As for compassion - it might be recalled that part of the Buddhist mythos is that, after realising supreme enlightenment, the Buddha was inclined to retreat into anonymity and say nothing further about it, but for the intervention of Brahma, who begged him to teach 'out of compassion for the suffering of the world' - which the Buddha then agreed to do.

But it also might be added that later Buddhism put a greater emphasis on compassion, in that the aim of the Buddhist aspirant was not for his/her own liberation, but that of all others. I think it's also a generally understood fact that seeing through one's own illusions and self-centredness naturally gives rise to a greater sense of empathy which begins to spontaneously arise as a consequence. — Wayfarer

Ah, I see you've just added the last sentence, which does go toward answering my question regarding detachment from the world in conjunction with compassion toward it.

To comment, as to the particular mythos of the Buddha just quoted, it should be held in mind that all mythoi are known to us via mixture of oral tradition over generations (in which the mythos told can undergo a good deal of plasticity and change) and writings which were not the subject's (in this case the Buddha's) own. The authenticity of the mythos is hence authored more by the characters and dispositions of those who told it than it is by the original Buddha himself. I much prefer the current Dalai Lama's underlying tenet that Buddhism is a faith grounded in reason. This over a potentially unquestioning acceptance of what mythoi have to say (which, after all, often diverge and conflict when taken as a whole in regard to a particular subject). In keeping with this, one can find the Dalai Lama's thoughts expressing that "a biased mind (which fully equates to a lack of psychological objectivity or else lack of psychological impartiality) cannot grasp reality" - which, to my best understanding, then equates detachment to an unbiased mind, hence to psychological objectivity/impartiality (not to be confused with physicality or else physical objects). This rather than lack of any outlook - outlooks which, as your examples illustrate, the Buddha indeed had - or else lack of being moved by the sorrows or joys of others.

I'm not disagreeing on the benefits of mindful, compassion-infused detachment (else unbiased-ness), but do want to question the attributes of it which were previously mentioned in your post, maybe in haste (?).

That said, I find myself having a great affinity toward the view that a Buddhist's calling is not personal salvation from suffering - this with unconcern for others' well-being such that one is not moved by their sorrows/suffering or joys/happiness - so much as the liberation of all.

And, since the first step on the Eightfold Path is samma ditthi, ‘right view’, it turns out that ‘right view’ is no view, in the sense of not holding to opinions or arguing for philosophical positions. — Wayfarer

Now you may ask what this detachment is that is so noble in itself. You should know that true detachment is nothing else but a mind that stands unmoved by all accidents of joy or sorrow, honour, shame or disgrace, as a mountain of lead stands unmoved by a breath of wind. …

(the second being from an Eckhart quote and not your own words)

It so far seems to me that to have compassion for others and the world at large one must necessarily hold opinions of what is right and wrong, of what is just, etc., and, furthermore, that via compassion one must become moved - if not into action then at the very least into personal sorrow - by the injustice-resulting sorrows of others in the world.

Going back to what was previously mentioned in relation to detachment and compassion:

If detachment is taken to equate to a) a lack of views being the "right view' and b) immovability (be it regarding physical action or psychological sentiment) by joys and sorrows, etc., then how do you understand a detachment from the world to coincide with a compassion for the world (and, obviously, hence for those from which the world is constituted)?

(To be clear, here with an explicit understanding of “the world” as “the subjective human experience, regarded collectively”.)

How do I make a character in my dream do and say everything it does and says, and still be surprised by everything it does and says? — Patterner

My way of explaining this is that it is not that you (i.e., that I-ness) which is the agential first-person point of view (i.e., which is the conscious intellect during waking states) that devises the given dream which one as first-person point of view experiences – no more than it is you as an agential first-person point of view which produces that which you see, smell, hear, etc. during waking states. Rather, it is that you (that I-ness) which consists of one’s total self or being (more specifically: one’s total mind, the unconscious aspects of it included) which produces the REM dream which is experienced by you as a first-person point of view during sleep. Just as its your unconscious mind which produces that which you are conscious of during waking states.

But this gets bound up in the philosophy or else psychology of what a self is constituted of. To use William James' basic dichotomy, which mirrors that of Kant’s and of Husserl’s, the first-person point of view is the “pure ego” which is that I-ness that experiences and thereby knows the phenomenal aspects of one’s total self; i.e., the “I” as knower of the experienced self; e.g., I see; I choose, I remember, etc. All aspects of selfhood that are experienced by this same pure ego is then broadly classified as the “empirical ego”; i.e., the “I” as the self which is known via experience (this by the pure ego); e.g. I am tall/short (or: I have two hands); I am stupid/smart in relation to some topic (or: I have an unconscious mind); I am of this or that nationality, etc. The first consciously experiences phenomena; the second is constituted of the phenomena experienced. So, during a dream, the agential first-person point of view (the pure ego) can well be surprised by that which agencies of its total unconscious mind present to it. To further complicate matters, the pure ego can in certain dreams hold an empirical ego quite distinct from its empirical ego during waking states. But this is a very broad and possibly very different topic.



Apropos, to add to the anecdotal accounts, some years back I’ve had a series of REM dreams (rather than daydreams) that were as coherent as any waking reality, in which I interacted with others in a coherently stable town and environment. In this series of dreams, it was always the same town, the same environment, and the same general cohort of people. What tripped me out upon awakening from these rather vivid dreams was that, in the later portion of these dreams, I’d while dreaming remember as vividly as any waking memory events that had occurred during previous dreams in this series. These dreams where clearly distinct from waking reality, but they were not distinct from each other and certainly not inconsistent.

If I interpret you correctly, we then are in general agreement on the key issues. (My intention was not that of championing Humean philosophy: to me, he got some thing right and others not. As to asceticism, my personal view is that if it does no harm, then to each their own.)

Our wants are not unanalyzable primitives that the intellect must figure out how best to accommodate, but are in fact shaped by the intellect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To what extent, if any, would you then agree with the following:

At minimum, no spatiotemporally occurring intellect (stated to differentiate from the hypothetical of a non-spatiotemproal intellect, commonly termed "God" in the West) can ever be other than fully unified in non-manifold manners with it own intrinsic wants, desires, intentions, and therefore passions - via which reasoning becomes implemented.

