Not essential to the issue, but I'll add this to my former post just in case it might eventually come up:

Yes, the naturalistic pantheism of someone like Spinoza is a non-dualistic naturalism wherein God pretty much equates to the sum of all natural laws and their effects. It is nevertheless a theism due to a stringent affirmation of God's being, a theism which upholds theological determinism. Ought one then consider it to be a form of “theistic physicalism”?

While I couldn’t give a hoot either way, this or any other possible to conceive of exception - such as the “naturalism” of the ancient Stoics - do not nullify today’s commonly held stance that theological determinism is fully resultant from a supposed omni-creator deity - one who thereby has reputedly created both the natural laws and the causal processes that are, this so as to result in … a reality of determinism. One which can be said to preclude libertarian free will to boot.

Nor, for that matter, would any possible exception nullify the use of the term “determinism” within such contexts as that of theological determinism. Which, again - I’ll here say “typically” - is taken to be at direct odds with physicalism, or else with non-dualistic naturalism when thus understood.

In trying to presume the best here: your usage of the term does not equate to the usage of the term. If it did, then theological determinism would equate to naturalism and thereby be a physicalist stance. This conclusion then being in tune with the slithering roses motif I previously mentioned.

Ah, I don't think javra was assuming you're just making the term and the meaning of it up. — flannel jesus

Quite true. I wasn't.

In fact, you said it's basically just not-dualism, and that already has a name: monism. Physicalism or materialism also seem to cover it, if I'm understanding it correctly — flannel jesus

Since monism too comes in different flavors - to include both neutral monism and idealism - it can only be a naturalism in the form of physicalism/materialism.

So, because one thus upholds, “philosophical determinism” then is “physicalism” … and since the latter, lo and behold, allows for, but does not necessitate, randomness, so too then does the former.

The style of reasoning will in some ways parallel that of roses being dogs, of dogs having three wings, and of wings being things which slither, ergo that roses can by definition slither (in part if not in whole) … or something to the like.

Not my idea of what philosophy is about. Wish I hadn't squandered so much time on this. But, hey, lesson learned.

If determinism and randomness are ontological opposites - as we then here agree - then, logically, how can "a determinism in which randomness occurs" yet be validly assigned the term "determinism

Determinism and randomness are ontological opposites only under D2 and D3. The opposite of D1 is supernaturalism, which makes the physical universe not a closed system, open to external causes from outside. Those causes are presumably not random but rather conveying intent. — noAxioms

D1, as specified by you, is "philosophical determinism". Not "naturalism". And you yourself provided the SEP link to reference D1 as such. From the link to the other forum post which you provided:

1) Philosophical determinism.
I googled 'determinism' and got this: "all events in the universe are caused by prior events or natural laws ". This is probably the primary definition used when asserting a dichotomy between determinism vs free will, the latter being defined as choices made by supernatural causes.
This sort of free will is required to be held responsible by any entity not part of the natural universe (God). It is in no way required for internal responsibility (to say society).

I think this equivocation on your part between "philosophical determinism" and "naturalism" is where our disagreement might likely primarily reside. If so, and if you want to insist that they are the same thing such that they then each "allow of ontic randomness", there then is a lot more befuddlement going on than I currently care to address in regards to determinism. In which case, I'll just call it quits.

The second question, and the one I touched on above, what dictates the objective? [...] What are you ultimately referencing to prove something is good. With law, you point to the law. With morality, what to you point to? — Hanover

It seems to me one can here only point to the Good, of a platonic / neoplatonic repute. It by entailment would be a) a completely fixed aspect of all being and b) completely impartial relative to the whims of individual egos or cohorts of these, this in all respects (be these egos deities or not), thereby being (non-physically) perfectly objective.

Oh wait, it's mysticalish of me to so say. Never mind, then.

Yes. God rolling dice, as Einstein put it. — noAxioms

OK, thanks of the replies. Want to point out that this example is not good, though. Given a metaphysics of determinism, though epistemically unpredictable in it's outcome, a rolling of the dice can only be ontically determinate. Else we get into issues of omniscience, which we've already agreed upon is a dud.

