A few times now, I've awoken with ideas that have come directly from dreams, remembered from the dreams and recognized as useful, I've transferred them into actual useful creative ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yea, dreams are a very interesting field of study I for the most part consider so far unexplored. Freud I think ruined it for a great portion of people; then again, I’m not big on Freud. Many in the field believe that dreams have an important role in the formation of long-term memories*; and, as we all know, lack of sleep can be devastating to the psyche (if not eventually lethal). Though I don’t look upon him (or anyone) as being without faults, I do like certain aspects of Hume’s notion of self as mind. In particular, that of it being a commonwealth (I’ll here skip my partial disagreements with his same stance). When we’re awake, this commonwealth—imo—becomes relatively unified at a conscious level in mostly undifferentiable ways; although there are things such as a conscience or pangs of emotion we sense affecting us that occasionally directly evidence to us the commonwealth that is; but most of this commonwealth enters into what we term the unconscious (again, imo) when we’re awake. But in dreams, the commonwealth becomes apparent to us, taking the form of dreamt entities which often hold their own agency in addition to ideas which we there are exposed to via symbolism. Yea, the nature of dreams is an interesting subject to explore—especially since a significant amount of our novel ideas as humans come from dreams.

I can relate, btw. (wanted to say something in addition to this)

* a link to back up that statement: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/dream-catcher/201602/are-dreams-required-memory

I'm not denying the fact of new representations. For example, a new model of a car is still just a car. A new-born human is just a human. By creativity, I mean generating a distinct concept which can be characterized independently of its source material. This is why I consider most creations as a synthesis. — BrianW

The thought of a hovercraft came to mind. At some last point in history the idea/concept of a hovercraft was not present—though cars, airplanes, and helicopters were (haven’t done my research but I presume something along these lines). Then, right after this period, the idea/concept of a hovercraft became present. A hybrid idea of something between cars and helicopters that then holds the capacity to engage in a hovering sort of flight. As ideas go, it would be, when allegorically expressed, a new species of idea: neither car, nor airplane, nor helicopter.

I’d also like to add that I’m quite certain that our unconscious minds think, and—as an example—in so doing, that they sometimes synthesize concepts just right, subsequent to which the new ideas are kicked up into consciousness, thereby producing eureka moments which we term moments of inspiration of insight.

So this process of creating new ideas is not always—maybe not typically—something which we as conscious egos do ourselves. Come to think of it—if I remember my history right—the theory of relativity was reputedly first conceived during a dream of sleep, this according to Einstein. (If wrong, may I be corrected.) Hence, not by the awoken conscious ego but by the unconscious mind’s thoughts while the total being was sleeping (though dreams are to me a complex subject when it comes to experience and awareness—we as egos are after all aware of our dreams while dreaming).

Currently, it seems to me that you might be asking too much from the notions of creation and creativity. I’m here thinking of the maxim that from nothing comes nothing.

If you don’t intend this maxim, then how would any creation not be accomplished via use of something that previously is/was? [To try to avoid questions regarding metaphysical implications, I for one uphold that the beginning of being is unknowable to us beings, period.]

Perhaps the reason might be that those who piously believed the Laws of Nature reflect the Divine Will may have been led to think that the invariances of nature are indeed deductively certain; it would be illogical for God to contravene the Universal Laws He has created. — Janus

:grin: If this "God" has an ego, an "I", then is it the biggest ego that has ever existed or can exist? Such an, um, egoistic individual would likely want to be believed with deductive certainty, I'm imaging.

Yea, no, I gravitate toward the concept of an egoless consciousness ... ya know, mystical stulf akin to notions such as that of Nirvana. But, as we all know, this at least metaphysical possibility is not something can can be deductively proven.

Eh, against my better judgment, currently finding myself somewhat humorous, I'll post this post anyway.

I had formed the impression, though, that his so-called 'problem of induction' consists in the thought that inductive belief is not rationally driven at all, — Janus

I haven’t read the guy’s works for a long time now, so I admit to being somewhat fuzzy on the details. As to the problem of induction which he’s renowned for introducing, there’s often a difference between what one says (else, intends to convey) and what others interpret as having been said. However, even without rereading his works, I can say with confidence that if Hume didn’t believe in the value of any reasoning whatsoever—if he, for example, thought that even induction was or else led to bullshit—he’d never have spent so much time in writing a massive book that was carefully reasoned out, with thoughts and inferences that by his very own admission were often very taxing on him. Oh, and then also rewrite a summative form of the same content after it was universally booed or ignored by just about everyone. Though all this did eventually irk Kant enough to be interested in philosophy.

Not to overly beat a dead horse, but: It’s my way of trying to succinctly justify my confidence that Hume’s “problem of induction” was not viewed as problem by Hume as far as reasoning (rationality) goes —he after all was a, uhum, fallibilist, at least as I believe Peirce would of phrased it (he wasn’t one to engage in Cartesian-like skeptical hypotheses in search for some holy grail of absolute certainty). Instead, the “problem of induction” is often a problem to those who desire deductively sound conclusions—for it rationally illustrates the problems in obtaining the latter.

I'm referring to ideas and concepts.

Everything we imagine or generate in our minds is a product of an already existing element.
For example, a unicorn - a horse with a horn in the front of its head. Neither the horse nor horn is a new creation. — BrianW

I grant this as minimally being an accurate generality, but believe that when two or more distinct concepts become synthesized this will in and of itself create a new distinct concept—one which is itself other than the parent concepts, so to speak.

To analogize these mental events with more tangibly physical events: two people, via their gametes, will synthesize into an offspring. The baby, throughout the span of its life, will be utterly other in relation to its two biological parents—yet it was only the product of a physiological synthesis between the unique physiologies of the two parents.

As this physical baby is “new to the world” so then can ideas and concepts strictly obtained via the successful synthesis of other ideas and concepts be new to the world. Given this train of reasoning, in so synthesizing, we then engage in acts of creation as pertains to new ideas and concepts.

Hume denies that it is rational to believe there are laws of nature, but he also denies that it is rational to believe that there have been events which circumvent the laws of nature. — Janus

From my remembrance of his writings, he only denies that it is decuctively rational to believe laws of nature. Yet he fully upholds that it is inductively (and I suppose he’d also agree with the more recent concept of “abductively”) rational to believe laws of nature. And he denies the veracity of miracles, i.e. events that do not conform to laws of nature, due to this very stance.

But yes, at the very least back in his days, many took deduction (i.e., arguments proven to be logically sound as well as logically valid) to be the only respectable form of rationality there is.

The most rational way would seem to be to provisionally accept the veracity of accounts of events which are well-documented and more or less universally accepted as having occurred. — Janus

Nicely said.

