-experience being a something which we hardly can comprehend) why then necessarily exclude the possibility of a "proto-understanding" which would be innate to this very proto-experience?

Well, I guess there are two questions here: compatibility and historical influence. "God is love" (1 John 4:8) predates Plotinus by a good deal and likely influenced his thought. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If the One were to in fact be real - by this or any other name - then it is by no means impossible, but rather quite plausible, that others than Plotinus experienced what in Ancient Greek was termed henosis - and if JC was a real person, then I can find no reason to deny that he too experienced henosis in his own right. This long before Plotinus came around (for Plotinus would not have invented the reality of the one). But this addresses extreme proximity, if not unity, with the One as completely infinite being devoid of any dualistic ego (with "dualistic ego" being denoted as holding any kind of duality between I-ness and other) - this rather than being extreme proximity or else unity with an omni-creator deity. Though, of course, interpretations can vary galore.

I'm not sure. I'd disagree if the idea is somehow that what the transcendent transcends is somehow absent from the transcendent itself, e.g. if God is incapable of what man is capable of. Or as Plotnius says, if we suggest that what is best in the Nous is somehow absent from the One, or something that the One is incapable of, this would be "absurd." There can be no actuality coming from anywhere else. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I previously mentioned in passing, while I endorse the reality of "the Good", I don't much find good reason to subscribe to Plotinus' description of the Emanations - the Nous / Demiurge included. For starters, there is no cogent reason for the emanations to emanate from the One in the first place - other than ad hoc attempts to give best explanation for what in fact exists. All the same, it is the One from which the emanations emanate (even if non-temporally so), and it is the One rather than its emanations which serves as the ultimate and fixed final cause of all existents.

When one addresses the One as God - i.e. as the ultimate reality/actuality - one does not (or at least ought not) then address the Nous / Demiurge as the ultimate reality/actuality which is therefore termed God. The latter would be contrary to what the One specifies.

Even when the Nous / Demiurge is deemed inseparable from the One for as long as existence exists, this Nous / Demiurge is not of itself a deity. It is not a psyche/mind distinct from all other psyches/minds - this as an omni-creator deity conception of God has it - but is instead, in many a sense, the raw thought from which all of us are constituted and, thereby, of which all of us are a fragmented aspect of. It is an inherent aspect of us, rather than being some other mind/psyche in relation to our own.

We might not find agreement on this, but I do find the One (to emphasize, this rather than its emanations) to be logically contrary to any notion of an omni-creator deity:

As just one example, the One is in and of itself the Good - to which all deities will themselves be subject to, this were deities to occur. Whereas the omni-creator deity is not (it is instead fully amoral - such that no matter what it decides it will not be subject to judgments of whether the decision is good or bad) but instead is that from whose might/power as deity the notion of the good takes form for all of us separate psyches/minds that are of this omni-creator deity's creation. In the first, right makes might (such as when speaking truth to power), this at least in some spiritual sense if not in the corporeal here and now - whereas in the second, quite blatantly, might makes right. These two perspectives then being logically contradictory in respect to each other.

As a less pertinent example, via the One it can be validly affirmed that, despite our many differences as individuals, "we are all one" - this in a priority monism sense. Whereas via the omni-creator deity - which, for one cultural example, sends us via his judgment either into eternal Heaven or eternal Hell after our corporeal death - there is no valid means of so appraising that "we are all one" (if for no other reason, for we all are not one with the omni-creator deity himself - this in many circles being blasphemy)

The One is then at direct odds with any notion of an omni-creator deity - that said, with most nowadays understanding the latter to be what is addressed by the term "God" and having little to no comprehension of the former. -- javra


I think it would be fair to say that this has not been the common reception of Neoplatonism across history. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I of course acknowledge the hybridization of the One and the omni-creator deity in the course of history - such that the omni-creator deity takes on the characteristics of the One. Omni-benevolence being one such characteristic when it is addressed in relatively very abstract manners - which can be simplified into the dictum of "God is Love".

Are you however disagreeing with the thesis that the characteristics by which the One is defined - e.g. that of perfectly infinite pure being (hence, devoid of any and all finitudes) - are logically incommensurate with the characteristics of any deity - which, as deity, necessitates some finitude(s) in at least so far as being a psyche/mind distinct from other co-occurring psyches/minds?

Could make sense (from a distance at least :smile: ) Thanks.

I think, though, that I can imagine there is something it is like to be, let's say, a worm, but that the worm has no sense of self. Does a worm know it is not the dirt through which it digs? I'm not saying it thinks it is the dirt through which it digs. I'm saying maybe it doesn't have any concept of itself, the dirt, or anything else. — Patterner

To be clear, the tacit understanding I've been addressing does not require, nor is it equivalent to, conceptual understanding. Tersely expressed, a concept is most always an abstraction abstracted from particulars . As abstraction, it is a thought one thinks or else cognizes. One which can then be understood in various ways and to various degrees by the respective ego - such that the concept is other than the ego which contemplates the concept. But what I addressed in my previous posts as tacit understanding is not this: it is not something other than the ego (which the ego then comprehends) but instead is innate to the ego itself, fully unified with the ego or consciousness, such that no duality whatsoever occurs between the ego/consciousness in question and its tacit understanding. And it is due to the ego's tacit understanding as innate and nondualistic faculty of consciousness that the ego then holds any capacity whatsoever to understand anything which is other than itself - be it a physiological percept of that which other or a concept, etc.

A worm, even one as simple as a nematode, will of course be able to distinguish self from other. It wouldn't be able to live otherwise - e.g., if not being able to discern predator from food from self and thereby act/react accordingly. And this very innate, here likely genetically inherited in large if not in full, ability of the nematode to discern and discriminate what is predator, from what is food, from what is self will - in and of itself - be the nematodes faculty of tacit understanding - which is innate to and utterly nondualistic with the nematodes ego/consciousness (however different from our own it might be). And which, again, the nematode holds without in any way contemplating concepts - conceptual understanding being neither innate to the ego nor fully nondualistic in relation to it.

