In our human form understanding and will might be one faculty with two modes. One "soul". But in metaphysical questions of the origin of the world distictions between Will and Intellect can be useful. Will has active power. Intellect is passive, Platonic Ideas — Gregory

I can readily understand that. For what its worth, I don't myself subscribe to an origin of existence; an origin of the universe as its commonly known sure; but not of existence at large. I can accept that the will is active and the intellect passive, but from the perspectives I so far adopt, in so conceiving, the whole reason for being of the will is to best satisfy the desires of the intellect. Eudemonia, for example, is not found in the active will's doings per se but in the passive intellect's state of so being, for lack of better words, happy.

Libertarian free will has been espoused in many different flavors, ture. And I personally don’t subscribe to libertarian free will being completely devoid of determinants and thereby of reasons for what it does (which could be construed in certain such variants of the concept). That said, this is to me the very crux of the issue:

One might phrase (b) as causal inevitability, or determinism, or an instance of the principle of sufficient reason. I'm actually leaning towards that latter phrasing lately - that determinism inside a universe means everything that happens in that universe has sufficient reason to happen. — flannel jesus

“Determinism” to most will necessarily entail what in former days was termed “necessarianism” and what today is coined as “causal inevitability” – in both cases, potential subtleties aside, everything that happens happens necessarily. Thereby disallowing for any possibility of libertarian free will.

It’s why I explicitly specified (b) as “causal inevitability”. Which is in no way equivalent to “everything that happens holds an ontically occurring reason for it so happening”. To exemplify this, in the libertarian free will that I sponsor, every possible decision will need to hold at the very least one intent which one intentions as the particular decision’s ontically occurring reason for its occurrence. And this intent is of itself construed to be a teleological determinant - an ontically occurring teleological reason - for the decision between options which was made. For any choice one makes, one will – at the very least when in the right frame of mind – be able to affirm why one made the choice: e.g. so as to get rich, or so as to find love, etc. All these being intents that determine that option which one chooses via one’s libertarian free will. Due to this, the principle of sufficient reason here fully applies – but it in no way translates into “the decisions I/you make are causally inevitable”.

I fully know and acknowledge that such a reality wherein the PSR holds for all choices made would be one in which all choice made via libertarian free will (as it was previously defined) are nevertheless determined by some determinant. However, when one does X for the sake of Z, Z (the end pursued) will not of itself causally determine X – but will instead teleologically determine X; this without in any way nullifying the lack of metaphysical constrains one has in choosing one of the options toward Z as intended outcome.

All this is not determinism as the term is understood today, such that it entails causal inevitability, while nevertheless yet being a reality wherein everything is yet determined by some or other determinant and, therefore, wherein the PSR holds for all events. One's of libertarian free will fully included.

Causally though, when one entertains libertarian free will, the agent in a large sense becomes an non-causally determined cause of the option chosen as effect - keeping in mind that this agent in its causing of the effect is necessarily teleologically determined by the intent which the agent pursued.

This is of course a very different mindset relative to those commonly held today: such as those wherein everything can only be either causally inevitable or else random. .

But this is the very reason why there is a pivotal difference between a libertarian compatibilism (where libertarian free will is maintained to occur together with the Principle of Sufficient Reason for all choice made), on the one hand, and a deterministic, else non-libertarian, compatibilism (where some non-libertarian understanding of free will is maintained together with the doctrine of universal causal inevitability).

One cannot willy nilly jump back and forth between a libertarian compatibilism and a deterministic, in the sense of non-libertarian, compatibilism on account of both of these being "compatibilism" - for the first mandates the ontic reality of a libertarian free will and the second mandates its very metaphysical impossibility.

Which is greater, intellect or will? — Gregory

Will translates into volition. How does intellect get to be understood? Going by its original Latin roots, intellect could be understood as the understanding. Not understanding when interpreted as anything other which is understood – e.g. a concept, an idea, etc. – but instead that intrinsic and often accumulative understanding of the first-person agent which facilitates the agents capacity to so understanding that which is other than itself: again, with concepts and ideas as examples of the latter. (Example: both a dog and a human toddler has some such proto-understanding as agents which facilitates their understanding of the external world but, while the dog’s understanding is capped at a level far lower than any adult human’s, the human toddler’s so-called “proto-understanding” of things understood readily holds the capacity to develop into the vastly more content-filled “proto-understanding” of an adult human.)

If one entertains this definition of the intellect, then one’s intellect shall be one aspect of one’s will at large – maybe being the most pivotal aspect of will conceivable. Such that there can be no will in the complete absence of any and all understanding.

And this perspective, in a way, then brings to mind Viktor Frankl’s “Will to Meaning”; here, in the sense of intending ever-greater (nonquantitative) magnitudes of what I’ve here tentatively termed one’s intellect as “proto-understanding” … via which one understands, and in this one sense knows; to include a yet awaiting potential understanding of the world, or reality, or even of being itself.