I greatly doubt that we’ll find common ground. I’ve also lost the desire to further debate this issue. I’m giving a partial reply so as to not be utterly off-putting:

If non-linguistic belief is correlations drawn between different things such that it presupposes its own correspondence to fact/reality then this belief will be acquired, hence learned, via the different things that become correlated. The belief then “comes about”. And unless lesser animals’ beliefs are always fully devoid of error, there must then be a means by which well-grounded beliefs attain this property in their initial formation.

You seem to however insist otherwise.

All belief presupposes it's own correspondence somewhere along the line. Positing belief at the genotype level is to posit belief that is inherently incapable of presupposing it's own correspondence. — creativesoul

No. Evolutionary theory would readily account for this. But I sense you will insist otherwise.

On the ground that any and sensible notions of trust must include - in some fundamental sense - what our everyday notions of trust include. — creativesoul

For the record, the Wiktionary definition is what everyday notions of trust entail. It is a long standing wiki page, after all.

The same grounds as above, and on the ground that that definition inevitably leads to aburd consequences(reductio ad absurdum).

The performance of a vehicle relies on all sorts of different qualities and people. It does not trust. — creativesoul

Next you’ll tell me that a vehicle acts and reacts? No, vehicles lack an agency by which to hold confidence in or reliance upon—something I take to be commonly understood.

That conversation hinges upon what counts as deception. I would deny that the dog deliberately sets out to trick another dog. — creativesoul

The denial or evasive treatment of research findings is not a thing I feel in any way comfortable with. I won’t ask you to specify what you mean by “deliberately”. I don’t know how one could believe that the dog in the Wikipedia example sat on the treat by accident until the other dog left the room. But I’m confident it can be conceptualized this way. Still, I’ll continue trusting research findings that are published by well-reputed peer-review journals, such as the APA (which I've previously linked to).

All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

Yet this does not distinguish thought from belief so as to define what belief is.

Again, I more than likely won’t continue in this debate, believing that it’s ran its course.

Size isn't everything
— unenlightened

Bigger usually is better. — Bitter Crank

According to the Kama Sutra, this is not true. Elephants are better for elephants and rabbits are better for rabbits, usually. I suppose ducks should have been included in all this (with ducks it gets tricky though, size doesn’t really apply to something not had). Just saying.

Firstly, thanks for this reply. I would also like to learn of your views regarding dogs' deception and the nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about.

However, we are talking about belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. Such belief can be reported upon. Our reports will have propositional content. The kind of belief that we're reporting upon cannot. Belief that is not existentially dependent upon language must consist of something other than propositional content, even though our report of it must. All this must be kept in mind when using the belief that approach as a means to take account of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language... — creativesoul

Can you provide, or point to, a concrete example of such belief-that which is not propositional?

This ties into what I address below.

You've actually posited trust/belief at the genotype level of biological complexity. That would require that the content of what's being trusted(belief on your view) is something that exists in it's entirety at that level and can transcend the believer on a physical level through reproduction. That's a big problem for your notion of belief for all sorts of reasons. We could explicate those consequences if you'd like... — creativesoul

For the record, though I too hold an ego, I have no problem in being shown how my beliefs could be improved upon or else how they are wrong.

Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief. — creativesoul

On what grounds do you affirm this?

Example: I see an odd shaped red apple on the table for the first time. I'm not at all familiar with this type of apple. I either trust that it is there as seen, trust that it is not as seen, or trust that both possibilities might be valid; the latter being an instance of uncertainty while the two former cases are instances of certainty. Regardless, all three scenarios are initially experienced by me without without a sense of familiarity, without thought, and without beliefs about beliefs (belief is what we're addressing to begin with, so I'm assuming you were here addressing beliefs about beliefs).

I'll posit a facet of trust to make this easier:

Trust: (1) confidence in or reliance on some person or quality. — Wiktionary

From this I extrapolate the following as a cogent facet of trust: To act and/ or react (either physically or mentally such as via intentions) to something being ontic devoid of rationality for the given something in fact being ontic is, in itself, a process of trust. The quality one here has confidence in or reliance on is property of being ontic.

On what grounds would one disagree with this extrapolation?

If the extrapolation is valid, then trust can be non-linguistic, genetically inherited, and does at all times affirm (else, makes firm within the respective mind) that which is true—but this without a necessary conscious understanding of the relation implied by notions of truth as we linguistically express it. Trust's contents, then, form the given belief.

Trusting the content of thought/belief cannot be had if innate fear takes hold of the creature. One cannot trust that which aggravates instinctual/innate fear, at least not one at a language less level. — creativesoul

I thought we weren't addressing belief about belief. Be this as it may:

Innate fear-based mistrust requires a more primary trust; namely a confidence about that which is feared being deserving of fear. It has to do with trust for optimal benefit to self in the face of that which is feared, or mistrusted.

Still, all this is, here, in large part contingent upon the facet of trust which I've explicitly extrapolated above.

I mostly nearly agree. I just prefer to leave the door cracked instead of closed. True, no demonstration may be possible, but this doesn't mean ideal knowledge is impossible - only not demonstrable. — Cheshire

Yea, these are among the more fine tuned issues concerning the matter: but of course fallibilism leaves the proverbial door open. To affirm an infallible knowledge that infallible knowledge is impossible is, of course, a blatant contradiction. One can only fallibly affirm this, if one so cares to.

Gladly, you don't have to prove you have infallible knowledge in order for it to be obtained. I concede I can't prove when or if I obtained infallible knowledge and yet I maintain its possible that I do and do not know it. — Cheshire

To refresh a previous argument of mine, operational knowledge can well be, ontically, not erroneous. Nevertheless, this is not currently possible to prove epistemically.

Are we not somehow agreeing to this? My only issue here is that infallibility to me is an epistemic property. My bad if I didn’t make that explicit previously. Maybe this facet makes a notable difference? If not, then we indeed disagree. Call it a day?

If the strength of my argument rests on my ability to doubt the law of non-contradiction, then I would get a new argument. I'm sorry, my position presupposes logic. — Cheshire

:razz: Well, I never once said anything about doubt. One does not need to doubt the law of noncontradiction, as one example among many, to understand that is not something which can be demonstrated perfectly secure from all possible error. There are strengths of operational knowledge, and the law of noncontradiction is pretty high up there in its strength.

And I'm arguing this is the reason infallible knowledge must possibly exist. What is infallible knowledge, but knowledge without error? — Cheshire

In laconic review of what you have yet to reply to: Operational knowledge cannot be demonstrated to be devoid of all possible error; ideal knowledge is devoid of all possible error, but it is only a conceptual ideal and not that which can be utilized in practice. I've argued why this is so at length in previous posts.

Hence, I view your quoted statement as category error, for infallible knowledge would need to be proven in practice in order to be obtained. And to prove it in practice requires infallible justifications for the given belief in fact being true. Explain why it is not the case if you disagree.

