Much of this will be contestable, so I’m up to hearing of alternative slants.

Eternity is limitless time. Infinity (i.e., “without end”) is tmk nowadays commonly interpreted more spatially, as in limitless space--I'm guessing due to its mathematical applications, with maths not consisting of time. Both can be abstracted to address particulars—e.g., an eternal universal such as that of “the Good” that stands in contrast to transient physical givens; e.g., a line whose length is infinite in contrast to its width. Likewise both can be abstracted to address everything as generality—e.g., space-time as being itself limitless.

Irrespective of the veracity to these abstractions—some of which often enough contradict when compared—their common denominator is the concept of limitlessness.

I currently know of only two possible symbols for limitlessness: the lemniscate (i.e., ∞, which can be interpreted to be a perfect circle twisted in upon itself) and the ouroboros (an imaginary animal consisting only of a head (mind) and the tale (body) which grows due to the actions of the mind—often represented as a snake or a worm—that can only subsist by means of taking into itself its own tail. It’s commonly stated to represent the endless cycle of life and death at a cosmic level—hence, limitlessness of cosmic being. Roughly speaking, it can also be interpreted in terms of karma, akin to: you, we, or else everything will need to take into itself tomorrow those effects that are produced today).

However, the lemniscate—though a symbol for that which is limitless (without end)—is again nowadays commonly interpreted more spatially than temporally (though technically it just stipulates “without limits”). On the other hand, the symbolic implications of the ouroboros—while they more readily connote the limitlessness of time—are often lost on us modern folk, with its more precise meanings seeming to be anybody’s guess (my own liberties in previously describing its symbolic meaning fully included).

I’ve no ideal of how stability can be represented via a precise symbol—but am aware of cultures that use the symbol of a rock for this purpose; e.g., the philosopher’s stone as, possibly, symbol for Sophia (wisdom), this among alchemists; or our own cultural saying of “steady as a rock”.

So I keep on thinking -- might it be the case that we use a (now believed valid) form of argument with true premises that then comes to false conclusions? — Moliere

Conclusions can be deemed erroneous due their being contradictory—either relative to themselves, as in some obtained conclusion that affirms A and not-A at the same time and in the same respect, or else in relation to some set of known truths that are contextual to the obtained conclusion. I can’t currently think of other means by which concluded truths can be deemed erroneous which do not themselves reduce to the presence of inconsistency. If someone else can, this would complicate my argument.

What you bring up can, to my mind, be exemplified relatively well by Zeno’s paradoxes. Their reasoning is logically valid, as far as we can tell. Yet their conclusions are contradictory to experience. Hence: That it’s impossible for a runner to outrun a turtle as long as the turtle has an initial lead, or that it’s impossible for an arrow to hit its target, are logically valid arguments (as Zeno argues them). But, because they contradict with experience (which is—as an ever changing awareness of givens—after all required to make sense of these paradoxes of change/motion which conclude that no change can occur), we then know that something is false somewhere along the way with the argument. It might be that some of the premises, thought they seem intuitively true, are false or that the arguments, which seem logically valid, are in fact not valid.

But generally speaking, if both the premises and the conclusions hold consistency to all other related truths and are obtained via reasoning that is not demonstrably invalid, then the argument gives all indications of logical soundness. It’s how we know that the premises are true to begin with: they’re consistency to all other relevant truths. It’s not until contradictions occur that we hold reason to question the soundness of arguments.

I’m not sure, but maybe this serves to address the issue you’re enquiring into.

So if I'm aware of thoughts, then they must be occuring? — Kranky

To you, yes.

But hey, that’s the wacky nature of mind: it’s personal to the awareness involved.

If you are aware of your thoughts and your thoughts thereby influence your awareness—which they do just by you being aware of them—then they occur as thoughts.

I don’t have the discipline to not do this. I’m kicking myself in the buttocks already.

First off I never read anything by this guy, but I’ve heard of one of em’ poetic sayin’s that I find more aesthetically pleasing. Here paraphrased from imperfect memory: Reality is a mountain whose material is composed of multiple paths of truth amid our deceptions and self-deceptions, and holds as its zenith Truth, a state of being where all these paths of truth converge into the same thing. So I disagree with this pathlessness interpretation and approach people have been speaking about here … this at an emotive level.

Also:

[...]I do know that those claiming that they are awakened are most likely not. — Posty McPostface

What about those who claim to be sleeping? If a person tells us that they’re asleep, should we trust that they are in fact sleepwalking? I think not.

(For the record, I agree with you, Posty. Just thinking that what I just said is funny. :joke: )

Just because we can conceive of alternative(s) for X does not make the alternative(s) true. E.g. That the Earth is pyramidal in shape, though this is an alternative to the Earth being roughly spherical, is not true on account of having been conceived.

Just because alternatives for X are conceivable does not then imply that there is reason to doubt X. E.g., the quantity of alternatives to “Earth’s shape is roughly spherical” is, I believe, on par with the quantity of geometric shapes conceivable. But since all of our experience is most consistently explained (i.e., explained in manners devoid of contradiction) by the Earth being spherical, it then is irrational to doubt that Earth is spherical because someone says “Hey, maybe it’s an octahedron … or may a donut.”

Otherwise, to doubt Earth’s shape via each and every alternative to its being spherical would—to be consistent in how one thinks—also require one’s doubting each and every conceivable alternative in turn ad infinitum. At which point some would say, “man, to hell with all this ad infinitum doubting; just suspend judgment as regards absolute certainty and just go with what is most evident and justified, always free to change one’s mind if the evidence ever changes.”

So what appears to be my thoughts right now, — Kranky

Be that as it may, can you justify any alternative to the highlighted quote? If not, then your awareness of the thoughts you are aware of is not possible to rationally doubt … because you can’t justify any conceivable alternative by which to doubt it ... because you'd have to be aware of the alternative in order to use for the purpose of doubting, thereby proving the alternative wrong (again, because you hold presence as an awareness aware of this alternative).

Are you or are you not aware of thoughts?

And if one’s own awareness is not possible to rationally doubt when one is aware of anything (such as of one’s own thoughts), then there might be other such forms of not yet absolute certainty* that is nevertheless not possible to doubt in practice.