To bring this back to the thread’s subject, when construed as expressed in my previous post, libertarian free will can then be neither a) random - for, if for no other reason, it will in all cases be intentional - nor can it be b) “causally inevitable” - for the lack of metaphysical constraints (aka, the metaphysical freedom) which strictly applies in regard to what option to choose entails that the option chosen cannot so be causally inevitable.

Libertarian free will, at least when so understood, will thereby necessitate a metaphysics regarding the possibility of determinants which is different from that in which the only two ontically occurring options are either that of a) randomness or b) causal inevitability. Such that the OP’s article, which only allows for these two possibilities, thereby misses the point.

That said, whether libertarian free will ontically occurs and, if so, what the details of such alternative metaphysics which it requires might possibly be, however, are separate issues from that of what the term “libertarian free will” intends to signify.

Javra, what you are saying here is that one can intend something differently when they intend the same thing: it’s internally incoherent. — Bob Ross

That’s not what I said in my post. What I expressed is that one can intend the same distant intent B by choosing a different option toward it, with each option toward the distal intent - say options X, Y, an Z - being its own possible, proximate intention toward the exact same distant intent B which one wants to actualize.

I gave a relatively easy to understand example of this here:

For example, a person wants to travel form A to B; the options cognitively available to the person for so doing are X, Y, and Z; if the person chooses option X as a means of getting to B, they at this moment of choice were metaphysically unconstrained in, and only in, their in fact choosing X rather than Y or Z. Hence, they could have chosen otherwise than they did. This very much assuming that the exact same physical context, the exact same intent to travel from A to B, and the exact same options of X, Y, and Z would occur. — javra

If you want to disagree, please disagree using this example just quoted.

There are two criteria that are used to distinguish between tyrants and sovereigns. One is that they are benevolent, at least in the sense that they try to do what is right. The other is that they are subject to the law. — Ludwig V

Maybe I was overly literal in the words' etymological meaning: with both tyrant and monarch being loose synonyms for despot, i.e. a single ruler with absolute power, in their etymological sense. With that acknowledged:

There of course are exceptions to most every generalization, and I’m by now confident that you will disagree with what I have to say. But with all of humankind’s history to look back on, I don’t find your two criteria indicative of what was and in many an area still is. The mythos of the noncorrupt and benevolent sovereign is much like the mythos that nobility is of noble character. I grant that my knowledge of history is not encyclopedic, but, given the span of human history I know of, most of the time things have not worked out this way.

So I more than greatly doubt your claim that these two criteria distinguish tyrants from sovereigns in practice - if that is indeed what you intended to say. Can you substantiate what you've here expressed beyond references to a) mythoi regarding what sovereignty is and ought to be and b) the potential historical exception that breaks the rule?

Off topic though this might be ...

You already did that when you specified "non-tyrannical", didn't you? — Ludwig V

The point I intended to make is that the British “constitutional monarchy” as it currently stands is not a monarchy proper. To call it a functional monarchy - which as term pretty explicitly specifies a governance under a sole absolute ruler, generally termed a king (far rarer a queen) - is akin to calling today’s Russia a functional democracy. And I hope we can agree that if we start calling a rose “a dog” it yet remains a rose in its characteristics. Hence, a non-tyrannical monarchy being akin to a triangular square, or a married bachelor - this even if the “sole absolute ruler” is taken to be benevolent (by some of his/her subjects at least).

You already did that when you specified "non-tyrannical", didn't you?
You are looking at it through the wrong lens. The elected Government is a buffer, taking the risk of popular unpopularity and taking the rap when the populace want a change of Government. In exchange, the monarchy gets security and lots and lots of influence and money - oh, and avoids all the boring part of running the country.
The people are enabled to get rid of unpopular rulers without a revolution.
Managed democracy. Perfect. What's not to like? — Ludwig V

I’m not going to say this is the way it actually is - don’t know enough about the situation to know - but, given the way you so far put things, it all sounds a bit too much like freeloading to me. That might be something not to like.

patterners example was about determinism. — flannel jesus

May I be corrected if wrong, but it was about whether one really has a choice in what one chooses. Again, if one does, then liberarain free will holds, irrespective of how it's metaphysically accounted for. If one doesn't, then back to everything being causally inevitable (or else everything being causally inevitable save for when it's sprinkled with a bit or randomness).

But I really am running short on time at the current moment.

does that answer your question? — flannel jesus

Not exactly.

My concern in just answering directly is that I'm not confident I understand what you mean. If you played ball with the rewind test, I would perhaps have been able to figure out what you mean, but without that I feel like I'm just guessing at what you mean. — flannel jesus

gives a good example. I'll let others take over for now.

