I think it's quite soothing, at times, to think it's all absurd. In the words of Monty Python:

"For life is quite absurd
And death's the final word
You must always face the curtain with a bow
Forget about your sin
Give the audience a grin
Enjoy it, it's your last chance anyhow"
— Echarmion

:up:

What do you think? — Ellis

My view is that that being per se is by its very nature beyond the principle of sufficient reason and, therefore, in one literal sense, absurd.

That said, beings, in the plural, are parts, fragments, of being proper. As fragmented aspects of being proper, we crave/want. And, inherent in this, is the need to understand, to hold and find meaning: this so as to quench our cravings/wants as best we can. Hence:

[...] but long story short, to me, everything, especially that in relation to human society, seems absolutely absurd. — Ellis

To me, while "everything" in its largest form can well be construed as absurd, as reason-less, that which relates to human society is anything but ... for it's replete with reasons and, as entailment, with meanings.

The OP reminds me somewhat of this:

A man said to the universe:
“Sir, I exist!”
“However,” replied the universe,
“The fact has not created in me
A sense of obligation.” — Stephen Crane

While I find a lot of truth embedded in this poem, notice that the man's implicitly given wants are, and can only be, inherently meaningful (at the very least to the man himself) - even though the universe which he addresses may very well not be.

I'm glad to hear that there isn't any significant disagreement (if any) in relation to Nirvana as "ultimate identity".

Finally got around to reading Kelly Ross's manuscript which you linked to. I’m envious of the clarity and simplicity with which complex concepts are expressed. I don’t fully agree with some of the concluding inferences. But, for the sake of this thread, I’ll skip all of this. (And for what its worth, despite his many shortcomings as a philosopher (what philosophy can ever be “perfect”?), I continue to greatly admire Hume for many of his insights. :razz: But anyways …)

For anyone interested in furthering the issues of identity already discussed in this thread, taken from about a third of the way in in Ross's manuscript:

Concepts, or predicates, are always universals, which means that no individual can be defined, as an individual, by concepts. "Socrates," as the name of an individual, although bringing to mind many properties, is not a property; and no matter how many properties we specify, "snub-nosed," "ugly," "clever," "condemned," etc., they conceivably could apply to some other individual. From that we have a principle, still echoed by Kant, that "[primary] substance is that which is always subject, never predicate." On the other hand, a theory that eliminates the equivalent of Aristotelian "matter," like that of Leibniz, must require that individuals as such imply a unique, perhaps infinite, number of properties. Leibniz's principle of the "identity of indiscernibles" thus postulates that individuals which cannot be distinguished from each other, i.e. have all the same discernible properties, must be the same individual. — https://www.friesian.com/universl.htm

If my interpretation of it is valid, to me Leibniz's principle of "identity of indiscernibles" can equally apply to substance theory and to bundle theory - the latter standing in contrast to the former, with the former being typified by the first portion of the quoted passage.

If so, curious to hear what would be wrong with the following: an individual object's identity of itself consists of a gestalt form that results from the synergy between all relevant properties as parts. In this manner, hybridizing substance theory with bundle theory in relation to identity. (I'm toying around with this notion at present). Hence, there here would be no inherent, independent substance (primary or secondary): all substances being emergent byproducts of properties. On the other hand, the gestalt is that to which all its properties are predicates of.

An individual apple's identity would then be the gestalt that results from all of the individual apple's properties, including those of its spatiotemporal placement (which is a predicate of the apple).

An individual number's identity (say, the number 2) would then likewise be the gestalt that results from all of its properties: this gets far more tricky due to the degree of abstraction, but maybe including those of duality, its placement within the appropriate context of other numbers (e.g., greater than 1 but lesser then 3), and so forth.

Edit: I'm aware that the Wikipedia article on bundle theory makes a skimpy mention of "bundle theory of substance". More musings on this issue can be found here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#BundTheoTheiProb. All the same, if anyone is interested in debating the notion of identity as a gestalt form emerging from a bundle of properties as parts, I'm curious to see in which ways this would be critiqued.

To do a Galileo like thing: but still the table can burn due to being constituted of wood rather than marble.

You are of course correct in respect to the notion of primary matter. Yet in practice we, for example, have to build houses whose bricks are constituted of solid matter rather than, say, some sponge-like material. I was addressing this more practical view of a hylomorphic given's constituency when addressing bottom-up determinacy.

I don't think we can correctly say that anything occurs in a moment of time without any temporal extension. All occurrences require duration. Therefore I do not think we can exclude "bottom-up" and "top-down" from a temporal analysis. — Metaphysician Undercover

In one sense I agree, but in this sense all four of Aristotle's causes co-occur (an Aristotelian variant of codependent arising). Which is not the case when each cause-type is addressed individually.

To address this via example, if a wooden table’s burnability holds as its material cause the wood out of which the table is constituted, what duration occurs between a) the material cause of wood and b) the table’s intrinsic potential to burn?

