It does not consist of qualia or quale. — creativesoul

Just because I'd like to get things straight: Does this conscious experience consist of quality?

I heard it said that solipsism can't be refuted because it's logically impeccable, but does that make it true? — Darkneos

Can you both intend X and intend not-X at the same time and in the same respect?

I take it that you have on occasion had your intentions obstructed by what you experience to be the intentions of others. If there are no others, then your answer to this question could only be “yes”. Yet so answering results in a) inconsistency with your own experiences and b) a logical lack of validity to any assertion imaginable (such as via the principle of explosion).

Ergo, other selves are.

One should add, as well as an impartial reality that is not of your will’s making and will thereby obstruct some of your intentions were you to hold these.

Point being, solipsism is not logically impeccable.

Such intimate conversations will always go awry when "qualia" rears it's ugly head. — creativesoul

Well, of course. One will start arguing about both of them being illusory intuition pumpin' machines; the other starts arguing that the quality to it all is going down the drain. And then presto, the magic is lost and there's no more making whoopee between the two.

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On a more serious note, quality occurs as an intrinsic aspect of our experiences. Is this debatable? For me the answer is "no". Then: A) Is a quality not possible to experientially differentiate from any other quality, thereby making quality unquantifiable; B) can a quality be experientially contrasted to other qualities and thereby be quantifiable, or c) something other?

I'm not enamored with qualia, as previously mentioned. Still, being charitable here, if we can discern and thereby distinguish between different qualities, then the philosophical notion of qualia might make some sense in certain philosophical contexts.

What say you?.

It's the too easily accomplished reification of the notion that is a primary problem, I think.

Actually, that phrase: "something it is like to..." is what does violence to the language. It's a recent invention found almost only in philosophical discourse, and so is inherently fraught. — Banno

Right, because sexual partners have prior to recent philosophy readings never asked each other, "what was it like for you?"

It takes a modern philosopher to interpret this and related statements as violence to the language. Which is why I say that those of a philosophical ilk need to get out more. (I speak from experience.)

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On the other hand, there's "qualia": a nifty quantification of quality for those who are endowed with "quanta"-envy.

How many qualia are there to an experience of beauty? Or of the ugly? Or else ... wait for it ... there's no quality to experiences of either. This because materialism can't account for it save via intuition pumps.

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In short, bah humbug.

The way in which you frame your argument misses the mark. For example: A property, any property, is bound to the property specified. And so it cannot specify - be it part or in whole - that which is without bounds, else without limits.

As to the conclusion that it returns the "value 0, null, void, cipher, nought", I don't know what (absolute) infinity is other than via description of what it cannot be, which isn't saying much. As an interesting tidbit, though, the description of being without any limit (e.g., as in volumeless, period; neither infinitesimally small nor infinitely large, but volumeless) is ascribed by some in the field of physics to the supposed gravitational singularity from which the Big Bang is supposed to have commenced. (Not a cosmology I subscribe to, but, all the same, the idea goes that finitude causally emerged from lack of finitude via the Big Bang.)

At any rate, given your conclusion that:

It appears that, paradoxical and self-contradictory as it sounds, the mother of all infinity, the be all and the end all of infinity, the infinity of infinities, is the humble zero! — TheMadFool

In assuming that absolute infinity is the humble zero, the question remains: Is the humble zero something potential, something actual, or something other?

:razz:

my personal view is that 1) infinity is, by definition, endless 2) something endless can't be completed, obviously.

How then the notion of an actual infinity, completed as it must be? — TheMadFool

Putting another philosophical spin on things, infinity does, or at least can, translate into “without limit” or “without boundary”.

This creates a misnomer of sorts. For example, most all mathematical infinities are infinities that are limited in some way. A line has infinite extension, but only in one direction; in the perpendicular direction it is bounded and thereby holds the finitude specific to a line (thereby for example distinguishing it from a geometric plane). Likewise with 1/3: the limitless series of 3s that results is nevertheless bounded to the number specified by the fraction, and thereby results in the finitude of 3s following the decimal point.

These, then, are all limited infinities. In effect, when claiming the infinity of X, the X specified remains bounded and, thereby, limited to X. So the infinity addressed in all such cases can be deemed equivocal: “without limit” in some way but “with limit(s)” in another.

We as humans can however also fathom the notion of an absolute infinity (what some term "The Absolute"): that which unequivocally is without limit. But, since even our concepts are by necessity limited to the concept specified, no one can conceptually understand what (absolute) infinity might actually be.

And it is in this fuzzy, else mystical, notion of absolute infinity (infinity proper?) that the notion of God as actual infinity unfolds for many, or at least some. For example:

Cantor linked the Absolute Infinite with God,[1] and believed that it had various mathematical properties, including the reflection principle: every property of the Absolute Infinite is also held by some smaller object.[2] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absolute_Infinite

You may misunderstand. I don't believe consciousness is an independent entity with its own substance separate from matter and energy. Wayfarer does. — Philosophim

A comedy of misunderstandings. I assumed you thought this to be my stance. As to Wayfarer, I greatly doubt this, seeing how he is greatly inclined toward Buddhist thought.

I have nothing against panpsychism as a theory, as long as it reduces down to reality. — Philosophim

Hear, hear! As I previously mentioned somewhere in the thread, I'm still trying to grapple with the notion of panpsychism philosophically. @Kenosha Kid's last post speaks to some of the problematic issues with it. But it is so far a position I infer as being readily likely.

I do disagree with this. I know what my own consciousness is from my self-subjective view point. The problem is you seem to be describing consciousness in terms of senses. Consciousness is not light hitting my eyes or soundwaves hitting my ears. That's why its a hard problem. It likely requires its own language to communicate exactly what it is. Which is perfectly fine. As long as the models are in line with reality, postulating and inventing new models to describe consciousness is perfectly fine — Philosophim

Hmm. So, earlier today I finally uploaded my culminating chapter on consciousness's demarcation. And, as you state, it makes use of novel terms to express either what I take to be novel concepts or, else, to make cumbersome phrases (like, "a first-person point of view") more easily communicable in ordinary speech. One will likely also need to read, or skim, through the chapters leading up to it to get a better grasp of what is expressed. Extremely understandable if you're not inclined, but, if it tickles your fancy, I'd would welcome your feedback on the demarcations of consciousness I've offered. (I known. I'm now shamelessly self-promoting a work I've barely begun. But seeing how doing so is moderately acceptable on this forum, why not, right?)

So, if interested, here's the link: https://www.anenquiry.info/index.php/Chapter_7:_Demarcating_Consciousness

You might misunderstand this. Energy and mass are interchangeable mathmatically. The reason why we say light has no mass is due to the mathmatical conclusion that light travels at the maximum speed allowed. — Philosophim

Although physics isn't my strong point (much prefer the biological sciences) what I was alluding to is that we nevertheless conceptualize a photon as being a thing, an entity, when it scientifically doesn't quite fit the bill. As to its particle/wave duality, I've read papers expressing that enzymes can exhibit the same duality. Just now quickly found this reference online: https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/11/09/238365/a-natural-biomolecule-has-been-measured-acting-in-a-quantum-wave-for-the-first-time/

That said, I like process theory, so I'm biased toward this outlook. So maybe that explains the stance I've taken.

