1. Motion exists
2. Anything in motion must have been brought into motion by something else
2a. A thing cannot cause itself to move (this needs to be either an assumption or inference from 2 in order for Aristotle to avoid obviously circular argumentation)
3. However, there cannot be an infinite chain of agents causing movement
4. Therefore, there must be something that causes motion which itself is not caused to move. — Mentalusion

Do you believe that any agency can occur in absence of motive(s) for that which the agents perform (think, act, etc.)?

I personally don’t. But then this evokes an issue of motives as driving forces for any agent's performance—and I don’t take motives to be in and of themselves agents but, instead, that which agents intend to manifest.

To my understanding, in Aristotelian causal structures, motives are teleological causes/reasons for motion—i.e., they are part and parcel of Aristotle’s final causes.

So, in this given line of thought, it’s not about an infinite chain of agents but an infinite chain of motives via which agents act.

Now, I’ve only read of Aristotelian metaphysics from secondhand sources—with excerpts from De Anima as exception—so I’m not claiming to go by first-hand knowledge of what Aristotle argued.

Nevertheless, given the reasons aforementioned, Aristotle’s “unmoved mover” then seems to me to be an uncreated fixed motive that either encapsulates or else results in all other motives, including those antagonistic to it … this rather than an agent (i.e.., something that engages in [motive-driven] thoughts).

I’ll certainly not argue against those who hold first-hand knowledge of Aristotle’s metaphysics, but this is how I’ve so far interpreted Aristotle’s position.

Insert name in @name. — Wallows

:smile: Just saw that. Cool

Suppose we have a memory of something.

Ontologically speaking, where does that memory refer to? — Wallows

How about this approach (I find it consistent with what Mentalusion is saying):

Memory is the (re-)experiencing of a previously obtained experience. The latter can either be of the external world or of internal cognitive givens (e.g., dreams, or else formerly obtained ideas). Hence, memories refer to previously obtained experiences.

-----

BTW, how do you guys insert the link of “@username”?

This subject reminds me of something that likewise hits very close to home, given the times we live in: to be tolerant toward intolerance is to eliminate tolerance from society. A complex issue to me.

As to civility when attacked, two quotes that come to mind which I find merit in as ideals to be aspired toward:

“A gentleman [i.e. a civil person] will walk but never run” … From a song by Sting: “Englishmen in New York”. Walking away from a conflict to me implies self-control that is also conveyed to the uncivil attacker, thereby helping to teach the attacker that their aggression was futile in its intentions. So, ok, running is sometimes the best defense, yet in context of the quote, becoming scared in so doing and conveying this fear to the attacker only teaches the attacker that their methods of incivility work … so it reinforces their unjustified aggression.

On the other end of the spectrum, a paraphrase from some likely important person that I can’t now recall:

“If you must kill [to which I’d add: in any way harm] someone, be polite about it.” By “must” I take it that it’s for some overall impartial good—such as that of preventing innocent lives from being killed/harmed by some uncivil individual. Attacking the attacker of one’s children in self-defense would certainly be a good example. By “being polite” I see it as not taking any pleasure form it (for there is guilt involved), not gloating about it, not being willingly cruel, etc. I’m here reminded, for example, of some soldiers who urinated in laughter upon the carcasses of those they killed and then boasted about so doing—this being an impolite/uncivil behavior for the given context of war. And it certainly doesn’t help out the political issues involved.

I am working on Hume's two definitions of causation so I would prefer not to leave Hume out of it completely. — Jamesk

Got it. I don’t know the angle your approaching this topic from, but if this helps out:

There’s a weird paradox that can emerge from Humean causation when it is envisioned to be devoid of all instances of agency (here knowing that Hume himself did sponsor the necessity of agency … I don’t recall that he provided a positive account of how this all works, but I do recall that he concludes that both agency and determinism are equally necessary aspects of the world … it’s been a while though).

The paradox:

Given that each cause is itself the effect of a previous cause, a causal chain can be represented in the following manner:

… e/c – e/c – e/c – e/c … etc. This where “e” stands for “effect” and “c” stands for “cause”.

It doesn’t matter how complex the chain or web of necessarily conjoined instances of e/c becomes. In all instances, it produces a reality devoid of change—for there is no link which is not perfectly determinate and, thereby, immutable. This logical derivation of a perfectly static reality stands in rough parallel to Zeno’s paradoxes.

Discerning what given causes what effect here becomes fully arbitrary and fully contingent on the subjects that so discern, which a) are themselves fully enmeshed into this perfectly changeless reality and, paradoxically, b) cannot experientially be in the absence of change.

Ignoring the awareness of subjects that, here, arbitrarily discern links between causes and effects, what logically results is a changeless space wherein no cause or effect can be validly distinguished—wherein all that is becomes a changeless block with continuous presence devoid of valid instances of causation.

In other words, premising a world of efficient causation devoid of agency can, I think quite validly, result in an objective reality fully devoid of causation.

But this is contrary to our lived reality … everything from personal experience to our scientific enquiries.

If this makes sense and you’re so inclined, feel free to make use of it.

