Have you found some proof that shows that there is no afterlife? — TheDarkElf

Generally speaking, isn’t this one of the logical entailments of physicalism? But since neither can physicalism as metaphysics be proven with infallible certainty – the fallibilist in me questions if any metaphysics can – my own take is that what occurs subsequent to death is a fundamental unknown. Make peace with this unknown – everything from it possibly resulting in non-being to it resulting in any of the many hypotheses of an afterlife which various cultures have proposed – and the living of life will unfold without this issue of death being any form of problem.

For example, if I live my life virtuously and death results in my non-being, I won’t be bothered by anything subsequent to death, for I will not in any way be – so why not endeavor to cultivate virtue as best as I can while I’m here? There are pleasures to it that cannot be obtained via vice. If, however, I live my life virtuously and (here contemplating a worst case scenario) am placed into some Hell that’s eternally divided from Heaven after death, I will be there on account of having a clear conscious. Consequently, to hell with Heaven, then: I’d only want to be where those who made an effort to have a clear conscious go, future demons though we all are (and to be an angel in such topsy-turvy Heaven would be an absolute nightmare for me). The resulting conclusion: live life more virtually than not and one won’t be bothered by what occurs after death, regardless of what might actually occur.

That said, my own sense of trust has it that it will likely neither be non-being nor a Heaven/Hell divide. But it’s still and unknown to me in terms of what will be. To each their own beliefs.

But this is very Schopenhauerian as I see it. [...] We are in constant need of being alleviated- both of things which befall us, and things we want but do not have now. — schopenhauer1

The part you quoted wanted to make a distinction between pleasure and eudemonia. Namely, that pleasure is of a transient nature whereas eudemonia is not. I gather my example was unsuccessful in so doing. Yet Stoic texts, for instance, speak of this distinction.

As one aspect of eudemonia, being at peace with oneself is not something that can be quantified. Nor does it bring about a cessation of all desires and of all dolors. Yet I reckon that once obtained it persists regardless of what befalls one, unless one were to squander it by willfully engaging in one too many vices. Here, then, is an example of an actualized goal that is not subject to an endless cycle of striving to alleviate frustration followed by more frustration. To the extent it is obtained, it is an end in and of itself and, as such, it breaks free from the cycle of endless frustration.

But then this can lead to Eastern notions which Schopenhauer overlooked despite being embedded in the overall Eastern metaphysics he translated for a Western culture. Notions of Moksha or of Nirvana come to mind. These have a lot to do with what in the west would be termed eudemonia gained via virtue and wisdom, as well as with an obtained awareness of what the self ultimately is. Or so are my best current understandings of these traditions.

I understand that we probably still disagree on issues of pessimism, but I’m thinking this disagreement hinges on basic metaphysical presumptions. All the same, the samsara which Schopenhauer addresses in his own ways is nevertheless something I readily acknowledge.

In this story, it's revealed quite a lot actually. First - running in circles, chasing. This is huge part of the self-actualization process. Chasing goals, again and again. — interim

I'm replying more to my overall impression of the OP in total than to any particular thing, and this will be a bit of a ramble as well:

Can’t remember ever desiring to self-actualize myself or recommending to anyone other that they do, and I haven’t seen Westworld (though you’re making it sound interesting).

I could easily see how at least some Buddhists would insist that the point to it all is to actualize no-self – i.e., to become utterly selfless being, and, paradoxically, that only there can non-hyperbolic equality reside. But this would be an about-face from the self-actualization motif as most interpret it. Still, it maybe could yet be interpreted as in tune with the “know thyself” dictum.

At any rate, I thought of a counter-example to the Schopenhauer-like generalization of an endless and unsatisfying striving: Itches. Its crude, but I think the example is concrete enough that all might be able to relate. If you feel an itch, it’s bothersome, and you hold as goal the disappearance of that itch. Scratching the itch can be in itself pleasing, this as a process toward an end. But it is not the case that one longs for new itches once the current itch disappears due to having been scratched. One instead would rather that no future itches reoccur. And, in a very diminutive sense of the term, in satisfying the eradication of the itch one obtains a state of (a very minor form of) eudemonia – i.e. a flourishing of being. The cessation of the itch allows you to better do that which you want done, rather than being persistently distracted, and hence hindered, from such (again, very minor form of) flourishing. So, in recapping this thesis, the scratching of an itch may be pleasing, but it of itself is not the obtainment of eudemonia, instead being a transient happiness; unlike the pleasure here referenced, it is the disappearance of the itch which grants the (minor) obtainment of a lasting eudemonia.

Some goals are held with false projections of how their obtainment will result in just such state of increased eudemonia – e.g., the desire to have the coolest car in town, to be richer than others, or the want to be seen by others with a romantic partner they all covet and envy you for. I think these are typical examples most are familiar with of how some approach a desire for self-respect and peace of mind (an untroubled inner being). Maybe pertinent, what is portrayed in these examples is often termed materialistic. Unlike these, though, the obtainment of other goals can actually result in eudemonia – as example, in an honest self-respect and peace of mind – such that it is lasting, often regardless of the material losses that might further occur somewhere down the line. For some, like the ancient philosophers that used the term “eudemonia”, the obtainment of eudemonia is pivoted around conformity to virtue, be it applied to ethics, to reasoning, or to anything else.

I believe that once we get into discussing the very nature of outcomes such as self-respect and peace of mind, things can get very complicated and debate might be non-stop. But I again stipulate that a basic physical itch can amply suffice as counter-example to a pessimistic understanding of life as endless struggle without the possibility of lasting satisfaction: The obtainment of some goals manifests something within us which is of value in and of itself, which is held irrespective of other’s opinions, and which is lasting rather than fleeting (sometime to the effect that we take it to the grave).

Metaphorically, then, all goals one seeks to accomplish are in some ways each an itch at which one scratches. Just that some of these do result in increased eudemonia and some don’t – the latter maybe being here best stipulated as “false itches” … for, their being scratched, while producing momentary pleasures, does not alleviate that which one is bothered by, this even when the goal is obtained.

With that in mind, firstly, I don't think eudemonia can be about being greater than thou. If you believe you hold it but you’re surrounded by those who don’t, you won’t be flourishing all that much – so, unlike many understandings of pleasure and happiness, hording it to yourself will paradoxically make it vanish. I believe this is one reason why the ancient philosophers wanted others obtain it. Then, secondly, as with the saying “scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours” – here staying true to the same theme I started with – endowing someone with eudemonia (with a flourishing of being), if not a bs proclamation, will get the other to want to help you out in turn. This instead of having the other hold grudges about you having done so fist.

As with others, my compliments on a very nicely written OP. My main overall disagreement is that rather than the Schopenhauer-like pessimism of “the glass is half empty” I’d rather acknowledge that “the glass contains 50% water”. In other words, there’s both good and bad to life and, by extension, to struggles for the obtaining of goals; focusing on one aspect and ignoring the other will not of itself make the other vanish.

I guess "intersubjective reality" is a metaphor. — David Mo

If I’m interpreting you correctly: I know this would be a vast debate on its own. Feel free to disagree, of course. But for me, “reality” is merely the noun form of the adjective “real” which, in turn, is intended to signify “actually existing or occurring - rather than fictional”. My recollection of a dream I had last night would, given this semantic, be real - and, by extension, would thereby be a part of my intra-subjective reality: one experience among others which actually exists or occurs for me but for no one else. If this dream was real and I’d express it to you, I’d express a truth; if unreal, I’d express a falsehood. In the same general way, because English (by which I include all semantics particular to the English language) is an actual, rather than fictitious, medium via which English speakers communicate, and because the English language is not the intra-subjective reality of one individual but is, instead, an actuality whose very occurrence necessitates commonality among a plurality of beings, the English language will then hold an intersubjective reality - i.e., will be intersubjectively real.

