:up: I agree. Maybe I should have been clearer.

Conceptually, this way of interpreting quantum mechanics is a hybrid. — flannel jesus

OK. But how do you reason this hybrid metaphysics to work? This has direct baring on what you are wanting to claim for free will.

Its a hybrid. It is a process which is in part deterministic and in part random. — flannel jesus

It might come as no surprise that others disagree with this. So how do you rationally conclude this affirmation?

Not that any of this addresses the reasons I've given. But all the same.

-----

Just saw this:

Then why don't accept the De Broglie–Bohm interprertation which is paredox free and determinsitic? — MoK

If it's deterministic, it ain't partly random. :wink: :razz:

OK. Why not?

I really don't understand why "quantum randomness" isn't a solid example of the question at the end of your post. That, to me, would be a hybrid. — flannel jesus

I've already explained why. But (unless I need to give further replies) I'll stop.

No. And how does that address the question you've yet to answer?

i feel like what I said about quantum crap is a good example, no? — flannel jesus

No. First off because it addresses hypotheses regarding physics at a quantum level which have in no way been evidenced to directly influence, much less determine, the choices that we as conscious beings make. Secondly, this issue is one of sheer metaphysical possibilities rather than about physical data with nebulous explanations.

So, again, what to you would a hybrid between 1) a determined event and 2) a random event be?

When you come to a fork in a raging river, if you don't make a conscious (responsible) choice, the river will make it for you. :cool: — Gnomon

The question was about that conscious choice, and not about whether rivers make decisions. But I guess you're not taking this seriously. Oh well.

Because the options aren't 100% determinism and 100% randomness. — flannel jesus

To my surprise, I fully agree with this statement as written. (You might recall that in the other thread I used the term "semi-determined" or something to the like, which signifies just this.) But I doubt we agree on what the statement entails.

So what to you is hybrid between determined and random? Or are all events either 100% determined or 100% random when you get down into nitty gritty?

We can just ignore that edge case. — flannel jesus

OK. Then, a compatibilist will necessarily believe in the reality of some form or other of free will. If so, to reinforce 's comment, how can free will be stated to be real if the act of deciding is of itself random?

Absolute Determinism would be one-damn-thing-after-another. Randomness is non-linear, so there are forks in the path. Those forks are opportunities for Choice. If there is an option, you may be forced to choose by pressure from the past, but left vs right would be a "free" choice. :joke: — Gnomon

You've explained options via randomness, but not the choice between options which is taken. How can randomness account for the very act of deciding while yet accounting for one's responsibility in light of the decision made?

How is this not playing footloose with definitions derived from a word's common use? One can entertain compatibilism but cannot oneself be a compatibilist if one denies compatibilism's validity, as in the validity that free will occurs and is compatible with the likewise occurring reality that everything is in one way or another determined.

Can we at least agree that there can be no compatibilism if free will is denied regardless of how free will is defined?

I could probably be persuaded otherwise on some weird technicality — flannel jesus

What technicality could that possibly be?

Please read the op and see that I have written the same.
The democratic city-states fought well, but the were just too small in comparison with the huge Persian Empire. This is explained that before inventing the printing press, only small territories could have a democratic government. And again, this is the same thing as the on I mentioned in the op. — Linkey

I missed that in the OP.

My main point in addressing Ancient Athens was that a democracy can engage in war just fine. Athens as democracy did great in battles until the Peloponnesian war - in which Athens became largely outnumbered due to the Persian empire assisting Sparta against Athens. But this is a case of sheer numbers rather than ability to engage in war effectively, to my best understanding at least.

Maybe more importantly: Are you suggesting that dictatorships are necessarily more stable than democracies when it comes to large populaces?

Just to check: We do agree that compatibilism entails the reality of free will, right?

If the world has a little bit of randomness, that doesn't necessarily destroy the causality one needs to enact one's will. So that should be the answer to your first two questions, right? — flannel jesus

No. It's not an answer to the first question. The first question regarded what a "random free will" can possibly signify, and if the idea of such a random free will is at all viable. It did not address the workings of the world, but instead addressed what free will can and cannot possibly be.

Please re-read the first question again.

