You'd have other reasons that caused your action, though. — NKBJ

Using this train of thought as a springboard:

In common modern parlance, determinacy is not equivalent to causation. The material used in a construction determines the relative flexibility of the edifice (e.g., wood makes the edifice flexible in comparison to the material of stone); yet the material does not efficiently cause the flexibility of the structure: the material and the structure are simultaneous. The same can be said of formal determinacy—what determines some particular form (with emergent properties of constituents as one possible example)—as well as for teleological determinacy, namely those of motives that most always determine particular motions of sapient beings and which simultaneously co-occur with the given motions. Causation as commonly understood pertains only to efficient causation—wherein the cause temporally precedes the effect it has the agency to produce. (This, though, is not do deny that at times all four of Aristotle’s categories of determinacy can be addressed as causal factors—further obfuscating the issue with unnoticed equivocations.)

Freewill as defined by the op seems to me to be, at best, a logical contradiction: effects being themselves determined by some originative cause that a) is devoid of motives for the action of effect origination and also b) is non-stochastic.

If freewill does exist, it is always semi-determined by, at minimum, motives—which are not efficient causes. It’s just that what one chooses will not be fully determined by antecedent (efficient) causes. In other words, that which does the choosing will itself be a terminating efficient cause of the effects produced within the constraints of, at minimum, the motives that are present.

Yea, I’m battling with windmills in thinking this is going to hold any sway in soundbite form—though I find nothing irrational about what I’ve just addressed. And this is one means of going about a compatibilist universe: one where freewill requires determinacy for its very manifestation (but is contradictory to being fully determined by antecedent efficient causes, i.e. a causally deterministic universe).

So, with all that said, should there be a distinct and credible men's rights movement? — Not Steve

I find myself onboard with your posts, but also find the term “men’s rights” lacking in its description of what you are addressing. To me (and I think to many others) a ‘rights’ movement connotes an intention to ameliorate the lack of rights applicable to a certain cohort.

My initial reaction to the title of this thread was: Is this about wanting to increase men’s rights so that they at last become of equal power to the social, economic, and political rights of women … because the latter have historically been used to oppress the rights of men? Or is this about men’s natural rights / God-given rights (choose as one’s pleases) being oppressed by the opposite sex’s wants. As one possible example of the latter: the oppressing of each man’s right to do as he wants with forty virgins that he owns as property … if not during one’s life on earth than in the afterlife; or, as a similar example: the right of certain skin-toned men (but not others) to impregnate any woman they want (this irrespective of the women's wants) being an unquestionable good that, thereby, should not be oppressed by anyone anywhere.)

Having read your posts, I'll assume you’d agree with the absurdity of these given examples.

How about a “men’s wellbeing or health movement” rather than one addressing rights? This, I’d agree, is direly needed considering all the suicides and such.

A personal observation: men’s wellbeing is most prevalently undermined by other men—rather than by women, though I hold no doubt that exceptions to this do occur. To be more explicit: engaging in very traumatizing unjust wars, the lack of reliance upon empathy or sympathy for one’s ailments, or any number of other male issue that impede men’s mental and physical wellbeing are most often caused by men in the same society ... that goad everyone into unjust wars, that decry affectionate men as [pick your pejorative: fairies, wusses, etc.], and so on.

From this vantage: it is not a lack of men’s rights that is the problem but, instead, the predominant, implicit, societal rights of men in current culture: the societal right to outcast those men who question authority in its decrees of war; the right to demean the human value of a man who sheds tears, even if in private; and so forth. … And yes, some women will sometimes reinforce the same by, I hold, following the social norms of ingrained rights that authoritarian men enforce in our shared culture.

For me, at least, it’s a complex and tough topic to handle. Especially since it, in part, addresses touchy-feely issues … which are, again, a current societal pariah among males. And in part because toughness is still often enough required; though I'd say this is valid for men and women alike, each in their own ways.

Fair enough. Never mind my post. I don't have the heart to enter into discussions about the proper significance of all the terms you've pointed out.

First, I wouldn't say that anything is objectively true. I see that as a category error. — Terrapin Station

I was making use of terminology previously used in this thread. The rest seems to also be about nitpicking semantics. Ignore what I said, then.

If a) it is objectively true that subjective beings hold presence, if b) it is objectively true that all subjective beings share a grouping of core characteristics that thereby validly makes them subjective beings, and if c) it is objectively true these core characteristics entail common, or universal, core wants (e.g., that of living life with minimal dolor), then: it is objectively true that all subjective beings hold an implicit, if not also explicit, understanding of what is good for them, this being a core reality that is universal to all subjective beings.

A possible candidate for this core preference universal to all subjective beings: the preeminent, basic, and generalized want of not having one’s intentions, or context specific wants, obstructed or barred (to be barred from doing what one wants to do will arguably always lead to some degree of displeasure in the short term if not also in the long term); or, more succinctly, the minimization of dolor, of suffering.

Then, considering such core and universal preference: parents who hold child vaccinations to be good and parents that hold child vaccinations to be bad, for example, will both operate from the same core preference universal to all subjective beings: say, that of minimizing dolor, this then of itself being an/the objective good (which is just as much an objective truth as is the existence of subjective beings to which this universal core preference pertains).

Given the objective good of the here hypothesized universal preference of minimizing personal dolor among all subjective beings, there will then be an objectively better and worse means of optimally actualizing this objective good—in the given example, via either vaccinating children or not.

But in short, if there is an objective good, it will not be found outside of subjective beings (like rocks over there are) but, instead, it will be an invariant and intrinsic preference universal to all subjective beings, one that is as objectively true as is the very presence of subjective beings.

Devil’s in the details. Nevertheless, to deny such objectively true good is to deny that subjective beings share any core characteristics of want/desire/need which defines all of them/us as subjective beings. Again, such as the generalized, hence universal, want of minimizing personal dolor—a preference whose universality among subjective beings can well be argued to be an objective truth.

I’m not intending by this to prove the reality of an objectively true good. I’m only adding to what previous posters mentioned: that a preference based ethics is in no way contradictory to the presence of an objectively true good.

Would you agree that confidence is required for activity, and doubt being an activity therefore requires confidence, but certainty is a special type of confidence which is not required for doubt? — Metaphysician Undercover

yes

p.s. I should say "yes" with certain caveats, but these would amount to the same overall summary I'm thinking.

Meta is the one who involved the word "possibility" in this discussion. Wittgenstein was content to remove the practicality of doubt. — Banno

Got it.

The problem specifically is that I often have the confidence required to proceed with an action, while I am actively doubting whether I will be successful in that procedure. This confidence I would not call certainty, because I am doubtful. So I am really calling into question your definition of certainty. If certainty is a type of confidence, as you claim, then it must be a type of confidence in which doubt is excluded, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I look upon it this way: all subjective certainties will entail respective states of confidence, but not all states of confidence will entail certainties. This to me gets into the complexities of human consciousness—which, imv, always entwines with our sub/unconscious mind, from where emotive states result. Hence, for one example, we can be emotively confident of an activity while consciously doubting ourselves in terms of this very activity. And yes, ditto to certainty being a type of confidence wherein the mental activity of doubt is absent—this for the timespan of the given certainty.

