I'm increasingly convinced that beliefs are a folk-psychological back-construct; that they are an invention that serves, however poorly, our attempts to explain what we do; but which does not correspond to anything real. — Banno

Can you—or anyone else for that matter—find any difference between the semantics of “a maintained trust that [such and such is the case]” and “a belief that [such and such is the case]”?

If yes, I so far haven’t, and would like to hear about it.

If no, then do you still feel the same about “a maintained trust that” (given that it means the same thing as “belief that”)?

For that belief to exist one would have to exist to believe it. Similarly [...]
in Descartes' argument, it's not the cause of the thought that is relevant. Even if the thought was thought by the evil demon, the one that holds the belief about thinking it, the one that is conscious of the thought and experiences it, must exist in order to do so. — BlueBanana

As a meta-example of what I’m saying: I uphold that fallibilism is true. It fallibilism is indeed a true belief (a belief which conforms to the ontic given which it references, namely our psychological/mental capacities), then it will be justifiable, at least in principle (it will not contradict any other epistemically established, believed truths and will cohere into such truths which are related). So here the onus is on me to justify that my belief is in fact ontically true (and not merely a believed truth that is in fact false, i.e. not true).

Some will uphold the Buddhist stance of no-self to signify that we do not exist--more particularly, that there is no ontic given which the pronoun "I" references. (Something which is not in keeping with what the Buddha stated; he said, “neither is there a self nor is there not a self” … or something along these lines, which need not be a contradiction if not at the same time or in the same way. More recently saw a documentary, “Compassion in Emptiness,” in which it is stanchly affirmed that self-worth is crucial for compassion—thereby acknowledging there being a self while yet maintaining a no-self thesis … different issue though.) As a different example, others will argue for one form or another of hard-determinism and, in so doing, will denounce all agency … as in “I did this (I caused this to happen)” or “Descartes thought things (Descartes caused his own particular thoughts to hold presence)" … which can also result in an argument against the presence of selves (minimally as pertains to the agency involved with thoughts, beliefs, interpretations (which are essential to the meaning/significance that either accompanies or is embedded with perceptions), etc.—and what is a self when deprived of all agency? … but I won’t play the devil’s advocate in arguing for this).

Feel like my hands are tied. I, for example, don’t want to rely upon a hard-determinist argument because I disagree with it. But I’ll conclude with this: until one can demonstrate with infallible certainty that all such alternatives are false, or impossible, there will remain some degree of possible error in our appraisals that we exist … even that anything exists (for it is we who make such appraisals).

Here’s a justifiable possibility (as compared to possibilities that are for example contradictory, thus unjustifiable, thus invalid--such as the possibility of a square composed of three sides) with which to more formally back this up: we humans are not the pinnacle of what intellect can existentially be, such that if our species survives some 100 millennia from now, it will then obtain some instances of knowledge which we currently cannot fathom. No one can prove a) that our species will go extinct and b) that 100 millennia from now some sapient descendent of our species will not discover some strongly justified alternative to our needing to be/exist (or to anything needing to be/exist). The very potential for such justifiable alternative being someday discovered in itself makes our current convictions that we exist less than perfectly secure from all possible error—therefore, our belief that we exist is yet technically fallible.

This is all taken to an extreme--though I so far find it to be a sound argument. But again, the onus is now on me to justify fallibilism as currently being ontically true (though maybe not at some future period of our awareness as sapient beings given all universal time that is yet to come … For, if fallibilism is currently true, the impossibility of this scenario could not be demonstrated with infallible certainty).

As you may notice, falliblism does away with the crutch of absolute/infallible subjective certainty. But this is not to say that it denies there being such a thing as the ontic, as well as conformity to that which is ontic.

But what if the teapot is not only small, but also invisible and does not interact with the Universe in any way - it can't be perceived and does not influence anything? How could its existence be proven even in theory? — BlueBanana

To keep this short for now: Why presume that such a teapot is an ontic given to begin with? If it’s not an ontic given, then all beliefs affirming its truth would be false … and thereby unjustifiable.

Not always: one can always know their own existence. Mathematics and logic can also be argued on. I also think the context matters, as some information can be said to be infallible with specific premises, like that we can generally speaking trust our perceptions. Considering "I think, therefore I am" to be the only certainly justified belief and the only infallible knowledge won't get one far and I think no meaningful conclusions can be drawn from that. — BlueBanana

But of course one can always fallibly know about one’s own existence, that 1 and 1 equates to 2, etc. In your statement though I read the implicit affirmation that knowledge is infallible in order for it to be real/true knowledge. Reminds me of my take on why so many philosophical skeptics in history maintained that there can be no knowledge: because to others knowledge is always taken to entail infallibility.

To be clear, by “infallible” I don’t intend “infallible for all intended purposes” of “infallible given the conditions X, Y, and Z” but, instead, that which is “perfectly secure from all possible error”. I duly uphold that the argument for the law of noncontradiction is abnormally strong to an extreme—or at least that it can be—but I as of yet don’t know of an infallible justification for it. Because there is no justification that is perfectly secure form all possible error that either you or me (or anyone else that we’ve ever heard of) can evidence for the law of noncontradiction, the law of noncontradiction then will not be perfectly secure form all possible error as far as we can evidence. It is thereby fallible—i.e. holds some capacity of being wrong, regardless of how miniscule and utterly insignificant this capacity might be. Which is not to say that it is therefore false.

Then, 1 and 1 being equivalent to 2 could potentially entail that 1 and 1 does not equate to 2 at the same time and in the same way. This is acknowledgedly aberrant. But since there is no infallible justification for the law of noncontradiction, contradictions could then be instances of non-erroneous reasoning in ways in which our limited (non-omniscient) minds can’t currently fathom. This is my short-cut argument for 1 + 1 = 2 being fallible—and not infallible—knowledge (for it could be that 1 + 1 is also not equal to 2 … iff contradictions were not errors of reasoning … which we can’t infallibly evidence one way or another). This, though, doesn’t make it untrue that 1 + 1 = 2 and only 2. Our notion of 1 + 1 = 2 could well be an ontic truth, and thereby infallibly correct, but I’m not holding my breath for anybody to demonstrate its literal infallibility.

As to Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, Descartes took the “I think” proposition for granted, without demonstrating its infallibility. In fact, the thought he refers to could conceivably be caused by some given other than himself—the “I” he is addressing—such as by the evil demons we’ve all since Descartes time have become so accustomed to … or else the thoughts could be utterly uncaused in all senses (a block-universe model could account for this). Were any of these alternatives to describe that which is true, the proposition “I think” would then be false. As with 1 + 1 = 2 however, this isn’t to say that “I think” is therefore false. But it is not an infallible premise, or proposition, or conclusion form which other infallible conclusions—namely, that of “I am”—can be drawn.

In short, knowledge pertaining to non-omniscient first person points of view will always be fallible, regardless of what it may be about. I can argue this one further if needed. Simply present an instantiation of what is supposed to be infallible knowledge. :razz:

Though, because justification can be strong and weak, so too can knowledge be strong and weak. We hold strong knowledge that we are earthlings (right up there with BIVs, say rather than all 7(?) billion of us being extraterrestrial offspring) … as well as that 1 + 1 = 2 and that we are/exist. We hold comparatively weak knowledge of what the weather will be like in a few days from now (but we generally still know something about it).

That all knowledge is theoretically capable of being wrong, again, does not then mean that all our knowledge therefore is wrong (it could in fact depict that which is ontically true). Only that it is fallible, sometimes to an exceedingly insignificant degree—this outside of philosophical contemplations such as those regarding the nature of knowledge.

What about the situations where people might disagree on whether the evidence justifies a belief? — BlueBanana

In these cases, these very same people would disagree on whether or not knowledge is had. My quoted statement states that where knowledge is had it will always be (fallibly) epistemically justified to be true. Where there is disagreement about the validity of justification, however, there will then also be disagreement on there being knowledge.