Can you explain what part of my answer feels like an ego-battle to you? — flannel jesus

Sure. Here were my two questions:

How can the stance of "compatibilism" be compatible with randomness? In other words, if one's actions of will are random, how then can one be stated to have free will?

If it can't, and if there is no other option than that of reality being "causally inevitable" or else random, doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable? — javra

Here was your reply which you insist answered the questions:

No.

Incompatibilists say "determinism destroys free will". Compatibilists simply say "determinism doesn't destroy free will". They're not (all) saying "and that means determinism is necessarily the case" or "indeterminism destroys free will".

Just one simple thing: determinism doesn't destroy free will.

Basically, imagine I have a snow globe in my left hand and a snow globe in my right hand - in each snow globe a little handheld universe. Suppose I know the one in my left hand is indeterministic, and the one in my right hand, while looking at a surface level pretty much just like the left one, is deterministic. An incompatibilist would say "free will may exist in the left globe but not the right", a compatibilist would say "free will may exist in both". — flannel jesus

For starters, my two questions are such that the second hinges on the answer to the first. You did not answer the first. You therefore neither answered the second.

you asked "doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable?" I explained why it doesn't. — flannel jesus

Okey dokey, then. (In the world I live in, however, context is quite important to individual words, such as the ones you've quoted. Apparently not so much in yours. Sounds more like an ego battle than an honest search for truths, in this case truths of a rational kind. But as you say, you've replied.)

None of which is a reply to what I asked. — javra


It's all explicitly a reply to what you said. — flannel jesus

OK. But neither question asked was in any way answered.

I think we first have to agree on how options could be real in a determinist world. Once that is established then we could understand that decision is not possible in a deterministic system. — MoK

Agreed.

Are you saying that in his opinion the decision is the result of randomness or else is determined? — MoK

Yes. With the caveat that "determined' here entails "causally inevitable".

I think we can simply exclude the latter because both options are real. The former also can be excluded as well because of the correlation between the time of decision and action. — MoK

I'd again agree.

None of which is a reply to what I asked.

Just one simple thing: determinism doesn't destroy free will. — flannel jesus

It does not destroy free will when free will is defined as:

"anything one wills to do that is not obstructed is thereby one's free will" — javra

If however does necessarily deny the very possibility of free will when free will is defined as:

"One could have chosen an option other than the one option one ends up choosing". Or, more simply, the ability to choose otherwise.

Common sense holds free will to be the latter. As it for example gets applied, however implicitly, in judicial systems.

Compatibilism isn't a hard commitment to determinism. — flannel jesus

How can the stance of "compatibilism" be compatible with randomness? In other words, if one's actions of will are random, how then can one be stated to have free will?

If it can't, and if there is no other option than that of reality being "causally inevitable" or else random, doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable?

Aren't you a compatibilist? — MoK

In trying to stave off potential headaches, he's a compatibilist in the sense of free will being defined as "anything one wills to do that is not obstructed is thereby one's free will" ... which would then be a free will notion that is perfectly compatible with realty being "causally inevitable".

@flannel jesus is of course free to correct or else modify this if wrong. But I've had my headaches in the past in trying to discuss with him the difference between libertarian compatibilism and deterministic compatibilism - which he seems to conflate into the same thing. He sticks to everything necessarily being either "causally inevitable" or else random. And hence to compatibilism only making sense within this framework.

Anyway, if this helps ...

Yes, and it might also be worth commenting that most of Ancient Greece was not democratic. The Spartans, with which the Athenians battled, for one example were oligarchical - with a duarchy (two kings with equal power) taking center stage.

Unfortunately, the one-man ruling is necessary for a war. At the same time, there is an opposite tendency: free countries support new ideas, including military innovations, better than unfree ones. — Linkey

What about the Greeks? They were the inventors of science... — Linkey

Which brings to mind: Ancient Athens was an exceedingly functional democracy (among male citizens) with excellent military prowess all in one bang. So this would directly speak against a non-democratic governance being necessary for war.

While I'm not claiming it's easy to obtain and sustain, it is nevertheless quite possible.

That sounds like the British "constitution". — Ludwig V

True that. But the British “constitutional monarchy” is such that the mon-arch (the sole ruler) is a figurehead which has no real power to rule anything. Sort of nullifying the “sole rulership” aspect of the political enterprise.