In short, the worm, just like any other organism (even prokaryotic ones), does have a (non-conceptual) sense of self. This as is empirically verifiable (at least when granting that no lifeform is an automaton). And this sense of self then entails a (non-conceptual) tacit understanding of what is and is not self on the part of the organism the organism's awareness.

Nicely worded. — Tom Storm

Thank you!

Do you find this model resonates? — Tom Storm

As I just described the big picture aspect of things, though I don't limit myself to Neoplatonic thought, yes, the notions resonate with me - the Good thus generally understood being what grounds my understanding of non-relativistic ethics. Although there are portions or Plotinus' writings which, in addressing the details of his own metaphysical understandings, I remember not resonating with me all that much. Its been a while since I've read him, though.

I guess some more nuanced information on what it means to say God is Being itself. What does it mean to say God is the fundamental existence or essence that underlies everything in the universe? — Tom Storm

Although its details are not easy to explain via the soundbites of forum posts (and I have no current interest in presenting them), one possible example of such "God is Being itself" outlook will be the following:

The Neoplatonist notion of "the One", aka "the Good" will be pure being itself of infinite, limitless, quality and magnitude that is divinely simple (devoid of any parts) and beyond both existence and nonexistence - this being a priority monism wherein the fundamental essence that underlies everything in the universe can also be conceptualized as God, this, for example, due to being a) of itself unmovable (i.e., a forever fixed, determinate, aspect of existence at large) and b) that which moves all that exists (this when understanding all that exists to be in significant part teleological and, hence, partly determined by final causes). Although open to various interpretations, this worldview then generally holds that the infinite (i.e., in no way limited or finite) pure being which is the One is the fixed and ultimate final cause of all existents, i.e. the unmoved mover of all existents to use Aristotelian terms (which as ultimate telos is thereby always contemporaneous with existence at large for as long as existence has been).

Of possible importance, the One then cannot be a deity - even when the One is expressed as being God - for a deity can only hold some existential finitude as a psyche, minimally, a limit of being by which it as deity is other than, say, an ameba's mind, a tree's life, or a human being in total (which as human might obey or otherwise listen to the deity's decrees as other than him/herself - a deity who in turn holds awareness of the human as other). The One is then at direct odds with any notion of an omni-creator deity - that said, with most nowadays understanding the latter to be what is addressed by the term "God" and having little to no comprehension of the former.

Thank you for the explanation. Still have my questions about what proto-experience or else proto-consciousness might be (this having read the OP's quotes - thanks for reposting them) - such as when devoid of any sense of self (which, as a sense of self, would then proto-experience or else be proto-conscious of that which is not self). But I'll here put those questions aside.

(Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.) — javra

You and everybody else in the world. :grin: All speculation. — Patterner

To be honest, given that life evolving out of non-life can only be part and parcel of the non-physicalist philosophical views I hold, I too end up speculatively concluding that pansychism is in fact the case. Still, as previously mentioned (and as you yourself also note) - as with everybody else - I don't presume to have any understanding of how it might work. Hence my questioning in regard to what proto-experience / proto-consciousness might be. :wink:

What is happening did not start with Trump, and we might look behind the curtain to see what is really going on and who is in control. — Athena

As far as my personal observations and perspectives go:

Anti-democratic sentiments have been simmering for quite some time in certain aspects of the US, in all sorts of ways. From not wanting to partake in civic duties (e.g., in jury duty) to an outright denouncement of democracy as a system of governance.

Many, maybe too many, people value authoritarian power. Deeming the populace (of which one might say they too belong to) to be idiots and blindly led sheep. That thereby need to be domineered.

Bad parenting – e.g., parents who laugh at teachers who tell them to restrain their children from cursing in school (to say the least) – tends to result in more selfish adolescents who put their own narrow and selfish interests before those of all others without much if any empathy for others, and with bullying on the rise, sometimes taking extreme forms. Which in turn leads to even more bad parenting.

Justice here is no longer that which is seen as applying to all equally (justice for all) but, instead, is that which empowers one’s own agendas so as to conquer all those that oppose your own will, this irrespective of the double standards involved.

The next generation of adults then hold these attitudes that were accumulated during their formative years, and then they vote, often this to empower authoritarian causes.

Then, there’s the vested interest of the authoritarian powers that be – political, economic, makes no significant difference – that the plebs at large are as uneducated and as fragmented as possible (no sense of community or solidarity among the plebs). Not only does this deprive commoners of any nobility of being but, more to the point, it facilitates greater capacity for authoritarian power-over and the financial wealth thereby accumulated – this, again, by the authoritarian powers that be. And all this is pivoted on an economy that is a global Ponzi scheme of sorts: a global economy that assumes infinite growth via infinite resources (by which new entrepreneurs supposedly have a chance to themselves get as big as the the biggest). And, as with all pyramid schemes, it will eventually go bust – but, here, on a global scale of economic devastation.

I wish I’d be – or at least find reason to be – more optimistic about the times we’re living in. I’m not. And I haven’t even started on the increasing calamities which will accompany increased global warming.

Unless a global cataclysm – e.g., a nuclear catastrophe, but there are other means of accomplishing the same cataclysm – reverts all of humanity back to segregated hunter-gather tribes of a dozen people or so – this being something which seems extremely unlikely, to not mention utterly undesirable, such as due to all the advances that will then be lost – in time there will indeed be a global governance. I’m thinking in terms of a few generations from now, more or less – but not in terms of millennia. Like the notion of not, it’s inevitable – this given our ever increasing interconnectedness via technology, economy, and the like. That stated, the concern here is that this global governance will not be a democratic republic, one that thereby aims for optimal justice for all citizens of the planet and seeks to give all citizens an equal voice in how they get to be governed. But that, instead, this global governance will turn out to be fully Orwellian, with pervasive fascistic structures and with injustices galore. And if such authoritarian power is ever acquired over all others on a global scale, it will be unimaginably hard to do away with.

