What confuses me to no end is the word combination, inter and subjectivity. I immediately think of oxymorons like bitter-sweet and the movie True Lies. :smile:

The word "inter" suggests a group of people and the word "subjectivity" is usually associated with one person. — TheMadFool

The same can be said of “interpersonal”.

All forms of human intercourse are interpersonal – yes, sex, but also commerce and communication, and so forth - wherein two or more persons in some way or another and to some extent converge to traverse a commonly shared path in relation to their awareness, if in relation to nothing else. On a related note, “understanding” holds the etymology of “inter” – “standing”.

I so far find that the principal difference between “interpersonal” and “intersubjective” is as follows: intersubjectivity takes the personhood out of the intended concept and replaces it with the more generalized notion of subjectivity. Bees in a beehive share an intersubjectivity, such as when one bee communicates the location of pollen to others, but this communication between bees cannot be effortlessly expressed as interpersonal, since bees are not construed to be persons.

It is my understanding that young infants have to learn the difference between what is part of them and what is outside. Wouldn't that mean they are not conscious, again, in the sense we are talking about it. — T Clark

Well, yes, an infant would not hold abstracted ideas regarding their innate awareness of self via which other is discerned. And if that is how one chooses to understand what "consciousness" refers to then infants hold no consciousness.

This specified notion of consciousness is to me however very biased toward cognitively healthy adult humans as holding a metaphysically unique status. Something that goes against the grain with me. E.g.: an adult with extreme forms of mental retardation would then also hold no consciousness.

For one thing, I believe there are gradations of awareness; even when one focuses on consciousness as self-awareness, there are gradations of this among adult humans and over time in any individual adult human. On average, contemplation of the self gives greater self-awareness than does watching a movie. These gradations would hold to minimal extents even for infants. Despite an infant not having language to specify concepts of self, it does hold innate and nonverbal notions of "mine", as in what we linguistically address as my thirst, my pleasure or pain, my affinity to familiar voices, and so forth--this even if its associating these personal states of self to stimuli takes time. And, in so doing, I offer that an infant holds an ingrained awareness of self, hence a degree of self-awareness without which it (the infant) would literally perish. But if language use is considered an all-important item for consciousness, any such perspective would be mute. (side note: interesting how in English infants, lesser animals, and divine beings such as angels are termed "it" rather than "he/she", the latter being reserved only for those with whom one can linguistically converse. This isn't so, at the very least, in the Romanian language.)

Maybe more to the point, if an infant can be unconscious it would be wrong to uphold that it is not (i.e., un-) conscious when it is not unconscious. On a technical level, so affirming to me seems to be a logical contradiction.

Also, if consciousness is the holding of abstracted ideas regarding one's innate awareness of self via which other is discerned, what can be said to engage in this abstracting prior to the abstraction taking hold? I'm thinking that consciousness engages in such abstracting to begin with, but I'm open to different views.

Being a hairdryer would really suck... — bert1

Being a vacuum would suck more. :razz:

One can think of X without perceiving X e.g. "unicorns", right? — 180 Proof

Of course. As I wrote in my original reply to the OP, re: one can be aware of being content without perceiving oneself to be content.

Are we not aware of what we know ourselves to be thinking?

First off, I didn't think your discussion of "awareness" was contentious at all. — T Clark

OK. Cool. :grin:

As I noted in my OP, I did not consider it because I thought it was a general term. You're right, though, you can't be self-aware without being aware. I have no objections to keeping it in the discussion. Do you think it adds to the discussion of "consciousness" in a way that "self-aware" does not? — T Clark

Self-awareness becomes redundant it is specifies an innate distinction between self and other, an innate awareness of selfhood in this sense. An ameba will hold awareness of this distinction, but we do not say it is self-aware. Lesser vertebrates can become unconscious—e.g., due to sedatives—but when conscious we likewise don’t consider them self-aware in the senses defined in the OP. Defining consciousness by self-awareness, as self-awareness was specified in the OP, constrains “consciousness” strictly to critters that can not only conceptualize information but, additionally, can conceptualize information about (and thereby hold abstract knowledge of) their personal innate awareness of their own selfhood via which other is discerned. A conceptualization of self which young enough human children cannot do. So, in equating consciousness to self-awareness, one would be forced to state that human infants hold no consciousness. This being something I’m personally very adverse to doing. If, however, consciousness is equated to awareness, then human infants and lesser animals can all be conscious (again, in contrast to being unconscious). But, in so defining, then unicellular organisms can then be deemed conscious as well, since they hold awareness of things, including of that which is other relative to themselves—and, hence, of themselves relative to that which is other.

All this to me gives good reason to keep “awareness” rather than just “self-awareness” on the table in the discussion of what consciousness is.

So I’m curious, can anyone provide an instance where one is conscious of X without being aware of X? — javra

Gods (re: believers). Lies (re: believers). Other minds (ergo 'theory of mind'). My death.... — 180 Proof

Just checked definitions to see how “aware” can have a specialized meaning as you imply. Wiktionary provides two, one of which is “conscious or having knowledge of something”. So I so far don’t follow your examples. Could you be more specific about consciousness sans awareness?