If you define democracy as non-ttyranical, then it must you're saying something about a term, not a political system. — Hanover

Your joking? My definition of democracy was this:

Democracy, instead, is any variant of a rather elaborate system which keeps the tyrannical drives of all participants and parties at bay via a non-hypocritical system of checks and balances of power. — javra

Which is very much a political system.

Suppose you have a non-tyranical monarchy, would it be a democracy? — Hanover

About as much as a triangular square would be. Which is to say, no.

2. If #2, then that person could will A for another intent, N, or intent some other action, B, with some other intent. — Bob Ross

Right. Only that what is quoted here is not mandatory for libertarian free will.

The physical causality could be the exact same and the intent pursued could be the exact same. Each option toward the given intent pursued is of itself, however, a more proximal possible intent toward the here distant intent one aims to actualize.

So A within the exact same physical context, with the exact same cognitive options available to A, can intend the exact same distant intent by choosing a different alternative. So construed, there will necessarily be ontically occurring reasons for any choice (between alternatives) taken, but reality, and so one's choice, is not "causally inevitable", and neither is the choice made of itself random (hence, devoid of any actual ontically occurring reason for its occurrence).

For example, a person wants to travel form A to B; the options cognitively available to the person for so doing are X, Y, and Z; if the person chooses option X as a means of getting to B, they at this moment of choice were metaphysically unconstrained in, and only in, their in fact choosing X rather than Y or Z. Hence, they could have chosen otherwise than they did. This very much assuming that the exact same physical context, the exact same intent to travel from A to B, and the exact same options of X, Y, and Z would occur.

Hey, I know we don't often agree on much, but damn that's a nice post. Wanted to so say. :grin:

So Chance, by definition, is not deterministic, it's non-compulsory. Change is inevitable, but Chance is optional. Where there are options, there is freedom. The door opens, but you can choose to walk through it, or not. — Gnomon

Sounds like you’re addressing “chance” in the sense of a random occurrence, this since its specified as not being deterministic. Two philosophically-minded questions:

1) How could randomness (“chance” so understood) allow for one’s responsibility (in the sense of culpability or praiseworthiness) for the options one decides upon?

2) How does any notion of free will when strictly understood as “I have free will whenever I’m not obstructed in that which I will” - be this act of willing chance-based or not - account for the sentiment of regret which most of us have and do on occasion experience, with this sentiment of regret basically translating into that of “I ought to have chosen a different course of events than the one I ended up choosing”? To be more explicit, how can regret be accounted for by free will when granting that “the ability to choose otherwise than what one ends up choosing” is fully illusory and thereby ontically non-occurrent (for the ontic occurrence of this very ability can only result in some form of libertarian free will, whose possibility is here denied)?

The Abraham story pushes the idea that unity with God is achieved through obedience. Unity with God is the carrot and obedience is the goal. Shouldn't unity with God be the goal? — praxis

Good question.

In many ways it parallels with the dichotomy between the often heard prescription that one ought to “fear God” (at least as this phrasing is most commonly understood) – wherein there is a necessary duality, else division, between the other which one fears and oneself, a necessary duality that will persist for as long as the fear persists – and the far less touted “love God”, which then not only allows for but is a calling toward a “unity of (sentient) being” (this being one loosely appraised definition of “love”) with that which one loves, in this one case, God.

Obedience of that authority as other which one fears vs. love and hence oneness (in most any of its senses) with that absolute goodness which one loves.

Or, in a more Christianity-specific mindset, the difference between fearing and thereby obeying Christ as one’s God and being someone who holds and thereby upholds Christ’s spirit within in most anything one does. But I get the nagging suspicion that being like Christ in one’s character and nature is a bit too heretical a perspective for most self-proclaimed Christians out there. Which kind of insinuates that being un-Christ-like is the typical calling of most Christians.

Tyranny can exist under any political system, including democracy. Tocqueville discusses the tyranny of the majority. Plato's philosopher king supposedly had the wisdom to rule and was to be selected by qualification, not democratic vote, which more emulates how religious leaders are chosen. I'm not in favor of theocracy, and I'm fully supportive of the state's power being supreme, but our recent elections hardly yielded a Solomon. — Hanover

Well, Hitler came to power in a democracy not by force but, to simplify history, by vote.