Debating definitions of certainty I think is deserving of its own thread, especially since folks here want to get on with their analysis of Wittgenstein. I’m hesitant to currently start one. Still, for accuracy’s sake, I personally define certainty so (this in the most general way possible): the state, or an instance, of givens that do not compete with alternative givens and thereby hold determinate presence. For example, an idea X which we consciously hold in manners devoid of alternative ideas that compete with idea X for what in fact is shall, then, be a held certainty concerning idea X—this for the timespan in which idea X holds a determinate cognitive presence within our minds; again, this on account of not competing with credible alternatives for what in fact is. As a more concrete example, Pyrrho held a certainty, thus defined, that his methods lead to eudemonia (rather than being uncertain or doubtful about this being so).

Let me know if you’d like me to start a thread dedicated to definitions of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt. I have an online chapter that addresses this very subject which I could link to, and which could do with some criticism. But I doubt I’ll partake in the thread as much as would be appropriate. I might start it next weekend if there is a call for it.

In the context of Wittgenstein, you might be correct in your arguments about “eliminating the possibility of doubt” being untenable. I have not read him so I don’t know.

In the context of philosophical skepticism, the subject matter changes tremendously. Here’s one reference to this point:

Consider next the notion of doubt. Doubt is often considered the hallmark of skepticism. So how can it be that ancient skepticism is not about doubt (Corti 2010, Vogt 2014a)? Insofar as ‘to doubt’ means no more than ‘to call into question,’ the ancient skeptics might be described as doubting things. However, skeptical investigation as Sextus Empiricus describes it does not involve doubt (I shall focus here on Pyrrhonism; on Cicero’s use of dubitari, see Section 3.3). — SEP (Ancient Skepticism)

Pyrrhonism is arguably the most extreme form of non-Cartesian philosophical skepticism. And, as stated in the quote, it does not involve doubt. Rather, it upholds a fallible subjective certainty (i.e., a consciously entertained confidence) that its methods result in eudemonia. No non-Cartesian philosophical skeptic ever expressed holding the stance of global doubt. If you disagree, please provide a credible reference to the contrary if such exists.

As to your more detailed observations concerning my stance:

Going by common usage of the term, doubt is well defined as “to call into question”—as per the definition given in the quoted text —thereby being a cognitive activity, and not a mood or generalized attitude. You also want to pigeonhole the term “certainty” to in all cases signify “the property of being indubitable”—which is not how the term is commonly used: e.g., I’m very certain (rather than somewhat certain) that the term holds the synonyms of sureness and certitude. To the extent to which we disagree about the semantics of these terms—which currently seems significant—we then have no bearing for a proper argument concerning the terms’ referents.

I'm totally cool with that. Let's do our bit to give some status to principled non-conformism, especially when it results in crucifixion. — unenlightened

If your sarcasm’s jab doesn’t contain hypocrisy, then you uphold that every social movement that has ever been was conducted by a bunch of cretins. Unless, that is, no risks in being humiliated by the powers that be were incurred in speaking truth to power—as though this were a realistic model of how the world is.

A contemporary example: Have those in charge call investigative journalists “the enemy of the people”, and only those who are deplorable cretins will continue investigating and reporting the same issues rather than becoming humiliated into proper shape. And yes, these unwanted journalists sometimes get assassinated (crucified, allegorically speaking)—in some countries a lot more than in others. Your rebuke: These journalists are imbeciles living in Lala land for not becoming properly humiliated in a timely manner; or even better, for not living life in manners that eliminate the risk of humiliation to begin with.

Or am I misunderstanding you yet once again? Maybe you’re totally cool with crucifying principled non-conformists, ya’ know, like those in the USA who claim that climate change is not a hoax. Imbeciles that they are, because a certain Trump so treats them.

No, I don't think you're catching my drift. — unenlightened

My bad in misinterpreting, then. As things go, I of course agree that your last post presents an accurate general overview. Most generalities do have their exceptions, though. I admire good willed people that persevere through hard times, rather than having their will broken – more specifically, rather than succumbing to unjustly imposed societal humiliation by becoming in fact humiliated at heart (they include some Jews that went through the Holocaust – from what I've gathered in my life, at least). I’d like to think that what I’ve just said is somehow intelligible to you. Was trying to speak up for those I find admiration for. (To be honest, this because I’d like to have a social context with more such people in it – and denying their presence, or even possibility, is antithetical to such want.)

I don't see how you can make a valid argument here. I'm doubting the location of my cup. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Doubt (as we are addressing it) is a conscious activity. Do we agree?

So, when doubting the location of the cup, can one simultaneously doubt that one is doubting, and furthermore doubt that one is in doubt about one's doubting of where the cup is, and this in infinite regress, at a level of momentary conscious awareness? If not, one will be psychologically certain that one is in doubt at the moment one is in doubt. Thereby making global doubt a psychological impossibility.

That one can doubt everything more or less sequentially if one wants (fist doubting this then doubting that) does not imply a global doubt (one that is fully devoid of any momentary certainty) ... unless one equivocates between infallible/absolute/indubitable subjective certainty and regular subjective certainty as it is commonly understood. But, then, if by "global doubt" one intends to express the held psychological certainty that there are no infallible certainties, this would in itself be a position one is certain about - and this, of itself, contradicts the position of global doubt.

I'm trying to address extremes since less extreme examples don't appear to be convincing to you.

As to the rest of your arguments, I noticed that they revolve around the issues of what words mean. As I previously mentioned, I have not read much of Wittgenstein. Started reading On Certainty but then lost interest. So I'll abstain from arguing these issues in general. I will make the observation that we cannot help from being momentarily certain of what we mean by the words we express to convey our meaning. Otherwise, why would any words be expressed by us?

Having by now read your post, I agree with most everything you’ve stated. Goths can serve as a good example of strong but not big egos, yes.



To be in pain, pissed, or even in states of despair over the injustice that befalls oneself is, to you, to be in states of humiliation without exception. OK

Your argument for this in simplified format:

I don't want to dismiss the personal side of identity, but [...] you can think what you like - in Lala land. — unenlightened

OK

Not much left to discuss on my part.

But as I've been explaining to unenlightened, there is a fundamental inconsistency between probabilities and impossible. Any impossibility created through probability is not a true impossibility, as the principle of plenitude indicates. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m in agreement with this.

So maybe you can explain to me what the others have not been able to. Why must there be an underlying psychological certainty? Take your example. I've lost my cup. — Metaphysician Undercover

The leading implicit (psychological) certainty in this hypothetical is that “I’ve lost my cup”. Devoid of this certainty, how would doubts as to where it might be begin manifesting?

I’ll do my best to summarize my position. Both certainty and uncertainty (but not doubt) can be linguistically applied to either a) ontology or b) epistemology. Emotive reasons for such statements aside, when it is said, “It is certain that the planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, an ontic certainty: a determinate state of affairs that thereby holds no alternative possibilities. In contrast, when one says that, “I’m certain that planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, a subjective certainty: a determinate state of mind pertaining to an awareness wherein this awareness deems that which its certain of to be the sole credible possibility, notably, regarding what is in fact ontically certain. Conversely, there are statements such as, “the future’s uncertain,” which can specify an ontic uncertainty: the indeterminate state of affairs that is found in the timespan we term the future. And: “I’m uncertain about the future,” which specifies a subjective uncertainty: an indeterminate state of mind wherein multiple credible alternatives compete for what in fact is the ontically certain (or determinate) state of affairs as it pertains to the future.