If the Russell's teapot existed there'd be no justification for individuals of it. — BlueBanana

A good point. Poorly worded on my part. Here I meant that truths are always justifiable in principle. For example, if a teapot floats in space between the Earth and Mars, it will be capable of being evidenced to so be given a sufficiently large body of acquired information and analysis of this information. So too with there being a needle in a haystack. But, yes, we were talking in context of knowledge being justifiable true belief in practice. What I was getting at, in retrospect, is a little more complex, and it deals in large part with what I take to be ontological themes. To not seem like a charlatan: Ontic givens will, I uphold, not be mutually exclusive (will not be contradictory) and will cohere with each other when sufficiently related … akin to saying that the cosmos is a whole (it in fact gets more complex due to ontic randomness/indeterminacy being, imo, part of the picture, but to keep this on the brief side …). Truths, then, by virtue of conforming to ontic givens in one way or another, shall then hold similar properties: they shall not contradict and will cohere when sufficiently related. I won’t try to justify this here; its more than a mouthful even if I haven’t missed the mark. But then, if so, to justify a truth is to show how it is noncontradictory to other established truths (with those of direct experience being paramount, though fallible; here invoking foundationalism) and, with this, how it coheres into sufficiently related truths (here invoking coherentism). So truths are then always justifiable, at least in principle. But, in retrospect, my bad for bringing this up. It’s a topic for a different thread, maybe. And, again, good call on what I previously said. Yes, some beliefs which are ontically true cannot be justified in practice.

First I'd like to say that the hollow Earth theory is a poor choice of example [...] — BlueBanana

I personally like the hollowed Earth example. The Earth is either hollow or it is not; they can’t both be true (and even if contradictions were to be non-erroneous reasoning, we wouldn’t be able to make any sense out of them anyway). Even when knowledge is specified as “believed to be true beliefs epistemically justified in being ontically true” it would still pivot around ontic truth … thereby being upheld to be justified true belief (till evidenced to in fact be untrue, were such time to ever present itself … it might never do). It could be that my expressions/understandings are off base—in which case I’m very grateful for the criticism—but, to me, propositional knowledge then entails that that which is known is always assumed to be ontically true. Then, because those who know the earth to be hollow hold contradictory positions to those who know the earth to be solid, at least one of these two maintained instances of knowledge will be false. Justifications for the Earth being solid far outweigh justifications for the Earth being hollow (e.g., tectonic plate movements caused by convection currents of magma explain earthquakes … earthquakes being something which the hollow Earth model cannot as coherently justify).

Now that I think of it, this turns out to be a fairly good example of the complexities involved with knowledge. But I’ll leave it as it is unless there’s greater interest in this example.

More on topic, I find the view peculiar in that it allows false knowledge but does not really allow its practical usage. Basically it gives individuals the possibility of belief that their knowledge has a chance of being incorrect, but the hollow Earth model is, although stupid, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us, theoretical possibility, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us. This is why I'd prefer to define irrational beliefs, when believed by other to be justified, to be knowledge, that one then has a belief about that the knowledge is false. — BlueBanana

I’m so far not getting this. While I haven’t myself explicitly made use of the phrasing “false knowledge”, I can understand it in this way: false knowledge is not knowledge because it is false. This in parallel to a false truth (e.g., a lie) not being truth because it is false.

That seems logical but I also can't quite agree. I feel like there's a jump between the colloquial sense of uncertainty and absolute certainty. — BlueBanana

My take is that if we don’t find a means to amalgamate common sense uses of certainty (as in, “I’m sort’a certain that […]” or “my certainty of […] is strong”) with philosophical certainty, then we deprive ourselves of a term (and corresponding concept) used for “not being uncertain about” within realms of philosophy of mind. What I meant was that to believe X is to not be uncertain about X (therefore, to not be uncertain that our beliefs concerning X are true)—and not that it means “believing belief X to be (philosophically/absolutely) certain”.

... And now, without further ado, I'm off to bed. Man, I'll try to keep my posts shorter next time around. No promises though.

Ah, just saw your usage of epistemic justification contra my usage of factual justification. I like it.

Whoa, I didn't consider this at all to be honest - that one could have infallible knowledge with justification that isn't infallible. [...] — BlueBanana

Right, but I don’t endorse the term of “infallible knowledge” in this case for the reasons I previously tried to provide. If knowledge is not a lucky guess, then one cannot have infallible knowledge—not unless one infallibly demonstrates it to so be "infallible belief that is infallibly true and is infallibly justified as being true".

On the other hand, one can luckily guess a conclusion which is ontically true and, in so being, which is factually correct and, thereby, perfectly devoid of error--hence, which is infallible. If one can’t justify this conclusion, though, it would not be knowledge. Where it gets trickier is: If one can justify that some conclusion is ontically true—but not infallibly justify the conclusion to so be—one would then have only fallible knowledge of an ontic truth, but not infallible knowledge.

Why would this conclusion not properly fit the stance of a fallibilistic epistemology? (From previous exchanges, we both agree with epistemology being fallible.)

As I stated somewhere earlier in this thread, I try to make definitions that describe colloquial uses, and that knowledge is in colloquial sense never certain is the very reason I'm using my idea of false knowledge. This leads to basically that when one believes to know something (that is, they believe to have a justified true belief) instead of knowing that they only believe that information, they must know that thing. — BlueBanana

I fully agree with this.

Because of this, it must be that as the person in your example believes their belief to be true and infallible, they do know that which their intuition tells them. — BlueBanana

But an somewhat unclear about this. Whenever we believe things--and are not then uncertain about them--we then hold a subjective certainty that our beliefs are true. But mere subjective certainty does not then imply that one holds knowledge of what one is confident about. I can be certain that the universe is most properly depicted by a cyclical model, but this in itself is not knowledge of the universe so being--not unless I can justify this certainty to be ontically true (which I can't).

What I'm not sure about is whether intuition, which I think is a valid justification, can justify intuition. — BlueBanana

Interesting issue. To me an intuition is an apprehension of awareness. This is in parallel to physiological perceptions being apprehensions of awareness. Foundationalism would hold that these immediate apprehensions of awareness are self-evident truths (though I'm not certain about how it typically addresses intuitions). The rebuttal is that they could be illusion, hallucination, or delusion. So, to me, that's where Haack's foundherentism shines. But I'll leave this open for some other post, if this topic of justification gets further addressed.

Seems like there’s something in the way here, though I’m not sure what it is. As you’ve mentioned, (fallible) justification is about (imperfectly) evidencing something to be the case, not about (absolute) proof. Then the implicit question is, “justified to be true to whom?” To the individual, to a cohort of those concerned in the matter, or, else, in an absolute sense as viewed from some supposed omniscient perspective? To the individual and the cohort, justification will always be fallible; from the latter ideal perspective, it will be infallible, i.e. serve as absolute proof.

To readdress a former example, that there is a sheep in the field is justified to Tom as a true belief—and is therefore fallible knowledge to Tom. But it is not factually justified as a true belief to the shepherd (and to us) who knows that what Tom was looking at was in fact a shepherd dog in the field. (Tangentially, the shepherd (or else us the onlookers) might find Tom’s presumption morally justified—else stated, understandable, and thereby not deserving of reprimand even if wrong—but the shepherd will nonetheless not find Tom’s belief to be factually justified, this due to being based on Tom’s false belief of having seen a sheep). To complete the example, the shepherd’s knowledge on this matter, though outstanding, is nevertheless fallible as well—this because it is not literally omniscient.

Hence, given Tom’s limited information, Tom has valid but fallible knowledge of there being a sheep in the field. If Tom doesn’t approach the animal or talk to any shepherd, that’s all he will ever know about what he saw in the field. And when Tom tells his friend about it, his friend will have no reason to doubt that Tom has knowledge of there having been a sheep in this one field.

The shepherd (as also applies to us the onlookers) also holds limited information—and is thereby not infallible due to not being omniscient. But he holds more information on this topic than does Tom. So both the shepherd and us the onlookers hold valid but fallible knowledge of Tom not knowing that there is a sheep in the field, this due to our knowing that Tom was wrong in what he thought he saw.

To Tom, his belief is justified (to the best of his awareness). For clarity, Tom here factually holds justifications for his belief being true—for he has no info that would evidence any of his other beliefs which he uses as justification to be false.

To the shepherd, Tom’s belief is not factually justified (to be technically correct, also to the best of his awareness), due to the belief being based either on false premises or illusory experiences.