*It can’t be absolute certainty because you can’t prove that you or someone else will never find justifiable alternatives that facilitate the possibility—but not the necessity!—to doubt the reality that you hold presence as an awareness while in any way aware of anything. This even though I’m guessing the given verdict of your presence as, minimally, an awareness is not possible to rationally doubt in practice.

But again, try to read up on those who would argue that one should suspend judgment on matters such as that of what is of absolute certainty. They used to go by the name of Skeptics.

Ideas and concepts may not be empirical but our knowledge of them may be said to be objective shared in the sense that we all acknowledge having them and characterize them quite similarly. — BrianW

:grin: I like that. Objectivity as the quality of being impartially shared between/among all--rather then the property of physicality as it applies to physical entities (which are themselves, after all, impartially perceived by all in the same way, here roughly speaking).

Considering they are a significant part of our experiences, perhaps we could deal with them more intelligently and seek to understand them further especially in how and why they come to be. — BrianW

I very much agree that we should. Yet, again, because they are not something perceived via our physiological senses, I rather envision this investigation occurring via science accordant philosophy. This rather than through strict use of science itself.

and I wonder if we could develop it further into a scientific process that can be designated as creation or conception?

Can we take the little we know of this mental process and develop it into a scientific discipline? — BrianW

Aren’t ideas and concepts by their very nature not empirical? This in the modern sense of the word, where empiricism is understood as all experience strictly obtained via the physiological senses. (Lock, Hume, etc. I believe often interpreted “empirical” in ways far more similar to what we’d intend by “experiential”—which ideas and concept are, for we know of them via our direct awareness/experience.)

Given that ideas and concept are not empirical, it’s hard to see understand how one could make a scientific discipline for their empirical study.

As to learning to be more creative, two ideas: a) practicing the allegorical muscle of imagination by more actively imagining things in general and b) (this, to me, given certain assumptions I partially addressed in a previous post) improving one’s total mind’s capacity of creativity by learning how to ask of oneself questions regarding (and with sincere intent to discover) things that are relatively uncertain, abstract, and/or as of yet unknown. Sort of tangentially, one practice I’ve heard of, for example, is that of writing down question to oneself prior to going to sleep, this with the apparent expectation that answers to these questions might be discovered during dreams. Haven’t done this myself though.

A few times now, I've awoken with ideas that have come directly from dreams, remembered from the dreams and recognized as useful, I've transferred them into actual useful creative ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yea, dreams are a very interesting field of study I for the most part consider so far unexplored. Freud I think ruined it for a great portion of people; then again, I’m not big on Freud. Many in the field believe that dreams have an important role in the formation of long-term memories*; and, as we all know, lack of sleep can be devastating to the psyche (if not eventually lethal). Though I don’t look upon him (or anyone) as being without faults, I do like certain aspects of Hume’s notion of self as mind. In particular, that of it being a commonwealth (I’ll here skip my partial disagreements with his same stance). When we’re awake, this commonwealth—imo—becomes relatively unified at a conscious level in mostly undifferentiable ways; although there are things such as a conscience or pangs of emotion we sense affecting us that occasionally directly evidence to us the commonwealth that is; but most of this commonwealth enters into what we term the unconscious (again, imo) when we’re awake. But in dreams, the commonwealth becomes apparent to us, taking the form of dreamt entities which often hold their own agency in addition to ideas which we there are exposed to via symbolism. Yea, the nature of dreams is an interesting subject to explore—especially since a significant amount of our novel ideas as humans come from dreams.

I can relate, btw. (wanted to say something in addition to this)

* a link to back up that statement: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/dream-catcher/201602/are-dreams-required-memory

I'm not denying the fact of new representations. For example, a new model of a car is still just a car. A new-born human is just a human. By creativity, I mean generating a distinct concept which can be characterized independently of its source material. This is why I consider most creations as a synthesis. — BrianW

The thought of a hovercraft came to mind. At some last point in history the idea/concept of a hovercraft was not present—though cars, airplanes, and helicopters were (haven’t done my research but I presume something along these lines). Then, right after this period, the idea/concept of a hovercraft became present. A hybrid idea of something between cars and helicopters that then holds the capacity to engage in a hovering sort of flight. As ideas go, it would be, when allegorically expressed, a new species of idea: neither car, nor airplane, nor helicopter.

I’d also like to add that I’m quite certain that our unconscious minds think, and—as an example—in so doing, that they sometimes synthesize concepts just right, subsequent to which the new ideas are kicked up into consciousness, thereby producing eureka moments which we term moments of inspiration of insight.

So this process of creating new ideas is not always—maybe not typically—something which we as conscious egos do ourselves. Come to think of it—if I remember my history right—the theory of relativity was reputedly first conceived during a dream of sleep, this according to Einstein. (If wrong, may I be corrected.) Hence, not by the awoken conscious ego but by the unconscious mind’s thoughts while the total being was sleeping (though dreams are to me a complex subject when it comes to experience and awareness—we as egos are after all aware of our dreams while dreaming).

Currently, it seems to me that you might be asking too much from the notions of creation and creativity. I’m here thinking of the maxim that from nothing comes nothing.

If you don’t intend this maxim, then how would any creation not be accomplished via use of something that previously is/was? [To try to avoid questions regarding metaphysical implications, I for one uphold that the beginning of being is unknowable to us beings, period.]

Perhaps the reason might be that those who piously believed the Laws of Nature reflect the Divine Will may have been led to think that the invariances of nature are indeed deductively certain; it would be illogical for God to contravene the Universal Laws He has created. — Janus

:grin: If this "God" has an ego, an "I", then is it the biggest ego that has ever existed or can exist? Such an, um, egoistic individual would likely want to be believed with deductive certainty, I'm imaging.

Yea, no, I gravitate toward the concept of an egoless consciousness ... ya know, mystical stulf akin to notions such as that of Nirvana. But, as we all know, this at least metaphysical possibility is not something can can be deductively proven.

Eh, against my better judgment, currently finding myself somewhat humorous, I'll post this post anyway.