Democracy is not "rule by the majority as mob" (what the USA seems to be currently exhibiting ... debatable, but all the same ...), It could never sustain itself if it were, instead becoming a dictatorship. Nor is democracy defined by voting. Democracy, instead, is any variant of a rather elaborate system which keeps the tyrannical drives of all participants and parties at bay via a non-hypocritical system of checks and balances of power. This is the only way a democracy can remain - be it that of ancient Athens or any non-Orwellian so-called democracy of today. I say this because some self-termed democracies - I'll here point fingers at Russia - are as non-democratic in practice as all official self-termed communisms of at least Europe were non-communistic in practice. (Addressing communism as politics rather than as economy: The comradeship of fellow brethren (or siblings) - of fellow comrades - in a given nation all working cooperatively together in a commonly upheld community never, ever, occurred.The only place were communism can be viably stated to have occurred is in the kibbutz - and nowhere else.) ((Unlike democracy as just described, communism is a bit too optimist in regards to human nature at large for its own good.))

All these being issues and perspectives regarding politics. But having so expressed, I yet maintain that (non-Orwellian) "democracy" is, and can only be, at direct odds with tyranny and tyrannical governance.

And again, the mythoi we tell ourselves - such as the mythos that the world is a dog-eat-dog reality (to here address a non-religious/spiritual mythos) - will have a large impact on our personal ethos as individual humans. The dog-eat-dog motif, for example, directly leads to tyrannical wants and desires - and directly opposes the possibility of a cooperative humanity in which agape plays a large role in society.

I’m having a hard time with your post. This in large part due to the quantity of disagreements I have with what you've written. I’ll do my best to reply, but if the quantity and severity of our disagreements persist, I’m intending to let things be as they are.

Do you agree that trial and error forms a significant part of a living being's activities, and that the process we know as evolution demonstrates a large scale trial and error process? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes to the first portion, but I have the suspicion that the phrase “trial and error” means different things to us.

To me, trial and error is a method of problem-solving, such that the solving of the problem is its entailed end. It also, in all non-metaphorical senses and applications, strictly applies to sentience: it can only be sentience that tries and sentience that determines failure from success. Trial and error in no way overlaps with unintended, and hence accidental, discovery: if one, for example, accidentally discovers a valuable jewel underneath one’s sofa while cleaning one’s room, there was no trial and error involved in the process; on the other hand, trial and error, because it always seeks an end, is always purposeful, intentional, such that when the problem is solved by this approach, its so being solved is not an unintended accident. For emphasis, although when, if ever, the problem gets resolved via the trial and error processes will be uncertain up until the time of resolution, and although many forms of trial and error utilize haphazard heuristics in the trials toward this end of resolving a problem, the resolution to the problem will never be unintended, hence will never be an accidental discovery in the sense just specified (unless one engages in equivocations of what “accident” signifies). Lastly, neither can a sentient being’s engaging in trial and error processes be devoid of observation (for then one would not be able to discern success from error) nor can it be devoid of doing (for trial and error is itself an intentional doing seeking to resolve some problem) – such that the agent, here the sentient being, which so engages in trial and error must be both doer and observer (in no particular order) at the same time in order to so successfully engage in the activity.

As to evolution being a trial and error process, I then find this to be a fully metaphorical application of the phrasing. Evolution is not a sentient being; and thereby cannot as process of itself intentionally problem-solve anything, much including via any trial and error means. More bluntly, what problem might evolution be intending to solve? This is not to then claim that evolution is not in large part a teleological process, but evolution is not the type of teleological process which applies to the intentioning of individual agents (and only to the latter can trying and failing and then trying again, this with a set goal in mind, apply).