I’m hoping that the intelligibility of these four sentences here suffices in substantiating the validity of these two distinct categories of certainty and uncertainty: those which are ontic and those which are subjective.

Ontic certainties and uncertainties are not taken by us to be possibilities but, instead, to be factual states of being. These to me are fancy ways of re-expressing the concept of “is”—which isn’t a possibility but, in our cognition, an absolute. “The cup is on the table” doesn’t express a probability but a fact, which, as facts go, are taken by us to be absolute/total/complete actualities (in so far as they are not mere possibility, or mere potential regarding being). Extreme scenario: the stance that there are no ontic certainties is itself cognized, however implicitly, as depicting that which is ontically certain, thereby resulting in contradiction (hence, an error of reasoning). We think in terms of ontic certainties. A tangential: all ontic uncertainties (i.e., indeterminate states of affairs), if they factually hold presence, shall themselves be ontically certain; e.g. that the future is uncertain, if it is factually so, will itself be a(n ontic) certainty. Otherwise, we couldn’t claim that ontic uncertainties / indeterminate states of affairs factually occur/are.

All subjective certainties (including both psychological and epistemic) will hold some ontic certainty as referent. E.g., if one is certain that planet Earth is not flat one will hold this affirmation to adequately depict that which is ontically certain (or, that which is a determinate state of affairs). The clincher is that no known subjective certainty can be infallible in what it upholds to be ontically certain—but this here seems to be an aside.

With this as general background:

All subjective uncertainties (of which doubt is a type) will likewise be about some given state of affairs, about something which in fact is. This given or set of gives one is uncertain or doubtful about, however, shall itself be subordinate to a subjective certainty (which upholds a referenced ontic certainty): namely, that there is a determinate state of affairs (an ontic certainty) to the subject matter one is uncertain or doubtful about. Devoid of our subjective certainty that there is a relevant, underlying ontic certainty to be discovered, states of uncertainty and doubt become meaningless. This last sentence might be the hardest point to convey given your stances so far, but, as an example: if I am uncertainty/doubtful about whether or not the cup is on the table (or anything else), I already hold a certainty that some cognitive possibility that is conceivable adequately depicts that which is ontically certain regarding this matter. It’s just that I can’t figure out which of the multiple cognitive possibilities I’m pondering this one cognitive possibility is (this for as long as I remain uncertainty/doubtful). Devoid of this underlying subjective certainty that some relevant ontic certainty holds presence, uncertainty and doubt would again not be possible—the multiple alternatives that go through my mind would then not be competing for what in fact is (each, instead, then being its own stable reality, even if they are contradictory to each other).

More briefly, one must first be certain that something is in fact the case in order to be uncertain or in doubt about what the case might in fact be.

Going by the aforementioned, the conclusion is that no subjective uncertainty (including that of doubt) is possible in the complete absence of all subjective certainty. (To me related: also, no ontic uncertainty is possible where it’s presence to not be ontically certain—and, thus, and ontic certainty). Hence, the presence of uncertainty is always subordinate to the presence of certainty.

I’ve condensed my views a lot in this post. Won’t be surprised if there happens to be lack of clarity in what I’ve written. But, if so, point out the pertinent areas where I’ve been less than sufficiently clear.

But generally, we are playing in the field of competing images, and some images are supported by power structures. — unenlightened

I very much agree with this.

This is quite interesting to me. It looks as though there are in the case of the guy in front of the tanks, 2 conflicting world views, both of which might be zero sum, but with opposing signs ... the guy is hero or villain he is humiliated or the army is humiliated.

If so, then it doesn't quite get to the place I am wanting to contrast with zero sum. — unenlightened

For the sake of simplicity, I’m going to try to distill two identity types and hope the end result won’t sound too fictitious. On one side is the authoritarian; this guy can only be when and if there are subordinates/losers/weaklings/idiots/etc. by which his proud title of dominator/winner/strong guy/intellectual that is of a different class than the inferiors is gained; here is found supremacist attitudes and autocratic governance. On the other side is the egalitarian; this guy believes in the ideal that we are all at least birthed of equal value and deserve to be treated impartially for what we are as persons, at the very least before the law; here is found a far more complex grouping of beliefs that include those of multicultural attitudes (even if it only means not visiting a foreign country as though one were taking a trip to Disneyland), democratic ethos and governance, and a valuing for objectivity, impartiality, and truth … here you can on occasion also find tree-huggers and we-are-all-one-ers … it’s a complex bunch.

The two are in conflict, because their wants are directly antagonistic. To the authoritarian, the egalitarian’s want to make his environment more egalitarian indicates that the equalitarian is a direct threat to the authoritarian’s wellbeing; the more egalitarian things become, the more the authoritarian loses his status of supremacy and hence his very being; the equalitarian is a source of terror, and the sole roundabout means at the disposal of the authoritarian to safeguard his very life and identity is to destroy the egalitarian’s identity as such—either via death or via some form of enslavement. Ditto for the equalitarian; he too finds the authoritarian guy to be a threat to his life and identity; only that the egalitarian tends to want to turn the authoritarian into someone who is also egalitarian, for that’s what in the nature of egalitarians to want. The egalitarian thinks, we’ll then be buds and both enjoy the gist of John Lennon’s “Imagine”. But what he often does not see is that, were he to be successful, he’d destroy the authoritarian’s identity as such—turning him into something he has so far not been.

The authoritarian does his best to humiliate the equalitarian by trying to make him feel like an inferior, which can include leaving him penniless—unless the equalitarian starts playing the authoritarian’s game of giving homage to what the authoritarian wills (much like a mafia cartel, this is when the authoritarian claims to be responsible for keeping his subordinates safe from harm and whatnot).

The equalitarian does his best to humiliate the authoritarian by shouting things like, “shame, shame, shame!” when the authoritarian lies, cheats, steals, etc. … not really carrying that the authoritarian couldn’t give two dimes about this word which reference an emotion he’s never personally experienced. Still, egalitarians for the most part don’t find great conform in humiliating others. Restraining others when appropriate, sure, but with as much dignity as is feasibly possible.

But to shorten this up: the two are, in an odd enough way, themselves stuck in a zero-sum dilemma of sorts. The authoritarian must destroy the identity of the egalitarian if the authoritarian is to maintain his way of life—and this by making the equalitarian into a fearful inferior that learns to love kissing ass and Big Brother. Conversely, the egalitarian can only maintain his way of life if he destroys the present identity of the authoritarian—this by turning the authoritarian into that which the authoritarian has always despised as being weak, stupid, mushy, etc.

Still, two authoritarians in the same room will antagonistically conflict till one is the top dog over the other. Here, there can be only one winner in the zero-sum game—with quote unquote lesser winners being those who kiss ass properly.

Two egalitarians in the same room will do their best to coexist, and will often be benefited by their efforts, with mushy aspects such as gained wisdom, fraternal love, etc. Here, the zero-sum game is won when everyone becomes, or else is, of an egalitarian ethos.

Humanity has always been composed of both characters, and these have always been antagonistic toward each other in their own ways. I’ll add my observation that villains most always tend to be of an authoritarian slant.

To get back to the example of the guy who stood in front of a tank. Because he was antagonistic to the authoritarianism of his environment, I place him in the egalitarian camp. But I still don’t believe that he stood any chance of being humiliated. Suppose a tank ran over a leg. He’d have felt pain galore, but, I’m thinking, not humiliation because his ideals (and his accordance to them) would have remained intact.

