You didn't take my last post seriously, did you. Please do.

You're out of your depth. — Bartricks

You, guy, are more than correct in this. When someone does not know what is meant by the law of noncontradiction but considers dialetheism to be consistent with his theory ... I at that point am out of my depth.

Shallow sounds about right right now.

I do not know what you mean by LNC, or how what you're saying responds to what I have already said about this.

Dialetheism is the theory that there can be true contradictions.

That's not a theory about truth, but a theory about what can be true.

It is consistent with my theory. — Bartricks

Um, OK. I was hoping you'd provide something I could reply to, though.

You agree with gibberish? What do you agree with? — Bartricks

Unless I misunderstood creativesoul's remark, I agree that reasoning is subject to laws of thought and that these are presupposed true in the very use of reasoning - such that their truth can only be a priori to any use of reasoning, including any assertion thereby obtained. Hence, that truth and reasoning are two different things. This in a way touches upon my first post on this thread which you've not yet replied to.

The correspondence theory of truth is not a substantial theory of truth. It is true - no one disputes that it is true - but it is true because it is trivial. It says "a proposition is true when it corresponds to the facts", yes? — Bartricks

This is only a particular instantiation of, "a proposition's correspondence to that which is real", and I take the latter to sum up the correspondence theory of truth. I in my own way agree that the correspondence theory of truth is insufficient, but I do take it to be a necessary aspect of any theory of truth that addresses propositions. (When I say it's insufficient, it for example does not easily explain "the arrows aim was true" or "a true friend" and like semantics of the same term, so to me there's something more general involved.)

But you disagree that it is a theory of truth at all. True is an adjective whereas truth is a noun form of this same adjective. To me truth is not a sharply different semantics from true but, instead, addresses what all instantiations of true hold in common as their property.

I get we don't agree on what truth is. But I'd ask you to reply to my previous post as pertains to the validity of your own theory. For ease, I'll re-post it here:

Dialetheism is the position that some statements are both true and false, i.e. that some contradictory propositions express what is termed “true contradictions”. I hold disregard for dialetheism, but the point is that it uses reason to make and substantiate this assertion. Dialetheism stands in contradiction to the law of noncontradiction (the LNC), which also uses reason to make and substantiate its assertion.

If truth is that which Reason asserts, given that reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC, would both dialetheism and LNC be true?

If they’re not both true, wouldn’t this evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC but, here, they’re not both true – hence one given which reason asserts is here necessarily false.

Alternatively, if they are both true, then how does this not negate the LNC in favor of dialetheism and, in the process, evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert the LNC but, if both dialetheism and the LNC are true, the LNC would necessarily be false as entailed by the true contradiction of both being true – thereby again making something which reason asserts false. — javra

(As to its last paragraph, I get the incomprehensibility of the LNC being false if it were to be true in conjunction with dialetheims - but this is what contradictions are, incomprehensible. Nevertheless, since the LNC stipulates that no contradictions can occur, were any contradictions to be deemed correct, the LNC would be false - and dialetheism contradicts with the LNC.)

Reason presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of it's premisses. — creativesoul

As should be apparent, I fully agree. A tricky philosophical question that ensues: To what does reasoning’s premises (first principles at least) correspond to?

As for me, since I have idealistic leanings, these correspond to universally applicable aspects of awareness – regardless of its type or degree – such that awareness per se is presumed a metaphysically real given (rather than a physically real given). Quite the mouthful, I know, but here truth as correspondence to that which is real is maintained.

I’m curious to discover alternative understandings regarding what reality the first principles of reasoning would correlate to.

As an example, one could make the case that Aristotle's laws of thought pertain to the physical wold and we gain knowledge of them via empirical observation - such that their truth is a correspondence to physical reality. The problem I find in this is that it places the cart before the horse: we as aware beings require the laws of thought aprioristically in order to engage in empirical observations - at the very least, the law of identity - and, moreover, aprioristically require these same laws of thought so as to hold the capacity of obtaining generalities (in this case, reasoning's premises) from observed particulars.

Edit: Just realized I might have misinterpreted what you meant by "reasoning's premises". You many have been strictly addressing formal reasoning which, as such, requires premises from which to infer things. If so, please interpret my usage of "reasoning's premises" as strictly specifying the laws of thought which we premise to be required for correct reasoning to obtain.

So, absent some good reason to think otherwise, our working hypothesis should be that truth is a performative of Reason. What it is for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting it. — Bartricks

Dialetheism is the position that some statements are both true and false, i.e. that some contradictory propositions express what is termed “true contradictions”. I hold disregard for dialetheism, but the point is that it uses reason to make and substantiate this assertion. Dialetheism stands in contradiction to the law of noncontradiction (the LNC), which also uses reason to make and substantiate its assertion.

