Some thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon language(written or spoken). — creativesoul

Yes.

I still disagree, but I'm starting understand why...I think. To dodge a bit of confusion, I'm reading [absolute, infallible, ontic, ideal, and objective] knowledge to be the same thing. — Cheshire

Yes, or OK, but in all honestly I dislike the term “objective” in this context. Knowledge and truths are held by subjective beings and, therefore, are subjective givens by entailment. Else, you're addressing objectivity in the sense of impartiality. And neither knowledge nor truth need to be infallible in order to be (relatively) impartial.

I disagree that it is a problem to not know when our knowledge infallible, so I don't see any reason to subscribe to the notion we can't have it — Cheshire

Ah.

Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. There are two ways to argue this: one is by lack of evidence to the contrary via which this belief can be falsified—and, here, the onus is on anyone other to provide evidence for any infallible knowledge (this is where evidence that the affirmed known is not perfectly secure form all possible error is provided via illustration of how this given holds some potential to be wrong); the other is by building up an argument from scratch to justify this belief (which would be lengthy … and, if I’m asked to do this, I’ll first point to a likewise lengthy first chapter on demarcations of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt that I currently have online. Again, building up a valid and all-inclusive argument for fallibilism takes some work. Meanwhile there’s the arguments found in Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus, and a few others.)

But in short, you believe that infallible knowledge is possible to obtain; I don’t. We might be at a standstill on account of this disagreement.

But I’ll continue replying as best I can all the same.

I'm reading "operationally" to mean subjectively or non-ideal; Really, the above sounds contradictory even though I'm pretty certain it isn't intended to be read that way. It's the "..so objectively true" that I'm confused about. — Cheshire

You may have not read or else forgotten a number of previous posts in which I’ve defined ontic truth and placed it in contrast to believed truth. Think of it as infallible belief of what is true that, thereby, factually is true belief. Or, alternatively, it might be better for me to instead refer to it as “ideal truth” … though I’ve really wanted to avoid Platonic notions of ideals, maybe this is a better terminology since I’ve already made use of “ideal knowledge” to contrast “operational knowledge”. (Again, I'm still fiddling with proper terms for the concepts.)

In my best review of previous posts: So ideal truth is factually correct correlation/conformity to that ontic given it regards. In contrast, operational truth is an embedded aspect of all beliefs-that. To believe that X is to believe that X is true, that X is not false, mistaken, erroneous, etc.—this with or without conscious conceptualization of the dichotomy between truth and falsity (added this to keep things better aligned with the discussion I’m having with creativesoul).

Any instance of operational truth can well be an instance of ideal truth. Furthermore, all, or at least most, operational truths will be assumed to be ideal truths while held by the bearer.

The fallibilist, however, will maintain that all operational truths are nevertheless fallible—not mistaken, but only hold some potential of maybe being mistaken in their in fact being ideal truths.

Hence, to the fallibilist, where any operational truth, aka belief-that, to in fact be an instance of ideal truth, it then would need to be justifiable due to its correlation / conformity to that which is real / reality at large.

Yet the fallibilist will also affirm that this justification too can only be operational / fallible—and not ideal / infallible.

So, to the fallibilist, when we believe something to be and can furthermore justify our belief we then hold demonstrable knowledge whose strength is directly proportional to the strength of the justification. And until this justification can be infallible—aka, perfectly secure form all possible error—our knowledge can only be fallible.

And again, ideal knowledge is infallible knowledge. To the fallibilist, operational knowledge can only be fallible.

Hence:

1. A person may know something objectively true and objectively know when they know it is objectively true. — Cheshire

Disagree. We may be aware of an ideal truth—else, hold an factually true belief—but we cannot hold an ideal knowledge of this being so (for ideal knowledge requires an infallible justification, i.e. one that is perfectly secure form all possible error).

2. You can not 'subjectively/operationally' know when something is objectively true by definition. — Cheshire

Disagree when the knowledge addressed is fallible and not infallible. Hence, we do fallibly / operationally know when we hold ideal / “objective” truth because, or on grounds that, our belief will be justified as being ideally true. What you’re inserting here is “infallible knowledge”, so that the quoted statement intends to read as follows: You cannot ‘subjectively/operationally’ hold an infallible known concerning when something is objectively true by definition. This rendition I’d agree with, but find it pointless on grounds that infallible knowns are baseless.

I’m guessing some of this will nevertheless yet be at least somewhat confusing, doubtless in part due to my less then perfect expression in a sound-bite post. (I too find the issue to be complex. I'm not happy with my presentation but I don't have the time to reedit it at length. Call it laziness.)

Still, I’ll again draw attention to your belief that infallible epistemic criteria are possible to obtain; in this sense, if I'm correct about this, your beliefs are then those of an infallibilist. Here there is a strong contradiction with my own beliefs, those of fallibilism.

This is the foundational issue that either becomes resolved or else will make all other debates about this matter frivolous. Are infallible epistemic criteria possible?

Because this last question is a complex issue, I’m OK with calling it a draw at this point, but it’s up to you.

P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not... — creativesoul

To some degree this is already so. But, yea, it would be nice.

This notion of "unreflective awareness" allows and/or must admit of a creature being aware of something that it's never thought about. — creativesoul

Yes.

Since you left it at that I guess I’d need to clarify some of my underlying positions at this point. To me awareness entails a good number of things. Among them is that to hold an awareness of X is to trust that X is for the duration one is aware that X is—and, therefore, is to hold a belief that X is for the same timespan. Awareness of, to me, thus entails some form of belief-that. As an example, if I’m visually aware that there is a tree in front of me, I will simultaneously via the same awareness hold a un-thought of belief that the given tree is in front of me. I may then reflect upon this belief, articulate it, or justify it after the fact; still, the basic belief was yet there at the time I saw the tree. This will not be belief about belief, nor will it be consciously active thought in the form of inference or deliberation. Yet it is still belief.

Thought, then, is to me various associations made between beliefs that holds some aim —regardless of whether these beliefs are stored in memory or else are actively experienced.

Yea … it’s not mainstream. But yes, this way I can for example find myself cogently stipulating that a dog can believe that there’s something wrong with 1 + 1 = 1 despite the dog not having in any way thought about it.

So, this has the potential to open up a whole can of worms regarding tidbits from philosophy of mind. I'm hoping not, though.

Will wait for your replies …

I was waiting for your two word post to be somehow enhanced. But seeing that it hasn’t been …

I disagree. — Cheshire

Ok. Noted.

I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability.
— Cheshire

The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: — javra


Well, there's certainly a difference between "nothing ontic" and lacking the knowledge that a thing is ontic. So, the explanation that follows doesn't really fit the claim I'm making here. — Cheshire

I found your statement somewhat ambiguous and was doing my best to cover all the bases, just in case.