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This to me is the other side of the same theme I previously mentioned: that all passions (emotions, desires, wants, etc.) are bound to and unfold via reasoning: namely, minimally, teleological reasons for being that which they are.

Maybe interestingly, wants are not all of the same nature in terms of whom, or what, they pertain to - even when all wants can be validly stated to pertain to the same self or being: To express a relatively straightforward example, there's a maybe subtle but extreme difference between being envious oneself and shunning as best one can pangs of envy which one senses withing one's own total being. I use envy because its telos is relatively simple and universal: roughly, that end or aim of becoming in sole possession of something which pertains to someone else. Envy is the emotion addressed, and it holds a clear want - itself bound by teleological reasons and hence reasoning. If one is envious, then one is actively intentioning the telos/aim/end of the envy. If, on the other hand, one is rejecting one's felt pangs of envy, than one as, I'll here say consciousness or intellect, is antithetical to becoming envious. The first envy pertains to the conscious intellect, is that which the conscious intellect momentarily is. The second however, does not pertain to the conscious intellect but to that intellect's total workings of mind at large. Yet it will be the (to me, always passion-possessing) intellect which via its capacities can choose and thereby determine whether it converges with the felt pang of envy to actively become envious or else denounces it so as to remain devoid of that given emotion. And, in this example, if the conscious intellect decides to not become envious, it will then hold a desire, else passion, antithetical to that of envy: in a sense, here, the intellect passionately endeavors to remain un-envious despite the felt pangs of intruding emotions (these emotions, wants, intentions, then, not pertaining to the conscious intellect itself).

Thought I'd mention one example to try to better clarify my previous statement.

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Edit: To complement what I've just expressed, on the one hand there are emotions for which we have no terms for in English; on the other, states of being such those of serenity, calmness, being focused, psychological objectivity or impartiality, and the like (which the intellect might strive to maintain in ideal conditions) are all emotive, of themselves sentiments or passions - and not products of deductive reasoning. The intellect might reason, deductively or otherwise, that these emotive states of being are beneficial and ought to be maintained or acquired, but these states of being which the intellect might potentially find itself in are yet emotive (loosely, facilitating certain, non-physical, motions of the intellect) - and so fall under the umbrella category of the passions or else sentiments.

If the Humean is committed to all issues of value ultimately stemming from wholly irrational passions, then this applies just as much to all questions of truth. Hence, the foundations of reason, logic, etc. would themselves be irrational (some are indeed willing to accept this).

The second counter is to claim that all notions of goodness ultimately stem from some sort of kernal of irrational preference. [...]. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I find that words and their connotations often get in the way: in Hume’s arguments against moral rationalism he wasn’t arguing or concluding that morality is grounded upon irrationality:

To paraphrase Hume: Hume, from my readings of a considerable time ago, in his “Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals” basically argues that morals are founded on wants (which are experienced sentiments or passions) rather than on a priori deductive truths (which constitutes the rationalism which, if I remember correctly, he was critiquing in his writings). And wants do not ubiquitously equate to pleasures: e.g. the want to go to the dentist when one finds doing so unpleasurable.

On a personal note, I’m by no means one to support the view that wants are by their very nature irrational or even arational: regardless of how irrational or arational we might deem our emotions, of which wants are an intrinsic aspect of, they all have their teleological reasons for being/manifesting—i.e., they all want to accomplish some not yet actualized end—and I thereby take them to thus be rational (aka, reason-bound) in the strict sense just mentioned. But the reasoning they pertain to is certainly not that of the a priori deductive truths which rationalism traditionally upholds. To be clearer, I just briefly checked and moral rationalism is indeed commonly defined as purporting that metaethical values can be known a priori, and, thus, devoid of any experience—something I find utterly nonsensical so far.

I get that Hume did not anywhere explicitly claim that wants/emotions/passions are themselves reason-bound, this as I myself just did. Nevertheless, regardless of critiques regarding his arguments and views, the fact remains that Hume’s perspectives culminate in a form of virtue ethics, one replete with altruistic concern—and not in simple utilitarianism or the naïve sentimentalism in which the “boo” and “yay” fully relative and idiosyncratic to individual person(s) grounds that which is morally wrong and right If it were otherwise, he could not uphold what he in fact upheld, e.g.:

As a result, certain character traits commonly deemed virtues by the major religions of the time are deemed vices on Hume's theory. Hume calls these so-called "virtues", such as self-denial and humility, monkish virtues. Rather vehemently, he writes:

Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices... (EPM, §9, ¶3) — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Enquiry_Concerning_the_Principles_of_Morals#Virtue_ethics

These so called "monkish virtues" are after all both pleasurable and of utility to many of the implied monks concerned.

I have noticed in Mahāyāna Buddhism, there is a lovely expression, that emptiness and compassion are like the two wings of a bird - that realisation of emptiness leads to detachment, but that detachment without compassion (Karuṇā) is meaningless. — Wayfarer

Thanks for that!

Since ancient times, both Eastern and Western philosophies have prized detachment as a virtue. — Wayfarer

Like the ‘nothingness vs. no thingness’ divide which we’ve agreed upon in previous threads, “detachment” is a term which in at least the English language doesn’t find a readily interpretable meaning for the spiritual (or spiritual-like) contexts in which it is employed. In other words, it doesn’t translate well from its metaphysics-relative, intended meaning in Eastern languages.

I. for example, know of no Buddhist who advocates for the abolishment of compassion, this while upholding the ideal of we in English translate as “detachment” with the same breath. Compassion, in our English lexicon, however, can only be obtained via attachment: not only the occurrence of empathy (i.e., the sensing of what the other senses, something that one can hold for a disliked rival while in battle with them so as to best act and react to their actions) but also the occurrence of sympathy (i.e., earnest caring for what the other senses). Love of parents, children, romantic partners, the world at large, etc., is always a compassion for the X addressed. And, in common English understanding, this always then equates to an attachment toward that loved.

I believe that the full scope of “detachment” when explicitly expressed is “detachment from maya (illusion)”. And maya, to my awareness, in either Hindu or Buddhist schools of Indian philosophy is never that which is considered the core aspect of subjectivity: the atman in Hindu philosophy; the anatman in Buddhist philosophy. The latter constituting that which is nonillusory reality per se in an ultimate metaphysical analysis of things.

