Here again, we have the issue of "the 'same' meaning" assigned to different phenomenal information. As I explained, I take this to be contradictory. If the two distinct phenomenal occurrences really had the same meaning to you, you would not be able to tell them apart, because it is by virtue of differences in what each of them means to you, that you distinguish one from the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Looks like we might be addressing different things in reference to meaning.

It seems that by the same arguments you’ve articulated, no two languages could share any meaning whatsoever, since the two languages are utterly different in their phenomenal information—and, as your given argument goes, for them to share the same meaning is for whatever so shares the same meaning to be indistinguishable phenomenally. But this would result in the conclusion that all translations are fully untrue in their correspondence to any meaning conveyed in the original language.

I’ll argue that meaning itself has multiple layers such that, for example, the core meaning to “yes”, “da”, and “si” is identical to itself while there is additional meaning which, for instance, endows recognition of the specific language utilized to express the core referent of meaning. This, then, is noncontradictory to the reality of language translations (granting exceptions where meanings may overlap but will not be the same in different languages).

What's to be shocked about? If it's only that the world at atomic scale operates differently than how we are used to seeing it at human scale, I don't see that as shocking at all. — T Clark

If you’re into the metaphysics of causality at all, there is no way that this experiment will not be shocking. Again, it’s about the reality of causal mechanisms, not about theories of such.

As to it being “out there somewhere”, consider that the cellular level, even large proteins (enzymes and the like) have been shown to exhibit quantum effects—never mind individual molecules of nucleic acids (genes). And we are made up of cells, body wise [ edit: as is our our neurally plastic brains ... a part of our body ]. But of course, they don't appear to exhibit these effects when we observe these cells under a microscope and, I’d argue, not to the cells themselves as living systems. But it's a very fuzzy borderline.

Courtesy of PBS:

I think the concept of hermeneutics fits nicely with this idea: We each have our own meaningful self interpretations while partaking in a common "essential" hermeneutical way of being human. — bloodninja

Though I'm not yet well versed in this branch of philosophy, having browsed up on it, I very much agree.

You could make an argument that DNA constitutes 'man's essence', insofar as there is one. Were a single piece of human DNA discovered by another advanced civilisation on another planet, they ought to be able to infer almost everything about the creature the DNA comes from. And h. sapiens, being a species, can't breed with other species. — Wayfarer

I’ve my issues with the notion that DNA (all chromosomes) can be translated into phenotypic characteristics of body and mind merely via analysis of the genome. For starters, a genome depends on interactions with environment to develop into a phenotype. So far, despite the big hoopla of mapping out the human genome, I’ve been evidenced right on this. And, I don’t know but I’ve been told: well, according to one professor’s shpiel, human DNA is similar enough to chimp DNA that it’s very likely one could get a hybrid going (if so, whether it would be mule like or not, i.e. capable of biological reproduction, is not known … hopefully for obvious reasons). Needless to say, though, there’s quite the behavioral divide which prevents such a thing from naturally happening, on both sides I’d add. Not even bonobos and chimps reproduce, due to their own behavioral divide, and the more peaceful bonobos are notoriously sexual things.

Anyway, had a new thought about the essence of Homme—one I think you might also be OK with: we are, as someone aptly named our species, by in large alike in our relatively large magnitudes of sapience/wisdom. Quite the ego-boost, come to think of it; our human essence: wisdom.

I happen to think that the term 'phenomena' applies to 'the manifest domain', i.e. approximately the area of study of the sciences. It's a very general term for whatever exists. But by this definition, numbers (and the like) are not phenomena, or among phenomena, as they're not in the phenomenal domain, but the intelligible domain, [...] — Wayfarer

Yes, and in today’s world, in large part due to the great modern influence of physicalism, “things that appear” (i.e., phenomena) is deemed fully identical with all possible experiences. Hence the common standard interpretation of “everything that exists is phenomenal” due to the modern intellect’s interpretation that the only experiences (and, thereby, information apprehendable to awareness) that exist are only obtainable via the physiological senses.

I’m intending to maintain otherwise … while I won’t argue a link to Humean empiricism (not quite physicalist empiricism) I do argue that it’s tied into the experiential.

Maths, while important, are to me not as important as meaning, however—since I figure that meaning is a priori to meaningful maths, i.e. maths that can be discerned as such.

[numbers] being the domain of things that can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. — Wayfarer

You should know a bit about me by now, so here it goes: it has been demonstrated that some animals can count--and hence function via recognition of numbers (the first article that popped up in a google search: http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20121128-animals-that-can-count). And I don’t think you’d feel comfortable categorizing lesser animals as holding any rational intelligence. Other than the greater apes and a few other of the more intelligent lesser animals, neither would I. A different, and very convoluted, topic though. But again, to me it boils down to information and awareness of information, and I'd agree that lesser animals don't have awareness of maths. Numbers is a different issue.

I can just hear someone in the back of the forum yelling, “yours was an awesome post!”, and I agree with them.

Trying my best to figure out something to debate about, what would your take be on the hypothesis that meaning, of itself, is non-phenomenal information?* So, for instance, in the examples of the OP where the same meaning applies to different phenomenal information, the meaning itself is non-phenomenal information (and hypothetically the same) whereas the various means of obtaining it will all be phenomenal information and thereby uniquely different.

A different example in my attempts to keep this simple: “four”, “4”, and “IV” serve as three different bodies of visually phenomenal information yet they all convey the same non-phenomenal information (the same meaning being identical to itself in all three, phenomenally different cases).

So the meaning of “4” has a form different from the meaning of “5”, for instance, but its form as meaning is noumenal: and thereby ontically distinct from the phenomenal information it is conveyed by to those who can so interpret the meaning of the given phenomena. (Alternatively, from the phenomenal information of the imagination one uses to convey the meaning to oneself.)

*As I mentioned to you on a different thread: here phenomenal is defined by anything apprehendable through the physiological senses and anything of the imagination that takes the same forms, e.g. sights, sounds, smells, tactile feels, proprioceptions, etc. (the list is a bit longer, e.g. physiological pain, vestibular sense of balance and acceleration, etc.).