The more important part of my reply was this:

Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided. — javra

In other words, your use of knowledge here is that of an absolute, or infallible, knowledge. That "we may not ever know if it is actually ontic"—for example—is only a problem when one believes such infallible knowledge can be had. Come to believe that we cannot hold infallible knowledge in practice for anything, and this problem fully dissolves, for we then can and do fallibly know "if its actually ontic"--and no other form of knowledge is possible.

Enjoi your weekend, my friend. — creativesoul

Cheers, amigo. Good news is I managed to do the more important parts of what I should’ve done. But back to debating.

False analogy. — creativesoul

Well, not by my count. The analogies intended to address non-reflective awareness of certain givens universally applicable to all awareness-endowed beings (I maintain, to all life). Here’s a very relevant, yet controversial, issue (relevant to the issue of awareness): the awareness of self. Self-awareness as it’s typically understood requires thought about thought/belief in the form of a concept of self. Yet the sheer awareness of what is other and what is not-other—and, thereby, an innate and non-reflective awareness of selfhood via which one acts and reacts—is inherent in all life; otherwise, it would starve to death, for one example. What I’m trying to get at is that the same non-reflective awareness of what is other and what is not-other—for simplicity, here strictly concerning dogs—can apply with equal validity to a non-reflective awareness of what is correct and what is erroneous. More on this below.

So the relevant question is...

Can any creature be aware that it is wrong/right about those things without being aware that it has true/false belief about those things?

I think not. — creativesoul

Whereas I, again, think this is the case.

There's a remarkable difference between being right/wrong and being aware of that. Being wrong/right is having true/false belief. Given that, being aware that one is wrong/right is being aware that one has true/false belief. Nothing else suffices. — creativesoul

Addressing only the first sentence, yes, of course; but this only from the point of view of our adult human awareness which, in part, consists of an awareness of our abstracted notion of what the true/false dichotomy requires. But the true/false dichotomy doesn’t exist because we’ve conceptualized it as an abstraction; rather, we’ve conceptualized it as our best map of a pre-existing territory. In this case, roughly expressed, the territory is the potential relations we as sentient beings hold with that which, firstly, is other relative to us as consciousnesses and, secondly—or, even more abstractly—with that which is ontic (here including the very presence of us as consciousnesses). But one does not need to conceptualize what truth and falsity are in order to make this distinction via consciousness/awareness—just as a being does not need to hold an abstracted understanding of selfhood to hold a crude but stanch innate awareness of what is itself and what is other.

A language less creature can form and have true/false belief without being aware of it. It can experience unexpected events(and confusion) as a result. I'm not arguing against the notion of a non-linguistic creature having true/false belief. Thus, I'm agreeing that such a creature can be right/wrong. I'm arguing that such a creature cannot be aware that it is right/wrong without being aware that it has true/false belief. — creativesoul

Here, I’m picking up on the culturally common understanding of awareness as consisting of humans’ awareness of abstractions regarding awareness. Thus, of self-awareness in the sense of being aware of an abstraction regarding awareness as the core of the (conscious) self—or something to this effect. It yet still amounts to a belief about belief(s)—and not to the non-reflective belief itself. Ok, this issue of non-reflective beliefs and acquired complex beliefs which then act as non-reflective beliefs via which we then filter yet other beliefs we're addressing can, of itself, become very complex. Still, I’m trying to clarify that this is not what I’ve previously intended:

Imagine, for example, that to the dog 1 + 1 = 1 just doesn’t feel right whereas 1 + 1 = 2 does. The dog then acts and reacts accordingly (I imagine only on average in relation to this simple arithmetic). The dog here doesn’t need to hold an awareness of the concepts of true and false (nor of the concepts of error and correctitude, for that matter … all of which being abstract thoughts/beliefs which one holds trust for, i.e. believes). Nevertheless the dog will instinctively trust via is awareness-dependent apprehensions of information (i.e. will hold a pre-reflective awareness) that one sum is wrong (and will thereby find it unfavorable) and the other is right (and thereby favorable).

I don't know if I've lost you so far—this regardless of whether or not you agree. I'm sure that if I have you'll let me know. But here's a different example that may be of greater service:

Dogs are relatively good at deceiving. This, again, requires a belief about the beliefs of others when they are being deceived. For willful deception to be at all effective, the dog then must hold a certainty that engaging in behaviors X will (or at least is very likely to) create an erroneous belief in the other which—simultaneously—the deceiving dog apprehends to be an erroneous belief and, therefore, not a correct belief. Wikipedia gives the example of a dog that sits on a treat to hide it till the other leaves the room. I’ve got plenty of anecdotal accounts of my own (e.g., with a very intelligent shepherd dog I had as a kid), but let’s go with the Wikipedia example. The dog must be aware that the treat really is beneath its bum. It must also be aware that by concealing it this way the other will then hold an erroneous belief that there is no treat in the room. Here again, I argue, is required an awareness of error and non-error regarding that which is—an awareness that is not dependent on abstract thoughts/beliefs regarding the concepts of right/wrong, or true/false, or error/non-error, etc. A belief-endowed awareness that can well be non-reflective (though in this case likely does contain some inference and, hence, reflection regarding what's going on in the mind of the other).

I’ll grant your objections to the study that dogs can discern error in 1 + 1 = 1 (thought I yet disagree with them) … but when it comes to dogs’ ability to deceive, here I’m holding fast. I’ve had too many experiences with dogs to deny them this ability.

Is referral to Reason, the Just, The Good or whatever still referral? — Πετροκότσυφας

As in, a) “Reason / the Just / the Good made me do it—so it’s not my fault,” or b) “I did it—and it is therefore my blame/praise—due to my convictions/beliefs regarding Reason / the Just / the Good”?

Phrased this way, it seems self-explanatory to me. (A) pertains to the category of not holding moral agency; (B) pertains to the category of moral agency.

Interesting question, though.

:blush: ... well. Yea, but I make an big effort to prioritize the stuff that ought to be prioritizing right now. So ... not that my word is in any way absolute ... but, I'd like to not reply until after this weekend my time.

Yeah well... without access to the details of the experiment, I cannot know if it's good quality or not. Do you have access to the details? — creativesoul

no, but see my reasoning in what I added/edited in my previous post.

Do you agree with these two claims? — creativesoul

I agree with them, but they're not essential to the issue of recognizing 1 + 1 = 1 to be erroneous/incorrect/wrong/etc. This does require the recognition of error and different quantities.

No, I wasn't taking it personally. Basically giving a shout-out to good quality research in the fields of psychology / cognition.

You've disagreed with the first claim above, which was being used as a premiss. It needs set out so that you can address it's ground, prior to it's being used as a premiss.

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief. — creativesoul

OK

P3 is to me not true/right/correct.