Thought I’d mention this given how common it is for westerners to associate “detachment” to utter unconcern, including relative to the welfare of other beings in general. In contrast to what many would think, and as you indirectly mention, detachment is not callousness. But, I think, rather the very opposite. Such that the Skeptic epoche and Stoic apatheia can make no sense, at least to me, in the absence of earnest compassion and its satisfaction with the conditions of not only oneself but of others which surround.

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Ps. None of which is to say that objectivity does not matter or is else unimportant.

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Pps. Written as a footnote to what you were saying. Hopefully nothing significantly controversial about it.

Me too, thanks for clarifying. — J

:grin: :up:

And notice what happens when we ask whether the doubt being expressed is about the thought or what the thought is about. I can be absolutely certain that, right this minute, I am having the thought "I think I did" concerning some previous action I'm not too sure about. Again, the ambiguity of "thought" as mental event (yep, definitely happening) and "thought" as that thought's intensional content (not too sure). — J

Yes, very much agree. Though I wouldn’t use the word “doubt” to express this but “(psychological) uncertainty” instead:

I find doubt to necessarily be “an uncertainty regarding an already affirmed, or else held, certainty - be it affirmed or else held by oneself in the past or else by someone other”. As one example, this can become very transparent in the two propositions: “the future is uncertain” and “the future is doubtful/dubious”. The first merely and strictly stipulates that future events are not yet determined. The second proposition, however, stipulates either a) that the heretofore upheld reality of the future as a whole might in fact not occur or b) that some heretofore upheld specific set of realities which are to occur in the future might in fact not occur.

So one can be uncertain about the object of one’s thought - e.g., I'm thinking that I left my wallet in the room (this while being fully certain that one’s current thought as process is occurring). And this uncertainty can be maintained without necessarily doubting the given object of one’s thought. As can again be exemplified by some future even one is uncertain about but does not doubt. For example, a person is uncertain of whether they will see a movie latter on in the day but - because they have not previously held the psychological certainty that they would see a movie later on - the person does not come to doubt this future event, even as they are uncertain about it.

To say “I think that […]” is to then express some degree of psychological uncertainty about that which one thinks is the case, but rarely if ever is it to affirm that one doubts that that given which one thinks is the case is in fact actually so.

The semantics of “uncertainty” and “doubt” being an utterly different issue to that of the thread, granted, but I do find interest in it. (A pet peeve of mine: unlike Cartesian skepticism - which is about doubting everything - ancient skepticism was about ubiquitous, and hence radical, (psychological degrees of) uncertainty …with no doubt of this position or of anything else required. This being what in modern parlance can be termed the stance of “fallibilism”. This doubt-independent ancient skepticism being something which the ancient skeptic Cicero for example nicely exemplifies. All this as an apropos regarding the difference between uncertainties and doubts.)

For my part, this issue boils down to what one interprets by the term “thought”.

If one holds that cognizance (a fancier way of saying “awareness”) is in itself a form of thought, then there can be no apprehension of p in the absence of thinking p. — javra


Thinking p requires thinking p. No one disputes this. The question of the OP is whether thinking p requires self-consciously thinking p; whether it requires thinking "I think p." — Leontiskos

I take most of this thread to be about the befuddlement of language in attempting to articulate that which ontically is or else occurs in regard to at least human cognition.

Going back to the OP:

This follows up on some issues in recent threads about Descartes, Sartre, Kimhi, and the nature of philosophical thought.

The “I think” accompanies all our thoughts, says Kant. Sebastian Rödl, in Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, agrees with this but points out that “this cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p.” He calls this a confusion arising from our notation, and suggests, not entirely seriously, that we could devise a more accurate notation “that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think.” He interprets Kant as saying the same thing: for Kant, “the I think is not something thought alongside the thought that it accompanies, but internal to what is thought as such.” — J

@J can correct me on this, but from my own reading of the OP, the primary question was: is the (Cogito-style) actuality of “I think” requisite for all instances of “I think (proposition) p” without exception? And the only way I can find this to apply is if the concept of “thinking” is expanded to include all cognitive processes, very much including cognizance. Otherwise, the stipulation that “I think” as a proposition always accompanies the proposition “I think (proposition) p” is, for my part, utterly absurd: it would entail that for each and every explicitly stated “I think that […]” there would necessarily be implicitly expressed “I think that I think that […]”, which is absurdity—in part because it would allow for if not imply an infinite regress of “I think”.

The semantics of words we use in modern times do not always hold a one-to-one correlation to the semantics of words that were used in the past—even when not translated from other languages. This especially when it comes to the more nuanced interpretation of terms which past philosophers on occasion made use of. This being something that, though maybe obvious, often eludes discussions of what others in the distant past meant to express by the words used.

As to modern semantics, in adding to this :

To answer “I did” and “I think I did” to some question is in no way and at no time equivalent: the first expresses a fact one is confident about regarding what one did, this while the second expresses something along the lines of a best presumption based on one’s best reasoning (i.e., thinking) regarding what one in fact did (presumably about a past deed one does not hold a clear recollection of). The second does not however require doubt of what one thinks is the case, but only allows for certain degrees of uncertainty.

To say, "I'm thinking (i.e., pondering) this is the case" is likewise not equivalent to, "this is the case".

Hence, to say, "I think (i.e., I best judge as a subject that) Paris is crowded" is not equivalent to saying, "Paris is crowded," with the latter, unlike the first, affirming what is to be taken as an objective fact (something that does or else should hold equal weight to all subjects irrespective of their biases).

... All of which would make "I think I think p" translate into "I best reason that I best reason (with a possibly infinite extension of this) that [...]". This being something that arguably is never done by anyone.