As backdrop to this forethought, as things currently stand, globally, governments are turning increasingly authoritarian – this, obviously, on the backs of many who then unjustly suffer or else unjustly die.

I don’t mean to bum you or anyone else out by all this – and I’m sure some will find the just stated an all too laughable fantasy or, else, see no problems with authoritarian governance to begin with. It’s just that, while I view some humanitarian causes lost in the relative short-term, in the long-term I yet find that there is yet much to struggle for. This, at least, for those who care about future generations of children and the like.

OK, but then you might want to explain what “subjective awareness” can possibly mean when completely devoid of any kind of tacit understanding*.

* By “subjective” I so far understand there being the minimal requirement of these two types of tacit understanding on the part of the subjective awareness in question: a) a tacit understanding as pertains to what is and is not self (this sense of self being the subjectivity in question), and b) a tacit understanding of this self as to whether this self experiences something of significance to it in its environment (rather than, for example, experiencing nothing of significance). Neither of which necessitates the occurrence of memory, btw.

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I’m not antithetical to panpsychism, btw, but if it were to be real, I don’t so far deem it possible that a rock, for example, would have a subjective awareness of its own and thereby be endowed with subjectivity - this for reasons previously mentioned. (Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.)

The Mind/mind to me is not a set of thoughts, ideas, percepts, etc. — MoK

Nor did I explicate that that's all which mind is, but these are certainly what I consider to be aspects of mind, rather than aspects of mater.

This then seems to me the crux of where we differ.

Mind, to me at least, consists of both (agency-endowed) awareness - not all of which pertains to consciousness - and, to simplify, the immaterial means via which these awarenesses (the awareness of consciousness, which is distinct from the awareness of one's conscience, from the different agencies - each awareness-endowed - of one's unconscious mind, etc.) then interact, combine, diverge, and communicate.

Differently approached, the term "mind" etymologically stems from the notion of memory, and memory too is a bundle of percepts - perceived by oneself as conscious awareness, which is thus aware of the memories one has.

All these thoughts, ideas, percepts - which are immaterial rather than being mater - are themselves experienced by what else than awareness (be this awareness either consciousness or not)?

This then will speak to the following:

I think that is the Mind/mind that perceives the state of pure awareness and Maya. — MoK

Do you feel safe? Do you care about justice and freedom of speech? — Athena

Wanted to say thumbs up to the OP. To the first question, for now yes; issue though is about the soon-to-become-present future. And here I am very concerned. To the second question: yes.

Seems to me that those who don't feel safe will not speak up against authoritarianism and fascism because of this very concern or else fear. Whereas those who don't see any problems with authoritarianism and fascism - maybe due to believing these to work in their favor - will not have any reason to speak up against them.

To my understanding, Maya and pure awareness are different modes of experience, so essence dualism refers to a duality—maya versus pure awareness—whereas substance dualism is the fundamental model of reality. — MoK

Again, no problem if the use of essence rather than that of substance doesn't work for you. But to address this quote: pure awareness would here be non-illusory essence which is that via which maya (illusory essence) is experienced. All that is not pure awareness - to include both mind (thoughts, ideas, percepts, etc.) and matter (rocks, atoms, etc.) - is thereby different aspects of the same maya as illusory essence - a sort of property dualism of maya.

So yes, there is a duality of essences here, but it is not a duality between "different modes of experience": all experience of maya being contingent on and originating from the non-illusory essence of pure awareness (also termed "witness consciousness").

Are you then maintaining that "consciousness in its most fundamental sense" can well be fully devoid of all understanding/comprehension - irrespective of how minuscule - regarding that of which it might be aware/conscious of?

Depending on definitions, many or all species are intelligent, though none with our abilities. So there can be consciousness without our intelligence on par with ours.

I think intelligence and consciousness are different things. I think all conscious things are conscious of whatever intelligence they possess. — Patterner

Although its been a few days now, you might want to reread my post: I said nothing to the contrary of this.

I did not address intelligence but the faculty of understanding innate to consciousness - which can be of greater or lesser magnitudes when comparing one being or species of such to another. And, in a breaking away from traditional conceptualizations going all the way back to Aristotle, I stated that this faculty of understanding (e.g., an ameba understands, however minusculely, differences between predator and prey when faced with another ameba in its environment) goes by the synonym of the intellect, i.e., that to which things are intelligible. To then be explicit, thereby granting an ameba a minuscule degree of intellect (which is not a synonym for intelligence - ameba don't understand and then apply principles, for example - although, in lifeforms, intelligence will itself be contingent on the degree or magnitude of this faculty of understanding which, again, is intrinsic to all consciousness)

As to intelligence and consciousness being different things as exemplified by AI, I've already mentioned the same in my initial post in this thread:

An AI program could well be argued to be of greater intelligence than a human, to at least have the capacity to simultaneously apprehend far more information than a human, and so forth … but, until it obtains the faculty of understanding, if it ever will, it will not be defined by consciousness. Thereby making the human of a far greater higher consciousness than the AI program, despite having a lesser intelligence, etc. — javra

Finite essence is a constraint in being, the being of things a particular constrained act of being. Fr. Norris Clarke refers to the "limiting essences" of things. God meanwhile, is not a thing, but being itself, and God alone is subsistent being (ipsum esse subsitens). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for this. I greatly like the terminology of "limiting essences" or else "finite essence" - this in contrast to what would then be pure ousia as "limitless, boundless, else infinite essence". Although I personally don't univocally associate the latter - this tmk being the quintessence of priority monism - to "God" for various reasons: one of these being that God is often construed to be a deity which, as a psyche, would itself then necessarily be in dualistic standing to all other occurring psyches (and hence not be limitless, etc.). But, yes, it's fully contingent on how the term "God" gets to be understood. To each their own. :smile:

My views changed as I contemplated the idea of higher consciousness, as it relates to various fantasy/sci-fi beings. Like Star Trek's Organians, Metrons, Q, Prophets of Bajor, etc. Such beings are often said to be of higher consciousness. I wondered what that might mean. Greater intelligence doesn't seem to equal greater consciousness. Nor do more extensive sensory capabilities, abilities to mentally manipulate reality, or an awareness that might be said to encompass a larger area.