By analogy: I can be aware of time (as can most any lesser mammal, for example) without needing to have an awareness about me having a belief about time. Same with space. Same with quantity and rudimentary arithmetic. Same with the law of noncontradiction. Same with values we term “bad” and “good”. Don’t tell me we humans now have a conclusively definitive understanding of what time, space, mathematics, laws of thought, and the meta-ethical reality of bad/good are … Nevertheless, we now as adults—just as we did as infants—hold an awareness of them … one that does not existentially require a belief/thought about our belief/thought prior to the very awareness being present.

Same type of pre-linguistic, pre-meta-cognitive awareness can be had in relation to error/non-error in manners a priori to an awareness about the belief that one can be erroneous/non-erroneous.

... as evidence, there's again the addressed empirical research into dog intelligence showing that dogs can find 1 +1 = 1 erroneous. I don't have access to the original experiment(s). But, the way I understand and know this ethological research to be, those who express human-like abilities in lesser animals are viciously assaulted by others in related fields. So I'm inferring that where this statement to not be well-justified/grounded, it would never have been published by the APA.

There's a reason why psychology is called a 'soft' science, and an appeal to authority is rather unconvincing, particularly nowadays given the way science is funded... — creativesoul

Having both engaged in independent psychological (cognitive science) experiments (particularly, in the importance of eyes v. mouth in human non-linguistic communication concerning emotions) as well as in a neuroscience lab (experiments on zebra finches learned capacities to recognize and produce song patterns via brain lesion to critical areas in chicks, etc.)—both some twenty years ago—my personal experience illustrates to me that well done psych. research can hold far, far fewer confounding variables and, therefore, far greater statistical integrity than the often termed “hard sciences” of biology/neuroscience. Take it or leave it. They’re nevertheless my experiences.

Do you not even grant these points? — creativesoul

No, actually. But I'm feeling there's often differences with the semantics of the words we're both using. And to get to the bottom of it would most likely be very time consuming.

At any rate, it was nice engaging in this overall debate with you. But I’ll leave it where we’re at. Till the next time. :up:

I would need to see the actual studies and experiments that these conclusions were based upon in order to offer a more informed opinion of the reliability of those conclusions. — creativesoul

Hey, I’m trusting the info based on what I take to be the fact that the information on both sciencedaily and Wikipedia would not be up there were it to be uncorroborated, merely anecdotal, or hearsay. Both sources heavily rely upon peer-review, after all.

In addition, you've now presented a strawman argument on multiple occasions. You've adamantly rejected things that I've not claimed. It is always better to actually present the argument and then clearly express which premisses or conclusions you disagree with and offer some valid objection for that disagreement.

I do not want to get into yet another discussion where one participant is criticizing another's position/argument without first granting the terms. That is the bane of philosophy. — creativesoul

Hm. Whatever I might have either not addressed or, else, poorly represented was unintentional on my part. I’m more than OK with simply agreeing to disagree at this point. I’ll leave it at that.

Very true. Yet, to me at least, the only meaningful distinction is between a Humean Compatibilism and that of Determinism. If determinism, than all agency is an illusion—as is all responsibility. If compatibilism (again, as per Hume and not as a semantically altered version of what yet remains a metaphysical determinism; the latter being our typical modern understanding of the term) then—though we can never choose the alternatives we choose between at any given instance of choice, nor choose the very impetus to make choices—the very act of choosing between the given alternatives at any given time will ontologically be dependent on nothing else but the chooser/agency in a metaphysical self-caused manner—i.e. via a metaphysically valid freewill (which is not the same as indeterminsim when interpreted as ontological randomness due to lack of causal determinism)—thereby leading to a noncontradictory justification for responsibility in the choices one does make ... and to the ontic reality of agency.

---

Edit for greater completion of argument: Freewill does get complicated by influence(s). Tell someone they need to do X to not go to hell but instead be welcomed into heaven and you will have influenced their choice, for example. But, under compatibilism, their choice will yet remain their responsibility—together with their choice to believe these notions of hell and heaven to be BS and the person to be a malevolent manipulator, for example. Influence upon some choice does not amount to a causal determination of what will be chosen. Alternatively: holding a gun to someone's head will strongly influence their choice, but it will not causally determine it.

---

But for the determinist, of course we’ve been predetermined to endlessly debate free will v. determinism; agency is an illusion, we’re all predetermined automata, and anything we do, believe, will, etc. is part of a fully deterministic whole. Talking about “living within an illusion” philosophies … this is it.

To answer all relevant points in all your posts would require a very long essay. I’ll try to focus attention of issues of belief and thought in non-linguistic lesser animals.

A sure sign that we've gotten something wrong here - when discussing non linguistic thought and belief - is if and when it is too complicated. Simply put, non linguistic thought and belief cannot be that complicated. — creativesoul

You’re forgetting the mind is a very complex thing. It includes, for example, unconscious processes that always effect, affect, entwine with, and bring about the consciousness’s form. And we do not hold conscious awareness of all our beliefs at any given time. At any given time, most of our beliefs are unconsciously held—staying there till they're brought up into conscious awareness for purposes of deliberation. And the assumption that non-linguistic thought and belief is somehow simple is, to me, very erroneous. I’ll give some data below to better illustrate my point.

I'm talking very specifically - as precisely as possible - about what it takes to become aware of one's own fallibility, which is a much 'cleaner' way to say "become aware of one's capacity to be right/wrong". — creativesoul

I’m not talking about a conscious awareness of an abstraction/thought concerning the possibility of being wrong. I’m talking about an innate, inborn, unlearned, not consciously contemplated, Kantian-like (if you will) mental capacity to distinguish the category of right/correct/etc. from the category of wrong/incorrect/etc.

Some data. Taken from https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/08/090810025241.htm

Dogs can also count up to four or five, said Coren. And they have a basic understanding of arithmetic and will notice errors in simple computations, such as 1+1=1 or 1+1=3. — APA

Yes, it’s very rudimentary arithmetic ability. However: Here is found the capacity to discern error in matters of fact—which would not be possible devoid of a complimentary capacity to discern non-error in the same givens. To whatever extent this capacity might be learned, if any, it is not contingent on language use.

I offered an argument for the position I hold. It's been sorely neglected. That argument is based upon something very important. The distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief that the whole of philosophy has neglected to draw and maintain... — creativesoul

You can maybe see how your argument is in contradiction to the data. Your argument's premise that awareness of right/wrong requires thought about thought and belief is faulty; it only requires belief and thought (without requiring thought about either).

Uncertainty is the mechanism. It is fear based. — creativesoul

I disagree, but this will be a long argument and relatively tangential to what we're focusing on. Still, dogs can be curious, and curiosity cannot occur when there is full psychological certainty relative to all matters regarded. So curiosity to me requires uncertainty--one that is obviously not fear based. All the same, trying to keep my reply focused ...