(A problem however emerges when one wants to affirm that a believed to be justified belief is not justified from an omniscient perspective—for no sentient being is endowed with this perspective in practice.)

Longwinded but this serves as a background to this conclusion: Wherever knowledge is upheld, relative to the individual(s) who so uphold, knowledge will always be factually justified to be true.

The property of truth doesn’t follow from the property of being justifiable; rather the reverse applies. If a belief is true, it will then necessarily also be to some extent justifiable. Untrue beliefs will not be factually justifiable (at least given sufficient enquiry into the matter and a sufficiently large body of information being obtained). So if one can’t justify a belief, it evidences the belief to either be uncertain or to be certainly false.

To that extent, both unjustified true beliefs and justified false beliefs would not be propositional knowledge whenever they are known to so be, this to whomever knows them to so be (this latter instantiation of “to know” is referencing knowledge via acquaintance/experience, maybe to greater extent than propositional knowledge … it would all be contingent on the particular examples).

So—while one can try to argue that knowledge is beliefs believed to be justified and true irrespective of whether or not they are in fact justified and true (this from an omniscient perspective?)—I’m maintaining that in practice knowledge will always be justified and true to the best awareness of the knowers … and will be so maintained to be until evidenced otherwise.

If an individual stubbornly maintains an irrational belief to be true and justified as true (e.g., the belief that Earth is hollow … believe it or not, I’ve heard this one before), while it will be considered knowledge to the individual, it will not be knowledge to us. That it is a “belief that is believed to be justified” is insufficient to make it knowledge to us. What would make this belief knowledge to us is a justification for this belief that would evidence this belief to be true (this in light of the many things we already (fallibly) know, such that gravity requires mass, thereby entailing that a hollowed planet would be devoid of the gravity we experientially know our planet to have).

We would hypothetically concede to this being knowledge only because we’d then come to believe that it is true on account of the justifications provided. Yes, it would then be a believed to be true and justified belief—but it’s status as knowledge would be fully contingent on these beliefs of being true and justified. Hence, I’m maintaining, whether or not a belief is (fallibly) true and (fallibly) justified is pivotal to what knowledge is.

knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, regardless of whether it's true or not and regardless of whether it's justified or not. — BlueBanana

This sort of leads its way into the issue of what justification is. There’s foundationalism, coherentism, or Susan Haack’s proposal of a hybrid, which I favor (I’ve yet to find reason to take other theories of justification seriously). All the same, if truth has no bearing on justification, then I so far find that the term “justification” would be devoid of meaning.

I’ll elaborate a little: Imo, justification is the process of evidencing that addressed to be just. To be just can hold two meanings: just in terms of facticity and just in terms of morality. When it comes to propositional knowledge, to justify a belief is to evidence how the belief’s contents are factually just (not morally just). This, in turn, entails that justification is about evidencing a belief to be true (with truth loosely meaning “conformity to that which is factually just”—which to me encompasses correspondence theory of truth).

So if knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, it would then need to be belied to be true. So then when we discover that our believed to be justified beliefs are not true, then they cease to be knowledge for us.

Also, doesn’t a belief need to be to some extent justified by oneself in order for one to believe it to be justified by oneself?



All too true. The issue as you pointed out is one of demonstrability. To add an example, one can hold an intuitive certainty about something—a gut feeling—and this belief can in fact be infallibly true, or infallibly correct (when ontically appraised from some supposedly omniscient perspective). But—as you’ve mentioned—if one has no means of evidencing this gut-felt certitude to be infallible, one would have no means of knowing whether or not it in fact is infallible.

But this then to me signifies that we can’t have infallible knowledge, since knowledge in part requires that it be justified. To be in possession of infallible knowledge seems to me to require that one is also in possession of a demonstrably infallible justification for that which one believes (again, with justification to me being an evidencing that that addressed is factually just).

To be more explicit, I take infallibilism to be about demonstrably infallible believed truths (Descartes comes to mind as an infallibilist, for that’s what he was searching for prior to commencing his methodological doubt; he had faith that he could demonstrate infallible believed truths). Fallibilism—as I see it at least—is like holding a null hypothesis that all of one’s knowledge is infallible despite not having infallible justification for this which, as a null hypothesis, will always then hold the potential of being falsified … thereby making all knowledge fallible from the get go.

So one could unknowingly hold infallible beliefs at any time. But without being able to infallibly justify any particular instantiation of this, one then could never be in possession of infallible knowledge (for one wouldn’t be able to appraise whether or not one’s beliefs are infallible). More to the point, because justification is an intrinsic aspect of propositional knowledge, devoid of infallible justification one cannot then have infallible knowledge. No?

Its late for me and I’m a bit tired; hoping I didn’t misinterpret your latest posts.

A justified true belief is true knowledge. It seems logical that justified belief is then knowledge. Knowledge can be false. Therefore a justified belief can be false. If something can be some way, I don't see why one couldn't believe the thing to be so. So, a justified belief can be false, and therefore one can believe a justified belief to be false.

Seems far fetched but that might work :chin: — BlueBanana

In thinking that I agree, and in furthering this train of thought:

There’s a difference between fallibilist systems of epistemology and infallibilist systems of epistemology—although the two often seem implicitly converged in addressing knowledge. I’m one to strongly argue against infallibilism (that we can obtain knowledge guaranteed to be perfectly secure form all possible error), so I’m addressing the position I uphold, that of fallibilistic epistemology. Some homemade perspectives:

Justified and true belief is, in a sense, the ideal standard by which we declare what is and is not knowledge. It is ideal because implicit to it is the affirmation of an infallible, or ontic, truth. In practice, however, all we ever have to work with is believed to be truths. So, in practice, what we uphold to be knowledge can be specified as “believed to be true beliefs which we can justify in being ontically true” or, more briefly expressed, “justified believed truths” … which we then assume to be justified true beliefs by default of being justified in being true. (I take this to be similar enough to what you mean by “justified belief is [...] knowledge”.)

JTB—due to being ontically true—cannot hold the potential of being wrong: it is infallible. The issue here becomes whether or not one knows the given truth, in which case one can justify it, or if one is merely lucky in holding a belief that is ontically true. But, again, in practice we only have JBT—which we then assume to be JTB when in deed justified (e.g., noncontradictory to our other JBTs, etc.). We can’t guarantee that what we assume to be a true belief is in fact true; this because we are fallible in our appraisals of what is true. And, I believe, it is because of this that we must then also be capable of justifying our beliefs as true. If we can’t evidence that our beliefs are in fact true then we don’t have grounds for confidence that our beliefs are true (either due to a then resulting uncertainty or due to flagrant contradictions between the beliefs we hold within awareness at any particular time).

This summing up my current views, what you’ve termed “false knowledge” is, to me, then JBT which we take to be JTB by default which, nevertheless, is however not in fact true (though it remains fallibly justified as being true).

As an example: if Tom believes he’s seen a sheep at a distance and can justify this belief (e.g., it looks like a sheep, etc.), then, to Tom’s awareness, he holds (fallible) knowledge of there being a sheep at a distance—though, in fact (in truth), what Tom has seen is a white coated shepherd dog bred to look like sheep. When Tom approaches the sheep he discovers that what he previously took to be knowledge was wrong—for new JBTs now evidence (justify) that the animal is in fact a dog.

Even if not everything here rings true, I yet maintain that there should be first made an explicit distinction between fallible knowledge (which always holds the potential to be incorrect and thereby false in what it upholds as true belief) and infallible knowledge, which by definition is incapable of being false (specifically in that which it affirms to be true).

Maybe some of this will help … again, only meant to confirm what I interpret you as saying.

Nietzsche was a pessimist, y'all. A Dionysian pessimist, but a pessimist nonetheless. — darthbarracuda

Seems like it’s a glass half full half empty issue, from what I recall of him. But he did have parables that to me are not indicators of pessimism. That one about the beast of burden as camel that then has its back broken due to carrying too much of a load, then transforming into a predator, a lion, that needs to destroy the monster of thou shalt (and thou shalt not)—the size of this monster being proportional to the weight it once carried—and, after so liberating itself from this body of authoritarian constraints, then is reawoken, or rebirthed, as a baby who sees the world for the very first time. To me, it is a parable of hope; of challenges to be sure, but one that is nevertheless far more optimistic than pessimistic in its underpinning.