I came to think there's no such thing as higher consciousness, and I don't think I have higher consciousness than anything else. I am just conscious of things, capabilities, I possess that other things do not. — Patterner

Wanted to address this notion of higher consciousness.

An intrinsic aspect of consciousness – at the very least as we humans experience it – is that faculty of understanding via which information becomes comprehensible. It is not that which is understood, like a concept, but instead that which understands. And can be deemed a synonym for the intellect, that to which things are intelligible. This faculty of consciousness, the intellect, can at least metaphorically be stated to have its non-quantitative contents – non-quantitative because in truth all such contents which could be individually addressed are unified in a non-manifold manner.

As an example of such content, one which typically remains tacit within our consciousness but is nevertheless understood or else known: we all understand, else know, ourselves to be human Earthlings, rather than Martians or some other type of extraterrestrial alien. (This again, is typically not declarative knowledge but, instead, an understanding intrinsic to us as conscious beings.) Likewise can be said of our not being brains in vats, or our being of this or that ethnicity, of this or that gender, etc. Most of the time all these are tacitly understood without being declaratively, else explicitly, known.

A frog, too, will have this faculty of understanding – such as might regard what is food and what is not.

And, when contrasting a frog’s faculty of understanding and a typical human’s – both of which are intrinsic to the consciousness of each – the human’s consciousness will be far greater in a) its capacity of such understanding and b) its contents of such understanding.

In so being, a human will then have what goes by the name of “a higher (more technically, greater) consciousness” than will a frog. And this notwithstanding that a frog might have intelligences of its own that humans might not be aware of, might have capacities of sensory experiences that exceed those of humans, and so forth.

An AI program could well be argued to be of greater intelligence than a human, to at least have the capacity to simultaneously apprehend far more information than a human, and so forth … but, until it obtains the faculty of understanding, if it ever will, it will not be defined by consciousness. Thereby making the human of a far greater higher consciousness than the AI program, despite having a lesser intelligence, etc.

Or, as another example, a good Jeopardy player might be of far greater encyclopedic intelligence than a bad Jeopardy player, while it is at least conceivable that the bad Jeopardy player might yet be endowed with a far greater capacity of understanding than that of the good Jeopardy player – here, then, denoting the bad player to be of a (at least somewhat) higher consciousness than the good player.

And this same faculty of understanding can fluctuate in magnitude within any single human. Contrast the difference in acuteness of understanding when one is “healthy, full of vitality, and in the zone experiencing cognitive flow” and when one is bedridden with migraines and stomach aches (or such) from a flu virus. Most always, one will be of higher consciousness in the first scenario but not in the second.

For reasons such as these, I don’t think the notion of “higher consciousness” – when understood as the non-quantitative content and capacity of understanding, which can hence be of greater magnitude in one being by comparison to some other – can be easily ruled out.

And, of course, unless one views humans as the end all and be all of this very faculty of understanding, more evolved species of life can well then be postulated to potentially hold far greater magnitudes of consciousness than any human has ever been endowed with. Just as a frog from the distant past could not fathom its future evolution into a human, so too can a human not fathom his/her future evolution into a being of significantly greater consciousness (forethought will always have its limits).

Glad to know. Thanks.

I wouldn't rule it out, but intuitively it seems like monism or dualism isn't even the right way to talk about it, because substances are an afterthought of being, — ChatteringMonkey

I think this gets back to the OP. In the case of priority monism - such as can be found in "the One" of Neoplatonism - there is no substance involved in the definition of the monism addressed. Rather it is being itself - as being beyond both existence and nonexistence. The Ancient Greek "ousia". Which both "substance" and "essence" are Latin translations of, but with only the latter nowadays yet holding some clear semblance to what the Ancient Greek "ousia" most typically signified in philosophical discourse.

All this to say that in priority monism, the monism addressed does not specify any type of substance whatsoever but, instead, essence itself: the One in Neoplatonism being quite literally quintessential - the ultimate essence of all that is. If Heraclitus had in mind a priority monism prior to there being words for the concept, the only substance he would have specified would have been the logos/fire - this being "stuff" - but by "Zeus / wisdom which is one" he would have intended and done his best to express in this own time "a nondualistic being/ousia - such as the Neoplatonic "the One" - upon which all existence and hence substance is dependent". Or at least something to the like. Hence making sense of fragments such as this (as previously addressed):

(110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one. R. P. 49 a. — Heraclitus

Just checked. Couldn't find any fragments to the effect of light equating to the "only one" - wanted to say my bad for this - but there are fragments and interpretations such as this:

(74-76) The dry soul is the wisest and best.[31] R. P. 42. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_118

with the following footnote:

31. This fragment is interesting because of the antiquity of the corruptions it has suffered. According to Stephanus, who is followed by Bywater, we should read: Αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη, ξηρή being a mere gloss upon αὔη. When once ξηρή got into the text; αὔη became αὐγή, and we get the sentence, "the dry light is the wisest soul," whence the siccum lumen of Bacon. Now this reading is as old as Plutarch, who, in his Life of Romulus (c. 28), takes αὐγή to mean lightning, as it sometimes does, and supposes the idea to be that the wise soul bursts through the prison of the body like dry lightning (whatever that may be) through a cloud. (It should be added that Diels now holds that a αὐγή ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ αρίστη is the genuine reading.) Lastly, though Plutarch must have written αὐγή, the MSS. vary between αὕτη and αὐτή (cf. De def. or. 432 f. αὕτη γὰρ ξηρὰ ψυχὴ in the MSS.). The next stage is the corruption of the αὐγή into οὗ γῆ. This yields the sentiment that "where the earth is dry, the soul is wisest," and is as old as Philo (see Bywater's notes).