So, that's three different elemental constituents that have been identified. Namely... 1.being existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between things, 2.being meaningful, and 3.presupposing it's own correspondence. — creativesoul

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dog_intelligence#Theory_of_mind (its not a long read):

Dogs are relatively good at deceiving others, and this requires that dogs hold a rudimentary theory of mind. This understanding of other minds is not learned via language, nor is it likely to in any way be thoughts about thoughts and beliefs. It is also likely not something learned but something innate, inborn, Kantian-like, etc. that only gets refined via experience. Here there is a belief of what the other will believe when deceived. But it seems obvious to me that this belief of other minds' capacities is not acquired via correlations between things (for it is not held as a result of learning about other minds; puppies will hold such belief of other minds).

Remember that I uphold a difference between innate beliefs (beliefs we're birthed with), learned beliefs (stored in our unconscious after having been acquired till brought up into consciousness), and enactive beliefs (e.g. beliefs we actively deliberate upon consciously). Correlations will be one means of acquiring learned beliefs, but they cannot account for innate beliefs. So I strongly disagree with all beliefs being dependent on correlations in order to manifest.

Thought and belief are indistinguishable at this level. The only difference between the two happens on a metacognitive level. — creativesoul

To me not at all. If all belief (innate, learned, and enactive) is a form of trust for what in fact is, then thought is a process of relating various beliefs--especially those that are innate in less intelligent living beings. The two processes are to me therefore distinct, and their ontological differentiation in lesser beings is not contingent on lesser beings' meta-cognition. (see again the two examples of dog intelligence, neither of which are contingent on a dog's capacity of metacognition).

There's again a lot here that could be disagreed with. So I'll stop here and see where the reply leads to.

If offering an accurate account of nonlinguistic belief by means of art, music, poetry, and/or metaphor qualifies as 'capturing nonlinguistic belief', then I may actually agree... — creativesoul

groovy :smile:

BTW, it's not an ideal time for me to be hanging out on the forum. Can't say when my next reply will be. But I would like to focus on the two empirical data addressed: that of dogs' capacity to discern error in 1 + 1 = 1 and that of dogs' having a very rudimentary theory of mind (more specifically, both belief and thought as regards other minds when these other minds are deceived).

nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor. — Blue Lux

Of course. Very good points. I thing think both me and creativesoul were limiting ourselves to how it might pertain to lesser animals. Feel free to complicate things, though.

(I'm a typo-holic. Can't help it. :roll: )

We differ remarkably regarding what an awareness of being wrong/right requires.

[...]

An awareness for the capacity to be right/wrong requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires the ability to become aware of, isolate/identify, and subsequently further consider one's own pre-existing thought and belief. That requires written language. Thus, an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as an awareness of the capacity to be right/correct requires written language.

A language less creature does not have what it takes to be aware of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken or right/correct. — creativesoul

I find that you’re thinking of right/wrong in too abstract a manner—as only relatively mature humans can do. Yet very young children sense when they do wrong things (cheat, act aggressively, etc.) just as much as when they do good things (overlooking the more fuzzy grey areas). What’s more, so do dogs.

Though I’d like to avoid metaphysical issues, I find I can’t address this properly without eventually mentioning something of metaphysics. To be relatively informal about it, there are metaphysics of sharp and absolute division pertaining to different life forms’ abilities and, on the other side, there are metaphysics of gradations. Doesn’t matter if its Richard Dawkins or many, but not all, Abrahamic fundamentalists, here there is a metaphysical divide between man and beast. I take the latter metaphysical position, one of gradation which, when sufficiently extended, results in sometimes expansive leaps of ability. I also don’t approach things from a physicalist account; pertinent here is that to me there is a non-subjective objectivity at play in reality at large: justness—this just as much as the laws of thought—is to me an aspect of this non-subjective reality which is equally impartial to all discrete givens. Why this is important: in the latter position, we do not learn of justness conceptually in order to sense right and wrong, no more than we learn of formal laws of thought in order to operate via laws of thought. It is not something acquired from language but, instead, it is a universal facet of mind which language expresses, however imperfectly. Here there is no absolute metaphysical division between man and beast; both are, in a very trivial way, equal facets and constituents of nature. It is not that a less intelligent being is metaphysically apart from the laws of thought, or from the universal of justness. It is only that less intelligent beings are in due measure that much less capable of forming abstractions about these universals—which, as metaphysical universals, concretely dwell within all of us (with or without our conscious understanding of them) as innate aspects of what, or who, we are as sentient beings.

So, potential debates galore on this issue—and the issue can sprawl in myriad directions. I’ve highlighted some of my beliefs, though, only to better present my disposition.

A dog doesn’t hold a conscious understanding of “alternatives” regarding some given nor of “right and wrong”. Nevertheless, to the extent that intelligent creatures, dogs included, can become uncertain of givens, they will actively experience competing alternatives which they must choose between so as to resolve the uncertainty. Not all of our uncertainty—as adult humans—consists of consciously appraised alternatives; arguably, most of our uncertainties do not. They instead consist of competing gut-feelings, intuitions which we do not during the even take time to linguistically quality (never mind contemplate), and we as conscious awareness choose, or decide upon, one—thereby forsaking all others once the decision has been (often) unthinkingly made. Arguably, this can easily be complicated by some of these uncertainties taking place in the unconscious mind—such that they bring about states of anxiety, disquiet, of fear … else, equally applicable, states of wonder, curiosity, awe, and sometimes even beauty (such that these states would not occur were we to be fully certain of all relevant aspects of that regarded). I’ll also add that not all forms of uncertainty equate to doubt: e.g., we can be, and most often are, uncertain about any number of future events without in any way doubting them. Yet, if there is uncertainty about something, what other mechanism can be at play other than that of competing alternatives for what in fact is?

I doubt this will resolve the given disagreement, but think of it this way. Were language mandatory for sensations of right/correctitude and wrong/mistakenness, Helen Keller could not then have made any non-stochastic choice in her life during her first seven years (I’ve checked with Wikipedia and Helen only began learning language at about seven-years-old). For she then could not have had any sense of mistakenness v. correctness via which to so make (non-stochastic) choices (I grant that stochastic choices is a contradiction in terms … but since I’m in a bit of rush) … and choices are always made between alternatives.

Well, this better expresses some aspects of my worldview. But I’m skirting around issues which underlie it: those of metaphysics and of philosophy of mind. And I understand if there will be plenty of disagreement throughout the aforementioned.

I’ll likely get around to the rest over the weekend (bit short on time for now).