Now could we come up with a better model that relates the math to us? Quite possibly. The requirement however is that it must be mathamatically sound when applied to reality as well. This is the attempt by unified field theories. — Philosophim

Yes, of course.

I do agree that consciousness is real, but consciousness is a word that represents an identity we observe, but does not assert it is its own composed entity. We don't say, "matter, energy, and water" exist right? Water is made up of matter and energy. Consciousness is made up of matter and energy. Consciousness is not another form of existence separate from matter and energy. If someone claims this to be, they must provide evidence to counter the evidence that shows consciousness comes from the brain, which is made out of matter and energy. — Philosophim

I'll elaborate a bit on the stance I favor for the sake of clarity:

But first off, stop it with the "conscious is entity" strawman. I won't reply if you don't. For some, such as myself, the belief upheld is that - while consciousness is likely primary to matter (the latter being physical energy, and vice versa ... this per the e = mc2 dictum on which our modern physics by in large rests) - a) consciousness is NOT an entity and b) matter/physical energy nevertheless holds blatant reality on account of its causal interactions with all first-person sources of awareness. The objective idealism of C. S. Peirce should suffice as an example of this ontological outlook. It's not something that can be cogently presented within the sound-bite format of a debate forum, so I'm not inclined to here make a cogent case for it upon request. All the same, neither I - nor those who uphold Buddhist (or Buddhist-like) views, such as I interpret @Wayfarer to - in any way, shape, or form maintain consciousness to be an entity. Quite the contrary.

Approrops, as to the evolution of life from non-life within such an ontological system, one leading inference is that of panpsychism.

Nevertheless, within such a framework, there is no denial nor doubt that for the individual consciousnesses of individual organisms there is a bottom-up causal process between the substratum of living organic matter and what we experience as our personal awareness. So this "separateness from matter or energy" doesn't hold in the day to day reality we experience. It only holds when addressing the utterly existential issue of what is metaphysically primary to existence as a whole.

One possible question might be: "but where does this (non-entity) consciousness come from existentially?" This, however, is just as mysterious - as of yet unknown and possibly unknowable in principle - as is the parallel question that can be placed to physicalists: "but where does physical energy come from existentially?".

So we're implicitly coming from two different schemas that attempt to cogently explain the same commonly shared reality: Yours affirms physical energy/matter to be primary but cannot explain either why physical energy/matter is in the first place nor why consciousness occurs. The one I currently hold affirms that physical reality - replete with is many intricate causalities and the like - is a complex byproduct of awareness dispersed among innumerable coexistent first-person loci of awareness. Which - as our impartial, shared, physical reality - then causally limits, binds, and goads (including via births and deaths) these sources of awareness in manners that are not fully predetermined but, instead, are causally compatibiliistic. Thereby allowing for progressive top-down causation upon the physical reality which is our brains. Here, there is no hard problem of consciousness, this being a physicalist problem. The only quintessential issue is that of what awareness in general actually is and where it comes from - but this is just as unresolved as the same questions applied to a physicalist's energy. Explaining that energy is energy is just as in/valid as stating that awareness is awareness.

In short, when addressing myself at the very least, consciousness is not an entity and it is not causally untethered from the physical reality which, nevertheless, is a product of awareness's global occurrence - as is the case in a system of panphychism, for one example. As to the magicality of its being, it is no more and no less an instance of pure and unadulturated magic as is the occurence of energy within any system of physicalism. One takes one pick of magical component of reality. I tend to pick the former over the latter - for, if nothing else, it at least accounts for the reality of that by which everything else is cognized.

So, I've presented a rough outline of where I, personally, am presently coming from ontologically. I'm not here interested, however, in debating metaphysical systems - with physicalism most certainly being one such.

That said, staying on track with the thread's topic of the hard problem:

I do agree that consciousness is real, but consciousness is a word that represents an identity we observe, — Philosophim

We do not, cannot, observe our own identity as a conscious being. Consciousness is that which observes; and is never that which can be directly observed. If you disagree with this, what then does your consciousness look like, sound like, or smell like, etc., to you? (And if you jokingly tell me something along the lines of "like ice-cream", who could seriously take this to define what consciousness in general is?)

Again, the hard problem can be phrased as a problem in explaining how the observable can account for that which is unobservable but observes - and is thereby known to be real.

Processes are actions, and interactions with other entities. When an electron travels across a wire, we get the process of electricity. When that electron travels to your computer, and allows a signal to alter a logic gate, that is the process of computing. Processes are not separate from the matter and energy, they are the result of their interactions. These interchanges are matter and energy. — Philosophim

OK, but a photon is more basic than an electron, and a photon has no mass last I've heard, thereby not being matter, thereby not being an entity.

Then you get into Zero-Point Energy:

Zero-point energy (ZPE) is the lowest possible energy that a quantum mechanical system may have. Unlike in classical mechanics, quantum systems constantly fluctuate in their lowest energy state as described by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.[1] As well as atoms and molecules, the empty space of the vacuum has these properties. According to quantum field theory, the universe can be thought of not as isolated particles but continuous fluctuating fields: matter fields, whose quanta are fermions (i.e., leptons and quarks), and force fields, whose quanta are bosons (e.g., photons and gluons). All these fields have zero-point energy.[2] These fluctuating zero-point fields lead to a kind of reintroduction of an aether in physics,[1][3] since some systems can detect the existence of this energy; however, this aether cannot be thought of as a physical medium if it is to be Lorentz invariant such that there is no contradiction with Einstein's theory of special relativity.[1]

Physics currently lacks a full theoretical model for understanding zero-point energy; in particular, the discrepancy between theorized and observed vacuum energy is a source of major contention.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-point_energy

This so as to back up what I've previously said: Though the issue is open-ended, it very much seems to be the case that entities emerge from non-entity processes, of which we still know very little about. Thereby, to make this explicit, resulting in a process theory view of reality.

But will science ever be able to produce the state of being a bat, and then have us feel exactly what it is like to be a bat? Maybe not. That is not relevant to stating that consciousness is separate from the brain. — Philosophim

While I know that I didn't provide an in-depth account, given what I first mentioned in this post, maybe you might understand how claiming that I affirm "consciousness is separate from the brain" isa misinterpretation of my views. No, a human consciousness is causally tethered to the workings of its respective living brain; its just that, in the worldview I endorse, this relation is not epiphenomenal, and so can result in top-down causality upon the physical brain.