Awareness - This is word that generally refers to perceptions of the world as a whole rather than our own internal experience. I don’t think it belongs on the list. If you disagree, do it in writing here. — T Clark

To me, "awareness" belongs in the list. I note that you’ve used “aware”/“awareness” in defining most of the other terms in the OP’s list. At least for some definitions.

For my part: If one knows oneself to be, for example, content, one knows this because one is aware of so being—i.e., due to an awareness of being content—and not due to perceptions of the world. I will add, nor due to perceptions of one own body (as one might perceive a stomachache): where there are sensory receptors whose data becomes interpreted by the aware being. To be clear, there are no known physiological sensory receptors for discerning the degree or presence of one’s own contentedness. Nevertheless, one is aware of being content when one so is. But it would be odd to say, "one perceives oneself being content".

Other examples can be offered alongside certain emotions and states of being. Awareness of value, of meaning, of concepts (i.e., generalized or abstracted ideas), and of the aesthetic come to mind. The same perceived item could hold different values, meanings, evoke different concepts, and hold different aesthetics to the same person at different times or, else, to different minds—despite being a perceptually identical item. And there are no know sensory receptors for discerning value, meaning, concepts, or beauty. Why one person discerns a sunrise as beautiful when another person doesn’t isn’t a direct product of perception—at least not when scientifically specified—though both will visually perceive an identical sunrise.

But (contentious as what I’ve so far written might be) back to the central point: My take so far is that all interpretations of “consciousness” will encompass awareness. This although certain notions of consciousness will specify only certain forms of awareness and therefore label other forms of awareness as not constituting consciousness proper. Many, for example, will believe that an ameba, despite being aware of its environment, is not conscious of its environment. (Then again, many will claim that great apes are not conscious either.)

So I’m curious, can anyone provide an instance where one is conscious of X without being aware of X?

It seems like men are not welcome anymore in educational institutions such as universities and so on. [...] But then again, they were all men. So they would be called lots of bad names. — User34x

My guess is that a certain portion of men get disliked due to holding baseless opinions such as this one that gets expressed in the OP.

Would some of these bad names be those of "cunt" and "pussy" ... expressing attributes only women are endowed with ... that are innately derogatory ... on account of being what women are biologically endowed with? The label of "dick" doesn't have the same resonance; it retains a type of respect even in the worse cases. Then again, I've never heard someone say "she was a dick".

When gender egalitarianism becomes equated to harm against men, though, those who so equate might get disliked by those who are egalitarian. Some of the latter being quite healthy men.

Just sayin'.

Gonna need some stats here or this thread gets closed. — StreetlightX

Good call.

No worries. I feel bad about this misunderstanding as well. But I'm glad to see it was much ado about nothing. :up:

The link was not by means of an explanation for that (hence "That said..."), it was just in case you were interested. — Kenosha Kid

And I was supposed to somehow mind-read your cryptic intended point? The "its not all about you" snide followed by laughter was not ... um, constructive. C'est la vie.

You asked me about my response to Gary's OP. Whatever you might have been discussing beforehand or since is irrelevant to that. It's not all about you, dude :rofl: — Kenosha Kid

Well, dude, I asked you about what on Earth your statement of backwards determinacy was supposed to mean in terms of causation. Making my two posts to you mostly about you. The vacuousness of you sending me to read your entire thread on QM as a followup reply seems to be lost on you, righteous one. But you’re not one to be bothered with explaining your extraordinary statements on a philosophy forum; in this case, that of quantum causes being fully determined by their effects; fine, got it.



Thanks for clarifying that.

That said: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9391/determinism-reversibility-decoherence-and-transaction — Kenosha Kid

You might have been better served pointing me to: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delayed-choice_quantum_eraser - something I've been acquainted with almost since the time of the first experiment. As it is, the wiki article is a shorter read than the thread you've linked to and, it seems to me after skimming the thread, more to the point here addressed.

All the same, the issue I was asking about regarded what causation is - its nature of being - which is an a priori, metaphysical issue that gets applied to a posteriori, empirical observations of the physical. Even Hume made ontological, i.e. metaphysical, commitments in defining what causality is prior to affirming that our knowledge of what causes what cannot be deductively obtained, but can only be inductive. Seeing how QM is a posteriori, I find that referencing QM does not address the a priori issue of causality I've previously asked about.

Given an effect (state of the world at time t) and laws of nature, the cause (state of the world at time t-1) can be *logically* derived. That may include both ontological and epistemic determination. — litewave

Its a very unique way of defining both effects and causes as "states of the world". A billiard ball's motion as cause for another billiard ball's motion as effect is not "a state of the world at time t" unless one equates the billiard ball's motion at time t to the state of the world at time t - which we don't do in practice.

But more to the point, to logically derive a cause is to epistemically determine what the cause was. To be clear about what you're saying, are you by the underlined sentence affirming that logically deriving what a particular cause was is - or at least can be - what determines (sets the limits or boundaries of) the given cause's occurrence ontologically? In other words, are you saying that our reckoning what the cause was is of itself what ontologically determines the cause's occurrence - such that an observed effect is ontologically uncaused up until the time we logically determine what its cause was?

Please keep in mind that I'm not affirming what I take causality to be but am only interested in clarifying what it is that you've stated causality to be.