Yes, and in so doing he is limiting himself to efficient causation pertaining to the physically objective world. This being in keeping with the definition of causation he provides. He, for example, addresses billiard balls hitting each other; not the fact that in most instances they are inert in the absence of some human subjects choosing to hit them with a stick.

If this thread is strictly about Hume’s notions of causation, I’ll likely abstain. No biggie.

Not sure how to vote since I agree with Hume in his own context of time and culture but also find his views in many ways outdated.

At any rate, I think it would be proper to first settle on an understanding of what causation is which adequately encompasses all of modern (and ancient) understandings of what it holds the potential to be. This prior to appraising whether or not it is real—and in which ways it might so be.

To give a maybe incomplete list, there’s Aristotle’s four types, there’s the logically conceivable retro-causation, and there are bottom-up and top-down forms of causation (neither of which occur in relation to duration: they each occur at the same instant of time addressed). So yes, Hume’s definition of causation is a bit outdated by modern standards, at least imo.

To my mind, though, all these conceivable forms of causation can be adequately defined via the notion of dependency; hence: When the presence of (set of givens) A (be they entities or processes) is existentially dependent on the presence of (set of givens) B (be these entities or processes), B is the cause to A as effect.

Yes, I’d very much like this curt definition of causation to be questioned for potential flaws; it would help me in better discerning where its deficiencies might be (if any; crossing my fingers here).

Still, tentatively granting this definition of causation, I then would be of the opinion that causation then necessarily exists. Deciphering the details of what causes what being a different matter altogether.

I’m finding myself liking your metaphors.

For what it’s worth, I myself sometimes liken things to a very complex and sometimes Sisyphus-like evolution toward greater self-awareness.

Then why the fuck are you asking anyone else anything at all? — creativesoul

While I don't believe that your comment validly applies to anyone here, I’m guessing it would be for the fuck of it—i.e., so as to facilitate the possibility of orgasmic moments of intellectual insight which can best be obtained via verbal inter-course.

In the words of Depesh Mode: “Pleasure: little treasure”.

So, it would seem that javra's perfect objectivity (impartiality) is, ironically, a form of cultural (collectivist versus individualist) bias. — Galuchat

Here focusing on the term “bias”: (perfect) impartiality can in certain contexts be synonymous to (perfect) fairness. And fairness is what most take to be the principle property of justice. It would be a long stretch to adequately argue this one out, but “fairness” is also commonly taken to entail aesthetics/beauty. Here wanting to say that impartiality is no more a bias than is the drive toward justice, for example. As a hypothesized absolute state of being that is metaphysically determinate, perfect impartiality would then serve as a metaphysical limitation on what can be—this at least as far as our human imaginations can conceive—a conceivable " absolute end-state of being" toward which one either aspires in the here and now in practical manners or else detests and acts against. Yet again, to me bias signifies lack of impartiality. And since none of us are perfectly impartial, we all hold some form of bias. If one so cares to argue, including that bias which aspires for a closer proximity to being devoid of bias.

Is this to say that all things which have awareness also have self awareness (said self awareness vanishing when perfectly impartial awareness is attained)? — Galuchat

This is indeed a very loaded question due to the connotations that self-awareness implicitly presents.

My short answer is “no”.

I’m currently finalizing three logical possibilities of self-awareness; I’ll express these so as to better answer your question. There’s nonreflective self-awareness; this is for all intended purposes a redundant means of addressing the basic constituency of any awareness, no matter how small or undeveloped, for here there is an innate distinction between the point of view concerned as different from that which it regards and interacts with as other. Then there’s conceptual self-awareness; this is when a first-person point of view entertains concepts of itself as a being; the concepts are nevertheless that which the given first person point of view regards and are thereby yet other relative to itself. Then there’s a third type of self-awareness which is what we ordinarily take it to be. I’m still searching for a more adequacy term for it, but am currently using "informed self-awareness". This is when one holds a non-dualistic awareness of what one as a first-person point of view is. For example we can hold a conceptual self-awareness of being “human earthlings” which we can analyze and ascribe truth-values to; in contrast, while reading sci-fi or watching a sci-fi movie, we hold an intrinsic awareness of us so being human earthlings and not, for example, extraterrestrial aliens—this without actively entertaining concepts of so being. [One complexity with this third type is that the empirical sciences evidence that even ants hold such awareness—scratching at blue dots on themselves when in front of a mirror (reference here). So it can either be innate, as I presume it is with ants, or learned via processes such as a habitually entertained conceptual self-awareness , as I hold that most of our human self-awareness is … But this issue aside.]

To then better address the answer, not all living beings will hold the capacity for either conceptual or informed self-awareness. Amoeba and plants I take to be prime examples. However, in general, the greater the intelligence, the greater the quantity and quality of informed self-awareness.