Now, when addressing "awareness" just as abstractly as when we address "physical energy/matter", then, and only then, the primacy of awareness comes into play - this, again, as far as the stance I currently uphold goes. But this existential generality of primacy should by not means be mistaken for a consciousness that is causally untethered from its respective central nervous system's workings.

I am stating that the only thing we have discovered in the universe is matter and energy, so those are the only things we can realistically analyze. Is it possible something else exists besides these? Sure, why not? What we know today could be contradicted tomorrow. But we can't talk realistically, and rationally, about things which we have no knowledge of being real. — Philosophim

Are you by this claiming that we do not know whether consciousness - via which we discover things such as matter and energy - is real? If not, please explain why we don't. If, however, you agree that we know consciousness is real, then we at minimum can claim to have discovered three things being real: matter, energy, and the consciousness via which these are known.

Everything that we know points to consciousness forming from the brain. So that is the only thing we can rationally discuss. You can propose that consciousness is some magical entity, but unless you can show some evidence of this magical entity being real, it is a fantasy, and not a rational argument. — Philosophim

Excuse the limitations of the English language via which this is expressed, but not everything will be a thing, i.e. an entity. Processes are for example known to occur, and a process - though being something - is not a thing/entity. The issue of whether processes are primary to existence or, else, entities are primary to existence - though open-ended - does not bode well for the primacy of entities.

By what logical argument would one pigeonhole consciousness into being an entity? This sounds very much like the type of reification that perspectives such as those of Buddhism oppose - and, needless to add, these perspectives are not physicalist.

As of yet, no. And they may never be able to. — Philosophim

Is this not the hard problem in a nutshell?

@Wayfarer, hope you don't mind me contributing for a little while.

Well, you could see this thread for an example of taking the idea further: even electrons have awareness of each other. As an intermediary point: even trees are aware of one another. The point befits the fact that human consciousness is a sophisticated kind of mammalian consciousness, which is a sophisticated kind of animal consciousness, which is a sophisticated kind of biological reactivity, which is a sophisticated set of chemical reactions, which are sophisticated sets of electromagnetic particle interactions. — Kenosha Kid

We're in accord here. Though I'm still trying to wrap my mind around it, so to speak, do you see how all this meshes with the notion of panpsychism?.

If I'm reading you right, you're talking about the third-person/first-person barrier. That is true. If you want to know what consciousness is, that is a third-person question. — Kenosha Kid

I prefer "fourth-person" as the idealized objective view - rather than "third-person", which to me implies "he, she, it (in the case of lesser animals) they, or them" ... all of which are deemed endowed with their own first-person awareness.

Still, maybe this presumption - that consciousness must and can only be understood via what I'll term fourth-person means - is at the crux of the issue. For a physicalist, this must be the case. For many a non-physicalist (I'll give C.S. Peirce like objective idealism as one example), despite the correlation between a human's CNS and a respective consciousness, this cannot ever be the case. Yes, in part because that which is first-person awareness is other relative to all it apprehends.

Of note, in so upholding, the physicalist by implication will then also uphold the stance of epiphenomenalism, right?. Here, top-down effects upon brain are an impossibility given the dictums which hold the worldview of physicalism together. Do you find this statement to be accurate?

Likewise an explanation for consciousness doesn't need to feel like consciousness. — Kenosha Kid

No, of course not. But it would need to give reasons for why tangible X, Y, and Z results in what it feels like to be conscious--rather than taking the latter occurrence for granted.

There's a difference between substance and function. There is a difference, for instance, in an electron and the movement of an electron. There is a difference between a computer and an executing program. You can't just look at the object, you have to look at what it does if you want to explain e.g. electric current, a machine learning algorithm, or consciousness. — Kenosha Kid

With that, now we're getting into metaphysical underpinnings - which could be disputed in multiple ways, depending on the vantage taken.

I was/am here only trying to differently present what the hubbub is about when it comes to the hard problem ... basically just aiming at the issue being better understood by supporters of Dennett et al.

Neurology is a physical discipline. It is not its job to satisfy metaphysicists any more than it's its job to satisfy creationists or dualists. If you're in principle satisfied that the science can isolate what consciousness is, not just correlates (including causal) of consciousness, but want a deeper understanding of why a thing that is something is that thing, which is not a question specific to consciousness at all, you ought to look to other metaphysicists, surely? Is there a specific aspect to consciousness that makes this special? — Kenosha Kid

I’ll try to reframe what is at issue in the hard problem of consciousness. I’m thinking maybe it might be of help. (Then again, it might not.)

A brain is tangible (to a consciousness); a consciousness is not tangible (to any consciousness).
Therein lies a, or maybe the, pivotal ontological difference—even when eschewing the issue of whether a consciousness can hold non-epiphenomenal, hence top-down, effects upon its own substratum of brain.

Tangentially, I’ll add that this thread's persistent reference to brains is overlooking the fact that even amebas hold an awareness of other: such as in an ameba’s capacity to discern what is relative to itself a predator from what is a prey. And that coupled with this awareness of other is a forethought of how to best act towards that which is apprehended as other by it (again, as example, a predator or a prey) so as to maximize its own stability of being. To evade, an ameba needs to foresee how to best evade the moment by moment activities of its predator; likewise to consume pray, it needs to foresee how to best sabotage the moment by moment activities of its prey (which can be smaller amebas). In cases such as that of the unicellular ameba, there is no nervous system involved in the awareness that takes place. And how the single-celled corpus of an ameba brings about a concordant (intangible) amebic-awareness replete with degrees of forethought is anybody’s guess. Point being, first-person awareness is not strictly contingent on living brains.

That mentioned, there’s no doubt that the processes of a central nervous system correlate with those of its respective consciousness—in addition to correlating to the occurrence of a consciousness’s subconscious or unconscious mind. (Despite their awareness of givens such as environmental factors, the latter two aspects of a total mind are not commonly addressed as being of themselves conscious: consciousness being instead reserved for the first-person awareness held by each of us—rather than for our sub- or unconscious mind’s awareness of givens.)

Again, though, we can empirically study the workings of the brain all we want. And, in so doing, we will undoubtably gain greater insights into the bottom-up processes in which the workings of a living brain can result in a respective consciousness (not all living brains do, with coma as an easily addressed example). Nonetheless, the physical brain and all it does will forever be tangible percepts which we perceive as other relative to us as the consciously aware observers. Whereas our living brain and its processes are tangible percepts, the consciousness aware of them is not tangible even to itself. And all our empirical knowledge—including of brains—stems from, and is ontologically dependent on, the occurrence of (always intangible) consciousness.

If, simplistically put, a living brain is identical to a consciousness, they then should both be either tangible or, else, intangible. But they hold different ontological properties in this respect; they are not identical.

Explaining how that which is perceived and is thereby tangible accounts for that which perceives and is intangible will, then, be one vantage to what the hard problem of consciousness is about.

There's a gap - something that we aren't measuring in our computational analysis.