Quantum mechanics *is* backwards deterministic, that is: the cause of a measurement is fully determined by the outcome. It's the other way round that's problematic: the effect is not predictable. — Kenosha Kid

Are you suggesting A) that the outcome/effect can *ontologically* determine its cause(s)? Or only B) that we can at times *epistemologically* determine cause(s) by the outcomes/effects that are observed?

If (A) - if the effect ontologically determines its cause - by what means can the notions of cause and effect retain their cogency?

I find that, here, the cause becomes synonymous to the effect just as the effect becomes synonymous to the cause. For a cause is that which determines its respective effect.

As an aside, in notions of retrocausality (regardless of their validity) this relation between cause and effect is preserved (wherein the cause determines the effect), only that they are taken to occur backwards via some universalized background of time - such that the effect is temporally antecedent to its cause.

Funny, I initially thought this thread was about the anxiety of a geocentric universe as regards sentience.

I seem to remember a line from (I think) Leonard Cohen which went something like: "Do we have the strength to be alone together?". — Janus

Yup, its from Cohen's "Waiting for the Miracle". Partial lyrics:

I dreamed about you, baby
It was just the other night
Most of you was naked
Ah but some of you was light
The sands of time were falling
From your fingers and your thumb
And you were waiting
For the miracle, for the miracle to come

Ah baby, let's get married
We've been alone too long
Let's be alone together
Let's see if we're that strong
Yeah let's do something crazy,
Something absolutely wrong
While we're waiting
For the miracle, for the miracle to come

Nice first post. :up:



My best attempt at a soundbite definition of what I take love to be: Love is a cohesion of sentient being which dissipates ego. This form of love is hence utterly different from - though at times intertwined with - intense liking. To intensely like (love, in this sense) money or ice-cream is not to love in the first sense specified. From non-egotistic/narcissistic forms of self-love, to non-obsessive love for a romantic partner (sexual as well as non-sexual), to love of family members, friends, or any other cohort of beings, love is about expanding one’s sense of self to encompass other beings such that one’s self, one’s ego - as an individual unit of being that is separated from other individual units of being - begins to vanish. It doesn’t much matter if the experience is pleasant or if it hurts, it is always an experience of ego-diminution via the widening of the intrinsic value other beings hold relative to oneself. As one consequence, when one loves, what others value become of equal worth to what one oneself values, even when others’ perspectives and one’s own perspectives differ.

Well … something along these lines.

It looks like the mind inhabits a world of its own, quite different from the world of the physical and there are regions of overlap between the two but some experiences are exclusively mental or exclusively physical. — TheMadFool

Seems like the Cartesian dualism approach, which isn't to my tastes. To each their own, though. What is an exclusively physical experience? I read it as affirming a non-mental experience - which to me is a contradictory affirmation.

How does this weigh in on the issue of real vs unreal? Well, if one subscribes to some variation of rationalism, ideas, whatever they may be, are real, as real as the apples Kant may have partaken of during one of his meals. If so, everything would be real. — TheMadFool

At least as regards ordinary language use, a dream (which is intra-personal), a language (which is interpersonal), and a physical apple (which is objective) can each be real, but in qualitatively different manners.

“Did you really dream that?” “Yes, that was a real dream I had [and not me telling you a fib]” Though more awkwardly, the same can be expressed of most any idea: “Is that your real idea of a fun time (or: of what a tree looks like), or are trying to pull my leg?”

Even when interpreting most everything to hold the potential to be real - i.e., to be actually occurring, rather than being fictitious - the type of reality implicitly referenced will often significantly differ. Thereby leading into considerations of different reality types: e.g. strictly personal realities (e.g. dreams), interpersonal realities (e.g. cultures), the empirically objective reality (physicality), and, maybe, a singular metaphysical reality (this being where the notion of God or related notions would fit it).

Then again, we implicitly most often address reality as that which is strictly objectively real. This is where we tell ourselves or others that a nightmare was not real. But here, no such thing as real ideas or real languages can occur.

I would see cultures, values and goals as arising from humanity, but they are are part of the collective unconscious. I am not sure if this is what you are saying, or asking? — Jack Cummins

I wasn't intending to offer an ontological position, but simply wanted to supplement your statements that that which is invisible is often very important - and this regardless of ontological stance.

Since you bring up the collective unconscious, and in keeping with the thread's subject, if physicality isn't to be interpreted as ultimate, or absolute, reality, would you then view physicality to of itself be a product of the collective unconscious?

I'm asking out of a curiosity to better understand your point of view. As for myself, to be forthright, my leanings are toward an objective idealism, with the ultimate/absolute reality being along the lines of the Neo-platonic "the One" - which makes me open to notions regarding the collective unconscious. I haven't read Jung in a long while, though.

I think that many philosophers are opposed to the idea of the invisible but we know that it operates in some ways, such as in electricity or Wifi, which just seem to be generated through signals. — Jack Cummins

I’ll add that cultures, goals, and values (to list just a few examples, the unconscious as just one more) are all invisible - imperceptible by the physiological senses - and hence non-empirical (in today’s understanding of the term “empirical”, which no longer signifies experiential). Most would deem each of these to be addressing immaterial givens, yet each of these will hold its own type of quite real determinacy upon us as conscious beings and, in consequence, upon how we interpret the world—including in relation to the question which the OP raises.