I had formed the impression, though, that his so-called 'problem of induction' consists in the thought that inductive belief is not rationally driven at all, — Janus

I haven’t read the guy’s works for a long time now, so I admit to being somewhat fuzzy on the details. As to the problem of induction which he’s renowned for introducing, there’s often a difference between what one says (else, intends to convey) and what others interpret as having been said. However, even without rereading his works, I can say with confidence that if Hume didn’t believe in the value of any reasoning whatsoever—if he, for example, thought that even induction was or else led to bullshit—he’d never have spent so much time in writing a massive book that was carefully reasoned out, with thoughts and inferences that by his very own admission were often very taxing on him. Oh, and then also rewrite a summative form of the same content after it was universally booed or ignored by just about everyone. Though all this did eventually irk Kant enough to be interested in philosophy.

Not to overly beat a dead horse, but: It’s my way of trying to succinctly justify my confidence that Hume’s “problem of induction” was not viewed as problem by Hume as far as reasoning (rationality) goes —he after all was a, uhum, fallibilist, at least as I believe Peirce would of phrased it (he wasn’t one to engage in Cartesian-like skeptical hypotheses in search for some holy grail of absolute certainty). Instead, the “problem of induction” is often a problem to those who desire deductively sound conclusions—for it rationally illustrates the problems in obtaining the latter.

I'm referring to ideas and concepts.

Everything we imagine or generate in our minds is a product of an already existing element.
For example, a unicorn - a horse with a horn in the front of its head. Neither the horse nor horn is a new creation. — BrianW

I grant this as minimally being an accurate generality, but believe that when two or more distinct concepts become synthesized this will in and of itself create a new distinct concept—one which is itself other than the parent concepts, so to speak.

To analogize these mental events with more tangibly physical events: two people, via their gametes, will synthesize into an offspring. The baby, throughout the span of its life, will be utterly other in relation to its two biological parents—yet it was only the product of a physiological synthesis between the unique physiologies of the two parents.

As this physical baby is “new to the world” so then can ideas and concepts strictly obtained via the successful synthesis of other ideas and concepts be new to the world. Given this train of reasoning, in so synthesizing, we then engage in acts of creation as pertains to new ideas and concepts.

Hume denies that it is rational to believe there are laws of nature, but he also denies that it is rational to believe that there have been events which circumvent the laws of nature. — Janus

From my remembrance of his writings, he only denies that it is decuctively rational to believe laws of nature. Yet he fully upholds that it is inductively (and I suppose he’d also agree with the more recent concept of “abductively”) rational to believe laws of nature. And he denies the veracity of miracles, i.e. events that do not conform to laws of nature, due to this very stance.

But yes, at the very least back in his days, many took deduction (i.e., arguments proven to be logically sound as well as logically valid) to be the only respectable form of rationality there is.

The most rational way would seem to be to provisionally accept the veracity of accounts of events which are well-documented and more or less universally accepted as having occurred. — Janus

Nicely said.

I greatly doubt that we’ll find common ground. I’ve also lost the desire to further debate this issue. I’m giving a partial reply so as to not be utterly off-putting:

If non-linguistic belief is correlations drawn between different things such that it presupposes its own correspondence to fact/reality then this belief will be acquired, hence learned, via the different things that become correlated. The belief then “comes about”. And unless lesser animals’ beliefs are always fully devoid of error, there must then be a means by which well-grounded beliefs attain this property in their initial formation.

You seem to however insist otherwise.

All belief presupposes it's own correspondence somewhere along the line. Positing belief at the genotype level is to posit belief that is inherently incapable of presupposing it's own correspondence. — creativesoul

No. Evolutionary theory would readily account for this. But I sense you will insist otherwise.

On the ground that any and sensible notions of trust must include - in some fundamental sense - what our everyday notions of trust include. — creativesoul

For the record, the Wiktionary definition is what everyday notions of trust entail. It is a long standing wiki page, after all.

The same grounds as above, and on the ground that that definition inevitably leads to aburd consequences(reductio ad absurdum).

The performance of a vehicle relies on all sorts of different qualities and people. It does not trust. — creativesoul

Next you’ll tell me that a vehicle acts and reacts? No, vehicles lack an agency by which to hold confidence in or reliance upon—something I take to be commonly understood.

That conversation hinges upon what counts as deception. I would deny that the dog deliberately sets out to trick another dog. — creativesoul

The denial or evasive treatment of research findings is not a thing I feel in any way comfortable with. I won’t ask you to specify what you mean by “deliberately”. I don’t know how one could believe that the dog in the Wikipedia example sat on the treat by accident until the other dog left the room. But I’m confident it can be conceptualized this way. Still, I’ll continue trusting research findings that are published by well-reputed peer-review journals, such as the APA (which I've previously linked to).

All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

Yet this does not distinguish thought from belief so as to define what belief is.

Again, I more than likely won’t continue in this debate, believing that it’s ran its course.

Size isn't everything
— unenlightened

Bigger usually is better. — Bitter Crank

According to the Kama Sutra, this is not true. Elephants are better for elephants and rabbits are better for rabbits, usually. I suppose ducks should have been included in all this (with ducks it gets tricky though, size doesn’t really apply to something not had). Just saying.

Firstly, thanks for this reply. I would also like to learn of your views regarding dogs' deception and the nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about.

However, we are talking about belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. Such belief can be reported upon. Our reports will have propositional content. The kind of belief that we're reporting upon cannot. Belief that is not existentially dependent upon language must consist of something other than propositional content, even though our report of it must. All this must be kept in mind when using the belief that approach as a means to take account of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language... — creativesoul

Can you provide, or point to, a concrete example of such belief-that which is not propositional?

This ties into what I address below.

You've actually posited trust/belief at the genotype level of biological complexity. That would require that the content of what's being trusted(belief on your view) is something that exists in it's entirety at that level and can transcend the believer on a physical level through reproduction. That's a big problem for your notion of belief for all sorts of reasons. We could explicate those consequences if you'd like... — creativesoul

For the record, though I too hold an ego, I have no problem in being shown how my beliefs could be improved upon or else how they are wrong.

Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief. — creativesoul

On what grounds do you affirm this?

Example: I see an odd shaped red apple on the table for the first time. I'm not at all familiar with this type of apple. I either trust that it is there as seen, trust that it is not as seen, or trust that both possibilities might be valid; the latter being an instance of uncertainty while the two former cases are instances of certainty. Regardless, all three scenarios are initially experienced by me without without a sense of familiarity, without thought, and without beliefs about beliefs (belief is what we're addressing to begin with, so I'm assuming you were here addressing beliefs about beliefs).