If truth is that which Reason asserts, given that reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC, would both dialetheism and LNC be true?

If they’re not both true, wouldn’t this evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC but, here, they’re not both true – hence one given which reason asserts is here necessarily false.

Alternatively, if they are both true, then how does this not negate the LNC in favor of dialetheism and, in the process, evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert the LNC but, if both dialetheism and the LNC are true, the LNC would necessarily be false as entailed by the true contradiction of both being true – thereby again making something which reason asserts false.

Hey, in adding some content to my previous post, here presenting a counterpoint to the “it’s too late” angle:

If the global mass disruptions that are now inevitable will in turn result in a global consensus of what should be done – rather than a global, tyrannical, surveillance-infused dystopia the likes of which we have never known – then research dollars will be heavily invested in carbon capture programs, along with more efficient renewable energy, etc. (One current problem is that over five percent of the global GDP is spent subsidizing fossil fuels rather than being invested in renewables.) In this optimistic scenario, although there will be extreme damage done to humanity and to life in general, there will also be a) relatively successful counter measures resulting from b) a global accord regarding (none tongue in cheek) democratic values. But all this is obviously a very big “if”, to say the least – especially since it will need to be global to have any meaningful effect. And this can only come from the people themselves.

As general rule, though, people don’t like immediate pain and suffering, so when it will hit most of mankind, things will either change for the better or for the worse. But whichever direction the change occurs, it will be significant.

As with yourself, I’m not here degrading the issue by entertaining thoughts of human caused climate change possibly being a hoax propagated by fake news. Or was it China?

The question is on par to asking: Is the challenge of changing the global status quo of “greed is good” something that is too great for humanity to handle?

It’s not something that can be easily answered.

But I reckon that those who still have a whole life ahead of them will address the issue with motivations that differ from those who’ve become jaded by the life they’ve so far lived.

My answer: Don't know.

Meaning, if the language of mathematics (metaphysical abstracts) is encoded into all of the physical/natural world, what does that infer? To me, it infers that a metaphysical reality exists.

The next question would be here, did that metaphysical truth always exist independently, or did humans invent it(?). Objectively, not sure anyone knows... — 3017amen

Stepping away from mathematics for a moment, I’ll address the possible metaphysical reality of first principles.

Consider the law of identity (A = A). Is the law of identity something that exists apart from our understanding of it? Or is it something we’ve created axiomatically and then put to use which we then reify into a metaphysically real given?

Since its impossible to create it sans the a priori existence of the law itself, and since young enough preadolescents have no understanding of it while yet making use of it (ostensibly, as do lesser animals), I heavily lean toward it being a non-created, a priori, metaphysical reality.

The same can then be stated of a priori mathematical givens: they can become intelligible to us, but exist apart from our understanding of them, all the while constraining what can be.

And as with laws of thought, we're free to concoct any mathematics that we please axiomatically, but those which are metaphysically real shall always remain irrespective of what we assume.

In one word: Trump. Whom we all know is our esteemed comrade of superior equality relative to everyone else in the world, this because he is the bestest leader in the history of trump = unrivaled truth. (Remember now, ignorance is power.)

And if this weren’t enough, he has supporters, both at home and abroad.

Nah, I don’t feel there’s a global conscious awakening on the horizon. Unless it’s about giving the rich more untaxed money so that more could trickle down to the ever growing poor, kind of thing.

Excuse me for my sarcasm. I have to joke about the unpleasantries I do feel in relation to what’s going on so as to keep some morsel of sanity. Still, no, the feeling you’re experiencing isn’t something that everybody else shares – definitely not something shared by me.

Then again, maybe you’ve had a lucky strike of pleasant encounters? I’d still say it’s not something global.

Let's take an empirical claim such as: All objects obey the laws of gravity. Notice that it is a Aristotelean categorical statement. Isn't it necessary then to consider the logical character of such statements before we talk of its empirical import? What do you think? — TheMadFool

While I find a sharp distinction between rationalism and empiricism specious - Kant gave good examples of why this is, imo - the only way to substantiate the claim that you give is empirically, hence inductively. Its truth cannot be derived merely from axioms.

If a scientific theory is categorically true then it is ontically unfalsifiable and the only way we can know that is to show that it's epistemically unfalsifiable. — TheMadFool

The underlined portion doesn't work. That's the thing to induction: it can't evidence something with absolute certainty, which our empirical propositions and theories most often implicitly purport. For instance, "All swans are white" explicitly states a determinate state of affairs as though it were an absolute certainty - that it isn't an absolute certainty remains implicit.