Which may or may not speak to the same thing? Don't know.

Upon further reading I think he may be using Zeus as a symbol for daylight, the other thing he commonly stands for. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't see how it could be physical daylight since this is of itself an aspect of logos/fire, of the universe in total - with night/darkness as its dyadic opposite. I instead interpret his references to light (and dryness) to be metaphors for wisdom ... which is in keeping with a) traditional western metaphors of light being wisdom and b) with the fragments I've previously referenced. Again:

(65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_32

(19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_41

It then seems plausible enough to infer from his total known fragments that for Heraclitus becoming has at its ultimate end this addressed "wisdom" which is "one only" and can go by the name of "Zeus" (although imperfectly). — javra

This sole nondualistic one - addressed at different times as Zeus/God/wisdom/light - then being the source of (what I so far find to be) a plausible priority monism, thereby being that "one only" from which the universe in oppositional total as fire/logos takes its form and attributes and which, as wisdom which is one, "knows the thought/logos by which all things are steered through all things" (with knowledge here, to my mind, clearly not being declarative knowledge - which requires changes via argumentation/justification, to not mention declaration - but more in keeping with notions of a complete understanding).

becoming does not logically entail a completely permanent relativism wherein there is nothing for all of this becoming to eventually become. — javra


This universe, which is the same for all, has not been made by any god or man, but it always has been is, and will be -- an ever-living fire, kindling itself by regular measures and going out by regular measures. — Heraclitus


It doesn't logically entail it no, but Heraclitus seems to have thought otherwise. — ChatteringMonkey

In all references I so far know of (e.g. 1; and e.g. 2), the Heraclitus fragment you've mentioned is devoid of the hyphenation between "be" and "an". This can change tthe meaning of the fragment significantly - so that the fragment can indeed be aligned to a notion of priority monism: All that is is therefore not made by any man or god - both being aspects of the logos/fire - such that for as long as the universe/existence is "it always has been is and will be an ever-living fire (etc.)". This with the "one" previously mentioned yet referencing its ultimate origin in a priority monism fashion.

But please do reference the fragment with the given hyphenation inserted if you believe the hyphenation is original, or else essential, to Heraclitus's fragment.

I haven't read Heraclitus's fragments in full for some time, BTW, but I don't remember reading anything that would contradict this plausibility of him being a priority monist. That said, I might of course be wrong.

Does the personification mean anything, in the sense of having agency or will? Or is it rather a naturalistic/pantheistic god?

"unwilling and yet willing"? — ChatteringMonkey

It's again speculative inference - a best conjecture based on his fragments - but if Heraclitus in fact did have in mind a priority monism, then this "God / Zeus' he addresses would not be any deity whatsoever but, instead, would be in general keeping with what the Neoplatonists addressed as the One as the source of all things.

Zeus is the totality of becoming, the one thing that is, the thing that cannot be named, the logos etc. I think he was using common used terminology of the time to convey to his contempories what he was getting at. — ChatteringMonkey

While I agree with the second sentence, I don't think Heraclitus can be pinned down to what you say in the first.

There are passages such as this:

(1) It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess that all things are one.[18] R.P. 40. — Heraclitus

... but, then, the "all things are one" motif is readily open to interpretation - it can be found in multiple traditions and can at least in some such be easily interpreted to stipulate a priority monism {... which thereby connects all otherwise disparate existent things - this so as to result in statements such as "everything is one" or else "we are all one"}.

Whereas fragments such as these following are harder to assimilate into this notion of "Zeus is the cosmic totality of becoming as the only thing that is one":

(97) Man is called a baby by God, even as a child by a man. R. P. 45.

(98, 99) The wisest man is an ape compared to God, just as the most beautiful ape is ugly compared to man.

(110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one. R. P. 49 a. — Heraclitus

Especially when analyzing the last given fragment - and in assuming that Heraclitus was not an ignoramus in his aphorisms - in which way can one make sense of "and it is law, too, to obey the council of [the cosmic totality of all that is]"?

The totality of all that exists is itself fire, perpetual transformations of constant strife between opposites. It so far to me makes no sense to then affirm that it too is law/logos (itself here appearing unchanging) to obey the counsel of "dyadic opposites in strife in their cosmic totality" (in contrast to obeying some aspects of the total at expense of others - or, what still seems to me more likely, obeying "Zeus" / God (per the quotes above) as that only given which is nondualistic and hence one)

Can you then make sense of how one goes about obeying the council of "the cosmic totality of dyadic opposites in perpetual strife (of which one oneself is an aspect of)"?

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At any rate, I don't see how my previously offered inference can be ruled out via Heraclitus's own fragments. Again, so far finding the inference offered plausible, albeit not the only one possible.

If being is becoming, then being is a fiction because being implies something that does not become but stays the same. — ChatteringMonkey

"Being" is however a verb, a process, that is treated as a noun conceptually, the same as "becoming" is in philosophical circles.

This cultural reification of being into something that is fixed and hence not process, I'll argue, may have something to do with the metaphysical notion of an ultimate goal or telos of being (as verb) which could, for one example, be equated with the Neoplatonic notion of the "the One" - which ceases to be a striving toward but instead is the ultimate and final actualization of all strivings.