You literally stated it was both perfectly and not perfectly secure. It's a direct contradiction, unless one just chooses to ignore it to maintain a position. — Cheshire

I disagree and will try again:

• Infallible: perfectly secure form all possible error
• Fallible: not perfectly secure form all possible error

“All my beliefs—including this one—are not perfectly secure from all possible error.”

Where is the contradiction?

BTW, just in case: If no contradiction can be discerned by you and me and if this is offered as “proof” of infallibility: Can you prove that for all remaining time no justifiable alternative to what is affirmed will ever be discovered? You'd have to be omniscient to do so. If not, then even this lack of contradiction will remain less then perfectly secure form all possible error—for any justifiable alternative, even those that might exist only in principle, introduces some measure of possible error. And one cannot prove that no justifiable alternatives exist in principle; again, not without being omniscient. ... This even when no justifiable alternatives can be found in practice.

To sum the just stated, one has to be omniscient to have infallible knowledge. (And I uphold that no psyche is capable of omniscience due to its intrinsic duality between self and other.)

In a further argument:

1. Infallible knowledge is possible or not.
2. Premise 1 is infallibly correct.
3. Infallible knowledge is possible. — Cheshire

Are you ready to prove how the law of noncontradiction is perfectly secure from all possible error? If yes, please do so. If you can’t then (1) is not infallible (this as per the aforementioned definitions).

OK, chap.

To first get this out of the way:

Innate beliefs, learned beliefs, metacognitive beliefs, unreflective beliefs...

The number of different kinds of belief is growing quickly.

Remove all of the individual particulars(that which makes them all different from one another) and then set out what it is that they all have in common that makes them all what they are... beliefs... aside - that is - from our just calling them all by the same name... — creativesoul

I've provided definitions for all belief types I've utilized and support. As to defining belief in general, I’ve already done that as well: trust-that. If you have objections to any of my definitions then so state with reasons for your objection. Otherwise, this post of yours to me looks like an example of spin.

You, however, have not provided a single interpretation of what belief is. Describing that a belief about belief is not the belief itself does not define what you mean by belief. Give it a go. What is belief to you?

As per the issue of dogs’ ability to discern errors, you have fully overlooked dogs’ ability to deceive and its implications of discerning errors of belief. I find that the following deserves to be addressed rather than ignored or evaded via spin:

Dogs are relatively good at deceiving. This, again, requires a belief about the beliefs of others when they are being deceived. For willful deception to be at all effective, the dog then must hold a certainty that engaging in behaviors X will (or at least is very likely to) create an erroneous belief in the other which—simultaneously—the deceiving dog apprehends to be an erroneous belief and, therefore, not a correct belief. Wikipedia gives the example of a dog that sits on a treat to hide it till the other leaves the room. I’ve got plenty of anecdotal accounts of my own (e.g., with a very intelligent shepherd dog I had as a kid), but let’s go with the Wikipedia example. The dog must be aware that the treat really is beneath its bum. It must also be aware that by concealing it this way the other will then hold an erroneous belief that there is no treat in the room. Here again, I argue, is required an awareness of error and non-error regarding that which is—an awareness that is not dependent on abstract thoughts/beliefs regarding the concepts of right/wrong, or true/false, or error/non-error, etc. A belief-endowed awareness that can well be non-reflective (though in this case likely does contain some inference and, hence, reflection regarding what's going on in the mind of the other). — javra

I’ve asked you to answer this:

While I'm waiting, please remember to answer this issue:

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not?
— javra — javra


What makes a "learned belief" different than other kinds of belief? More importantly what makes them similar enough to still qualify as belief?

What are you waiting for? — creativesoul

The questions you pose have already been addressed by me in previous posts. Your questions are also purely tangential to the issue at hand: that of whether the property of being "well-grounded" must be arrived at via some form of substantiation, or is a matter of happenstance, or something other?

The issue I've asked you of remains unaddressed.

True faith is mystical union with our Creator, where light from His grace shines onto and off of a true believer's face. It's not proselytizing or philosophical theology. So in that much I agree with you, the god of the philosopher is a stuffed animal. — Modern Conviviality

I’m writing this because you so far strike me as a warm soul and because your comments are of some interest to me. And I’ve wanted to enquire into this matter for some time.

Some background:

Broadly speaking, I find that this is what a good deal of the whole theism v atheism debate is about—with some reservations, here stated vulgarly so as to better make my intended point: Is there an omnipotent creator of everything whose ass I must both politely and sincerely kiss in order to not loose “grace” / be punished or, otherwise, is there no such thing? The latter being a belief that doesn’t like the proverbial bathwater of authoritarian deities/religions and finds that to fully eliminate this wrong the baby must be thrown out as well—the proverbial baby here being any rationally consistent system of thought which is not a soulless materialism/physicalism.

To be fair, as a disclosure, I’m a disbeliever in both Theist and Atheism thus understood. Yup, I uphold both these types of theists and atheists are plain wrong. And this conviction, fully independent of anything else, makes me a very liked guy everywhere I go (My sarcasm, if it’s not clear. No, both hardcore theists and atheist detest any such belief as an abomination to be spit upon—this for gutturally emotive reasons rather than reasoning itself). At any rate, these are my beliefs/non-beliefs laid bare.

To address some concrete examples, here are some philosophers’ notions of divinity: Aristotle’s principle teleological cause as “unmoved mover”, Neo-Platonic notions of the “the One”, Spinoza’s understanding of Nature as being Divinity and vice versa, many an Eastern philosophical notion of, roughly expressed, a perfect (and non-hypocritical) state of non-duality wherein all suffering and impermanence eternally cease, this being what is professed as our ultimate reality … I’ll stop short, but there are other examples to be found.

To be again explicit: None of these reasoning-supported notions of divinity imply or encourage the kissing of the behind pertaining to some absolute and authoritarian psychological power—be this hypothetical psyche one of love, of hate, or of both. I phrased it this way to make clear what I take to be at least one of the typical atheist’s dislikes when it comes to notions of divinity. However, reverence, for example, is something that can well be found in many, if not all, of the philosophical notions of God/divinity … Spinoza’s much included.

I sincerely hope I have not been upsetting with the brash means in which I’ve expressed myself. No need to answer, but, with the aforementioned as background, my earnest questions:

Is the intrinsic lack of a bowing down to a superlative, authoritarian, psychological power that which makes philosophers’ notions of divinity nothing other than “stuffed animals”? Otherwise, do you find reasoning about the nature of reality which, in the process, addresses non-materialistic facets of what is real—aspects which materialists would address as “spiritual” or as reeking of divinity—to be proselytizing? If "no" to both questions, what other motive do you hold for saying that philosophers’ notions of divinity are “stuffed animals”?

Thanks in advance if you decide to reply. I’m just curious.

Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. — javra

Isn't this being put forward as infallible knowledge, because its so well evidenced to render any counter argument baseless and untenable. If so, it proves itself wrong. — Cheshire

If I haven’t mentioned it in a super-explicit form before, I will now: my stated affirmation is itself fallible; i.e., not perfectly secure form all possible error. Here is not addressed “infallible for all practical purposes” or “so close to being infallible that it makes no difference in everyday life”—but, again, technically infallible in its being perfectly secure form all possible error. And again: A fallibilist will fallibly know that he/she holds no infallible knowledge (not even in this affirmation).

Hence, no contradiction, not for the fallibilist. Contradictions only appear when an infallibilist account of knowledge is taken into consideration.

And, as previously discussed by me, just become X is liable to error (i.e., less than perfectly secure from all possible error) does not in any way signify that it is therefore erroneous.

I am many things, but dishonest ain't wunuvem. — creativesoul

Glad to hear. Still, I have no interest in rereading the entire thread on a daily basis to see which newly lengthened posts require my re-reading due to me not being informed of the lengthy additions in a timely manner—and this after I’ve already taken time to reply to them. Ya know? I get it. It was a lack of ideal tact—something which I obviously lack as well. Nevertheless, that and a lot that I’ve addressed and/or asked which has not been addressed in turn presently leaves me wanting to leave our discussions as-is.

The following bears repeating... — creativesoul

Bears repeating, huh?

To alleviate some potential ambiguity: In my experience beliefs can decay just as easily as they can be gained. My former belief that this debate between us has been one of honestly reasoned enquiry has now eroded. On account of this, I will no longer be debating this subject with you.

While I'm waiting, please remember to answer this issue:

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not? — javra

I believe that there is such a thing. I'll go first. As always, we look to set out a minimalist criterion, which when met by some candidate or other, serves as a measure of determination. All things that meet the criterion qualify as being an unreflective belief.

What are your thoughts on such a method? — creativesoul

It strikes me as putting the cart before the horse. Else as tautological and hence as much ado about nothing: "everything this is an unreflective belief as per some definition qualifies as being an unreflective belief per stated definition

If not, explain.

What are your thoughts on such a method? — creativesoul

You’ll have to better explain your stance so that I may better understand “the method” you are proposing.

Are we of a sudden skipping back to the issue of pre-linguistic justification?

This presupposes that belief does not begin already being well-grounded. — creativesoul

With some ambiguity. The post you quoted from was addressing learned beliefs. Hence the issue of how a learned belief becomes well-grounded. What is presupposed is that beliefs—whether innate and genetically inherited via processes of evolution, learned via experience, or actively contemplated—can be wrong.

Innate beliefs can be argued well-grounded due to evolutionary processes upon genotype appearing in phenotype. This is their means for being well-grounded, yet fallible.

Learning is a process that in part makes use of innate beliefs to arrive at learned beliefs.

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not?

Some thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon language(written or spoken). — creativesoul

Yes.

I still disagree, but I'm starting understand why...I think. To dodge a bit of confusion, I'm reading [absolute, infallible, ontic, ideal, and objective] knowledge to be the same thing. — Cheshire

Yes, or OK, but in all honestly I dislike the term “objective” in this context. Knowledge and truths are held by subjective beings and, therefore, are subjective givens by entailment. Else, you're addressing objectivity in the sense of impartiality. And neither knowledge nor truth need to be infallible in order to be (relatively) impartial.

I disagree that it is a problem to not know when our knowledge infallible, so I don't see any reason to subscribe to the notion we can't have it — Cheshire

Ah.

Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. There are two ways to argue this: one is by lack of evidence to the contrary via which this belief can be falsified—and, here, the onus is on anyone other to provide evidence for any infallible knowledge (this is where evidence that the affirmed known is not perfectly secure form all possible error is provided via illustration of how this given holds some potential to be wrong); the other is by building up an argument from scratch to justify this belief (which would be lengthy … and, if I’m asked to do this, I’ll first point to a likewise lengthy first chapter on demarcations of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt that I currently have online. Again, building up a valid and all-inclusive argument for fallibilism takes some work. Meanwhile there’s the arguments found in Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus, and a few others.)

But in short, you believe that infallible knowledge is possible to obtain; I don’t. We might be at a standstill on account of this disagreement.

But I’ll continue replying as best I can all the same.

I'm reading "operationally" to mean subjectively or non-ideal; Really, the above sounds contradictory even though I'm pretty certain it isn't intended to be read that way. It's the "..so objectively true" that I'm confused about. — Cheshire

You may have not read or else forgotten a number of previous posts in which I’ve defined ontic truth and placed it in contrast to believed truth. Think of it as infallible belief of what is true that, thereby, factually is true belief. Or, alternatively, it might be better for me to instead refer to it as “ideal truth” … though I’ve really wanted to avoid Platonic notions of ideals, maybe this is a better terminology since I’ve already made use of “ideal knowledge” to contrast “operational knowledge”. (Again, I'm still fiddling with proper terms for the concepts.)

In my best review of previous posts: So ideal truth is factually correct correlation/conformity to that ontic given it regards. In contrast, operational truth is an embedded aspect of all beliefs-that. To believe that X is to believe that X is true, that X is not false, mistaken, erroneous, etc.—this with or without conscious conceptualization of the dichotomy between truth and falsity (added this to keep things better aligned with the discussion I’m having with creativesoul).

Any instance of operational truth can well be an instance of ideal truth. Furthermore, all, or at least most, operational truths will be assumed to be ideal truths while held by the bearer.

The fallibilist, however, will maintain that all operational truths are nevertheless fallible—not mistaken, but only hold some potential of maybe being mistaken in their in fact being ideal truths.

Hence, to the fallibilist, where any operational truth, aka belief-that, to in fact be an instance of ideal truth, it then would need to be justifiable due to its correlation / conformity to that which is real / reality at large.

Yet the fallibilist will also affirm that this justification too can only be operational / fallible—and not ideal / infallible.

So, to the fallibilist, when we believe something to be and can furthermore justify our belief we then hold demonstrable knowledge whose strength is directly proportional to the strength of the justification. And until this justification can be infallible—aka, perfectly secure form all possible error—our knowledge can only be fallible.

And again, ideal knowledge is infallible knowledge. To the fallibilist, operational knowledge can only be fallible.

Hence:

1. A person may know something objectively true and objectively know when they know it is objectively true. — Cheshire

Disagree. We may be aware of an ideal truth—else, hold an factually true belief—but we cannot hold an ideal knowledge of this being so (for ideal knowledge requires an infallible justification, i.e. one that is perfectly secure form all possible error).

2. You can not 'subjectively/operationally' know when something is objectively true by definition. — Cheshire

Disagree when the knowledge addressed is fallible and not infallible. Hence, we do fallibly / operationally know when we hold ideal / “objective” truth because, or on grounds that, our belief will be justified as being ideally true. What you’re inserting here is “infallible knowledge”, so that the quoted statement intends to read as follows: You cannot ‘subjectively/operationally’ hold an infallible known concerning when something is objectively true by definition. This rendition I’d agree with, but find it pointless on grounds that infallible knowns are baseless.