I’m of course on board in upholding that language is extremely important (crucial in this sense) to the uniqueness of human intelligence. But I don’t deem it necessary (essential in this sense). I wasn’t there when it happened, but Einsteins reported epiphany about the speed of light was reputedly non-verbal, instead being strictly imaginative. Another renowned example is that of Archimedes’ eureka moment. I interpret these, and many other, examples to be instances of non-verbal thought - with a great deal of intelligence to boot. For those who uphold the possibility of a perennial philosophy or some such, the same might be said for at least some people’s epiphanies regarding the nature of being: these being non-verbal insights (which might provide profound understandings that are difficult, if at all possible, to put into propositional format in any cogent, or else non-poetic, way). These examples of non-verbal thought then entail the occurrence of non-propositional thought (unless one wants to affirm such a thing as languageless propositions). Hence, while I deem language vastly important to intellect, I don’t deem intellect (or thoughts for that matter) to necessarily be dependent on language use.

And yes, though a bit off topic, I’m in full agreement with the Cosmos consisting of Heraclitean or else Stoic Logos - which we are embedded in. Unlike Aristotle’s dichotomy of humans as the rational animal versus non-human animals all being non-rational, however, I instead interpret humans as being the current zenith of comprehension regarding the Cosmos, and hence of the Cosmos’s rational order. Such that there is a quite significant partition, or else chasm, between the human intellect and the intellects of all other known life forms. Yet this I appraise as nevertheless being an aspect of a gradated and ever evolving spectrum, or cline, in regard to comprehension-ability (an ability which, again, language tremendously benefits) - this rather than any kind of metaphysical divide between humans and all other life forms. Otherwise expressed, they too are aware subjects that are part and parcel of the Cosmos’s Logos and which likewise behave via its properties, but they lack our human ability to comprehend it (imperfect as our human comprehension nevertheless is).

The key cleavage seems to be whether thought is meant to be essentially sentential or propositional, as opposed to "representational". — J

Some thoughts in considering this:

Were thought essentially propositional, a person who for example ponders and arrives at conclusions solely via use of mental images (and, hence, not via use of any internal monologue) would then not be engaging in any thought. Which seems quite odd to affirm as far as commonsense understandings of thinking go. Or are propositions meant to be understood as sometimes being languageless? (Sentences certainly can’t be). If so, then plenty of non-human animals give all indications of using propositions all the time. But this doesn’t seem right either.

On the other hand, were thought to be essentially representational, then the faculty of understanding could not be an integral aspect of the faculty of thought—this even if understanding will always accompany thought. This will be so because, while one can of course understand representations, understandings will not of themselves be representations of anything. And, hence, will not of themselves then be thoughts.

But in either of these two scenarios regarding what thought is taken to essentially be, many if not most will at least at times be able to hold an awareness of some thought p without thinking “I think p” (without either forming a proposition regarding p or else forming a mental representation of p that is thereby other than p).

As one example: Suppose a person is daydreaming of p, and thereby holds an awareness of thought p. Doing so neither requires that the person forms a proposition regarding p nor that the person forms a representation of the p they are aware of.

Because of all this, I’ll yet maintain that for “I think” to be interpreted as accompanying all thoughts, the thinking which the “I think” addresses must be other than either propositional or representational.

The “I think” accompanies all our thoughts, says Kant. Sebastian Rödl, in Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, agrees with this but points out that “this cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p.” He calls this a confusion arising from our notation, and suggests, not entirely seriously, that we could devise a more accurate notation “that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think.” He interprets Kant as saying the same thing: for Kant, “the I think is not something thought alongside the thought that it accompanies, but internal to what is thought as such.”

This has some obvious relevance to the debate about the force/content distinction in Frege, which we discussed at length in an earlier thread, inspired by Kimhi. But for now . . .

Suppose my friend Pat replied as follows:

“Sorry, but I don’t have this experience. When I look out the window and say to myself, ‛That oak tree is shedding its leaves,’ I am not aware of also, and simultaneously, thinking anything along the lines of ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ Please don’t misunderstand me as saying that I’ve never had such a thought, or wouldn’t know what it was to experience such a thought. There are indeed circumstances under which I may additionally reflect ‛And I am thinking thought p at this moment’ or ‛Thought p is my thought’ or ‛I judge that p’. But I disagree that this characterizes my experience of thinking in general.”

Which of these responses do you think would be appropriate to make to Pat?:

1. You've misunderstood. The thesis of the ubiquity of the “I think” is not based on empirical observation. It’s not about what you experience; whether you are aware of having such an experience is not decisive either way. Some people are aware of it, some are not. But we’re not relying on personal reports when we claim that the “I think” must accompany all our thoughts.

2. The “I think” is an experience of self-consciousness, and requires self-consciousness. When you say you are “not aware of it,” you are mistaken. But you can learn to identify the experience, and thus understand that you have been aware of it all along.

3. The “I think” is not experienced at all. It is a condition of thought, a form of thought, in the same way that space and time are conditions of cognition. Self-consciousness, in Rödl’s sense, is built in to every thought, but not as a content that must be experienced.

4. If your report is accurate, then the thesis that “the ‛I think’ accompanies all our thoughts” has been proven wrong.

Or is there another response that seems better? — J

For my part, this issue boils down to what one interprets by the term “thought”.

If one holds that cognizance (a fancier way of saying “awareness”) is in itself a form of thought, then there can be no apprehension of p in the absence of thinking p. For one must cognize p in order to in any way apprehend it. And, since cognizance is here taken to be one form of thought, one must then think p in order to apprehend it.

And, in this interpretation, it is possible that one simultaneously has a meta-cognizance of cognizing that which one immediately apprehends, say, though one’s physiological senses. In other words, it is possible that one can hold an awareness of being aware. Conversely, some might at least at times be aware without being aware of so being.

Apropos, this first interpretation can be in harmony with the more ancient understanding of intellect (one in keeping with the original Latin): namely, that of the intellect being the faculty of first-person understanding via which one understands anything which is other (be this other a concept or a concrete reality). One’s understanding of a concept (say, the concept of biological evolution) will always be necessarily but insufficiently contingent on the depth, or else nonquantitative magnitude, of one’s ready occurring body of first-person understanding. Otherwise exemplified, an adult human holds the potential to thereby understand what (the concept of) a mathematical variable is, but neither can a human infant nor an adult dog ever understand what a mathematical variable is, and this irrespective of how much they come to experience. This, in short, due to their own intellect being far smaller as both faculty and body of content by comparison to that of a typical adult human’s. Hence, if understanding too is deemed to be an aspect of thought, then here too there can be no apprehension of p in the complete absence of an understanding of p—and, thereby, in the absence of thought of p. (Interesting to me, in ancient interpretations, there also at times seems to be an equivalency between understanding and knowing. One cannot know that which one does not understand, nor can one understand something without knowing that which is understood. This being a knowledge other than that of JTB.)