It’s the ideal of being top dog (and accordance to this ideal) that becomes damaged when one loses material things, be this legs or wealth or the popular opinion of the times (here thinking of abolitionist in the US: they were in the minority, and initially didn’t have popular opinion on their side). This causing autocrats, roughly speaking, to be humiliated by such events—but not egalitarians. The egalitarian black slave who was caught in the act of being of an egalitarian ethos and then viciously whipped may have lost a great many things, but not their dignity.

My late night way of going about my reply.



I'll reply later.

I think you'll actually find the greatest potential humiliation comes from not big egos but weak egos and insecurity. — Judaka

You bring a good counter example. I’m tempted to theorize that we are humiliated in the examples you’ve given on account of valuing the opinions of those who humiliate us to the point that our self-esteem is dependent on their opinions. Were we to not value their opinions, we’d be injured, hurt, would possibly lose social capital, but not in modes that represent (at least what I interpret to be) humiliation—which, to me, indicates a loss of personal dignity.

Or—my ego sayin’ this might be an even better rebuttal—big egos necessarily require insecure egos to be subservient in order to so be or become big egos. Deprived of subservient insecure egos, big egos become insecure egos themselves, that are then subservient to other big egos. If true, it’s the flipside of the same coin, or of the same worldview. Insecure egos require praise from without in order to feel dignified—and will often become big egos themselves when this praise is consistent (thereby safeguarding that they no longer feel insecure by means of being big egos).

Gandhi might exemplify someone who was neither. The guy was humble (not weak, but quite confident and capable without being inflated) and was ridiculed galore at the time by his oppressors. His self-esteem was not contingent on popular opinion. And, although he ended up winning his battle, there was no guarantee of this. If he would have lost, he would have lost big time. But I doubt he would have died feeling humiliated.

So if a person wears extravagant clothing not to show off or to get compliments but due to it being an honest portrayal of what they deem to be aesthetic, and is well grounded in their reasoning and emotions, some popular other claiming the attire to be awful will not humiliate the person—because the person will know better. No big ego required. Though the experience would likely yet be unpleasant for the individual.

What's the difference between feeling embarrassed and humiliated? — Judaka

Hm. I can only speak for my current state of understanding. To me humiliation cuts to the very marrow of bone, such that one’s sense of dignity becomes lost, whereas embarrassment does not. One can be embarrassed and still hold dignity in so being.

People who think their high status is untouchable are less likely to feel humiliated than people who care about their status and fear to lose it. So whether you've got a big ego or not, only impacts how likely you are to perceive loss of status, bigger ego mightn't see it as easily because they always see themselves in an unrealistically positive light. — Judaka

In the book/movie Dangerous Liaisons, the villainess had one of the bigger egos one can imagine. Yet when publicly booed at the end of the story, was mortified by humiliation. Does this seem unrealistic to you? (Other easily expressed examples don’t currently come to mind).

At any rate, I’ve mentioned a simplified theory of what I think might be going on. Though, again, I’m aware that human psychology is very complex.

What do you make of the above? Would you say Gandhi had a big ego and, if so, why?



I’ll get back to your post at a later time.

I suppose that if you could exclude all doubt from your mind, you would have absolute certainty. I do not think that this is humanly possible. You mentioned "absolute doubt", so I assume that this would be to exclude all certainty. Why would absolute doubt be a bad thing? An attitude, or "frame of mind" of doubt does not prevent you from proceeding, it simply produces a cautious attitude toward procedures, with due respect for the possibility of mistake. While certitude produces a careless attitude toward procedures, because it inclines disrespect for the possibility of mistake. It appears to me, that to exclude the attitude of certainty (absolute doubt), would be a good thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I’m not misunderstanding:

For what I’ve so far read it seems to me that doubt has mostly been equated to uncertainty; a very common practice which, if I’m correct, is an improper definition of doubt.

As per common usage, if Ted is simply interested in learning more about the properties of X, he does not hold certainty about those properties of X he wishes to learn more about--and is thereby, technically, uncertain about those properties of X he wishes to discover. (We can only be curious about things we are not fully certain about psychologically). However, in this scenario, Ted cannot be validly stated to doubt X’s properties. (Curiosity does not entail doubt for that which one is curious about.) Else: not being omniscient, we are all to some extent uncertain about what the future holds; however, this of itself does not entail that we doubt the specifics of what the future holds.

A hypothesis that I belief to be correct: Doubt is an uncertainty about some previously held certainty, be it one’s own or others, be this held certainty psychological or epistemic. For example:

If I were to claim that the future holds attribute A, and were you to be uncertain that my belief (held beliefs are always held psychological certainties) is valid, then you would doubt that the future holds property A. But without me, you, or anyone else purporting specifics about the future, there would be nothing to doubt about the future—even though one would yet remain uncertain about the future’s specifics.

Doubt demolishes a previously held certainty by making it one credible alternative among rivaling others (not by proving it false). Doubt is one form of uncertainty. But uncertainty in general does not entail doubts:

All enquiry, learning, curiosity, sense of wonder (and maybe some others) require an uncertainty about what if fact is—none entail doubt for that enquired into, learned, wondered upon, and so on.

-----

In what I believe to be agreement with your general sentiment, I do contend that one can well subsist with an acknowledgment that no such thing as infallible/absolute certainty can be obtained. And that belief that infallible certainties can be obtained is untenable.

Still, to hold any form of uncertainty—including that of doubt—one must first hold a psychological certainty that some contextually relevant given is real/true. E.g., to be uncertain about whether one forgot a cup on a table, I must first hold a psychological certainty that there is a reality/truth to whether or not the cup is presently on the table, that there in fact is a table, and so forth.

So uncertainty cannot hold an absolute psychological presence (much less can doubt). The aforementioned instead results in the position of fallibilism*, such that less than infallible certainties of various strengths are maintained till evidenced wrong (with acknowledgment that all of one's certainties are to some extent fallible).

*Which to my mind is validly equivalent to non-Cartesian forms of global skepticism (as in “thoughtful; enquiring”) Global doubt is that pursued by Cartesian skepticism, and this only in the hopes of arriving at infallible certainties that are thereby indubitable.

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p.s., haven't read much of Witt

if as I have been suggesting, humiliation is loss of status - a public matter, if somewhat nebulous, of social standing, then we can answer the question. And the answer will have to do with how the incident feeds out into the wider world, who controls the story, how the other managers and other workers respond. — unenlightened

I was interested in the discussions regarding humiliation and identity. Trying to entice more discussion of this, some opinions:

Humiliation can be defined as depriving someone of their previously held pride. Double-checking with Wiktionary, it can also be defined as making someone humble, i.e. endowing them with humility.

Here’s a possible monkey wrench thrown in: humility is not always a personal negative, as humiliation is understood to always be.

Speaking from some personal experience, a person can gain great happiness from being made more humble by other’s actions and abilities—given that what humbles oneself is the ability of some other which one greatly reveres in society at large, as well as in oneself. A trite example: I’ve been known to like and to dabble in poetry. I can distinctly remember times I was elated at being humbled by others’ poetry at poetry readings. Same can hold true for most any other talent or ability. It elates the spirit to know that what one values in the world is not only present in it but excels what one previously was aware of as being present. One is here humbled and simultaneously enlivened with verve, hope, and, sometimes, rekindled aspirations.