I’m guessing some of this will nevertheless yet be at least somewhat confusing, doubtless in part due to my less then perfect expression in a sound-bite post. (I too find the issue to be complex. I'm not happy with my presentation but I don't have the time to reedit it at length. Call it laziness.)

Still, I’ll again draw attention to your belief that infallible epistemic criteria are possible to obtain; in this sense, if I'm correct about this, your beliefs are then those of an infallibilist. Here there is a strong contradiction with my own beliefs, those of fallibilism.

This is the foundational issue that either becomes resolved or else will make all other debates about this matter frivolous. Are infallible epistemic criteria possible?

Because this last question is a complex issue, I’m OK with calling it a draw at this point, but it’s up to you.

P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not... — creativesoul

To some degree this is already so. But, yea, it would be nice.

This notion of "unreflective awareness" allows and/or must admit of a creature being aware of something that it's never thought about. — creativesoul

Yes.

Since you left it at that I guess I’d need to clarify some of my underlying positions at this point. To me awareness entails a good number of things. Among them is that to hold an awareness of X is to trust that X is for the duration one is aware that X is—and, therefore, is to hold a belief that X is for the same timespan. Awareness of, to me, thus entails some form of belief-that. As an example, if I’m visually aware that there is a tree in front of me, I will simultaneously via the same awareness hold a un-thought of belief that the given tree is in front of me. I may then reflect upon this belief, articulate it, or justify it after the fact; still, the basic belief was yet there at the time I saw the tree. This will not be belief about belief, nor will it be consciously active thought in the form of inference or deliberation. Yet it is still belief.

Thought, then, is to me various associations made between beliefs that holds some aim —regardless of whether these beliefs are stored in memory or else are actively experienced.

Yea … it’s not mainstream. But yes, this way I can for example find myself cogently stipulating that a dog can believe that there’s something wrong with 1 + 1 = 1 despite the dog not having in any way thought about it.

So, this has the potential to open up a whole can of worms regarding tidbits from philosophy of mind. I'm hoping not, though.

Will wait for your replies …

I was waiting for your two word post to be somehow enhanced. But seeing that it hasn’t been …

I disagree. — Cheshire

Ok. Noted.

I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability.
— Cheshire

The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: — javra


Well, there's certainly a difference between "nothing ontic" and lacking the knowledge that a thing is ontic. So, the explanation that follows doesn't really fit the claim I'm making here. — Cheshire

I found your statement somewhat ambiguous and was doing my best to cover all the bases, just in case.

The more important part of my reply was this:

Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided. — javra

In other words, your use of knowledge here is that of an absolute, or infallible, knowledge. That "we may not ever know if it is actually ontic"—for example—is only a problem when one believes such infallible knowledge can be had. Come to believe that we cannot hold infallible knowledge in practice for anything, and this problem fully dissolves, for we then can and do fallibly know "if its actually ontic"--and no other form of knowledge is possible.

Enjoi your weekend, my friend. — creativesoul

Cheers, amigo. Good news is I managed to do the more important parts of what I should’ve done. But back to debating.

False analogy. — creativesoul

Well, not by my count. The analogies intended to address non-reflective awareness of certain givens universally applicable to all awareness-endowed beings (I maintain, to all life). Here’s a very relevant, yet controversial, issue (relevant to the issue of awareness): the awareness of self. Self-awareness as it’s typically understood requires thought about thought/belief in the form of a concept of self. Yet the sheer awareness of what is other and what is not-other—and, thereby, an innate and non-reflective awareness of selfhood via which one acts and reacts—is inherent in all life; otherwise, it would starve to death, for one example. What I’m trying to get at is that the same non-reflective awareness of what is other and what is not-other—for simplicity, here strictly concerning dogs—can apply with equal validity to a non-reflective awareness of what is correct and what is erroneous. More on this below.

So the relevant question is...

Can any creature be aware that it is wrong/right about those things without being aware that it has true/false belief about those things?

I think not. — creativesoul

Whereas I, again, think this is the case.

There's a remarkable difference between being right/wrong and being aware of that. Being wrong/right is having true/false belief. Given that, being aware that one is wrong/right is being aware that one has true/false belief. Nothing else suffices. — creativesoul

Addressing only the first sentence, yes, of course; but this only from the point of view of our adult human awareness which, in part, consists of an awareness of our abstracted notion of what the true/false dichotomy requires. But the true/false dichotomy doesn’t exist because we’ve conceptualized it as an abstraction; rather, we’ve conceptualized it as our best map of a pre-existing territory. In this case, roughly expressed, the territory is the potential relations we as sentient beings hold with that which, firstly, is other relative to us as consciousnesses and, secondly—or, even more abstractly—with that which is ontic (here including the very presence of us as consciousnesses). But one does not need to conceptualize what truth and falsity are in order to make this distinction via consciousness/awareness—just as a being does not need to hold an abstracted understanding of selfhood to hold a crude but stanch innate awareness of what is itself and what is other.

A language less creature can form and have true/false belief without being aware of it. It can experience unexpected events(and confusion) as a result. I'm not arguing against the notion of a non-linguistic creature having true/false belief. Thus, I'm agreeing that such a creature can be right/wrong. I'm arguing that such a creature cannot be aware that it is right/wrong without being aware that it has true/false belief. — creativesoul

Here, I’m picking up on the culturally common understanding of awareness as consisting of humans’ awareness of abstractions regarding awareness. Thus, of self-awareness in the sense of being aware of an abstraction regarding awareness as the core of the (conscious) self—or something to this effect. It yet still amounts to a belief about belief(s)—and not to the non-reflective belief itself. Ok, this issue of non-reflective beliefs and acquired complex beliefs which then act as non-reflective beliefs via which we then filter yet other beliefs we're addressing can, of itself, become very complex. Still, I’m trying to clarify that this is not what I’ve previously intended:

Imagine, for example, that to the dog 1 + 1 = 1 just doesn’t feel right whereas 1 + 1 = 2 does. The dog then acts and reacts accordingly (I imagine only on average in relation to this simple arithmetic). The dog here doesn’t need to hold an awareness of the concepts of true and false (nor of the concepts of error and correctitude, for that matter … all of which being abstract thoughts/beliefs which one holds trust for, i.e. believes). Nevertheless the dog will instinctively trust via is awareness-dependent apprehensions of information (i.e. will hold a pre-reflective awareness) that one sum is wrong (and will thereby find it unfavorable) and the other is right (and thereby favorable).