But to better understand: with the process of thinking in mind: can a thought, of itself, be defined as not necessarily consisting of a consciously understood abstraction (regardless of the degree of abstraction)? For instance, could we settle on correlations between percepts being an act of thinking? This would not require language nor consciously appraised abstractions. Still, the implications of so defining thought would then be fairly expansive (e.g., if an ameba can make correlations between its percepts than it would be engaged in an act of thought while eluding predators (e.g. bigger amebas) or while searching for prey. Amebas can easily be discerned to elude predators and search for prey—which takes a bit of autonomous order within an environmental uncertainty to accomplish—but I mention them because, obviously, they are rather “primitive” lifeforms.). I lean toward a more inclusive understanding/definition of thought and, therefore, thinking—again, favoring the outlook of gradation rather than that of division. But I’d like to know your general position as regards the nature of thought before I reply.

I'm still wrapping my head around your framework... — creativesoul

No problem.

Good question! Lol — Blue Lux

:grin: I know; I know ... :cool:

I disagree here. You've presupposed what needs argued for, and arrived at the realization that the account needs some unaccounted for notion of falsity/mistake. We could do away with the need for a non-linguistic notion of being mistaken. On my view, that is not even possible. Dog's can be uncertain about what may happen as a result of having unexpected consequences result from their actions in past. This doesn't require a non linguistic notion of being mistaken. — creativesoul

I don’t follow. Here, written hastily enough, a more formal argument:

-- Premise 1: If there is uncertainty of any form, there will be uncertainty about something (there is no such thing as a context-devoid, free-floating, uncertainty).
-- Premise 2: If there is uncertainty about something, there will minimally be two competing alternatives regarding that something: that that something is (else should be, or can be done) and that the same something is not (else shouldn’t be, or can’t be done).
-- Premise 3: Uncertainty holds the potential to cease so being.
--Premise 4: The potential of uncertainty being resolved entails the following: Whichever former alternative remains at expense of all others, this now resulting singular possibility/decision will signify that—to the mind of that which was formerly uncertain—all former alternatives other than the possibility which remains where wrong (if addressing something of fact, a belief-that).
-- Premise 5: In order for premise 4 to hold any validity, there must be some sense of wrongness/mistakenness v. rightness/correctness on the part of the mind involved.
-- Conclusion: The presence of uncertainty entails an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as of the capacity to be right/correct as pertains to some specific given.

Please explain what you disagree with and why in the just given generality—so that I may better understand what you have in mind. If you answer than only humans can understand the concepts to any of these words, you’d be completely missing the intended point of the argument—which aims at universals regarding how the mind works (in this case, as pertains to the presence of uncertainty). In which case, without getting into philosophy of mind or that of metaphysics—which I don’t care to do presently—we’d at best end up running in circles, something that I don’t want to do.

If we set out trust in a minimalist fashion, in order to trust without the ability to doubt, we would lose sight of all of the different situations where one deliberately does not doubt — creativesoul

Only if one were to take an either/or approach to it, which I’ve already explained is not my take. To me, we all have innate “minimalist” trust/beliefs and our more complex beliefs are built up on top of them.

But this is all deviating from the issue of belief.

How do you go about conceptualizing non-linguistic belief?

Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is?

BTW, if you’d like to mutually agree to disagree and be done with the discussion, I’d be onboard.

Non-linguistic creatures have no choice but to 'trust' physiological sensory perception. They also 'trust' the correlations, associations, connections drawn between different 'objects' thereof and/or themselves. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content...

There is no ability to doubt it for pre-linguistic creatures. — creativesoul

Even if so, we maybe agree that one does not need to doubt in order to trust? So we may hold beliefs that are justifiable and true without needing to doubt/question ourselves about them, for example.

I think we agree that all (reasonable/justifiable)doubt is belief-based(trust-based on your framework). It seems you've also implied that doubt is dependent upon a creature's awareness of falsity/mistake? — creativesoul

Well, again, for me to believe is to trust that; and a belief is the contents of that which is trusted.

If to doubt is to presume some preestablished certainty as possibly being wrong, then yes, for a creature to doubt (themselves or others) they’d need to be capable of holding some innate understanding of falsity/mistake. I’m thinking of a dog that wants to traverse some narrow bridge, for example, but doubts whether or not it can do it via some sensed fear or anxiety (i.e., holds some trepidation about it). It would need to be aware that there is a possibility of being mistaken in trusting that it could traverse the bridge. Because of this, it would need to hold some notion of falsity/mistake—obviously not linguistic or linguistically conceptual.

No. — creativesoul

Cool.

Can one trust prior to being able to doubt? — creativesoul

My answer is an unequivocal "yes". To doubt one must first hold a trust for that which is accurate, for one example. Since we were talking about non-linguistic creatures, were a dog or a chimp capable of doubting something, it would first need to trust that there is a distinction between what we term right/true/correct and wrong/false/incorrect (they each point to something held in common). Addressed otherwise, doubt always is contingent upon a preexisting certainty, i.e. on something which we trust to be.

Seems to me that a maintained trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality" requires understanding the notion in quotes. — creativesoul

Ah. I can see how that could be inferred. But no. What I want to address is not something which is because it takes the form of a thought which we can manipulate via the act of thinking. I instead was here addressing what to me are inherent aspects of awareness. For example: To be aware of anything, I argue, presupposes a trust that that which one is aware of is as one interprets it to be. [It would be a long list, but, for example: an imagined ghost is trusted to so be imagined; a so called real apparition of a ghost is trusted to be real by those who "see" the ghost. Thoughts and justifications as to what was and was not real that occur after the fact here placed aside; though these too are likewise trusted to be as one apprehends them to be ... and so forth.]

Hence, I was not addressing this as an acquired trust. For example, we instinctively trust that that which we see is as we see it to be; as do animals; we humans can, however, come to no longer trust our eyes in certain situations due learned trust: such as when where sticks get seemingly bent when submerged in water. But this is built up over our innate trust in what we see being as we see it to be. BTW, I gather that some presume human infants acquire all such trust. I disagree with this. As an example: an infant trusts the stimuli of a nipple to be as it anticipates it to be and acts accordingly, without having learned how to do so or consciously holding conceptual understandings of what it's doing and interacting with. Nevertheless, in so doing, it innately trusts its impressions (not very visual, but consisting of many tactile perceptions) to "correspond to reality". Not reality as a conceived of ontology; rather, reality as that which is real.

I'm curious. Do you uphold a "blank slate" notion of mind?

The wisest is who knows that he knows nothing. — Blue Lux

Oh yea, well:

Once there was a man --
Oh, so wise!
In all drink
He detected the bitter,
And in all touch
He found the sting.
At last he cried thus:
"There is nothing --
No life,
No joy,
No pain --
There is nothing save opinion,
And opinion be damned." — Stephen Crane

:razz:

Who wants to be wise, anyway. :smile:

I think that's more like a description of the jhana states of 'neither perception nor non perception' and the like, which are part of the Buddhist path, but not the final aim of it. — Wayfarer

Good to know.