On a different train of thought: Christian doctrine is fond of saying that the meek (the humble) shall one day rule the world (paraphrasing—and leaving the issue of historical hypocrisy out of it). Here, humility, the state of being humble, is pivotally valued (at least in speech).

However, for some—and going by dictionary definitions, for many—to be made humble is necessarily synonymous to being humiliated (in the negative connotation sense). And, in the process, one is made subservient to that which one was once not subservient to. Hence being made humble—aka, humiliation—is here synonymous to abasement and loss of power (i.e., ability to accomplish).

Tying this into identity:

Personal identity can be thought of as that which one at core is, which to me can be made into a dichotomy. In one train of thought, there’s identity of character: this can be one’s affinities and aversions, and, hence, one’s sum intentions: i.e., one’s character. Here one identifies which others of like characters (e.g., people who like the same music for the same roundabout reasons, who hold the same roundabout values for life, who make the same decisions one would oneself make (were one to be in the same situation), etc.) and will not identify with others of unlike characters (e.g., people who proudly cheat, steal, lie, deride, murder, etc.). In a different train of thought, there’s identity of physicality: the core of what one is is here intuited as consisting of physical elements: ones skin/hair/eye color, one’s height/size (e.g. midgets as the “other”), one’s sex, one’s owned possessions, etc.

Its complex due to the two stated forms of personal identity always being to some extent converged, but to keep things on the simple side: Where race plays a crucial factor to personal identity, one will tend to favor others of unrelated characters—say, unethical individuals—just as long as they are of the same race, this by comparison to those individuals of related characters (say, ethical individuals) who differ from you in their racial makeup. The converse applies for those who self-identify most with their own propensities of intention: here, one tends to form bonds of empathy, etc., with those of like natures regardless of their race, nationality, economic class, etc.

Re: identity and humiliation

Those who identify with a zero-sum worldviews shall always be humiliated in being made humble. In this worldview, to not be on top of others is to necessarily be trampled by those who are on top. Here, to be humble is to be trampled upon as someone else’s inferior (and being trampled upon is here always shame-worthy).

The same entailment does not apply to those who do not so identify with zero-sum worldviews (egalitarians included, I presume). More likely, here the “other” is found to be those who strictly pertain to a zero-sum worldview of winner/looser relations—regardless of their physical attributes (be they rich or poor, etc.). That guy who was filmed standing in front of tanks in Tiananmen Square (hope most know of him) seems to serve as an example of this personal identity type: He didn’t lose pride in so doing, though he likely knew he was taking the risk in losing all his social capital, if not also his very life (potentially via torture). Else said, he wasn’t humiliated by the powers that disdained him and wanted him to be “put in his place” of subservience, this while seeming to retain his humility (and dignity in so being)—and the risks he took were for others of the same character which he himself identified with (those who desired non-autocratic governance), rather than people of particular colors, ethnicities, etc.

Place IMOs wherever you may; and, again, I know its complex; society has always been a conflux of these two personal-identity worldviews; and the two identity types can be easily found comingling in most individuals to different extents.

In short: The less humble, the greater the ego(ism), and hence the greater the potential humiliation—and, thereby, the greater the want/need to crush others who could make one humble. (acknowledgedly, this coming from someone with an ego of notable size, me thinks). Those who are humble in dignified manners, however, will in due measure not be humiliated by ridicule (though they might lose their ability to accomplish what they want).

I’ll cut these opinions short. Still, I’d like to read more views out there concerning identity and humiliation in general. Nice topic.

This seems to be the very crux of the disagreement. I could phrase in terms of there being a pivotal difference between a) pulling the plug on a very complex machine and b) pulling the plug on some living being who’s on life support. It’s not the same thing — javra


If the machine was conscious though it would be immoral either way. — Devans99

I feel like we’re starting to go around in circles. The property of being conscious is one held by living systems. The point of the “pulling the plug” example being that humans (and other living beings) are something other than mere “complex machines”—mere complex machines not being living and thereby lacking the property of being conscious.

Would you class a virus as intelligent? What about a single celled organism? What I'm getting at is there a point where a machine (biological or otherwise) becomes intelligent? All life evolved from inanimate matter and inanimate matter is not intelligent. Early forms of life (pre single cell creatures) must have been simple machines without DNA, RNA. Would they qualify as intelligent? At what point of complexity of matter does intelligence first manifest? — Devans99

As it happens, I’ve address much of this in my last reply to @Harry Hindu. Viruses are not living. Living things are autopoietic (roughly: self-sustaining). A bacterium, which is autopoietic, might be argued to hold some miniscule form of mind and intelligence, but not a virus (which is not autopoietic). Autopoiesis being a negentropic process. Otherwise, what would the distinction between life and non-life be? Or is there no distinction whatsoever?

As to life being “machinery”, be it simple or complex, one can think of it this way: There are two forms of machines: living and non-living, which brings us back to square one: differentiating the properties of life (such as that of degree of intelligence) from those of non-life.

Thought your ‘entropic/negentropic’ distinction was spot on. — Wayfarer

It’s good to know I’m not the only one. :smile: Thanks.

I’ll likely be backing away from this discussion. Happy holidays and a good new year to everyone.

I don't see anything particularly special about life: we are just complex machines. — Devans99

This seems to be the very crux of the disagreement. I could phrase in terms of there being a pivotal difference between a) pulling the plug on a very complex machine and b) pulling the plug on some living being who’s on life support. It’s not the same thing.

Still, this ultimately revolves around differing ontological perspectives regarding the nature of agency … which winds its way toward the ontological nature of reality.

There are aspects of intelligence (self-awareness, consciousness) that only the more advanced life possess but I think these aspects are outgrowths of the more simple intelligence rather than something unique to life that could not be achieved with computers. — Devans99

I don’t disagree with this, btw. But again, for me, only if computers were to somehow become living. ... Well, a correction: I don't disagree with the contents of the quote save that intelligence is unique to life.

I can relate to inanimate things being capable of displaying what we interpret to be intelligence. A smartphone is after all considered to be “smart”. It learns your typing habits, for example. And the greater the complexity of these processes, the more intelligence seems to be displayed.

I however question the ontological verity of real, rather than faux, intelligence being applicable to givens devoid of animate agency. Which again resolves into issues of life v. non-life.

Take robots found in Transformers or Terminator, for example. They were alive in so far as they could be killed, subsequent to which they’d undergo entropic processes of decomposition. A better example for me are the organic androids of Blade Runner. In all these cases we can relate ourselves as living beings to other forms of living systems. This being not too different than our capacity to relate to extraterrestrial aliens in sci-fi. We, for example, understand that they strive and suffer in manners that are in some ways similar to us, which enables us to hold sympathy for them (in certain situations).

But these are all examples of negentropic beings. What we have today is not this. I take today's AI to be complex decoys of life and of intelligence proper. But not instances of real intelligence as it holds the potential to apply to life.

As to terms, their semantics can differ between different cohorts of people. An electronic watch can be deemed intelligent. Even a crystal which “knows” how to grow over time. But this is not the intelligence I refer to when I express the term (real, or actual) intelligence in non-allegorical manners.

From Wiktionary: Intelligence: (1) Capacity of mind […]

I associate mind with life.