"To maybe clarify this question: Is it deterministic?" - javra

What, randomness? By definition of 'not random', it cannot be, but that's not to say that a completely different definition of determinism allowing randomness.

" If [randomness is] not deterministic, how then does randomness's occurrence not contradict the determinism otherwise upheld." - javra

I don't think that in such cases the determinism is otherwise upheld, at least not by definition D2 or D3. — noAxioms

If determinism and randomness are ontological opposites - as we then here agree - then, logically, how can "a determinism in which randomness occurs" yet be validly assigned the term "determinism" - this instead of now validly being termed an "indeterminism"?

This issue will only validly apply in reference to D1, due to the reasons given bellow:

----

Can you provide even one philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing? — javra

I had counted six kinds of determinism.
Short summary:
1 philosophical determinism
2 Bohmian (hard)
3 MWI
4 eternalism
5 classical
6 onmiscience — noAxioms

In having had further time to think about your initial reply, and with the definitions you provide here for D1 - D6: We already agree that D6 is a dud, so D6 does not validly count. D2 - D5, however, are all models of physics which are construed to be different types of determinism only in so far as they can each be deemed a subcategory of D1.

Because of this, the only one of the six categories listed which validly counts toward a "philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing" will strictly be that of D1.

To this effect, I for example found this article in relation to "D2":

Why Bohm was never a determinist

Marij van Strien

Forthcoming in Guiding Waves In Quantum Mechanics: 100 Years of de Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave
Theory (ed. Andrea Oldofredi). Oxford University Press, 2024.

Abstract
Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has generally been received as an attempt to restore
the determinism of classical physics. However, although this interpretation, as Bohm initially
proposed it in 1952, does indeed have the feature of being deterministic, for Bohm this was never
the main point. In fact, in other publications and in correspondence from this period, he argued that
the assumption that nature is deterministic is unjustified and should be abandoned. Whereas it has
been argued before that Bohm’s commitment to determinism was connected to his interest in
Marxism, I argue for the opposite: Bohm found resources in Marxist philosophy for developing a non-
deterministic notion of causality, which is based on the idea of infinite complexity and an infinite
number of levels of nature. From ca. 1954 onwards, Bohm’s conception of causality further
weakened, as he developed the idea of a dialectical relation between causality and chance. — https://philarchive.org/archive/VANWBW

Point being, whether or not in this case D2 is a determinism is measured against D1. This as I just specified above.

--------

"One could view D1 as equivalent to naturalism. (This being contingent on how "nature" itself is defined, but this is a different issue.) But that does not then of itself allow for ontic randomness (of a non-deterministic kind) in D1." - javra

It allows for it, but does not necessitate it. — noAxioms

Your answer is unjustified. And, unless you can answer the question posed at the beginning of this post in a manner that makes cogent sense, it further seems to me unjustifiable in principle.

First, I take it that we then agree that by randomness we are not addressing mere unpredictability but, instead, some ontic attribute of reality.

You did nitpick but then agreed with the definition of randomness I provided. It is here that I'm not understanding your premises. What, to you, then is ontic randomness?

To maybe clarify this question: Is it deterministic? Or is it not deterministic?

If deterministic, in what way is the ontic randomness not an intrinsic attribute of the ontic determinism specified per se (to which it is otherwise contrasted as something other than)?

If not deterministic, how then does randomness's occurrence not contradict the determinism otherwise upheld.

Examples of physics will be of no help here, for their metaphysical interpretation can vary considerably in this matter.

This is the principle area where I'm losing what you're trying to say (all other differences of opinion to me follow suit): If determinism, of any variety, can be said to allow for randomness, doesn't this then imply that, since its determinism, the randomness addressed must have been itself determined by antecedent givens (things, events, etc.)? — javra

I've encountered plenty of people that use definition 1, the one in the dictionary, which yes, doesn't seem like determinism at all to me. That D1 allows it does not in any way imply that the others do. D1 just says naturalism: no magic going on. No interfering miracles or anything like that. — noAxioms

You'll notice the SEP article on D1 nowhere mentions that the determinism therein addressed allows for ontic randomness (when understood as not deterministic). Randomness is not address until section "3.3 Determinism and Chaos" which, upon first reading, only presents what might be potential problems for determinism as described by the article. The section, for example, ends with this sentence:

Nevertheless, the mathematical exploration of chaos in dynamical systems helps us to understand some of the pitfalls that may attend our efforts to know whether our world is genuinely deterministic or not.