So far, to me (a) and (b) seem to be necessarily simultaneous, with no duration in-between, while standing in a bottom-up relation.

Nice concepts on the issue of space, btw.

I have mentioned this essay before, but you might find it worthwhile - Meaning and the Problem of Universals, Kelly Ross. (The author is a retired academic.) — Wayfarer

Thanks. Briefly skimmed some of it for now. Will look further in it in a few days. Looks to be up my alley.

Buddhism says that there is nothing that constitutes an 'ultimate identity' in this sense whatever. — Wayfarer

I have a great deal of respect for Buddhism in many regards, this being one of them.

That said, the Buddhist notion of Nirvana, though different in many ways to that of Aristotle's unmoved mover, to me does share a number of similarities. The utterly, literally, selfless state of awareness (hence, a state of awareness devoid of all duality) which is Nirvana - more correctly in this context, "nirvana without residue" - seems to be interpretable, to me at least, as the ultimate identity of all sapient beings (and at least some schools of Buddhism seem to hold of all sentient beings; this being an inference gathered from those Buddhists that take an oath to enlighten all sentient beings). And - again imo - it is from this vantage of what our ultimate identity is that the no-self principle of Buddhism can be derived.

Don't know if its just me, but I take it that anything which can be identified holds an identity, a discernible form. Though we're accustomed to thinking of all identities as being finite forms that are constituted of parts, the state of being which is Nirvana certainly is utterly devoid of parts, is stated to be infinite in the sense of being devoid of limits or boundaries, and is identifiable. Hence, Nirvana is a discernible form of being. So while this will probably be a bit irksome, I can interpret Nirvana to of itself be the ultimate identity. This in parallel to what was previously discussed about the Aristotelian unmoved mover as the ultimate identity ... or of what can be said in relation to the Neo-platonic notion of "the One".

(The perennial philosophy parts of me like to believe that all three are different interpretations of the same metaphysical given.)

Curious to hear your thoughts on the just given musings.

I also question the tendency to 'absolutize' the forms. I think they're real on a specific level, viz, that of the 'formal realm' which 'underlies' the phenomenal realm but they can't be pinned down or ultimately defined. — Wayfarer

Right. I tend to agree in this for all forms save for "the One".

I don't agree, I think "that which constitutes" is closer to what Aristotle meant than "composition". — Metaphysician Undercover

In truth I can't find much of any meaningful different between a constituent and a component of a given, so I'm perfectly fine with rephrasing material causes as a "constitutional determination" rather than a "compositional determination". I was initially hesitant in so doing due to "constitution" being so readily interpretable in the senses of government and law. But I suppose the term's contextual use would suffice to clarify the intended meaning. Thanks for that.

What I'm saying is that I believe that final causation, intention, will, is bottom-up. Formal cause, which we apprehend as acting top-down, is distinct from final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I find reasons to disagree, thanks for the explanation.

To illustrate what I mean, the goal, or objective, one has in mind while engaged in making a decision will be the decision's final cause: it determines what will be chosen in so far as what will be chosen will be so chosen for the reason of best obtaining the objective. Bottom-up addresses synchronic occurrences, yet the goal pulls the momentary act of choice making toward a potential future that has yet to be objectified. So, to me, there is a type of temporality involved with a telos. This to me stands in contrast to both bottom-up and top-down determinants, both or which strictly occur in the specified moment of time without any temporal extensions into the future.

So I am disagreeing with your use of "composition". I think it is misleading, implying that we can remove the particular arrangement of the parts as inessential to the composition. — Metaphysician Undercover

No such implication was intended:

1. The act of putting together; assembly.
2. A mixture or compound; the result of composing. [from 16th c.]
3. The proportion of different parts to make a whole. [from 14th c.]
4. The general makeup of a thing or person. [from 14th c.] — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/composition

One one hand, these definitions are in accord with Aristotle's definition of matter as ""that out of which" X is made". One the other hand, my current more formal definition of composition is "a given's synergy of parts"

My reason for using "composition" rather than "matter" as a determinant (as in: material cause) - this in what I'm currently working on - is that "matter" nowadays commonly denotes that which constitutes the physical, whereas composition does not. The latter being more in-tune with what Aristotle meant. So, the synergy of ideas which constitutes a paradigm (say evolutionism rather than creationism, or vice versa) is the paradigms composition (its matter in Aristotelian terms). This synergy of parts, in this case of ideas, then sets the limits or bounds of what form the paradigm can take and of what changes it may or may not undergo so as to remain the same paradigm. This synergy of parts is then the paradigm's compositional determinant (the paradigm's material cause). This even though, in today's terminology, neither the paradigm nor the ideas from which it is composed are material - rather, both, to most, are deemed immaterial.

What is inevitable with this process of reduction of the matter, is the appearance of infinite regress. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here, and in related passages, we seem to agree in full.