I'll posit a facet of trust to make this easier:

Trust: (1) confidence in or reliance on some person or quality. — Wiktionary

From this I extrapolate the following as a cogent facet of trust: To act and/ or react (either physically or mentally such as via intentions) to something being ontic devoid of rationality for the given something in fact being ontic is, in itself, a process of trust. The quality one here has confidence in or reliance on is property of being ontic.

On what grounds would one disagree with this extrapolation?

If the extrapolation is valid, then trust can be non-linguistic, genetically inherited, and does at all times affirm (else, makes firm within the respective mind) that which is true—but this without a necessary conscious understanding of the relation implied by notions of truth as we linguistically express it. Trust's contents, then, form the given belief.

Trusting the content of thought/belief cannot be had if innate fear takes hold of the creature. One cannot trust that which aggravates instinctual/innate fear, at least not one at a language less level. — creativesoul

I thought we weren't addressing belief about belief. Be this as it may:

Innate fear-based mistrust requires a more primary trust; namely a confidence about that which is feared being deserving of fear. It has to do with trust for optimal benefit to self in the face of that which is feared, or mistrusted.

Still, all this is, here, in large part contingent upon the facet of trust which I've explicitly extrapolated above.

I mostly nearly agree. I just prefer to leave the door cracked instead of closed. True, no demonstration may be possible, but this doesn't mean ideal knowledge is impossible - only not demonstrable. — Cheshire

Yea, these are among the more fine tuned issues concerning the matter: but of course fallibilism leaves the proverbial door open. To affirm an infallible knowledge that infallible knowledge is impossible is, of course, a blatant contradiction. One can only fallibly affirm this, if one so cares to.

Gladly, you don't have to prove you have infallible knowledge in order for it to be obtained. I concede I can't prove when or if I obtained infallible knowledge and yet I maintain its possible that I do and do not know it. — Cheshire

To refresh a previous argument of mine, operational knowledge can well be, ontically, not erroneous. Nevertheless, this is not currently possible to prove epistemically.

Are we not somehow agreeing to this? My only issue here is that infallibility to me is an epistemic property. My bad if I didn’t make that explicit previously. Maybe this facet makes a notable difference? If not, then we indeed disagree. Call it a day?

If the strength of my argument rests on my ability to doubt the law of non-contradiction, then I would get a new argument. I'm sorry, my position presupposes logic. — Cheshire

:razz: Well, I never once said anything about doubt. One does not need to doubt the law of noncontradiction, as one example among many, to understand that is not something which can be demonstrated perfectly secure from all possible error. There are strengths of operational knowledge, and the law of noncontradiction is pretty high up there in its strength.

And I'm arguing this is the reason infallible knowledge must possibly exist. What is infallible knowledge, but knowledge without error? — Cheshire

In laconic review of what you have yet to reply to: Operational knowledge cannot be demonstrated to be devoid of all possible error; ideal knowledge is devoid of all possible error, but it is only a conceptual ideal and not that which can be utilized in practice. I've argued why this is so at length in previous posts.

Hence, I view your quoted statement as category error, for infallible knowledge would need to be proven in practice in order to be obtained. And to prove it in practice requires infallible justifications for the given belief in fact being true. Explain why it is not the case if you disagree.

You literally stated it was both perfectly and not perfectly secure. It's a direct contradiction, unless one just chooses to ignore it to maintain a position. — Cheshire

I disagree and will try again:

• Infallible: perfectly secure form all possible error
• Fallible: not perfectly secure form all possible error

“All my beliefs—including this one—are not perfectly secure from all possible error.”

Where is the contradiction?

BTW, just in case: If no contradiction can be discerned by you and me and if this is offered as “proof” of infallibility: Can you prove that for all remaining time no justifiable alternative to what is affirmed will ever be discovered? You'd have to be omniscient to do so. If not, then even this lack of contradiction will remain less then perfectly secure form all possible error—for any justifiable alternative, even those that might exist only in principle, introduces some measure of possible error. And one cannot prove that no justifiable alternatives exist in principle; again, not without being omniscient. ... This even when no justifiable alternatives can be found in practice.

To sum the just stated, one has to be omniscient to have infallible knowledge. (And I uphold that no psyche is capable of omniscience due to its intrinsic duality between self and other.)

In a further argument:

1. Infallible knowledge is possible or not.
2. Premise 1 is infallibly correct.
3. Infallible knowledge is possible. — Cheshire

Are you ready to prove how the law of noncontradiction is perfectly secure from all possible error? If yes, please do so. If you can’t then (1) is not infallible (this as per the aforementioned definitions).

OK, chap.

To first get this out of the way:

Innate beliefs, learned beliefs, metacognitive beliefs, unreflective beliefs...

The number of different kinds of belief is growing quickly.

Remove all of the individual particulars(that which makes them all different from one another) and then set out what it is that they all have in common that makes them all what they are... beliefs... aside - that is - from our just calling them all by the same name... — creativesoul

I've provided definitions for all belief types I've utilized and support. As to defining belief in general, I’ve already done that as well: trust-that. If you have objections to any of my definitions then so state with reasons for your objection. Otherwise, this post of yours to me looks like an example of spin.

You, however, have not provided a single interpretation of what belief is. Describing that a belief about belief is not the belief itself does not define what you mean by belief. Give it a go. What is belief to you?