This usage of “realtiy” is in keeping with common usage, as in, “they live in a different reality than we do” - as can be affirmed for the flat earth society. Here is not implicitly referenced objective reality - which “reality” is most often employed to express - but, instead, a belief structure of what is real via which individuals interpret the objective world and act within it. Differently exemplified, those who are Young Earth Creationists will hence dwell in a different intersubjective reality than those who accept the validity of biological evolution - the two cohorts' belief structures in essence make each inhabit a vastly different (interpretation of) cosmology relative to the other - yet both cohorts will nevertheless inhabit and be bound by the same objective reality. The YEC doesn’t deny the presence of dinosaur fossils, for example, this being a facet of objective reality - but does (I presume) believe that they were placed here by God to test their faith in their notion of God … this latter shared belief then being a facet of the YEC’s intersubjective reality.

Yes, there could be countless intersubjective realities. The reason I used the singular so far is that I was concerned with the idealised "human" intersubjective reality, i.e. what would result if there were no bias, mistakes etc. While that will never practically be the case, it serves as my baseline for what could be called "practical reality". — Echarmion

The case could be also made that each species of animal shares its own species-specific intersubjective reality. A human, a dog, and an ant will interpret the objective reality of a rock differently, given the species-specific proclivities of perception and interpretation peculiar to each. But, here again, there would not be existent just one species-specific intersubjectivity, but a multitude of these; each one relative to a different species of life. All the same, I now understand what you were getting at.

It'd be more a question of what you think the order is: do the objects develop subjectivity, or do the subjects develop objects? — Echarmion

In case this question wasn’t rhetorical: My own understanding of ontology addresses this question in horrendously complex manners. Currently, I’d rather be remain a mute about it - though I will simplistically express that, to me, subjectivity is ultimately conditional on objectivity.

There was another prominent idealist whose name I forget. — Marchesk

You mean that Evolog guy? Maybe the bloke changed his avatar name to something less fancy, and changed his mind about terming things “objective idealism” to terming things “neutral monism”, thinking it to make the same difference anyway. The same way that “non-Cartesian skepticism” and “fallibilism” do. The tyke might still be around, I’m guessing. No offense in calling him a tyke, btw: my own avatar name “javra” translates to “mongrel”, in case it wasn’t known. But, then again, you might have had someone else in mind.

Noticed that you’ve so far only addressed intersubjective reality in the singular. Although all this might go without saying, I wanted to make it explicit that each and every culture is its own intersubjective reality; as is each unique religious worldview, here including atheism; each unique language and its embedded semantics; and so forth. I have extreme doubt about such being anything but a practical joke, but the flat earth society, if their proclaimed belief is real and not mere deception, would be just one intersubjective reality among many. On the other hand, our tangible objective reality - if it is deemed to impartially effect (causally) all coexistent sentient being - can only be singular by entailment.

I’ll add that, to me at least, if these categories of “personally subjective realities”, “intersubjective realities”, and “the singular objective reality” are taken to be valid, they’d then retain the same properties regardless of which ontology happens to be the correct one: e.g., they’d apply just as much to idealism (it’s all psychical stuff in different forms) as they would to physicalism (it’s all physical stuff in different forms). The only main differences would be the metaphysical implications.

moral realism insists that there is a true good, a real good, which is *not* dependent on your or my or anyone’s viewpoint, opinion or even consent; it simply *is thus*. — Wayfarer

Given my (maybe peculiar) interpretations, this could be else worded as that which “just-is” (in the sense of being sans cause) … also, with “just” in part meaning “right, correct, impartial, and fair” – a notion from which the notions of both justice and justification - as well as the aesthetic (fair as that which is both pleasing and moral) - are derived. For instance – here imperfectly expressed - when we justify a belief we seek to evidence that that which is believed is impartially, factually, so - and, in so doing, imv we seek to align our beliefs to that which “just is” (rather than to our egoic wants or needs of what is; i.e., it’s not because I or you so say it is but because it is an impartial given that thereby is aligned to perfect impartiality, to that which just is).

This general notion then stands in contrast to the idea that that which is just will be the effect of one or more psyches (as can for example be stated of mainstream monotheisms, wherein that which is just is the product of a singular all-powerful deity's will - but, in fairness, for example excluding some of the more mystical facets of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam … Sufis, for example, here come to mind)

The first notion makes that which is good objective - as you say, impartial to the wants or needs of individual psyches. The second notion makes that which is good contingent upon, and thereby relative to, the wants or needs of one or more psyches - such that what is good is the creation of psyches.

Furthering this a bit, in the “is thus/just is” interpretation of the good: Affinity toward this state of being is what produces moral thought and behavior. Fear of this state of being, from where are produced aversions of various types, then results in immoral (bad or evil) behavior. This then can bridge to the rather archaic - and extremely laconic - notion of ethics being reducible to either love or fear (here, implicitly, for that which just is ... unless one further equates a perfectly impartial justice/fairness/etc with love, in which case there is then either affinity toward (universal) love (and its instantiations) or fear of it).

I guess my realism is showing.

People who take “objective” to mean “physical” just introduce unnecessary confusion and baggage to discussions about the objectivity of things other than reality (like morality, for example). — Pfhorrest

Since I’ve recently had the issue of governance on my mind, wanted to embellish my previous reply to this with something that is of interest to me - though, no doubt, which will be a highly dubious use of semantics to others.

As with the multiple meaning of “objective” - e.g., from that which is impartial to that which as noun is a goal – “to be a subject” too has its multiple meanings.

With that in mind, as an at the very least metaphoric appraisal of nature at large: Given the interpretation of objectivity which we so far agree upon, all subjective beings can thereby be further concluded via this mode of thought to inescapably be subjects to objectivity as ultimate authority - a power which the power of all subjects is conditional upon. Waiver too much from that which is objective, i.e. fully impartial, and the individual perishes. Stay accordant to objectivity and the individual holds the potential to flourish.

Of note, though, objectivity is in no way a psyche - nor can it be. We as psyches can be more objective by comparison to others or to other personally held states of mind - but our very nature of being individual selves precludes us from actualizing a perfectly impartial state of being. Hence, in this interpretation, we are above all subjects to a collectively shared, impartial reality - rather than being subjects to some monarch, some other leader, or some superlative incorporeal deity. No physical or spiritual sentient being to bow down to here.

You touched upon notions of an objective right and wrong - at least as possibilities to consider. To me, this too would then be a perfectly impartial, here metaphysical, reality. What some have termed, “the Real,” and what Plato termed “the Good” - this then, imv, being a metaphysical objectivity which holds at least some overtones to the neo-Platonic notion of “the One,” from which physicality was stated to emerge. But again - even when a neo-Platonic frame of mind is considered - I fail to fathom how “the Good” could in any way be a psyche and, hence, a deity. For, again, as that which is fully objective, it would need to be perfectly impartial in all conceivable ways. And a psyche always remains to some extent partial toward that which is good for itself, if nothing else.