One could view D1 as equivalent to naturalism. (This being contingent on how "nature" itself is defined, but this is a different issue.) But that does not then of itself allow for ontic randomness (of a non-deterministic kind) in D1.

At any rate, rather than writing considerably more, I'm hoping you can clarify things by answer the question(s) posed at the beginning of this post. Just so you know, though I'm currently confident in my position, I'm of course open to the possibility of being wrong.

All this by way of suggesting that it might be our intent that is important in ethical situations rather than our emotional response. — Banno

To this effect:

If one intends to save a life (and has good enough reason to believe oneself capable of so doing) but accidentally kills it (say in the process of giving CPR or first aid), ought the person be deemed good or bad? Most of us would say "good", and the law generally agrees. (e.g., in California there's the so-called "Good Samaritan law" which applies to just this kind of thing. It's in large part based on intent.)

Conversely:

If one intends to murder another but accidentally benefits the other in the process of so trying to murder but failing (say by alleviating them of a malignant tumor, for example), ought the person who intended to murder be deemed good or bad? Most would say "bad".

This offered in the context of intents vs. doings.

And, of course, one can always actively intention X while emotively disliking so doing. Here I figure things could get relatively complex. But we still judge ethical standing on the intentioning and not on the emotive state of being. If one intentions the saving of a life by giving mouth to mouth resuscitation while being disgusted by the vomit, for example, the actively engaged in intentioning is nevertheless what counts.

I ask because, as far as I can see, if necessitarianism is entailed by determinism

OK, let's compare it to my list of 6. 1 is out since it allows randomness — noAxioms

This is the principle area where I'm losing what you're trying to say (all other differences of opinion to me follow suit): If determinism, of any variety, can be said to allow for randomness, doesn't this then imply that, since its determinism, the randomness addressed must have been itself determined by antecedent givens (things, events, etc.)?

If so, then one gets randomness only in the sense of notions such as chaos theory, of the butterfly effect repute, which is itself deterministic ontologically... and so here the resulting randomness is only so epistemologically (to any non-omniscient being) but not so ontologically. Ontologically, there is no randomness. And so everything ontologically remains causally inevitable. Edit: And so completely necessary in every respect; thereby completely fixed; and thus fully equivalent to eternalism in its ontic being.

------

Maybe we should better define what "randomness" is intended to here specify. I'll start by defining it as an event within the cosmos (with the cosmos here understood to be the totality of all that is, to include multiple worlds or universes where such to occur) that as event has no reason whatsoever for its so occurring. This then to me generally conforms to this definition of randomness:

3. A measure of the lack of purpose, logic or objectivity of an event

Only that instead of being "a measure of" which holds degrees, it's taken to be a complete lack of that specified.

Do you mean something different by the word such that randomness would be something not deterministic in terms of ontology (rather than in terms of mere epistemology as just previously addressed)?

As an afterthought to my previous post, to bring this purely philosophical issue of determinism more into the purview of physics, to me determinism - when so understood as necessitarian - equates to eternalism, aka "the block universe" understanding of time and, hence, of the cosmos at large. Here, everything is fixed bar none.

:grin: No worries about the link. And many thanks for the thoughtful clarifications. I get that there can be found ambiguities in many definitions if one so intends.

As to determinism vs. fatalism, do you not find that determinism as concept entails necessitarianism. If you're not familiar with the concept, here is a synopsis:

Necessitarianism is a metaphysical principle that denies all mere possibility; there is exactly one way for the world to be. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necessitarianism

I could argue this well enough via the SEP article specified: Such as via this affirmation:

#1 is 'causal determinism' as opposed to 'determinism', distinguished in the SEP article. It later gives a less rough definition of the former that attempts to cover as many bases as possible.
"Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. " — noAxioms

If things are "fixed" (irrespective of why), then there will only be "exactly one way for the world to be".