As per the issue of dogs’ ability to discern errors, you have fully overlooked dogs’ ability to deceive and its implications of discerning errors of belief. I find that the following deserves to be addressed rather than ignored or evaded via spin:

Dogs are relatively good at deceiving. This, again, requires a belief about the beliefs of others when they are being deceived. For willful deception to be at all effective, the dog then must hold a certainty that engaging in behaviors X will (or at least is very likely to) create an erroneous belief in the other which—simultaneously—the deceiving dog apprehends to be an erroneous belief and, therefore, not a correct belief. Wikipedia gives the example of a dog that sits on a treat to hide it till the other leaves the room. I’ve got plenty of anecdotal accounts of my own (e.g., with a very intelligent shepherd dog I had as a kid), but let’s go with the Wikipedia example. The dog must be aware that the treat really is beneath its bum. It must also be aware that by concealing it this way the other will then hold an erroneous belief that there is no treat in the room. Here again, I argue, is required an awareness of error and non-error regarding that which is—an awareness that is not dependent on abstract thoughts/beliefs regarding the concepts of right/wrong, or true/false, or error/non-error, etc. A belief-endowed awareness that can well be non-reflective (though in this case likely does contain some inference and, hence, reflection regarding what's going on in the mind of the other). — javra

I’ve asked you to answer this:

While I'm waiting, please remember to answer this issue:

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not?
— javra — javra


What makes a "learned belief" different than other kinds of belief? More importantly what makes them similar enough to still qualify as belief?

What are you waiting for? — creativesoul

The questions you pose have already been addressed by me in previous posts. Your questions are also purely tangential to the issue at hand: that of whether the property of being "well-grounded" must be arrived at via some form of substantiation, or is a matter of happenstance, or something other?

The issue I've asked you of remains unaddressed.

True faith is mystical union with our Creator, where light from His grace shines onto and off of a true believer's face. It's not proselytizing or philosophical theology. So in that much I agree with you, the god of the philosopher is a stuffed animal. — Modern Conviviality

I’m writing this because you so far strike me as a warm soul and because your comments are of some interest to me. And I’ve wanted to enquire into this matter for some time.

Some background:

Broadly speaking, I find that this is what a good deal of the whole theism v atheism debate is about—with some reservations, here stated vulgarly so as to better make my intended point: Is there an omnipotent creator of everything whose ass I must both politely and sincerely kiss in order to not loose “grace” / be punished or, otherwise, is there no such thing? The latter being a belief that doesn’t like the proverbial bathwater of authoritarian deities/religions and finds that to fully eliminate this wrong the baby must be thrown out as well—the proverbial baby here being any rationally consistent system of thought which is not a soulless materialism/physicalism.

To be fair, as a disclosure, I’m a disbeliever in both Theist and Atheism thus understood. Yup, I uphold both these types of theists and atheists are plain wrong. And this conviction, fully independent of anything else, makes me a very liked guy everywhere I go (My sarcasm, if it’s not clear. No, both hardcore theists and atheist detest any such belief as an abomination to be spit upon—this for gutturally emotive reasons rather than reasoning itself). At any rate, these are my beliefs/non-beliefs laid bare.

To address some concrete examples, here are some philosophers’ notions of divinity: Aristotle’s principle teleological cause as “unmoved mover”, Neo-Platonic notions of the “the One”, Spinoza’s understanding of Nature as being Divinity and vice versa, many an Eastern philosophical notion of, roughly expressed, a perfect (and non-hypocritical) state of non-duality wherein all suffering and impermanence eternally cease, this being what is professed as our ultimate reality … I’ll stop short, but there are other examples to be found.

To be again explicit: None of these reasoning-supported notions of divinity imply or encourage the kissing of the behind pertaining to some absolute and authoritarian psychological power—be this hypothetical psyche one of love, of hate, or of both. I phrased it this way to make clear what I take to be at least one of the typical atheist’s dislikes when it comes to notions of divinity. However, reverence, for example, is something that can well be found in many, if not all, of the philosophical notions of God/divinity … Spinoza’s much included.

I sincerely hope I have not been upsetting with the brash means in which I’ve expressed myself. No need to answer, but, with the aforementioned as background, my earnest questions:

Is the intrinsic lack of a bowing down to a superlative, authoritarian, psychological power that which makes philosophers’ notions of divinity nothing other than “stuffed animals”? Otherwise, do you find reasoning about the nature of reality which, in the process, addresses non-materialistic facets of what is real—aspects which materialists would address as “spiritual” or as reeking of divinity—to be proselytizing? If "no" to both questions, what other motive do you hold for saying that philosophers’ notions of divinity are “stuffed animals”?

Thanks in advance if you decide to reply. I’m just curious.

Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. — javra

Isn't this being put forward as infallible knowledge, because its so well evidenced to render any counter argument baseless and untenable. If so, it proves itself wrong. — Cheshire

If I haven’t mentioned it in a super-explicit form before, I will now: my stated affirmation is itself fallible; i.e., not perfectly secure form all possible error. Here is not addressed “infallible for all practical purposes” or “so close to being infallible that it makes no difference in everyday life”—but, again, technically infallible in its being perfectly secure form all possible error. And again: A fallibilist will fallibly know that he/she holds no infallible knowledge (not even in this affirmation).

Hence, no contradiction, not for the fallibilist. Contradictions only appear when an infallibilist account of knowledge is taken into consideration.

And, as previously discussed by me, just become X is liable to error (i.e., less than perfectly secure from all possible error) does not in any way signify that it is therefore erroneous.

I am many things, but dishonest ain't wunuvem. — creativesoul

Glad to hear. Still, I have no interest in rereading the entire thread on a daily basis to see which newly lengthened posts require my re-reading due to me not being informed of the lengthy additions in a timely manner—and this after I’ve already taken time to reply to them. Ya know? I get it. It was a lack of ideal tact—something which I obviously lack as well. Nevertheless, that and a lot that I’ve addressed and/or asked which has not been addressed in turn presently leaves me wanting to leave our discussions as-is.

The following bears repeating... — creativesoul

Bears repeating, huh?

To alleviate some potential ambiguity: In my experience beliefs can decay just as easily as they can be gained. My former belief that this debate between us has been one of honestly reasoned enquiry has now eroded. On account of this, I will no longer be debating this subject with you.

While I'm waiting, please remember to answer this issue:

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not? — javra

I believe that there is such a thing. I'll go first. As always, we look to set out a minimalist criterion, which when met by some candidate or other, serves as a measure of determination. All things that meet the criterion qualify as being an unreflective belief.

What are your thoughts on such a method? — creativesoul

It strikes me as putting the cart before the horse. Else as tautological and hence as much ado about nothing: "everything this is an unreflective belief as per some definition qualifies as being an unreflective belief per stated definition

If not, explain.

What are your thoughts on such a method? — creativesoul

You’ll have to better explain your stance so that I may better understand “the method” you are proposing.