One can note that the term "becoming" can also easily raise the question "becoming what?" And, unlike many a modern interpretation of the process theory of becoming - which, to my mind, again seems to in some way reify becoming at large into a static thing, or else "something that always stays the same" - becoming does not logically entail a completely permanent relativism wherein there is nothing for all of this becoming to eventually become.

Heraclitus, or at least his known fragments, are not very explicit about the philosophical working which Heraclitus espoused. Nevertheless, one will find in Heraclitus in quite explicit manners the notion of something which is - i.e., some being per se - which is not in duality with its opposite and hence is not in a state of perpetually changing:

(65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_32

(19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things. R. P. 40. — https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fragments_of_Heraclitus#Fragment_41

It then seems plausible enough to infer from his total known fragments that for Heraclitus becoming has at its ultimate end this addressed "wisdom" which is "one only" and can go by the name of "Zeus" (although imperfectly).

A very good - and might I add substantial :wink: - OP!

How do you think it affects how we talk about mind, matter, or metaphysics more generally? — Wayfarer

Personally, given its modern connotations, in my own writings I tend to reserve the term "substance" for "stuff" - be it mental (e.g., ideas, thoughts, paradigms, etc.) or else material. Whereas ouisia - being - I instead address via the term "essence".

I find that so doing allows me to specify awareness as being (as essence) and all that is non-aware (be it an idea one entertains or else a rock one sees) as a different type of being (a different type of essence) - and this without importing the baggage of "stuff", else of "thingness" (ideas are things as well), nowadays too often associated with the term "substance" into the concept of awareness's being.

That's why I'm questioning whether -- or admitting my ignorance about -- how bringing in choice-worthiness helps matters. — J

In truth, I'm not intimately familiar with the philosophical use of "choice-worthiness" ... but I take it to specify that which makes one alternative among the two or more we're faced with worthy of being chosen.

So understood, choice-worthiness would then be an intrinsic aspect of ethics - for it is that which we presume to make a given alternative worthy of being chosen which determines our ethical standing in so choosing. Hence, we always chose what we assume to be beneficial/good to us. But only if our reasons for the choice made (to include teleological reasons) are correct, hence right, will our choice then be ethical.

For instance, the murderer chooses to murder in the pursuit of that happiness which accompanies so successfully murdering. Here, to successfully murder will be good relative to the murderer's character due to the murderer deeming this beneficial to him/herself (maybe on account of the euphoric thrill thereby obtained in so doing and getting away with it). But we sane people deem this to be an unethical choice due to knowing full well that it leads, sooner or later, to everyone's reduced eudemonia/wellbeing (including the murderer's). We sane people thereby know this choice to murder to be a blatant wrong - rather than being a right / correct choice to make - and this in almost all conceivable scenarios imaginable we might care to hypothesize. To this extent making murder objectively wrong (although I could play devils advocate to this and provide examples where murder might be the lesser of the available wrongs and, in this manner, not be the unethical choice to make).

This then can be contrasted to choosing chocolate vs. vanilla ice-cream. Unless there's allergies or other outstanding factors involved, choosing one one or another will make virtually no difference whatsoever to the telos of optimal eudemonia. Here, though we yet choose based on what we deem to be most beneficial for us, our choice will not readily fall into the category of "ethics".

All the same, devoid of the criteria of choice-worthiness (as previously defined), I don't yet understand how any comportment or deed can be appraised as being either ethical/virtuous or not. Conversely, the activity of entities we deem devoid of any ability to choose - rocks as one clear example, such as when they result in an avalanche - we neither appraise as ethical or unethical. Such that it (at least so seems to me) is only via what we deem "worthy of being chosen" that any determination can be made as to the ethics concerned or the ethos we adopt.

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This seems like a good window onto virtue ethics, and the way you go on to elaborate it also makes sense. — J

BTW, I neglected to say this initially, but thanks for these comments. They’re appreciated!

I think you will like it. — Wayfarer

A fellow "mystic"? Sure! I think I'd like it as well. :wink:

I also noticed your explication of substance/essence above. I tried to introduce the topic of what substance means in philosophy as distinct from everyday use earlier in the thread. I think I'll write an OP on it. — Wayfarer

If you do, substances aside, I'd be interested on any offerings regarding the notion of essence-dualism. Again, this for example as per the Hindu distinction between maya and pure-consciousness/atman.

If I choose to read an interesting book, that book is, arguably, choice-worthy. But why? I honestly don't see how calling out its choice-worthiness gets us anywhere. You can't mean that being chosen is any sort of moral criterion. So how does "good" get brought in here? What is it about the book that would make my choice a worthy one? — J

While I hope I’m not intruding on the discussion, I thought at least parts of this might be of use to the issue (these being some personal perspectives interjected with what I take to be staple aspects of the philosophy of ethics at large):

A synonym of “good” is “beneficial”. We always select what we select to do deeming it beneficial to us. This is quite arguably a universal to all choices made and all those with an ability to so chose. Going to the dentist because it is beneficial, even if deemed unpleasant. Etc.

Ethics come into play in the context of whether or not that which we deem to be beneficial to us in fact actually is so or not. If it in fact is beneficial, then it is the correct - aka the right - thing to do. If it in fact is not beneficial to us (either in the short or long term when considered in terms of overall outcome), then it is the incorrect - aka the wrong - thing to do.

There’s of course much which could then be considered in this calculus of what is the right vs. the wrong thing to do. Including taking into account other’s actions and reactions to what one does (or does not) do.

This calculus then ultimately ending in the possible metaphysical notion of there being an ontically real but yet to be actualized, ultimate beneficiality to aim toward – one that is of itself validly obtainable in principle (this, again, at some future time rather than in the here and now), hence being correct or true, hence being right – and this irrespective of people’s perspectives pro or contra – which could be worded as “a complete and perfect eudemonia or else wellbeing”.