I ask because, as far as I can see, if necessitarianism is entailed by determinism (or vice versa), then determinism is necessarily fatalistic when contemplated in terms of events occurring over time.

... but this might spin into how to then interpret "fate" or "destiny". To be clear, I don't here intend any omni-anything to have so determined. I only intend that if necessitarianism, we are then fated or else destined to do what we will do by reality at large, irrespective of how its workings get to be construed, such that the future can only be fixed and, hence, can only take one particular course of events.

Yes. Perhaps more cautiously, it is the confidence that one knows what the absolute authority is telling us that is the danger. — Ludwig V

Without in any way denying this, in parallel, what I’ve previously termed “the dark side of faith” can also manifest thusly:

The conviction that the stance which one holds and proclaims is superlative to - and thereby unaffected by - any rational or empirical evidence to the contrary. This in itself could be contextualized via the notion of “hinges” - in the sense that one’s stability, or else integrity, of being will here hinge on one’s never being wrong in what one upholds, irrespective of the evidence.

And I'll contest that the ability to so maintain in turn establishes what is loosely termed “strong men”, who then can become a cult-of-personality to all those they impose their authoritarian authority upon. (So stated because not all sources of authority will be authoritarian - be it an encyclopedia or some specialist in some scientific field, etc.)

I very much like the general thrust of your thesis and find much agreement with it, but as a minor quibble:

Knowledge is treated today as if it were static and timeless, as Plato might have suggested, [...] — DasGegenmittel

Knowledge so construed would be lacking in any possibility of being wrong - and so would be infallible by entailment. Such that the notion of infallible knowledge to me corresponds what you’ve termed “static knowledge”.

Plato, via Socrates’s voice, however, is almost always understood to present the case for what is called - not Cartesian Skepticism, which is about doubting everything till some infallible knowledge is supposedly obtained - but Ancient Skepticism, whose aim can well be argued via today’s terminology to present the case that there can be no such thing as infallible knowledge, else what you’ve termed static knowledge. Such that the very knowledge that “there can be no infallible knowledge” will of itself be fallible knowledge - else what you term “dynamic knowledge” - this rather than infallible or else static.

The link you provide does not provide links to philosophical references regarding the term "determinism." — javra

The SEP article on the subject is the best I can do, and it opens with using #1 as its definition, and touching on some of the others. — noAxioms

Are you sure you provided the correct link? To be clear, as it stands, this forum post (which your link takes me to) does not reference any SEP article. Nor does it specify six determinism types. Nor does it address why omniscience cannot hold librarian free will.

I searched SEP again, and the only entry that stands out is this one, which defines causal determinism in the same old way: in short as entailing causal inevitability.

Can you link to "the SEP article on the subject" you had in mind?

What is 'biological determinism'? Sounds like biological things operate deterministically, but robots don't. — noAxioms

Biological determinism, also known as genetic determinism,[1] is the belief that human behaviour is directly controlled by an individual's genes or some component of their physiology, generally at the expense of the role of the environment, whether in embryonic development or in learning — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_determinism

(with full libertarian free will on #6) — noAxioms

How on earth do you rationally justify this claim? If omniscient X knows all that they will choose in the future (entailed by their omniscience) they can't have libertarian free will on account of all their future choices already being pre-established. No?

If you read my linked post, I ask exactly that. — noAxioms

Again, I read nothing in the linked post to that effect. But then, if we agree on this, then #6 as specified in the parentheses does not apply to the issue at hand. Period.

and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability. — noAxioms
Irrelevant to the issue of causal inevitability, which it does entail.

Sort of. If the initial state is far enough back, you choose both vanilla and chocolate. You do otherwise. — noAxioms

No. You don't do otherwise. You by entailment do both in causally inevitable manners, each being done in a different world, with no ability to do otherwise to speak of.

As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. — noAxioms
How is this in any way relevant?

It (along with double slit) are flagships of hard determinism vs randomness. The former says that the decay will happen at time X. Quantum theory gives only probabilities of when it will decay (a half life). Most interpretations consider such decay to be totally uncaused, just like where the photon gets detected after passing through the double slits. — noAxioms

These "interpretations" are irrelevant to what the metaphysical stance of determinism signifies.

but #1 does not entail this inevitability — noAxioms
How do you figure that?