Are we of a sudden skipping back to the issue of pre-linguistic justification?

This presupposes that belief does not begin already being well-grounded. — creativesoul

With some ambiguity. The post you quoted from was addressing learned beliefs. Hence the issue of how a learned belief becomes well-grounded. What is presupposed is that beliefs—whether innate and genetically inherited via processes of evolution, learned via experience, or actively contemplated—can be wrong.

Innate beliefs can be argued well-grounded due to evolutionary processes upon genotype appearing in phenotype. This is their means for being well-grounded, yet fallible.

Learning is a process that in part makes use of innate beliefs to arrive at learned beliefs.

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not?

Some thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon language(written or spoken). — creativesoul

Yes.

I still disagree, but I'm starting understand why...I think. To dodge a bit of confusion, I'm reading [absolute, infallible, ontic, ideal, and objective] knowledge to be the same thing. — Cheshire

Yes, or OK, but in all honestly I dislike the term “objective” in this context. Knowledge and truths are held by subjective beings and, therefore, are subjective givens by entailment. Else, you're addressing objectivity in the sense of impartiality. And neither knowledge nor truth need to be infallible in order to be (relatively) impartial.

I disagree that it is a problem to not know when our knowledge infallible, so I don't see any reason to subscribe to the notion we can't have it — Cheshire

Ah.

Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. There are two ways to argue this: one is by lack of evidence to the contrary via which this belief can be falsified—and, here, the onus is on anyone other to provide evidence for any infallible knowledge (this is where evidence that the affirmed known is not perfectly secure form all possible error is provided via illustration of how this given holds some potential to be wrong); the other is by building up an argument from scratch to justify this belief (which would be lengthy … and, if I’m asked to do this, I’ll first point to a likewise lengthy first chapter on demarcations of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt that I currently have online. Again, building up a valid and all-inclusive argument for fallibilism takes some work. Meanwhile there’s the arguments found in Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus, and a few others.)

But in short, you believe that infallible knowledge is possible to obtain; I don’t. We might be at a standstill on account of this disagreement.

But I’ll continue replying as best I can all the same.

I'm reading "operationally" to mean subjectively or non-ideal; Really, the above sounds contradictory even though I'm pretty certain it isn't intended to be read that way. It's the "..so objectively true" that I'm confused about. — Cheshire

You may have not read or else forgotten a number of previous posts in which I’ve defined ontic truth and placed it in contrast to believed truth. Think of it as infallible belief of what is true that, thereby, factually is true belief. Or, alternatively, it might be better for me to instead refer to it as “ideal truth” … though I’ve really wanted to avoid Platonic notions of ideals, maybe this is a better terminology since I’ve already made use of “ideal knowledge” to contrast “operational knowledge”. (Again, I'm still fiddling with proper terms for the concepts.)

In my best review of previous posts: So ideal truth is factually correct correlation/conformity to that ontic given it regards. In contrast, operational truth is an embedded aspect of all beliefs-that. To believe that X is to believe that X is true, that X is not false, mistaken, erroneous, etc.—this with or without conscious conceptualization of the dichotomy between truth and falsity (added this to keep things better aligned with the discussion I’m having with creativesoul).

Any instance of operational truth can well be an instance of ideal truth. Furthermore, all, or at least most, operational truths will be assumed to be ideal truths while held by the bearer.

The fallibilist, however, will maintain that all operational truths are nevertheless fallible—not mistaken, but only hold some potential of maybe being mistaken in their in fact being ideal truths.

Hence, to the fallibilist, where any operational truth, aka belief-that, to in fact be an instance of ideal truth, it then would need to be justifiable due to its correlation / conformity to that which is real / reality at large.

Yet the fallibilist will also affirm that this justification too can only be operational / fallible—and not ideal / infallible.

So, to the fallibilist, when we believe something to be and can furthermore justify our belief we then hold demonstrable knowledge whose strength is directly proportional to the strength of the justification. And until this justification can be infallible—aka, perfectly secure form all possible error—our knowledge can only be fallible.

And again, ideal knowledge is infallible knowledge. To the fallibilist, operational knowledge can only be fallible.

Hence:

1. A person may know something objectively true and objectively know when they know it is objectively true. — Cheshire

Disagree. We may be aware of an ideal truth—else, hold an factually true belief—but we cannot hold an ideal knowledge of this being so (for ideal knowledge requires an infallible justification, i.e. one that is perfectly secure form all possible error).

2. You can not 'subjectively/operationally' know when something is objectively true by definition. — Cheshire

Disagree when the knowledge addressed is fallible and not infallible. Hence, we do fallibly / operationally know when we hold ideal / “objective” truth because, or on grounds that, our belief will be justified as being ideally true. What you’re inserting here is “infallible knowledge”, so that the quoted statement intends to read as follows: You cannot ‘subjectively/operationally’ hold an infallible known concerning when something is objectively true by definition. This rendition I’d agree with, but find it pointless on grounds that infallible knowns are baseless.

I’m guessing some of this will nevertheless yet be at least somewhat confusing, doubtless in part due to my less then perfect expression in a sound-bite post. (I too find the issue to be complex. I'm not happy with my presentation but I don't have the time to reedit it at length. Call it laziness.)

Still, I’ll again draw attention to your belief that infallible epistemic criteria are possible to obtain; in this sense, if I'm correct about this, your beliefs are then those of an infallibilist. Here there is a strong contradiction with my own beliefs, those of fallibilism.

This is the foundational issue that either becomes resolved or else will make all other debates about this matter frivolous. Are infallible epistemic criteria possible?

Because this last question is a complex issue, I’m OK with calling it a draw at this point, but it’s up to you.

P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not... — creativesoul

To some degree this is already so. But, yea, it would be nice.

This notion of "unreflective awareness" allows and/or must admit of a creature being aware of something that it's never thought about. — creativesoul

Yes.

Since you left it at that I guess I’d need to clarify some of my underlying positions at this point. To me awareness entails a good number of things. Among them is that to hold an awareness of X is to trust that X is for the duration one is aware that X is—and, therefore, is to hold a belief that X is for the same timespan. Awareness of, to me, thus entails some form of belief-that. As an example, if I’m visually aware that there is a tree in front of me, I will simultaneously via the same awareness hold a un-thought of belief that the given tree is in front of me. I may then reflect upon this belief, articulate it, or justify it after the fact; still, the basic belief was yet there at the time I saw the tree. This will not be belief about belief, nor will it be consciously active thought in the form of inference or deliberation. Yet it is still belief.