So from where I currently stand, the closer we approach the ideal and metaphysically determinate potential of a perfect impartiality, the greater the quantity, quality, and accuracy of our informed self-awareness becomes. Were it to be possible to actualize, at such juncture this information regarding ourselves as awareness would become literally devoid of limits—though, at the same hypothesized juncture, self as a point of view simultaneously vanishes. Stated more colloquially, our informed self awareness at this hypothesized juncture would become perfect and infinite, thereby entailing that all points of view (which are by nature limited) transcend into a literally selfless awareness. What this would be, or be like, and what would be next, I’ve no idea. I venture that it this unknown regarding a perfect impartiality/fairness/beauty/etc. then leads some—knowingly or unknowingly—to not intend closer proximity to this metaphysical limitation.

I also want to mention that other so termed metaphysical “end-states of awareness” are also conceivable, and are part of what I’m working on. For example, one such conceivable, alternative end-state is that of being an ego of absolute authoritative power over all that is. I hasten to say that to many individuals, but by no means all (the majority?), this is what is addressed by the term “God”: an omnipotent psyche. Other "end-states" are also conceivable. But this is where meta-ethics come into play: there’s a mutually exhaustive list of conceivable alternatives but only one of these can be a metaphysically determinate end-state of being. Because none can be established with epistemic certainty (here skipping the details) there is a choice as to which end-state to pursue. Meanwhile, before any end-state is actualized, competition between these different end-state intentions prevail.

At any rate, no, self-awareness wouldn’t vanish but would instead become without limits, i.e. infinite—the only thing that would dissipate would be the presence of the self as something distinct from something other.

A definition of awareness would be useful, because I cannot determine whether or not "being" is used equivocally (as "subject" obviously is). — Galuchat

I have equivocated in some places for the sake of brevity. I don’t have a definition of awareness other than what can be found in most any dictionary. I can however say that iff the metaphysically determinate reality is that of perfect impartiality, I infer that the only way of finding out what ourselves as egoless awareness is would be by actualizing this end-state. Which again, even if all humans were to so intend at most times in their lives, would yet be a very, very long time into the distant future.

That's a really good analysis, especially the different perspectives on subjectivity, especially that idea of 'dia-subjectivity'. I haven't heard that before, did you devise that terminology? — Wayfarer

:blush: Thanks kindly. I was feeling a bit anxious about the post. Yes, “dia-subjectivity” is a term and concept that I’ve devised.

However I will take issue with the 'perfectly non-subjective'. In my view (which is basically Buddhist in this particular respect) objective and subjective are co-arising or dependent on each other; there is no object without subject, and no subject without object. — Wayfarer

I very much agree with what I've underlined--but am not so certain with the concept of objectivity being a synonym for the presence of objects.

Finding the adequate term that best conveys what is intended, this to a broad number of often different understandings, is difficult for me. To explain my reasoning for the terminology I’ve so far employed:

If you recall form a different thread some time back, I uphold that there are aspects of awareness wherein the object of awareness becomes undifferentiable from the subject of awareness—such that there is no duality between the two. Awareness of one’s own happiness and certitude are easy examples of these. Furthermore, impartiality, which is one sense of objectivity, to me nicely depicts egoless being/awareness. In practical terms—especially when we engage in the empirical sciences and the like—we can either intend to become more objective/impartial or not—but, paradoxically, becoming perfectly impartial/objective would entail the absence of self as a point of view. It would entail a literally selfless presence as being/awareness. And, as a yet different reason for the terminology, when differently addressed, we are all subjects first and foremost not to some king, god, government, etc. but to objectivity itself—from my frame of reference, objectivity as both dia-subjectivity and the metaphysical reality stipulated (upon which dia-subjectivity is reasoned to be contingent). Drastically deviate from objectivity and one’s existence in this world is eliminated. In fact, I find that evolution itself can be pithily expresses as conformity to objectivity over time given haphazard variations. (Here, it is not subjects v. objects but, instead, subjects to objectivity/impartiality as authority.) Lastly, if physical objectivity is dia-subjectivity, then it is the property of being impartially applicable to all beings; so "an object" can be here understood as that whose presence impartially affects all beings.

More metaphysically, I hold the presumption that this state of perfect egoless being is synonymous to Aristotle’s “teleological cause as unmoved mover” And that among numerous other terms and understandings of the same can be, at least potentially, the Buddhist concept of Nirvana—this when addressed from a different cultural vantage. My main point here being that, were this state to in fact be a metaphysically determinate aspect of existence, and were beings to be capable of someday actualizing this state of being in non-hyperbolical ways, then here all sense of subjectivity, of self, would vanish … and one would become perfectly impartial awareness (what I believe Neo-Platonist address by “the One”). Here, as with one’s own awareness of happiness or certainty, no duality could occur between object of awareness and subject of awareness. Yet the end result would be one of perfect impartiality—hence, of perfect objectivity in this sense of the term—wherein subjectivity ceases to be.

I guess I should add in a general way that if such state of being were possible, it would be very, very far away into the distant future. I remember the Dali Lama in a lecture stating that [even he] still has many thousands of lifetimes yet to live before obtaining Nirvana. Be this as it may.

So, if I’ve expressed myself cogently enough: I so far find it easiest to address all this by saying that this metaphysical reality is one of "non-subjective being". The terminology is of course not written in stone, but so far nothing else seems to better express the overall concept via the use of a single term.