The difference between indeterminism and determinism is, given the exact same conditions, with determinism you get the exact same result every time. With indeterminism you don't. That's what this rewind test is all about.

So when you say "could in fact choose", I'm trying to figure out if you mean like in an indeterministic way, or if you mean some other way. — flannel jesus

You're in many a way placing the cart before the horse. If one can choose any of the two options via one's own volition, that is termed liberatrian free will. If this belief that one can is only illusory, that is then determinism in the sense of "everything is causally inevitable" - be it compatibilist or nor. Each will in turn require its own metaphysical account for how it operates. With these being all over the place.

There are other ways of defining determinism and indeterminism. But using the definitions you've just given, quite plainly, libertairan free will shall need to adopt some variant of indeterminism, i.e., some variant which specifies that not everything is causally inevitable - such that given the same physical context, the same intent, and the same options (these being the conditions) different options can be chosen (the option chosen then being the result, such that different results are then possible - but certainly not necessary).

If you're the god of some universe, and you want to check if someone "in reality has a choice between the two", how would you check that if not doing the rewind test? — flannel jesus

Why "god" and not a "brain-in-vat dragon"? It has nothing to do with god, nor with the omniscience omnipotence I take it you're here addressing.

What does it mean to "in reality have a choice between the two" though? — flannel jesus

It means that you could in fact choose either of the two options of your own volition. This in contrast to such presumption being in reality only an illusory emotion / sentiment regarding your ability to do so.

That's what you mean by "allows me to have chosen differently", right? — flannel jesus

Nor really. It has nothing to do with rewinding time, and certainly has nothing to do with any god. Assume your right now have two options of either replying or of not replying. In this very act of choice-making, can you of your own volition (which would preclude the outcome being random) choose either of the two options? Or are you causally determined to choose one option such that you in reality have no true choice between the two?

I call all that crap free will. — flannel jesus

Can you be explicit on whether or not "all that crap" allows for you having chosen differently than what you do or else did?

If we do some rewind experiment, — flannel jesus

For the record, it has nothing to do with rewinding time. (It has to do which what is and is not possible at any juncture of choice-making. which as event always occurs in the present, and not in the past. If one can chose differently than what one ends up doing at any present juncture of choice making, then one could have chosen differently at any past juncture of choice-making.)

But I didn't call that "free will" at any point. — flannel jesus

I thought you implicitly did. But ok, you didn't. What then does this "free will" term signify to you?

I'm getting headaches again. So I'll stop.

I don't think so. Do you think so? — flannel jesus

Can you clarify what you're here addressing. As a reminder, what I was addressing is in relation to what you expressed here:

IF there's quantum randomness, genuine randomness, then probably. — flannel jesus

It doesn't Account for it. It's just there. It exists. — flannel jesus

Than why did you just specify the possibility of free will thus defined as being contingent on "genuine randomness"?

IF there's quantum randomness, genuine randomness, then probably. — flannel jesus

Unless one introduces some form of a hybrid event in one's metaphysics, I still don't get how randomness can account for any notion of free will. But thanks for the answer. :up:

De Broglie–Bohm interpretation can simply address this paradox as you can find it here. — MoK

Granted. Bohm does have a lot of interesting things to say.

It's an implementation detail that doesn't give us or deny us free will. — flannel jesus

As a reminder, do you believe that you could have chosen otherwise at an past juncture of choice-making (i.e., at any juncture in which you decided upon an option)?

So I don't necessarily think any *single event* is hybrid at that detailed level of description, no. Maybe it is, idk, I'm agnostic. — flannel jesus

Got it. I'm still curious though: What then would be your gut feeling regarding this in terms of free will?

The wave function does not collapse randomly. It just collapses when a measurement is done on the system. — MoK

If you're not yet familiar with this, the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment gets extremely interesting.

Nothing conclusive about it in this regard, but - from my last readings regarding it - it to me so far illustrates that the measurement by which collapse occurs might well be pivoted upon observers as conscious beings. But I grant that's debatable.

At any rate, its an interesting QM experiment that's been replicated many times.

The Schrödinger equation evolves the wave function deterministically, and then at some moment it collapses the wave function randomly. — flannel jesus

But here your saying that the first is 100% determined and the second is 100% random. Neither then are hybrid events. Where is the hybrid event at?

:up: I agree. Maybe I should have been clearer.

Conceptually, this way of interpreting quantum mechanics is a hybrid. — flannel jesus

OK. But how do you reason this hybrid metaphysics to work? This has direct baring on what you are wanting to claim for free will.

Its a hybrid. It is a process which is in part deterministic and in part random. — flannel jesus

It might come as no surprise that others disagree with this. So how do you rationally conclude this affirmation?

Not that any of this addresses the reasons I've given. But all the same.