With all this briefly mentioned for the sake of some background, that we as sentient beings are all subjects to, first and foremost, objectivity as ultimate authority is to me something that has a rather aesthetic appeal.

At any rate, since I started off with poetic mumbo-jumbo in this thread, I figured complimenting it with this take on the subjectivity/objectivity dichotomy can’t by now hurt too much.

Does that answer your question? — javra


Yep. — frank

Glad to hear you acknowledge so. Meanwhile, you don't happen to hold a monopoly on the semantics to the term "democracy" do you? Little old me - we've had our talks before - do not subscribe to your meanings of the term.

If you're American, I can tell you why you think that. — frank

BTW, think what exactly on account of my being "American"? A quote from me would make this statement of yours other than arbitrarily vague.

So can people who don't care about science arrive at decisions democratically? — frank

Strictly speaking, it all depends on the semantics we have in mind. So, three tyrannical brothers that don't give a fuddle about what science says who vote between themselves on what to do in reference to the populace they rule over, under the semantics you've simplistically articulated, do engage in democratic governance.

Given the same semantics, the same then can apply for a whole entire global populace who shuns science - and the scientists via which it manifests - as devils work.

Does that answer your question?

Suppose you have a community of people who don't particularly care about science. Could they not arrive at group decisions democratically? — frank

This to me has funny implications. I take democracy to be inclusive - this as an ideal it strives for. The Orwellian propaganda of "bringing democracy to the middle east" and the like aside. You are here asking about an exclusivist democracy, of a democracy for us but not for them, the other(s). Oligarchies work this way. As did many aspects of Hitler's regime. Neither of which fit what we (most of us at any rate) interpret to be democracy - to not even mention democratic values.

To my ear “objective” always means “impartial”, and what makes physical stuff objectively real is precisely that it can be impartially determined to exist, vis our common (and therefore unbiased) experiences.

People who take “objective” to mean “physical” just introduce unnecessary confusion and baggage to discussions about the objectivity of things other than reality (like morality, for example). — Pfhorrest

Fully agreed. To add: Culturally, this can often get confusing due to the commonly understood semantics of "objects" - despite, for example, concepts being objects of awareness. We're often habituated into thinking that objects are always necessarily physical and, as a result, end up thinking of objectivity as being the physicality which applies to (physical) objects. Whereas, as you say, each physical object holds an impartial existence to all coexistent sentient beings - and is (or at least can coherently be conceptualized as being) thereby objective precisely due to its nature of being impartially applicable all subjects.

Science arrives at facts democratically? That's an interesting perspective. When do they vote? — frank

Trite, but I’ll play along. Vote for what? For what is real, right? Scientists do this every time they offer a conclusion to the data that is gathered via experiments regarding falsifiable claims. The conclusions – i.e., interpretations - offered by one scientist are an individual voicing of what is true, given the data obtained … hence, a vote for what is real. It takes many multiple scientists holding the same interpretation to make the given interpretation a scientific theory of what is. And, of course, intrinsic to the whole process is further validation by more experiments which are themselves a) peer-reviewed and replicated and b) concluded via interpretations of the data.

But no, frank, empirical science and political governance are not one and the same. And no, scientists don’t vote for a common president.

“Rule by the people (which is what democracy is) as concerns what is true” as compared to say “rule by some person(s) who is/are superlatively close to the monotheistic God who alone decrees what is and is not true” has applications in social settings outside of political governance all the same.

As for science, again, no one is opposed to it, but I'm still not seeing how it has much to do with democracy. — frank

If democracy is not mob rule wherein “might makes right (both morally and factually)” but, instead, incorporates the ideals of consent via compromise and accord among a given plurality of subjective beings which in turn makes them unified - E Pluribus Unum as motif - then:

All empirical sciences are governed by this same ideal via their essential property of peer-review. Peer-review is not only, or even primarily, journal councils reviewing newly submitted articles. It at its essence incorporates a mandatory replicability of data. This, expressed in the simplest possible way I can currently think of, is akin to “Do you also see what I see? If we’re all seeing the same thing, then that which is here referenced impartially applies to all of us and is thereby evidenced, but never proven with infallible certainty, to be objectively real. If only one of us sees it and the rest do not, then it was only a misplaced subjective perception of what is - and can be safely ignored.”

This, then, is at pith a democratic process of appraising what is and is not real.

Take away all aspects of the peer-review process and what remains are authoritarian, hence totalitarian, decrees of what is objectively real, wherein might makes right ... which is contradictory to a

government of the people, by the people, for the people — Lincoln

Modern empirical science is obviously not a panacea, hence adequate for all fields of knowledge (metaphysics for starters), but it is deeply instituted in democratic principles.

Comments... — TheMadFool

As for myself, furthering this metaphor, many species of thought have become extinct. We might be able to discover their fossilized remains within our history - but the allegorical flesh and nervous system of these can only be imperfectly inferred. The fragments of Heraclitus’ philosophy to me seem a good example of this. As with physical manifestations of life, those species of thought that have gone extinct are forever to remain extinct. Nevertheless, via analogous evolution, we find many of the same forms of belief in today’s species of thought that once pertained to now extinct species of thought. Process theory is a different, currently living, species of thought than that of Heraclitus’s now extinct philosophy of global flux - unlike process theory, the latter being fully grounded in an understanding of logos as natural law (of which our own human reasoning, replete with its laws of thought, was only a sub-constituent of), this being a species of thought that now no longer is. Yet the analogously evolved properties between today’s process theories and Heraclitean philosophy is blatantly present all the same. And, alongside analogous evolutionary processes, there are also homologous evolutionary processes: the gradual change from one species of thought into another. As one example, what was once the Empiricist driven period of the so-called Enlightenment in the west steadily morphing into today’s physicalism (as one crucial difference, ideas were empirical to the likes of Lock and Hume, whereas against the backdrop of today’s species of thought termed physicalism, that which is empirical is today strictly constituted of what can be grasped via sensory receptors - which, in today’s species of thought, precludes ideas from so being empirically known).

I have little interest in justifying these affirmations, so one can chalk them all up to being mere opinions. But, given this general outlook:

Just as the changes that occur in physical manifestations of life - which are commonly termed “(biological) evolution” - hold global limitations and attributes (e.g., the adaptation of life to that which is objectively real via, in part, life’s random mutations – here simplistically expressing something very complex), so too can be expressed for the evolution of species of philosophical thought: these too are bound to global limitations and attributes. As an additional offered opinion and nothing more, all species of philosophical thought evolve - via both analogous and homologous processes - via adaptation to that which is objectively (here understood as "impartially" rather than "physically") real; this, in part, through at times random changes that can for example obtain though trial and error, novel intuitions, and the like.

A species of philosophical thought that would, for example, affirm that one can fly off of tall buildings by flapping one’s hands were one to will it with sufficient force will not last long.

On the other hand, studying the so-called fossils of bygone species of philosophical thought can at times help us better understand the global aspects of – here, primarily metaphysical – reality; in particular, those global aspects which makes the analogously evolved properties of certain species of thought reoccur throughout history.

------------

Yup, nothing here but the poetic articulation of a metaphorical perspective regarding philosophy’s history - with not an ounce of proper justification to any of it. But, then, in my own defense, the OP was drenched in metaphor to begin with.

You, as a thing just like any other thing, have small changes which occur to you over time, so your point of view changes, nevertheless you are still the same thing, and it is still your point of view. So the law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, allows that a thing which is changing as time passes, might continue to be the same thing, because the thing never ceases to be the same as itself despite the fact that it is changing over time. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are very likely interpreting the term “thing” in different ways. “I am a thing” to me doesn’t register.