Yet, in stark difference to all the aforementioned, wherever thought is interpreted to be the “representation created in the mind without the use of one's faculties of vision, sound, smell, touch, or taste” then there certainly will be times when one apprehends p without in any way thinking p. For instance, at any given time, one will always apprehend things in one’s peripheral vision which one in no way thinks about (this when thought is interpreted as being representations created in the mind which one can then in any way manipulate at will).

In this latter interpretation of thought, (4) will be valid.

But when considering the former interpretation of thought, a hybrid between (1) and (3) might likely be upheld. Maybe as follows: You misunderstand. Thought—when understood to necessarily consist of both cognizance, i.e. awareness, and understanding—is a precondition for any thought in the sense of “representation created in the mind”. Hence, the “I think” when interpreted to mean “I am aware (of)” is a condition for anything one might think of in the latter sense.

But then, so construing would endow even bacteria with the reality of being a first-person thinking creature—this IFF bacteria happen to be in any way aware (such as of what is and is not food, and how these differentiate from predators)—for then they too will hold some form of, acknowledgedly miniscule, cognizance and understanding.

Again, the issue is contingent on what one interprets the term “thought” to signify.

The truth of formalizations of truth is rightly called, and it is binary. I don't think it makes sense to call this a sui generis artificial truth though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Been thinking more about this and I wanted to address it.

Neither do I find it to be a sui generis artificial truth, but I do find it to define truth by an undergeneralization of what truth in its every day meaning has the potential to signify. So, in readdressing this portion of the OP:

A major difficulty for modern thought has been the move to turn truth and falsity into contradictory opposites, as opposed to contrary opposites (i.e. making truth akin to affirmation and negation). For an example of contradictory opposition, consider a number's "being prime." A number is either prime or it isn't. To say that a number is prime is to say that it is not-not-prime (i.e. double negation). For contrary opposition, consider darkness and light. Darkness is the absence of light. On a naive view, we might suppose there can be pitch darkness, a total absence of light, or a sort of maximal luminescence. The two are opposites, but they are not contradictory opposites. To say of a room that "it is light" is not to say that it admits of no darkness. Shadows are still cast in bright rooms. — Count Timothy von Icarus

While I readily agree with this quoted statement, there yet remains the following observation: when dialetheism is denied as invalid and the law of noncontradiction is affirmed, it nevertheless remains the case that no proposition can be both true and false at the same time and in the same way. Rephrased in my current understanding of truth: nothing can both conform to actualities and not conform to actualities at the same time and in the same way. Hence, to say of a room that "it is lit with light" - while so saying readily admits of various shades of darkness in the given room - cannot be to say that "it is dark" at the same time and in the same way that "it is lit with light".

The general nature of propositional truth is not that of a strict binary regarding two absolutes - say of either 0 or 1 (as per the absolute ends on the spectrum of quantifiable probability). Is thereby not that of an absolute, hence complete and perfect, truth vs. an absolute, hence complete and perfect, falsehood (falsehoods too will in general contain some true elements which are minimally tacitly understood if not explicitly specified; were this to not be the case, lies, for example, would not ever be believable and thereby effective) Else, the nature of truth is not a binary between absolute truths vs. that which is not absolute truths and thereby false.

In this it seems we agree.

Yet it nevertheless remains the case that no proposition can be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect.

Formal logic that then addresses truth strictly via the two values of 0 and 1 seems to me to axiomatically presuppose that, due to the law of noncontradiction holding as just specified, the nature of truth can admit of no vagueness - such that partial truths cannot occur, for example.

This, though, would again to me be an undergeneralization of what "truth" semantically encompasses.

I'm not sure how this train of thought would then fit into the nature of truth being, or else not being, binary. I'm so far tempted to say "the nature of truth is binary in one sense but not in another" - but I presume this wouldn't be of much service.

What do you think about cases where we can speak truthfully about potency or what is not? For instance:
"Joe Biden could have stayed in the 2024 election."
"I can learn Italian, but I currently do not."
"Joe Biden did not win the 2024 election."
"Dogs are not reptiles."

There is also the issue of authenticity, particularly as it is often applied to personal freedom. When we are not being "true to ourselves" or "being our true selves" the issue is precisely our actions (actuality) have failed to conform to something that is true, presumably of our nature, but which is as yet only potential. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You raise a good point. But I do hold some concerns regarding the dichotomy between actuality and potentiality. If actuality is “that which is presently happening, occurring, or acting” and potentiality is “the capacity, ability, or power to become actual” then the following ensues:

While all conceived of potentiality will be further deemed to be potential actuality by definition, ontically speaking, some conceived of potentialities will of themselves conform to the reality, else actuality, of what is possible to make manifest while others will not. The potency of a typical acorn to grown into an oak tree is real, actual; whereas its potency to grow into a dog is not.

So one can then have notions regarding “true potentials” - as in the phrase “obtaining one’s true potential” (in contrast to conceived of potentials which are in fact false and hence not possible to actualize; else expressed, potentials which have no present ontic occurrence and, hence, are which are not actual).

Rephrased, while “potential actuality” is cogent to me, so too is the phrase “actual potentiality” (this, again, in contrast to the notion of a conceived of potentiality which as concept is false, such that the conceived of potential holds no being, or reality, or actuality as a possible future actuality).

My intended semantics here might well not find a solid enough footing in the choice of words used. All the same, what might a “true potential” signify if not some form of conformity to that which a real, and thereby an actual, potential?

If, as I so far presume, there occurs a dichotomy between real, and hence actual, potentiality as contrasted to unreal or false, and hence nonactual, potentiality, then truth as conformity to that which is (in some way) actual remains valid. Again, as per “true potential”.

As to truths regarding what is not, these truths to me present a conformity to an actual state of affairs wherein X, Y, and Z are not.