BTW, the aforementioned is a basic premise I hold; wanting to test out the waters with it, so to speak.

I don't know what an "essence of man" would be — Bitter Crank

Sounds like a cologne name translated into English. Some Homme by somebody or other. (Don’t want the bring up the Twilightzone episode of “To Serve Man”)

Myself, don’t yet know. I’m however more comfortable in reframing the question into “is there such a thing as human nature” … the nature of man being close enough to the essence of man, I’d think. To say yes is to be endlessly pondering what this might in fact be, especially considering all the diversity that can be found and the many shared attributes with lesser lifeforms (awareness, toolmaking, sounds used to communicate, and the like). On the other hand, to say no is to deny there being such a cohort as humankind. So I heavily lean toward a “yes” answer to this improvised question, but have no idea as to what the particulars might be.

Both. — Rich

I agree; via the reformulation of the question that makes more sense to me: we all have our own individual natures even while we all partake of a common human nature.

I’ve been thinking about this some. As before, I agree that your position serves as a very good rule of thumb. I feel I could easily complicate this issue, but I don’t believe that so doing would result in the obtainment of a more satisfactory answer. Because of this, I’ll back away from the conversation for the time being. All the same, at the end of the day, we’re in agreement in regard to the Golden Rule being a good.

No-- but then the foundation for this question has not been established. Is information-- in and of itself-- endowed with color? With a sense of humor? With musicality or elegance? — Srap Tasmaner

What would the foundation be? As to your questions, I again uphold it takes awareness to interpret information thus.So, devoid of awareness so interpreting, no.

Okay.

Are you quite certain that when I try to figure out what I'm looking at and what it might mean to me, that it is information I am interpreting? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, in a non-absolute-certainty sense, to be clear. BTW, information holds multiple viable interpretations. My preference is the non-mathematical interpretation of “that which endows form to” … you might think it a bit Platonic. Did you have a different interpretation in mind? If so, I’m curious to see if there would be no overlap.

As I understand it, autopoesis was coined by Maturana and Varela, but I don't think it was something that was thought to be explanatory at the level of individual species but as a general characteristic of metabolic systems. — Wayfarer

Right, but I don’t interpret a squirrel (or any individual lifeform) to be an individual species. TMK, it was conceived to be a characteristic of living systems, as in individual lifeforms, including the individual cell.

javra - squirrels are not self-creating - they come from mama and papa squirrels. :-) — Wayfarer

Funny, kinda. So homeostatic processes are not self-generating/creating … this as defined by the notion of autopoiesis?

I don’t know if you do this intentionally or not, but you get bogged down in details as regard individual particulars. I’m asking a metaphysical question in relation to general ontological givens. To simplify my question even further:

Is information—in and of itself—endowed with awareness?

If yes, this needs explaining since it currently seems illogical to me.

If no, than I argue you have (at some abstract threshold whose particulars need not be here established) a duality between a) awareness to which information holds meaning and b) awareness-devoid information. Here, all meaning will pertain to awareness, which is an aspect of mind. Hence, if any notion of information or lack thereof is in any way meaningful, it will be so due to the presence of minds which interpret the given information.

I’ll for now drop the issue of causal agency—though to me it is a necessary correlative of informed awareness. So yes, to me even a bacterium holds some minimal degree of causal agency between alternatives given that it is endowed with any degree of awareness of stimuli to which it reacts—otherwise it would be a fully entropic entity. It’s not an easy conclusion to establish, and most certainly not mainstream. And in hindsight, as you say, it does appear irrelevant to the thread’s discussion.

BTW, as to whether information is physical or not, be it via an objective idealism or via a dual-aspect neutral monism, my stance is that some information is physical and some is mental. So, I disagree with the notions that all information is physical.

Now there can be something similar without life (or an extension of it like the thermostat), in, say, an avalanche. Little input, big output that spends a lot of free energy. And there's an obvious connection in the way life keeps its "subsystems" balanced at criticality. You can get sensitivity by creating tiny avalanche conditions and then waiting, maintaining those conditions, and then resetting after each tiny event. Like a thermostat.

[...]

So yes I lean toward seeing the use of information about your environment, rather than just being shoved about by it, as a hallmark of life. But the information is still obviously physical, just as living things and their environments are. And I don't immediately see the need to describe this use as interpretation. — Srap Tasmaner

One important difference between a squirrel and an avalanche is that the first is negentropic while the second is entropic. Otherwise expressed, the squirrel is autopoietic (self-creating) while the avalanche follows strict paths of least resistance toward an end of optimal equilibrium between all given inanimate entities. Or: the squirrel as given does its best to preserve its self-identity while the avalanche as given has no impetus to preserve its self-identity.

Yet these details overshadow the basic metaphysical point I was addressing. The point being that of causal agency: some givens hold causal agency (e.g. it is the squirrel that hides its nuts and remembers where they’ve been stashed so as to maintain its own livelihood) while some givens are devoid of causal agency: e.g., from the first pebble that commences it to the grand finale of optimal entropic equilibrium, the avalanche was all part of a complex causal chain that neither begins nor ends with the avalanche itself—at no point was there an avalanche-agency that commenced the effects of the avalanche of its own impetus.

To make choices—to hold causal agency—is to necessarily be aware of alternatives (otherwise, no choice can exist). Hence, it is to necessarily hold awareness and, thereby, to necessarily interpret (give meaning to) information. This is one type of given: that of agency. On the other hand there is information devoid of causal agency.

Traditionally, at least, physicalism has attempted to reduce all that is to lack of causal agency. Where causal agency is deemed to be ontic, however, there is obtained an irreducible duality between causal agency and non-agency.

It’s a bit of a catch-22 for traditional physicalism. Either causal determinism and all that we experience as in any way being causal agency being strict illusions (a different metaphysical argument, I suppose) or causal agency and an irreducible duality between two different types of entity or structure or process.