I don't know if I've lost you so far—this regardless of whether or not you agree. I'm sure that if I have you'll let me know. But here's a different example that may be of greater service:

Dogs are relatively good at deceiving. This, again, requires a belief about the beliefs of others when they are being deceived. For willful deception to be at all effective, the dog then must hold a certainty that engaging in behaviors X will (or at least is very likely to) create an erroneous belief in the other which—simultaneously—the deceiving dog apprehends to be an erroneous belief and, therefore, not a correct belief. Wikipedia gives the example of a dog that sits on a treat to hide it till the other leaves the room. I’ve got plenty of anecdotal accounts of my own (e.g., with a very intelligent shepherd dog I had as a kid), but let’s go with the Wikipedia example. The dog must be aware that the treat really is beneath its bum. It must also be aware that by concealing it this way the other will then hold an erroneous belief that there is no treat in the room. Here again, I argue, is required an awareness of error and non-error regarding that which is—an awareness that is not dependent on abstract thoughts/beliefs regarding the concepts of right/wrong, or true/false, or error/non-error, etc. A belief-endowed awareness that can well be non-reflective (though in this case likely does contain some inference and, hence, reflection regarding what's going on in the mind of the other).

I’ll grant your objections to the study that dogs can discern error in 1 + 1 = 1 (thought I yet disagree with them) … but when it comes to dogs’ ability to deceive, here I’m holding fast. I’ve had too many experiences with dogs to deny them this ability.

Is referral to Reason, the Just, The Good or whatever still referral? — Πετροκότσυφας

As in, a) “Reason / the Just / the Good made me do it—so it’s not my fault,” or b) “I did it—and it is therefore my blame/praise—due to my convictions/beliefs regarding Reason / the Just / the Good”?

Phrased this way, it seems self-explanatory to me. (A) pertains to the category of not holding moral agency; (B) pertains to the category of moral agency.

Interesting question, though.

:blush: ... well. Yea, but I make an big effort to prioritize the stuff that ought to be prioritizing right now. So ... not that my word is in any way absolute ... but, I'd like to not reply until after this weekend my time.

Yeah well... without access to the details of the experiment, I cannot know if it's good quality or not. Do you have access to the details? — creativesoul

no, but see my reasoning in what I added/edited in my previous post.

Do you agree with these two claims? — creativesoul

I agree with them, but they're not essential to the issue of recognizing 1 + 1 = 1 to be erroneous/incorrect/wrong/etc. This does require the recognition of error and different quantities.

No, I wasn't taking it personally. Basically giving a shout-out to good quality research in the fields of psychology / cognition.

You've disagreed with the first claim above, which was being used as a premiss. It needs set out so that you can address it's ground, prior to it's being used as a premiss.

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief. — creativesoul

OK

P3 is to me not true/right/correct.

By analogy: I can be aware of time (as can most any lesser mammal, for example) without needing to have an awareness about me having a belief about time. Same with space. Same with quantity and rudimentary arithmetic. Same with the law of noncontradiction. Same with values we term “bad” and “good”. Don’t tell me we humans now have a conclusively definitive understanding of what time, space, mathematics, laws of thought, and the meta-ethical reality of bad/good are … Nevertheless, we now as adults—just as we did as infants—hold an awareness of them … one that does not existentially require a belief/thought about our belief/thought prior to the very awareness being present.

Same type of pre-linguistic, pre-meta-cognitive awareness can be had in relation to error/non-error in manners a priori to an awareness about the belief that one can be erroneous/non-erroneous.

... as evidence, there's again the addressed empirical research into dog intelligence showing that dogs can find 1 +1 = 1 erroneous. I don't have access to the original experiment(s). But, the way I understand and know this ethological research to be, those who express human-like abilities in lesser animals are viciously assaulted by others in related fields. So I'm inferring that where this statement to not be well-justified/grounded, it would never have been published by the APA.

There's a reason why psychology is called a 'soft' science, and an appeal to authority is rather unconvincing, particularly nowadays given the way science is funded... — creativesoul

Having both engaged in independent psychological (cognitive science) experiments (particularly, in the importance of eyes v. mouth in human non-linguistic communication concerning emotions) as well as in a neuroscience lab (experiments on zebra finches learned capacities to recognize and produce song patterns via brain lesion to critical areas in chicks, etc.)—both some twenty years ago—my personal experience illustrates to me that well done psych. research can hold far, far fewer confounding variables and, therefore, far greater statistical integrity than the often termed “hard sciences” of biology/neuroscience. Take it or leave it. They’re nevertheless my experiences.

Do you not even grant these points? — creativesoul

No, actually. But I'm feeling there's often differences with the semantics of the words we're both using. And to get to the bottom of it would most likely be very time consuming.

At any rate, it was nice engaging in this overall debate with you. But I’ll leave it where we’re at. Till the next time. :up:

I would need to see the actual studies and experiments that these conclusions were based upon in order to offer a more informed opinion of the reliability of those conclusions. — creativesoul

Hey, I’m trusting the info based on what I take to be the fact that the information on both sciencedaily and Wikipedia would not be up there were it to be uncorroborated, merely anecdotal, or hearsay. Both sources heavily rely upon peer-review, after all.

In addition, you've now presented a strawman argument on multiple occasions. You've adamantly rejected things that I've not claimed. It is always better to actually present the argument and then clearly express which premisses or conclusions you disagree with and offer some valid objection for that disagreement.

I do not want to get into yet another discussion where one participant is criticizing another's position/argument without first granting the terms. That is the bane of philosophy. — creativesoul

Hm. Whatever I might have either not addressed or, else, poorly represented was unintentional on my part. I’m more than OK with simply agreeing to disagree at this point. I’ll leave it at that.

Very true. Yet, to me at least, the only meaningful distinction is between a Humean Compatibilism and that of Determinism. If determinism, than all agency is an illusion—as is all responsibility. If compatibilism (again, as per Hume and not as a semantically altered version of what yet remains a metaphysical determinism; the latter being our typical modern understanding of the term) then—though we can never choose the alternatives we choose between at any given instance of choice, nor choose the very impetus to make choices—the very act of choosing between the given alternatives at any given time will ontologically be dependent on nothing else but the chooser/agency in a metaphysical self-caused manner—i.e. via a metaphysically valid freewill (which is not the same as indeterminsim when interpreted as ontological randomness due to lack of causal determinism)—thereby leading to a noncontradictory justification for responsibility in the choices one does make ... and to the ontic reality of agency.

---

Edit for greater completion of argument: Freewill does get complicated by influence(s). Tell someone they need to do X to not go to hell but instead be welcomed into heaven and you will have influenced their choice, for example. But, under compatibilism, their choice will yet remain their responsibility—together with their choice to believe these notions of hell and heaven to be BS and the person to be a malevolent manipulator, for example. Influence upon some choice does not amount to a causal determination of what will be chosen. Alternatively: holding a gun to someone's head will strongly influence their choice, but it will not causally determine it.