Thought, then, is to me various associations made between beliefs that holds some aim —regardless of whether these beliefs are stored in memory or else are actively experienced.

Yea … it’s not mainstream. But yes, this way I can for example find myself cogently stipulating that a dog can believe that there’s something wrong with 1 + 1 = 1 despite the dog not having in any way thought about it.

So, this has the potential to open up a whole can of worms regarding tidbits from philosophy of mind. I'm hoping not, though.

Will wait for your replies …

I was waiting for your two word post to be somehow enhanced. But seeing that it hasn’t been …

I disagree. — Cheshire

Ok. Noted.

I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability.
— Cheshire

The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: — javra


Well, there's certainly a difference between "nothing ontic" and lacking the knowledge that a thing is ontic. So, the explanation that follows doesn't really fit the claim I'm making here. — Cheshire

I found your statement somewhat ambiguous and was doing my best to cover all the bases, just in case.

The more important part of my reply was this:

Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided. — javra

In other words, your use of knowledge here is that of an absolute, or infallible, knowledge. That "we may not ever know if it is actually ontic"—for example—is only a problem when one believes such infallible knowledge can be had. Come to believe that we cannot hold infallible knowledge in practice for anything, and this problem fully dissolves, for we then can and do fallibly know "if its actually ontic"--and no other form of knowledge is possible.

Enjoi your weekend, my friend. — creativesoul

Cheers, amigo. Good news is I managed to do the more important parts of what I should’ve done. But back to debating.

False analogy. — creativesoul

Well, not by my count. The analogies intended to address non-reflective awareness of certain givens universally applicable to all awareness-endowed beings (I maintain, to all life). Here’s a very relevant, yet controversial, issue (relevant to the issue of awareness): the awareness of self. Self-awareness as it’s typically understood requires thought about thought/belief in the form of a concept of self. Yet the sheer awareness of what is other and what is not-other—and, thereby, an innate and non-reflective awareness of selfhood via which one acts and reacts—is inherent in all life; otherwise, it would starve to death, for one example. What I’m trying to get at is that the same non-reflective awareness of what is other and what is not-other—for simplicity, here strictly concerning dogs—can apply with equal validity to a non-reflective awareness of what is correct and what is erroneous. More on this below.

So the relevant question is...

Can any creature be aware that it is wrong/right about those things without being aware that it has true/false belief about those things?

I think not. — creativesoul

Whereas I, again, think this is the case.

There's a remarkable difference between being right/wrong and being aware of that. Being wrong/right is having true/false belief. Given that, being aware that one is wrong/right is being aware that one has true/false belief. Nothing else suffices. — creativesoul

Addressing only the first sentence, yes, of course; but this only from the point of view of our adult human awareness which, in part, consists of an awareness of our abstracted notion of what the true/false dichotomy requires. But the true/false dichotomy doesn’t exist because we’ve conceptualized it as an abstraction; rather, we’ve conceptualized it as our best map of a pre-existing territory. In this case, roughly expressed, the territory is the potential relations we as sentient beings hold with that which, firstly, is other relative to us as consciousnesses and, secondly—or, even more abstractly—with that which is ontic (here including the very presence of us as consciousnesses). But one does not need to conceptualize what truth and falsity are in order to make this distinction via consciousness/awareness—just as a being does not need to hold an abstracted understanding of selfhood to hold a crude but stanch innate awareness of what is itself and what is other.

A language less creature can form and have true/false belief without being aware of it. It can experience unexpected events(and confusion) as a result. I'm not arguing against the notion of a non-linguistic creature having true/false belief. Thus, I'm agreeing that such a creature can be right/wrong. I'm arguing that such a creature cannot be aware that it is right/wrong without being aware that it has true/false belief. — creativesoul

Here, I’m picking up on the culturally common understanding of awareness as consisting of humans’ awareness of abstractions regarding awareness. Thus, of self-awareness in the sense of being aware of an abstraction regarding awareness as the core of the (conscious) self—or something to this effect. It yet still amounts to a belief about belief(s)—and not to the non-reflective belief itself. Ok, this issue of non-reflective beliefs and acquired complex beliefs which then act as non-reflective beliefs via which we then filter yet other beliefs we're addressing can, of itself, become very complex. Still, I’m trying to clarify that this is not what I’ve previously intended:

Imagine, for example, that to the dog 1 + 1 = 1 just doesn’t feel right whereas 1 + 1 = 2 does. The dog then acts and reacts accordingly (I imagine only on average in relation to this simple arithmetic). The dog here doesn’t need to hold an awareness of the concepts of true and false (nor of the concepts of error and correctitude, for that matter … all of which being abstract thoughts/beliefs which one holds trust for, i.e. believes). Nevertheless the dog will instinctively trust via is awareness-dependent apprehensions of information (i.e. will hold a pre-reflective awareness) that one sum is wrong (and will thereby find it unfavorable) and the other is right (and thereby favorable).

I don't know if I've lost you so far—this regardless of whether or not you agree. I'm sure that if I have you'll let me know. But here's a different example that may be of greater service:

Dogs are relatively good at deceiving. This, again, requires a belief about the beliefs of others when they are being deceived. For willful deception to be at all effective, the dog then must hold a certainty that engaging in behaviors X will (or at least is very likely to) create an erroneous belief in the other which—simultaneously—the deceiving dog apprehends to be an erroneous belief and, therefore, not a correct belief. Wikipedia gives the example of a dog that sits on a treat to hide it till the other leaves the room. I’ve got plenty of anecdotal accounts of my own (e.g., with a very intelligent shepherd dog I had as a kid), but let’s go with the Wikipedia example. The dog must be aware that the treat really is beneath its bum. It must also be aware that by concealing it this way the other will then hold an erroneous belief that there is no treat in the room. Here again, I argue, is required an awareness of error and non-error regarding that which is—an awareness that is not dependent on abstract thoughts/beliefs regarding the concepts of right/wrong, or true/false, or error/non-error, etc. A belief-endowed awareness that can well be non-reflective (though in this case likely does contain some inference and, hence, reflection regarding what's going on in the mind of the other).