The bottom-up form, which is properly an immaterial form, as responsible for the cause of material objects, is the form of an individual, rather than a universal form. [...] The teleological form, associated with intention and final cause is the bottom-up cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

This part to me is a bit confusing. Are you saying that formal causation is a bottom-up causation? Or that a hylomorphic given's form is the result of material causation, with the latter being bottom-up? Or something other?

As a little bit of background: To me a form, as the term was traditionally intended, can be reexpressed as a whole, as a given's entirety (of being). So, in a maybe oversimplified manner, one can contrast a given whole with the same given whole's synergy of parts. (Yes, each individual part is its own whole ... but this leads into different avenues of investigation, ones you've already touched upon). The given's whole, or form, results in the given's formal cause upon its synergy of parts. Whereas the given's synergy of parts results in the given's material cause upon its form (upon that which makes the given a whole given).

At least when viewed this way, formal causation is to me always top-down, rather than bottom-up, even if it is deemed to be of primary importance relative to any identity: for it is the whole's determination of the synergy of parts from which it as a whole is constituted. (And I acknowledge this is a very complex subject to embark upon; but, notwithstanding, it still strikes me as a synchronic top-down determination). Whereas it is material causation - the synergy of parts' determination of what the whole is - that strikes me as bottom-up causation.

So, here, everything both material and immaterial (modern usage) is hylomorphic, save for the unmoved mover. But the latter is a telos which moves everything teleologically. So its being as form need not have a synergy of parts. Not being itself a hylomorphic being, it holds neither top-down (downward) nor bottom-up (upward) determinations, but instead is solely composed of teleological (what I currently term "pull-ward") determinations ... which affects everything (including all efficient causes) either directly or indirectly.

I likely expressed more than a mouthful. Of course, feel free to critique my interpretations, but I am curious why you express formal causes to be bottom-up rather than top-down IF this is indeed what you here intended.

I don't think that you can call the parts of a thing as the cause of its composition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here, you’ve misconstrued what I was saying. I wasn’t saying that a given’s summation of parts *causes* the given’s composition/matter. What I was suggesting is that its summation of parts, or constituents, *is* its composition/matter. This such that “matter” and “composition” can be used interchangeably. Hence the reason why the bronze statue can dent—for one example—rather than shatter or burn, is its composition/matter of bronze (rather than the same statue-form being composed of stone (which can shatter) or wood (which can burn)). Reworded, the bronze statue is dent-able (rather than shatter-able or burnable) due to its composition as the cause of its dent-ability. Again, such that composition and matter are in the addressed Aristotelean context interchangeable.

Aristotle assumed that there was matter so that he could say that an object has an identity, and to insist that it continues to be the same object despite changes to it. This was an argument against philosophers like Heraclitus who would say that all is flux, becoming, disputing the idea that there even is any real objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

As regards continuity, forms, and matter, I think it’s a complex minefield. However, this is to me an interesting Aristotelian tidbit that might (?) clash with the gist of your affirmations regarding the impermanence of forms vs matter: the teleological unmoved mover is taken to be pure form sans any and all matter. And, as the unmoved mover, it neither comes into being nor goes from being, remaining as permanent as permanence can get, this while being deemed the mover of everything hylomorphic, with the latter taken to be in states of change, i.e. flux.

So, in my quirks of interpreting Aristotle, if we’re looking to affix identity strictly to that which is permanent, unchanging, then this cannot be matter but instead can only be form: specifically, that matter-less/composition-less form which specifies the identity of the unmoved mover as telos.

But again, to me this is a complex field to enquire into. And, for the record, no, I’m not denying that forms (other than that form which specifies Aristotle's teleological prime mover) change over time, including by appearing and disappearing. I simply don’t associate identity to that which is necessarily unchanging.

As regards concepts, it looks like we disagree on a lot of small points that, in short, add up to a large disagreement overall. I won’t nitpick, preferring the let this issue of concepts be for the time being.

Read the context or shush. — Kenosha Kid

Blushingly, point taken.

In Aristotelian physics temporal continuity is provided for by matter. Matter is what persists, unchanged as the form of a thing changes, and substance contains matter. Today, this is represented by conservation laws, energy and mass. Accidentals are formal, as part of a thing's essence. The problem with representing "the concept" in the same way, as having temporal continuity, is that it seems to be immaterial. So it seems like we need a principle other than the physical "matter" to account for any temporal continuity of a concept. We might try 'information' to account for the identity of a concept, but that doesn't remain constant over time, so identity of the concept would be completely different from identity of an object, if we were to develop such a principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm going to push this issue a little.

Aristotle defines X's matter as "that out of which" X is made.[1] For example, letters are the matter of syllables.[2] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism#Matter_and_form

From such quotes I interpret Aristotelian matter to be fairly synonymous with composition. A material cause is a compositional cause, for instance, one whose effects are bottom-up and concurrent with the composition as cause.

So Aristotelian matter need not be physical (as we moderns interpret it to be). For a somewhat easier example by comparison to a concept, a paradigm's Aristotelian matter is, or at least can be, the sum of ideas from which it is composed. This in the same way that a syllable's matter is the sum of letters from which it is composed.