This, whatever it might be in its details, then being what would be termed “the (objective) Good” – which would then hold ontic presence, hence be real, as a telos (teloi, final causes, always being givens that await to be actualized in the future that, at such, are likewise always concurrent with that which they teleologically effect - in this case the very sentience which innately seeks optimal wellbeing).

As to why the Good is not yet actualized, simplistically, this can be explained via our ignorance and our capacity to choose wrongs (in the erroneous belief that they are beneficial when, in fact, they are not).

In any case, the whole thrust of the book is (as I understand it) the quantum nature of consciousness. He presents the idea of ‘seity’ - the individual, conscious subject as a unique center of experience that cannot be reduced to anything more fundamental. — Wayfarer

Yes, that's indeed up my alley, so to speak. Thanks for the reference. :up:

But there are multiple primary particles, right? Photons and electrons are not made of anything else. Protons and neutrons are made of quarks. Aren't neutrinos also primary? Can monism be the answer if we already have those? — Patterner

On a physical level of understanding, all quanta themselves emerge from the quantum vacuum state:

In quantum field theory, the quantum vacuum state (also called the quantum vacuum or vacuum state) is the quantum state with the lowest possible energy. Generally, it contains no physical particles. The term zero-point field is sometimes used as a synonym for the vacuum state of a quantized field which is completely individual.[clarification needed]

According to present-day[when?] understanding of what is called the vacuum state or the quantum vacuum, it is "by no means a simple empty space".[1][2] According to quantum mechanics, the vacuum state is not truly empty but instead contains fleeting electromagnetic waves and particles that pop into and out of the quantum field.[3][4][5] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_vacuum_state

... which is located neither here nor there but, quite literally, is physically everywhere - omnipresent.

In then interpreting the vacuum state to be physical, such that all physicality emerges from it in one way or another, physicalism can well be preserved despite the many different variants of quanta that are known to occur.

I'm not sure if anyone brought this up yet (haven't read the entire thread) but have you considered an "essence dualism" - this so as to avoid all the pitfalls of "substance dualism"?

Here is one possible example of an essence dualism; Here leaning on Hindu views as one example, one could then posit an essence of "maya (illusion or magic-trick in an ultimate sense of reality, which would in traditional views include both mater and mind)" and a separate essence of "pure awareness" (which is non-illusory actuality).

No worries if this doesn't make much sense or else work for you. But I thought I'd mention it just in case.

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BTW, the distinction between substance and essence can get easily complex and maybe at times convoluted, but for example:

Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.[1][2] Substances are particulars that are ontologically independent: they are able to exist all by themselves.[3][4] Another defining feature often attributed to substances is their ability to undergo changes. Changes involve something existing before, during and after the change. They can be described in terms of a persisting substance gaining or losing properties.[3] Attributes or properties, on the other hand, are entities that can be exemplified by substances.[5] Properties characterize their bearers; they express what their bearer is like.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory

vs.:

The English word essence comes from Latin essentia, via French essence. The original Latin word was created purposefully, by Ancient Roman philosophers, in order to provide an adequate Latin translation for the Greek term ousia.

The concept originates as a precise technical term with Aristotle (although it can also be found in Plato),[1] who used the Greek expression to ti ên einai[2] literally meaning "the what it was to be." This also corresponds to the scholastic term quiddity or sometimes the shorter phrase to ti esti[3] literally meaning "the what it is" and corresponding to the scholastic term haecceity (thisness) for the same idea. This phrase presented such difficulties for its Latin translators that they coined the word essentia to represent the whole expression. For Aristotle and his scholastic followers, the notion of essence is closely linked to that of definition (horismos).[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence#Etymology

So roughly construed - to provide just one more example - the Neoplatonic "the One" could then not be a substance - but it might conceivably be referred to as essence (in at least certain interpretations of it, such as in addressing it as that which is "essential" to being itself - this in contrast to something like the aforementioned maya being essential only relative to existence (that which "stands out") at large ... but maybe all this is a bit off topic).

Again, though, no problems if this seems to hinder your position rather than help it.

interesting distinction, to call yourself a monist but not a physicalist. — flannel jesus

There are many different types of monism. These can include "priority monism" - of which Neoplatonism is a type - "dual-aspect monism" - in which both mind and matter as two aspects of the same underlying given - and the far more familiar "substance monism" - of which physicalism is only one particular type (with idealism being its often mentioned opposite). Quantitatively addressed, physicalism is just one of a far greater plurality of possible monisms - with some such monisms not being logically contradictory (e.g., one can uphold a priority monism while cogently also at the same time upholding, for one example, a monism of objective idealism - else, an objective variety of dual-aspect monism).

Dennett's particular flavor of physicalism is strongly epistemological.

[...]

Almost none of that is true, especially about the first-person stance, IMO, but I want to give Dennett a fair hearing so we can see what a sample version of physicalism is up against. — J

I acknowledge this. To me, however, it does raise the question: Can there be anything epistemic without there being something ontic* which the epistemic references?

I so far take philosophical relativism to implicitly, if not also explicitly, make just this claim. A different topic maybe, but I'll argue that upholding an affirmative answer to this question can only result in a logical contradiction: at the same time and in the same respect there both a) is an ontic actuality which the epistemic addresses (namely, the ontic actuality of there in fact not being any ontic actualities - this being a sort of meta-level ontic-actuality) and b) is not any ontic actuality which the epistemic addresses ... This might be better formulated, but the same logical contradictions seems to remain irrespective of adjustments.

The stance of physicalism does seem to presuposes that everything ontically actual, and hence real, is physical. Such that any epistemological account (regarding what is) seems to pivot upon this very bedrock assumption of what the ontic is, even if its kept utterly tacit in the arguments provided.