However, eventually, some norms are established, like not killing another human being, etc.

Rather, it is the process of being ethical, or observing morals, that brings about the change in character or the mind which leads to happiness. — Posty McPostface

Again, I’m in overall agreement with the sentiment the OP proposes, but I don’t yet see this sentiment being in any way applicable in today’s world--in terms of concrete results. The DSM could easily incorporate among its metal-disorder indicators something about unethical behavior—regardless of type or degree. One might be surprised at how trite some of the there listed mental disorders are. Yet there are complications:

You mention murder as an example. In war, there can be both killing of humans as well as murder, the later often entwined with extreme cruelty. Skipping the examples, in today’s world would there be any interest to then have those who engage in the latter diagnosed as insane?

Ask most any young enough child if cruelty—toward other humans, toward animals, or in any other form—is good and they will answer, “no”. Us adults, having a history in which we’ve all more or less had instances of being cruel toward some other at some point in our lives (even if indirectly, such as in our eating of veal knowing the cruelly required for its production), will then justify such instances of not being saints or angels as often excusable, if not utterly normal and necessary. Or worse, we go about pretending that we actually are saints or angels, somehow separated from the swine, because this is less painful than being honest about our own faults. Regardless, we all nevertheless know that cruelty is wrong. Yet to make the case for this to be an un-health of mind would then affect all of us adults in manners that most of us would not like. And so, we adults are generally ambivalent in terming cruelty a wrong. It all depends, we most often say.

Don’t want to draw this out in other directions in relation to ethics. I simply believe that generally, insanity will be minimally contingent on the given behaviors standing out from the norm. There’s this modified quote I picked up on that I like, “When the lunatics take over the asylum their beliefs become the dogma of the sane.”

I very much agree with the original argument that being aligned to a moral compass can only make a mind healthier. Yet if one become too moral one deviates from the norm—at a certain juncture can even become harmful to the norm (such as by exposing too many deceptions, etc.). And this generally does not lead to good results for a social individual. I could fathom that some wise individual might be able to hold onto both an integral moral compass and a general accord to the practices of the norm, but I don’t yet understand how the tension would not yet remain … it would not be the serene happiness that I take is most often associated with eudemonia.

Not that any of this is a formal argument, but I think it better expresses my quibble with the pragmatic application of holding unethical behaviors and inclinations to be aspects of an unhealthy mind. (as for murder, please see my aforementioned comments).

I’ll be taking a break for now. Still—without here presenting what I already agree with and what I find issue with—I’m thinking it might be beneficial to first try to present a definition of this very abstract term, “aesthetics”. Yes, I know it’s something that has been addressed for over two millennia without yet being definitively defined. But having a general idea of what aesthetics is supposed to be to those who’d partake of this discussion would nevertheless be helpful.

As to me, I’ve already said a little of it in my previous posts. If needed, I’ll better express what I interpret as the referent to this word in a later post.

Hmm, guess no takers then. I thought it was an edifying thought that what is ethical can be thought to be conducive to a sound and healthy mind? — Posty McPostface

I gather from a few mocking birds that people have a hard time even figuring out what the golden rule is supposed to be about. How on earth is anyone expected to know what is wrong and what right if we adults don’t first have a cognitively present, perfectly justified, absolute truth about what ethics are? I say adults because most all kids have such knowledge; but kids don’t count because they don’t think about their thoughts as we adults do … at least they don't count according to a bunch of learned adults that can’t settle on what the golden rule is.

Skipping some potentially important step in argumentation, in short, I find a lot of truth in the OP’s basic assertion. So, more seriously, I second that there ought to be some established clinical diagnosis for cruelty, for instance. Problem is it’s so rampant among mankind that you’d have a hard time finding someone devoid of this mental disorder to write it up as a mental disorder in the first place—and even if you did, then the majority of others would ensure that this denotation of mental insanity never makes it to the light of day.

My occasionally present dark and obtuse sense of humor, I guess. But the point to this post I think still holds.

This is in opposition to just measuring somethings aesthetic value purely on subjective taste, without regard for the taste of others, or whether some have better or worse taste. — Noble Dust

There are some terms that don’t chime true to me within the context so far addressed: “measure” and “better and worse taste [...objectively(?)]”.

The first, measure, to me doesn’t fit because aesthetics are not something measurable. One can make a numeric scale, such as from 1 to 10, but even so there is no mathematically precise way of gaging aesthetic quality or intensity ... save by comparison of qualia to the extent this is at all possible.

The second, better and worse taste, is to me about as ambiguous as it gets. Refinement by the self-declared elite will be deemed better taste than what is the common and, hence, vulgar tastes of the masses. An individual with commonsense-like tastes will deem the overly abstract tastes of the self-professed elite to be pompous buffoonery that, maybe, has lost touch with reality. Now, me personally, I’ll find better tastes as well as worse tastes in both the more refined and in the more vulgar—this to not confuse a generalized observation with a personal inclination. But, being that it’s an issue of value, the question will always remain: better or worse to whom and for what personal reasons?

That aside, where you find a strawman in my stance I find a perspective which does not work in yours (imo … but I’ll refrain from adding this “imo” to every statement I’ll make, though they will so be—which to me signifies that I’m still learning things and could well be wrong in what I currently uphold).

This objective aesthetic would either be objective in the sense of a rock, as a physical and measurable object, being objective or, else, objective in the sense of being 100% impartial, as in (partial) objectivity in what one judges to factually be.

I for now greatly presume we both agree that it would be more along the lines of the second form of objectivity. Correct me if needed. Nevertheless, I strongly disagree with the first application of the term within this context of aesthetics.

Then objective aesthetics would be something which holds for all particular cases of experienced, subjective aesthetics … these always being individualistic and, where commonality is found, common to some given cohort.

The objective aesthetic, though, would itself not consist of any particular phenomena which would apply to individual cases of experienced aesthetic. Otherwise, it would not be a universal property common to literally all instances of this experience of the aesthetic.

Suffice it to say that, from the vantage I’ve tried to present, while one can hold an understanding for others’ aesthetics, the value of the experienced aesthetic will nevertheless always be accordant with the statement that “aesthetics is in the eyes of the beholder”. It’s not this or that object that is the objective aesthetic. Its more like this: it’s what all individuals experience—a calling toward (akin to a telos) which attracts in a specific way relative to where the individual presently is mentally—that serves as the myriad different facets of the same, objective aesthetic.

While I’d be glad if this at least makes some sense even if not fully agreed with, no problems if it doesn’t. I don’t now currently know how to express myself better.

At any rate, I don’t find myself to be presenting a strawman so far.

I don't equate personal "truths" with aesthetic preferences, because I don't use the term "personal truth"; I'm not sure what it means. Personal experience, for instance, is not synonymous with personal "truth". — Noble Dust

A personal truth simply means a personal non-falsity, or non-self-deception. That a person dreamt of trees would be the person’s personal truth, were this dream-experience to have been real. That the trees actually signify what the person dreamed them to signify, for example, might or might not be a self-deception.

Aesthetics—unlike things such as hallucinations—are always truths that strictly apply to the being in question. One cannot, for example, hallucinate an experienced aesthetic.

Hence the different between personal experiences and personal truths as a significant subset of the former.

Do you have a better way for making this distinction?

I do know of another alternative: c) an objective standard of aesthetic value that exists, but which no one subjective being is in possession of.

Or, better:

c) An objective aesthetic reality which no subjective individual has fully experienced, but which is the basis of each subjective individual's aesthetic experiences, even experiences that result in conflicting aesthetic opinions. — Noble Dust

This is an issue of metaphysical inquiry into whether there is something along the lines of a Platonic Form for the aesthetic. I believe there is. All the same, in what way does either alternative you’ve expressed serve as a means of appraising that which is aesthetic?

For my part, I'm in agreement.