Because we cannot ever show that an empirical claim is ontically unfalsifiable, it will always remain epistemically falsifiable to us. This even if it happens to be "categorically true", in which case it would be ontically unfalsifiable. The best we can do is not be able to falsify it in practice despite trying to - while never knowing if it can be falsified in principle. Not being so able, in turn, substantiates the belief that the claim is true.

Let me cheat and use categorical logic to show that indeed I am, very surprisingly to me, right.

All swans are white in logic doesn't have existential import unlike its negation: Some swans are black which can only be true if and only if there is at least one black swan.

Lacking claims of existence the proposition: All swans are white, is true even if you never saw a swan let alone white swans. I think in predicate logic the statement gets translated as:

IF x is a swan then x is white. Emphasis on "if". — TheMadFool

This thread is about empirical knowledge, I presumed, not axiomatic claims. Aside from which, how would "all unicorns are white" not be a true statement given the system of logic you're presented?

Aside from a contradiction in your statement which I expect to carry some deep meaning I'll focus on the words "impossible to falsify". Such statements would be metaphysical for Popper, right? — TheMadFool

OK, too brief in the expression. No contradiction intended. What I was addressing is a proposition that is epistemically falsifiable but not ontically falsifiable. This presumes that our knowledge is imperfect. To better illustrate via example: I say "all swans are either black or white" while holding imperfect knowledge of the world; I could falsify this claim by observing a red swan in some remote location; so its epistemically falsifiable. However, reality has it (here assuming a perfect knowledge of the world) that only black and white swans exist. So no matter how much I - the one with fallible knowledge - look in attempts to falsify this proposition, I will never be able to. Because only black and white swans exist, the proposition is not possible to falsify ontically.

This state of affairs is what makes the following understandable:

However, if that addressed is falsifiable and if we are unable to falsify it despite our best attempts, then it gives all indications of in fact conforming to that which is ontic (else, of accurately corresponding to that which is real), i.e. of being true. — javra

The above argument looks ok but actually has a flaw in that when predictions fail to materialize (aren't observed) it doesn't always mean the theory in question is false. Take for example the classic case: All swans are white. If you fail to observe white swans it doesn't mean that the claim is false. It just means that you haven't discovered evidence for the claim. The only way we can say that the claim, all swans are white, is false is by observing a non-white swan. — TheMadFool

This one example doesn't work. If one fails to see any swans period, then the proposition of "all swans are white" is no better than "all unicorns are white" - and there are no grounds to believe that swans are real (much less that they're only white) due to the proposition being unfalsifiable (here simplifying things by not introducing reasoned conclusions, such as could apply to the probability of alien life). However, if one does observe swans but fails to see a white swan, then the proposition is falsified.

Can't think of a different example to substantiate the claim you want to make. Maybe you can?

Why is falsification more important than verification to Popper? I think the reason has to do with induction failing to provide definitive truth. If we are to put our trust in a theory it can't be based on it being true because the nature of induction only allows for tentative truth. — TheMadFool

I think the underlined portions miss the mark. Truth is, but appraising when it is is not something that can be done with what others term absolute certainty. For as long as a falsifiable theory is not falsified, it can well be true - in an ontically determinate way. But since our subjectivity is not 100% objective (this being shorthand for a long-winded argument - my bad), we can't subjectively know with absolute subjective certainty that every instantiation of what we deem to be true (personally or collectively) actually is in fact true. However, if that addressed is falsifiable and if we are unable to falsify it despite our best attempts, then it gives all indications of in fact conforming to that which is ontic (else, of accurately corresponding to that which is real), i.e. of being true.

To this effect, hypothesize that a falsifiable proposition or theory is impossible to falsify both in practice *and* in principle. By what reasoning could one claim that this proposition or theory holds any chance of being untrue?

So, I think that we trust falsifiable theories that have not been in any way falsified precisely because we expect them to be true.

I agree with the general gist of your arguments so far, btw.

First, Hume is difficult to interpret which makes him difficult to categorize. — Ron Cram

OK. So he is difficult to categorize. Yet this directly contradicts your stance throughout this thread that the proper way to categorize Hume is obvious. I get the sense that this too will be ignored by you. But I find it very significant.

This is due in part to Hume's self-contradictory statements, called antinomies, in the philosophy literature. — Ron Cram

Antinomies are not logical contradictions; they're two or more conclusions that are each equally well justified yet appear to contradict each other. To me, Hume's greatest antimony, so to speak, is his justification that free will and determinism not only coexist but require each other. But this doesn't make him contradictory to himself, i.e. self-contradictory, this makes him a compatibilist.