What then do you make of formal causation? — javra

I would describe formal causation as the restriction imposed on the possibility of change, by the actual physical conditions present at the time. So at any given time, any situation is describable in formal terms. The describable physical conditions which are present act as a constraint on the possibility of future situations, therefore this present form, is in that sense, a cause of future situations. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are oceans apart. A culture's form (imperfectly) determines the nature of the individual, constituent, human psyches it, as a culture, is composed of - language and its semantics as one example. But nowhere does a culture have "describable physical conditions".

He shows how matter itself must come to be from some type of teleological form, therefore we need to seek the Divine Will, as the cause of matter and temporal continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

This puts a big damper on things for me. I cannot logically appraise Aristotle's teleological unmoved mover to be "Divine Will" - in part because will itself is always teleological motivated by an outcome it seeks to accomplish, and it is thus always in motion. Maybe this is a/the primary source of our disagreements - with most other issues regarding identity being derivatives.

In any case, I'm respectfully bowing out of the conversation.

But I will confess that I have downloaded many books on my Kindle. I have managed to get so many of the classics free, and a lot of the authors are not living ones. — Jack Cummins

You're in good company. Done so myself plenty of times. But, as you say, here the authors are not living ones. And their works were not pirated.

So I am left wondering how do we change a culture which expects the arts as a free extra? — Jack Cummins

I don't have any straightforward answer for this. Still, culture is constituted of individuals. The relation between the top-down effects culture has on individuals and those individuals have upon a culture is complex, to put it mildly. Bare minimum I can do, I'm thinking, is preserve my own way of valuing things as a constituent of the culture I am a part of. And of course, engage in conversations such as this. There's too much egotism that accompanies the prevailing materialist perspectives of the day, I'm thinking. Again, with this materialism being perpetuated by the overwhelming sum of (commercial) art we are exposed to. This, in turn, entailing not enough thought as regards others and what they require to produce those things that enrich our own lives. And this is a hard tide to turn, especially in the short run.

I do like your comment. — Jack Cummins

Thanks. :grin:

Most people I know who try to make money through various arts cannot make enough money to live and have to have another job, or be topped up with benefits. So, where does that leave most people wanting to pursue the arts? Does it end having to be just a hobby' — Jack Cummins

Pragmatically speaking, this seems to be the case in today's world.

All the same, there's a musician I like who makes the claim that we must out-create the dominant, corporatized creations of the day if we are to preserve our humanity. This is very loosely paraphrased - and the "corporate" part is likely my own embellishment. But I find the underlying notion - that of a competition between types of artistic creations in relation to society at large - to be quite noteworthy.

Paying the artist for the artwork one likes rather than downloading it for free is one way to support the artists one likes so that they can continue making their art. Though a majority of people prefer not to pay money for it. Which in turn suffocates the art that they would otherwise want.

This I think, is the problem evident in the hylomorphic approach to concepts. In the case of conception, such a whole is never quite complete, therefore an invalid "whole". This is the example I provided with the regress into unclarity: the concept of "Socrates" refers to "man", which refers to "mammal" which refers to "animal" which refers to "living being", and so on. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Refers" is an inadequate term here. "Socrates" refers to Socrates, and not just any man. Likewise "animal" refers to animals, and not just any living being (plants, for example).

So I would say that wholeness is what is required by the intelligible form in order to be completely and absolutely intelligible, but human conceptions lack this. This is quite evident in the most fundamental mathematical principles. The natural numbers are infinite. The spatial point is infinitely small. A line is infinitely long, etc. This is evidence that human conceptual forms, as intelligible objects, are fundamental lacking in wholeness. This is why I prefer not to call them "objects". However, as I said above, in our attempts to understand physical objects we are met with the same deficiency of wholeness. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm glad that this is evident. In short, when in search of absolutes - such as in a complete and absolute intelligibility, to paraphrase from this quote - absolute wholeness does not occur for givens, be they conceptual or physical. Nevertheless we cognize givens as bounded entireties. For example, a rock is cognized as a bounded entirety, as a whole given. Not as two or more givens; and not as an amorphous process. Even "a process" is cognized as a bounded entirety, and can thereby be discerned to be one of two or more processes.

Maybe you're looking for the absolute, fundamental nature of individual things that dwells behind our awareness of them, so to speak. Whereas I'm addressing the very nature of how we cognize givens: by cognizing each individual given to hold the attribute of oneness.

But I find that this following statement might be pivotal to our disagreements in large:

In Aristotle's hylomorphic structure, matter accounts for the temporal continuity of the object, its capacity to persist, and therefore its identity as a continuation of being the same object. — Metaphysician Undercover

What then do you make of formal causation?

I also note that while a flower is neither an unopened bud nor the stem off of which all petals have fallen, it yet remains the same (numerically identical) flower throughout the time period in-between, despite considerable changes in its matter over this span of time. Its identity nevertheless remains static in its form - again, despite the changes in its matter - such that form accounts for the temporal continuity of the object, and therefore its identity.

I am asking about the level on which art can play in addressing social and political issues. I am speaking about the role of expression of feelings in art, fiction, music and other art forms. — Jack Cummins

While maybe a bit of a tangent to the OP’s intent, I’ve been itching to say this, so I will.