I'm wondering what theories there are that specifically address the question of measuring this gap. — Malcolm Lett

How to measure what remains of the hard problem. Maybe by using the upper left side of a measuring stick that is fit for the task but has yet to be discovered?

The framing, after all, presupposes that consciousness is something measurable and therefore quantifiable. For if it isn’t quantifiable than it can’t be measured. And if it can’t be measured than it can’t be properly termed scientific – most vexing for those who equate that which is real strictly to that which is physical and thereby amiable to quantification by the sciences.

As to the magnitude (as in lesser or greater) of, for example, a particular conscious desire - wherein the difference between slightly wanting and desperately wanting some given X ought to be measurable to the minds of many - there of course is the option of decrying “desire” to be a false concept upheld by the stupidity of folk-psychology (often interpreted by the masses as plain commonsense) that must thereby be fully eliminated from the equation of what is real (equations being quantitatively computable, as is any materialist reality) or, alternatively, there’s always the search for that elusive, magical measuring device, previously alluded to, by whose use all aspects of consciousness can at last be scientifically quantified through and through.

Intensities of happiness and suffering, of beauty and the grotesque, of our sense of justice or injustice, even of our awareness of good and bad, these are all mathematically computable states of conscious being after all, right? No more and no less. We just need to find the correct means of measuring their quantitative, and therefore computational, nature, that’s all. But when we do, the gap will at long last be resolved.

And all this would be upheld by principles other than that of a blind metaphysical faith in what is – one that is on par to that maintained by any opposing party, even that of (heavens forbid) anything one can deride as mysticism.

For one can in practice prove that everything, including consciousness, is quantitative.

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If anyone’s reading, don’t mind me too much in all this. Tis a post intended for no one in particular. And if I’ve unintentionally made a strawman of anyone’s position, please feel free to elaborate on how. Was just passing through as someone who’s a stickler for the notion that not all aspects of what is real are measurable in principle, much less in practice. And yes, to me consciousness, as in "that which is conscious of", serves as one example of something immeasurable - despite admitting to different magnitudes.

You are poor, or even miserable; empathy, humbleness, and other of these "virtues" would not help you out of this state at all. — Gus Lamarch

Think I've read this before. It does not address the question posed, but gives one specific hypothetical where, it would so seem, being a merciless and arrogant person are endorsed. Why wouldn't empathy and humility greatly assist in getting hired at the job interview if one is poor, for one example. Or in getting others' assistance if one is miserable.

As it is, I'll take a break from this conversation.

There is nothing wrong with being an unconscious selfish, I just think that if you became aware of that fact, and accepted your nature, you would be a better person. — Gus Lamarch

OK. So how do you find that everyone’s increased selfishness will lead to improved conditions for selves?

FYI, survival of the most selfishly powerful as being those most fit – this at everyone else’s expense - easily comes to mind. Sadism could fit the bill nicely. Still, I’m open to being surprised by your answer.

There we got to another point that I don't know if this discussion would be the right place, but it is the fact that selfishness had been a virtue that we - humans - have distorted so much to the point of becoming a concept seen as evil. It is a good start to have discussed with me and to let yourself try to understand what I say. Many here do not try to do it. — Gus Lamarch

Please don’t misunderstand. Trying to better understand your point of view does not equate to me agreeing with it.

The person in question that would sacrifice itself could have been "rightful" on his motives to do it - as being certain that he was doing something that was not egoist - but in the end - unconsciously - the only motive for his actions was one of egoism - maybe eternalizing his person forever to the one saved? Maybe to righ something he had done wrong for someone that the person he was saving knew, etc... the possibilities are endless -. — Gus Lamarch

Or one could sacrifice one's ego for the benefit of a whole of which one's ego is but one constituent of. Some soldiers have been known to do this. Sometime for love of one's country. Sometime for the love of some ideal, such as that of democracy. The ego here holds part of its identity as that which inheres into something greater than itself ... and can willfully sacrifice its own life for it.

Understand: - I am not saying that people cannot or should not be altruistic, empathetic, humble, etc ... I am just saying that indirectly, these same actions are the result of the individual's selfish will, even if they do not know that and are acting as if they were virtuous, and seen by society as good people. — Gus Lamarch

The example I just tried to illustrate depicts what is commonly appraised as virtue. Not a mere acting as if one were.

I'm not yet certain, but, from one vantage, I think I can get what you mean. As egos we are at the center of the world we experience. Hence, your use of the term "egocentrism". Even so, altruism, empathy, humility are commonly described as selfless endeavors. This being shorthand for "less selfish than those endeavors that are the opposite" or something to the like.

There's a difference between, for example, being empathetic and pretending to be. The first is deemed to be a virtue in most cases, the second not. The first is commonly deemed a selfless endeavor, the second a selfish endeavor.

If you endorse things such as altruism and empathy, are you confident that you use of selfishness is an accurate description of what you want to present?

To me, and doubtless to many others, your use of selfish to describe things such as altruism and empathy makes no sense. Selfishness describes the opposite of these things.

We could say that through the term "tree" we would both be talking about the same concept - a tree - and the same object - the tree itself, as being in the universe - however that would be pure speculation by comparison. — Gus Lamarch

I feel you've overlooked my argument. For starters, we could not converse were we to not hold many of the same experienced understandings, for instance, regarding what a majority of these terms mean. But so be it.

The development of the feeling of love for a being other than yours, the egoism- here, referring it only to the love for another person - grows and gets stronger and stronger - if it is an exemplary relationship, something utopian, of course -. And it is to be believed that your partner also has his selfishness exacerbated if he feels in the same dose as you. — Gus Lamarch

I get the feeling you're conflating esteem and heightened well-being with selfishness.

How then do you account for altruism (such as in cases where love is to be found)? Does one willfully sacrifice one’s being out of an interest to optimally preserve the very same being one sacrifices?

Your perception remains the same through the movement through time. You - here understand as your ego, conscience, individuality - remains you intact through the change of "form". You do not have lapses of mileseconds of different personalities, ways of being, etc ... because time passes and with it you change, no, what makes you an "I" remains fixed. — Gus Lamarch

Difference and sameness are for me not as simple as you present them to be. Yes, we remain the same over time, granted, but in which way? Most everything about us changes over time, and no two moments we experience are identical in their details.

The point is that there is no scientific, philosophical, theoretical, etc ... evidence that you - your self - can somehow come and take my place in space within the Universe. — Gus Lamarch

In using terms such as “evidence”, by which I take to mean modern understandings of empirical evidence, you are setting up the goal post in a way that necessarily leads to the conclusion you want. The same tree cannot be seen in the same way by you or me due to our different bodily locations in space. But sensory information does not exhaust the spectrum of givens which are termed experiences. The faculty of understanding is one such example. To understand the theory of evolution, for example, is neither to see it, smell it, touch it, taste it, nor hear it. That said, how can you demonstrate that your understanding of tree is not an identical experience to my own? I presume you can’t. And if our experienced understanding of tree were to in fact be completely unique to each of us, we could not then be referencing the same thing by this empirically apprehended term.