So I’ll ask this in a different way: does information in and of itself hold causal agency in your opinion—thereby holding awareness of different alternatives? If so, please justify you’re stance, for this position seems illogical to me. If for no other reason, because awareness of alternatives is an aspect of mind—and not of the physical. (I so far take if for granted that you know yourself to hold such awareness-required causal agency between alternatives -- such that you acknowledge the presence of causal agency.)

Then black holes are about information loss - so only erasure in being lost over an event horizon. — apokrisis

The hypothesis I learned of is of a polar explosion of information which thereby flattens galactic stars into their common disk shape form. But again, I'm not in a position to debate the matter.

But then where does that leave spontaneity, creativity, novelty? Is this ontic structural realism the new determinism? Or is material cause - the ineffable thingness that is missing from the formal account - now the pure indeterminacy, the pure uncertainty, the pure notion of "an action", that lurks just out of sight of the phenomenology?

Is material cause now the ghost in physics's formal machinery? — apokrisis

Right, all this gets into the metaphysics of causation. I don't personally find it an easy issue to delve into.

I did present one causal conundrum in my previous post on this thread. So far, I believe this conundrum touches upon the core source of disagreements in relation to the physicalist / non-physicalist theme.

When a squirrel makes that "cat near my tree" sound, I don't think we need to call that rationality. It's involuntary, but it is exactly the kind of transformation we're talking about. (I'd rather talk about thermostats, but everyone will want to talk about the thermostat designer instead.) — Srap Tasmaner

Nevertheless, as to the duality between some X which is interpreting information and the information itself: Is the squirrel here deemed an inanimate interpreter? Is the thermometer deemed an animate interpreter? Or, else, is there somehow deemed to be no meaningful difference between animate givens and inanimate givens?

All three questions at the very least appear to address nonsensical metaphysical positions.

This just touched upon issue gets into the metaphysical issues of causal agency: what can be said to be endowed with it and what cannot. If my memory serves me right, this is similar enough to somebody’s comment about “that which breath’s life into the maths”. (I don’t recall who said this or in what context.)

Point being: To do away with the underlying duality between some X which is interpreting (often termed conscious agency) and the information thus interpreted so far seems to me nonsensical. And it is this metaphysical duality which is meaningfully addressed by the terms “animate” and “inanimate”.

How does one logically do away with the metaphysical need for the just addressed duality?*

*But, please note that mind as information is itself strictly information, and not the agency-endowed X(s) which is engaged in the activity of interpretation: for example, the unconscious mind which brings about memories at proper times might itself be replete with causal agency or agencies, but a memory itself as information will not of itself be a causal agency (rather, it will be information interpreted by some agency X). Hence the duality just mentioned will not be that of a Cartesian dualism between mind and body—both of which are strictly information (when addressed as givens devoid of causal agency).

Ditto.

Physicists would want an it from bit Universe in which the information is a conserved quantity. — apokrisis

One relevant issue that I find interest in is the ontic possibility of novel information creation and information erasure. As it happens, there are some physicists who uphold the possibility that information itself might be both created and erased within Black Hole gravitational singularities (to be clear, non-allegorically). I know it’s speculative, and for the sake of disclosure my current interest in these branches of physics is solely limited to what I glimpse from documentaries on the topic.

All the same, I have an affinity toward this roundabout interpretation of information: one where it is ontically possible--given the proper events--for information to be created and erased.

Nothing to debate here on my part. Just curious to hear if you’ve taken this possibility of information creation/deletion into account in any way.

I went to see Matrix with my kids. I got really annoyed at the red pill/blue pill scene - I thought it was frankly sacrilege. Why? Because it is a metaphor for something profoundly important, which, I thought, had been seized upon by pulp-fiction hustlers to make a buck. — Wayfarer

Very true. The two things that got to me most, personally, was their interpretations of Goddess and God and their Hollywood minded favoring of personal love between two beings over and above the preservation of the whole world’s integrity (the I’ll say “to hell with the health of humanity at large” so as to save your individual precious life, dear … not quite what the ideals of selflessness are about, as I so far see things anyway).

Although it's interesting that films like Matrix, Inception, etc, are so popular, I think they speak to an intuition we all have about the possibility of the world being a grand illusion. — Wayfarer

I too can’t deny the impact the fairytale story has had on the general public consciousness in terms of possible interpretations of reality. (I don’t see a whole lot of philosophical merit to Inception, though.)

Hmm. It is ironic that a lot of you guys are reacting in horror at physicists who might take it literally that reality is just a pattern of information. It is after all just a modern version of idealism. You have physicists who are denying materialism and saying things are pure information. Reality is even observer created if you go to the quantum extreme.

So here we have science prepared to talk openly about a concrete idealist ontology. And everyone gasps in shock. No they must be wrong. Matter is obviously real. The Matrix could only be a simulation hanging off an electrical plug. — apokrisis

You appear to confuse humorously sardonic remarks with horror. Hell, bring these new interpretations of information on!

Who knows, given enough information interpretation, maybe that ancient notion of the “the One” might itself come to be interpreted as a core component of physicalism. Why not again? (this gets to that other, non-rhetorical, question I posed in relation to neo-physicalism v. non-physicalism: “what’s the difference?”)

Could the creation of violent music be an act of love (in any sense) as opposed to the music itself being an embodiment of love? — Janus

If one presumes something along the lines that love is ontic Truth and that ontic Truth is always expressed through some form of love, then: the creation of violent music can be an expression of love when it seeks to express some truth of the human condition, this for the sake of the truth’s expression, imo.

"[So who puts the blame?] Man through his actions. But this isn't to say that the blame is something in addition to the sinful actions that is actually put on top of everything else. It's already included in the package." — Agustino

This doesn't make sense. — Noble Dust

To add what I view to be an added metaphysical dimension to this conversation in terms of causality:

At the very least technically, blame is (one type of) responsibility *, and responsibility pertains to that (he / she / it (angels, for example, are all gender-neutral “its” last I checked)) which creates: i.e., that which causally brings about effects via its own being and impetus.