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Edit: Maybe I was too laconic with my answer. As to Nirvana being the end of samsara, I’ve read of this, naturally. I’ve also read of many who claim to have obtained, or actualized, Nirvana … this while still in samsara, still getting hungry/thirsty ever now and then, still hurting occasionally from pains, still getting old and dying. Which to me seem rather hypocritical, if not dishonest—as compared to professing, say, “he’s gained an awareness of what Nirvana is; or of Nirvana as an aim”. But I don’t want to turn the thread into a discussion on what Buddhist notions of Nirvana entail ... a topic on which you're much better versed.

Yes, but is the first person point of view really as it is usually characterized, or is that too a reification of an abstract conceptual understanding? — Janus

I’d go with the latter. In this situation, there something of the Buddhist thought that I rely on (to the extent my interpretations even come close to what was meant): The first person point of view holds real being and therefore is, yet the reified thoughts it very often ascribes to its own being—making itself an entity which, like physical objects, persists in unchanged ways over time—is erroneous. For example, I imagine the Buddhist notion of Nirvana to be the non-temporal instance wherein the first person point of view is no longer “constrained” so to speak by objects of awareness … and, somehow, gains a fully awareness of Being as foundationally being non-dualistic (or something like this). So, “neither is there a unified self nor is there not a unified self” sort of thing.

In this connection and in relation to my discussion with Wayfarer I would say that the notion of "transcendental apperception" is a very sophisticated example of an attenuated analysis founded on the notion of the subject/object divide; and not something experienced prior to it. — Janus

Then I’ve misunderstood some crucial aspect of transcendental apperception. I was previously thinking it was, in part, a way of addressing that process in which experiences of being and being are undifferentiated. Again, that awareness which is not of an object/subject divide but to which objects of awareness pertain. I’ll read on to see what unfolds. Curious to find out.

I would want to say that the unified self—“the first person point of view” as I name it—is not so much before the object/subject divide as it is at the very center of it. Taking the form of subject whenever objects of awareness are apprehended—which is pretty much whenever we’re aware of things other than those that are constituents of us as the unified self/ves (I can't stand the thought of solipsism, and that some entertain it). Words get in the way, but, for example, the moment we think of ourselves being happy/certain we then make this thought an object of our awareness—and at its core is the subject which is happy/certain in manners that do not differentiate the experience from the being which experiences. But this now seems to be somewhat tangential to the issue.

Agree with your analysis. — Wayfarer

Cheers :grin:

So do you think Javra is saying that the unchanging unity of apperception is experientially and/or metaphysically real, as opposed to being merely a formal stipulation? — Janus

Oh, to me the first person point of view is as real as anything else.

Not only physical objects are objects of experience; sensations, pains, emotions, thoughts may also be; in fact they must be objects of experience if we can speak sensibly and truly about them. — Janus

True, but there are certain experiences which do not consist of a first person point of view perceiving, sensing, or understanding something other—other relative to itself as the first person point of view which apprehends percepts, sensations, or understandings/meanings (e.g. abstractions). In these limited set of experiences the object of awareness / subject of awareness divide break down so as to no longer be. These experiences can include those of being happy and of being certain—among others, naturally including unhappiness and uncertainty.

Here it is the “I” which both is happy or certain as a subject of awareness and also, simultaneously, experiences its own happiness or certainty as the objects of its awareness. But, this latter sentence is only a poorly phrased linguistic expression. Experientially (which I intentionally differentiate from our modern understanding of “empirically”), in being happy or certain the object/subject of awareness no longer exists as a dichotomy. And it is this unified awareness of self - always changing in form in some way while likewise always remaining unchanged in being unified - that can be happy or certain which, then, cannot be an object of awareness. Again, experienced happiness or certainty is neither the object nor subject of awareness, while simultaneously being both in an undifferentiated manner while taking the form of :"that which experiences objects of awareness".

Re-expressed, happiness and certainty are examples of experiences which are not objects of awareness but, instead, constitute that which is the subject of awareness which apprehends objects of awareness.

So to say that the unified self which can experience itself to be happy/certain, etc. is itself an object of awareness/experience is a category error—for it is that to which objects of experience (including those of thoughts and imagined objects) pertain which, of itself, can be happy or certain (for example) in its so being.

Wikipedia defines thought as encompassing a “goal oriented flow of ideas and associations that leads to a reality-oriented conclusion.” Granting this definition (imperfect though it might be), whether thought requires language and, if not, when it does and when it doesn’t is, to me, again, ultimately grounded upon metaphysical presuppositions. And I currently do not want to engage in debate over metaphysical presuppositions. If this is too abstract, one issue is that of whether or not thought is teleological. And language to me is at the very least one form of highly developed thought. But, again, I find that answering your questions requires complex, metaphysics-contingent answers—which I’d rather not presently discuss.

Am I somewhat uneducated then? — Posty McPostface

no

:razz: :up:

Then again, no one can be perfectly educated, and the ambition to become better educated is always a good thing for, well, typically, at least those individuals that are educated.

Two things to assist in your reply. (I probably won't be around for a day or two)

I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability. — Cheshire

The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: it is ontic that there is nothing ontic; thereby concluding in both A and not-A at the same time and in the same way. If we allow for one logical contradiction, such as this one, to be valid/just then it would lead into a type of ubiquitous unintelligibility—for anything could then potentially only be valid only if logically contradictory. We are therefore stuck with the law of noncontradiction for as long as we want anything to remain intelligible to us. Thereby necessitating that we mandatorily accept that there in fact is something ontic. This too is not infallible, but I propose it is not falsifiable either. (Having read up on it some, I’m not big on dialetheism for this reason—which is upheld due to a lack of justification for the law of noncontradiction.)

So we then can "unfalsifiedly" know that something ontic is. But as to the details, such as in our knowledge of what is ontic being accurate, yes: we remain fallible with sometimes lesser degrees of certainty. Still, again, this does not entail that we are thereby wrong.

Simply put, objective truth may be possible, but knowing when it occurs might not be. — Cheshire

Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided. (It’s a bit of a quantum leap, I imagine, between the assumption that we can hold absolute/ideal/objective/infallible/indubitable/etc. knowledge (for which truth—if not also justification—with the same qualifiers is required) and a justified conviction that such a thing is not, at least presently, possible to obtain for anything whatsoever.*)

Again, we cannot infallibly know anything. Be we can and do fallibly know very much--some of which, such as 1 + 1 = 2, is currently unfalsifiable by any means we can currently think of.

I mentioned these two points, in part, because your stances seem to me to present a kind of slippery slope toward Pyrrhonianism. This is where, roughly expressed, it is deemed warranted to not hold any beliefs due to all epistemological criteria being fallible. But then, if so held, the very act of debating would be a bit hypocritical.