Same applies to what we term feelings. The more complex ones, such as sweet sorrow, are shared by fewer. But the more basic feelings, such as that of pleasure, are universally shared by all. Pleasure in response to what stimuli will differ among individuals, as will its nuances, but all individuals will feel the same thing in terms of what we term pleasure as a state of conscious being.

If one were to solely focus on the differences to each instantiation of pleasure, the concept of pleasure would lose all meaning.

I thank you for taking the time to debate with me respectfully. — Gus Lamarch

You’ve so far been neither rude nor insulting. Simply replying in kind … and starting off by presuming a better case scenario rather than a worse one.

Yes. Love is too, an act of egoism. — Gus Lamarch

Thank you for the honest reply. So, the more one loves, the more egoistic one becomes?

I can be a different person with each passing second, however, the death of my cells and the creation of new ones does not negate the fact that my "I" is the only one to witness these changes. — Gus Lamarch

You are a different person, a different "I", with each miliisecond as well. But this does not address why or how you nevertheless remain the same person, the same "I", throughout. Not such if you're understanding what I'm here addressing, so I'll drop it for the time being.

No other being in existence can feel, and experience my existence in transition through time. — Gus Lamarch

Not when it comes to many of the details regarding these experiences, but these details can well be argued accidental and not essential to that which is you (as an "I") through time. When it, for example, comes to things such as belief that cats are termed cats in English, or to the very experiencing of being as a being, we both feel/experience the exact same thing. In the latter two cases, my experiences are identical to yours, and yours to mine. No uniqueness whatsoever. Uniqueness only presents itself in the differences, which then divide, or ration, or give boundary to, some given from some other.

Experiences can be shared. And some experiences are universal to all beings by sheer virtue of such being beings. How would you disagree with this, if you do disagree?

Loving is the act of using - and being used - as an object by another selfish individual other than yours; — Gus Lamarch

This is diametrically opposite to that which I'm referring to. Language can be a funny thing. Cats can be termed dogs and dogs cats if there is common consensus. But we two so far have no common consensus on what the term love references. So, you are denying the reality of that which I described in my previous post, yes?

[...] that the other is not and cannot be part of what makes you unique and be able to deal with that fact. — Gus Lamarch

"Unique" can be a vacuous term when it comes to identity. No two sunrises have ever been exactly the same - some stand out, others don't; some are tumultuous, others are tranquil; etc. - and so each sunrise in the history of sentience on this planet has been unique. Notwithstanding, all sunrises are exactly the same in being just that, sunrises. Same can be said of romantic love affairs, or of parental love, and so forth.

What makes you you? The you of four minutes past was a unique constituency (be it of givens such as intentions and percepts or of brain and bodily states, take your pick if needed) that is not the same you of the present moment. Yet you are the same, quote-unquote, unique you. How so?

Also, all these virtuous acts - unconsciously, or consciously - are done selfishly - you help others not because you love them, but because seeing them well accomplishes you individually -. — Gus Lamarch

You here deny the reality of love. I think I can see why. Love as a pure ideal is an unadulterated selflessness of being, is being sans ego; and, in practice, the degree of love one holds for other(s) will in due measure make one less selfish and more selfless in respect to those loved. I’m not here talking about having the hots for another, nor about love of inanimate objects like money or ice cream. I’m talking about compassion, valuing of another not as an instrument toward one’s own selfish interests but for their own sake as fellow beings, and the like. When we willingly risk and sometimes sacrifice the welfare of our own self for some other solely out of a desire that they are not harmed, this is the effect of love in dire times. And with love comes first an openness and then a craving to see the world through someone else’s eyes. When mutually shared, love binds egos into a greater self. Such that when one’s loved child, parent, lover, or friend dies so too dies a part of one’s own self.

In short, you’re denying the reality of love because love is the destroyer of ego in beings that yet are. And this runs counter to the thesis you’re presenting.

Do correct me if I’m wrong regarding your stance on love.

Ps. I say this without denying that first-person points of view are just that. But when we close our eyes and stop focusing on specific percepts of the external world, we can find ourselves being of the same (or nearly the same) first person point of view as others in terms of the values and beliefs which define what might well be our core identity.

My conscious mind is saying "do something knew", but the unconscious is what dictates what I actually do. So maybe that's determinism? Idk. — Noble Dust

Odd. My experiences are different. I'm more apt at painting (not claiming to be good at either). I start with a general idea or intent of what I want to convey and how I want it conveyed. Then reality bites in terms of implementation. Here there are creative dry spells and creative eureka moments. And there are alternatives I'm presented with. Based on what is most true to me - true in a more artistic sense of truth being aesthetics and the aesthetic being true - I then make my choices of how to compose my piece. The final product is then always a conflux of me as conscious choice maker and my subconscious as provider of often contradictory ideas between which I choose.

I wouldn't address this as determinism, though. Then again, I'm one to uphold the common sense version of freewill.

But doesn't the conscious self serve an active creative role in manifesting the final product, this via the choices taken? — javra

I don't know what you mean. — Noble Dust

Does the just mentioned better clarify what I was getting at?

The subconscious is made up of all sorts of things; the (sort of?) conscious part of the brain makes signs and symbols out of this subconscious stuff. What this stuff is or means is anyone's game; rather, it's the game of art interpretation...or expression? Yeah, who decides, really? — Noble Dust

When one composes music, one's subconscious gives one possibilities of what note to play next and the like. In the creative process, isn't the conscious self that which decides on which of these alternative possibilities to make actual at expense of all others?

Agreed that creativity is neither random nor deterministic. But doesn't the conscious self serve an active creative role in manifesting the final product, this via the choices taken?

Ideas as I speak of them are images of possible, yes; — Pfhorrest

Can’t say that your notion of idea matches with mine. What makes a mental image an idea but a mental sound (else an imagined smell, taste, or tactile feel) not an idea? There are also mental representations of the actual, rather than the possible, and these seem to me to be ideas as well. Furthermore, many ideas are thoroughly abstract, and as such lack tangible sensory information, including those of mental images. The idea of arbitrariness serves as one example.

the claim that reality matches one of those images is something beyond a mere idea, it is something one can do with an idea. — Pfhorrest

To claim that an idea is accordant to reality is indeed to engage in a doing, yes, but the state of affairs that the idea is accordant to reality is not something which we do, i.e. is not something which we produce or else in any way originate. Moreover, how can one obtain a correspondence to reality in the absence of some idea which so corresponds? (But this question might be colored by our different understanding of "idea".)

Still, this is why I hold that we discover truths sans our creation of them. More tersely expressed, truths are uncreated aspects of the world … that, again, can solely be discovered.