Then, responsibility in general (and blame in particular) is that obtained through the free-willed act of choice between different alternatives (the choice being the effect one causally brings about).

To clarify that I here personally intend a non-deity/psyche God, I’ll refer to this referent as “G-d”.

G-d is then the a priori reason—or source—for all free-willed action. Yet G-d is absolute, unconditional love. Hence, all free-willed action that is not oriented toward the alternative of closer proximity to an absolute, unconditional love (maybe also here expressible as an absolute harmony of being) is not itself caused by G-d but by the humans in question: choosing alternatives which go in any number of other directions but that of closer proximity to G-d.

Here probably putting words into Agostino’s mouth (may he correct me to the extent that he see fit): it is therefore, and thereby, us humans which expel the love which is G-d via our own freewill, this then being our responsibility and, thus, our blame … these being effects resultant of our own causation and, hence, creation (and not that of G-d’s).

* Its odd to me how we don’t have a succinct word in our lexicon for praiseworthy responsibility, one that rivals that of “blame” for sinful responsibility. To get a bit esoteric in hypotheticals, it could be due to an interpretation that when we act via freewill in favor of alternatives that lead us closer to G-d, we then act as an instrument, or as a vessel, of G-d—that G-d then act through us, so to speak. But I can’t say that I’m certain about this hypothetical interpretation. Still, why “I am to blame” but not “I am causally responsible for that freely willed act of virtue which I chose”? Strange to me.

Well, though of course there are other culturally imposed modifications on human behaviour, the objective biological evidence I referred to would seem to indicate that the premier underlying factor motivating partner selection historically has been physical appearance. — Robert Lockhart

Appearance, at one level, gives evidence of biological health (here strictly in the sense of carnality). Everyone is a bit shallow in one sense and I presume it deals with this issue of biological health represented by image. A body sans mind is, however, a dead, decomposing carcass. So biological health is also partly dependent upon (not so much the presence of an aware consciousness, but) the very character of the consciousness of the given body. Character is, to some, the defining factor as regards attraction, here greatly overriding most all ideals of the healthy body image (which, btw, changes with cultures and the passing of generations). This is where a person’s beauty is no longer superficially judged based on image.

It’s a complex relation between physical health and character. Made even more complex by the wide variety of people who deem what is attractive to them. Plenty will deem big boobs and fat wallets as the epitome of attractiveness—and these people will often label these attributes beautiful.

Character, furthermore, is often partly represented by the attire worn. Some find very, very short (i.e., easy access) miniskirts to be beautiful; others find elegant attire to be as beautify and sexually attractive as things can get. Neither has to do with biological health but which the character of the individual who so dresses. This aspect of character, nevertheless, being yet conveyed via image.

What some deem to the the most important aspects of character—such as honesty, compassion, and the like—will almost never (if ever) be portrayable via appearance. Some, whose attractions for partners are at all times literally superficial, may give lipservise to these traits but will not actually be attracted to them, i.e. will not find any honest beauty in them. Yet it can well be argued that these non-representational aspects of a person are most in tune with the non-phenomenal truths of the aesthetic.

To each their own, no?

But I agree that it becomes a problem when—due to the advertising pressures of the marketplace—the overall populace becomes solely fixated on image … and thereby loses touch with the beauties of character. Some, given perspectives such as those aforementioned, can argue that it is a global degeneration of what supposedly makes humans human: our humanity (and if this latter term here needs defining, it’s likely not worth the hassle … as I currently believe you’d agree)

"The really hot physicists these days dispense with the stuff, and manage with just structure. So worse than information is physical, they claim that physicality is informational." — unenlightened


Correct.
John Archibald Wheeler writes:
“It from bit”. Otherwise put, every “it” every particle, every field of force, even the space-time continuum itself derives its function, its meaning, its very existence (even if in some contexts indirectly) from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits. “It from bit” symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom a very deep bottom, in most instances an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe.

Wheeler, J.A.: Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search for Links, Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information. In: Zureck, W.H. (ed.). Addison Wesley, Redwood City (1990).

But instead of worse, even better: information can be physical and/or psychophysical. — Galuchat

This is somehow amusing to me. In terms I think even preadolescent kids might understand, it all amount to: who has the metaphysical rights to the ontology portrayed in the movie “The Matrix” (sans the part of being unplugged from the Matrix)? The physicalists or the non-physicalists?

Which to me necessitates the question: What’s the difference!

Yet this latter question is to me more important that it may at first seem. What then are the tacitly maintained differences between neo-physicalism and non-physicalist approaches to the same basic understanding of ontology as information rather than as stuff? It may not be that easy to answer … but I’m currently betting that the physicalists will uphold that death leads to the nonbeing of awareness, whereas the non-physicalists will uphold otherwise. Any other differences?

[BTW, while I can enjoy the movie as a movie, I don’t look upon it as a prophetic body of bits as to what ontology really is. To state the obvious, the movie series is not a thought-out philosophy but only a modern mythos.]

It is absurd in the grandest sense. — schopenhauer1

Though I’m taking the quote slightly out of context, that the presence of being "is absurd in the grandest sense” I can very much acknowledge. There is no rational answer to why there is being rather than nonbeing (the very issue eludes the PSR). I’m fully on board with this conclusion of absurdity in respect to brute being. The next question is, “now what?”

Various options come to mind as hypotheticals: like the bioengineered creation of a new enzyme or chemical that would render all life biologically non-reproductive. Whamo!, right?: Instant peace for all that is Will … But wait ... This very presumption of an obtainable peace for Will through the obtainment of nonbeing all of a sudden makes the very absurdity of brute being no longer absurd: for it now has an escape from its predicament of brute being, a tangible salvation, and, thereby, a potential purpose worthy of pursuit. This same exit clause then renders the very absurdity of brute being null and void.

Still, there is no metaphysical proof I know of to substantiate that the nonbeing of all Will is in any way possible.