As for the main gist of the quote:

A rock as a thing is in perpetual change and this change eventually results in sediments. Though the same physical components are present, the rock is not the same thing as the sediments which inevitably result. There will be a time over this course of slow transformation - in which the rock turns to sediments - when the given rock ceases to be the same given rock, instead being a different rock. Sortie’s paradox here applies (imo, as it applies to the identity of all spatiotemporal givens). Before this time is arrived at, its sameness over time is not a result of the same unchanging total package of constituent parts - which never remains the same - but only of the same holistic form which is maintained despite all the changes that unfold. Nothing spatiotemporal ever remains in a static state of being - and so identity through time is not a property applicable to the organization of the parts but only to the holistic form which the parts bring about. Hence, one cannot step twice into the same river in terms of constituent components - yet it remains the same river in terms of its holistic form via which it is recognized over time to be the same river. Such is my view.

If a given’s constituents are never identical across time, but only its holistic form can so remain, then the notion of identity can only apply to holistic forms. Coming round to the previous topic, again, what I’ve been trying to express is that the holistic form of a first-person point of view is the same, qualitatively identical, for all numerically different first person points of view - despite the constituents of awareness pertaining to each being drastically different, thereby being a part of what makes each numerically different first person point of view unique.

Via analogy only: the holistic form which makes some given be a rock is of itself the same, qualitatively identical, for all numerically different rocks - despite the constituents of each individual rock being drastically different. This rock is not that rock for a multitude of reasons, their unique spatial location included, but both clear cut cases of rocks will equally be a rock.

Maybe you no longer subscribe to realism when it comes to universals? I thought you did. Or maybe we hold drastically different understandings of these as well.

All the same, I’m not here trying to convince you but am instead justifying my stance, which you took issue with. And I don't find the metaphysics of identity to be an easy topic.

It was you who was talking about a first-person-point-of view as if it were a thing, — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in the slightest. This is what you’ve projected upon what I said, via your own means of interpretation.

If the first-person-point-of-view is not a thing which can be talked about, then what is it that you are referring to with this phrase? — Metaphysician Undercover

A process, maybe? All the same, as I see it, what a first person point of view is ontologically - a thing, a process, both, or neither - does not need to be in any way known by us for one to hold a rather strong certainty that such nevertheless is, at the very least in the here and now.

The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Therefore, one person's point of view is the same as that person's point of view. — Metaphysician Undercover

Taking a different route, if I’m understanding you correctly: Since no singular first person point of view remains the same over time - e.g., the you of five seconds past is not identical to the you of the present - there thereby can be no personal identity through time. Is this correct?

I should add that I don't consider the first person point of view to be a thing, i.e.a homunculus.

Your claim that all first-person points-of-view are exactly the same, by virtue of being first-person points-of-view, is just like saying that all things are exactly the same by virtue of being things. How is that a useful assumption, rather than a misleading assumption, in this context? — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to have misread what I wrote. To try to better explain via the law of identity: X = X. Hence, "a first person point of view = a first person point of view". This just as much as "a thing = a thing". I did state and then emphasize that each first person point of view is different in various ways - but that all first person points of view are nevertheless identical strictly in so being first person points of view. To then use your example, all things are identical strictly in their property of being things. A rock is no more nor less a thing than is a bolder - despite the two things mentioned being distinctly different in givens such as their spatial properties. The thingness, or thinghood (don't laugh, these are words one can find in a dictionary), of all things is nevertheless exactly the same, this by virtue of all things being things - rather than for example being actions. Again, just as X = X, so too does a thing = a thing.

Now, thingness is an abstraction we abstract from individual things. In the context of consciousness, or else of awareness, though the words "a first-person point of view" are themselves abstractions, what I'm saying is that we each can reference these words to a personal experience of being which, of itself as experience, is intimately real and non-abstract.

I get the Cartesian skepticism that could unfold (the "what if" and "how do you know with infallible certainty" questions). Still, you experience yourself to be, among other things, a first person point of view, as I myself do. These experiences are as real as experiences get. We are of course uniquely different in innumerable ways as first person points of view. Nevertheless, if you are a first person point of view, and if I am a first person point of view - this among all our other attributes which differentiates us - then (get ready) how would the "first-person-point-of-view-ness(or, -hood)" which we both share be in and of itself in any way different ... as that which we both at base minimally are as aware beings?

Do you for example experience being a first person point of view by physiologically seeing some given from two different points of view at the same time and in the same way?

Again, I do maintain that the beetle you hold of being a first person point of view and the beetle which I hold of likewise being a first person point of view - in so far as strictly this one attribute of being is concerned - can only be qualitatively identical (again, in so far as strictly concerns this one attribute). That we, for example, each see different things that impart upon us different forms as first person points of view does not, of itself, annul the fact that we both minimally are first person points of view as aware beings that cognize things. As a bolder is no more or less a thing than is a pebble, so too are you or I no more or less a first person point of view than the other.

You make me feel so Jung :grin: — Wayfarer

Ha! It’s good to be Jung at heart. :razz: (Well, in some ways at least, given that we are referencing Carl Jung).

I offer this not to be contrary but only to keep things interesting by defending an opposing view. It's not for me about destroying the concept of consciousness but instead in recontextualizing it. The idea is (as I understand it) that we have certain conventions that give concepts identity. — jjAmEs

I’ll expand my views on this a little in reference to consciousness. As I was previously implying, consciousness as an abstract conceptual noun has no meaning in the absence of awareness. Although “awareness” and “cognizance” can hold different spectrums of meaning, “to be aware” and “to cognize” do not - this at least when applied to the first-person point of view (rather than a total mind): to be aware of X is to cognize X and vice versa. Here we have multiple abstract conceptual nouns that convey somewhat different concepts that, nevertheless, reference the same exact beetle that is in everybody’s box. Though we’re all uniquely informed as first-person points-of-view by information at large, this being in part what makes us all uniquely different, we all nevertheless hold an identical beetle in that we are all endowed with (else are) a first-person point of view. Granting that an ant is a sentient being and not an automaton, so too does an ant hold the same beetle in its box: that of having, else being, a first-person point-of-view. For emphasis, all first-person points-of-view will be different in form - again, partly due to the differing information they are informed by, also by biological predispositions that are genetically inherited, etc.; nevertheless, all first-person points of view will be the same, by which I mean qualitatively identical, in their one property of so being first-person points-of-view – differently worded, in being a first-person nexus of awareness.

Here, to me, the occurrence of first-person points-of-view is a concrete, albeit intangible, reality – in the sense that our so being is directly experienced by us, rather than being something which we abstract from direct experiences. And to say that I as a first-person point-of-view “am conscious of”, “am aware of”, or “am cognizant of” makes not the slightest difference in what I am intending to be understood by the given signs. But once we enter into the world of abstracted nouns, things change. As abstracted nouns, consciousness, awareness, and cognizance – though their meanings overlap – can each convey different meanings. And, to the extent that these terms can translate into other languages, these meanings are culturally relative, rather than universal.

Notwithstanding, all these abstracted nouns are generalized from that which is directly experienced, and, in this sense, concrete: the first person point of view which is conscious of / aware of / cognizant of. And this concrete experience of what is will itself be of a proverbial beetle.