So truths and lies are different ways ideas are employed, but not themselves ideas. — Pfhorrest

You however conclude that truths are not ideas but what we do with ideas. Maybe there’s something lost in my translation of this statement. For instance, the idea that “planet Earth has trees on it” can be either a truth or a falsity given what employment(s) of it?

I wouldn’t say that that means ideas are discovered-only though, because the act of finding the content of an idea is also an act of creating an instance of it, which is why I don’t think the two can really be distinguished. — Pfhorrest

In trying to better grasp the notion you're presenting:

Common sense has it that the truths we discern are discovered, but are not in any way givens we create or originate. Likewise, common sense has it that the lies we tell are inventions, i.e. that they are alternate realities we come up with, are ideas that we create or originate, which we furthermore intentionally peddle to others as full scale truths (unlike fables and allegories, which are acknowledged to be of human creation but intend to tell often deeper, but always uncreated, truths via our fabrications as vehicle for the telling of these truths).

While I disagree with the following, I can somewhat understand the metaphysical position that would uphold all lies to be discovered within an ocean of boundless potentiality, or un-bounded possibility. This as though each possibility were itself an actuality awaiting to be discovered?

However, this yet leaves truths unaddressed. If the obtainment or all ideas occurs via a hybridization between discovery and creation, and if truths are ideas that correspond to reality (here taking explicitly held beliefs to be ideas), are truths then also partly of our creation?

But then - if both truths and untruths are ideas which we in part create and in part discover - how would one go about distinguishing the obtainment of truths from the obtainment of untruths?

Especially pertinent when considering that the untruths we would be discovering (rather than strictly creating) would themselves correspond to aspects of a reality consisting of boundless potentiality. Hence, they would themselves then correspond to reality.

Maybe I phrased some or most of this improperly. Still, there to me seems to be an important dichotomy between, for example, the discovery of truths and the invention of truths.

Couldn't agree more on maths (as well as the quantity and quantitative relations which it references) not being a deity ... nor, for that matter, a pivotal, or else essential, foundation of Being. — javra

By all means use numbers, even marvel at their proficiency, but please stop claiming they are a secret, comic language of the universe. — JerseyFlight

There is a reading incomprehension in all this. Unpleasant and unproductive.

Quantity does not equal mathematics. Humans have produced a symbolic structure to try to make sense of quantity. — JerseyFlight

Can you address a quantity without making use of number? Given an example if you can.

What I said is the mathematics is the language of quantity and its relations. Not that quantity equals mathematics. Read what I say the second time around with more care. Else no second reply from me.

But arguing for this is above my current pay-grade. — javra

Then you should easily be able to provide an example of two things that are exactly the same? — JerseyFlight

Two instantiations of an abstract entity are exactly the same in reference to both being the same abstract entity. Hence, one table and another table are both exactly the same in being a table.

But this latter part is beside the point - and also seems to be another misreading of what I wrote.

I'm contesting the seemingly common notion that such mental creativity can only come from sort of non-deterministic process, the likes of which for instance could not possibly ever be programmed into an AI. — Pfhorrest

Yes, I get that. I was intending to present a viable possibility of creation in fact being such a form of non-deterministic process. Of course, in a fully deterministic worldview, both the novel idea and the manifestation of it in physical realms will be fully deterministic. Creativity, or creation - of an artifact or of the idea(s) that are used to actualize it - however specifies that that which creates X will originate X of its own momentary being. And, again, such causal mechanism (when not rejected on grounds of determinism) can neither be random nor fully deterministic.

As to strong AI, I'm of the opinion that were such to ever be actual, it would necessarily then be endowed with the same causal ability of creation that we humans are sometimes quite apt at.

But if your approaching the issue from a preestablished worldview of determinism, the viable possibility I'm mentioning will be denied a priori due to the confirmation bias of the worldview held. Question then becomes one of whether determinism is the only viable possibility. But I don't want to argue this at present.

To be a mathematical supernaturalist you simply need to hold to the position that numbers are more than human symbols, that they are something we discover weaved into the fabric of the cosmic universe, as oppose to something we create in an attempt to understand and navigate the universe. — JerseyFlight

Mathematics is a formalized language of quantity. Sans quantity, no maths. The latter can be readily disproven by one example of a non-quantifiable mathematics.

Though we can produce symbols via which to convey mathematical concepts, we do not likewise willfully produce the universe’s attribute of being endowed with quantity. Therefore, at least some of the mathematics we know of is “something we discover being weaved into the cosmic universe”—this in correspondence to how quantity and its relations is so weaved. (And there’s a lot of maths which isn’t, especially when entertaining the nearly boundless forms that theoretical mathematics can take.)

That claimed:

What then does mathematical supernaturalism entail? The straight-forward confession that one worships math and that math is a God? I think not. — JerseyFlight

:up: Couldn't agree more on maths (as well as the quantity and quantitative relations which it references) not being a deity ... nor, for that matter, a pivotal, or else essential, foundation of Being. But arguing for this is above my current pay-grade.

Even when granting that infinite possibilities eternally exist (if I'm not misunderstanding your claim), there is yet a limited, and hence finite, set of what can be, or else is, actual—limited both by time and space when addressing physical givens; yet again quite arguably limited existentially when addressing metaphysical givens (such as can be argued for actual, rather than what we epistemically consider to be possible, laws of thought).

We as sentient beings not only discover possibilities but actualize realities (not reality in the singular; rather real events or states of affair in the plural). Our actualization of some such realities is then an act of invention, else stated of creation—for the actualization did not exist prior to our instantiation of it nor would it have existed as it does without our instantiation of it. Artists, for one example, are known for and expected to accomplish such feats. Yes, some of the actualized art was discovered by the conscious artist (e.g., the notion that a statue was already preformed within the marble or wood comes to mind); but, generally speaking, creation, and hence invention, played at least an equal role in the artwork’s manifestation—and hence in the idea(s) the artwork conveys. In this example, the artist caused their artwork to come into being.

So it’s known, I’m in no way disagreeing with the notion that we are bound by a limited, finite, set of both physical and metaphysical actualities (rather than possibilities) which we hold the capacity to discover. In other words, I agree that we are bound by reality (in the singular). Yet given these existential boundaries, there is nothing to evidence that we as individual sentient beings, and as collectives of such, do not also create actualities—and thereby cause them to come into being.

You’re right, though. Creation of X translates into the causal origination of X—even when this creation is influenced by myriad givens. And such causal mechanism, when address without bias toward its being or not being, can logically neither be that of randomness nor of a full determinacy.

Here's what Hobbes said the Leviathan:

...when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an incorporeal body, or (which is all one) an incorporeal substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all (Hobbes 1655, 4.20–1).