Then, of course, there might be other goals of Will that may be worthy of pursuit. Schopenhauer borrowed heavily from Eastern religious paths but omitted their notion of Moksha, for instance, which is also stated to be about peace of Will but is not about a state of nonbeing.

Also, maybe paradoxically, because some of these other potential goals of Will are not about states of nonbeing, here the grand absurdity of being’s presence will be thoroughly embraced despite these “salvations” from Will’s conundrum: for here there will neither be escape from being nor will there be the promise of an understanding regarding why being instead of nonbeing.

Hey, you know why many of us don’t like addressing this topic, why it’s so taboo, in other words: it can easily result for too many in the conclusion that suicide is the only exist. I get that’s not what you’re saying. Then again, there’s now a worry in me that some kid somewhere will become the next 007 villain by living his life trying to bioengineer that enzyme I was talking about.

All the same, we may not fully agree on all of this. Like others, still hoping we can at least find some common ground. The absurdity of being is. What are we going to do about it is the issue that we may still find disagreements on.

With the proviso of actions out of learned habit. — Rich

Trying to keep things as simple as possible. With habit, it can well be argued that former consciously willed actions between teloi have become repeated so often that they become automated relative to conscious awareness. Actions from learned habit can then be argued to still be constrained by the a priori existence of teloi. Same stimulus, same choice of which way to go between alternatives, only that now it’s become a learned instinct. Or so I’d maintain.

But then what meaning does constraint have except that it is relative to a possible action? So how is the actual possibility of that action not prior to the existence of the constraint?

Unless there is something trying to happen, then it makes no sense to speak of that which is preventing it happen. — apokrisis

The possibility of action is the possibility of causal agency. In a culture heavily habituated to notions of causal determinism this is often overlooked, or else looked upon as illusions we live by. This especially holds where we know the physical to be inanimate (devoid of causal agency) and then further uphold the ontology of physicalism (everything is physical and, so, inanimate).

The possibility of causal agency, in turn, cannot be devoid of ready existent teloi which bind, limit, and thus constrain that toward which possible actions can move. So no possibility of action can exist prior to the actuality of teloi which constrain what the causal action moves toward.

The action will always be concurrent with the actuality of teloi, but the teloi will be a priori to the possibility of action.

Science is a systematic search for knowledge that follows a specific, defined set of rules and algorithms. — T Clark

Agreed, but to me this sentence is omitting making explicit what the vital essence of all empirical sciences is : empirical data. In theoretical maths one can concoct infinite mathematical universes if the will and intelligence is there for so doing (invent new axioms and, using these as rules, make all the novel algorithm you want). Especially as regards the empirical sciences, this is all however meaningless unless it happens to be accordant to our body of experience derived, empirical data.

Picking on this omission because it’s a hefty pet peeve of mine: that many in the general community place maths before experience in their understanding of the empirical sciences.

Thank you for the feedback on Platonic Forms. I’ve read much of Plato but it’s been some time and, to be honest, my memory of his writings are by now more hazy than not. What you’ve said about Plato and Pythagoras makes sense. And I don’t have anything to debate in regard to the historicity of the concepts.

So we have to posit a different type of actuality, one which determines which potentialities will be actualized at each moment as time passes. This actuality must be in some sense prior to the actuality which is time passing, in order to have any power over time passing (on its other side, potentialities being actualized). So this is the actuality which is somehow outside of time, as prior to time passing, and cannot be said to be co-existent with it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m very much in tune with this. As previously noted, I would append to it the additional factor of this same “actuality which is somehow outside of time” being itself a metaphysical end-state of being. All the same, the relation between actuality and potentiality you’ve described in relation to the present works well with me.

The principle of plenitude says that if given an infinite amount of time, any possibility will be actualized (a monkey at the typewriter will type Shakespeare for example). — Metaphysician Undercover

I should have known. Cheers for the explanations.

So you are presuming that motion, change or action needs a cause and can't instead be spontaneous?

I'm instead making the opposite presumption. Fluctuations are the result of a lack of constraint. The problem that existence has is in developing regulating habits.

The initial conditions are an everythingness of spontaneity that is utterly unruly. There is nothing standing in the way of motion, change and action. Then out of that constraints develop. Chaos is transformed into definite actions having definite directions. — apokrisis

To be accurate, in the first quoted sentences “a cause” should be changed to “causation”—thereby including various types as well as allowing for a plurality of instantiations. And then, yes, this is one of my premises.

BTW, doesn't "spontaneous" translate into something like an uncaused event? You could also uphold ex nihilo events but these would need to reify the nothingness into an uncaused given, or so I'll argue. Nevertheless, these are yet notions of causality--for they address causal mechanisms (of origination).

As it happens, I also very much uphold the notion that “[random] fluctuations are the result of a lack of constraints”. Yet this chaos (these random fluctuations) to me is always relative and can never be absolute (absolute chaos to me is logically contradictory); this, then, likewise specifies that the lack of constraints upon the given chaotic system is itself always relative, and can never be an absolute lack of constraint.

As to the issue of causation-devoid motion, change, or action: how would one go about justifying this position? As a reminder, we both agree upon there being multiple, existent forms of causation, and not merely the efficient variety.

That would seem to fit with my position then. Form stands "at the end of development" as ""emergent necessity". In the end, it restricts free choice as there is only one "right" choice. — apokrisis

I’m in no way surprised by this. For my part, the main disagreements between us so far concern there being vagueness (potential) devoid of a ready existing a prior global telos. Without the ready existing telos, the apeiron could only remain apeiron, as MU has so far argued.

If the apeiron were not perfect potential but, as you sometimes state, “fluctuations of potentiality” (which to me indicates some notion of time and of separateness, however chaotic) and there would already be a ready existent, a priori, global telos, then I could understand how the metaphysics you endorse could logically get off the ground.

All other disagreements as regards the metaphysical seem to me secondary to this one.