#1 is a synonym for naturalism, meaning that will is a function of natural physics. — noAxioms

Again, provide a link to reference this.

I did a internet search on "philosophical determinism" and nothing came up to this effect, with all results specifying the same thing; again, in short, causal inevitability.

I personally don't think what you've described is fundamentally different from causal inevitability. I consider your distinction to be a word game. — flannel jesus

Well then. That's that, then. No further comment.

I had counted six kinds of determinism.
Short summary:
1 philosophical determinism
2 Bohmian (hard)
3 MWI
4 eternalism
5 classical
6 onmiscience — noAxioms

The link you provide does not provide links to philosophical references regarding the term "determinism." But I grant there's a bunch of variants: biological determinism, cultural determinism, etc.

Maybe I should have specified "as pertains to the concept of free will as context".

(with full libertarian free will on #6) — noAxioms

How on earth do you rationally justify this claim? If omniscient X knows all that they will choose in the future (entailed by their omniscience) they can't have libertarian free will on account of all their future choices already being pre-established. No?

and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability. — noAxioms

Irrelevant to the issue of causal inevitability, which it does entail.

As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. — noAxioms

How is this in any way relevant?

EDIT: Almost forgot:

but #1 does not entail this inevitability — noAxioms

How do you figure that?

Determined it's determined. It looks exactly the same as determinism to me, you just have some abstract reason not to call it determinism despite it walking like a duck and quacking like a duck. Determinism has a simple criteria to me, and what you described passes that criteria.

I'm not insisting you call it determinism, but as far as the reasoning in the op of this thread goes, it's determinism, not indeterminism. You can have your reasons for calling it indeterminism, those reasons just don't appeal to me, they aren't compelling to me. — flannel jesus

Not to be rude, but the enterprise we term “philosophy” does not revolve around your personal preferences, no more than it revolves around mine.

Can you provide even one philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing?

You’ll also notice that if the article in the OP intended by “determinism” a non-causally-inevitable reality in which the Principle of Sufficient Reason yet holds, the very problem of libertarian free will it addresses would dissolve. Not being causally inevitable, the two worlds of Bob 1 and 2 would readily allow for the possibility of different choices made, despite the PSR yet holding. As quoted from the OP's article:

Both the hard and soft determinists endorse determinism, which is the view that all events (including human choices) are causally determined (necessitated) by antecedent conditions. Humans do what they do, make the choices they do, according to both these views because of factors outside of the agent’s control

... which equates to a causally inevitable world, one that thereby precludes the metaphysical possibility of libertarian free will.

In our human form understanding and will might be one faculty with two modes. One "soul". But in metaphysical questions of the origin of the world distictions between Will and Intellect can be useful. Will has active power. Intellect is passive, Platonic Ideas — Gregory

I can readily understand that. For what its worth, I don't myself subscribe to an origin of existence; an origin of the universe as its commonly known sure; but not of existence at large. I can accept that the will is active and the intellect passive, but from the perspectives I so far adopt, in so conceiving, the whole reason for being of the will is to best satisfy the desires of the intellect. Eudemonia, for example, is not found in the active will's doings per se but in the passive intellect's state of so being, for lack of better words, happy.

Libertarian free will has been espoused in many different flavors, ture. And I personally don’t subscribe to libertarian free will being completely devoid of determinants and thereby of reasons for what it does (which could be construed in certain such variants of the concept). That said, this is to me the very crux of the issue:

One might phrase (b) as causal inevitability, or determinism, or an instance of the principle of sufficient reason. I'm actually leaning towards that latter phrasing lately - that determinism inside a universe means everything that happens in that universe has sufficient reason to happen. — flannel jesus

“Determinism” to most will necessarily entail what in former days was termed “necessarianism” and what today is coined as “causal inevitability” – in both cases, potential subtleties aside, everything that happens happens necessarily. Thereby disallowing for any possibility of libertarian free will.