Dude, if what one is interested in is a discussion that mutually attempts to better understand the subjective truths of others, where I come from tonality matters … strange as this might seem. A shoot first ask questions later approach doesn’t suit me well. Yes, to each their own methods; just saying, though …

As allegory, I’ll address paintings since it might be less personal. The aesthetic value to works of Rembrandt and Warhol can either be judged—I’ll use the harsher word for “appraised” since it is a judgment after all—based on a) personal truths of aesthetic preferences or b) an objective standard of aesthetic value which one as a subjective being is in possession of. If you know of an alternative to (a) and (b) let me know.

I have in no way claimed that Warhol is devoid of value, to me. To me, his artwork is often repetitive in structure, his painting and illustrative technique is quite simple and at times juvenile, and the concepts and social critiques he makes—though I too like them—do not stand up the concepts and social critiques of Rembrandt. Now that the novelty of each has passed, you’re typical schooled artist will far more easily duplicate Warhol’s methods (though not his genius in the context of his own time) than those of Rembrandt, whose degree of subtlety is immense. I appreciate the layers of meaning that can often be found in Rembrandt far more than in the one-size-fits-all in your face approach of Warhol. This, then, is a reflection—for better or worse—of my own tastes, i.e. is one person’s summed up explanation of his own personal truths as regards one’s own aesthetic preferences.

Another might likewise cordially explain why they find Warhol more appealing than Rembrandt. Maybe on account of being more minimalist, more serene in expressions, while all the while being more frank. I, then, upon then better understanding this alternative aesthetic, might then further develop my own, maybe to the point that I then will indeed favor Warhol over Rembrandt on a personal level of who I’d most likely first buy an art book of, or who’s works I’d first place in my house most prominently where I to have the money.

Still, all this would yet be (a) interacting with (a), and at no point in time would it be due to (b).

To claim a bird’s eye view of aesthetic truth is, from where I currently stand, to be a participant in the emperor’s new clothes phenomena. “Why yes, they are beautiful … well, maybe not to me personally now but to all those others out there who exalt in this view from nowhere regarding aesthetic truths and who I naturally then agree with; its they who are the experts, after all; you can tell by how much money they’re making.” Something along these lines.

To me aesthetics is power relative to the psyche(s) which hold the experience of it. If it does not grab you without letting go—while dragging you toward realms of reality both intimately familiar and yet estranged from you--it holds no power to you and is not to you an aesthetic. Of course it may not to you while it may indeed do so to others. Aesthetics are in the eyes (or ears, etc.) of the beholder. And, in so being, they will always pertain to (a); not to (b)—again, this as I currently interpret things.

Same, then, with music. And my own subjective truths so far remain the same as they were when first here expressed—idiosyncratic as they might, or might not, be. Yet I now see I need to emphasize this: again, I hold this perspective not in terms of all music, but in terms of the overall music making its way into common culture. Such a thing still exists, I at least hope. And I of course do not deny occasional exceptions standing out as great music. In terms of new bands within common culture, X Ambassodors come to mind with their hit single Renegades. But again, it’s an issue of individual tastes.

I was suggesting that you were assuming an objective standard by saying "It's about what is expressed". — Noble Dust

To me art is minimally differentiated from non-art precisely due to the intention of expression and its then manifested results. If I find a brick placed on a brick wall and it was maybe forgotten there by someone, it then is not art. If, on the other hand, the same brick on the same wall in the same position resulted from some psyche’s intention to express anything whatsoever either to others or this their own person, then it is art. Maybe not the best to most, but it then is an instance of art all the same.

So yes, I do claim this aspect of something expressed to be a universal in relation to what art minimally is. Hence, were someone to claim that a certain landscape is art, this—as I currently interpret it—can only make sense were the person in question to interpret the landscape to have been in some way created by some being with intention to express some either emotive or cognitive meaning. Can you find something wrong with this?

If not, then I argue that what is expressed then matters relative to who it is expressed to.

Another way to appreciate this last point is to appreciate that we don't have an ongoing model. each one of us has our own on going model which is different to others - and sometimes radically so - and all of them are conjectural on your understanding. But this, surely, makes every model, no matter how seemingly absurd, equal in authority to every other. — PossibleAaran

You raise good points. Yet there remains this: the Viking, the young Earth Christian, and the physicalist atheist, when they are in close enough proximity to interact, will all hold implicit accord on everything which is common to all three. They may each enter into immediate conflict upon such an encounter due to disagreements—even that of an all-out war—yet even in so doing they each will hold implicit accord in what causes what in relation to their immediate, concrete, commonly shared reality (hence, in the reality of causation); in who said or did something prior to the other saying or doing something (hence, in the reality of temporal sequences and, thereby, of time); in the truth that they are standing upon a solid substratum which affects each equally (hence, in the reality of a physical realm applicable to all); etc.

Each of the three individual’s explanations for causation, time, physicality, etc. will indeed be different—and each will project upon the others a belief that the others lack an adequate understanding of what is metaphysically true—yet this commonly shared reality between each will itself hold its own metaphysical validity in so being.

To me at least, the more mature caricatures of the Viking, the YE Christian, and the physicalist atheist would only have grounds for conflict when contradictions occur in regard to what is commonly shared.

They share one world but hold different explanations for it. This, in itself, is not grounds for conflict for it is a difference that makes no significant difference. But when these explanations for the shared world a) are not demonstrated to be and b) infringe upon the others understanding of what the shared world is, then the explanations of each takes away from the extended-self of the others. By “extended-self” I’m keeping in mind that context is itself one aspect by which the self is defined; e.g. who I am is in part defined by whether I’m a BIV puppeteer by others or not; by whether the world I inhabit is fully deterministic or else can facilitate the reality of freewill; by whether the laws of nature are stable—and some can from this extrapolate eternally fixed—or, to address the other extreme, can change on a dime at any time for no reason whatsoever; etc. A different subject but I'm hoping this issue of an extended-self can be at least partially understood.

To simplify, I’ll only address the YE Christian and the physicalist atheist. They both hold common knowledge of a multitude of givens regarding the here and now—including that of both being humans inhabiting planet Earth. Yet the first claims that Earth started about 6,000 years ago on causal grounds of God and the latter claims that Earth started about 4.5 billion years ago on causal grounds of physical laws. The latter’s claims are accordant to the empirical sciences at expense of any divinity being real and the former’s claims are accordant to one of many interpretations of divinity being real at expense of the empirical sciences. Add some politics into this as regards what the nation to which they both hold citizenship should do and conflicts as regards explanations can then unfold on grounds of contradictions in terms of what is.

Despite such potential conflicts, there yet remains the common reality. I’m upholding that while this reality common to all (“uni-verse” will carry the same connotations) may be reinterpreted metaphysically—such as via inquiry into metaphysics regarding substantiations for what is—it nevertheless can neither be ignored nor denied as a core metaphysical component of reality.

Not that all this serves as any resolution to the problems addressed. But to me at least it reframes the problems in a way that is more acceptable. So, with such outlook, it’s not an issue of everyone for themselves in terms of metaphysics but an issue of which explanation for the whole best accounts for what is common to all in noncontradictory manners … ideally, in as impartial a fashion as is possible, imo.

You're essentially stating your bias (as we all do), but then saying that we're all just biased. — Noble Dust

And somehow, this isn't true?

either own up and make a claim about one era being superior to the other (and then defend the claim), or stop complaining and just accept the evolution of music. — Noble Dust

Sorry, but you lost me here. T-Bone Walker is neither superior nor inferior to Sting. Neither were the eras. To me that is.

As to the second portion of this quote, I to me have not complained, but only frankly stated one more person's subjective truth.

But by assuming that standard and not expressing it and defending it, your assertions hold no weight. — Noble Dust

I'll then let the those who know the objective truth of the aesthetic matter determine what is superior.

Not my style of argument.

As I mentioned previously, it’s a matter of taste. To entertain the comparison you’ve chosen— comparing an apple with an orange in terms of content—the allegorical, metaphorical, and metaphysical allusions made in the lyrics of Running Up that Hill to me far surpass the lyrical appeal of Dare You to Move. Why and how and who cares are not things that can be decided via logical analysis.

Same with the painting world. Some will deride those who claim that painting quality has gone down the drain in terms of what is the modern standard. Yet to someone like myself, a Rembrandt far outweighs the quality—both of structure and of content—of a Warhol.