But on what would the necessary "wrongness of non-physicalism" be grounded? (My own take so far is that physicalism provides a maximal explanatory power to those who are physicalists - and that it's due to this teleological motivation alone (namely, the intent to best understand) that physicalism is so stringently upheld and maintained.)

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* "The ontic" being that which ontology studies (this via any of various epistemologies).

To begin with, can you provide references evidencing that modern hunter-gather societies - or at least some such - are of an authoritarian leadership which so 'oversees' all others in the tribe so as to preserve social cohesion? — javra

No, because I didn't claim this. — AmadeusD

Again, what you in fact claimed:

I think the idea that a pre-historic society was egalitarian is pretty much a DOA. Nothing to it. The less oversight society has, more abuse happens. — AmadeusD

My knowledge of several of those groups is that they are decidedly not egalitarian, even in principle. — AmadeusD

Rationally then, your affirmations entail that in the absence of a non-egalitarian, hence authoritarian leadership which "oversees", societies will have ample "abuse" ingroup.

I personally don't know of tribes which have ample abuse ingroup. So I assumed that you knew of tribes with authoritarian leadership.

Can you then, instead, reference tribes wherein abuse is rampant ingroup due to not having authoritarian leadersphip?

If not, your claims above are unjustified and, thereby, rather hollow.

I sense some bristling in this response, so forgive me for being pretty lack luster in mine. I don't care for bristles — AmadeusD

Might as well be calling me a porcupine. Name-calling, while it might have its political advantages amongst some, is not something that validates affirmations, though.

"In the Aka community, despite a sexual division of labor where women primarily serve as caregivers, male and female roles are highly flexible and interchangeable. Women hunt while men care for children, and vice versa, without stigma or loss of status. Women are not only as likely as men to hunt but can even be more proficient hunters."

If you're not seeing a problem, I can't say I care to explain it. — AmadeusD

As to examples like this one, no, I'm not seeing any problem whatsoever in terms of egalitarian governance of the tribe.

"The Bambuti tend to follow a patrilineal descent system, and their residences after marriage are patrilocal..... The only type of group seen amongst the Bambuti is the nuclear family."

"Sister exchange is the common form of marriage. Based on reciprocal exchange, men from other bands exchange sisters or other females to whom they have ties.[9]"

Clearly not egalitarian, despite the claim (not referenced) in the following paragraph, that they are. — AmadeusD

Because a patrilineal society cannot be egalitarian, or because the "exchange" of women cannot be consensual?

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You offered just one reference to one patriarchal society, the Ket. Which does not a generality make.

Furthermore, if the Ket were patriarchal, this is because we know via their oral tradition that these tribes were led by shaman (it's from these peoples that the term "shaman" gained its repute) which were men. This as is clearly stated in the article:

The Kets have a rich and varied culture, filled with an abundance of Siberian mythology, including shamanistic practices and oral traditions. Siberia, the area of Russia in which the Kets reside, has long been identified as the originating place of the Shaman or Shamanism. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ket_people#Culture

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I also spent about eight years looking in to and speaking with members of Amazonian tribes (for different reasons) and it was patently obvious all of those groups (Jivaro, Shipibo, Ashaninka etc..) are patriarchal through endless books, conversations and papers - I can't pull out some specific reference without carrying out some actual research, which this thread doesn't call for. — AmadeusD

Given your empirical expertise, you might then want to rewrite the Wikipedia page on hunter-gatherers, which directly contradicts your claims. Again, this as pertains to hunter-gatherers at large as they are known to be in various scientific fields. I say this quite earnestly, for truth is truth and facts matter.

Till then, I'll trust what the referenced scientists say.

Further, this concept of hte 'noble savage" or some weird idea that indigenous societies were more just than ours needs to stop. They were mostly brutal and unforgiving. — AmadeusD

First off, I made no such mention of a "noble savage" - and only claimed they were/are largely egalitarian, which in no way precludes their ability to be brutally violent for reasons such as that of self defense or warfare.

Secondly, the boldfaced affirmation seems to directly speak to the very same inference based on your previous posts made at the beginning of this one post: namely, that of there being a good sum of ingroup abuse.

To which, again, references are as of yet lacking to show how hunter-gatherer tribes are "mostly brutal and unforgiving" or else "abusive" when it comes to ingroup members. This even as pertains to the very few human-cannibalism-practicing tribes among them,.

"descriptions and predications" — J

Yes, it doesn't address what physicality per se is. But this theme brings to mind how water can be described via, and predicated on, the structure of two elements. It also brings to mind the fact that such description and predication neither changes a) the reality that water can be wet (a liquid) at room temperature whereas the two gases cannot nor b) the reality that there is no known explanation for why H2O ceases to be strictly gaseous at room temperature, this unlike compounds such as CO2 (predictable thought it is, this quality of H2O, and of other compounds in general, nevertheless being blatant hocus-pocus events that are often overlooked as so being, as though they’ve been in some way explained).

And this, to me, in some ways parallels to the mind-brain dichotomy. There still remains a difference between mind and brain (e.g., the second can be touched, smelled, seen, even tasted; the first can’t - to skip on a long list of maybe more pertinent examples), and there is still no viable explanation of how or why the two correlate. Save that, unlike chemical compounds, the mind holds properties that are commonly understood to be immaterial.

He was less circumspect in later talks and seemed to be pushing a notion that could possibly run afoul of Hemple's Dilemma (i.e. if something is real, it is, by definition, included in what is physical).

The difficulty is that "physical," like the "methodological naturalism" mentioned earlier in this thread, is that they can be pushed very far in different directions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, exactly so. Hence, were something like “the One” to in fact be real, it would then need to be deemed physical due to the necessity of anything real being strictly physical. And what an odd form of physicalism that would be.