It’s why I explicitly specified (b) as “causal inevitability”. Which is in no way equivalent to “everything that happens holds an ontically occurring reason for it so happening”. To exemplify this, in the libertarian free will that I sponsor, every possible decision will need to hold at the very least one intent which one intentions as the particular decision’s ontically occurring reason for its occurrence. And this intent is of itself construed to be a teleological determinant - an ontically occurring teleological reason - for the decision between options which was made. For any choice one makes, one will – at the very least when in the right frame of mind – be able to affirm why one made the choice: e.g. so as to get rich, or so as to find love, etc. All these being intents that determine that option which one chooses via one’s libertarian free will. Due to this, the principle of sufficient reason here fully applies – but it in no way translates into “the decisions I/you make are causally inevitable”.

I fully know and acknowledge that such a reality wherein the PSR holds for all choices made would be one in which all choice made via libertarian free will (as it was previously defined) are nevertheless determined by some determinant. However, when one does X for the sake of Z, Z (the end pursued) will not of itself causally determine X – but will instead teleologically determine X; this without in any way nullifying the lack of metaphysical constrains one has in choosing one of the options toward Z as intended outcome.

All this is not determinism as the term is understood today, such that it entails causal inevitability, while nevertheless yet being a reality wherein everything is yet determined by some or other determinant and, therefore, wherein the PSR holds for all events. One's of libertarian free will fully included.

Causally though, when one entertains libertarian free will, the agent in a large sense becomes an non-causally determined cause of the option chosen as effect - keeping in mind that this agent in its causing of the effect is necessarily teleologically determined by the intent which the agent pursued.

This is of course a very different mindset relative to those commonly held today: such as those wherein everything can only be either causally inevitable or else random. .

But this is the very reason why there is a pivotal difference between a libertarian compatibilism (where libertarian free will is maintained to occur together with the Principle of Sufficient Reason for all choice made), on the one hand, and a deterministic, else non-libertarian, compatibilism (where some non-libertarian understanding of free will is maintained together with the doctrine of universal causal inevitability).

One cannot willy nilly jump back and forth between a libertarian compatibilism and a deterministic, in the sense of non-libertarian, compatibilism on account of both of these being "compatibilism" - for the first mandates the ontic reality of a libertarian free will and the second mandates its very metaphysical impossibility.

Which is greater, intellect or will? — Gregory

Will translates into volition. How does intellect get to be understood? Going by its original Latin roots, intellect could be understood as the understanding. Not understanding when interpreted as anything other which is understood – e.g. a concept, an idea, etc. – but instead that intrinsic and often accumulative understanding of the first-person agent which facilitates the agents capacity to so understanding that which is other than itself: again, with concepts and ideas as examples of the latter. (Example: both a dog and a human toddler has some such proto-understanding as agents which facilitates their understanding of the external world but, while the dog’s understanding is capped at a level far lower than any adult human’s, the human toddler’s so-called “proto-understanding” of things understood readily holds the capacity to develop into the vastly more content-filled “proto-understanding” of an adult human.)

If one entertains this definition of the intellect, then one’s intellect shall be one aspect of one’s will at large – maybe being the most pivotal aspect of will conceivable. Such that there can be no will in the complete absence of any and all understanding.

And this perspective, in a way, then brings to mind Viktor Frankl’s “Will to Meaning”; here, in the sense of intending ever-greater (nonquantitative) magnitudes of what I’ve here tentatively termed one’s intellect as “proto-understanding” … via which one understands, and in this one sense knows; to include a yet awaiting potential understanding of the world, or reality, or even of being itself.

To bring this back to the thread’s subject, when construed as expressed in my previous post, libertarian free will can then be neither a) random - for, if for no other reason, it will in all cases be intentional - nor can it be b) “causally inevitable” - for the lack of metaphysical constraints (aka, the metaphysical freedom) which strictly applies in regard to what option to choose entails that the option chosen cannot so be causally inevitable.

Libertarian free will, at least when so understood, will thereby necessitate a metaphysics regarding the possibility of determinants which is different from that in which the only two ontically occurring options are either that of a) randomness or b) causal inevitability. Such that the OP’s article, which only allows for these two possibilities, thereby misses the point.