A good place to develop a firm understanding of the relationship between potency and act, is by reading Aristotle's On the Soul. All the powers of living creatures are described as potencies. But these potencies must be attributed to something actual in order to substantiate their existence. The potencies, or powers, exist as the body of the living being, the various different bodies of various living beings, are the various potencies of living beings. So the body as a collection of potencies, must be attributed to something actual, and this is the soul itself. Aristotle provides, as the primary definition of soul, the first actuality of a body having life potentially in it. This necessitates that the body has no actuality prior to having life, there is no actual body, only the potential for such. And the soul brings, or gives, actual existence to the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

Though I’ll skip the details, I can very much relate to this understanding.

This is contrary to the principles of emergence which hold that the soul, or life, emerges from the existence of the body, as if it is a potency of the body. But when this premise is taken, then we must look to a prior material existence to substantiate the actual existence of the living body. Since this prior material existence is not living, it can only substantiate the potential for life, not the actual existence of life. So the infinite regress of potential without anything to substantiate the actual, gives way to the infinite vagueness of pure potential, or apeiron. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, agreed. It’s what I was looking for with the OP: some process that, while not life / anima, is yet not altogether nonlife / devoid-of-anima. I acknowledge, maybe a bit too Quixotic even for my eccentric tastes. Hind sight is always 20/20, or so they say.

Lots of material here. Not sure if all my replies will be worth debating if there are disagreements, and I’m confident enough that there will be. Most is an exchange of perspective. I'm mainly interested in the notions of actuality and potentiality as applies to a global telos.

Therefore, that the independently existing ideas exist, cannot be known in any sense beyond an ungrounded assumption, and we must maintain this in our representation of reality, that independently existing ideas is a possibility. The next step of the problem is that an eternally existing possibility is not a real possibility due to the principle of plenitude. So eternal, immutable, independent "Ideas" is refuted in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

If ideas are taken to necessarily be human representations of their referents, then I would understand this position of “[human] representations of reality”. However, this to me seems at odds with at least some Platonic Forms. To me, representations are phenomenal in constituency (either perceivable via the physiological senses or perceivable via imagination in like manners: sights, sounds, smells, proprioceptions, etc.). This while some Platonic Forms, such as that of the aesthetic, for example, are of themselves articles of awareness only in so far as being purely sense-ual and, hence, noumenal: thereby more aligned to faculties such as those of understanding (of sense/meaning)—albeit, this despite the aesthetic as Form being most often apprehended through concordant awareness of the phenomenal. Here, my position is that our awareness of at least some Forms—though they may find representation via words or other symbols—cannot constitute representations of what actually is. For example, an awareness of the aesthetic is itself non-representational … and any representation of what is experienced (though it may help to convey the essence of meaning from one person to another) will in no way of itself embody the given experience (if one for whatever reason cannot experience what another experiences as aesthetic, no amount of phenomenal representation will convey the noumenal reality that is experienced by the other).

All the same, can you further explain the argument from the principle of plentitude: why it precludes any eternally existent possibility from being a real possibility? This to me is tied into what I express toward the end of this post regarding a global telos.

But this produces a categorical separation between human ideas, which according to Aristotle's argument are of the nature of potential, and the independent Forms which are of the nature of actual. In theology the independent (actual) Forms are the divine Ideas, property of God. There is a necessary separation between these Forms, which are independent from, and prior to material existence, and human ideas, which are dependent on the human soul's union with the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I can feel at home in certain discussions of theology, these independent Forms to me will hold even when addressed atheistically (i.e. when contemplated in the absence of Deity or deities, angels , and the like). The independent Forms in my view are occurring limitations which bind that which can be. To again use the aesthetic as example, this particular independent Form (here presuming it to so be) will limit, constrain, and form that which in essence is sense-ual attraction and aversion—this from the most base variants of this Form which can be found in the lower lifeforms to more refined and elevated variants of this same Form which can be found among mankind. As Form, the aesthetic emanates through the phenomenal in relation to observers and, in its most refined state, is purely noumenal: the former phenomenal variants being the allegorical shadows on the wall in Plato’s cave; the latter noumenal variants being the Form’s non-representational pure nature—which is sometimes accessible to humans. Given that all beings hold attractions and aversions, all beings are then limited, constrained, and formed by an intrinsic sense of the aesthetic; because no sensation-based attraction or repulsion could manifest devoid of this limitation on what can be, the limitation of the aesthetic is a priori to any potential attraction or aversion of individual beings. (This is quite the mouthful and not at all well substantiated, I’m well aware.)

I bring this perspective up, however, both to offer the possibility that independent Forms need not be theistic in their nature and, for me more importantly, to say that (at least some) independent Forms, as universals, are that which actively in-forms all beings’ identity—thereby making the actuality of the Forms minimally concurrent with the actuality of the beings whose identity is thus brought about via these universal Forms. Else argued, to me, the independent Forms are never fully severed from the beings thus formed—even if these beings hold no conscious awareness of these Forms; e.g. a cat may hypothetically sense sense-ual attraction toward some stimuli (say, some patch of colors) and aversions to others—this being the cat’s aesthetics—even though the cat has no comprehension of what aesthetics are. Yet, the greater the awareness of the beings in-formed by aesthetics, the more the beings can approach sense-ual understanding / awareness of this Forms’ noumenal, true (or pure) non-representational nature. E.g., all life will hold affinities and aversions to phenomenal stimuli but only humans can hold awareness of non-carnal beauty (here taking beauty to be a more refined aesthetic) … and, at times, even reapply this sense of beauty back to carnal bodies: e.g. a straight guy’s appreciation of the beauty to a male nude figure, like Michelangelo’s David, without any sense of sexual desire or any aversion due to this same issue of sexuality (top scores if a straight guy can at times likewise hold appreciation of non-carnal aesthetics when considering the female nude, I’d think).

In overview, imo universal Forms cannot be severed from anything which they any way in-form … this even when that which is thereby in-formed holds no conscious awareness of the universal Forms’ most likely noumenal nature.

Needless to add, these are perspectives on this issue.