Intro:
I'm going to make a case against both of these assumptions. :cool: — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with the position that the nature of truth is not binary. For starters, to emphasize what I take the OP to in part state, many if not most of our day-to-day propositional truths are partial or else incomplete, though nevertheless true rather than false. A reply to “what did you see” for example can only be just such a partial or incomplete truth (one does not spend eons to propositionally express all that one sees at any given juncture, from one’s focal point to one’s peripheral vision, in the minutest detail). And so, as you say, many a statement can be more true or else less true—again, while yet remaining true rather than false. But I’m not clear if by “univocity” you mean simply “not equivocal” or else the “univocity of being”. Since no mention of God was given until some time after the OP was made, I’m here assuming it was the first.

Hence, we might take up the previously common supposition that truth has something essentially to do with the relationship between the intellect and reality. I would go a step further: "truth is primarily in the intellect and only secondarily (or fundementally) in things." Signs, statements in language, etc. can be true or false in virtue of what they mean, and meaning is likewise primarily in the mind, secondarily in things.

So, without having to make any commitments to any specific sort of correspondence or identity relationship between thought and being, we can simply leave it as "truth is the conformity or adequacy of thought to being." — Count Timothy von Icarus

You’ve mentioned it but I have not seen you focus on the topic of truth being equivalent to conformation. Which I so far find far more pertinent to the topic than the specification of “adequacy”.

I want to make an affirmation to see if it is possible to falsify via example: The univocal nature of truth (i.e., the state of being true) is that of conformity to some actuality—truth hence has this meaning in all cases—this either as a process of conforming to the actuality, which requires duality between that which conforms and that which is conformed to, or else as a state of being fully conformed to the actuality, which implies a nondualistic format of truth wherein there is only the law of identity (A=A) to specify the truth concerned.

To “conform to” is thereby always equivalent to “being true to” (hence, and vice versa). Example: conforming to a rule/norm/reality/fact/intent/ideal/etc. is being true to the same. Here conformity and hence truth will be unidirectional. By extension, then, “the arrow’s trajectory was true” specifies that the arrow’s trajectory conformed to the aim which was intended for it—and was thereby accurate or adequate in this sense alone. Else, making X conform to Y (say, painting a portrait with fidelity to the original) will be equivalent to making X be true to Y (e.g., the copy was true to the original).

“True” in the sense of loyalty, faithfulness, or trustworthiness is then conformity to interpersonal (intersubjective) actualities (actualities that come about via the interaction between subjects) to which all constituents are implicitly understood to willingly conform (be true to). This could encompass being true to a friendship, or else a romantic relationship one can be true to or else proverbially cheat on.

Then there are cases where the "conformity to that which is actual" is taken to be perfect and absolute, such that there here is no duality, i.e. such that the actuality becomes of itself fully equivalent to the truth specified. Here “true” can be either equivalent to “genuine” (e.g., the true statue was found) or else equivalent to “real” (e.g. the true crime which the book expounds upon is a crime that really happened). Here too can be found the meaning of Truth with a capital “T” being that which is ultimately and absolutely real—such that, in this sense, Truth and that which is ultimately reality are one and the same. And, for some, this can then translate into the understanding that God is Truth.

Then, when truth is understood as the process of conforming to that which is actual, this act of conformation can be more complete or else less complete. This while still being an alignment to what is actual (hence true) rather than a misalignment to what is actual (hence being false to the actuality concerned, hence a falsehood).

While it’s interesting to me to note that truth in other languages can hold a somewhat different set of denotations and connotations (e.g., the Ancient Greek “alethes” meaning un-concealment or un-forgotten—to my knowledge hence not easily specifying something like “the arrow’s aim was true”), I so far do think that the English notion of truth does hold the univocal general meaning just specified: conformity to the actual, and this either as a) the process of remaining aligned to that which is actual or b) the state of being absolutely conformant and hence identical to that which is actual (such that (b) can be found to be a perfected form of (a)).

While I acknowledge not being infallible in this belief (as in any other), I so far can't find any meaningful exception to it.

↪javra

One relevant book which is useful in thinking about wholeness is, 'The Wisdom of Imperfection', by Rob Reece. He links Bufdhism and its idea of enlightenment with Jung's idea of wholeness. Jung spoke of the emphasis on moral perfection within the Judaeo-Christian tradition( it would apply to Abrahamic religion in general). It led to the accumulation of a shadow, as a dark side of the repressed and suppressed aspects of human nature. This involves a tension between 'good' and 'evil', which needs to be balanced to combat the destructive aspects of human potential and power. He spoke of this in the form of nuclear warfare, but it applies to both individual psychology and humanity on group levels. — Jack Cummins

I think I can understand the argument you’re endorsing: one way to paraphrase my understanding is that one ought not strive to be perfect in the here and now if one is to cultivate virtue and moral means of accomplishing moral ends. If this is in keeping with what you’re seeking to express, then I’m in full agreement.

Yet I still find that following this general approach to applied ethics requires holding some future ideal reality in mind toward which one strives. Here’s what I take to be a worldly example of this:

In here taking for granted the premise that prostitution is immoral, there then are two general means of moving toward its obliteration.

The first, which I’ll label “puritan”, is to outlaw all prostitution with the most draconian laws possible in attempts to obliterated it in as soon a time as possible given the realities of the current world as is.

The second means, which I’ll tentatively label “non-puritan”, is to first acknowledge the myriad reasons for prostitution—to keep things simple, here only addressing willful prostitution (rather than unwilful sex slaves of one form or another): all these reasons generally pivoting on it being a means of gaining an income within a context where prostitution’s many risks and downsides (physical and mental) are to be deemed better than the alternatives of not prostituting oneself (from one’s own starvation to the starvation of one’s children or parents … to the more frivolous “its more financially profitable than any other means of making money"). Were society to be one where a) no people would pay money for sex with others, b) all genders would be rewarded with equal pay for equal work, c) people would be respected as fellow beings—and so forth—then no prostitution would occur, for no one would find reason to prostitute themselves. But society is not such currently. So, currently, some will always find prostitution preferable to its alternatives. The non-puritan who wants prostitution to not occur on grounds that it is an ethical wrong (as per the given premise), would then see it best to make prostitution legal and thereby regulate its commerce—this till the world changes into a humanitarian realm—placing prostitutes far away from kids, ensuring that prostitutes are and remain healthy (STD tests and so forth), that no prostitute gets raped by customers, and so forth. A potentially longer story made short, here the means are a gradual progression toward a world in which prostitution will no longer occur due to an eventual respect for all fellow human beings—this, by starting to respect prostitutes as fellow human beings (rather than deeming them as expendable and deplorable).