Thanks for bringing it up this point of disagreement.

I very much enjoyed the quote and your comments on it, btw. I'm myself dealing with many of the same issues in terms of the philosophy I'm working on.

But it does highlight the way in which the mind 'constructs' or 'creates' reality, in the sense intended by Schopenhauer's 'vorstellung'. — Wayfarer

It is the reflective and creative nature of Idea which I seek to explore. — Fobidium

Currently thinking of Schopenhauer’s Will and Representation, and in attempts to add to the general discussion of awareness and ideas as its creations, here’s a very rough outline of a general concept I’ve been working with.

Tmk, there are four logically possible types of actuality in relation to subjectivity:

1) Intra-subjectivity: That which is exclusively (intra-)personal; e.g., the contents of one’s imagination or of an experienced dream; this attribute in large part demarcates a personal mind.

2) Inter-subjectivity: That which is inter-personal; e.g., cultures, sub-cultures, and languages; these are constructed from a cohort of interacting minds which are in agreement as concerns meaning; more complexly, they include species-specific perceptual interpretations of what is often termed the objective world (e.g., humans’ implicit agreement on what particular things look like; dogs’ implicit agreement what particular things smell like; etc).

3) Dia-subjectivity: That which dia-personal, i.e. that subjective actuality which is equally applicable to all co-existent instantiations of awareness/will in simultaneous ways. Natural laws, the universals of numbers/quantity, causal processes, and the presence of particular objects all serve as examples of what is dia-subjective. While these are all apprehended via subjective faculties of (intra-subjective) minds, they again affect and effect all co-existing instantiations of will/awareness in the same way. As (1) demarcates personal minds, (3) demarcates physical objectivity.

4) Lastly, there’s the logical possibility of a reality that is perfectly non-subjective. Here would be found a metaphysically objective reality. One such possibility is what Aristotelians would term “the primordial final cause as an unmoved mover” and what Neo-Platonists would term, “the One” ... neither of which are about deity/deities.

To keep this brief, while at risk of potential incongruity, it is possible to think of Schopenhauer’s Will and Representation in a stratified manner: (3) is a product of all co-existent instantiations of (1)—via rough analogy, this in the same way that one geometric point is space-less but a multitude of geometric points creates an impartial space within with each point is located; (3) thereby serves as a solidified and perfectly impartial representation of Will/Awareness in general. Yet the solidified causal and natural laws of (3) is also what brings forth all instantiations of (1), from their/our birth to their/our worldly death—here fully including the causal relations between body and mind.

I know quite well that this outline is very far from comprehensive. All the same, in this general approach, the world as idea/representation to me makes more sense than addressing the same in a manner devoid of structure.

It is the reflective and creative nature of Idea which I seek to explore. — Fobidium

It a very interesting topic to me as well. Didn't intend to in any way derail it. Looking forward to reading the conversations. Wanted to clarify this.

In case the point of the analogy was missed, animals and children hold confidence in “what is” just as we adults hold confidence in “what is”. They certainly have not contemplated the issue as much as the typical adult human—and yes, empirically speaking, more intelligent lesser animals given indications of thought, including that of object permanency and of theory of mind … to not address these matters via the evolution of the central nervous system. But then these contemplations we adult humans partake of can sometimes lead to pitfalls instead of improved knowledge.

Anyways, I’m affirming that in the sense of “holding functional confidence in what is”—for lack of better terms—yes, animals and children know reality. This in a worldly, and not metaphysical, way.

Yes, but do calves or children 'know reality'? — Wayfarer

My best reply is a semi-rhetorical question: do adult humans "know reality"? We certainly build constructs to explain what reality is and entails, and they typically are justified to be true beliefs, but given all the disagreements and various inconsistencies, can we affirm which model of reality is actually true without our opinions/biases getting in the way?

But it does highlight the way in which the mind 'constructs' or 'creates' reality, in the sense intended by Schopenhauer's 'vorstellung'. — Wayfarer

I have no issue with this, in and of itself. Yet I do uphold that, first, metaphysically and, secondly, physically, there is/are givens which are not 'created' but is instead are ontically determinate ... here holding notions such as that of "the Good" in mind ... and by no means concepts of a stringent causal determinism.

Nor does it reflect on experience. — Wayfarer

True, no more than grown adults reflect on Kantian categories of experience--until they so contemplate. I'm arguing that both, however, know of reality via a prior notions of what is in the same sense of "innate knowns".



... though, of course, Kantian categories of experience are more metaphysical than a calf's instinctive knowns regarding its worldly context ... But then the calf too would hold the same Kantian categories of experience that humans hold so as to discern things such as distances and "before and afters", I'm thinking.

If a reason is a reason there is no choice, right? — Heiko

A reason can be a cause, a motive (which is basically a teleological cause), or an explanation. What are you addressing by “a reason”? — javra

A reason as such. — Heiko

Then my answer is "no: choice is yet possible" ... with what I've stated in my previous posts as justification for this answer.

All of which we know consciously comes from Ideas built from impressions. — Fobidium

Pointing out that this opinion is very contestable, if not directly contradictory to the nature of experience.