Likewise, he was neither an obvious idealist nor an obvious materialist. With both SEP and Wikipedia as references, Hume is commonly considered a neutral monist. This conclusion is not devoid of criticism, but it is what most subscribe to. In this light there are no contradictions in his philosophical works as regards idealism and materialism.

I can't grasp why it is that you're so certain of what was going on in Hume's head. Especially when you characterize him as someone who is difficult to categorize.

Unless one equates hate to a mere dislike of something, but this denotation doesn't seem right to me. — javra


Ditto as well as with like versus love. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

Ok, each to their own takes. So I clarify why my take is different than yours, one will risk and sacrifice for givens that are loved, but not for givens that are merely liked. Than one loves ice-cream is an aberration in other languages, ancient Greek being a well known one. Unless one believes that languages create our core emotions, this is then sufficient evidence that the English term love conveys emotive states of being that, while including that of intense liking, also consist of sentiments that are other than liking. One can, for example, deeply love someone whom one at the same time thoroughly dislikes.

Hate is not the same. I can't imagine how one could deeply hate someone whom one at the same time thoroughly likes. To earnestly hate can, and most often does, convey some measure of visceral disdain for that which is hated. Hence, I can greatly dislike earthworms without hating them (not that I dislike earthworms).

So, the way you're using the words, their referents could be conceptualized as a dyadic relationship. But not in the way I'm using them. Still, I'll skip on "what is love" debates.

Cool.

Noticed in this thread that you nitpick what to reply to in relation to my posts. Leaves me to believe that you might not address other's writings, such as Hume's, with a fair sense of impartiality. Can you provide any reference to Hume being a "skeptical idealist"? Or else one that critiques Hume as "doubting the existence of an external world"? Fallible though I am, these complaints seem idiosyncratic.

The link I put up shows otherwise. Dualism exists in our emotions, like it or not. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

I haven't once denied that there is both love and hate in the world, nor that these two emotions stand in opposition to each other. That said, the video - nice contents, btw - only evidences, at worst, an innate bias toward self and against other. But this bias can be maintained in the absence of hate for other - and none of the babies or children exhibited signs of hatred in their choices. So the video doesn't illustrates that hate is as an essential aspect of our constituency, much less that it is as essential as is love. It does illustrate that self-love is innate from the get go, however.

Unless one equates hate to a mere dislike of something, but this denotation doesn't seem right to me.

The bundle theory of substance thus rejects the substance theories of Aristotle, Descartes, and more recently, J. P. Moreland, Jia Hou, Joseph Bridgman, Quentin Smith, and others." — javra


This is not Hume's theory of substance. Notice that Hume's name does NOT appear in that list. — Ron Cram

Why would Hume appear in a list of individuals whose theories of substance the bundle theory of substance rejects?

You asked for a quote directly from the Treatise. Here's a quote from 1.1.6: — Ron Cram

Greatly appreciative of that. I'm now content, and actually happy to see that he did write something regarding a bundle theory of substance - and not just of self. So I acknowledge being wrong in remembering him to only address the bundle theory of the self. But we obviously interpret his comments in considerably different ways.

I don't think Hume ever claimed that individuals were immutable. — Ron Cram

No, Hume's bundle theory of the self claims that there is no immutable self - which is what I've previously stated.

What I asked is where Hume specifies a bundle theory of objects.

I don't have a quote at my fingertips but the Wikipedia article on Bundle Theory, the one you linked above, has this quote:
"Thus, the theory asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the properties are inherent."

Wikipedia has it correctly. — Ron Cram

Its not a long article, form the same article:

"The bundle theory of substance explains compresence. Specifically, it maintains that properties' compresence itself engenders a substance. Thus, it determines substancehood empirically by the togetherness of properties rather than by a bare particular or by any other non-empirical underlying strata. The bundle theory of substance thus rejects the substance theories of Aristotle, Descartes, and more recently, J. P. Moreland, Jia Hou, Joseph Bridgman, Quentin Smith, and others."

god said he was a jealous god when speaking of his love for us. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

:smile: Reminds me of Nine Inch Nails song I like. "Bow down to the one you serve; you're going to get what you deserve" kind of thing. Why on earth should I bow down to an omnipotent hater? Give me eternal hell instead. I imagine one would get quite used to the flames after a while, anyway. :joke:

Besides, the archaic definition of jealousy is "concern for that which one is jealous of; vigilance; protective; guarding".