So our abstractions, our concepts, do float about, so to speak, in a linguistic webbing of our own intersubjective making. Our linguistic conventions do give the concepts we entertain their identity. Yet, as is the case with consciousness, these abstract nouns are yet abstracted by us from an underlying non-abstract reality that is. Rather than it being abstract nouns all the way down.

Not saying this to object to your perspectives, but in attempts to better find a suitable middle ground.

Feel free to link to any art you have online. I'll check it out. — jjAmEs

Oh, man. This made me blush. Didn’t mean to imply that I’ve either been prolific or good at the artistic stuff I’ve engaged in - though it’s always been a pleasurable challenge for me. As it is, I haven’t yet posted most anything of my arts on line. Certainly nice to have been asked, though. Ditto, btw. If you have anything online, it would be nice to check it out.

Different languages have different ways of breaking up or articulating reality. I find that fascinating. — jjAmEs

Yes, me as well. Though I yet maintain that there is some underlying reality that is signified. In a way it reminds me of a ruby metaphor: the same gem gets expressed, and conceptualized, via one of its many faces. Though each conceptualization, as abstraction, picks up a different impression of the underlying reality, the underlying reality as a whole still is. Maybe I'm over-generalizing here, but I find this for example holds in relation to what can be termed "awareness".

But I'd like to add the notion of the artist discovering experiences by experimenting with the medium. I've worked in various media (music and visual art, for example) and personally I did not in general know where I was going or wanted to say. Instead I experienced a 'reactive' critical faculty that was or was not satisfied as I tried this or that, starting perhaps with vague general ideas. If all went well, I'd end up with shapes or sounds that felt good. — jjAmEs

:grin: Yup, I can relate. Sometimes, I'd dabble random dots on a blank paper and then proceed to connect them till something interesting would appear. Then I'd refine this general appearance into a finalized product that "felt good". I think that's the extreme I've gone in that direction. Music too, placing bits of sound that worked individually into a streamlined whole. Still, I've also often had a general image, or feeling, that I wanted to make tangible - not a picture perfect imagination, but a clear awareness of the impact I wanted the subject matter to convey. Then, of course, as the work progressed, aesthetic decisions changed what I initially conceived into a somewhat altered final product.

For me the artist would share with others in the experience of the art afterward. But he or she would never know for sure that the experience/beetle was the same. — jjAmEs

Seems as though this goes without saying. Agreed. Then there's the case to be made of the artwork holding the artist as its principle audience. One knows, senses, when it came out at its best. The pleasure then is intrinsic, rather than being obtained from other's reaction.

Hmm, notice this is changing the thread's topic a bit - possibly a bit too much. But its good to relate about these things.

I gotta link to this, in case you're interested: http://lab404.com/misc/ltdinc.pdf — jjAmEs

I'll check it out. Seems like a worthwhile read.

Have to ask, have you ever experienced concepts that are not communicable via the language(s) you speak?

Yea, I know, the beetle.

Since I'm Romanian-American, as example, in Romanian there is no translation of "awareness" - as there is, for example, of "cat" ("pisica"). There is "conștință" - which stands for both consciousness and conscience - as well as "cognizență", which is fluidly translated into "cognizance" - but there's no term for "awareness". This example, of course, is easier than expressing Romanian words for which there is no English translation. It's because of such multilingual experiences - along with sentiments and for me at times concepts which I find are not communicable via the languages I know (other than via generalities that miss the mark, e.g. "an aesthetic experience") - that I take the following view:

Allegorically, words as signs are akin to boxes into which we package our intended semantics so as to have our meaning delivered to some other who then opens the box, so to speak, in order to grasp - as best they can - what we wanted to be understood by them. These boxes are intersubjectively manifested, with a long history to them, and so goad that which we can and cannot convey - both to others as well as to ourselves. In the case of the latter, a language's words limits the forms which our linguistically conveyed thoughts can take. Hence, language shapes thoughts by imposing itself upon which concepts are possible to convey. Yet, at the same time, it is due to the very existence of "beetles" which it references that language has any import for us. Rather than it being a unidirectional causal process - either envisioned from without (language) toward within (subjects) or vice versa - I strongly believe the relation between language and subject to be bidirectional. New words come into use via individual subjects' intentions (culturally speaking, this being a bottom-up influence upon language). Once these words become mainstream, they then shape that which can be conveyed and the very thoughts of those who convey information (language's top-down influence upon subjects). These are my general musings on the subject, here given for disclosure.

At any rate, we all have our unique experiences. Again, was curious if you've ever experienced concepts that were not communicable via language.

Now that I think of it, to me many art forms are just this: the attempted communication of experiences, sometimes conceptual, that are not communicable via language.

I hope my answer is somehow helpful or at least not boring. — jjAmEs

Definitely not boring, and certainty insightful. I agree that meaning is not static, fixed, but instead fluid and alive (allegorically speaking). It's also a given to me that language is inter-subjective, rather than what I'd term intra-subjective (as would be one's private awareness of a flashing insight, for example) - and, hence, that linguistic meaning is largely social and historical. Myself, I however am also of the general opinion that most concepts - or, at least, those which are most important - do however reference concrete existents, for lack of better terms, this in reference to what's going on within (again, as I term it, in reference to each of our own intra-subjective reality). That said, I by no means deny the complexity to our semantics, which you've eloquently expressed.

Thank you for the candid reply.

I suggest that it makes as much sense to ground the subject/consciousness in language as it does to ground language in the subject/consciousness. The whole philosophical discourse of consciousness occurs within public sign-systems. The subject is an effect of language, not as a body, of course, but as a concept, as one more sign that only makes sense in a system of signs. — jjAmEs

Though not new to me, I find this to be an interesting take.

I'd like to know if you'd affirm the same of the term awareness. More specifically, in your view, is it a valid position to affirm that the English linguistic percept of "awareness" is in itself what manifests the occurrence of awareness - such that the term does not reference anything that can occur in the term's absence?

If yes, this would naturally entail that language-less beings are devoid of sentience due to their lacking of awareness - to include not only lesser animals but young toddlers as well - for none such hold a linguistically framed concept of "awareness".

BTW, I in part ask because a) the concept of "awareness" can of course only be linguistically conveyed and because, b) given the wide array of possible denotations that can be applied to the term "consciousness" - while it is conceivable given some such denotations that awareness can occur sans consciousness (e.g., an ant can be so claimed to be devoid of a consciousness while yet aware of stimuli) - denoting consciousness as something that can occur in the absence of awareness makes the term "consciousness" utterly nonsensical. And our own awareness - via which we perceive just as much as we cognize intuitions and introspections - seems to me to be the pivotal "beetle".

So, to sum: in your view, is it a valid possibility that awareness cannot occur in the absence of language?

--which, by the way, come from Charles Sanders Peirce. — aletheist

I like some of his takes as well.

I am having trouble understanding this question, and I wonder if there is a disconnect between what I mean by "position" and what you mean by "location." Again, what I primarily wish to maintain is that continuous three-dimensional space is not really composed of discrete dimensionless points. Put another way, there are no absolute positions in space, only those that we deliberately mark for some purpose. A physical thing does not occupy a discrete point or collection of discrete points, since it is always in continuous motion. We can only designate its position relative to an arbitrary reference frame, which is also always in continuous motion. — aletheist

That geometric points don’t really hold being other than in our abstract contemplations I too take as a given. To try to better explain my own perspective:

Like the meaning applicable to specific words as percepts - be they written, auditory, or, as is the case with braille, tactile - specific units of length will hold their designation due to communal accord; alternatively stated, they hold an inter-subjective reality ... But not a reality that is solely applicable to one individual (such as would be awareness of some previously experienced, language-less, REM dream), nor one that is universally applicable to all coexistence sentient beings in manners impartial to the wants or needs of any one individual or cohort of such (as is the case with the physical universe).