The passage by Thomas Hobbes probably isn't going convince non-materialists that materialism is true, yet I think this might be an excellent place to start. Let this be a challenge for the non-materialists to provide a definition of incorporeal substances, which makes it clear that it isn't inconsistent. — Wheatley

The issue of substance has already been addressed. As to “incorporeal body”, this will be a contradiction in terms only when “body” is itself interpreted as strictly referencing material givens. This as the Latin “corpus” does, tmk at least.

However, the English term “body” can also signify, “A coherent group; a unified collection of details, knowledge, or information” as in, for example, a body of evidence.

Now suppose the hypothetical of an incorporeal self—with possible examples including angels and deities—things we can all imagine despite disagreements on the ontological possibility of such. Here, then, you can coherently declare each of these to be an “incorporeal body”—such that the body addressed references a coherent bundle of information, or knowledge, pertaining to some consciousness that is devoid of material attributes. There is yet a self that stands in dualistic relation to that which is not-self, to other, but this self and its properties will (in the conjectures here specified) be fully immaterial and, thereby, incorporeal. The extents of this immaterial self will here be the given self’s immaterial body, standing in contrast to that which is other.

Without intending to argue for one side or the other, and regardless of one’s ontological stance on the possibility of such incorporeal beings, when thus interpreted the term “incorporeal body” is thoroughly consistent, rather than being self-contradictory.

Why is it something no one would ever say? — Srap Tasmaner

Hoping this hasn't been previously addressed in this long thread:

We would say “It’s raining” when we do not believe it is raining whenever we would intend to lie to another about what the given state of affairs is. But since acknowledging one is lying while actively lying defeats the very intention of lying which one is engaged in, and since we in practice cannot experience intending to lie while simultaneously intending not to lie (this being a contradiction), saying “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it’s raining” is something no one would ever say in earnest.

But, then, in so arguing I find that the statement, “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is,” is contradictory in terms of the intentions it implies on the part of the speaker who so affirms.

And people make conception of you based on social group you are in, and assume that you gathered bad karma to be born in low class, what can be used as a tool to marginalization, and mainly lower classes suffers from this.

So karma thinking can lead into dangerous ideas. — batsushi7

Yes, but the same can be said, for example, of the Abrahamic notion of Grace (as in "God's chosen"). IMO, most any formalized system of ethics, theistic or atheistic, can be sophistically misapplied by those with authoritarian power to further their own power over others.

My thoughts are that karma ought never to be the source of blame or of resignation. If you say 'it's their karma' or 'it's my karma' to rationalise misfortune or place blame, then it's a pretty repugnant theory. — Wayfarer

Not only repugnant, but also incoherent.

For example, when adopting the perspective of karma, it has always appeared to me that being uncompassionate toward others who experience unjust plights—notably, this on account of what one perceives to be the bad karma they’ve accumulated from previous lifetime(s))—will be, in and of itself, a conscious intention that results in one’s own future bad karma.

Reawakening as a newborn which grows up within a future society that is at best insidiously vein and at worst sociopathically uncompassionate—a future society one has helped to bring about by one’s own actions in this lifetime—to me is one example of what bad karma might be like. And being uncompassionate toward others who unjustly suffer in this lifetime would be what helps precipitate such future society one would be re-birthed into. (Again, all this from the vantage of karma.)

----

Also, more generally, while karma as applied to individual egos might be questionable (either in terms of intra- or cross-lifetimes), how is collective karma—wherein the current generation of egos creates the good or bad circumstances for subsequent generations of egos that have yet to be birthed—something that can be doubted? Here, simplistically expressed, one generation of human awareness gets re-birthed into a future generation of human awareness whose circumstances were produced by the former generation.

Then again, under the worldview of karma, the egos of today will reawaken as the conscious beings of tomorrow—again, in a world that is (at least in part) the consequence of today’s sum of intentions and actions. Thereby seeming to tie in such collective karma to the karma of individual egos.

I'm not following; in what sense does this signify that they might be wrong or not? — Isaac

That we might be genetically hardwired for X (e.g., perception of bent sticks when placed in water), that we have been habituated as kids into upholding X (e.g., for most of us older folks, that Santa Clause is real ... one can substitute an omnipotent deity if one wants), and that some X can be asymptotic to phenomenal data (e.g., one's upholding physicalism rather than idealism or vice versa in relation to some tree or rock), does not of itself then signify that the X addressed is beyond the purview of being correct or wrong. Sticks do not bend in water, Santa Clause is not real, and we do live in a world that can be physicalist, idealist, or other but not all at the same time and in the same respect.

An example: efficient causation as defined by Hume (which is subtly different from Aristotle's in arguably important ways). We were born in a culture that upholds it as fact. People ask questions, such as "how did it all begin". Here, this metaphysical conviction we imprinted via habit into our being does not, of itself, serve to answer the question. Hence, our metaphysical conviction (typically for most) that such efficient causation and only such efficient causation is factual might - or might not - be a fallacy. (We know it is cultural because other former cultures did not live by this belief regarding what is causally real - e.g., teleology was not denied in Aristotle's time)

Changing the metaphysical parameters used then changes the possibilities of addressing this question that most humans have asked themselves at one point or another: as one example that sometimes floats about, what if creation ex nihilo is factual? But this, where it true, would then hold other implications which, for many, are unwarranted (such that, then, logically, anything might be created from nothingness, and by nothingness, at any time and place for no discernable reason whatsoever).

Both the aforementioned perspectives regarding causation are equally metaphysical. Given the principle of noncontradiction, they cannot both be correct at the same time and in the same respect. One or both of these metaphysical positions will, then, be wrong.

(Please do dissociate my own metaphysical beliefs (which are not here the issue) regarding causation from the one example of causation just provided.)

but I can't see a way in which any could be more true without their having some consequence, which puts them (at least theoretically) within the remit of scientific investigation. — Isaac

Are there such things as upheld beliefs that have no psychological impact on the being that upholds them? I can't think of any at the moment. For instance, one's beliefs - be they tacit or explicit - will in part determine how empirical data is interpreted (this without altering the empirical data all can agree on). For example, if one beliefs in ex nihilo creation, one can then believe that a seen rock was created ex nihilo minutes prior to the rock being seen - without negating the presence of the rock as it is seen.

Such psychological impact, being first and foremost present within the mind of the individual, will then be in the purview of the empirical sciences only via empirical data obtained - for one example, via CAT scans*. Which does not give an account of this psychological impact when devoid of preexisting beliefs (and their respective psychological impact) held by sentient observers of the data: e.g., that other sentient observers share some of the core ontological properties of being that one oneself holds will be one such belief (for we are not solipsists - itself a contradiction in terms) - e.g., I'm a conscious being, and so are you.

* For better precision, we may here need to enter into discussions/debates of what the cognitive sciences require. Not yet certain is this is what is intended to be of focus. IMO, it would deviate too much from the topic. All the same, I'm gonna take a breather from debates for the time being.