Art is, and has always been, a major social force. Cave paintings weren’t just for kicks; they played a massive role in forming the institutionalized, though tribal, cultures of the past, often via initiations and rights of passage for folks that held an upper hand in how society, and its concepts of worth and of reality, were formed. Which played a significant role in politics with an upper “P” via politics with a lower “p”. And art still shapes most of our attributes as a society in total. Today, however, the vast majority of artists are the servants of corporations. Billboards are art, as one example among many. Corporations taking over the music industry and the public airways as another. To stick with advertisements, they are not made by CEOs but by the artists companies employ. An advertisement is worthless unless it captivates via some form of aesthetic, has some form of emotive appeal. And this is the artist’s job to produce. It’s just that, nowadays, the vast majority of art that shapes our minds - our perspectives and thoughts regarding values and so forth - is not done by artists pursuing the expression of truths - be these personal, universal or anything in-between. For most of these artistic productions, there’s little if anything inherently valuable to the artist in the artwork created. It’s value is mostly, if not fully, instrumental: typically, a tool for hording as much cash as one can. For the often poorly paid artist, yes, but also for the CEOs and fellows that largely determine what the vast majority of society’s artists can and cannot do. This if the artists care about sustaining themselves, if not also their loved ones. And by being a major influence upon society’s collective values, this same commercial art influences what people tend to chose in respect to elected officials and their attributes, it influences people’s judgments of what is just and unjust in respect to legal decisions, and so forth. In short, it influences politics with a small “p” and, consequently - though very much indirectly - our politics with a large “P”.

So, in my view, yes, art is a major force in forming society at large.

ps. Especially as regards today’s world, I’m obviously not talking about high art - which, imv, is today more often than not socially impotent. But the art we're exposed to on a daily basis via advertisements and the like is art all the same.

pps. Yes, artists of all stripes have been known to be rewarded for their art with money for some time now. Still, the corporatization of today’s vast majority of art stands on its own relative to humanity’s history.

Seems like we’re approaching a common ground in respect to the hylo-morphology of concepts. Cool.

BTW, to me there’s a parallel between Aristotle’s prime matter and today’s notion of zero-point energy. Both seeming to hold the properties of pure potentiality and unintelligibility while underlying all that is intelligible matter. As we were previously discussing, the intelligibility of actualized identity is always brought about by forms - including the forms of intelligible matter. And, in Aristotelian terms, the ultimate form is that of the teleological unmoved mover, which is singular as form in being devoid of constituents and, therefore, devoid of matter. Please remind me if there were any disagreements between us in the aforementioned.

What criticism would you give to the proposition that every intelligible form is, and can only be, cognized as a whole (for context, where every whole - save for the unmoved mover - is itself a hylomorphic holon). Thereby making the concept of a whole, i.e. of an entirety, and the concept of a form fully synonymous.

As background, I find this issue to be pertinent to the context of the Aristotelian category of formal causation. Which is distinct from, though entwined with, teleological causation (as might be evidenced in Aristotle’s coinage of entelechy as term for addressing actualized things).

Therefore no individual concept is a complete unity, it always refers to something outside as a source for meaning. It is a part which is not itself a whole, because it is wholly dependent on something external to it for its meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

A very informative post. Thanks for it. To let you know a little more of where I’m coming from:

There is the philosophical notion of holons: givens that are simultaneously both wholes and parts. Although my views are not identical to those addressed in the article, I do have great empathies toward the views therein expressed.

Any animal - as a whole token - is itself in part determined by its environment: from that of its ecological environment to that of the world’s natural laws as environmental givens. As one example, a mammal would not be in the absence of air it inhabits just as a fish would not be in the absence of water it inhabits; in both cases the occurrence of the former is *in part* determined by the occurrence of the latter. An individual animal can thereby be construed to be a part-holon of its environmental-holon.

It’s a complex ontological approach, but then an animal's parts, say its lungs, has an identity, just as the animal itself has an identity, just as the animal’s environment, say a particular forest, has an identity.

Using the notion of holons, then, to me each concept is itself a holon - constituted of parts that are themselves holons, and is itself a part of greater concepts that are themselves holons.

While this synopsis will not address all conceivable issues related to this approach, I get that we will likely disagree in our basic approaches. No harm in that though. Save for a few disagreements here and there. :grin:

It appears like you are not quite grasping the law of identity clearly, and you are equivocating between two senses of identity, sometimes known as "numerical identity" and "qualitative identity" (check Stanford for an explanation). — Metaphysician Undercover

Since you’ve pointed me to SEP, you’ll notice that the entry on identity is in no way unequivocal about what identity is. But taken from the introduction:

A distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or sameness. Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973). — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/#1

Given this distinction - and the plasticity of the term "thing", which can reference a concept – how is your own concept of “griffin” not numerically identical?

(That it might change over time equally applies to any physical thing. Moreover, it can only change so much as concept while remaining the same concept of “griffin” – this, again, in parallel to the numerical identity of any physical object: e.g. the numerical identity of a flower between the time it is a bud, or earlier, and its full wilting, or later.)