Then, as with the specific, here visual, percept used to address a concept - as with a word - so too will the use of feet or meters (for example) be inter-subjectively arbitrary. But - here focusing in on the issue of spatial lengths - the spatial length will remain the exact same length regardless of which unit of measurement is used (and even if no unit of measurement is used), thereby making the discrete position at which a given length starts and ends something that is not inter-subjectively arbitrary; instead, these as discrete positions will be universally applicable to all causally interrelated, coexistent beings regardless of a) their individual idiosyncratic properties of body and mind and b) their shared mindsets. Here the discrete positions (what I’ve termed “locations” for brevity) of where the given length starts and ends will not be in any way arbitrary but, by all accounts I can currently think of, objective.

Importantly, I am of this opinion while fully agreeing that there is no objective center to the physical universe, nor any objective top/down, front/back, left/right to it.

Nevertheless, by virtue of there being multiple physical things, there will likewise be multiple discrete positions – such as the start and end of each physical thing’s longest extension (to nitpick, even if this is equally applicable in all directions as is the case with a perfect sphere … which is likely solely conceptual).

To now try to bring this back to the arrow paradox, remember I discussed the point-free topology notion of spatially extended “spots” as an alternative to volumeless geometric points, this in terms of contemplating what space is constituted of. The same conceptual dilemma emerges: if there is a distance - a start-spot and an end-spot to a given length - which has to be traversed, then there will logically be a mid-spot to this distance, this whether or not it is marked by anyone. And, also logically, there will then be an endless quantity of mid-spots getting ever closer to the end-spot but never actualizing a perfectly identical location relative to it.

Hence, in my view, this logic will hold for as long as there is some objective length that needs to be traveled. It doesn’t matter if the length is measure in feet, in meters, some other unit of measurement, or is not measured at all via any inter-subjectively established unit of measurement. The mid-points or, alternatively, mid-spots will be - not because one individual discerns them, nor because of some interpersonally established means of measurement (including those of geometric points and topological spots) - but, it seems to me, these will be just as objectively present as is the very start and end of the given length. And devoid of some start and end to length, width, and height no physical object could itself be - instead, all of physicality would be one center-less and volume-less whole.

Don't know if I expressed myself well enough. At any rate, to me the spatial aspects of the arrow paradox are just an interesting thing to think about at times, this as a distraction of sorts. But I don’t want to beat a proverbial dead horse. I think I get the perspectives you’ve presented, which is what I was interested in. And its clear to me that we both agree on space and time being continuous, with no absolute spatial (or temporal) locations (or durations) to be found in the spatiotemoral universe.

Thanks for the exchange.

No, this is conflating reality with existence; I hold that they are not synonymous or coextensive. Reality is that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it. Existence is reaction with other things in the environment. [...] Positions and instants are artificial creations, so they only exist after we have deliberately marked them for some purpose, such as description or measurement. — aletheist

Got it. Thanks for the clarification. Existence is a very ambiguous term in philosophy: can either imply something along the lines of “that which stands out (perceptually - sometimes, or cognitively - to some observer, some cohort of such, or all coexistent observers … such that, for example, the “points of awareness” which do the observing don’t themselves exist in this sense, for example leading to notions such as the so-called problem of other minds)” or, else, is deemed synonymous to being and, hence, that which is real (in which case, for example, we as “points of awareness” do exist). Hard to tell what gets interpreted by the term existence sometimes.

A discrete position or location is established relative to a coordinate system whose origin, orientation, and unit length are all arbitrary--again, artificial creations. — aletheist

Arbitrary relative to whom? I ask because you haven't addressed what is to me the difficult question: How does perceptual agreement between all sentient observers that causally interact in regard to the location of physical objects - very much including where they start and where they end - come about?

(While I'm aware of the "god did it" argument, I'm not of this view - nor do I want to debate issues regarding theism in this thread.)

No, physical things exist regardless of whether humans ever designate their positions/locations relative to an arbitrary coordinate system. — aletheist

Given your clarification of "existence", how can physical things (note the plurality and, hence, intrinsic quantity to this affirmation - which also entails discrete locations for each as per the law of noncontradiction) exist regardless of whether locations exist - given that the latter are mind-dependent?

Yes, but again, the unit by which we measure length or duration is arbitrary. Moreover, both the stick's length and the song's duration are subject to change--we can cut off a portion of the stick, or adjust the tempo of the song. — aletheist

We're in agreement to the second sentence in this quote. But, again, length and duration would be arbitrary relative to whom? To me "arbitrariness" loses its meaning when ascribed to that which all coexistent sentient beings do in like manner so as to result in their tacit agreement upon existent physical things that are concretely experienced and interacted with.

So as to not be misinterpreted, I've already given my own perspective in the post to which you've just replied: both continuous spatiotemporal change and discrete aspects of space and time which we quantify are real and existent, though the first is more foundational than the second.

Of note, with its possible philosophical interpretations here placed aside, the theory of relativity clearly indicates that space and time are not discrete but a continuum. — javra

No, this is a mistake in the other direction; the theory of relativity assumes that space and time are continuous, rather than discrete. — aletheist

My point to this being that, though the theory of relativity is in itself a model of reality, it accurately describes those aspects of nature it is relevant to, as is evidenced by its predictive power. This, in turn, can give additional credence to space and time not only being individually continuous but also mutually continuous.

I'm replying primarily out of my curiosity for the following.

What you said here:

Continuous motion is a more fundamental reality that discrete positions in space and discrete instants in time. — aletheist

seems contradictory with what you say here:

Yes, in my view a discrete position (or instant) is an abstraction that we impose when we mark it for some purpose, not a real constituent of space (or time). It certainly does not exist, since it does not react with anything. — aletheist

The first statement affirms degrees or reality, such that some aspects of reality are more fundamental than others, with all aspects of reality (regardless of its metaphysical(?) degree) being existent by definition. The second statement implies a strict binary understanding: either something is real, and thereby existent, or it is not.

We so far agree that at least everything we deem to be physical is in continuous change - that everything is in flux, to here paraphrase Heraclitus. I say “everything we deem to be physical” so as to bracket off certain givens such as basic laws of thought (the law of identity, for example, is not continuously changing relative to us sentient beings - despite our own perpetual changes).

To address your second comment that discrete position - i.e., location - does not exist, is the computer screen that I am now seeing not located in front of me, beneath the sky and above the earth, having locations to the left and to the right at which it terminates? Are all these in fact nonexistent? If so, how do you account for our mutual perceptual agreement of where physical objects are relative to each other … as well as for their three-dimensional spatial properties? Addressing the same in more general terms, how would one account for the physical world which all sentient beings tacitly, if not also explicitly, agree upon: e.g., an ant, a cat, and a human will all tacitly find the same spatial properties to what we humans deem to be a rock, including its three-dimensional volume. Rearticulating the same, if location is to be deemed nonexistent, would the physical world (here encompassing all physical objects which are in part known via their discrete spatial positions) also be considered nonexistent?