------

* In thinking of a possible criticism for what I've stated: Instead of something along the lines of "I know that I know nothing", replace with, "I/we fallibly know that I/we infallibly know nothing".

Rational justification doesn't imply infallibility, so falling short of infallibility does not leave a thing unjustified. — Cheshire

But of course.

And here lies the issue I have and repeat. All justification can not be said to be sufficient based on the criteria of any given audience. Can it appear as such? certainly, but this is no fault of the concept of justification. An argument can't said to be justified because of who is judging it. — Cheshire

Yes and no. But here, to approach the matter from a different angle, we'd start addressing the issue of universals. Justness, or the property of being just, is only found within individual minds; yet, it is impartially applicable to all minds, regardless of what the particular mind might want to make of it. So the the universal of justness is a universal standard by which all judgements, be they rational or irrational, are measured. And the decision to deem something sufficiently justified rests upon the mind(s) concerned.

Though I already know the concept of universals is a big and contentious issue. But this is my take.

BTW, tangentially, I venture that lesser animals do not appraise the world via what we recognize as logical contradictions. If so, than the universals of the law of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle applies to them as well. Again, making such ubiquitous universals technically be ubiquitous universals. Its a supposition, but I find merit in it all the same.

I don't find justification to be the best measuring stick for the quality of knowledge. So, I'm a bit indifferent to how well somethings been justified. I would rather know that it had been criticized and remained unfalsified. — Cheshire

Remaining unfalsified is itself a form of judgment as pertains to justification: the means used to appraise something as unfalsified will themselves be a form of justification. But this aside:

If one upholds that all justification and appraisals of truth are fallible, then by what (rational) means does one discern what is and is not in fact wrong if not via justifications? (an answer here is sincerely wanted)

No, I probably could try to; but I was alluding to the third law of thought. "What is, is." The fact you posses an unknown error in your knowledge is simply a matter of being human subject to error. — Cheshire

The third law of thought is that of the excluded middle, which naturally follows those of identity and noncontradiction. (for technical purposes, this when the qualifier of "in the same way and at the same time" is applied)

More importantly: How does it follow that some given which is liable to error is therefore erroneous?

I'm really just skipping the middle man and suggesting our definition of knowledge falls short of reality. Because either our apprehension of what is true or our justification for what is true will be subject to error so long as we are human. I think we nearly agree. — Cheshire

Here's a crucial point in which we disagree: that our awareness of what is ontic is liable to error does not then entail that there is nothing ontic. Hence, the distinction between operational knowledge and ideal knowledge. Until infallible appraisal of truth and justification can be made, we will not be able to obtain ideal knowledge (there's a caveat to this, but it applies only to one metaphysical given which is itself a-rational: that which just is; and the obtainment of ideal knowledge of it also requires a literal eradication of distinction between itself and all forms of subjectivity ... this only as a hypothetical of what might be possible in principle; its a trite issue but I've mentioned this hypothetical exception for maintained accuracy all the same. Please don't mind this part if it doesn't make sense or apply to your concerns as pertains this thread's issues of knowledge). Again, until then, we only have operational knowledge of what is, which itself is meaningless without the standard of ideal knowledge ... by which it can become potentially falsified.

Hence, until you evidence why the possibility of being wrong about X entails that one is wrong about X, that which we operationally know can well be fully conformant to reality.

If you find yourself disagreeing, then please evidence how fallibility entails the necessary presence of error.

Don't you have to torture the meaning of "justified" in order to maintain this position?" By saying to the satisfaction of its bearers" it seems to erase justification's implied rational characteristics. — Cheshire

Can rational justification be infallible, i.e. perfectly secure form all possible error? I don’t believe it can. This does lead into a major quandary in philosophy, but, if its untrue, can anyone here supply evidence of an infallible justification (e.g., such that all premises and means of justifying are themselves evidenced to be perfectly secure from all possible error)?

Otherwise, it seems to me that all justification will be deemed sufficient for its intended purposes when it satisfies those for which the justification is provided (be it one’s own self or others to which its expressed).

So the issue of how and when knowledge is deemed to be, such as in relation to the examples previously provided, still remains.

But I acknowledge the issues become increasingly more complex the further they become enquired into; to me, it inevitably leads into metaphysical positions concerning various aspects of reasoning, such as those of the three basic laws of thought.

And the result of this trespass is a new variable. The 'Grounding'; which feels nice intuitively, but have we solved a problem here or created one? What does a belief alone mean to us now? The answers given randomly to binary questions, but held without discern-able reason?

No sir, you put justification back where you found it and play with your own toys. — Cheshire

Don’t know if you’ve been keeping track of the conversations on the thread; I added the “grounded” part due to them. For simplicity of argument, however, I’ve no issue with sticking to the concept of “justification” as traditionally understood.

And stop it with the “sir”, mon senior. We’re all brats here, me thinks. :smile: [or maybe this was just you being a brat just like the rest us :razz: ]

Why should you believe that in all the things you know at least one is a mistake? I would maintain you accept it based on the law of identity. — Cheshire

You’d have to explain this better for me to understand. Are you alluding to the law of noncontradiction?

I think there's reason to be certain at least some of them are wrong and by trying to falsify our beliefs we eliminate our errors and our knowledge improves or specifically becomes a better approximation to ideal knowledge. Without this assumption of unknown error we are left guarding beliefs when we should be testing them. It's a subtle, but significant difference in positions. — Cheshire

As stated, I can find this disposition warranted. Nevertheless, what I was attempting to emphasize is that there’s no need to become paranoid about being wrong about any particular upheld known—not until there’s some evidenced reason to start believing it is, or at least might be, wrong. But yes, remaining at least somewhat open to the possibility is part and parcel of the epistemological stance I maintain: fallibilism (or, a specific form of global skepticism that, unlike Cartesian skepticism, is not doubt-contingent).

I cannot be convinced that a language less creature is capable of believing/trusting that the earth beneath it's feet is solid, unless that belief can be formed by virtue of a language-less creature drawing correlations between different things(including but not limited to itself), and all of those things exist in their entirety prior to being part of the creature's correlation. — creativesoul

My more justified answers to your posts are contingent on a number of metaphysical conclusions. I’ll try to do my best to reply without embarking upon these.

Trust to me is itself a process of awareness heavy embedded in metaphysical issues. Trying to define trust in the broadest manner possible while skipping all these, I get roughly this definition: a disposition—be it a) genetically instinctive, b) learned and stored within memory and one’s unconscious, or else c) consciously maintained and utilized—of so called “psychological” (and not epistemic) certainty toward what was, is, or will be.

So:

Suppose an animal which has not acquired a trust that the earth is solid beneath its feet were to walk upon quicksand. Why would it have done this if not for its innate (genetically instinctive) trust that the earth beneath its feet is solid?