It’s not about the new which does away with the old. It’s about what is expressed, the quality with which it is expressed, and the tastes of the audience which is exposed to the former.

Now, I acknowledge my bias in what I uphold. But, then, for others to not acknowledge their own is more than a bit dishonest—else, they’re stipulating that their own aesthetic tastes are to be deemed the metric standard by which all else is measured.

So, I’ll be true to myself and uphold that which I initially stated … not as an objective reality but, again, as one more person’s preference.

Again, this is just a skewed view. — Noble Dust

And I will continue to uphold my own bias till I discover good reason not to.

Nitpicking on two songs in an out of context fashion does not evidence an unbiased conclusion that the quality of music overall has remained unchanged.

It depends on tastes, but for someone who doesn’t like the superficial stuff, I’m in agreement that as an overall appraisal, that which now makes it out into culture at large tends to be lacking in the deeper truths—lyrically and instrumentally (here, emotive resonance with what feels true to oneself)—heard in the music of yesterday.

In comparing modern pop with pop songs such as Cyndi Lauper’s Time After Time or Kate Bush’s Running Up that Hill—both of which had plenty of radio play in their day—the more modern pop music that gets radio play is not up to par … this in terms of depth, for lack of a better word.

As to not selling out, you have singers such as Lenard Cohen. Even his last album, released about the time of his death, was superbly intense.

Thinking of downward tendencies, NIN’s Downward Spiral—as with everything that preceded and most of what followed—was good as well … OK, more than great for some of us. Sepultura too has persisted without any indication of selling out.

I can think of other examples of bands that keep things honest for the long hall, Collide as one such band that has never been and likely never will be mainstream (it’s not like every band I listen to has a large following).

But, since this seems to me to be a matter of voting on whether or not music is still staying strong, I too will vote with, “no; as an overall human endeavor and industry, it’s not as good as it used to be”.

Then again, having everyone now exposed to lyrics such as “war, what is it good for?” or “you say you want a revolution”—lyrics that tend to say something meaningful in relation to the lives most people are living (other than simple sex and violence)—might not be in the financial interests of the large corporations which have bought up most of the music industry in the last couple of decades … or so my presumptions go.

A bit of historical pedantry on my part, but I feel it important to note just cuz -- Cicero was a Stoic, and not a Skeptic. — Moliere

Hey, no problem. Didn’t find anything specific in my quick reading of his Wikipedia page but did find this on the Wikipedia page De Natura Deorum:

Gaius Velleius represents the Epicurean school, Quintus Lucilius Balbus argues for the Stoics, and Gaius Cotta speaks for Cicero's own Academic skepticism.

Having read this particular work and a little background—and as is confirmed in the quote above—we was an Academic (i.e., philosophical) skeptic who favored Stoicism in this very addressed work.

I mentioned the guy because he was anything but an ascetic.

There’s Truth, there’s truth(s), there’s a multitude of sometimes inconsistent connotations to each, and there doubtless is an unlimited amount of both individual and communal imagination as to what these signs could be established to mean.

Nietzsche is a fun guy in his expressions of there not being any truth(s).

Yet there’s an underlying problem to any such wondering when addressed at a strictly rational plane of thought.

Is what one believes—and then furthermore claims—a falsity, i.e. an either consciously willed or unconsciously constructed deception regarding ontic facticity? We cannot even begin to cognize this question in manners devoid of a Kantian-like, a priori conviction that there is such thing as truth, i.e. non-falsity. The truth that there are no truths is itself either a truth worthy of being upheld or a falsity which, we all aprioristically intuit, ought not be believed princely because it is not true.

Upholding anything with a negation of truth’s presence or value rationally results in a catch-22, and in a logical contradiction: both X and not-X are at the same time and in the same way (this were X signifies “the presence of truth, i.e. non-falsity”).

For example, suppose one proposes a post-truth world as beneficial. This proposition will either correspond with the reality of what is beneficial—and then be true, i.e. a truth, in at least this one sense of “correspondence to what was, is, or will be factual”—or else it won’t so correspond … in which case the given proposition will at the very best only be a partial truth and, at worst, a complete falsity.

As to Nietzsche, given the total body of his works, I strongly feel that Nietzsche was implicitly equivocating in his assertions about there being no truth(s). Equivocations being something he was fond of doing, such as when addressing the issue of virtue.

All that stated, our knowledge may not ever be demonstrably absolute about anything, but this is no valid reason to then deny the presence of knowledge—maybe formally demarcated as “beliefs fully consistent with the non-contradictory reasoning by which they’re substantiated which we, furthermore, hold no valid reason to suspect being false”… or something along these lines. I, then, can’t find any valid reason to uphold that we do not hold knowledge of truths.

For instance, though I cannot demonstrate this to be absolute/infallible knowledge, I nevertheless know it to be true that this thread has an opening post. Also: though I might not be able to demonstrate my knowledge of this truth to be absolute under intense philosophical interrogation, this by no means contradicts, nor nullifies, the viable possibility that what I here know is, in fact, absolutely true and, in this sense, an absolute truth regarding what is ontic.

Then, how would our philosophical investigations be oriented at anything other than the discovery of deeper truths respective to those we are already knowledgeable of?

Otherwise expressed, to me it seems like when we hold curiosity we likewise hold a desire to know truth--something we more often than not obtain when we act upon our curiosity.

Which aspect? The "value beyond value", or something else? — Noble Dust

Yes, the value beyond conceptualizations of value. I'm working with the presumption that we're on a close enough page with what this signifies--but, to the extent this is wrong, I'd like to find out more about your opinions.

For my part, to use more Eastern slang, to me it is the Akasha—some term it void, or sky, or emptiness—that serves as the non-physical core of the first-person point-of-view—of all first-person points of view. Slightly comically and slightly seriously, in western cultures (as in many of the East) it sometimes was/is termed the fifth element … from what I seem to remember at any rate. The element that binds all other elements together. Here, to be clear, I'm addressing the five ethereal elements of fire, water, air, earth, and this fifth. Oddly, The Fifth Element comes to mind now, but that’s not quite what the potential metaphysics of Akasha would be about. Anyway, my blabbing away aside, please feel free to offer your own takes on what you interpret to be the metaphysical component of being.

I'm not familiar with a nihilistic "meaningless meaning". What is that? — Noble Dust

Oh, my late night sense of humor. Nihilists believe that there is no basic meaning to life or existence, yet they mean things when they speak, so at least their speech is meaningful. Yet because there’s no basic meaning to life, this meaning is basically meaningless. Thus: "meaningless meaning". Or something along those lines.

So do you tend to ascribe this metaphysical aspect of being outside individual selves? Inside? Both?

Now, zoom back in to every day life, and our every day human concept of value, the one which you rightly described as "a human construct that is not the core referent it tries to conceptualize", suddenly seems meaningless without a metaphysical referent. So, if someone were to insist that it doesn't require a metaphysical referent (which I think is implicit in economics, politics, capitalism, etc), then their view, would, necessarily, regardless of whether they are conscious of it, be a materialistic, and thus a nihilistic view. — Noble Dust

This rings true to me. Yes, I too take it that there needs to be a metaphysical component to being in order for value-systems to not be nihilistic. Although, I’ve yet to come to terms with the notion of “meaningless meaning”, a notion which I take to be common staple within nihilisms … which, because of this, so far don’t make sense to me.

That last post of ten hours ago baffled me a bit ... and I reinterpreted the previous ones in light of it. I read "Buddhism, Hinduism, and other spiritual worldviews are inherently materialistic and thus nihilistic". Still hoping this was a bad interpretation on my part. Eah, it likely was.

I don't understand how you can agree here if 1) you consider the gist of my argument to be laconic and 2) your counter-argument is to emphasize the fppov, which is a given in my metaphysical argument for "value beyond value". — Noble Dust

I’d like to remind that laconic, as I so far understand it, is also Spartan (such as in the movie 300): i.e. courageously to the point.

That should answer #1. As to #2, in my current outlook, it is the metaphysically ontic aspects of the first-person point-of-view within which the “value beyond [human conceptualization of] value” resides. My emphasis of the first-person point of view wasn't a counter argument but an intent to make the argument no simpler than as simple as it ought to be ... considering. At any rate, it wasn't an argument against what the OP concludes.