On the one hand, philosophies such as those of Kant have it otherwise. On the other, lesser animals are birthed with a priori notions of reality; e.g., a calf doesn’t struggle to run immediately after birth due to acquired impressions of what is. And so are human infants: e.g., without acknowledgedly crude yet nevertheless preconceived notions of reality, they’d starve to death.

I'd use the term "a prior knowledge" but I don't want to connote "consciously justified, true, belief".

But you have mentally assigned the probabilities based on prior beliefs, and this determines your choice. — Relativist

This conclusion is in direct contradiction to risk taking: from buying lottery tickets to deciding what to do when one falls in love with someone they hardly know and could get badly burnt by … with this list of risks being very long.

Even when in theory everything is composed of infinite causal chains and is thereby perfectly determinate, in practice uncertainties abound and, along with them, indeterminacies in respect to the choices we make. And this irrespective of the amount and quality of reasoning we make use of.

Still, I acknowledge, the issue is at base a metaphysical one, directly pertaining to the existential nature of causation. Belief in a stringent causal determinism will always presuppose the impossibility of any causal process that is not itself a link in one or more infinite chains of efficient causation.



I’ve at times chosen between ice-cream flavors without any deliberation—hence in manners devoid of at least conscious reasoning. The choice was still mine and not any others.

Regarding traveling on a long path or next to a cliff, both getting lost on the path and falling off of the cliff would be detrimental to arriving at C—which is the end that one wants to obtain. Which alternative best facilitates the obtaining of the desired end is then governed by the end pursued.

Where one to want to wander off for the fun of it instead of reaching C, then getting lost on the long path would then become the alternative that best facilitated the wanted end. Etc.

However, because no alternative is known to be better than the rest with epistemic certainty, the uncertainty that results in due measure facilitates an indeterminacy in what one chooses, making the choice directly determined by the will of the agent—this in attempts to best arrive at the intended end.

E.g. maybe descending down the cliff would be a better way of wandering off for the fun of it.

This just expressed view does not however of itself prove the position of freewill here mentioned—for one can always get bogged in the many details of what is and what isn't determined.

Addressing how all aspects of mind are not determinate is also not in keeping with my views. Imo, some aspects of our minds are determinate, some have been acquired via our former choices in life, some are mutable by further choices we make, etc.

What I was addressing is only a perspective on the very activity of choice making. One in which there being a reason, i.e. a motive, for the choice does not in and of itself entail that the choice is thereby fully determinate.

It seems you are giving a modified account of LFW. — Noah Te Stroete

Yes. From today's point of view I am.

I wanted to present the perspective I've mentioned since its uncommon today though very much accordant to positions held by David Hume—who, to my knowledge, was among the first (if not the first) to propose the stance of compatibility between determinism and metaphysically valid free will ... but this clearly not in the form it takes today wherein, as you say, "free will" merely implies acting in non-coerced ways.

A reason can be a cause, a motive (which is basically a teleological cause), or an explanation. What are you addressing by “a reason”?

If you are addressing motives, my previous posts address how motives and choice are compatible.

Why does your agent want to go to C? Did he choose so? Is this just "given"? — Heiko

It’s only a simplified example. The moment we choose our intentions is also when then become to us competing alternatives—themselves governed by other motives that, in this scenario, serve as meta-motives/intentions. This does lead into the question of whether or not there are metaphysical constraints on what we as sentient beings can intend—these then encompassing all of our worldly intentions. I believe that there are—and that, in so being, these metaphysical alternatives are for all intended purposes existentially predetermined. Evidencing this, however, is not an easy thing to do. But, otherwise, I’d imagine it would be turtles all the way down, so to speak.

If you say that the alternative possibility must be under the libertarians control, then what exactly is the libertarian controlling that is not determinative? Why is he choosing Y instead of X? If there's a reason, that reason is determinative. If there's no reason, it's random - and QM indeterminism seems to fit that bill. — Relativist

The reason here is a motive, a motive that governs why one would choose one alternative over the others. But the motive itself is not any of the alternatives, which are instead means toward some end that the motive intends. Unless one can find an epistemic certainty for any alternative being best, all alternatives contemplated will hold likelihoods of being best means of obtaining the given end. The decision of which alternative to pursue, this as resulting effect, is then directly originated from the momentary constituency of the being in question as cause. The choice is then neither random—for it is guided/limited by the motive and the sum of alternatives one is aware of—nor is it determinate, for probabilities (i.e. some measure of uncertainty) are intrinsic to that which one willfully chooses. If no uncertainty in what to do is present, then neither will there be present the activity of making choices between alternatives--one here instead simply does what is deemed best.

For example, imagine a line segment with point A and C at the ends and point B at the center. The agent is at point B and intends to arrive at point C. But there’s an obstacle in the way. The alternative of going to point A is, in this situation, an invalid alternative—so it is rejected by default. Say that what one is left with is whether to go a long distance to the right of the obstacle—where there’s a risk of getting lost—or a short distance to the left of the obstacle—where there’s the danger of falling off of a cliff. What one chooses will be governed by the intention of obtaining the end pursued, but deciding which way is best is of itself, in this case, an effect directly caused by the agent at point B.