I know this breaks with common and traditional interpretations, but how do you find that Aristotle himself would have disagreed with what I've just outlined in relation to matter?

No, the concept denoted must be different, because the Spaniard and the Anglophone are two distinct people, with two distinct backgrounds, so the meaning will be different to each {...] — Metaphysician Undercover

As someone who speaks two languages fluently, I wholeheartedly disagree with this. Yes, some concepts do not translate in a single word, if at all. But basic concepts (again, generalized ideas), such as that of "tree", are the same across multiple cultures regardless of the language via which they are addressed (given that the populace is exposed to concrete instantiations of trees in its environment).

[...] just like the concept of 'tree' is different for you and me. — Metaphysician Undercover

As to the concept of "tree" being different for you and me: these visual scribbles we term letters, syllables, and words are meaningless in the absence of the concepts they convey. The complexities of language aside, if no such scribble could convey the same (essential) concept between two different people, how would communication of anything be possible?

The concept of tree is not the same as the concept of tree, because there are accidental differences in each instance that it occurs, therefore it violates the law of identity and cannot be an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

By this argument, no continuity of (the Aristotelian notion of) any substance can occur, for any physical object will have accidental differences between itself at any time t and t'. Yet (the Aristotelian notion of) substance - as I best understand it - is precisely that with is identical relative to itself over time; more precisely, that which survives accidental changes (implicitly, over time). In much the same way, the concept of tree remains identical relative to itself over time; i.e., it survives accidental changes, or differences, over time.

The issue becomes even more problematic when considering personal identity over time.

Because the law of identity applies to objects only, and a concept is not an object, I don't think there is a valid way to say that a concept might be identified. Instead, we define concepts. If we proceed to state that a definition identifies the concept, then we are in violation of the law of identity. A definition exists as words, symbols, so now we'd be saying that the identity of the concept is in the words, but by the law, the identity must be in the thing itself. That's why a concept does not have an identity. However, if we assume an ideal, as the perfect, true definition of tree, an absolute which cannot change, then this ideal concept could exist as an object. Every time "tree" is used, it would be used in the exact same way, to refer to the very same conceptual object. But I don't think that this is realistic. — Metaphysician Undercover

When we say “tree” and a Spaniard says “arbol” are not the concepts denoted by each different term identical - this despite possible accidental differences in the two term’s connotations? As in: the concept of tree, T, is the same as the concept of arbol, A. Hence T = A.

Given that the definitions of each will utilize different words, the English definition of “tree” and the Spanish definition of “arbol” might very well not be identical; but both definitions will define an identical concept. Again, one that survives accidental changes, including those of possible differences in connotations.

In Europe it's a bigger deal and holocaust deniers get much more coverage because they're doing something illegal and it gets blown up into this big thing. — BitconnectCarlos

And what's wrong with it being illegal in human made democratic laws if fascism is indeed something bad ... that inevitably leads into lands of the atrocious?

Tolerance for those who are intolerant can only lead to intolerance, period.

I get the need to talk to others. But this can only have any meaningful effect/affect when the other is of an open mind and is listening. Otherwise, it becomes an issue of fending off offensive violence with defensive violence.

What is the logical conclusion of anti-fascism? — Kenosha Kid

What is, democracy?

Its a jeopardy-like answer to a jeopardy-like question.

Shit may happen when you attack a federal building, I suppose. — Olivier5

Try to imagine the same attack being perpetuated by people of non-white skin ... or by those utterly evil "anti-fascists" (an attitude which blatantly specifies whom the good guys are: those who are not antagonistic to fascism but, instead, either endorse it or are indifferent to it).

The shit you've specified would have been a lot worse. More along the lines of a slaughter. "Why" we wonder (sarcasm here).

But then, those who are not anti-democracy wouldn't attack a democratic institution to begin with.

I’m curious to know how you would address the following scenario via the law of identity:

--The concept of tree is the same as (is equal to; i.e., is identical to) the concept of tree … and is different from (is not equal to; i.e., is not identical to) the concept of rock.

Here, I’m addressing conceptual forms (which are naturally devoid of perceivable shapes: for, as a concept, i.e. as a generalized idea, it can take on multiple concrete, perceivable shapes …. None of which individually specifies what the concept, a generality, itself consists of in full). This, to me, is very much in tune to how a triangle, a geometric concept, can take on innumerable perceivable shapes without any such concrete shape being in and of itself the universal, abstract form of triangle per se. Likewise to how any number, itself an abstract concept, is identical to itself as number but not to any other number.

But my main interest here is in how you'd address the concept of tree as having, or as not having, an identity (albeit an inter-subjective one) as a concept - this as per the example mentioned. To be explicit, an identity via which it as concept can be identified.

Do you disagree with the qualitative difference, or the out-dated notion of a god-given Soul? — Gnomon

Neither. I sharply disagree with the part about there being a metaphysical division between humans and all non-human life.