Notice that qualitative identity requires the sameness of qualities that pertain to two or more things. By comparison, the concept of “griffin” is one thing - a given whole that as form is undivided - and not two or more. It is a hybridization of different animals – an eagle and a lion – true; but the hybridized given is nevertheless singular.

----------

As to the ontology of identity, my own views are fringe. In all fairness, I’d rather not get into them right now.

Given that, as you say, we are going around in circles, it might just be that we might need to agree on disagreeing.

All the same I'll give a reply.

If we apply the law of identity to all forms, we see that universal forms cannot have an identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The conceptual form of "griffin" is not the same as the conceptual form of "unicorn". I take it we agree in this. How could this be so if neither has an identity? (an issue further addressed below)

My argument is that since there are numerous number systems, natural numbers, rational numbers, real numbers, imaginary numbers, and so forth, there are numerous different conceptions of "one", and no single mathematical system unifies these into one concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

You would need to establish how the concept of "one" holds a different meaning in each of these systems to make this affirmation. What I find is that - even though they use the foundational concept of "one" in different ways - the concept of "one" remains the same. It's a given whole, a concept requisite for any such system of mathematics to manifest.

This is because we can use language to refer things without any identity. You don't seem to be grasping the intent of the law, which is to prevent the situation where we assume that just because we can talk about it, it is a thing with an identity. You completely misinterpret the law if you claim that a fictitious thing has an identity, because the law of identity puts the identity of a thing into the thing itself, rather than what we say about the thing. The fictitious thing has no existence independent from what we say about it, therefore it cannot have an identity.

Sure, you can say that "the law of identity pertains to all conceivable givens", but unless you abide by that law, and acknowledge that some conceivable givens do not have an identity, then you step outside that law and you enter into hypocrisy. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are conflating identity with primary substances (with empirically known to be physically existent givens).

If I were to ask you for an example of a thing language can refer to that is devoid of any identity, you would likely identify givens that are not "empirically known to be physically existent" ... but you would be identifying them all the same, i.e. disclosing their identity. This in the same breath with which you'd affirm that they lack any identity.

If you believe you can sidestep this contradiction, please provide an example.

This is not a breaking of the law of identity, it is an issue with the law of non-contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is commonly accepted that the law of noncontradiction is a derivative of the law of identity, and that the former is meaningless without the latter.

and primary awareness is necessarily of the external. — Metaphysician Undercover

We again disagree. A different issue, though. But by this I take it that to you the laws of thought can only be external to awareness. A view which stands in utter contradiction to my own.

I don't agree with this at all. I think it is incoherent, so perhaps I misunderstand. First, how could one have knowledge of something which is independent of whether that something occurs? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, my statement was misunderstood: What is real is regardless of whether or not it is known. One does not need to know what is real in order for what is real to be. This applies to what is metaphysically real just as it applies to what is physically real.

Second, the law of identity is extremely difficult even for human beings to understand (as evidenced by this thread), it is set up as a defence against sophism. So I don't see how children or lesser animals could be applying the law of identity as a defence against sophism. I believe you continue to misrepresent "the law of identity". — Metaphysician Undercover

My dog can identify me (e.g., as not being another member of the household or some stranger). Nor does my dog behave as though me is not the same as me. My dog doesn't need to have a cognitive understanding of the law of identity in order to do so. He just does. This is what I meant by saying that the law of identity is intrinsic to awareness, i.e. that it governs all awareness - irrespective of whether there is propositional knowledge of it.

Would you agree with Aristotle, that when the geometer produces geometrical constructs, and discovers geometrical principles, this is an act which is properly described as the mind actualizing the principles. The principles exist in potential, prior to being actualized by the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

For the example just provided, I would not agree - though there might be other examples for which I would agree. The geometric principles, say those pertaining to a triangle, exist as actuality prior to their discovery. Awareness of them is a potentiality that becomes actualized. But the geometric principles can only be so, in actuality, prior to their discovery.

MU, since we disagree on so many issues, I'm OK with leaving things as they are. Of course, feel free to critique my reply, but I might not reply in turn. Benefited from the discussion all the same. Thanks.

That is basically modern realism. [...] — Wayfarer

Agreed.

Don't the three fundamental laws of logic qualify here, as fundamental conclusions concerning "that which is physical"? — Metaphysician Undercover

For me they apply to all forms, including fictional ones, and not only to that which is physical. That Harry Potter is not a unicorn is true - addresses a reality that stands in its own context of fictional concepts - this via the laws of thought, including the law of identity.

But "1" does not signify any absolute unity. It is divisible, and infinitely so, by the accounts of many. So how could it signify an absolute unity? — Metaphysician Undercover

"Oneness" can be readily defined as the state of being undivided, of being a whole. As to 1's infinite divisibility, remember that I take the concept of one to be a hylomorphic whole, a form endowed with constituents. But one constituent does not of itself equate to the given whole. A whole given is taken to be undivided as form, hence - for me at least - can be represented by the number 1. As one example, one horse can only be represented by the number "1", and not by any division. Yes, a horse can be divided into parts ad nauseam, all the way down into zero point energy. But its multiple parts are not the horse as a whole, which is in a state of being undivided. As a more abstract example, one grouping of two or more givens is, as a grouping, itself one whole. As one example, "animal" can be conceived of as a grouping of givens, yet the concept of "animal" is itself one whole - distinct, for instance, from the concept of "plant".