No better simple example currently comes to mind. But one result is that one here is metaphysically responsible for the choice one makes—and that the choice is neither random nor determinate.

A non-physicalist compatibilism affirms that a) no choice is possible in the complete absence of preexisting constraints—e.g. intentions and viable alternatives—that determine limitations of what can be and b) that the decision itself is neither determined via infinite chains of causation nor random—but is instead an effect directly originated by the agent.

Well, first, don't equate physicalism or materialism with being a Dennettian. Dennett and that ilk (the Churchlands, for example) are often considered eliminative materialists. Not all materialists are eliminative materialists.

I think that consciousness, and all mental phenomena in general, are physical/material, and no, i don't at all think that consciousness, qualia, etc. are an illusion. (Not to mention that the very idea of an illusion obtaining while not involving consciousness is incoherent.)

Re "explanations," are you talking about verbal (or lets say mathematical etc.) accounts of phenomena? — Terrapin Station

I’m taking a step back from your last post to me.

This isn’t so much to convince as it is an attempt to help you understand why physicalism can be incoherent to certain people, myself included.

Matter—hence, physical stuff—is commonly understood to be devoid of agency. By “agency” I intend the term’s commonly understood meaning of “ability to act on one’s own volition”. Metaphysically speaking, agency is neither randomness nor determinism. A billiard ball hit by another is, for example, therefore commonly understood to not have agency in how it behaves; it doesn’t decide where to go on account of its own volition but, instead, acts in deterministic manners. (By comparison, when humans and other animals are hit they will exhibit agency in their behaviors.) Matter, then, is commonly understood to be inanimate at all times—for it is devoid of agency.

If, on the other hand, one ascribes agency to matter, I then fail to see any metaphysical difference between the physicalism thus defined and the metaphysical position of animism—the latter being somewhat similar to panpsychism, an anima mundi, and so forth. But then, tmk, this would no longer be physicalism as it’s universally understood.

To sum up: Since physicalism proposes that everything is matter, and since matter is understood be devoid of agency, physicalism then upholds the complete absence of agency in the universe.

If physicalism is true, then all our awareness of agency—both personal and as it pertains to others—can only be considered an epiphenomenal illusion resulting from agency-devoid matter; more specifically, from agency-devoid brains.

Yet awareness is of itself inextricably converged with what we deem to be agency. It’s why we term living beings animate rather than inanimate—or a living brain animate and a dead brain inanimate.

As some in fact do argue, if everything is agency-devoid matter, then awareness itself can only be an illusion of animate being produced by inanimate matter—and would in truth not actually exist. This is argued not on grounds of what one is aware of but as an entailment of causal reasoning wherein the premise is that no agency can exist.

Top-down causation, after all, is a succinct means of addressing the agency of the whole over its parts. In this case, awareness’s agency over the structures of its brain; e.g., think in a certain way and one’s synapses will simultaneously, and in due measure, strengthen and become reinforced or decay and eventually vanish—this, obviously, within limits. Compliment this with awareness being itself resultant from bottom-up causation of neural interactions resulting in mind, and one does obtain a rough picture of awareness’s identity to its physical “substrata” of brain, for lack of better terms. Yet, because physicalism precludes the presence of agency, this very bottom-up + top-down approach to brain-mind relations would contradict the position of physicalism—for the bottom-up + top-down approach entails the presence of agency, i.e. of animate being, this rather than of strictly inanimate matter.

I venture that most would agree that it is awareness which ascribes truth values to all these conceptualizations and inferences. In other words, it is awareness that deems one conceptualization to be true and another one false. The faculty of so judging what is true and what is false being itself entwined with the agency of awareness.

Now, if the presence of awareness is an epistemic certainty, and if awareness entails agency (which—while intuitively true—is not that easy to philosophically evidence), this to me indicates that physicalism as just addressed is an erroneous conceptualization of reality.

So the issue here is not one of whether or not the earth beneath our feet is solid/material/physical on account of us perceiving it to so be, but one of how agency (or at least the illusion of agency) can come about if everything were to be agency-devoid matter, this as physicalism upholds.

Otherwise, without the presence of agency, one is for example left with the reality that all animate beings are actually inanimate.

OK, a fair reply. You are right in that I don’t view identity to be in and of itself an explanation. We could go about saying “X is so because it is X” or “X is so just because it is” for pretty much anything. And in most all situations, so doing wouldn’t provide any intellectual satisfaction. On the other hand, pointing to parts of the brain as being responsible for awareness rather than the whole brain doesn’t quite address the issue—namely, one of how one goes from material interactions to awareness as we know it (which, after all, holds agency via its body).

BTW, I agree that it happens, but as of yet stand firm that materialism/physicalism can’t provide for how.

But embarking upon the issue of causation so as to more properly address causal explanations for this would be for me, currently, an issue too expansive to likely settle. For instance, I agree with a few others hereabout that such a thing as top-down causation takes place … and arguing this out would take a lot of time.

As it is, it’s getting a little late for me. It’s been good chatting with you.