Which are determined by what one loves, which is why I did not like you trying to separate the Yin and Yang of love and hate. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

Yea, pain and pleasure duality kind of thing. Reality has both. Still, in my experiences at least, when I've felt the most intense moments of love, hate was utterly absent - be this love platonic or otherwise. When I've hated, I've always loved that which what I've hated was antagonistic to. So, I maintain my conviction. Love can exist without hate; hate can't exist without love. One is essential; the other isn't.

I think there's a misunderstanding at the back of this, though, arising from the anthropomorphism of 'God as super-engineer'. In that vein, both the pro- and anti- sides of the argument have it wrong - if you believe that the order of nature 'proves' that God exists, then you're tending towards Biblical literalism, i.e. interpreting myth as fact; and if you believe it 'proves' that God doesn't exist, then you're tending towards scientific materialism, which is kind of a mirror image. (That's why, as many have noted, Dawkins himself comes across as a kind of secular fundamentalist.) — Wayfarer

I'm not in disagreement with this. I do tend to think that most people, be they theists or atheists, associate the term God with an omnipotent psyche (meaning soul or mind). I'm reminded that even the "teleological argument" most often aims to validate just such a personage. This means of conceptualization, however, stands in stark contrast to Stoic concepts of an anima mundi of logos, or to the Neo-Platonic notions of the One, among other similar outlooks in western culture alone - all of the latter being in some form of another teleological without invoking the idea of a creator deity, be s/he theistic or deistic.

In any case, interesting to note that many modern classical (e.g. Thomist) theologians and philosophers will have no truck with any design arguments whatever. For that, they are sometimes branded as atheists or closet atheists by the ID advocates - which says a lot, in my view. — Wayfarer

It does say a mouthful. I haven't taken the time to read Aquinus carefully, but I've perused enough to get the cliff-notes version. I remember admiring him, in large part, because he upheld the reality of Divinity while simultaneously drawing attention to what we'd now term empirical approaches to studies of nature. Maybe in time I'll have a second look at his writings, but, for now, I'm a little overwhelmed by my reading list.

I'm primarily asking because in a forced choice between actualizing Nirvana and actualizing an absence of all suffering via the noneixstence of all future life, I so far view the first to be less fantastical. — javra


I am not sure what you mean by being less fantastical, but the idea of Nirvana is not deviating from Schopenhauer. In fact, it aligns well with him since he very much agreed with Hindu ideas of Moksha and Buddhist Nirvana as salvations of sorts for the Will to diminish its constant state of desire. So quite the opposite actually. — schopenhauer1

I know Schopenhauer borrowed ideas from the East, but didn't catch him entertaining the notions of Nirvana or Moksha.

My point was that stopping all humans from reproducing seems impossible, but if it were possible, how would one stop all greater apes from reproducing? If not, they will experience their own suffering and will eventually evolve into sapience akin to our own. This same reasoning can be taken all the way to bacteria reproducing. If all life on all planets is not completely abolished by prohibiting all reproduction everywhere, suffering will yet be. And life has a way of evolving into sapience. Succeeding in this endeavor, then, is to me unrealistic. Btw, I know some Buddhists maintain such general perspectives on prohibition of reproduction, but I do disagree with them in this.

Anyway, wanted to better express my point of view.

[...] I provided Hume's quote saying that he understands that his theory of personal identity is not correct and that he cannot find a way to rescue it. — Ron Cram

Yes, I recall that statement. What makes his bundle theory of the self imperfect is the presence of what some might term a unified first person point of view. Still, I can well argue that this imperfection does not in any way invalidate the claim that there is no permanent, immutable, aspect of the self.

Hume's bundle theory states that an objects consists of its properties and nothing more. — Ron Cram

OK, I haven't read him in a very long time. Still, I don't recall him saying that "objects consist of its properties and nothing more". All I recall is his argument for the bundle theory of the self, in which he states that the self is a commonwealth of elements that constantly change.

Can you point out where in his own works Hume claims a bundle theory of objects?

No, all material objects are mutable. The substance objects are made of are well characterized. Take any object to a condensed matter physicist and they can tell you all about the substance and its properties. — Ron Cram

As to modern bundle theory, it does not deny substance, but presents the view, roughly speaking, that substance is composed of an aggregate of properties (such that properties can includes relations, which include causal relations.) The link I previously gave can serve as reference to this.

Also, we are addressing substance within contexts of philosophy, not those of science. It makes for a world of difference. If properties do not inhere into the immutable substance of "apple", for one example, I still fail to see how the modern notions of bundle theory are erroneous? (note, I presume an external world throughout) But I gather this issue addressing bundle theory isn't central to the thread.