Both the puritan and the non-puritan in the scenarios presented, however, will hold the very same future ideal in mind when attempting to put their respective means in practice: that of a future world devoid of prostitution. It not that the non-puritan seeks a balance between good and evil—they in fact seek the very same evil-devoid good which the puritan desires—but the non-puritan’s outlook and reasoning is not absolutist in terms of what is possible to accomplish in the here and now.

In the here and now, for the non-puritan there is balance between extremes, yes, whereas for the puritan it’s a worldview of absolute good and absolute bad. But both—as they’ve been herein so far addressed—will nevertheless seek the same perfected state of being: The non-puritan by following a balanced approach toward this future state of perfection (with the puritan likely to deem this approach perverse in so far as it accommodates what is bad). The puritan by imposing an absolutist view of what is good and what is bad upon all others (with the non-puritan likely to deem the puritan’s approach as unrealistic, shortsighted, and blatantly mistaken in believing that the puritan’s means can ever accomplish the given and otherwise shared goal).

While I’m sure this terse appraisal via the example of prostitution can be disparaged by many, it does provide an outlook on what I myself generally endorse: a non-absolutist, balanced approach toward moving toward a better future. Yet, again, this very notion of a “better future” which was just stipulated will itself be an ideal regarding future states of being—will steadfastly remain the goal which is pursued.

(Not trying to write a thesis on this one subject here, but yes, fyi, I myself deem prostitution to be an ethical wrong which can only be realistically done away with in time via what I’ve here termed non-puritanical means. Means which I thereby take to at least attempt to hold greater compassion toward prostitutes in general as fellow human beings, hence as fellow human beings with the same needs and rights as the rest of us. Our own imperfections very much included.)

While you bring up a cogent distinction, I’m not familiar with the term “creativity” being used in the first sense of simply “creating things”.

For example, if one follows a blueprint to at T so as to create an item, is one then being in any way creative? I get that one here creates the item in the sense of “bringing it into existence”, but there so far seems to me to be something quite off in expressing that this same act of creation was in any way creative.

How would one then distinguish the creativity of a poet, for example, in bringing a poem into existence from the ability of a non-sentient AI program to via its (fully deterministic) algorithms create linguistic expressions and thereby bring into existence what we would recognize as a poem? Same could be asked of images (AI now being a staple part of Photoshop, for example), sounds, and so forth. And this same train of reasoning can then be further pursued in terms of a non-AI robot in a factory being creative in creating, for example, a certain car part.

Or would one not find reason to so distinguish?

Thoughts?

There is nothing new under the sun; there are no ideas that nobody's ever had. You will never make anything completely different from everything that's been done been before. Creativity is more like being a kaleidoscope; reconfiguring what already exists in a new arrangement. — Vera Mont

Here’s a postulate I’d like to test out:

There can be no distal goal held by life—from bacteria to humans—which is utterly original and thereby never before held in any manner by any lifeform. Nothing new under the sun in this sense. Yet there can occur utterly original heuristical means of best obtaining a given goal, and, in this, creativity can and does occur—such that, for one example, novel ideas can be devised as just such means toward a pursued end. With one such fairly recent example of a novel idea being that termed “meme”.

This will then apply to all contexts in which creativity can unfold: artistic, technological, mathematical, scientific (esp. in relation to scientific hypotheses but also in relation to means of testing these), philosophical, etc.

Hence making creativity necessarily dependent on some intent and the intentioning to get there. And, hence, teleological. Purely accidental results are thereby not a product of creativity—though their newly found application or utility can be.

Unfortunately for your theories, the reality is the majority of unsuccessful suiciders regret their decision to attempt suicide. In fact among unsuccessful suiciders, greater than 90% will never die of suicide (23% will have another unsuccessful attempt, but a whopping 70% will never attempt it again). — LuckyR

I'm no stranger to being wrong, but I so far don't find a connection between what I've said and what you've said. Can you embellish?

It seems obvious you cannot carry on challenging conversations without becoming offended. — Janus

You have a way of psychoanalyzing - and it's often as erroneous as hell to boot. But that your are imputing motivations which are not there is, well, it can't be projecting.

I have no desire to hurt your feelings. — Janus

How nifty of you. Don't worry about my feelings though so much as about the substance of what is said. This without assuming such psycho-babbles as that I'm posturing in my answers because I'm unable to come up with a response. Or that my feelings have been hurt by you.

Just in case we run across each other again.

You are projecting—my question insinuated nothing, I was simply trying to get a clear answer from you. — Janus

:rofl:

A can of worms that, so I'll leave it be. — javra

Why? Because you cannot come up with a response? — Janus

And "I am projecting", this because you say so.

Gaslighters are as gaslighters do. (This statement doesn't insinuate anything. :chin: )

Yea, you gave me a good laugh.

I think it's best to stop. — Janus

If you say so.

My own perspective on ethics is that the integration of reason, emotion and the instinctive aspects of life are important. However, there may be so many juxtapositions In the search for balance. Imbalance and error may be important here in resets and human endeavours towards wholeness, as opposed to ideas and ideals of perfection. — Jack Cummins

I can very much respect this. As to "endeavors towards wholeness", I tend to find wholeness in this context and wholesomeness to be virtually indistinguishable. None of us are such or can obtain anything near this state of being in this lifetime. But does not the endeavoring toward this end of wholeness in itself speak of an ideal wherein wholeness awaits to become perfected?

Thanks for your reply — Jack Cummins

Glad to see you're in no way peeved by it. :grin: Cheers.

I wonder how compassion fits into the picture. That is because it involves a certain amount of distancing from moral absolutes and ethical ideas. — Jack Cummins

In which way do you find that compassion is a distancing from moral absolutes and ethical ideas?