As Aristotle pointed out in his analysis of ends and means, each specific end can be viewed as the means to a further end, and this produces an infinite regress if we do not designate an ultimate, final end, which he named as happiness. So this activity of turning over rocks is like your "happiness", you are fulfilling what you perceive as your ultimate end, you apprehend no reason for this act, or even doubt the possibility that there might be a further reason which you are unaware of, therefore you are satisfied in your acts, and you are "happy" fulfilling your desire. — Metaphysician Undercover

In an Aristotelian model of things, “optimal eudemonia” (what you’ve termed “happiness”) is everybody’s ultimate end at all times – and not just for he who has agreed to uncover rocks for someone else. It will hence equally apply to he who wants the rocks uncovered for his own hidden purpose by the person who’s agreed to do so. And this Aristotelian conception of the ultimate end is only the most distal (distant) telos of an otherwise potentially innumerable quantity of teloi any person might be intending at any given time. And in so being, though one might get closer to it at certain times rather than others (when one is more at peace, or else joyful, for example), this ultimate telos of “optimal eudemonia which can only translate into a perfected eudemonia” is the most unreachable telos of all teloi out there. The most difficult, if at all possible, to actualize. It here drives, or else determines, all other teloi, this at all times, but it itself cannot be obtained for as long as any personal suffering occurs or is deemed to have the potential to occur. This includes some personal interpretation, granted, such as in what "suffering" signifies. But I still find it to be the only coherent way of understanding 'happiness as ultimate end'.

Secondly, why did the person who’s agreed to turn over rocks so agree in this first place? Teleological reasons can range from that of having a gun held to his head (with the person preferring to do so rather than die due to his ultimate end of optima eudemonia), to having been offered a fair sum of cash for so doing (with the person finding the cash worth the time and effort required to so turn over rocks), to simply wanting to make the person who so asks happy (harder to briefly explain but yet a teleological reason). So the person whose turning over rocks isn’t considering “all rocks having been turned” as his ultimate end. At the absolute least, he’s turning over rocks as a proximate end in order to satisfy the more distal end regarding the reason he’s agreed to turn over rocks to begin with – which all then being yet governed by the far more distal telos of “optimal, hence perfected, eudemonia”.

So of course there are (teleological) reasons galore for the act of turning over stones which do not end in the successful act of so turning over all stones in an area. Endlessly ask someone why they did X starting at some concrete doing and you will obtain an endless list of reasons for their doings, much including teleological reasons. (Sure, some such reason that some will give might be the incorrect reasons for their doings - reasons given for things done while hypnotized comes to mind as an example - but this yet presupposes that there are accurate reasons for that which we do, have done, and will do.)

But the question I wish to ask is, in some sense, aren't all universal moral systems inevitably going to be flawed in some way and therefore rendered futile? What is the point in laying out moral edicts that are so abstract and impractical when the layman already has a fairly solid intuitive grasp of how to act ethically based off sheer compassion and, for want of a better term, "common sense"? — Dorrian

There’s a hitch in the first question which you pose. To be futile presupposes the requisite of fulfilling some aim, which futility fails to allow for. So in this very question is presupposed an end pursued, one which ought to be obtained – thereby and end which is of itself good - which “universal moral systems” can only fail to actualize.

It might be that certain meta-ethical enquiries seek to better understand just what exactly this just mentioned good is, or at least what it could be. If so, these meta-ethical enquiries - which to be valid can only be universally applicable – must necessarily be descriptive of what already is, has always been, and will continue to be. They therefore don’t prescribe "moral edicts" in an authoritarian sense, but rather, it at all successful, describe what is and allow one to thereby more lucidly decide for oneself what one ought do, this given such and such scenario. Because of this,such meta-ethical enquiries, if successful, cannot be futile, almost by definition - for they would then make clear the very end relative to which you question the functionality of "universal moral systems" by wondering if they're all futile in their nature.

I don't think it's heretical. It's natural to retroject our own 21st century moral views to biblical characters. — BitconnectCarlos

I'm very glad you believe so. Thank you for so mentioning. As to retrojecting values on the past, to a certain extent this can only be true, irrespective of the values currently held. One can however say that I'm biassed by the notion of the Good of itself being an absolute and determinate facet of all cosmic being. This would enter into a completely different realm of discussion than that of "faith" per se. Abrahamically appraised, though, if Elohim, the archangels, the seraphim, etc. are indeed good, my own inclination is to believe that they all in their own ways align with the Good. (With the latter in certain interpretations potentially being associated with, if not fully equated to, G-d).

Yes. Much agreed.

My stance generally orients on the mythoi we live by (irrespective of whether we happen to be theists, atheists, or something in-between) by virtue of partaking of our common culture.