If true, then Hume's bundle theory is demonstrably false. It is demonstrably false because objects actually exist and are "made of" something. — Ron Cram

Hey, my bad. I guess I should slow down a bit. You do understand that Hume's bundle theory of the self basically states that there is no such thing as a permanent, or immutable, self? I presumed you do on account that you've read Book 1 of the Treatise.

But again, going at a slower pace, do you then presume that the something which objects are made of have a permanent, or immutable, core?

edit: Just in case, as quick references:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_identity#Bundle_theory_of_the_self

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory

You didn't quite reply to my question. But, so to address your latest post via a quote from the former:

It is a real natural law and it is never violated on cosmic scales and rarely on much smaller scales. — Ron Cram

I didn't initially reply to this aspect of the previous post mainly because in my own view Hume is very much on board with this quoted perspective. I find that he is in the sum of his works. His critique of miracles - in which he argues that all supposed miracles have as of yet unknown natural causes - comes to mind, but other potentially better examples abound.

Now, I'm not one to treat Hume as infallible, but to me, at least, in Book 1 he was addressing the logic how we justify our beliefs. His observation (I forget where it was made) that we know that tomorrow not all the leaves of all trees in the world will be on the ground - despite our not having any deductive means of evidencing this - was an epistemological observation. I don't personally find that this observation has any barrings on ontology - other than by illustrating how we know of an external world (and that tomorrow will be much like today) via non-genotypic instinct, or habits, and via induction. But not via logically sound deductions. This aspect of epistemology is to Hume universal, and so it can't be used to justify that there is no external world - not that he ever does.

As a reminder, Hume was not an adherent of Berkeley's philosophy, which devoid of Berkeley's all-perceiving god arguably does amount to the absence of an external world.

All the same, you ask in this thread of what original and good philosophical idea(s) exist in Book 1 of the Treatise.

I'm simply curious to find out how you think that Hume's bundle theory fails.

I once told a friend that I could go through Book 1 and put each of Hume's propositional statements in one or more of five categories:
1. Patently absurd
2. Demonstrably false
3. Self-contradictory
4. Intentionally obscure
5. Trivially true — Ron Cram

At the risk of being redundant, and assuming in good faith that this is to be interpreted as written, into which of these categories would you put Hume's bundle theory of the self from Book 1 of the Treatise? I guess I'd also like to know why.

No gripes with personal tastes, it's just that his bundle theory stands out to me as something both significant and worthwhile.

actually the Wiki entry on Hume has the following — Wayfarer

Ha, you beat me to it. Haven't read it in a while but in my notes-laden copy of David Hume's "Principal Writings on Religion including Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and The Natural History of Religion" (edited by J.C.A. Gaskin; Oxford Univ. Press; 1998) not only does Hume argue against the design argument via the voice of one of his speakers, Philo, but - as summarized within an abstract within this book:

Part VIII: Investigations of a new hypothesis of cosmology, namely that the universe could be as it is through a process of natural selection operating within a large but finite physical universe: the natural selection being the persistence of forms (things) and processes (repeating chains of events) which once hit on by chance are well adapted to endure. [note: My take is that this part is tacked on because, if he'd have gotten around to publishing this while still living, he'd have been burnt at the stake for heresy without the incorporation of such statements as that which follows.] But nature is more generous, more orderly and more well adapted than this would lead us to expect. So: 'A total suspense of judgment is here our only reasonable resource.' — Abstract of Part VIII of Hume's Dialogues

emphasis mine

The Dialogues - whose style was inspired by Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods - was published in 1779. Close enough to 100 year's before Darwin's The Origin of Species was published. The rough idea of natural selection is within it - although somewhat indirectly addressed as a possibility. And I'd find it hard to believe that Darwin didn't read Hume.

Also, though the book ends by claiming that Cleanthes - who upholds the design thesis - has the best arguments, a careful reading will - or at least might - reveal many an understanding for and potential sympathy with the nature centered religions of the ancients. Hence:

Where I think both Hume and Dawkin's argument fails, is that science itself presumes an order which it doesn't explain. Science itself is based on observation and inference - but it is created on the basis of existing order, namely, 'the order of nature'. I don't think there's any sense in which science explains that order. — Wayfarer

I obviously can't prove this, but I doubt that Hume would have been in any way antagonistic to this notion.

But, at any rate, Hume wasn't keen on there being a Sky Father deity that created everything. Which is what the design argument typically is about: as with inferences made after finding a watch in the middle of a desert, since there is apparent design to the universe there then must also be an onmi- this and that designer of the universe.