So how does this work? — apokrisis

I'll leave that for another day.

primacy of awareness — javra

How would you define this? — Olivier5

My own definition of awareness’s primacy: The tenet that everything which can and does exist (i.e., everything that can and does stand-out in any way) is either directly or indirectly contingent on the presence of awareness - with some existents (like the objectivity of space, time, and matter) being contingent on all cooccurring instantiations of awareness, some (like the intersubjectivity of cultures and languages) being contingent on certain limited cohorts of cooccurring instantiations of awareness, and some (like one’s personal REM dreams) being contingent on unique instantiations of awareness. This tenet of awareness’s primacy thereby results in a stance of idealism.

My post regarded a conditional partly constructed from “if primacy of awareness is true” and not an argument for awareness’s primacy. I currently don’t want to engage in any such argument.

I noticed once an item of dogma from one of the Hindu religious sects: 'life comes from life'. To my knowledge, this supposition has not yet been overturned by an empirical observation. — Wayfarer

I think I can very much understand and respect where you’re coming from. Abiogenesis is a big thorn in the side. As for myself, though, I do strongly believe in the universe having once existed in the absence of lifeforms - despite my idealist leanings.

That is where panpsychism becomes even more intellectually dishonest. People do argue that neural complexity somehow amplifies the dilute awareness that is already a property of the material realm. — apokrisis

People are sometimes also fond of arguing that ameba do not hold a first-person awareness of light and dark, not to again mention of what is relative to them predators and prey. They hold no "neural complexity" to speak of. But then, this can get boosted all the way up the to the supposed metaphysically unique status of humans - as divided from everything else in the cosmos.

Then we sharply disagree.

Most of the higher animals have some form of culture, including ants & bees. But I wouldn't put them in the same category with human culture. — Gnomon

Bees and ants do not have socially transmitted behaviors as far as I'm aware - hence, no culture. If you know otherwise, please provide a reference.

No, human culture is not chimpanzee culture, nor vice versa. The question isn't whether human culture should be placed into the same camp as the culture of some lesser animal species or another. The issue is one of whether humans are metaphysically divided from the rest of life, or, else, are a progressive aspect of life in general - this despite the massive punctuated-equilibrium leap which our species has undergone.

But it doesn't support panpsychism for the reason I gave. There is still a clear line to be drawn between the inorganic realm and the organic realm. Science also talks about that. — apokrisis

Other than via mischaracterization or willful strawmaning, panpsychism does not deny the (somewhat) clear line between the inorganic realm and the organic realm (unless we forget viruses, viroids, and prions - which are organic and replicate but are nonliving, or, at the very least, non-metabolizing).

Recall that, of itself, panpsychism "is a difference that makes no difference".

The "effete mind" quote is easy to misinterpret as one sentence picked out from a large corpus.

Peirce was clearly trying to move beyond Cartesian dualism in toto, not merely declare against materialism and for divine soul. His focus was on the semiotic relation between impersonal information and informed material being.

Either you critique that machinery - the thirdness of a modelling relation - or you are avoiding the point of his metaphysics. — apokrisis

I'd don't believe that I misinterpreted the notion of effete mind. Peirce, after all, was an objective idealist, not a materialist. And yes, the concept is vastly more complex than what can be conveyed by two words.

As to Peirce's point, agapeism was a part of it. Something your system appears to conveniently overlook.

Primacy itself is the problem here.

Whether you are an idealist or realist, theist or materialist, the problem with your scheme is the drive to declare one metaphysics right and its opposing metaphysics wrong. That is the faulty mindset that defines the Cartesian bind. — apokrisis

Misplaced words. The dichotomies offered are faulty. Plato, for instance, was a realist. Moreover, isn't it about truth and that which is real? As one example, if one rejects the notion that a first-person awareness can be reincarnated, is this not about one's belief in what is true? In what can and cannot be real? Or is this conclusion the "faulty mindset that defines the Cartesian bind"?

So that makes a hierarchy with a sharp division. The foundation is a brute material world of entropy flows and the structures and patterns that must produce. Then the further thing is the evolution of semiotic mechanisms - truly informational substrates like membranes, genes, neurons, words, numbers - to support a world of self-interestedly entropifying organisms. — apokrisis

How does that follow from the premise that the universe has been partly negentropic from the Big Bang get go? This being something you’ve previously stipulated in other threads.

Upholding a partly negentropic universe that is, and has always been, governed by teleological and formal principles is nothing short of a proposal for an Anima Mundi, i.e. for an animated cosmos with teleological strivings, this being a form of panpsychism. Only that, to the staunch materialist, this flavoring of “anima/psyche” can only be an object of ridicule. And this due to a deeply engrained materialistic dogma that needs to be safeguarded.

On the other hand, if there indeed is upheld a sharp division between the entropic and the negentropic, as you’ve here asserted, then how can a fully entropic system logically give rise to negentropy? The empirical fact that life (which is negentropic) emerged from nonlife (which you here specify as being sharply entropic) does not, in and of itself, provide a shred of explanation of how this could have come about.