As to the adjective "absolute" we neither innately perceive nor contemplate "a horse", for example, to be a relative whole - a whole that is only so due to its relativity to some other given(s). We innately identify it as a complete, unmitigated, whole.

The only difference is that you are not moving along to see the reason why the law of identity has the capacity to govern what we say about physical reality. It gains that capacity to govern, by saying something true about physical reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, the law of identity pertains to all conceivable givens, and not just those of physical reality. One three-headed dragon - say one that a person saw in an REM dream - cannot at the same time and in the same respect be both green and not-green. This, to my mind, is so because it would then break with the law of identity. At any rate, a three-headed dragon holds an identity despite it not being a physical given.

I don't see how you can say this. The "empirical" is fundamentally sense experience. Therefore it is a very base level of knowledge. How could it be "governed by metaphysical properties" which is a principled, and therefore higher level of knowledge? The most basic must always govern the higher, as the most basic has a higher degree of certainty. The lower substantiates the higher, and the empirical is the lowest. — Metaphysician Undercover

Two points:

The empirical is just one aspect of awareness, not the only, nor, imv, the most important. Take the sense of understanding. Without an understanding of that which is perceived via the physiological senses, that which is perceived would be meaningless. We also experientially know of things such as being ourselves happy or sad, and some such states of personal being of which we are aware are in no way obtained via the physiological senses. Hence, I maintain that awareness, and not that which is empirical, is fundamental to knowledge.

Secondly, knowledge of metaphysical realities has nothing to do with whether or not these metaphysical properties occur. Same as with physical reality. Take a preadolescent child or a lesser animal as example. Their awareness operates via the law of identity without them having any knowledge of the law of identity. Or else take adult humans prior to Aristotle's formulation of the principle. They too where governed by the law of identity thought they had no propositional knowledge of it.

That said, to me these metaphysical realities are intrinsic aspects of awareness - again, irrespective of whether the awareness addressed has propositional knowledge of them. We do not, and cannot, create them. We can only discover them. As such, we do not govern metaphysical realities, this just as we don't govern physical realities. We, as aware beings, are predetermined by the former. And, though in different ways, we are likewise determined - bounded/limited - by the latter.

I think "substance" has its meaning relative to logic, and it refers to whatever grounds any particular system of logic, as what underlies it to support it. So it is quite clear to me, that "any whole that can be cognized" is not an acceptable definition of substance, because it allows that fictitious objects may be substance, or have substantial existence. And this is clearly inconsistent with any logically rigorous definition of "substance", as that which provides truth to the logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see your point here. A unicorn as concept is not substantiated by primary substances (which I still maintain can only be empirically known). The claim that “unicorns are objectively real” thereby being unsubstantiated. Yet the claim that “the concept of unicorns occurs within western thought” would be substantiated. Granted. Yet for me the concept of unicorns is itself hylomorphic and as such has an identity as a whole given, as a form, which is itself composed of parts, i.e. has a constituency.

It is only when you disavow the object to which "2" is attributed as a property, that numbers are necessarily arbitrary. That's what you've been talking about isn't it, claiming that there is not need for the physical object which substantiates the number? Didn't you mention bundle theory? Physical groups of two things, is what substantiates the non-arbitrariness of 2, just like physical instances of animals substantiates the genus "animal". The physical group, which consists of two, is the physical object, the particular, the substance in this instance, and "2" is a property of that physical object. — Metaphysician Undercover

In relation to both quotes:

For what it’s worth, I personally don’t take the laws of thought, the law of identity included, to be grounded in anything physical. I instead interpret these to be grounded in metaphysical aspects of reality that then, via awareness, govern how we interpret that which is physical. This in a Kantian-like manner. It’s a can of worms - the details of which I’d rather skip - but, for instance, the absolute unity which can be conveyed by the numeral “1” cannot be found in physical givens: for any one physical given is itself less than perfectly integral—being, instead, in constant flux, change, regarding its constituency, with smaller components always coming in and out, with these leading all the way down into zero point energy. So I take it that the integrity, wholeness, of physical givens is only relative to their context, rather than absolute, and that a perfect wholeness, or unit, is what we experientially project onto the world perceptually. In short, to me, the law of identity isn’t substantiated by physical reality; instead, it of itself governs, and in this sense substantiates, that which we deem to be integral wholes within physical reality.

I mention this because, at the end of the day, our different takes on the law of identity - and maybe on laws of thought in general - seems to play a crucial role in why we disagree about the nature of mathematical objects.

I think I get where you’re coming from, however. More or less, the position that all concepts need to be substantiated in empirically known to be real particulars in order for the concepts to be non-arbitrary, and thereby true to reality. If I’m indeed interpreting you correctly, when applied to most contexts, I would be in agreement with this. The only main, but subtle, disagreement would be that the empirical itself is, to me, governed by metaphysical properties (these including what is formalized as the law of identity, in addition to other Kantian categories such as those of space and causation): thereby making the empirically known reality of the physical itself, in one sense, substantiated by that which is purely metaphysical.

Dude! I'm trying to figure out MU's position a little better. Thanks for the ignoble backing, all the same.