As for myself, I adopt the perspective that the continuity of change, hence of motion, is a more fundamental reality than the fixedness of quantity (including distances that have a beginning and end as well as durations that have a beginning and end) - this being in-tune with your first quoted statement. Yet both change and quantity are nevertheless real and, thus, existent – here, in a non-binomial manner but one of degrees. We all know where a given stick’s length starts and ends, just as we all know when a given song starts and ends – thereby making the stick’s length and the song’s duration impartially, hence objectively, real, and thereby making the stick and the song existent. For emphasis, to me this is so despite lengths and durations being of a less fundamental reality than is the reality of continuous spatiotemporal change.

… or, in the words of the Cheshire Cat, “we’re all mad here”.

It’s the ones that take themselves to be fully, absolutely, infallibly sane that you have to watch out for. They’re mad too, just differently (one can tell by their mad reactions to being informed of this).

While I’m quoting form Lewis Carrol …

Mad Hatter: "Have I gone mad?"
Alice: "I'm afraid so. You're entirely bonkers. But I'll tell you a secret. All the best people are.”

Also

Mad Hatter: “Everyone wants some magical solution to their problems and everyone refuses to believe in magic.”

To be less lighthearted in my reply, philosophy takes time. And, if its goal is the gaining of wisdom, it is then a never-ending endeavor. No wisdom is ever perfect. As to repetition expecting different results, is “if at first you don’t succeed, try and try again” to be shunned as something only lunatics do? A mostly rhetorical question, given that the attempts are made in different ways. (just noticed beat me to this :razz: )

Continuous motion is a more fundamental reality that discrete positions in space and discrete instants in time. — aletheist

I am of the same opinion. With the paradox addressed in mind, this stance in turn implies that our conceptual quantification of space and time, as a mapping of the terrain, does not accurately represent that which is being mapped. Of note, with its possible philosophical interpretations here placed aside, the theory of relativity clearly indicates that space and time are not discrete but a continuum. All the same, the quoted mindset with which I agree will also stand in opposition to the block-universe model of the world, wherein there can be no real motion (due to there being no real change). As a reminder, Zeno’s paradoxes were intended to support Parmenides’ stance that change, and thereby motion, does not exist as anything other but illusion.

The arrow indeed will pass all the Ms that we actually mark, but that will be a finite number. — aletheist

This part I don’t yet get. If we don’t mark a location, or else don’t think of a location, does that then mean that the location does not exist – this in contrast to those locations we do mark or think about which would thereby exist? I’d wholeheartedly disagree with an answer of “yes”. But this then entails an endless quantity of existent midpoints that reside ever closer to the finishing location. BTW, one could employ something along the lines of point-free topology—which does not make use of extension-less geometric points but of extended “spots”—and still arrive at the same conceptual issue of endless “mid-spots” residing before the finishing “spot”.

Again, at least one resolution, as per the implications of your previous statement, would be to understand that our conceptual quantification of space, as a mapping of the terrain, into discrete positions does not accurately represent the terrain.

The arrow can move because time is not made up of zero-sized instances/moments; instead time is essentially an interval and so, the arrow can move. — TheMadFool

I like this. To me the temporal aspects of the paradox are nicely addressed and resolved in the OP.

All the same, my problem with Zeno’s arrow paradox is not so much temporal as spatial, which the OP’s resolution doesn’t address. Maybe you, or some other, can find a resolution to it; this in parallel to the temporal issues addressed by the OP.

To sum, the arrow’s motion has a starting location, I’ll label it S, and a finishing location, here labeled F. This can get represented by a line segment between S and F. The line segment has a midpoint, here labeled M. To get from S to F one has to pass M. Once passed, though, there’s a second midpoint between M and F, here labeled M2, that needs to be passed. Then there’s a midpoint between M2 and F, M3, that needs to be passed. The trouble with the spatial paradox, as I understand it, is that it leads to an infinite quantity of midpoints that need to be traversed in order to arrive at F. In short, because the quantity of midpoints that need to be passed is endless, one could never arrive at F, for one is forever stuck in passing through midpoints that reside before F.

Once this problem is cognized as such, it then can be applied retroactively to the midpoint between S and M – such that M (the midpoint between S and F) can never be obtained either. Nor, for that matter, can any movement whatsoever occur when rationally considered in spatial terms, regardless of how miniscule the distance: given the tacit presumptions of rudimentary geometry most, if not all, of us maintain, there will always conceptually occur an infinite quantity of midpoints between the place started from and any given destination, with all these endless midpoints residing before the destination.

Eppur si muove!

Imo, the ancient Greek understanding of nature – or of the physical – would be direly incomplete without an ancient Greek understanding of logos. I here principally have in mind philosophies such as that of Heraclitus’ and of the Stoics.

Tangentially, I strongly emphasize that one should not confuse the ancient Greek understanding(s) of logos with the Abrahamic, monotheistic understanding of logos, i.e., with the notion that logos is “the word” of an omnipotent psyche by whose will all becomes created. Rather, here, logos is the stuff from which notions such as that as the anima mundi (world soul) become established. It is not just discourse and, by extension, the thought (hence human reasoning) that produces it, but also cause and effect, natural law, and the like.

Still, what Ancient Greek logos is was something that was debated even back then, never mind now when it’s very usage gets derided as mystical babble. Seems as though discussing what logos signified to the Ancient Greek philosophers (and, as is the case with Stoicism, many religious adherents, as we would today call them) would be somewhat of a quagmire.

Still, while being and logos may not be the same, for the Ancient Greeks, being as we know and live it is intimately entwined with logos – which, in essence, then presents that which is natural, or else physical, i.e. that which is “in-born”.

Just remembered, matter – in Latin, materia – is directly derived from the Latin mater (“mother”); in ancient Greece this general mindset was intimately intertwined with notions such as that of Gaia and, again, for the Stoics, of an anima mundi … this being in many ways reminiscent of ancient understandings of the “virgin mother” (birthing sentience without being inseminated), and this long before the convergence of ideologies at the first Council of Nicaea which is Christianity as we now know it.

"I am the center of the universe, and everything else moves around me." - how am I to disprove this to myself? — Pneumenon

If assuming idealism, by not assuming a solipsistic idealism. All other beings are just as much at their own center of the universe as you yourself are (thereby nullifying you being the absolute center). I’ve, for example, read Aikido philosophy to articulate things in just this manner.

It’s somewhat like saying that, because our planet is spherical, all inhabitants of Earth are always on top of the world in more or less equal fashion – so that no one person or populace is more on top of the world than any other. It to me also meshes well enough with modern cosmology’s stance that the physical universe has no - dare I say, objective - center.

Embellishing this with some imperfect thought:

We all interact with that which is impartially applicable to all sentient beings, and hence in this sense with that which is independent of us – which in common understanding is termed the physical or, alternatively, nature. Given a non-solipsistic idealism, that which is commonly termed physical will itself be contingent on the coexistence of minds (in the plural, since it's not solipsism). Via analogy, this could be in some ways comparable to the following understanding of geometric space:

The existence of geometric space is contingent on the coexistence of multiple, otherwise volume-less (hence space-less) geometric points. Hence, the very plurality of points is what the given manifestation of geometric space is dependent on, with no individual geometric point in any way being the cause to the space all share. If there is only one point in the whole of existence, then, because the one point is volumeless, there will be no space. Then, given a plurality of geometric points, the space that is thereby inter-dependently manifested by all coexistent points will itself be independent of the properties of any particular geometric point – including its location or whether the particular geometric point ceases to be. Further embellishing this analogy, one can imagine that each geometric point is itself at its own center of three-dimensional space – such that what is up or down, front or back, and left or right will be relative to each geometric point. Again, each geometric point is at the center of space in total – a space inter-dependently caused by the coexistence of multiple points standing in relation but not caused by any individual point - such that up or down, front or back, and left or right as three spatial planes hold their existence by virtue of being impartially shared among all spatially related points. Here, there is no absolute center to the three-dimensional space which the plurality of geometric points brings about; nor is there any absolute up or down, front or back, and left or right to the three-dimensional space which the geometric points inhabit.