Again, panpsychism is a theory that is "not even wrong" as whether it is the case or not, makes no difference. Panpsychists still explain atoms vs amoeba vs chimps vs humans in terms of genetic information, neural information and cultural information. — apokrisis

And so panpsychism is not something that, of itself, makes a difference. Granted. Notwithstanding, the primacy of awareness, from which the stance of panpsychim can be derived, does. A reading of C. S. Peirce's philosophy can illustrate how. With one example being that of the objective world being effete mind; another being the difference in where the cosmos is headed: a difference that is exceedingly substantial.

But I gather the primacy of awareness is a bit too theistic reeking for the materialistically minded. So, to avoid that slippery slope into monotheism or some such, it must be denied tout court.

A psychism limited to certain life forms. — Olivier5

Maybe this needs clarification: if primacy of awareness is true, and a universe that was once devoid of life-forms is also true ... then what other viable conclusion to reconcile these two truths?

But the categorical difference between our own and chimp/dolphin consciousness, is that human self-awareness has created a whole new form of Evolution : Culture. — Gnomon

Haven't read up on dolphins but, as a fun tidbit, chimpanzee cohorts have their own unique cultures (with a small "C").

For example: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2195890-unique-chimpanzee-cultures-are-disappearing-thanks-to-humans/

If one accepts both a) the primacy of awareness in one form of another, together will all that this entails (e.g., goal, and thereby telos, driven behaviors), this as an idealist would; and b) the logical necessity that life - and, thereby, the first-person awareness it can be deemed to necessitate - evolved from nonlife; what other conceivable, logically consistent inference could one arrive at other than that of panpsychism?

As you’ve alluded to, the “biggism” brand of panpsychism which bert1 refers to is a modern rebranding of the Stoic Anima Mundi. In such form of panpsychism, prior to the emergence of life in the cosmos, the cosmos would yet have been an animated given governed by Logos and its universal telos (the “universal end” the first quote in your post makes reference to). What awareness, or consciousness, or mind, or psyche/anima means in the context of a cosmos devoid of life is to me still a riddle. But, so far, the conclusion of panpsychism (in some variety or other) seems to me well enough justified - here claiming this as someone who upholds both (a) and (b) aforementioned.

I’m asking because I’ve gained the impression that you don’t find the panpsychism hypothesis appealing—while yet upholding both (a) and (b) as tenets.

I might be wrong in my presumptions regarding your outlook, however.

If my imaginations serve me right, when younger I once remembered a world of benevolent and wise Yahoos while reading Gulliver’s Travels.

Oh, wait, a faulty imagination: I got it backwards. It was a remembrance of the Houyhnhnms that gave me pause.

Yea, doesn't quite work.

Yea, false memories can occur. Whoop-de-do. So can illusions and hallucinations. What’s the big novelty here? How does one “know” that one isn’t suffering the same conundrum as that guy in the movie Beautiful Mind when seeing a stranger on the street? Confirmation? All those one confirms this with could be part of one’s hallucination as well. Too many doubts in search for infallible knowns, me thinks. One trusts till evidence indicates reason not to trust. And yes, this is coming from a die-hard fallibilist.

In essence, as a purely mental effort, we can't distinguish between imagination and memory. Does this mean that our imaginations could actually be memories or, what for me is the more implausible alternative, that memories are imaginations? — TheMadFool

Since I haven’t read anybody mention it yet, imaginations are willed at the time experienced, memories (be they false memories or not) are not willed at the time experienced. At most one wills to recall a memory, rather than having the memory enter one’s awareness on its own. But one never will’s the memory’s contents into psychological existence, else one knows oneself to be willfully imagining things.

[Un-willed imaginings that occur during awakened states, on the other hand, are often enough ascribed to various mental disorders - be these mild, transitive, and generally normal (like a brief hallucination of seeing an animal in a dark corner when it was just wind-blown leaves, which is still a hallucination) or, else, psychological conditions that can be more debilitating.]

In case one asks “how does one know what one wills and what one does not”: One knows this via immediate awareness of oneself as a first-person awareness that engages in volitions.

The problem is, it easily morphs into a form of fatalism and/or blame-placing. — Wayfarer

Yea, I acknowledge that. To my mind though, the same roundabout mind-games can occur with just about all other perspectives. Being or not being favored by God, as one example. Being or not being favored by natural selection as another. It doesn't seem to much matter what perspective is held, some will always find a way to use the given worldview for the purposes of fatalism and/or blame-placing; again, imo.

If you regard it as a regulative principle for action, rather than as a means of blaming or rationalising misfortune, I can't think of a more obvious moral principle than 'as you sow, so will you reap'. — Wayfarer

:up:

I’m probably gonna kick myself in the morning for asking this, still, why so harsh on the philosophical notion of karma?