Are this reconstruction of the argument and Hume’s objections to it correct? — ModernPAS

Sound good to me.

How might one respond to Hume? — ModernPAS

Waiting to find out with baited breath ...

:rofl: :joke: :cool: ciao

That there must be an event that is uncaused is reasoning that I think can only apply to linear models of the universe.

One alternative to this are the cyclical models of the universe. Here, there would be no uncaused events, for there would be an endless procession of Big Bangs followed by near ends of the universe that again result in Big Bangs, etc. ... this, again, without end or beginning. — javra

Not every event can have an event that causes it, for then we'll have an actual infinity of events and you can't have an actual infinity of anything. — Bartricks

As an aside, the unmoved mover of old time philosophies - i.e. the uncaused cause - can neither be a sentient being nor a thing: Sentience only occurs via the experience of perpetual change and, hence, movement; and things can only be in some form of process and, hence, movement. — javra

Your insistence that the uncaused causer cannot be a 'thing' is false. Certainly you've said nothing to support it. — Bartricks

Yup, we speak in different lexicons. It seems far too different to have any meaningful conversation.

Causer, cause. Whatever. Means the same and doesn't "entail a psyche". — Bartricks

Hmm, a causer does not convey "someone or something that causes"?

As an aside, the unmoved mover of old time philosophies - i.e. the uncaused cause - can neither be a sentient being nor a thing: Sentience only occurs via the experience of perpetual change and, hence, movement; and things can only be in some form of process and, hence, movement.

Still, hey, seems that we have different interpretations of terms.

And they said that there must be some events that have an uncaused causer. — Bartricks

An uncaused cause, not causer. The first doesn't entail a psyche as the second does. Makes for a very significant difference.

There must be an event - so, an occurrence, a happening - that is uncaused. — Bartricks

That there must be an event that is uncaused is reasoning that I think can only apply to linear models of the universe.

One alternative to this are the cyclical models of the universe. Here, there would be no uncaused events, for there would be an endless procession of Big Bangs followed by near ends of the universe that again result in Big Bangs, etc. ... this, again, without end or beginning.

Ah.. If the world was a guaranteed paradise and paradise meant that you can tune it into as much pain as you wanted at any given time to "grow from it", but then can stop whenever you wanted, and you can sleep for any amount of time and wake up any given time and had no needs or wants other than what you wanted to need or want at any given time? You can choose to live in a universe like ours with slogans like "growth-through-adversity" but then stop it at a whim when you find that it is relatively sucky, or then go back to it if you find it fascinating? Sure..But that is pure fantasy, as is the notion of a paradise. — schopenhauer1

Granted that the notion of non-hyperbolical paradise is fantasy, I'm still curious - this since many people of diverse backgrounds do hold onto some such notion of paradise which to them is not fantasy:

How would a never-ending obtainment of wants as they are wanted not eventually lead to an excruciating boredom with existence - and, hence, to an extreme psychological pain?

It seems to me that the overcoming of strife is part and parcel of what makes life pleasurable. This includes everything from states of fun to the obtainment of a personal dignity that is of intrinsic value (iow, rather than the winning of popularity contests, type of thing, whose value to me is extrinsic). And strife devoid of some form and degree of suffering - at minimum, an uncertainty about suffering's future occurrence - is not something I find possible.

In some more abstract versions of a "paradise" everything would be a completeness or a nothingness such that you would not have any needs or wants whatsoever.. thus even the need for need for need wouldn't matter. — schopenhauer1

Isn't this deviating from Schopenhauer and entering into Eastern belief structures? Specifically, those of actualizing Nirvana or Moksha. But I take it that you do interpret this too to be fantasy. I'm primarily asking because in a forced choice between actualizing Nirvana and actualizing an absence of all suffering via the noneixstence of all future life, I so far view the first to be less fantastical.

Reality [...] is "what you run into when you are wrong." — Ron Cram

I greatly like this statement. But I so far also don’t find anything in Hume that would at all contradict its stance. Hume was about prioritizing our experience, rather than our rationality. Yet, by establishing via non-deductive reasoning that all our reasoning is liable to some degree of error, his position to me seems to stand in firm agreement with the quoted statement. It is most often via our experiences that we discover “what we run into when we are wrong”. And even when it is via reasoning that this is discovered, to be so discovered, it will need to conform to our experiences.