That we have what you're calling 'metaphysical' assumptions does not mean that we have some task of establishing them which must preceed their use. It may be that they're hard-wired, it may be that they're learnt unreflectively in early childhood, it may be that they are asymptotic with regards to phenomenal experience... — Isaac

Of course, which in turn signifies that they might be wrong. Or not.

I don't follow how a metaphysical belief as you describe them could be in accordance or not with reality. Accordance with reality has to be measurable (otherwise what form would the discordance take?) as such any discordance would be a scientific consideration. Any purely metaphysical position is, by definition, such that it has no affect whatsoever on reality. If it did we could at least theoretically detect that effect and so model it scientifically. — Isaac

Using the standards you've presented, why then all the debates about whether, for one example, physicalism or idealism is true? And if this is to you nonsensical to ask, why then uphold any such or related position as true?

Your reply is in relation to things I do not disagree with - and I'm tempted to believe is instead a strawman.

The pattern-recognition you reference has nothing to do with whether physicalism, idealism, or some other ontological system is true - or else with what types of causality (efficient, teleological, formal, material as just some examples) are true - or else with the nature of time (e.g., presentist, eternalist, or what not) - or else with what laws of thought (law of identity, of noncontradiction, of excluded middle) are true - or else with the nature of self as that which is conscious of (e.g., it being a machine or not).

May I be corrected if wrong on this count.

For improved clarity of my position: That we have historically established a set of metaphysical beliefs X which have been used to engage in the modern empirical sciences we have; which, in turn, have empirically evidenced themselves to be fruitful in innumerable (but by no means all) ways; does not negate the fact that today's empirical sciences are necessarily founded on metaphysical beliefs X - this in the plural. These metaphysical beliefs have historically included that of physicalism, of efficient causation as defined by Hume at the expense of teleological causation and with a negation of free will as illusion, of block time, often enough of the self being a complex epiphenomenal automaton, i.e. machine, and till recently, a fervent belief in causal determinism.

None of these beliefs can be obtained as brute facts via "pattern-recognition" - and will all require metaphysical interpretation to determine what is and what is not the case - for none are universally apprehended as is the optical illusion you've re-posted. And, as beliefs go, these historically foundational metaphysical beliefs might, or might not, be fully accordant to reality.

Not at all. In fact, we are biased the other way. — Kenosha Kid

Really, we're innately biased (as machines, no less) to be causally deterministic? Then how is it that most people hold onto the bias of being endowed with some form and degree of free will?

The above answers this also. — Kenosha Kid

It doesn't answer why one set of innate biases ought to be accepted on face value while another form of communal bias ought not.

I respond that, on the contrary, metaphysical explanations and justifications for determinism instead rely on the empirical fact that the balls fell to the floor ninety-nine times. — Kenosha Kid

You do understand that these same empirical facts can be used to justify systems of causality that are not causally deterministic. For instance, to justify a causal system of indeterminism-based compatibilitism (as Hume can be argued to have upheld), this in contrast to a determinism-based compatibilism (as compatibilism is generally understood nowadays).

One's presumption of causal determinism - just as with one's presumption of physicalism - will be fully metaphysical, rather than empirical.

Then again, there's more to life and existence than balls dropping. Intentions serve as one example.

How do empirical observations of balls and such determine that our intentions - which always intend, and are driven by, some goal - are in fact not teleological (and this without the use of metaphysical considerations and conclusions)?

Trying to find out if I should reevaluate my opinion of Descartes.

Because the the OP is directly from Descartes, proper critiques of it should follow from Descartes as well. In the two sections following his infamous assertion, he qualifies his intentions thus:

[...]

“....I take the word ‘thought’ to cover everything that we are aware of as happening within us, and it counts as ‘thought’ because we are aware of it...” — Mww

He states this clarification after the fact, but how does it apply to the very argument he provides in his Meditations for the cogito? Last I recall, it was argued by something along the lines of “I can’t doubt that I doubt”. Extending Descartes’s demon, though, it can be conceived that one’s own doubts which one can’t doubt having are, in fact, completely an effect that is fully produced by the demon – thereby failing to demonstrate with the sought after certainty that these doubts one sense to be one's own are in fact one’s own. If it is not “I” but the demon’s thoughts, the proposition of “I think” would then be false. (This, ironically, hinges on the issue of who, or what, causes the thoughts, or doubts, to be.)

BTW, I’ve been spewing this about for a while now, so I’m fully on board with the proposition that one’s own awareness (of anything) evidences that one is while aware. This would then include one’s awareness of any doubts (regardless of any Cartesian skepticism regarding their cause).

On a different note, given this quoted affirmation from Descartes, one’s emotions would be classified as a portion of one’s thoughts. But this so far seems to be a category error. Again, especially when taking his Meditation arguments into account.

In any case in the sciences and technologies causation is assumed in most of our explanations and doings, and working from that assumption complex and highly predictively successful systems of explanation, which are also (mostly) coherent with each other have been developed. What more would you ask of science?

It is inapt to ask for proof of scientific theories; proof is appropriate in logic and mathematics, not, for the most part, in science. What Hume showed is that causation is not logically necessary. — Janus

From the interpreted tonality, I get a feeling you might be expecting me to disagree? I don't. As a subtle reminder, I'm a die-hard fallibilist - which, as an epistemic stance, to me encapsulates logic and mathematics as well. Degrees of certainty ranging between perfect certainty and perfect doubt, with these two extremes not being obtainable by any ego. A different issue though.

My contention was and remains that the empirical sciences are founded upon a non-empirical (said for emphasis only) metaphysics - a metaphysical system of beliefs which are not in themselves, nor can they be, the subject of study for empirical sciences. And I listed causality as a prime example of this.

Personally, at least, I take the empirical sciences to be mute on that branch of ontology which classifies reality into physicalism, idealism, neutral monism, and the like. And, imv, so should it be. The elephant in the room, however, is that most of the scientific community (a guesstimate) also subscribes to some form of physicalism as foundational metaphysics. But then it somehow gets insisted by many that physicalism is not a metaphysical stance - but is instead a worldview which is substantiated by the empirical sciences ... which are, again, grounded in metaphysical understandings such as those of causation.

At any rate, my position, in sum, is that the empirical sciences are inescapably bound to a foundation of metaphysical beliefs. That empirical science devoid of metaphysical understandings is an impossibility. Do you find disagreement in this?

Have to get going for now, but what meaningful import does the OP hold other than affirming something along the lines of, "I think, therefore I have thoughts"?

On these pretenses it has to ring true because only you are experiencing the exact experience as you. — Lif3r

I think I get what you're saying, in which case, again, sure. But is this quote there might be implied something that does not ring true: my experiences of a physical item, though being from my own unique perspective, is shared with all other sentient beings in that all will tacitly or explicitly agree (minimally via behaviors) that the same physical item is. A different way of saying this is that there can be no personal realities (in the plural) were it not for a commonly shared, singular, and impartial reality ... which we presume to know to at least some degree.