No, the problem is that your definition of entropy and negentropy isn't clear. — Harry Hindu

What parts were unclear? I thought I’d simplified the concepts into very clear terms. Entropy: energy moving toward thermal equilibrium. Negentropy: energy moving away from thermal equilibrium.

Where do you draw the boundary of life and non-life? Are dragonflies entropic or negentropic? What about starfish, jellyfish, an oak tree, mushrooms, bacteria or viruses? — Harry Hindu

Hm. Viruses, viroids, and prions are non-life; I don't know of any such thing as a dead virus, viroid, or prion. Bacteria and everything more complex is life; all these can be either living (and not decomposing) or dead (and decomposing in entropic manners).

We could approach this issue via the cybernetic concept of autopoiesis. But without background on these concepts we might be running around in circles. And I grant that my knowledge of cybernetics is only second-hand. Still, I know something about autopoiesis.

Life is just more complex non-life. — Harry Hindu

This can translate into “negative entropy is just a more complex form of entropy”.

Can you provide justification for this? To be clear, something that is not mere speculation.

Yes, our empirical world evidences that non-life developed into life. I’m not dispelling this. But you’re forgetting that no one understands how. Also that there is a clear distinction between life, which is animate, and non-life, which is inanimate.

But they're still entropic. Right?

You guys have read my full post.

Is there disagreement, for example, in that you uphold life itself to be entropic rather than negentropic?

You guys want to say that we'll be making negentropic computers soon. OK. I can't argue with this issue of faith (other than by questioning what the benefits would be of so doing). But my point was that until its negentropic its not thinking, or understandings, or intelligent, etc.

Entropy is the process in which energy progresses toward thermal equilibrium. Some express it as ordered systems progressing toward uniform disorder.

Negative entropy is an opposite process. One in which the organization of thermodynamic systems increases. Biological process such as those of homeostasis exemplify negentropy. Here, the complexity of a system is either maintained or else increased over time.

Life is about negative entropy whereas non-life is about entropy. Some could make this far more complex. Still, I take this to be the simplified stance. May I stand corrected if wrong in my summary.

Living things, including brains, restructure their “hardware”. For brains, this is called neural plasticity. As the “hardware” is restructured, so too do the capacities of the “software” change in turn (which can further restructure the hardware). This, generally, either maintains or increases complexity over time; roughly, till death occurs.

The computers we have today, regardless of how complex, do not restructure their hardware via the processes of their software so as to either maintain or increase complexity as a total system—no matter how much electricity is placed into them.

I don’t have a link for this (I’ve lost track of the researcher’s name) but it’s rudimentary by today’s standards. Take an insect like body with basic sensory inputs, allow for a chaos algorithm together with a preset goal of arriving at some location, and the robot will adapt to any obstacle put in its path, even with legs bent or cut off, in its motions toward the given location. Very sophisticated stuff as far as artificial intelligence goes. Its behaviors are nevertheless entropic. Given its preset instructions, its energy follows paths of least resistance toward thermal equilibrium. It, for example, can’t change its immediate goals of its own volition—this as intelligent lifeforms do so as to maintain or increase total system organization. So doing being one integral aspect of intelligence as we know it to apply to ourselves.

Programs can mimic the intelligence of lifeforms rather well in some but not all contexts. And their computations certainly outperform human intelligence in many ways. But I yet maintain that until robots and/or their programs can become negentropic, they will only mimic intelligence without actually so being intelligent. Their intelligence being only allegorical.

To be frank, to me this issue boils down to one of whether or not ontology is one of hard causal determinism. If it is, crystals can be stated to be intelligent by comparison to rocks. If its not, than intelligence strictly applies to valid metaphysical agency ... something which is a property of living systems. I find myself in the latter camp. So to me computers need to become living beings prior to being endowed with real, and not just artificial, intelligence.

Computers are all entropic, algorithms, memory, and all. Life, regardless of how simple, is negentropic—and, quite arguably, always awareness-endowed, for it must survive in an ever changing environment it must be to some measure aware of.

I’m sometimes surprised by how easily we animate inanimate objects via metaphor (“my car’s my baby: listen to her purr/roar”) and then lose sight of the metaphors we use being just that. No one proposes that a marriage license should be sanctioned between cars and those who love them. But when it comes to AI, we have no problem accepting such things in our sci-fi … and then we often make a quantum leap into arguing this fantasy to in fact be reality—one that is always just on the horizon.

Till a computer can be produced by some neo-Frankenstein-like person to be negentropic, it won’t think, nor learn, nor perceive. There’s no smidgen of awareness inside to facilitate these activities. But, then, we hardly know what negentropy is, mechanically speaking … never mind how to produce it.

Still, allegorically addressed, an electrical watch is far more intelligent, far smarter, than a mechanical one: it can remember different times to wake us up, is aware of multiple time zones, and some of the more fancy ones can even be emotionally astute in how they address us (some maybe doing so in sexually alluring voices with which they speak). They’re still entropic, though.

To add to the previous posters:

I’m here addressing what most take to be freewill, agency; roughly: a finite LFW limited by factors beyond any individual’s control, one in part contextualized by a fluid form of causal determinism and in part formed from birth (biologically (and/or karmically for some)) by these same fluid factors of causal determinacy. I take it that most individuals worldwide would agree to something like this as rough description, although evidencing it philosophically is a completely different ball park.

Let’s assume one worst case scenario: the heroin addict once chose to pursue experimentation with heroin despite knowing of all the risks of addiction simply on account of feeling bored with life—as though life itself can ever be deemed boring. (Were the heroin addict to have so become due to extreme psychological or physical pain that was itself not of their choosing, one for which heroin seemed to be the only available remedy, to my mind the scenario of culpability, guilt, would be nowhere near as extreme.)

Even in this worst case, there yet exists the choice on the part of others for things such as forgiveness upon the person’s acknowledgment of having made an error, an understanding born from willingness to step into the other’s shoes, and, consequently, a sympathy—regardless of how mild—via which others attempt to resolve what the heroin addict now recognizes to have been a mistake.

LFW does not apply only to one person, but to everybody. And everybody is fallible—though some will do all they can to deny it, often by placing blame on other(s) for their own doings. In this universally shared fallibility there is the potential for a universally shared forgiveness of imperfections. Not as an encouragement of wrongs but as a—maybe all too idealized—communal effort for mutual assistance to help others out when they are down.

The same becomes far more complex when it is likewise applied to those that intentionally do harm toward others for reasons other than that of self-defense. It is one thing to understand that Charles Manson had an extremely difficult life during his formative years as a child, and to thereby hold sympathy, if not even empathy, for him as a child (something that, from my experiences, unfortunately few people are willing to do). It is an utterly different thing to then deem Charles Manson devoid of culpability for his actions as the adult he became. Notwithstanding, we westerners (or many just those of the USA?) live in a world focused on punishment as retaliation, as communal revenge—this rather than punishment for crimes and misdeeds that is sincerely influenced by motives of successful rehabilitation into society. The former is almost by definition devoid of compassion. The latter almost by definition consists of compassionate forms of realignment to states of moral sanity. But this too is a choice of how to react on the part of those who judge wrongs (as we all always do).