Re "explanations," are you talking about verbal (or lets say mathematical etc.) accounts of phenomena? — Terrapin Station

I had causal explanations in mind. You have a brain; its alive; there's this very complex thing called awareness. How?

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I should clarify. How from a physicalist's point of view?

OK, in your view, does physicalism explain the presence of awareness? Or, as it’s more commonly addressed, of consciousness.

I ask because tmk, according to those such as Dennett (cf., Consciousness Explained), physicalism entails that our “sense” of being an awareness/consciousness—which we label in the first person as “I”—is an illusion. Hence not in fact existing.

Here, the theory of physicalism is in contradiction with our so called sense of awareness being real. Yet, as I’ve argued in a recent thread on certainty of thought, in which you’ve posted, it is impossible to rationally doubt one’s own awareness while one is aware.

Hence, the presence of one’s own awareness while one is aware is an epistemic certainty for which one cannot discern any justifiable alternative.

Physicalism has plenty of justifiable alternatives, and is hence only a psychological certainty (for those who are certain of it).

So we have a contradiction between the epistemic certainty that we hold presence as an awareness while we are aware and a psychological certainty that we don’t (in the latter case, because our awareness is nothing but an illusion).

The contradiction then implies that at least one of these positions is false.

Assuming that you can understand what I’m saying, where do you disagree?

Just briefly skimming some of that, it doesn't look like it addresses anything in the vein of "Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness.". Although of course I'm not sure what you're saying in that quote, and I only skimmed the chapter you posted. — Terrapin Station

Hm, if you don’t know what the quote is saying, how would you know that the chapter doesn’t address it? You kind’s lost me with that one.

As it turns out, it doesn’t. It’s only a first chapter, whose topics set up the field, so to speak. I provided it not to derail the thread but to evidence, empirically, that I’m actually busy working on a philosophical shpeel. And not merely making stuff up about so doing.

Yea. It's in the works. But I grant, it doesn't work well in soundbites. But I am tempted. It'll have to do with degrees of certainty, though (none of which will be absolute). — javra


Well I look forward to reading! Make sure to cc my username if/when you get around to it. — John Doe

On second thought ... Just in case you’re somewhat sincere, the “first principles” of the work can be found here: https://michaelwmoiceanu.com/2018/09/02/ch-1-first-principles-certainty-uncertainty-and-doubt/

Don’t know when I’ll get around to putting up more chapters online—it’ll likely be on a dedicated website. This first chapter, however, gives basic explanations of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt—which will then be used to establish conclusions of optimal certainty throughout the work. These topics are nevertheless standalone. I don’t want to seem like I’m BSing, so I’d thought I’d share.

You can PM me if you ever get around to reading it and care to comment.

But back to the thread’s discussion …

Well I look forward to reading! Make sure to cc my username if/when you get around to it. — John Doe

:smile: Cool

I defy you to justify this statement - "Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness" with reasons that don't terminate either in your intuition or in a form of reasons which can be addressed and debated from a materialist perspective. — John Doe

Yea. It's in the works. But I grant, it doesn't work well in soundbites. But I am tempted. It'll have to do with degrees of certainty, though (none of which will be absolute).

What is "matter is substantial" supposed to be saying? — Terrapin Station

I believe that was in reference to my statement. Its saying "matter as sub-stance (that upon which everything is founded)"

"

Okay. But I don't see the fact that physicalism doesn't seem intuitively right to you as a good reason to reject it. — Terrapin Station

No, my intuition has little if anything to do with it. Materialism is self-contradictory to that which appraises its truth: the presence of awareness.

Ok, taken in context of this thread, it was addressing what the "good reason" to question materialism is. I feel certain that other reasons can also be found. But I provided one.

Wait a minute--let's clarify this first: "the usual folk metaphysics" is physicalism re the mind-body issue? — Terrapin Station

I'm not going to get into an argument about what the "usual folk metaphysics" is ... other than to say that most folks take matter to be substantial.

Personally, I don't believe that "the usual folk" could give a rats ass about metaphysics (pardon my English) ... they just care that things work out better for them in their immediate lives. Which does entail the presence of awareness.

If It's "the usual folk metaphysics" and there's supposedly a problem with it, there would need to be a good argument for whatever the problem is supposed to be. — Terrapin Station

One good argument runs along the lines of: Because awareness matters … to all of us … except maybe when we've got our head in the clouds philosophizing about what is real. But matter as substance doesn’t explain the presence of awareness or any of its charms, things like its happiness and suffering, and its ability to cause these same attributes in other instantiations of awareness. The best a physicalist can do is do that faith thing which they often detest theist for: someday it will somehow magically be explained. Thus presenting a good reason to question that “everything is matter”.

I doubt that anyone here in their daily lives can’t colloquially/intuitively differentiate between that which is physical and that which is thoughts—regardless of their philosophies. Yet the affirmation that “all thoughts are composed of matter” has the equally justifiable—and also not perfect—alternative that “all matter is composed of thoughts”. Just that the latter can explain awareness, agency, and the like—especially when adopting a view such as Peirce’s objective idealism—whereas the former can’t.