-----

Just saw this:

Then why don't accept the De Broglie–Bohm interprertation which is paredox free and determinsitic? — MoK

If it's deterministic, it ain't partly random. :wink: :razz:

OK. Why not?

I really don't understand why "quantum randomness" isn't a solid example of the question at the end of your post. That, to me, would be a hybrid. — flannel jesus

I've already explained why. But (unless I need to give further replies) I'll stop.

No. And how does that address the question you've yet to answer?

i feel like what I said about quantum crap is a good example, no? — flannel jesus

No. First off because it addresses hypotheses regarding physics at a quantum level which have in no way been evidenced to directly influence, much less determine, the choices that we as conscious beings make. Secondly, this issue is one of sheer metaphysical possibilities rather than about physical data with nebulous explanations.

So, again, what to you would a hybrid between 1) a determined event and 2) a random event be?

When you come to a fork in a raging river, if you don't make a conscious (responsible) choice, the river will make it for you. :cool: — Gnomon

The question was about that conscious choice, and not about whether rivers make decisions. But I guess you're not taking this seriously. Oh well.

Because the options aren't 100% determinism and 100% randomness. — flannel jesus

To my surprise, I fully agree with this statement as written. (You might recall that in the other thread I used the term "semi-determined" or something to the like, which signifies just this.) But I doubt we agree on what the statement entails.

So what to you is hybrid between determined and random? Or are all events either 100% determined or 100% random when you get down into nitty gritty?

We can just ignore that edge case. — flannel jesus

OK. Then, a compatibilist will necessarily believe in the reality of some form or other of free will. If so, to reinforce 's comment, how can free will be stated to be real if the act of deciding is of itself random?

Absolute Determinism would be one-damn-thing-after-another. Randomness is non-linear, so there are forks in the path. Those forks are opportunities for Choice. If there is an option, you may be forced to choose by pressure from the past, but left vs right would be a "free" choice. :joke: — Gnomon

You've explained options via randomness, but not the choice between options which is taken. How can randomness account for the very act of deciding while yet accounting for one's responsibility in light of the decision made?

How is this not playing footloose with definitions derived from a word's common use? One can entertain compatibilism but cannot oneself be a compatibilist if one denies compatibilism's validity, as in the validity that free will occurs and is compatible with the likewise occurring reality that everything is in one way or another determined.

Can we at least agree that there can be no compatibilism if free will is denied regardless of how free will is defined?

I could probably be persuaded otherwise on some weird technicality — flannel jesus

What technicality could that possibly be?

Please read the op and see that I have written the same.
The democratic city-states fought well, but the were just too small in comparison with the huge Persian Empire. This is explained that before inventing the printing press, only small territories could have a democratic government. And again, this is the same thing as the on I mentioned in the op. — Linkey

I missed that in the OP.

My main point in addressing Ancient Athens was that a democracy can engage in war just fine. Athens as democracy did great in battles until the Peloponnesian war - in which Athens became largely outnumbered due to the Persian empire assisting Sparta against Athens. But this is a case of sheer numbers rather than ability to engage in war effectively, to my best understanding at least.

Maybe more importantly: Are you suggesting that dictatorships are necessarily more stable than democracies when it comes to large populaces?

Just to check: We do agree that compatibilism entails the reality of free will, right?

If the world has a little bit of randomness, that doesn't necessarily destroy the causality one needs to enact one's will. So that should be the answer to your first two questions, right? — flannel jesus

No. It's not an answer to the first question. The first question regarded what a "random free will" can possibly signify, and if the idea of such a random free will is at all viable. It did not address the workings of the world, but instead addressed what free will can and cannot possibly be.

Please re-read the first question again.

Can you explain what part of my answer feels like an ego-battle to you? — flannel jesus

Sure. Here were my two questions:

How can the stance of "compatibilism" be compatible with randomness? In other words, if one's actions of will are random, how then can one be stated to have free will?

If it can't, and if there is no other option than that of reality being "causally inevitable" or else random, doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable? — javra

Here was your reply which you insist answered the questions:

No.

Incompatibilists say "determinism destroys free will". Compatibilists simply say "determinism doesn't destroy free will". They're not (all) saying "and that means determinism is necessarily the case" or "indeterminism destroys free will".

Just one simple thing: determinism doesn't destroy free will.

Basically, imagine I have a snow globe in my left hand and a snow globe in my right hand - in each snow globe a little handheld universe. Suppose I know the one in my left hand is indeterministic, and the one in my right hand, while looking at a surface level pretty much just like the left one, is deterministic. An incompatibilist would say "free will may exist in the left globe but not the right", a compatibilist would say "free will may exist in both". — flannel jesus

For starters, my two questions are such that the second hinges on the answer to the first. You did not answer the first. You therefore neither answered the second.