I’m saying “philosophical notion” so as to differentiate the notion of karma from what, let’s say, ignorantly self-righteous folk seek to do with it: anything, any concept, can be corrupted by certain people, regardless of what the concept is, imo.

May @Wayfarer correct me to the extent that this is incorrect or incomplete: Karma at its root is the, what we westerners would call, natural law/principle of “action and consequence”. That’s all. No one is judging. Its just upheld that the action is the cause for the consequence as effect.

Since it applies to a non-materialist metaphysics, it can get complicated - especially since intentions are in themselves considered to be actions, hence causes, to consequences that result. Still, tmk, karma is basically the principle that for every act there is a consequent. Hence, to say that karma judges you is akin to saying that causation judges you, which to me is nonsense.

Just curious.

[...] The problem with this is it that it has no intellectual underpinnings [...] — Restitutor

It seems we have different metaphysical perspectives. That aside, do you find any way of avoiding some given that “just is”? To give example, historically three main candidates have been “matter/the-physical just is” (which leads to physicalism), “a creator deity of everything just is” (which leads to monotheistic creationism), and “being, when interpreted as the generalized notion of awareness—replete with correlates such those of truth and the good—just is” (which can lead, for example, to Neo-platonic notions of the “the One”).

I’m not asking for a metaphysical discussion of why one of these positions is more viable than the rest—although, in fairness, I believe I did present a somewhat mild logical argument against the viability of a creator deity.

What I’m asking is if you know of some way of avoiding the conundrum of there being some given that just is—and, therefore, some way of avoiding a given for which the principle of sufficient reason (by which givens gain their intellectual underpinnings) cannot apply?

Let me know what you think? — Restitutor

For me at least, the question can be posed in parallel to “what is truth in the context of atheism”.

For those who uphold an omnipotent creationist deity, this deity must logically be the creator of truth, and, hence, all instantiations of it. Otherwise, this specified deity isn’t omnipotent and is itself subservient to, a subject of, truth—which in this case is not of the deity’s creation.

The same issue can then be posed in relation to the good—without which all morality is meaningless: An omnipotent creationist deity is either the creator of the good, or the good is an uncreated aspect of the reality which all beings, including all deities (were they to occur), are embedded in.

I’ve addresses the parallel between truth and the good because they both seem to me to carry the same philosophical weight. If truth is a creation, whose creation is it such that the given creator(s) are not themselves subject to any truth in so creating truth (be it of physical realities, of logical principles, or anything other)? Likewise, if good is a creation, whose creation is it such that the given creator(s) are not themselves subject to doing what is good (for themselves or any other) in the creation of good?

As to morality being relative, I’d say that it is to a certain extent, varying from culture to culture, but that it is dependent upon the existential reality of the good which—though it may take many forms to many diverse beings—always remains unchanged in its property of being good. Just as truth remains unchanged despite its instantiations taking many different forms for many different beings.

While there are many different ways of addressing these two parallel issues of truth and the good, one such approach is then to uphold that both truth and the good simply are, this in the presence of beings—but are in no way the creation of any being. This presents, here loosely articulated, the uncreated and unchanging existential reality of both truth (thereby that which demarcates all instantiation of truth: all truths) and the good (thereby that upon which morals are dependent) within at least one possible atheistic framework—wherein no omniscient creator deity occurs.

Speaking of contradiction, note the following:

By the previous logic, cause and effect, being entirely distinct from one another, must therefore have entirely autonomous, separate existence already, prior to the confluence which is defined as “cause and effect” qua “cause and effect”.

[...]

The cause needs the effect to be defined as the cause; and the effect needs the cause to be defined as an effect.

But the effect cannot be a direct function of the cause without eliminating the distinction; and the cause cannot be given its absolute meaning and relevancy by the effect without likewise eliminating the distinction.

I fail to see any contradiction, contradictions as I understand them being "both X and not-X at the same time and in the same respect".

Cause and effect have a dyadic relation, so they do not occur independently/autonomously in respect to the other.

The same argument you've quoted in the OP (from whom, by the way) can, for instance, be made for "up" and "down": Up cannot occur without a down; down cannot occur without an up. The two can only have a dyadic relation. They do not occur independently/autonomously of the other - except in the faulty abstractions of some. That said, one does not conclude that up and down (and derivatives such as top and bottom) pose a contradiction, however.

Indeed–and in conclusion–the presence of relativity in object interactions precludes any actual (materially “existent”, for lack of a better term) cause and effect; yet it necessitates a conceptual cause and effect that the self-aware agent engages as a means to define and identify both what an object is, and how it is observed (i.e. its position relative to the observer at any given moment).

As to this idealist interpretation of things - with heavy emphasis on idealism not equating to sole-self-ism (this being an issue for a different thread) - I'll leave that open-ended on my part.

Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state. — TheMadFool

OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being? — javra

Well, as I see it, the English translation of cogito ergo sum viz. I think. Therefore, I am, is slightly inaccurate. My research, for what it's worth, shows that cogito ergo sum actually means: Thinking. Therefore I am. — TheMadFool

A disingenuous answer to the issue at hand. My point is that in the phrase "it is" the being (verb) addressed is not a doing: the specified "it" doesn't do the specified "is".

