So materialists and idealists are one and the same and have no idea that they have been arguing for the same thing all of these centuries? — Harry Hindu
And that needs to be explained - why some things can interact and some things can't - again without using terms like "substance" (because, according to you, it is a vacuous term), or "physical" or "mental".
...and what you agreed with. So, we agree on one thing - that there is a false dichotomy between physical things and mental things, therefore dualism is just wrong.According to what you have said, yes. — Michael
Dark matter is just an idea, or a solution (that hasn't been proven), to our observation of the behavior of galaxies. So to use light and dark matter as an example of things that don't interact is quite presumptuous. Do you have any other examples of things that can't interact?They'd also be false, given that some things can't interact with other things (e.g. light and dark matter). — Michael
If "substance" is vacuous, then it would seem to me that "causation" would be vacuous as causation is dependent on the idea of like substance can, and do, interact with each other. If they aren't the same substance, then how do they interact? We can observe that these things do interact, and can even make predictions of what kind of effect will result from a certain cause. An explanation of causation would also need to explain how we can make causal predictions that come true more than they don't. To have a higher than 50% chance of making causal predictions must mean something, no?Of course. Like I said, the problem of causation is a problem for everyone. — Michael
Do you have any other examples of things that can't interact. — Harry Hindu
Yeah, what makes it the best? Materialism for that matter is also a "satisfying" solution because it denies that the mind exists in any way transcendental to the body. And of course, then we have positions like substance dualism, or neutral monism. — Agustino
So just like the metaphysics of being is a psychological defense mechanism against the flux of existence, so too the metaphysics of becoming is a psychological defense mechanism against immutable, unchanging Being. These are of course neither arguments for nor against one metaphysics or the other. They're just red herrings. — Agustino
Then you ought to certainly cast both of them aside if you really want to rely just on psychology.The point is not to refute metaphysical positions through psychology but to move away from them, cast them aside as being unnecessary. — darthbarracuda
Okay.But materialism fails for the self-evident truth that the mind is not reducible or identical to the brain.
I'll admit, dualism a la Aquinas are plausible as well. — darthbarracuda
OK, but on its own this leads to the position of Cartesian Dualism. The position does hold some logical inconsistencies at a metaphysical level of contemplation. — javra
The question of "whose mind is it then?" holds, at minimum, two alternatives: a) somebody's, such as being the mind of God (as you've alluded to) or, else, b) nobody's, something like "the collective phenomena-endowed mind emerging from out of the collective unconscious, to which all individual minds (similar to Jung's worldview) are in their own ways partly tied into" (hence, not the mind of God). This, of course, is painted with wide brush strokes ... and the two alternatives mentioned are not exhaustive. — javra
Do the Jews, the Christians, or the Muslims hold the same notion of God, or do they hold three different such notions vying with each other for supremacy? And of course, there are other major religions out there, such as Hinduism and Buddhism — javra
It's a satisfying solution to the mind-body problem because it denies the body exists in any way transcendental to the mind. — darthbarracuda
Mathematical realists are unlikely to be materialists. — Michael
Spinoza's 'dual aspect' conception is also consistent and coherent with our ordinary understandings of matter and mind. — Janus
You say these alternatives are not exhaustive; can you think of others? — Janus
And how would “dual aspect” monism be logically contradictory to a stance of objective idealism? To better spell things out, some mind-stuff holds the aspect of matter and some holds the aspect of individual minds. — javra
But again, I await your justification of what is and is not real regarding mind — javra
All I have been trying to point out from the start is that any idealism which would purport to explain human experience of a shared world must posit some objectively existent absolute mind or spirit; something to foundationally connect and unify individual human minds. — Janus
To be honest, I still don't understand what you are asking for. — Janus
OK. To reply, no: There is no "must posit" some guiding mind or spirit required for the stance of such idealism. One could instead posit an end-state that is a final cause. Again, no mind/spirit required in so doing. Actually, a mind/spirit would will/aspire/intend/etc.; hence, would not of itself be the final cause/telos ... for it would be via this final cause that the mind/spirit intends, regardless of how evolved or superlative it might be. — javra
The question of what of our being is real is pivotal to the entire metaphysical discussion--far more so than the issue I've just given reply to. — javra
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? non-skeptical realism · 82% (760/931) other ················· 9% (86/931) skepticism ············ 5% (45/931) idealism ·············· 4% (40/931)
Going by idealism, and keeping it consistent, there’s no difference among you and my experiences of you. — jorndoe
Going by idealism, and keeping it consistent, there’s no difference among you and my experiences of you. (On a non-idealist account it’s impossible for me to experience your self-awareness, since then I’d be you instead.) You = my experiences of you. But I’m not omniscient, since otherwise I’d know that I were. I don’t have to experience someone else’s self-awareness to take it’s independent existence for granted, I don’t have to become the Moon to take it’s independent existence for granted — and I learn of both much the same way, by interaction, observation, coherence, whatever. Attempting to escape solipsism by declaring that others also are selves would be textbook special pleading. — jorndoe
I agree. In fact, like this one, nearly all sentences that anybody ever utters are as meaningful to idealists as to materialists. It is only when one drills down through a long sequence of definitions from the sentence that one can start to discern any difference. That's why the simple, snappy 'refutations' of idealism like Johnson's kicking a stone or asking about fictional characters are so ineffectual. — andrewk
This cannot be directly deduced from 1 and 2, since neither of them mentions an external world. At best, there may be some steps omitted, that introduce that notion and could bridge that gap, but they'd need to be written out explicitly for it to be convincing.3. All thought/belief formation is existentially contingent upon presupposing the existence of an external world.(from1,2) — creativesoul
3. All thought/belief formation is existentially contingent upon presupposing the existence of an external world.(from1,2)
— creativesoul
This cannot be directly deduced from 1 and 2, since neither of them mentions an external world. At best, there may be some steps omitted, that introduce that notion and could bridge that gap, but they'd need to be written out explicitly for it to be convincing. — andrewk
presume that everyone is in agreement that the conditions of assertion of a and b are not generally inter-translatable. Wittgenstein mentioned in PI that the experiential criteria for (b) are "what he says and does", but that (a) cannot be given experiential criteria in terms of other words. — sime
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