My intend point to all this is that the belief in LFW is not in and of itself something that leads towards less compassion for others. Instead, it is the sense of moral superiority that is, when rationally appraised, bogus which leads to lack of sympathy and empathy for others. For all her imperfections, Mother Teresa would have welcomed helping the heroin addict when she/he asked for help. Whereas your average so called “virtuous person (one that likely believes her/himself to already have a seat in some heaven)” would at best treat such person like lepers not to be touched.

It is true that we all have our limits of inclusion. But while some deal with the us/them divide in terms of absolutes, other’s will address it in terms of degrees, always willing to be more inclusive when they themselves are sufficiently stable in their daily needs.

At any rate, belief in any form of LFW will be belief that LFW is equally applicable to all. There is no grand end of perfect righteousness that anyone of us can obtain in this lifetime (or any other, as the case might be). We all on occasion err. And we all have personal culpability for our errors. From this vantage, we then can choose to assist others in due measure to need, or we can choose to indiscriminately forsake all those who have stumbled while simultaneously declaring ourselves innocent of any “significant” wrong doing … which is bullshit. Our choices today will in part determine what our futures will be; and this applies for every day of our lives.

So no, belief in LFW does not make one less empathetic or sympathetic toward others by comparison to hard determinism. Though it might consist of a somewhat different mindset.

… However, as per William James’ argument, LFW does explain the presence of regret—regretting having chosen this alternative rather than that, something which hard determinism cannot coherently account for. When we don’t succumb to moods of desperation for things we’ve previously done (which is never a good thing for oneself or anyone other we have yet to interact with) our regrets then help us in not repeating the same mistakes ad infinitum, as well as in best remedying the things that are within our control to remedy. Imo, one could well argue that it is the absence of regret which leads to societal mayhem, including lack of sympathy and empathy for others—the rational absence of regret being something that is more in keeping with hard determinism.

The ancients didn't have a concept for "homosexuality". [...] It's difficult sometimes for us to understand the ancients. — Bitter Crank

OK, yea. You’re right. For what it’s worth though, I have a vague memory from some documentary of a Cesar who was ridiculed for being sexually attracted only to women. They might not have had a term for it, but they did have the suspicion that the guy was strangely heterosexual. :rofl:

I somehow imagine (don’t know how much substance my imagination has here) that you’d be more knowledgeable about this than I am. And I currently am not.

Have you heard anything about sexual confusion (i.e., men wanting to be women and women wanting to be men) back in the Greco-Roman days?

I don’t know. Maybe dressing up in the other sex’s attire didn’t matter all that much on account of everybody wearing togas. :joke: No, they did dress differently, come to think of it. Still, I’ve never heard of transvestites back then … which I would think would be a lot more accepted by these two ancient cultures.

At any rate, the history I’ve read holds both the ancient Greeks and Romans as unconfused about their, quite often bi/homosexual, sexuality. Which leads me to tentatively speculate that the “confusion” is largely cultural byproduct of today world rather than a natural aspect of our human biology (which I take homosexuality to be … as well as the far rarer instances of intersexed individuals).

... Which is odd to me considering all the suffering that people confused about their gender have to endure in today’s world. Although this later part is probably a different topic.

I think 'time' is central somehow. — sign

Couldn't agree more.

Should be food for further conversation. — sign

I look forward to them. :cool:

Got it. Thanks for the links.

And he tries to describe the rush of meanings or 'phenomenological time.' — sign

Interesting concept, one that I might be inadvertently paralleling in my own philosophical musings. Husserl is one more person I haven't yet read. Do you recommend any particular work his that best focuses on this concept of "phenomenological time"?

Some people are clearly in the mood to find others in error (possess the truth solely, denying any kind of mystery or darkness yet to be explored.) Others are clearly in the mood to find common ground and maybe share in the pleasure of what they both already understand. I'm no saint. — sign

Yea, I share that feeling. Being anything but saintly myself, I'll gravitate toward closure in some situations. But its one thing I always admired about many of the ancient skeptics (which I've now come to nickname fallibilists): they sought open-mindedness and thereby greater understanding. The other side of things can, often enough, be all-knowning of all pertinent absolute truths. Not my cup of tee.

BTW, wanted to share this since it seems to me to be pertinent to the discussion:

There was a man with tongue of wood
Who essayed to sing,
And in truth it was lamentable.
But there was one who heard
The clip-clapper of this tongue of wood
And knew what the man
Wished to sing,
And with that the singer was content. — Stephen Crane

This in context of meaning as value and the signs we thereby produce. Beside which, I like this guys poetry.

What I mean is something like the 'I' who uses language is not exactly an 'I.' The subject that speaks this theoretical fiction of the subject is already plural in some sense, already speaking 'outward.' — sign

:up: I very much like that. :smile: There is no living being that exists devoid of other living beings with which it interacts. Even the most solitary and un-evolved of lifeforms live among predators and prey. The existence of experience is not an "I" but a "we".

Though, here thinking of Sartre's play "No Exit", this can be a blessing as well as a curse. :razz:

Language is most real, I'm tempted to say, as it rushes by. Meaning both remembers and anticipates. It's not (for me, for the most part) instantaneously present. It is 'stretched' and 'on the way.' — sign

Here again, I agree.

I agree with this. What I had in mind is the nature of this possession. What is it to think the idea of a tree? Of course we 'know.' We can have the experience right now. I vaguely picture a tree. I imagine typical uses of the word 'tree' in sentences. How does it sit in my mind when plucked from the flow of using it unselfconsciously? — sign

I'm not claiming these are easy questions to answer, but to me the key to obtaining answers is found in interpreting all meaning as complex relations of values. Among the most basic are those of positive valency (attraction toward) and negative valency (repulsion from). It's the relevancy something holds to the individual. But buried somewhere in all this is a parallel belief in some forms of universality as it applies to experience, regardless of the individual. This being what makes meaning communicable via signs.

My laconic answer is then: to think the idea of a tree is to noumenally apprehend (with or without imagined phenomena) the value of a tree in relation to oneself, which would include its value in relation to its environmental context(s) as one is aware of them.

What I have in mind is something like a stream of experience with a certain elusiveness for itself. — sign

I'm not sure if what I said addresses this. Could you elaborate if I misinterpreted?

I follow that. I'd only add that many of a more literal mindset have problems with the term "nothingness"; rather than interpreting it as "no-thing-ness" they can only comprehend it as unbeing, or an absolute lack of presence. Using this figure of speech led me to a whole bunch of problems a long time ago. But whatever works in getting the meaning conveyed.

Is this a defense of pure meaning? — sign

Yes.

Can we possess it without the signs? — sign

To keep things simple, in a word on the tip of one's tongue, one knows exactly what one wants to say, so the meaning is possessed without the sign. Its just that one can't express it to anyone other or to oneself.

And do we ever quite possess it even with the signs? — sign

I believe in certain, if not most all, cases we very much do so. I'd say that when we name an abstraction (e.g., world, or animal) we possess the meaning via the name. This, naturally, after we've associated the required meaning with what the name logically necessitates (e.g., neither rocks nor plants can be animals).

To me, part of the complexity is in that different people create and project different meanings that yet correspond to the same sign used to convey meaning. As example, for one person, "animal" more or less means non-human mammal, whereas for those who are more scientifically inclined it will include sponges, insects, fish, birds, etc., and humans as well. Here, the same sign holds two different, though overlapping, meanings.

I agree that it asks for a meaning. I guess one of the things I'm getting from Derrida so far is the impossibility of a perfect separation of sign from signified. As I understand it, this perfect separation is something like the heart of metaphysics. — sign

What do you make of words that are at the tip of one’s tongue?