I’ll keep this short since there’s a lot here that could be disagreed with; including a philosophy of mind which addresses a) innate, genetically inherited behaviors/dispositions, b) the unconscious were tacit memories and learned behaviors are stored, and c) conscious awareness (with the latter being perpetually interwoven with the two former). Although this isn’t metaphysics, it’s still a rather contentious subject, and my understandings of trust heavily rely upon the overall understanding of mind just addressed.

I’m mainly wanting to see the extent to which there’s common ground so far as concerns understandings of what trust is.

ps.

Here you've invoked the need for trust/belief prior to associations between things. I replace trust/belief with presupposing the existence thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification(s). That would be the presupposition of correspondence to fact/reality inherent to all belief. — creativesoul

To me, this very presupposition you address is one of maintained trust that, namely trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality". And here, I'd uphold this to be an innate (or genetically inherited) trust.

This seems to be an issue of finding meaning in one's life. I suspect it is an issue of not knowing what one wants. So, part of the aim of education should be to identify what a person wants and needs, and try to have them achieve that, within reasonable circumstances. — Posty McPostface

Well, to me that sounds more like the role of a counselor. Good teachers however can wear many hats. Thing is, shoot … I think the best way I can express this is via the parable of the person who teaches the famished other how to fish rather than giving him/her food. Does this make sense?

I think it was Aristotle that I’m now paraphrasing: A good teacher is to be admired more than a parent, for the parent only gives the gift of live, whereas the good teacher gives the gift of living life well.

But, as others have said, this won’t happen by “telling”.

I suspect also, that there's a deeper issue here. We are no longer treated as subjects in academic settings. Instead, we're a bundle of potential utility to the economy, which schools have to realize. — Posty McPostface

Definitely.

--------

I'll be out for a while.

So, in the end, do we feel guilt or shame in getting something for nothing? Guilt is a powerful motivator. — Posty McPostface

Don’t know. Children, I believe, just feel the vanity to it without knowing how to articulate it. Adults, sometimes, learn to believe that getting everything for nothing is the best way to go. And I somehow doubt these adults feel shame or guilt about it—but I do believe they yet feel empty inside.

I want to bring up the self-esteem movement that has grasped American high schools and other educational settings. — Posty McPostface

It’s been going on for a while where I'm at.

What's the deal with that movement? Everyone should get a reward for just being in school or what? Is this what trying to encourage happiness as a goal has resulted in? It's an utter failure in my mind. — Posty McPostface

Because it’s contradictory to our innate sense of merit, to feeling rewarded for successfully overcoming challenges, for doing good, and for being correct in our beliefs. It’s getting everything for nothing. And children sense that this is a vein, or empty, worth.

I could argue there are good intentions behind it—such as in wanting children to not feel worthless—but, from my experiences, it doesn’t work for the reasons just mentioned. In my experience, the hardest thing to teach is a genuine interest in wanting to learn, to gain more knowledge and, possibly, wisdom. This by learning how to question. The good teachers I had knew how to do so—thereby bringing about self-esteem in us as a consequence of our held effort and desire. Not by teaching that we should hold self-esteem so as to learn. Don’t know if this is what other as calling “awesomeness” but it certainly wasn’t about having fun in the classroom. It was about learning, and when there was a mutually pleasant, reciprocal interest on the part of students and teacher(s), the fun then followed.

But since I take it you’re looking for something more concrete, the number one way to making education better? Decrease class sizes. Make it more personal. This can only make things better regardless of the qualities of the teacher(s). There are other factors, such as in selecting for better teachers via better pay that draws in more candidates, but impersonal interactions are always a lot less effective than personal ones.

Ok. I was going by the US and what I know of Europe. Glad to hear, and quite hopeful, that this situation isn’t ubiquitous.

Yea. I was a high-school teacher in Compton once. Spoke from some personal experience. Kids that are intelligent—with a big emphasis on this—but don’t know how to subtract hundreds, don’t know who Hitler or Stalin was, and so on. You’ll note that “too many” is, however, not a blanket statement. That aside, are you upholding that society today is better informed about the world than it was a few decades past?

Yea :smile: . Thought I'd help out a bit by doing my part to keep the thread on topic.

Just saw some similar comments, but since I’m feeling a bit cranky myself:

Uhum. To hell with happiness. You want to be happy go to Disney town until you’re sick and tired of it, then, after your fed up with being happy, go back to class where the teachers teach you (and not “facilitate”) about the world.

Problem is that too many teachers today have their heads stuck up their donkey, have no good education themselves, and don’t give a hoot about children’s welfare—which doesn’t consist in being happy, but in being well-informed. Why do we not all get lobotomized just right so as always be happy till the moment we perish? Whatever your personal answer happens to be, it demonstrates that there’s a lot more to life than constantly feeling oneself to be on cloud nine.

And as compared to today—a time that correlates nicely with economic theories which illustrate that it’s in the interest of profit to have an uninformed/dumb electorate/populace—the 50s and 60s in America (at the very least) was one golden age of education. Because those folk were vastly more informed than we presently are. It only led to things such as increased equality between people of different stripes being institutionalized—activities which did not make the respective practitioners persistently happy, like when being bit by police dogs.

Ok, just wanted to throw that in.

I think I get what others are saying though, happiness in the sense of eudemonia … in which case, never mind all of this.

My reason for presenting it in the way that I did was, largely, to illustrate the difference between justified / well-grounded beliefs (in the latter example) and those that are not (in the first example). Maybe a better example should be used; all the same: In both the before and after versions, the same two basic realities are at play: a cat is out in the yard and satellites are up in the sky. In the before version, though, there is no rational connection between these facts and the held known. In the latter (granted that it’s a very strange cat which only goes outdoors on fully sunny days), the same two facts are now rationally associated with the affirmed known.

The way I’ve asked the question, “if it’s a believed truth that is justified (or warranted) to the satisfaction of its bearers”, then intends to get at more significant examples of knowledge. Such as knowledge of reality being as materialism, or idealism, or Cartesianism affirms it to be. Which, if any, actually knows how reality in fact is? (it could be something apart from these three choices) If it’s asserted that they all in fact know how reality is, then is reality inherently contradictory? Or is knowledge indifferent to truth? And so on … but in all cases, the respective belief-that will be justified/warranted to the satisfaction of its bearers—just that it will not be deemed justified by those of contradictory positions, due to what these latter will perceive as inherent contradictions in the positions addressed (or some other rational fallacy).

I know the aforementioned probably confuses things a bit. But, again, what else can knowledge be if not a belief whose reasons for being are rationally associated and that is in fact true?

Alternatively, isn’t this why so called mad men are so labeled: their explanations for why they believe what they do are not rationally sound?