By analogy, the ancient Greek understanding of Zeus varies greatly. From Heraclitus's notion of Zeus to mythoi such as that of Leda and the swan. In certain interpretations of the latter Zeus, who takes the form of a swan, doesn't seduce Leda but instead rapes her. Greeks who then revered 'Zeus as rapist' would then align their own ethics as individuals with the ideal which they here revered - thereby raping others themselves.

I'm not intending to make a thesis out of this complete with references. My main point being that the stories we tell ourselves and emotively idealize end up having a large sway on our own individual ethos. With these stories often enough in today's culture emerging from that which was written in the Torah / Bible.

Not interpreting these stories ethically but instead interpreting them in manners that, for one example, reinforces authoritarian interests by claiming these authoritarian interpretations to in fact be the so called literal word of God then, in turn, reinforces, in this one example, tyrannical societal structures. Which stand in direct conflict with democratic ideals - that can also come about via certain interpretations of biblical stories. God being Love as one such motif that comes to mind - cliched though it may sound to many.

As previously hinted at, I've myself no issue with people being spiritual. But spirituality does not translate into an unquestioning acceptance of what authority figures, especially those who are authoritarian in character, command you to do and believe. And in my mind set, nor ought it to so equate.

(I don's know if there was an interaction between El and Abraham. But, if there was, its why I uphold the interpretation previously provided: its ethos is an ideal I could look up to, even if I often fall far short of it; rather than being something which conflicts with what is good and right. This in my own ethos and, I venture to say, in most others' as well.)

Utterly heretical of me to say so, but if there ever in fact was an interaction between El and Abraham, why could it not be the case that El was in search of someone whose ethical constituency El could trust no matter what would happen? So El tested Abraham by giving Abraham an utterly unethical command (something that Satan could have just as easily done while pretending to be El, for example). Abraham toward the end then of a sudden had an ethical epiphany and conveyed to El something like, “fu*k you, I’d rather live in eternal damnation than perform such an unethical act, so I ain’t killing Issac despite the power you hold over me”. So El at that juncture realized Abraham’s goodness of being in the face of extreme duress, and so henceforth trusted Abraham for the good person he was.

Were something along these lines to have in fact occurred, the event would then make far more sense to me.

Again, I get it, it’s a very heretical interpretation of events. Given by someone who does NOT know the bible like the back of his hand. The heretic that I am, though, I will fall back on the bible / torah having been written by imperfect men via their own less than perfectly objective and, hence, biased interpretations of events, such that that part about El intervening in Abraham’s killing of Issac could well be an untrue written account of the events which actually transpired.

Since this is a philosophy forum and not a church schooling, I thought it worth sharing this interpretation alongside those previously offered.

I have a tough time seeing it your way. I think an autonomous entity has - is - a mind. Archaea, bacteria, and amoeba live on their own. Neurons do not. I think neurons are part of a mind; part of the chain connecting the sensor and doer. In the archaea, being single celled, that chain is made of molecules. We couldn't (at least I couldn't) say any of the molecules are minds. And I think the neurons in a hydra are more complex links in the hydra's chain, rather than each being a mind within the mind of the hydra. — Patterner

I feel like I get it. Thanks for the explanation.

Maybe this is worth expressing as a follow-up. Especially when considering the dire need humans have for nurture in the formative years after birth - without which we either perish or at best become insane and then perish on our own - humans too require a community of fellow humans in order to live. This, though, doesn’t take away from the individuality of human minds. In certain respects only, the same roundabout situation could be potentially claimed of neurons.

In terms of molecules and minds, I certainly wouldn’t claim that individual organic molecules are minds either. Going by the notion of “autopoiesis” which I’ve previously pointed out indirectly, the very life of any single-celled lifeform (to include metabolism, awareness, and sentient doings) in a sense supervenes on the structure and functioning of the single-celled lifeform’s organic molecules. Take away one lipid from an ameba and the ameba will continue living and doing what it does just fine. However, take enough individual lipids away from an ameba and the ameba will cease living. As an ameba’s life supervenes on the organization and functioning of this bundle of organic molecules, so too then will the ameba’s mind so supervene. The same could then be potentially claimed of a neuron’s sentience.