Thanks for the kind reply.

I was thinking this sums up the core aspect of your argument:

For life to have value, it has to be metaphysically predicated on some valuation that is beyond the human concept of value. — Noble Dust

And given your latest reply, I’m now taking it that you hold disagreements with the human concept of value … maybe due to the human concept of value itself being a human construct that is not the core referent it tries to conceptualize? Am I in the general ball park?

I’ve reread your posts, and now find myself having a hard time following. For instance, I in no way understand your last post:

But a system of value that is self-contained is inherently materialistic, thus nihilistic. — Noble Dust

What would a system of value that is not self-contained be? Even when one invokes an Abrahamic Creator Deity the system of value itself as a whole would be self-contained. This self-containment, then, to you makes all forms of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—as only three examples of possible systems of value—inherently nihilistic and materialistic. (?) On account of my own limitations, I don’t know how to reply to this—presuming that this is an accurate interpretation of your own position.

If I’ve misinterpreted, can you better explain this conclusion which you state as fact.

But the issue I'm trying to highlight in regards to measuring the value of human life is that it's always self-contained if we can never truly get beyond the fppov; and if value is always self-contained in this way, then nihilism follows, because all attempts to qualify a measurement of value in regards to life will always be based on something else within life itself; — Noble Dust

I’m short on time now, but:

Unless one wants to uphold materialism and its cherished assumption that death of the flesh is identical to an eternal death of the self … slightly more accurately and metaphysically, an eternal death of the primordial awareness on which awareness-of (hence, selfhood as we know it) is contingent … then nihilism is by no means an entailed conclusion. Nihilism is a product of materialism.

Buddhism upholds Nirvana as this end. Hinduism Moksha (though many variants of Hinduism also occur). I won’t get into other worldviews. Yet there tends to most always be found the concept of a metaphysical end as one of absolute, selfless, and superlative being: an eventual (… who knowns how many physically measured eons from now …) ending in which being/awareness holds presence in manners devoid of other-ness. And as typical of any such worldview, until then the self itself evolves into, ideally, closer proximity toward such “state of bliss”. As some say, for every rebirth there must first be a death (which obviously doesn’t hold materialistically—but is quite often addressed of the self in many religions the world over).

I’ll try to better reply latter on. Though I have to say that, even here, I feel weary of getting into what most would consider to be spiritual worldviews—even when they don’t necessarily contain the presence of deity.

It's ambiguous, what "life" actually means. — darthbarracuda

This is a good point. So, from where I stand, I currently think of life as necessarily consisting—on an individual plane—of a first-person point-of-view regarding anything that is other relative to the same first-person point-of-view; the presence of this ontic state of affairs is then in no way contingent on what we typically understand by self-awareness—on any degree of meta-awareness regarding one’s own awareness; and to be clear, I take this first-person point-of-view to be in perpetual transformations.



I believe that I get what you are saying and that it holds validity at certain plains of thought regarding reality—this when addressed more metaphysically. Yet, soberly and without any intent to disparage, I in my lexicon would term this overall argument “laconic” (both in the sense of “Spartan” and in the sense of “simpleton”). Einstein was good for quotes, including something like this, “make things as simple as possible, but no simpler”. To make it simpler relative to the requirements of a given context, then, to me is to be laconic—something I’m guilty of often enough.

I say this because, in my view, the moment you address life you address a set of first-person point-of-views aware of other. Thus, self as inescapable reference point (a technical self-centeredness) for actions becomes simultaneously established. With any such self, there are then basic value judgments of what is good and what is bad for the respective self—these ranging from the genetically innate to the most abstract concepts that humans are capable of either conjuring or discovering.

I’ll here use to “fppov” to specify “first-person point of view” for the sake of brevity.

Value will always be relative to, minimally, one such fppov. For instance, if one deems one’s own life to have no value, the question then is “no value relative to whom”? One’s self (as a fppov that holds one’s own total life as the object of one’s momentary awareness), others one is surrounded by, the species at large, etc.? Different people are likely to provide different honest answers despite these people affirming the same proposition. Same can be said of egotistic evaluations of one’s own value.

To me, there is no getting beyond self—and thereby beyond value of, firstly, individual lives one encounters (including one’s own) and, secondly, the abstraction of life in general (when it comes to us humans)—for as long as there is an ontic presence of fppovs.

So, in what I take to be states of overall health, it makes sense to me that one values one’s own total being (of body and mind) more when one does virtuous deeds than when one engages in vice (one might think of something extreme to make this general truism stand out better). And, furthermore, likewise does it make sense to me that one then finds value in a similar fashion for the individual lives of others—as unique persons or as individual cohorts—this, again, in respect to one’s own fppov.

Nevertheless, as concerns the abstraction of life in general and its ontic value, I fully agree that it is predicated on the very being of life, more particularly on the presence of human life from which values regarding this abstraction emerge, and not the other way around. As you say, “value must be predicated on (human) life, not life predicated on value.”

I have read somewhere that the Dalai Lama has acknowledged that some of the tenets of Buddhism might need to be revised if they do not accord with modern science, and particularly, neuroscience. If that report is accurate it leaves me wondering if he was genuine about that. — Janus

Without any modesty intended or implied, why is there a logical contradiction between neuroscience and reincarnations. Would one hold a naïve physicalist mindset in which solid atoms are supposed to disassemble and the reassemble back into the same object/body? Such assumption, if at all held, would be specious.

Without claiming this to be a fail-proof argument: you neurologically are more similar—in innate and context-relevant-acquisition of affinities, interests, aptitudes, etc.—to one human in the history of all mankind than to any other. Same self, but dwelling at a different time (especially if we entertain Buddhist “neither is there or is there not a self”). Project this into the future and you obtain the same results, that of reincarnation of the self.

Yes, there’s a bunch of additional things that could be here inquired into and debated. Still, here you have both neurological presence and the concept of reincarnation in manners that are not logically contradictory.

Fair enough. Can we agree on this, though: You hold a trust/faith/belief that things such as the true nature of experienced/enactive aesthetics will be answered via investigation of objects while I hold the trust/faith/belief that such things can never so be discovered?

(I say "trust/faith/belief" because they in at least one sense all signify the same thing.)

Just pointing out that there are plenty of things that we do not doubt until some philosopher asks us to.

Folk take it as read that we ought not believe unless we have a justification.

Ought we doubt the obvious without justification? — Banno

Well, personally, I’m here only speaking on behalf of some of the more traditional forms of philosophical skepticism, such as that upheld by Cicero (insert: “global/radical/etc.” in place of “philosophical” if one pleases; this so as to definitively contrast it to philosophical dogmatists who finds “skepticism” for that which they are fully certain not be the case from the very get go … like the hardcore materialist who’s “skeptical” of ghosts):

There is never a good reason to doubt when no contradictions are present to one’s awareness. So, unless one gets to a situation that indicates both Q and not-Q both at the same time and in the same way, not an inkling of doubt is justifiable … but there’s always space for inquiry into anything one wants (from God almighty to … pick your poison) during the leisurely parts of the day. As life has it though, the more one inquires the more apparent contradictions one encounters, and, so, justifications are required to resolve the inconsistencies. But this basic, aforementioned principle is as steadfast as anything.

Not sure how the non-philosophical-skeptics would address this issue, though. A different recent thread on this form now comes to mind.

Edit: Speaking on behalf of the same perspective, I should add that when these contradictions become available to one’s awareness—though one’s life moves on with its hierarchies of priority—these contradictions are nevertheless accepted as givens that need to be addressed so as to be resolved. Whether they’re all remembered becomes a different issue. But rejecting their presence on account of one’s emotive dislike for their presence would, I believe, here be termed dogmatic prejudice regarding what is … and hence not the path of a philosophical skeptic.

I take it then that you’re for the alternative position of English-ism for those here involved, no?

Does it come down to either Dogma or Existentialism or Relativism?

[...]

Are there other possibilities? — anonymous66

Wouldn’t all conceivable stances yet be addressing that which is true (of the ontic)? In which case, there would then be a ubiquitously present meta-position: that of philalethia (the love of truth). … One could add an “-ism” to this term if one likes.