The important part regarding the global telos as both actuality and potentiality:

Plato demonstrated, that in nature, the form of all material things precedes the material existence of the thing, and Aristotle followed this principle with a claim of "that the thing will be" only follows from "what the thing will be". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm so far in full agreement with this.

To me the global telos is also something which can eventually become fully actualized on a global scale by all sentience. In this way, the factual global telos also serves as a global end-state of being. I know this perspective can easily be ridiculed as unusual. Still, when comparing this outlook with theistic worldviews, it can readily approximate notions such as “closer proximity to God / G-d”, “to Brahman”, “to Nirvana”, “to Moksha”, and so on. Even when one addresses this global telos in a purely atheistic manner, it is for me the universal noumenal Form (as both global telos and global end-state of being) on which all other universal Forms are contingent—via which, again, all presently actual individual beings become bound, or limited, and, thereby, given their present actual form.

Then, as to the relation of actual and potential: This global telos is both actual as real telos and as an eventual, predetermined, global end-state of being (apo’s Heat Death; my hypothesis of an “unbounded awareness”)—as well as not yet manifest as an actualized, global end-state of being. So while it is thus actual as global telos (and as a metaphysically determinate end-state of being), because it is not yet manifest, it is also only a potential future manifestation whose realization is contingent upon numerous givens—including (in at least the metaphysics I uphold) the free-willed intent of all conscious agents so desiring it to become manifest. (Hence, it’s a given to me that we’re in no danger of it becoming manifest anytime soon, nor in any number of millennia from now.)

In this manner it is both an actuality that is a priori (akin to the Kantian sense; not necessarily in a temporal sense) to all other forms … while also being as end-state a potentiality forever awaiting to be realized.

Though the metaphysics are notably different, I see this relation between actuality and potentiality as holding fast both for a physicalist notion of the Heat Death as global end-state of being as well as for the non-physicalist metaphysics I’ve just touched upon … wherein the end-state is that of what for brevity I’ve so far termed “unbounded awareness” within this thread (including in the OP).

TMK, the conclusion that a global telos is both an a priori actuality and a temporal potentiality remains wherever a global telos is postulated. It is this stated conclusion that gets me interested in the logics of actuality and potentiality.

Then, as a generalized metaphysical hypothetical: Why can it not be logically viable that an eternally present, a priori actuality is coexistent with the temporal potentiality which it as a priori actuality brings forth? Otherwise expressed, given that the global manifestation of the end-state (as global telos) is itself contingent upon multiple unpredictable factors (such as the freewill of all coexisting agents), then this temporal potentiality of a manifested end-state will itself be contingently eternal: the moment in which the globally manifested end-state occurs forever remains indeterminate until all the proper events occur which will result in the end-state’s manifestation.

I maintain this possibility. In which case, one simultaneously has an eternal a priori actuality and a contingently eternal temporal potentiality as a consequence of a global telos. (But this seems to contradict what you say Aristotle argued to be.)

I’m in a bit of a hurry right now. So a quick reply to a quick reading of your post (may reply in greater detail later on after a rereading):

I agree with the position that actuality can logically only be a priori to potentiality. So, from my point of view regarding a global telos, the telos must be a priori to all potentiality as an existent actuality—this even though its obtainment by aware agencies (these also being present actualities) can only be appraised in terms of potentiality. I’m hoping that this at least makes some sense—and it is this overlap of actuality and potentially that currently has me further contemplating the matter. Still—though I can’t yet make out if it’s due to the same reasons or not—I’m in full agreement that actuality cannot be birthed of pure potentiality, and that the latter notion is nonsensical.

As I said it is a double edged sword which defeats both materialism and idealism. He demonstrates how ideas have no actual existence prior to being "discovered" by human minds. The act of discovery is an actualization. So anyone who claims that ideas exist prior to being discovered by the mind must consent to the fact that such existence is purely potential. Then he demonstrates that anything eternal must be actual. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m not sure how to here best interpret the term “ideas”—and I have not read Aristotle’s arguments first hand. I so far find it reasonable that at least some platonic ideas (ideals / forms) can be safely presumed to exist prior to any person’s awareness of them. Though not my main interests, basic geometric forms might serve as an easy example—a triangle, for instance. More importantly to me, though, are forms such as that of the Good—which I maintain necessarily exist as actuality even were no human to be consciously aware of this platonic “idea”.

Better expressed: My own present contention is that the Good as form, for example, is both actual and, in an equivocal sense, simultaneously potential. The Good thereby, imo, exists in and of itself as metaphysical actuality while, from the vantage of all actual people, existing only as a potential state of affairs yet to be obtained by any of us. Furthermore, it would hold this status even if no sentience were to be consciously aware of it so being.

For me, this is in no way intended as a defense of idealism. I’m however interested in better understanding the logics of actuality and potentiality from the vantage of a hypothetical global telos.

A guy calls up the city’s unique, Socratic zoo keeper and asks, “What would you term an animal that is half elephant and half rhino?” The zookeeper, staying true to his philosophical roots, replies: “El-if-I-know!”

Obviously monks already do this but they require on the charity of others to sustain them and also devote their time to prayer or charitable work and have other vows beyond poverty. What if you worked a normal career but knew a good portion of your salary went to others and not yourself? Again my wife would probably veto this idea, so it's just a thought experiment. — MysticMonist

I’m on board with your general thought experiment; its good intending. As to your wife’s veto, I believe it may have something to do with a commonsensical approach to life and our relations to others. We have to be living in order to help out others we hold agape for. Like what they tell us about oxygen masks when we’re aboard airplanes, we have to take care of ourselves before we can successfully take care of others. Imo, finding the right balance between maintaining one’s self and giving to others is the trick, though, especially since contexts change all the time. And we can’t all be monks: even if it where what everyone wanted to be, there’s be no one left to sustain us with the occasional charity. For what it’s worth, if you don't mind me saying: sounds like you’ve got a wife with sound judgment, one that's also good intending.