Your retort is to tell me the obvious about what the cogito translates into.

My issue is with premise 1 and I've already said what I wanted to say. Your point concerns argument 2. — TheMadFool

No it is not. I agree that argument 2 is faulty.

Let's look at the issue of awareness from a different angle. In my humble opinion, if one is aware, necessary that one doing something with one's mind e.g. thinking, perceiving, etc. — TheMadFool

You've here gone off into abstractions regarding awareness rather than sticking to concrete instantiations of its first-person occurrence - with the latter including, for example, an immediate awareness of one's own emotive states of being (e.g., being happy/sad), this in addition to perceptions, sensations, and understandings.

Mind, however, is an abstraction whose occurrence can be doubted. Some eliminative materialists do so often enough.

Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)? — TheMadFool

In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here. — javra

Read above. — TheMadFool

Another disingenuous answer to the issue addressed.

You want to avoid the issue of awareness and stick to the "I think therefore I am" argument, go for it. As I stated in my first post on this thread, I too find Descartes' cogito to be possible to doubt in practice.

It lands on, I am consciousness, and from there it can not go any further. — Pop

Were this to be true, it would signify that solipsism is logically impeccable. I've disagreed with this on logical grounds in this recent thread.

So I disagree with your conclusion, instead agreeing with @Olivier5.

--Sextus Empiricus” — Darkneos

As in the truth to metaphysical and/or epistemological solipsism. Right. Deep questions that are best not cherry-picked.

Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state. — TheMadFool

OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being?

Definition of aware (courtesy Google): having knowledge or perception of a situation or fact. In other words awareness consists of the actions knowing (verb) and perceiving (verb). — TheMadFool

To know and to perceive are both ambiguous terms in ordinary language. We can get into this if you'd like. Knowledge by acquaintance, or else by experience - such as in knowing oneself to be happy/sad or certain/uncertain in manners devoid of inference - for example. Or seeing that apple one imagines to be: the perception of imaginary givens. I'm thinking so doing might deviate too much from the topic, though.

Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)? — TheMadFool

In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here.

What's really getting me worked up [...] — TheMadFool

If this conversation is getting you worked up, I'll stop partaking. Best not to get into even more worked up modes.

I'm still trying to understand the notion of panpsychism. Currently, to me, it seems to be a logical conclusion, though I can't make sense of it, not to my own satisfaction at least.

If you don't mind indulging me further, what of the distinction I alluded to in my reply to TMF?:

Thought is caused by X, whereas awareness isn't caused by X but, instead, is a state of X's being ... thereby making thought and awareness ontologically distinct givens.

Don't mean to badger. Only want to flesh out whether or not they are the same thing in you view.

OK. Thanks. Due to the plasticity of language, I'll agree that the terms' extension is debatable. Just to further this: Then, if it is granted that an ameba can in its own way be aware of what is relative to itself predators and prey, and act accordingly, would you then also confer thoughts to the given ameba? I'm asking out of a curiosity to see if so conferring would be deemed commonsense, or else counterfactual.

If you think we should get into the mechanics of thought [...] — Pantagruel

No. Philosophy of mind is a vastly complex issue, I agree. I was only interested in whether you interpret "thought" and "awareness" to be identical.

:cool:

You've made an inference from "...are aware..." to "...aware beings." For this to work you need the premise 1. All doings are things that have doers to be true. — TheMadFool

First, "aware" is an adjective, not a verb. As such, it's a state of being; not a doing.

Secondly - and this is harder to address impersonally rather than from an experiential vantage, but I'll try - for "X to be aware" is for X to be in a state of being of awareness ... which entails that X is, i.e. holds the property of isness being, i.e. is a being (here, is a given that is).

I don't aware; I am aware.

Contrast this with the cogito. Here, the affirmation of "I think" is questioned due to lack of evidence that that which is done (the thought in question) pertains to a particular doer ("I"). Differently expressed, that that which is (the thought in question) is a product of some agency (the "I"); here, then, there can be the implicit issue of causality, as in X causes Y. It might have been Descartes demon that was doing (else causing) all the doubting that Descartes ascribed to his own agency, for one example.

However, (and correct me if I'm wrong about this) you've granted that "I am aware" is a sound experiential fact whenever the given "I" is aware. At this junction, X's awareness cannot logically occur in the absence of X; X must be in order for X to be aware. If Descartes was aware of all the given doubts he talked about - even if we get into weird doubts about telepathy on the part of the demon being the cause of this awareness, or some such - it remains the fact that a first-person awareness which addressed itself as Descartes was aware. Since this first-person awareness was aware, this first-person awareness was.

To sum up the aforementioned, regardless of the status of the world, BIVs, and the like, if I am aware, I as a first-person awareness am.

... Interesting to see where this goes.