Hume's idea that causation cannot be observed is counter to our everyday experience and completely irrational. — Ron Cram

Causation is an abstract concept or reasoning and, as such, is not directly observable via the physiological senses. To Hume, we form understandings of causation as abstract concept via an accumulation of experiences that hold uniformity. Yet Hume never denied that we hold instincts (in the broader, non-genotypic sense) via which we interact causally:

If constant conjunctions were all that is involved, my thoughts about aspirin and headaches would only be hypothetical. For belief, one of the conjoined objects must be present to my senses or memories; I must be taking, or just have taken, an aspirin. In these circumstances, believing that my headache will soon be relieved is as unavoidable as feeling affection for a close friend, or anger when someone harms us. “All these operations are species of natural instincts, which no reasoning … is able either to produce or prevent” (EHU 5.1.8/46–47). — SEP - David Hume - 5.3 Belief

For example, Aristotle's physics are terrible. He was wrong about many things. But he is also the author of deductive logic. — Ron Cram

Am I correct in presuming that you dislike Hume's, here paraphrased, affirmation that all logically sound arguments are founded upon non-deductively obtained premises? Premises that thereby hold a possibility of error?

That there are no infallible premises and, thereby, infallible conclusions is not to me irrational - though it might offend many a rationalist, granted. Instead, this conclusion, to me seems to be what honest reasoning is about.

As just one implication of such reasoning, Hume is basically saying (without name calling): "Hey guys, think twice about Cartesian philosophy, for our reasoning cannot ever be infallible, as Descartes claims it can be; also, yes, Berkley said this and that, but Berkley's reasoning by no means establishes the absence of an external world and, in fact, we can't help but live with beliefs (instinctive or otherwise) that an external world exists - which makes the external world as solid as anything else, given that nothing is infallible."

Hume's "sensible scepticism" is really just an admission that his philosophy is irrational and unlivable. — Ron Cram

One might be overlooking contexts. Hume’s Treatise was in many a way a reply to both Descartes and Berkeley. Understand the logic used by these two predecessors and one might, maybe, hold a more empathetic view of Hume’s logic, for it serves to counteract the effects of Cartesian skepticism and that of Berkeley’s subjective idealism. This by illustrating how all our knowledge is built out of habituated thoughts inductively put together – thereby impelling one to reappraise the logic used by both Descartes and Berkeley. But I get it; Hume’s not to your liking. To each their own. And no, I've no interest in composing a thesis to support the just mentioned perspective.

As to what is both original and good in Book 1 of the Treatise, good to whom? This possible trick question has some degree of importance to it.

Hume’s detailed musings on what would nowadays be most properly termed experientialism (and not empiricism) and of what he termed probabilistic reasoning (due to the possibility of error – which is nothing else but the pragmatist notion of fallibilism) are original in the details they present, but I take it you don’t deem them to be good. So be it.

On the other hand, bundle theory (which you’ve alluded to) was originated in the western world via book 1 of the Treatise – Hume’s noted dissatisfaction with it at the end of the treatise aside. This theory has persisted as an important ontological hypothesis since. So it is both original to at least western thought and good to a large number of individuals.

But again, by what standards do you demarcate the goodness of ideas?

:grin: cheers

I was hoping that he would at least explain what he means by saying that Reason is a sentient (if not sapient) subject; but even there, disappointingly, nothing was forthcoming. — Janus

I think I saw Reason once. Far away and hunched over a bit as though engaged in some activity. I approached but then the bastard turned a corner in the street - and I never got to find out what the guy was up to.

Um, so it’s known, the above is my sense of dry humor … with a bit of self-deprecation thrown in, granted.

I like what javra said. He pointed out that the laws of thought are universal. Despite his intentions for doing that not being clear to me it brings to relief the fact that nature's patterns are, if anything, universal in character. — TheMadFool

Yup, that was my intention.

I think we can actually ask a simple question: "Why don't we think alike?" — TheMadFool

So, given that the laws of thought are universal, in this sense alone, we do all think alike.

But I get it, you're asking why there are variations in our thoughts. And, I acknowledge, my previous train of thought can't address this.

By universal I mean the laws of nature apply to any and all without exception. — TheMadFool

Curios to see where this question leads. It could be a really abrupt dead-end.

Do you take the laws of thought to be laws of nature?

I'd like to strike-through the word "thought" in "laws of thought", but I can't. But to be explicit, I'm here considering the law of identity, the law of noncontradiction, and, possibly, the law of the excluded middle. I'm here also supposing that these laws of thought do apply to any and all without exception - which is about as good a supposition as any (other?) law of nature.

And, granting that these three laws of thought hold ubiquitous application:

If not, why not? We - the ones aware of these laws of thought - are but energy and matter, right?