(Besides which, there’s always the dual-aspect neutral-monism position wherein all stuff is, roughly speaking, basically just information that causally interacts, hence neither matter nor thought but that from which both manifest in their respective forms. Thought I’d trough this one in since it’s my view.)

I don't think we disagree all that much. — Bitter Crank

Yes, in relation to your last post, we don’t disagree on a whole lot. :smile: :up:

I wonder how common the "pleasure in power over" actually is. — Bitter Crank

You’ve never heard of kids burning up ants with magnifying glasses? Without pride in so saying, I’ve done so as a kid, also pulled wings off of flies. I’ve heard of a whole lot worse (cats flung off of roof tops with tails on fire, etc. ... funny to some, not to others). Ones interest in doing so is always entwined with pleasure in holding power over other. In the world I live in bullying hasn’t receded but increased. My point is, power-over is rather prevalent. And often increases in sociopathic ways into adulthood rather than being regretted. One would like to think that it’s receded some since the time of the Colosseum, but it can always come back again if we all were so willing and wanting.

To be honest, I find it naive to believe that power-over is not an endemic aspect of what we are as humans. Though, of course, not the only aspect of our human species.

As to sexuality, sex-slavery—quite often of preadolescents—is on the increase in the West, this based on things I’ve heard and read. But of course accurate data is hard to obtain. Still, are you one to believe that children don’t get abused sexually? If so, we strongly disagree on facts.

As to the me2 movement. I don’t recall ever being pinched in the ass by a stranger while in public. I imagine that if this would have occurred back when my ass might of been worth pinching, at least one of us would have ended up with blood on his face. However, in the world I inhabit, this same power-over behavior toward women is quite common – ass pinching, etc.

BTW. I’ve had more than a few girlfriends who eventually told me that they, at some point in their lives, were or nearly were raped or sexually attacked in public places. Also personally knowing of one close female friend in high school who I later discovered was repeatedly raped during that time. Maybe my secondhand experiences are an anomaly. We’re after all on a philosophy forum where all possibilities can get dragged out ad nausium. But I can say with confidence that I choose to believe that they are not anomalies.

In short, we disagree.

Finding agreement with what you say, I’ll add to it:

I’ve read it that there are two types of power: power-over and power-with.

Power-over is about authoritarian control over that which is existentially divorced from us as selves, other as that which is or holds the potential to be possession, and to be done with as one pleases without any sense of compassion. While we all engage in such form of power in relation to inanimate givens, this form of power can also endow some people with pleasure precisely via its capacity to enslave other beings as puppets—to turn people into objects to be possessed as one would possesses any other inanimate object. A pleasure that increases with increases sensations of absolute control over another being’s very life and death. Whenever we deride, lie, thieve, threaten, and kill with pleasure in so doing, it stems from our gravitation to this type of power.

Power-with is about mutually shared goals. This leading into mutually shared degrees of compassion for the other, wants for the other to be successful, to be pleased, etc. It includes the ideal power relations between leader and willfully led—be this teacher and student, typically male dance leader and typically female dance follower, and, I very much uphold, sex … regardless if it’s lovy dovy or full-blown S&M.

I’m saying this with an implicit understanding that both men and women can engage in power-with behaviors. Just as they both can in their own ways engage in power-over behaviors.

Rape is a product of the pleasure and momentary happiness gained via greater power-over the person raped.

The label of sexual harassment can become less clear—especially in its subtler forms and at the very commencement—become here both forms of power can manifest with the same overall effects: those of romantic overtures. Power-over seeking its power over the other—often teasing out the degree to which it may so accomplish without getting injured. Power-with seeking to discover and encourage the possibility of a power-with relationship with the other. Of course, power-with gets the point when clearly told no. Thereby, I’d say, not being sexual harassment. But power-over just sees this rejection as a personal insult to be retaliated against—this so as better prove to oneself one’s capacities of power-over ... else such individual will often think of themselves as week.

So I agree: sex is about power. But I want to add that not all power takes the form of power-over.

I think 'ego' is incorrect terminology here. An all-perceiving mind/consciousness, perhaps; but not 'ego' which is 'one's sense of oneself'. — Wayfarer

Yes, it was written in haste. I here intended “ego” in what I understand to be its Latin sense. But, even so, I acknowledge this could still become ambiguous more quickly than not. To clarify:

Berkeley supposes some being that perceives and that via this faculty is all-perceiving.

I was alluding to a possible argument that this very concept is self-contradictory. In summation: To perceive is to have a point of view from where perceptions occur, yet the very presence of a point of view would entail that some things are not perceived—thereby precluding the possibility of perceiving everything in a simultaneous and eternal way. Otherwise, devoid of such point of view, omni-perception as a hypothetical could maybe be denoted as consisting of all perception from all co-existent point-of-view-endowed beings simultaneously. Yet Berkeley specifies a being that governs all by perceiving everything as singular point of view. Something that to me is self-contradictory. As it is, I don’t currently care to more formally argue this out. But I do deem it to be a problem with the consistency of Berkeley’s overall paradigm.

Notwithstanding, I agree with your post.