That said, whether libertarian free will ontically occurs and, if so, what the details of such alternative metaphysics which it requires might possibly be, however, are separate issues from that of what the term “libertarian free will” intends to signify.

Javra, what you are saying here is that one can intend something differently when they intend the same thing: it’s internally incoherent. — Bob Ross

That’s not what I said in my post. What I expressed is that one can intend the same distant intent B by choosing a different option toward it, with each option toward the distal intent - say options X, Y, an Z - being its own possible, proximate intention toward the exact same distant intent B which one wants to actualize.

I gave a relatively easy to understand example of this here:

For example, a person wants to travel form A to B; the options cognitively available to the person for so doing are X, Y, and Z; if the person chooses option X as a means of getting to B, they at this moment of choice were metaphysically unconstrained in, and only in, their in fact choosing X rather than Y or Z. Hence, they could have chosen otherwise than they did. This very much assuming that the exact same physical context, the exact same intent to travel from A to B, and the exact same options of X, Y, and Z would occur. — javra

If you want to disagree, please disagree using this example just quoted.

There are two criteria that are used to distinguish between tyrants and sovereigns. One is that they are benevolent, at least in the sense that they try to do what is right. The other is that they are subject to the law. — Ludwig V

Maybe I was overly literal in the words' etymological meaning: with both tyrant and monarch being loose synonyms for despot, i.e. a single ruler with absolute power, in their etymological sense. With that acknowledged:

There of course are exceptions to most every generalization, and I’m by now confident that you will disagree with what I have to say. But with all of humankind’s history to look back on, I don’t find your two criteria indicative of what was and in many an area still is. The mythos of the noncorrupt and benevolent sovereign is much like the mythos that nobility is of noble character. I grant that my knowledge of history is not encyclopedic, but, given the span of human history I know of, most of the time things have not worked out this way.

So I more than greatly doubt your claim that these two criteria distinguish tyrants from sovereigns in practice - if that is indeed what you intended to say. Can you substantiate what you've here expressed beyond references to a) mythoi regarding what sovereignty is and ought to be and b) the potential historical exception that breaks the rule?

Off topic though this might be ...

You already did that when you specified "non-tyrannical", didn't you? — Ludwig V

The point I intended to make is that the British “constitutional monarchy” as it currently stands is not a monarchy proper. To call it a functional monarchy - which as term pretty explicitly specifies a governance under a sole absolute ruler, generally termed a king (far rarer a queen) - is akin to calling today’s Russia a functional democracy. And I hope we can agree that if we start calling a rose “a dog” it yet remains a rose in its characteristics. Hence, a non-tyrannical monarchy being akin to a triangular square, or a married bachelor - this even if the “sole absolute ruler” is taken to be benevolent (by some of his/her subjects at least).

You already did that when you specified "non-tyrannical", didn't you?
You are looking at it through the wrong lens. The elected Government is a buffer, taking the risk of popular unpopularity and taking the rap when the populace want a change of Government. In exchange, the monarchy gets security and lots and lots of influence and money - oh, and avoids all the boring part of running the country.
The people are enabled to get rid of unpopular rulers without a revolution.
Managed democracy. Perfect. What's not to like? — Ludwig V

I’m not going to say this is the way it actually is - don’t know enough about the situation to know - but, given the way you so far put things, it all sounds a bit too much like freeloading to me. That might be something not to like.

patterners example was about determinism. — flannel jesus

May I be corrected if wrong, but it was about whether one really has a choice in what one chooses. Again, if one does, then liberarain free will holds, irrespective of how it's metaphysically accounted for. If one doesn't, then back to everything being causally inevitable (or else everything being causally inevitable save for when it's sprinkled with a bit or randomness).

But I really am running short on time at the current moment.

does that answer your question? — flannel jesus

Not exactly.

My concern in just answering directly is that I'm not confident I understand what you mean. If you played ball with the rewind test, I would perhaps have been able to figure out what you mean, but without that I feel like I'm just guessing at what you mean. — flannel jesus

gives a good example. I'll let others take over for now.

The difference between indeterminism and determinism is, given the exact same conditions, with determinism you get the exact same result every time. With indeterminism you don't. That's what this rewind test is all about.