About self-renunciation: I had an insight today from Plato's Republic where he says the virtue/justice is the path to happiness. [...] First, the joy from helping others would be deeper and longer lasting than sensual pleasure. Second, if I could live off a very austere lifestyle then I would become immune to the desire or worry of wealth. — MysticMonist

This could be much ado about nothing—and it’s not directly oriented toward your post. Still—as a tangential to the thread—I wanted to express that although sensual pleasure all too often gets a very bad rap, imo it shouldn’t. I say this without yet knowing what position you yourself take on this topic.

I’m thinking of everything on a spectrum from John Lennon’s song, “Love” (e.g., love is touch) to sexual practices, including those of Tantric sex. In many—though not all—religions, a divinity aligned sex (which in ancient Hindu practices could get very raunchy by today’s standards, for example) serves as a vehicle for attaining closer proximity to God. This “divinity alignment” could well be interpreted as the presence and pursuit of sensuality (as compared with things like sex devoid of any sensed intimacy). I’m aware that in today’s culture such attitude—to not even say spiritual truth / reality—is most often deemed contradictory to what in fact is … this regardless if one is spiritual or atheistic. Nevertheless, to me there’s something worthwhile about sensuality as one more facet of closer proximity to divinity … be this sensuality of a sexual nature or not: like in the sensual (sense-ual; as contrasted to percept-ual) pleasures of deep understandings that have at times been termed ecstasies. I’d even uphold that experienced love—from eros to agape—can itself only be an experience of the sensual.

To be clear, while I don’t disagree with the notion that one can live well even when devoid of most carnal forms of sensuality (such as what can result from out of physical touch), I do maintain that an ideal, fully balanced life (which no one can be in perpetual possession of) would include a wide range of sensual experiences as means of closer proximity to God.

I’ve brought this up because there’s a historical precedent in modern western culture that sensuality if of the Devil’s—from Savonarola to more modern notions of it being the Devil tempting one away from salvation. (no dancing in the streets, kind of thing) Then there’s a self-renunciation in Eastern spiritualties that seem to me to have almost taken over other paths after the West’s colonization of (parts of) the East. Yet, from Shinto to ancient Hindu to other ancient Eastern paths—as well as many ancient western paths—the being-at-home with sensuality as a means of closer proximity to divinity was once relatively widespread … again, be it expressed sexually or not, the focus was on new understandings of the divine gained through sense-experience (rather than percept-experience or reasoning).

Thought it worthwhile to bring this perspective on sensuality into view.

Hello, btw. So you know, I don’t personally subscribe to any notion of God as deity, though I do hold a belief in divinity, with what I here term God essentially being divinity’s pinnacle. The Neo-Platonist “the One” works for me, for example, as well as other notions of what is to me the same referent.

All jokes are welcome. — T Clark

(Y) The Monty Python bunch are imo among the best comedians out there. I almost laugh only at the memory of A Fish Called Wanda: “The central message of Buddhism is not ‘Every man for himself!’” said the Brit to the Yankee—this, I presume, in reference to the notion of freedom. Brazil, Life of Brian … good stuff.

If what wise men say is true about greater knowledge leading to greater awareness of one’s own ignorance, then it must also be true that all the very wise people in humanity’s history have also known themselves to be idiots. So, if all the world’s sages are self-acknowledged idiots, then why should any of us regular folk take anything they’ve said seriously? I mean, come on, you’d have to be an idiot to think that acknowledged idiots are sagacious.

I call this “the sagaciousness fallacy”.

(an attempted emulation of British dry humor)

There, that's more like it. — T Clark

When it comes to humor, I’m in the dark.

How many real men does it to change a lightbulb?

None. Real men aren't afraid of the dark. — Bitter Crank

… need I say more? 8-)

Btw, nice one BC.

This is a bit suspect to me for several reasons. 1) You are assuming future people will reduce suffering in the same way as the parents. Offspring may be nothing like their parents. 2) Using future people in order to decrease some overall suffering seems to not be in the spirit of the moral stance to not use people for a means to an ends. You create a life with suffering in order to reduce some total suffering. — schopenhauer1

OK, I’ll defend my previously made argument and see how far it can go.

As to (1), true, things are not deterministically set—either biologically or behaviorally. Yet just as the kids’ phenotypes are on average a mixture of the parents’ phenotypes, so too can be argued for the kids’ behaviors, including their sense of ethics, when both parents have been around. What I’m upholding is that the kid’s behavior will not itself be random but will be in great part learned from the parent(s)’ behavior. So if the parents desire less suffering in the world, given that they are good parents by common sense standards, so too will their children. Exceptions could of course occur. But this argument is about average outcomes.

As to (2), I very much acknowledge that this position is hard knocks. All the same, if one cares about suffering in the world among humans and lives one’s life thus, then the absence of this person to humanity only increases the suffering in humanity relative to this person’s being otherwise present—this for reasons aforementioned. E.g. where this person would smile at a homeless kid, a non-caring person would not show any kindness toward the same homeless kid; and without the caring person the same homeless kid would receive less compassion and would therefore experience greater suffering. Do you deem this overall reasoning valid or erroneous?

I’ll try to address “the people as means toward ends” issue after this one issue is first addressed—since the former issue is contingent upon the latter issue being valid as here expressed.

On the philosophical principle of using reasoning in conjunction with one’s ready acquired body of empirical knowledge to establish what is and is not real:

An Eastern European, outback shepherd who’d only seen local animals his entire life—with no connection to the world outside his village, such as via books or TV—finally made it out into the country’s big city. There he visited the city zoo. At the zoo he came face to face with a very tall-necked giraffe. While staring at it in disbelief, he contemplated deep and hard. At last, the intrepid shepherd confidently concluded with a wave of the hand: “No animal such as this can even exist!”

(A Romanian joke that may not translate as well as it could. I like it though.)

A more English based one also about observations and reasoning:

Two Californian dumb blonds stare up at the moon. One asks, “What do you think is closer: the moon or New York?” The other replies: “You stupid? The moon, of course! Look, you can’t see New York from where we’re at.”