Yea, I get that. For right now I think the argument centers on whether or not there are any mathematical objects to begin with.

Any concept which cannot be substantiated (grounded in substance) is an arbitrary concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're using substance to denote something different than what I'm denoting by it: for you, it seems, substance is only that which is empirically cognized via the physiological senses. For me it is any whole that can be cognized - perceptually or otherwise, such as via the understanding - which is constituted of parts, any hylomorphic given. In this latter sense, then, every concept is itself a substance. This as per Aristotle's philosophy, wherein concepts are secondary substances. Even so:

Unless we have a principle as to what constitutes a whole, an entity, or an object, all concepts with numbers would be arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't yet understand why you presume that basic numbers are not substantiated via that which is empirically cognized? We perceive quantities. And we express these perceptions of quantity via numbers. Thereby making basic numbers (e.g., 2), as well as their basic relations (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4), non-arbitrary.

We take a group of two and look at it as a single thing, and say that this thing has the property of consisting of two. There's no fundamental problem in saying that the group is not a true object, it's arbitrary, and arguing therefore that the only true object is the property which is assigned. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given what we've been through in terms of prime matter being pure potential and all givens being identified by their forms, why would the abstract form of "2" be deemed arbitrary rather than a "true (abstract) object"? Seems to me that basic numbers are not arbitrary, despite their very abstract nature; else, for example, 2 + 2 could equal 5 in certain cases.

As for context, what is salient is that there are ways of stating beliefs and ways of showing beliefs. Which is the right hand side of a T-sentence? A showing or a saying? I say both. — Banno

Long story short, I agree with this.

Consider how someone might demonstrate to you that they understood what to do at a traffic light.

They might say that they know to stop on red, go on green and dither on yellow.

Or they might take you for a drive, through sets of traffic lights, and show you that they can do as expected. — Banno

In still trying to think this through:

It strikes me that the showing can occur even if not intended. For instance, in this quoted example they might intend to show you their understanding but inadvertently show you the opposite via their actions. Whereas a telling would always be an intended conveyance - an intended showing (?) - and, hence, maybe, always propositional.

In other words, I'm currently assuming that what is show may or may not be propositional. But that what is told (via language or otherwise) is always propositional.

As to one possible significance of this: In terms of at least art, since art is an intentionally produced expression, it would then consist of tellings (which might be construed as intended showings). If so, does that then imply all art to be in some abstract way propositional? Haven't thought that far out yet. But the notion of fake rather then genuine art does have some sway ... as in, for example, art that is a sell-out. Might the emotions of some songs, for example, be false rather than true due to the intentions behind their expression? This such that the beliefs via which the songs are produced are, in some highly abstract way, false beliefs? Thereby somehow making the song a propositional expression?

I'll apologize in advance if I need to. I'm freely thinking out loud here, without any discernible conclusions, in what's likely a very idiosyncratic take regarding what propositions can be constituted of ... And I know these thoughts are in a serious muddle.

But I'm posting this anyway, just in case it might be of interest. Still, may the post be overlooked if its train of thought derails the thread's subject matter.

I haven't thought about the distinction between showing and telling much; but to give a quick answer i would say that they are more or less synonymous in this context. — Janus

Yea, I'm thinking it through myself. To use an example, if the pointing dog is not showing but telling, then its pointing is itself propositional - could be a true or false telling (which doesn't seem to fit for "showing") - and this sans the use of language. And if its pointing is propositional, then it is indicative of (language-less) belief. Something along these lines. (I know from at least anecdotal evidence that dogs can deceive - and are thereby endowed with a rudimentary theory of mind.)

Haven't read through most of the tread, so I don't know if I'm addressing things already addressed.

I'd say that good art always shows something. In the case of music (absent lyrics) and painting, nothing is said in the literal sense of 'said' that applies to sentences. In the case of poetry I agree that what is literally said rarely, if ever, exhausts its meaning. But in the case of poetry meaning is not use at all, but association. — Janus

Maybe I'm naive in asking:

Why always the metaphor of "shows" and never that of "tells"? As one example: a good poem tells of things it does not directly say. Or, in the case of lyric-less music, the melody doesn't show you emotions but instead tells you of emotions. Or, a pointing dog doesn't show you where the given is but tells you of where to look so as to discern the given.

"Showings" imply visualized images, which could be construed to be meaningless in the absence of a tale that they invoke. "Tellings" are always telling, bear significance and, hence, meaning, by their very nature.

This question goes out to @Banno as well.

Therefore, we need to keep in mind that the very notion of meaning is artificial and is seperated from nature. — Eliot

This would make sentient beings seperated from nature. Which invokes a very weird notion of "nature".

This means that purpouse is an artificial concept not just for nature, but also for us: we do not have any goal in life, rather we tend to create objectives upon which we set ourselfes to make sense of the world around us. — Eliot

We are not that which causes ourselves to be in want. Wanting is an intrinsic aspect of all sentient beings - from the want of physical sustenance to strictly sapient wants, such as those of a better life, of greater wisdom, and so forth. This the quenching of want is, of itself, a goal we constantly pursue.

Are you, in contrast to this, saying that the quenching of wants is not "a goal in life"? Or else somehow not real? How so?