As to hydras, they’re weird, in no small part due to being virtually immortal as far as we know – this of course barring environmental mishaps – with extreme regenerative abilities (including the ability to regenerate their heads). Yet even here, I presume that the activities of their nervous system – though far, far less complex than that of a mammal’s (having a few thousand neurons tops) – will be that upon which the hydra’s mind supervenes. Such that the hydra’s mind will not of itself be conjoined with the sentience of the hydra’s individual neurons – but will instead supervene upon the totality of its nervous system’s doings (if not a totality resulting from other somatic cells as well).

But yea, this perspective maintaining that neurons are not insentient is by no means common staple in today’s world. So I get why I can be very hard to entertain.

I think my difficulty lies in the fact that I haven't been at any of this for very long. I always took mind and consciousness to be pretty much the same thing. Intellectuality, I see a difference. But my feeling that they are the same still intrudes at times. I'm working on it. :grin: — Patterner

Yea, its common practice around these parts to address mind and consciousness as though they were the same thing. I'm thinking maybe it's in part because one sense of "consciousness" is that of "awareness" and all aspects of mind, the unconscious very much included, are aware in one way or another. But, yes, if (at least our human understanding of) consciousness is contrasted to a co-occurring unconscious mind upon which consciousness is dependent, then consciousness can't be equivalent to a mind in total - for it excludes the far larger portion of mind which we are not conscious of. Whereas I don't find reason to believe that something like an ameba (or a neuron :wink: ) has any such dichotomy of mind to speak of.

By the way, I found a simple neural network that can perform a simple sum. — MoK

I too am interested. The link or image however is still not displaying.

Then again, for many, “faith” simply boils down to the conviction that the “word” of God is absolute. What exactly God or this very word is remains elusive, save for those who have faith in this very absolute, and very much authoritarian, word of God. This in contrast to all other people out there. Thereby granting these faith-endowed folk the ability to discard any empirical facts, reasoning, or common-sense ethical considerations regarding the good and goodness which in any way stand in the way of their obedience to this very word. Else they get punished by the tyrant (literally, “absolute ruler and dictator”).

No, all this doesn’t make sense to me either. But, yes, it happens.

And while I still maintain that faith as concept and experience has been hijacked by such people to the detriment of what it signifies among humanity at large, I nevertheless wanted to more explicitly acknowledge this darker aspect of “faith” as the term is often employed. (And I say this as one who for my own reasons believes in what it commonly termed “the divine” ... with the notion of the Good taking center stage.)

In contrast, using faith to justify the belief that the world was created by a magic space wizard -the fundamentalist's deity- operates on an entirely different level. How can these two phenomena be meaningfully compared? It’s not merely that faith is a poor analogy for reasonable expectation; it's also about the magnitude of the claim being justified. — Tom Storm

To me, it again has a lot to do with things such as this:

I'll add that it is not OK to have faith in things that blatantly contradict reality - to have faith that humans once upon a time walked along side dinosaurs, for example. — javra

Genesis II onward is replete with logical contradictions - which one is supposed to blindly overlook so as maintain one's faith in ... precisely what Genesis II onward claims. You've got this "omnipresent" being that is walking the earth. How exactly does that work??? Is the earth walked on part of the walking being, the "Lord"??? The same earth walking being is also said to be "omniscient" but is taken aback by this serpent (who is not yet slithering on earth) entering the picture, then gets pissed of as hell at everyone for not obeying him. Um, not quite rationally valid to then affirm this Lord as being omniscient. This same Lord is also omnipotent ... but had no power over what the serpent, Eve, and Adam did. And so forth.

Faith here isn't about trust in that which one cannot yet prove or soundly justify. Faith here is self-imposed blindness (as metaphors go, not physical blindness but a self-imposed blindness of the soul else intellect). And, just as with a faith in dinosaurs and humans once mingling, its at these junctures that I take faith to become deleterious. As I previously commented in this thread:

If God is dead and an actor plays his part
His words of fear will find a place in your heart
Without the voice of reason every faith is its own curse
Without freedom from the past things can only get worse

[…]

Convince an enemy, convince him that he's wrong
Is to win a bloodless battle where victory is long
A simple act of faith
In reason over might
To blow up his children will only prove him right — History Will Teach Us Nothing (song by the musician Sting)