---

But for the determinist, of course we’ve been predetermined to endlessly debate free will v. determinism; agency is an illusion, we’re all predetermined automata, and anything we do, believe, will, etc. is part of a fully deterministic whole. Talking about “living within an illusion” philosophies … this is it.

To answer all relevant points in all your posts would require a very long essay. I’ll try to focus attention of issues of belief and thought in non-linguistic lesser animals.

A sure sign that we've gotten something wrong here - when discussing non linguistic thought and belief - is if and when it is too complicated. Simply put, non linguistic thought and belief cannot be that complicated. — creativesoul

You’re forgetting the mind is a very complex thing. It includes, for example, unconscious processes that always effect, affect, entwine with, and bring about the consciousness’s form. And we do not hold conscious awareness of all our beliefs at any given time. At any given time, most of our beliefs are unconsciously held—staying there till they're brought up into conscious awareness for purposes of deliberation. And the assumption that non-linguistic thought and belief is somehow simple is, to me, very erroneous. I’ll give some data below to better illustrate my point.

I'm talking very specifically - as precisely as possible - about what it takes to become aware of one's own fallibility, which is a much 'cleaner' way to say "become aware of one's capacity to be right/wrong". — creativesoul

I’m not talking about a conscious awareness of an abstraction/thought concerning the possibility of being wrong. I’m talking about an innate, inborn, unlearned, not consciously contemplated, Kantian-like (if you will) mental capacity to distinguish the category of right/correct/etc. from the category of wrong/incorrect/etc.

Some data. Taken from https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/08/090810025241.htm

Dogs can also count up to four or five, said Coren. And they have a basic understanding of arithmetic and will notice errors in simple computations, such as 1+1=1 or 1+1=3. — APA

Yes, it’s very rudimentary arithmetic ability. However: Here is found the capacity to discern error in matters of fact—which would not be possible devoid of a complimentary capacity to discern non-error in the same givens. To whatever extent this capacity might be learned, if any, it is not contingent on language use.

I offered an argument for the position I hold. It's been sorely neglected. That argument is based upon something very important. The distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief that the whole of philosophy has neglected to draw and maintain... — creativesoul

You can maybe see how your argument is in contradiction to the data. Your argument's premise that awareness of right/wrong requires thought about thought and belief is faulty; it only requires belief and thought (without requiring thought about either).

Uncertainty is the mechanism. It is fear based. — creativesoul

I disagree, but this will be a long argument and relatively tangential to what we're focusing on. Still, dogs can be curious, and curiosity cannot occur when there is full psychological certainty relative to all matters regarded. So curiosity to me requires uncertainty--one that is obviously not fear based. All the same, trying to keep my reply focused ...

So, that's three different elemental constituents that have been identified. Namely... 1.being existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between things, 2.being meaningful, and 3.presupposing it's own correspondence. — creativesoul

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dog_intelligence#Theory_of_mind (its not a long read):

Dogs are relatively good at deceiving others, and this requires that dogs hold a rudimentary theory of mind. This understanding of other minds is not learned via language, nor is it likely to in any way be thoughts about thoughts and beliefs. It is also likely not something learned but something innate, inborn, Kantian-like, etc. that only gets refined via experience. Here there is a belief of what the other will believe when deceived. But it seems obvious to me that this belief of other minds' capacities is not acquired via correlations between things (for it is not held as a result of learning about other minds; puppies will hold such belief of other minds).

Remember that I uphold a difference between innate beliefs (beliefs we're birthed with), learned beliefs (stored in our unconscious after having been acquired till brought up into consciousness), and enactive beliefs (e.g. beliefs we actively deliberate upon consciously). Correlations will be one means of acquiring learned beliefs, but they cannot account for innate beliefs. So I strongly disagree with all beliefs being dependent on correlations in order to manifest.

Thought and belief are indistinguishable at this level. The only difference between the two happens on a metacognitive level. — creativesoul

To me not at all. If all belief (innate, learned, and enactive) is a form of trust for what in fact is, then thought is a process of relating various beliefs--especially those that are innate in less intelligent living beings. The two processes are to me therefore distinct, and their ontological differentiation in lesser beings is not contingent on lesser beings' meta-cognition. (see again the two examples of dog intelligence, neither of which are contingent on a dog's capacity of metacognition).

There's again a lot here that could be disagreed with. So I'll stop here and see where the reply leads to.

If offering an accurate account of nonlinguistic belief by means of art, music, poetry, and/or metaphor qualifies as 'capturing nonlinguistic belief', then I may actually agree... — creativesoul

groovy :smile:

BTW, it's not an ideal time for me to be hanging out on the forum. Can't say when my next reply will be. But I would like to focus on the two empirical data addressed: that of dogs' capacity to discern error in 1 + 1 = 1 and that of dogs' having a very rudimentary theory of mind (more specifically, both belief and thought as regards other minds when these other minds are deceived).

nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor. — Blue Lux

Of course. Very good points. I thing think both me and creativesoul were limiting ourselves to how it might pertain to lesser animals. Feel free to complicate things, though.

(I'm a typo-holic. Can't help it. :roll: )

We differ remarkably regarding what an awareness of being wrong/right requires.

[...]

An awareness for the capacity to be right/wrong requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires the ability to become aware of, isolate/identify, and subsequently further consider one's own pre-existing thought and belief. That requires written language. Thus, an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as an awareness of the capacity to be right/correct requires written language.

A language less creature does not have what it takes to be aware of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken or right/correct. — creativesoul

I find that you’re thinking of right/wrong in too abstract a manner—as only relatively mature humans can do. Yet very young children sense when they do wrong things (cheat, act aggressively, etc.) just as much as when they do good things (overlooking the more fuzzy grey areas). What’s more, so do dogs.

Though I’d like to avoid metaphysical issues, I find I can’t address this properly without eventually mentioning something of metaphysics. To be relatively informal about it, there are metaphysics of sharp and absolute division pertaining to different life forms’ abilities and, on the other side, there are metaphysics of gradations. Doesn’t matter if its Richard Dawkins or many, but not all, Abrahamic fundamentalists, here there is a metaphysical divide between man and beast. I take the latter metaphysical position, one of gradation which, when sufficiently extended, results in sometimes expansive leaps of ability. I also don’t approach things from a physicalist account; pertinent here is that to me there is a non-subjective objectivity at play in reality at large: justness—this just as much as the laws of thought—is to me an aspect of this non-subjective reality which is equally impartial to all discrete givens. Why this is important: in the latter position, we do not learn of justness conceptually in order to sense right and wrong, no more than we learn of formal laws of thought in order to operate via laws of thought. It is not something acquired from language but, instead, it is a universal facet of mind which language expresses, however imperfectly. Here there is no absolute metaphysical division between man and beast; both are, in a very trivial way, equal facets and constituents of nature. It is not that a less intelligent being is metaphysically apart from the laws of thought, or from the universal of justness. It is only that less intelligent beings are in due measure that much less capable of forming abstractions about these universals—which, as metaphysical universals, concretely dwell within all of us (with or without our conscious understanding of them) as innate aspects of what, or who, we are as sentient beings.