Here I find a clear example of our awareness of an utterly non-phenomenal meaning—a meaning for which we momentarily do not know the sign for; a meaning which we momentarily cannot re-present. In the pre-Kantian sense of the word, this to me exemplifies our direct apprehension of the noumenal—itself a hidden aspect of all our apprehensions of the phenomenal which hold any type of significance for us. What I'm here aiming to illustrate is the logical possibility that the two are in some way separate and distinct in the here and now—this rather than as a hypothetical potential to be actualized only in some form of absolute state. In other words, though they are almost always intimately entwined, to me the word at the tip of one's tongue illustrates the complete separation between meaning and sign in the form of an experience available to all of us less than ideal subjects.

And thank you for the link. :grin:

Well, it is a sort of semantic game but I think it is the believer who makes it that way, by calling “disbelief” a belief. — DingoJones

From what I’ve so far read, I align myself with @Rank Amateur. In attempts to approach the issue from a somewhat different angle:

In one’s lack of belief concerning a given belief X:

A: Is one unaware of X as a stipulated belief of what is true? If yes, then no cognition of X occurs, as with the infant. If no:

B: Is one uncertain of whether or not belief X presents what is in fact true? Then one is agnostic about the truth-value of X.

Or

C: Is one certain that belief X is false? Then one holds a positive belief that belief X is false.

Where X signifies deity/deities, A is irrelevant to issues of belief, B defines agnosticism, and C defines atheism.

Other than the additional possibility of theism, what other possibilities are there? Else, how are the three offered possibilities wrong?

The question 'what is....?' asks for signs. — sign

I differ here in believing that it asks for meaning ... which is however only conveyable—be it to other or to self—through signs. But to me there is a distinct ontological differentiation between the two.

There are just so many thinkers to read and only so much time. Let me know if you want me to send you a link to a pdf of S&P. It's about 80 pages and is thought to contain essential Derrida. — sign

Please do; thanks. However, while its likely good background to have, I should confess that I don’t have an aesthetic for Derrida-like philosophy; at least as I so far know. I instead prefer systematic approaches. For instance, regardless of what one makes of it as a body of understanding, I greatly admire Spinoza for attempting to make all his premises explicit for each and every conclusion in his Ethics.

It’s a personal aesthetic preference and, as is always the case, when we each honestly follow our own individual aesthetic calling—regardless of how much we deviate from the norm in so doing—we each remain aligned to the truth that is us as well as to the truths with which we have yet to be fully acquainted. The aesthetic, after all, being as much an experience of pleasure as it is a calling toward that which is at once familiar and unknown—toward a heart’s home that awaits on the horizon, so to speak. My way of saying: to each of us our own aesthetic preferences and paths.

But I’ll do my best to read through it as time allows. Thanks again.

How is meaning distributed between the words and in time? What is the 'resolution' of language? Is meaning ever trapped in perfect definiteness at an instant? Is an act of meaning ever perfectly repeated? If meaning is distributed, there is no master-word but only substitutions that may finally point at the distribution of meaning and structure of substitution itself as final, as the impossibility of some other finality, fulfilling the metaphysical quest as it snips its root. But this 'fulfillment' is subject to its own law. It's never perfectly repeated or stable. — sign

...the sign is that ill-named thing, the only one, that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: ' what is ....?' — Derrida


Why does the sign escape this question? I have my thoughts, but I wonder if others like this line and have something to say. — sign

Some musing:

Meaning is equivalent to significance. Placing the etymology of sign-ificance aside, the term/sign of “meaning” (correction: significance ) is defined on Wiktionary as “the extent to which something matters [implicitly: to some set of subjects]” and as “importance [roughly: the extent to which something is, else is worthy of, being imported into oneself as conscious being from without … this due to the degree of affect and/or effect this something might have upon oneself]”

So appraising is one way of arriving at the understanding that meaning is inextricably related to value—value itself always being relative to some given set of beings. The two are of course not synonymous, but there can be no meaning in the complete absence of value. So much so that I believe meaning is in all instances a complex relation of values.

Values are again contingent upon, and relative to, subjects. Given the aforementioned, to objectify meaning is, then, to lose sight of what it is of what it consists of.

Signs then are often arbitrary and, in and of themselves, meaningless. This is not to deny that we also often ascribe signs in manners limited by the wide array of meaning that exists prior to their being produced. But terms such as “cat” and “dog” are, as signs, fully interchangeable were it not for the values we associate with each. The meaning of signs—while at times conforming to the world that surrounds (e.g. a drawn crescent moon as sign for "moon" rather than "sun")—is nevertheless contingent on constructed realities, e.g. cultures, which are themselves the products of a multiplicity of individual value-appraising beings.

So if I understand the latter question properly, signs elude the question of "what is …” because they are in one sense arbitrary and inherently meaningless while simultaneously also serving as anchors by which our communal, value-constructed meanings are tethered and stabilized, this across a given cohort of beings, on account of communal consent.

This all being a rough draft version of my current perspectives.

I haven’t read Derrida, btw.

However, when all is said and done, I do not understand (and that is the pejorative "i don't understand") how one type of cause can affect another type cause such that the explanation for how that happens is not either contradictory or question begging. — Mentalusion

In case you’d like to explore the issue:

As to agents, such as ourselves, our motives are not of themselves efficient causes for what we choose. In a way, at least, that which we choose to do is itself an efficient causation—one which commences with our current state of being making the choice to act and which holds the particular act as the resulting effect. Our motive(s) for these choices, however, governs what we choose by serving at a telos: a future we intend to manifest and are driven by in the choices we make between alternatives. Though which alternative best satisfies out motive-as-telos is fully up to us to decide upon. This is of course conceivable only when one entertains the possibility of a reality that is not fully governed by strict causal determinism.

As to efficient causation that occurs between all inanimate givens, by today’s standards one can hypothetically conjoin what we know of physical entropy (which I take to be somewhat different then entropy as defined by IT) with Aristotelian notions of final cause so as to result in the following: all inanimate efficient causation holds as its motive optimal entropy.

I’m not trying to insinuate that so entertaining of a sudden resolves everything. But I think both scenarios can illustrate how different types of causes—here, namely, particular efficient and final causes—can interact in manners such that both are conceivably governed by an “eternal” final causation.

So I'm not here intending to address the details of how things work but to illustrate how different types of causes can conceivably interact in manners that are neither contradictory nor question begging.

The big issue here, imo, is how agency interacts with inanimate efficient causation in manners that, as you say, are neither contradictory not question begging. To me, one very good example of this would be how inanimate organic matter results in a living—rather than dead—unicellular organism; inanimate matter being of inanimate efficient causation and the living unicellular organism being of a very undeveloped yet still present agency. This would of course be contingent on the entire metaphysical ontology that is presupposed, and I don’t know enough about Aristotelian philosophy to comment on how Aristotle resolves this. Well, other than that he also makes use of formal causation.

OK. However: Were Aristotle’s unmoved mover to be a motive rather than an agency, would you still find 2 & 4 to necessarily contradict?

As for me, Aristotle’s difficulty from the vantage of today’s world is in showing how inanimate objects are governed by motives. But again, while I’m aware that concepts such as that of the Anima Mundi were prevalent back then, I haven’t read his works myself.