If this analogy doesn’t make any sense, so be it. But to the extent that it might, in the aforementioned analogy each individual sentient being is represented by a geometric point, and the universe by three-dimensional space.

Not here to argue for idealism, just wanted to address the OP with a, I grant, somewhat whimsical way of thinking about the paradox of each sentient being dwelling in its own center of an otherwise centerless universe – and this within a framework of idealism.

You're increasing the complexity of your argument without considering what I've just said with regard to what the meaning of a term consists of.

The term is one elemental constituent. That fact refutes your initial objection. No kidding. — creativesoul

An assertion of fact based on what evidence?

In all honesty, my experience contradicts it. Given that the experience which “tip of the tongue” specifies is universal enough to be termed in multiple cultures and languages, including sign language (here, “tip of the finger”), I’m quite confident I’m not alone in experiences where I know what I want to say but can’t find the term for it. The meaning is there; the term is not.

Again, if a term at the tip of one’s tongue is meaningless (because its meaning is forgotten along with the term, this since they're both are one and the same "elemental constituent"), than how would one be aware of there being such a thing?

Addressing this would be an argument. Again implying that it doesn’t fit your offered definition of meaning and thereby is erroneous would not be.

Specify what you take to be the assumptions, please.

I, btw, don't take the occurrence of experience - be it in general or in particular - to be an assumption.

(I have to take off for now.)

#1 How can one know what truth is, without knowing what truth is in the first place? — Monist

Since a) we all hold the capacity to lie, b) we are all adults (more or less), and c) the adults that affirm they have never told a lie will most certainly be lying, we can then safely conclude that we all experientially know what lies are. Then, one can start addressing the question by observing that truth is what occurs in the absence of lies - contextually, this within awareness related givens, such as statements and beliefs, regarding what is experienced. (But I acknowledge that in at least a tacit matter all those who have told at least one lie in their lives already knew this.) From this can then be further inferred that delusions, illusion, hallucinations, etc. are a type of self-deception and that truth - being the opposite of deception - will, roughly speaking, be an accordance to that which is non-deceptive; the latter being roughly equivalent to what is termed reality.

The short version of the same answer: experientially.

Though not without faults, I yet find this response to be good enough to get the ball rolling.

As to the second issue, what alternatives to justification are there? Same can be said for reasoning, btw.

This makes no sense on my view. Meaning consists of correlations. Your asking me what meaning I would ascribe to the meaning of a term that is at the tip of one's tongue.

Hopefully the correct one.



"At the tip of one's tongue" — creativesoul

Joking, I presume.

Temporarily forgotten... in part at least. [...]

The meaning of a term is lost when a word is on the tip of one's tongue; when a term is forgotten; when one cannot remember which term applies. — creativesoul

I'll offer that only the term's perceptual properties (both visual and auditory) are forgotten, and that terms are always percepts - but that the concept that the term would be used to adequately reference is itself present to the awareness of the person and, hence, is not forgotten. A simple argument for this: Were the concept that the term is used to denote to be forgotten, one would hold no means of recalling what the proper term is. There would be no reason to search for a term, for there would then only be a meaninglessness background to ongoing cognition - rather than a meaning one intends to adequately convey but is momentarily unable to. To make this explicit, a concept which a person contemplates will be in some way meaningful to the bearer - even if inexpressible.

Again, at such instances of experience, there is awareness of meaning (here, of concepts) devoid of an awareness of what its proper, representational sign or symbol is (the latter always being perceptual - which concepts of themselves are not ... likely a different argument).

In order for a term to be on the tip of one's tongue, one must have already long since used it or been around it's use.

One cannot forget which word to say unless previous use has paved the way. — creativesoul

No doubt. But how a person comes to hold awareness of a particular concept and, hence, of a conceptual meaning holds no bearing on what is here at issue: the reality of being aware of meaning when the given meaning is, granted momentarily, devoid of a known sign or symbol.

Since the topic's been revived:

At a bare minimum, all attribution of meaning(all meaning) requires something to become symbol/sign, something to become symbolized/significant and a creature capable of drawing a mental correlation, association, and/or connection between the two.

There are no examples to the contrary. — creativesoul

What correlation, association, and/or connection would you ascribe to the meaning of a term that is at the tip of one’s tongue? To be clear: to the known meaning of a word which is momentarily not known to oneself as sign/symbol … but, again, whose meaning one is nevertheless aware of.

At the very juncture of this experience, the meaning cannot be deemed to be due to a correlation involving its sign, for the sign is absent from one’s awareness while the meaning is not.

There’s a term for this. Empathy. It happens when one experiences the experiences of another. If one doesn’t experience the experiences of another as one’s own but believes one does, then the empathy is delusional; hence, in all instances of non-delusional empathy, we experience each other’s experiences. I guess some hereabout would then question, “How does one know?” which can be simply answered with, “through gut feeling that is then verified via the other’s reactions to one's gut-feeling-based actions, or else falsified via the same”.

Here’s my thing with Descartes’s cogito. How else would one go about evidencing that consciousness—the so called “I”—is not illusory? This since some philosophers make it a habit to claim that consciousness does not reference anything real, but is instead a reified notion.

here I would questions some of the nuances of the term "selfish". I agree it is selfish=not thinking of others but that is not the same as selfish=seeking one's own interest above others. — jambaugh

Your statement is ambiguous, so I'll ask: How does this compare to the semantics of the term selfish as, for example, listed on Wiktionary?:

Selfish: 1) Holding one's own self-interest as the standard for decision making. 2) Having regard for oneself above others’ well-being. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/selfish

My basic claim is that (genuine, human) love is an un-selfish activity (this in degrees). But I don’t know how to go about things if we happen to disagree on the semantics of selfish. For instance:

But there is no denying that the suicide, the intentional premeditated suicide who has no belief that he is not actually going to die but rather "cross over into another existence" has placed the value of a future in which he exists below the value of a future where he is absent. Pure selflessness in the second sense. — jambaugh

Your presenting this to be "pure selflessness" is to me a nonsensical conclusion. For one issue, selflessness pertains to being, rather than to nonexistence and nonexistent givens - desiring to not be cannot of itself be a selfless desire, for selfless desires value the preservation and thriving of beings. As one example, a mass-murderer putting scores of people "out of their misery" by murdering them is not engaged in selfless love for these people, for their friends and family, nor for humanity at large (despite maybe being self-deluded into so believing). But I can see how this can quickly get bogged down in semantics and presumptions.

More philosophically asked, are you equating an idealized pure selfless being to nonexistence and, hence, to non-being? If so, how would this not be a logical contradiction: i.e., some given both is and is not at the same time and* in the same respect.

[* edit: this if the two underlined givens can in any way be deemed to be bound by time and, hence, temporal - here recognizing that at at least one level of contemplation, neither given can be deemed to be temporal]