I’ll grant your objections to the study that dogs can discern error in 1 + 1 = 1 (thought I yet disagree with them) … but when it comes to dogs’ ability to deceive, here I’m holding fast. I’ve had too many experiences with dogs to deny them this ability.

Is referral to Reason, the Just, The Good or whatever still referral? — Πετροκότσυφας

As in, a) “Reason / the Just / the Good made me do it—so it’s not my fault,” or b) “I did it—and it is therefore my blame/praise—due to my convictions/beliefs regarding Reason / the Just / the Good”?

Phrased this way, it seems self-explanatory to me. (A) pertains to the category of not holding moral agency; (B) pertains to the category of moral agency.

Interesting question, though.

:blush: ... well. Yea, but I make an big effort to prioritize the stuff that ought to be prioritizing right now. So ... not that my word is in any way absolute ... but, I'd like to not reply until after this weekend my time.

Yeah well... without access to the details of the experiment, I cannot know if it's good quality or not. Do you have access to the details? — creativesoul

no, but see my reasoning in what I added/edited in my previous post.

Do you agree with these two claims? — creativesoul

I agree with them, but they're not essential to the issue of recognizing 1 + 1 = 1 to be erroneous/incorrect/wrong/etc. This does require the recognition of error and different quantities.

No, I wasn't taking it personally. Basically giving a shout-out to good quality research in the fields of psychology / cognition.

You've disagreed with the first claim above, which was being used as a premiss. It needs set out so that you can address it's ground, prior to it's being used as a premiss.

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief. — creativesoul

OK

P3 is to me not true/right/correct.

By analogy: I can be aware of time (as can most any lesser mammal, for example) without needing to have an awareness about me having a belief about time. Same with space. Same with quantity and rudimentary arithmetic. Same with the law of noncontradiction. Same with values we term “bad” and “good”. Don’t tell me we humans now have a conclusively definitive understanding of what time, space, mathematics, laws of thought, and the meta-ethical reality of bad/good are … Nevertheless, we now as adults—just as we did as infants—hold an awareness of them … one that does not existentially require a belief/thought about our belief/thought prior to the very awareness being present.

Same type of pre-linguistic, pre-meta-cognitive awareness can be had in relation to error/non-error in manners a priori to an awareness about the belief that one can be erroneous/non-erroneous.

... as evidence, there's again the addressed empirical research into dog intelligence showing that dogs can find 1 +1 = 1 erroneous. I don't have access to the original experiment(s). But, the way I understand and know this ethological research to be, those who express human-like abilities in lesser animals are viciously assaulted by others in related fields. So I'm inferring that where this statement to not be well-justified/grounded, it would never have been published by the APA.

There's a reason why psychology is called a 'soft' science, and an appeal to authority is rather unconvincing, particularly nowadays given the way science is funded... — creativesoul

Having both engaged in independent psychological (cognitive science) experiments (particularly, in the importance of eyes v. mouth in human non-linguistic communication concerning emotions) as well as in a neuroscience lab (experiments on zebra finches learned capacities to recognize and produce song patterns via brain lesion to critical areas in chicks, etc.)—both some twenty years ago—my personal experience illustrates to me that well done psych. research can hold far, far fewer confounding variables and, therefore, far greater statistical integrity than the often termed “hard sciences” of biology/neuroscience. Take it or leave it. They’re nevertheless my experiences.

Do you not even grant these points? — creativesoul

No, actually. But I'm feeling there's often differences with the semantics of the words we're both using. And to get to the bottom of it would most likely be very time consuming.

At any rate, it was nice engaging in this overall debate with you. But I’ll leave it where we’re at. Till the next time. :up:

I would need to see the actual studies and experiments that these conclusions were based upon in order to offer a more informed opinion of the reliability of those conclusions. — creativesoul

Hey, I’m trusting the info based on what I take to be the fact that the information on both sciencedaily and Wikipedia would not be up there were it to be uncorroborated, merely anecdotal, or hearsay. Both sources heavily rely upon peer-review, after all.

In addition, you've now presented a strawman argument on multiple occasions. You've adamantly rejected things that I've not claimed. It is always better to actually present the argument and then clearly express which premisses or conclusions you disagree with and offer some valid objection for that disagreement.

I do not want to get into yet another discussion where one participant is criticizing another's position/argument without first granting the terms. That is the bane of philosophy. — creativesoul

Hm. Whatever I might have either not addressed or, else, poorly represented was unintentional on my part. I’m more than OK with simply agreeing to disagree at this point. I’ll leave it at that.

Very true. Yet, to me at least, the only meaningful distinction is between a Humean Compatibilism and that of Determinism. If determinism, than all agency is an illusion—as is all responsibility. If compatibilism (again, as per Hume and not as a semantically altered version of what yet remains a metaphysical determinism; the latter being our typical modern understanding of the term) then—though we can never choose the alternatives we choose between at any given instance of choice, nor choose the very impetus to make choices—the very act of choosing between the given alternatives at any given time will ontologically be dependent on nothing else but the chooser/agency in a metaphysical self-caused manner—i.e. via a metaphysically valid freewill (which is not the same as indeterminsim when interpreted as ontological randomness due to lack of causal determinism)—thereby leading to a noncontradictory justification for responsibility in the choices one does make ... and to the ontic reality of agency.

---

Edit for greater completion of argument: Freewill does get complicated by influence(s). Tell someone they need to do X to not go to hell but instead be welcomed into heaven and you will have influenced their choice, for example. But, under compatibilism, their choice will yet remain their responsibility—together with their choice to believe these notions of hell and heaven to be BS and the person to be a malevolent manipulator, for example. Influence upon some choice does not amount to a causal determination of what will be chosen. Alternatively: holding a gun to someone's head will strongly influence their choice, but it will not causally determine it.

---

But for the determinist, of course we’ve been predetermined to endlessly debate free will v. determinism; agency is an illusion, we’re all predetermined automata, and anything we do, believe, will, etc. is part of a fully deterministic whole. Talking about “living within an illusion” philosophies … this is it.