So when you say "could in fact choose", I'm trying to figure out if you mean like in an indeterministic way, or if you mean some other way. — flannel jesus

You're in many a way placing the cart before the horse. If one can choose any of the two options via one's own volition, that is termed liberatrian free will. If this belief that one can is only illusory, that is then determinism in the sense of "everything is causally inevitable" - be it compatibilist or nor. Each will in turn require its own metaphysical account for how it operates. With these being all over the place.

There are other ways of defining determinism and indeterminism. But using the definitions you've just given, quite plainly, libertairan free will shall need to adopt some variant of indeterminism, i.e., some variant which specifies that not everything is causally inevitable - such that given the same physical context, the same intent, and the same options (these being the conditions) different options can be chosen (the option chosen then being the result, such that different results are then possible - but certainly not necessary).

If you're the god of some universe, and you want to check if someone "in reality has a choice between the two", how would you check that if not doing the rewind test? — flannel jesus

Why "god" and not a "brain-in-vat dragon"? It has nothing to do with god, nor with the omniscience omnipotence I take it you're here addressing.

What does it mean to "in reality have a choice between the two" though? — flannel jesus

It means that you could in fact choose either of the two options of your own volition. This in contrast to such presumption being in reality only an illusory emotion / sentiment regarding your ability to do so.

That's what you mean by "allows me to have chosen differently", right? — flannel jesus

Nor really. It has nothing to do with rewinding time, and certainly has nothing to do with any god. Assume your right now have two options of either replying or of not replying. In this very act of choice-making, can you of your own volition (which would preclude the outcome being random) choose either of the two options? Or are you causally determined to choose one option such that you in reality have no true choice between the two?

I call all that crap free will. — flannel jesus

Can you be explicit on whether or not "all that crap" allows for you having chosen differently than what you do or else did?

If we do some rewind experiment, — flannel jesus

For the record, it has nothing to do with rewinding time. (It has to do which what is and is not possible at any juncture of choice-making. which as event always occurs in the present, and not in the past. If one can chose differently than what one ends up doing at any present juncture of choice making, then one could have chosen differently at any past juncture of choice-making.)

But I didn't call that "free will" at any point. — flannel jesus

I thought you implicitly did. But ok, you didn't. What then does this "free will" term signify to you?

I'm getting headaches again. So I'll stop.

I don't think so. Do you think so? — flannel jesus

Can you clarify what you're here addressing. As a reminder, what I was addressing is in relation to what you expressed here:

IF there's quantum randomness, genuine randomness, then probably. — flannel jesus

It doesn't Account for it. It's just there. It exists. — flannel jesus

Than why did you just specify the possibility of free will thus defined as being contingent on "genuine randomness"?

IF there's quantum randomness, genuine randomness, then probably. — flannel jesus

Unless one introduces some form of a hybrid event in one's metaphysics, I still don't get how randomness can account for any notion of free will. But thanks for the answer. :up:

De Broglie–Bohm interpretation can simply address this paradox as you can find it here. — MoK

Granted. Bohm does have a lot of interesting things to say.

It's an implementation detail that doesn't give us or deny us free will. — flannel jesus

As a reminder, do you believe that you could have chosen otherwise at an past juncture of choice-making (i.e., at any juncture in which you decided upon an option)?

So I don't necessarily think any *single event* is hybrid at that detailed level of description, no. Maybe it is, idk, I'm agnostic. — flannel jesus

Got it. I'm still curious though: What then would be your gut feeling regarding this in terms of free will?

The wave function does not collapse randomly. It just collapses when a measurement is done on the system. — MoK

If you're not yet familiar with this, the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment gets extremely interesting.

Nothing conclusive about it in this regard, but - from my last readings regarding it - it to me so far illustrates that the measurement by which collapse occurs might well be pivoted upon observers as conscious beings. But I grant that's debatable.

At any rate, its an interesting QM experiment that's been replicated many times.

The Schrödinger equation evolves the wave function deterministically, and then at some moment it collapses the wave function randomly. — flannel jesus

But here your saying that the first is 100% determined and the second is 100% random. Neither then are hybrid events. Where is the hybrid event at?