So, potential debates galore on this issue—and the issue can sprawl in myriad directions. I’ve highlighted some of my beliefs, though, only to better present my disposition.

A dog doesn’t hold a conscious understanding of “alternatives” regarding some given nor of “right and wrong”. Nevertheless, to the extent that intelligent creatures, dogs included, can become uncertain of givens, they will actively experience competing alternatives which they must choose between so as to resolve the uncertainty. Not all of our uncertainty—as adult humans—consists of consciously appraised alternatives; arguably, most of our uncertainties do not. They instead consist of competing gut-feelings, intuitions which we do not during the even take time to linguistically quality (never mind contemplate), and we as conscious awareness choose, or decide upon, one—thereby forsaking all others once the decision has been (often) unthinkingly made. Arguably, this can easily be complicated by some of these uncertainties taking place in the unconscious mind—such that they bring about states of anxiety, disquiet, of fear … else, equally applicable, states of wonder, curiosity, awe, and sometimes even beauty (such that these states would not occur were we to be fully certain of all relevant aspects of that regarded). I’ll also add that not all forms of uncertainty equate to doubt: e.g., we can be, and most often are, uncertain about any number of future events without in any way doubting them. Yet, if there is uncertainty about something, what other mechanism can be at play other than that of competing alternatives for what in fact is?

I doubt this will resolve the given disagreement, but think of it this way. Were language mandatory for sensations of right/correctitude and wrong/mistakenness, Helen Keller could not then have made any non-stochastic choice in her life during her first seven years (I’ve checked with Wikipedia and Helen only began learning language at about seven-years-old). For she then could not have had any sense of mistakenness v. correctness via which to so make (non-stochastic) choices (I grant that stochastic choices is a contradiction in terms … but since I’m in a bit of rush) … and choices are always made between alternatives.

Well, this better expresses some aspects of my worldview. But I’m skirting around issues which underlie it: those of metaphysics and of philosophy of mind. And I understand if there will be plenty of disagreement throughout the aforementioned.

I’ll likely get around to the rest over the weekend (bit short on time for now).

But to better understand: with the process of thinking in mind: can a thought, of itself, be defined as not necessarily consisting of a consciously understood abstraction (regardless of the degree of abstraction)? For instance, could we settle on correlations between percepts being an act of thinking? This would not require language nor consciously appraised abstractions. Still, the implications of so defining thought would then be fairly expansive (e.g., if an ameba can make correlations between its percepts than it would be engaged in an act of thought while eluding predators (e.g. bigger amebas) or while searching for prey. Amebas can easily be discerned to elude predators and search for prey—which takes a bit of autonomous order within an environmental uncertainty to accomplish—but I mention them because, obviously, they are rather “primitive” lifeforms.). I lean toward a more inclusive understanding/definition of thought and, therefore, thinking—again, favoring the outlook of gradation rather than that of division. But I’d like to know your general position as regards the nature of thought before I reply.

I'm still wrapping my head around your framework... — creativesoul

No problem.

Good question! Lol — Blue Lux

:grin: I know; I know ... :cool:

I disagree here. You've presupposed what needs argued for, and arrived at the realization that the account needs some unaccounted for notion of falsity/mistake. We could do away with the need for a non-linguistic notion of being mistaken. On my view, that is not even possible. Dog's can be uncertain about what may happen as a result of having unexpected consequences result from their actions in past. This doesn't require a non linguistic notion of being mistaken. — creativesoul

I don’t follow. Here, written hastily enough, a more formal argument:

-- Premise 1: If there is uncertainty of any form, there will be uncertainty about something (there is no such thing as a context-devoid, free-floating, uncertainty).
-- Premise 2: If there is uncertainty about something, there will minimally be two competing alternatives regarding that something: that that something is (else should be, or can be done) and that the same something is not (else shouldn’t be, or can’t be done).
-- Premise 3: Uncertainty holds the potential to cease so being.
--Premise 4: The potential of uncertainty being resolved entails the following: Whichever former alternative remains at expense of all others, this now resulting singular possibility/decision will signify that—to the mind of that which was formerly uncertain—all former alternatives other than the possibility which remains where wrong (if addressing something of fact, a belief-that).
-- Premise 5: In order for premise 4 to hold any validity, there must be some sense of wrongness/mistakenness v. rightness/correctness on the part of the mind involved.
-- Conclusion: The presence of uncertainty entails an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as of the capacity to be right/correct as pertains to some specific given.

Please explain what you disagree with and why in the just given generality—so that I may better understand what you have in mind. If you answer than only humans can understand the concepts to any of these words, you’d be completely missing the intended point of the argument—which aims at universals regarding how the mind works (in this case, as pertains to the presence of uncertainty). In which case, without getting into philosophy of mind or that of metaphysics—which I don’t care to do presently—we’d at best end up running in circles, something that I don’t want to do.

If we set out trust in a minimalist fashion, in order to trust without the ability to doubt, we would lose sight of all of the different situations where one deliberately does not doubt — creativesoul

Only if one were to take an either/or approach to it, which I’ve already explained is not my take. To me, we all have innate “minimalist” trust/beliefs and our more complex beliefs are built up on top of them.

But this is all deviating from the issue of belief.

How do you go about conceptualizing non-linguistic belief?

Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is?

BTW, if you’d like to mutually agree to disagree and be done with the discussion, I’d be onboard.

Non-linguistic creatures have no choice but to 'trust' physiological sensory perception. They also 'trust' the correlations, associations, connections drawn between different 'objects' thereof and/or themselves. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content...

There is no ability to doubt it for pre-linguistic creatures. — creativesoul

Even if so, we maybe agree that one does not need to doubt in order to trust? So we may hold beliefs that are justifiable and true without needing to doubt/question ourselves about them, for example.

I think we agree that all (reasonable/justifiable)doubt is belief-based(trust-based on your framework). It seems you've also implied that doubt is dependent upon a creature's awareness of falsity/mistake? — creativesoul

Well, again, for me to believe is to trust that; and a belief is the contents of that which is trusted.

If to doubt is to presume some preestablished certainty as possibly being wrong, then yes, for a creature to doubt (themselves or others) they’d need to be capable of holding some innate understanding of falsity/mistake. I’m thinking of a dog that wants to traverse some narrow bridge, for example, but doubts whether or not it can do it via some sensed fear or anxiety (i.e., holds some trepidation about it). It would need to be aware that there is a possibility of being mistaken in trusting that it could traverse the bridge. Because of this, it would need to hold some notion of falsity/mistake—obviously not linguistic or linguistically conceptual.

No. — creativesoul

Cool.