IF "physical" is defined as what science has explained.

THEN what is "non-physical" is what science hasn't explained.

Then how can there be "physical" stuff that science hasn't yet explained? How is it that the mind, and it's relationship with the world, isn't just one of those "physical" things that science hasn't yet explained? — Harry Hindu

You’re concluding rhetorical question relies on a circular argument, as far as I can currently see.

Just as can be the case with any other stance regarding, basically, philosophy of mind—idealisms (in plural since these can take many forms), Cartesian substance dualism, pluralism, and (my now personal favorite) dual-aspect neutral monism—so too can physicalism be a circular argument in search of some justification for not merely being a “because I say/believe/will so” argument.

Hence: P1) because I/we/they so assert, everything discoverable by science is physical (even though science might have no clue as to what it is; e.g. dark matter and dark energy (maybe over 90% of the known universe and of what we ourselves consist of as physical beings, this in the colloquial sense of physical); P2) because I/we/they so assert, everything shall be discovered by science at some future point in time (including all aspects of being and its becoming involved in consciousness); C) therefore, everything is physical (this due to the cause of me/us/them so saying it is—as explicitly affirmed in the two former premises).

This, as presented, is then a circular argument (where the conclusion is implicitly upheld in the premises) that does not demonstrate any stance to be true at expense of any other stance being erroneous.

But you are reducing nature to just an ejaculatory reflex, when I've made clear, had you read the whole of my post that violence and power-over is also closely linked to the male sex drive.
Wanking is not enough it's what chimps have to do when in captivity. — charleton

While you’re focusing on the power-over tendency in human males, I hold a different—what is to me, sad—reality to be true: it is the majority of women who select for these overly testosterone infused, power-over maniacal, human males to begin with. You’re forgetting that in Darwinian evolution, it is very often the female of the species that selects which males it copulates and reproduces with.

An unbiased look at other species reveals a wide array of more or less genetically hardwired heuristics of behavior. Them evil wolves (unlike the regal, good lions) are monogamous for life, else they—typically as immediate family members—serve the monogamous alpha mates of the pack. There is no power-over structure to this and like species’ relations between sexual partners. But I aim to keep this short.

Chimps are a notoriously aggressive species. Clincher is we’ve descended not from chimps but from a common ancestor to a) us, b) chimps, and c) bonobos. To those who give a rats’ behind (because they understand the deep neuro-psychological ramifications of this), unlike chimps, bonobos—as one measly but factual example—inherently smile like we do for all of the same reasons. Quite a commonality--which we do not share with chimps. So, via genetic resemblance, it seems we humans parted ways with something that then parted ways to result in chimps and bonobos in a manner that links us slightly closer to chimps than to bonobos. Nevertheless, the quantity of analogous evolution we share to bonobos by comparison to chimps is, for me at least, impressive—e.g., bonobos are known to walk for short distances, especially females with children on their backs while they carry stuff in their hands (this as another tell-tale indicator of our partial resemblance to bonobos … chimps don’t do this). But OK, keeping this short, bonobos are a wet dream for orgy-mongers. They do it anytime, anywhere, for pleasure, for comfort, for a banana they’d like but the other has—in heterosexuality and both male and female homosexuality … it doesn’t much matter to them. And none of it has to do with power-over: power-over being a typical chimp behavior, though not universal among chimps. (among my references are those of Frans de Waal’s published works … he’s both very esteemed and well known in the field).

For us humans, along with our massive cognitive abilities is also included an unprecedented amount of behavioral plasticity—including in our sexuality and in the cultural norms which affect our sexuality.

As to the gay thing: some of us have no choice because we're birthed 100% heterosexual or homosexual; most humans, however, are birthed (as I've learned at my university) with some degree of bisexual tendency ... which can adapt to whatever culture states ought to be (where the individual to so want).

Keeping this as artificially relevant to the nuts and bolts of basic sexual selection theory as it is known today: both males and females would like to successfully reproduce. The male has a basic choice between shooting out seeds like Rambo into whatever it can and, on the other side, doing everything he can to ensure that one or a very few seeds will out-compete all rivals when turned adult. First translates into promiscuity, for lack of a better term, and is normally benefited by power-over strategies/heuristics. The second variant translates into a life-long carrying, nurturing, father that safeguards the lives and welfare of his few progeny. Now, rape is rape, and it sometimes leads to pregnancy--this always being a result of the first male-type's heuristics. But abortions are not a new modern invention. Yes—and I very much stress this—males hold responsibilities for how they/we act toward women (or other men, when it comes to homosexuals). But then so too do women hold responsibility for the genotypes and phenotypes they select for in our species each time they chose a mate.

So long story short, no, it’s not in our genes—it’s not our “biologically” determined fate--to be power-over-other fanatics when it comes to sexuality. It’s in our upbringing, our culture, and in our individual choices as adult members of a collective regarding what the next-generation’s culture will look like … and when I assert "our", I’m asserting both males and females equally.

Pimping? Note how this slang affirms sexual power-over-other (namely, over the "bitch-hos") as good.

As a male addressing what I believe to be another male, what’s stopping us from affirming our male tool to be our “magic wand … that dreams up the dark how it pleases”—or something like this (I won’t be more explicit in what it could be; force is a natural aspect of healthy sex … but not non-consensual harm/violence)—this rather than addressing it as our “gun”, “sword”, “hammer”, etc.? Nothing. Nothing but our own sense of deviating from the flock, of not being cool, or fear of being strange. I say to hell with it. I say, what women wouldn’t want to have a wizard in bed? I’ll stop short. Point being, we human beings are evolved … to add a spiritual slant: into closer proximity to the purely abstract than any other lifeform we know of … this to the extent we can explicitly make our own moral choices and take the responsibility that follows suit.

Man, our global society is proliferating in sex-slave ownership, and for those in the dark, this in Europe, the USA, and doubtless other developed nations/places. Not cool.

Would complete realization of the Sexual Revolution--complete liberation; complete openness --result in the end of sexual harassment? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

It seems obvious to me that the power-over-other structure of sexuality goes deep in our, and a few too many other, cultures. The penis as a gun that shoots off bullets, as a sword that penetrates, etc. All these “fun” metaphors are inextricable from notions of non-consensual violence/harm on those that are penetrated. Furthermore, modern science has evidenced ( :-} ) that women too enjoy sex—though, most don't enjoy being shot at with bullets as a bad/nauty/dirty things, or else repeatedly stabbed at with a knife/sword for the same reason. (Though, we all adapt to the culture we have no choice (or virtually no choice) but to live in, emotively and cognitively.) But, fuck, "fuck" is understood and used by both men and women. And to say “fuck you” is most often not used to express “let’s have loving, rambunctious, passionate sex that brings both of us into closer proximity to ecstatic being of mind, spirit, and flesh” but, basically, to express “may you be brutally raped”.

Fuckin’ hell.

So my impression is that this equality of value/worth/respect between the sexes and their sometime unique ability to accomplish (aka, their unique power) is gonna take some time in actually manifesting, and this only at a progressive, step by step rate.

Still, in terms of the 70s-like notion of love = sex within the slogan of “free love”, I don’t believe that were (consensual) orgies to be the norm everywhere and at all times within the workforce, that, then, sexual harassment would miraculously begin to vanish. OK, me, I’m not an orgy guy. But even so, you can’t have orgies all the time while working. What about during the hours when orgies don’t occur. Would sexual harassment then be reduced? I think not.

How come ataraxia? — charleton

Personally, I liken it to making both emotive and cognitive peace with the epistemic truth that “we have not yet demonstrated any proposition to be perfectly secure from all possible error—not even this one”.

O:)

... but then this can go in as many directions as there are directions to go in.

Edit:

I saw a man pursuing the horizon;
Round and round they sped.
I was disturbed at this;
I accosted the man.
“It is futile,” I said,
“You can never —”

“You lie,” he cried,
And ran on. — Stephen Crane

Notice that in the deeper truths of this poem, the horizon nevertheless does hold ontic presence.

… to try to add some perspective to the issue of ataraxia, at least as I so far understand it.