To re-frame the issue into Western lingo, some in the west have upheld that love is the greatest good. Compassion is certainly inherent in, if not equivalent to, love - from self-love, to romantic love, to all other (some might say less selfish) forms of love.

In Western terminology, this can be stated as God/G-d is equivalent to absolute love which is equivalent to absolute good. So that wherever love occurs so does God/G-d in due measure. This train of thought is often enough expressed by mystics, such as the Sufi as one well enough known branch. But it is at the very least also echoed in JC's teachings as Christian doctrine: e.g. both "love thine neighbor" and "love thine enemy". There's also the Corinthians' "And now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love."

At any rate, I don't yet understand how compassion is to be construed as a distancing from the moral absolute of the Good.

Since a middle way assumes a middle path or placement between extremes which are otherwise accessible, when applied to ethics (i.e., the study of good and thereby right and bad/evil and thereby wrong), it leads toward a logical contradiction:

The ethical middle way shall be in-between being or acting in manners which are “most good” and “most bad/evil” - and shall furthermore value itself as the middle way as that which is “most good”. Thereby resulting in the following contradictory proposition: The greatest good in being or else acting is to avoid being or else acting in manners that are the greatest good. This such that in the same way and at the same time a) one ought not be or else do that which is the greatest good and thereby right and b) one ought to be or else do that which is the greatest good and thereby right.

(The terms “best” and “worst” would be better fit grammatically in the above, but they do not clearly specify ethical notions of good and bad/evil.)

Otherwise reasoned, if balance between good and bad/evil is of itself good, then an infinite regress into bad/evil will result in which that which is good can never be obtained. For one will always need to be in-between that which is good and that which is bad in order to be or do that which is good.

-----

I haven’t yet come across any Buddhist doctrine that recommends as favorable a middle way between that which is ethically good and that which is ethically bad. For example, in Buddhism's endorsement of compassion, I've yet to hear that "its best to not be very compassionate but instead to also be somewhat callous". If you have, however, can you provide links or references?

Janus, before you reply with question after question, try addressing those I asked of you.

Pointless according to who? Is not the idea that life is basically pointless not merely a subjective opinion? — Janus


If life sooner or later necessarily result in nothingness, what is its point in its occurrence to begin with? Its not an issue of opinion but of logic. Something with a point has a purpose. (Unless we play footloose with terms again). The point of life is ... ? — javra

And as to:

Why are you so ready to feel insulted. — Janus

Simply because your question directly insinuates that my reply was pompous charlatanry - thereby taking a serious jab at my character. And in this, I stand by my right to feel insulted. Only human, don't you know. There a difference between being thick-skinned and being thick.

Everything in the universe is natural. If there is anything in the universe that is non-physical, invisible, and unmeasurable in quantifiable ways, it is still natural. — Patterner

Very much agree.

So you think Buddhism gives life meaning? In virtue of what? — Janus

In virtue of Buddhism being a soteriological school of thought.

Pointless according to who? Is not the idea that life is basically pointless not merely a subjective opinion? — Janus

If life sooner or later necessarily result in nothingness, what is its point in its occurrence to begin with? Its not an issue of opinion but of logic. Something with a point has a purpose. (Unless we play footloose with terms again). The point of life is ... ?

And even if life were basically mind (whatever that could mean) rather than basically matter or energy, how would that fact alone give it more point? These are the same questions I already asked that you did not even attempt to answer. — Janus

1) I stated that non-physicalism does not entail nihilism. Not that it necessarily results in purpose. and 2) Try not to bullshit so much, please. You asked me no such questions. As is blatantly evidenced here:

I think you are talking about theism because even if the world were simply non-physical and/ or held in some universal mind, that does not on its own lend it an overarching meaning. You need to add a God that cares for us, has a purpose for us, and the promise of a better life to come and personal immortality to give that overarching universal meaning.

Also I don't agree that physicalism leads to nihilism. Ironically I think it is religion that leads to nihilism by positing one meaning for all and thus nihilating the creative possibility that people have to find their own meanings by which to direct their lives.

If nature consists of that which is visible and measurable in quantifiable ways, then is the mind and, more specifically, that which we address as I-ness which is aware of its own mind and its many aspects (thoughts, ideas, intentions, emotions, etc.) not natural? For the latter is neither visible nor measurable in quantifiable ways. Hence notions such as that of the transcendental ego. — javra


Energy itself is not measurable except by gauging its effects. If you accept the idea that consciousness is not anything over and above neural activity, then its effects are measurable. The transcendental ego is arguably merely an idea. Even if it were more than merely an idea we could have no way to tell. — Janus

A can of worms that, so I'll leave it be. — javra


Why? Because you cannot come up with a response? — Janus

No. Because it is a can of worms. Why do you respond this way? Other than to insult.

The notion of energy stems from Aristotle. Energy/work without purpose/telos as concept is thoroughly modern, utterly physicalist/materialist, and it need not be. But then to you energy would then be one of those transcendental issues that wouldn't be natural. And so forth.

My question was as to how we could possibly know that the transcendental ego is anything more than an idea. — Janus

You never posed a friggin question. You affirmed a truth, and this as though it were incontrovertible. As per the quote above.

As to how do I know that I as a transcendental ego am more that a mere idea: I am a subject of awareness that can hold awareness of, for example, ideas - farts as another example - thereby making my being as subject of awareness more than an idea.

I think you are talking about theism because even if the world were simply non-physical and/ or held in some universal mind, that does not on its own lend it an overarching meaning. You need to add a God that cares for us, has a purpose for us, and the promise of a better life to come and personal immortality to give that overarching universal meaning. — Janus

As with most versions of Buddhism for example, I strongly disagree.

Also I don't agree that physicalism leads to nihilism. Ironically I think it is religion that leads to nihilism by positing one meaning for all and thus nihilating the creative possibility that people have to find their own meanings by which to direct their lives. — Janus

Playing footloose with what the term "nihilism" signifies. For my part, I've already specified what I intended it to mean in this context. Basically, that of existential nihilism: the interpretation of life being inherently pointless.

Energy itself is not measurable except by gauging its effects. — Janus

A can of worms that, so I'll leave it be.

Even if it were more than merely an idea we could have no way to tell. — Janus

We can have no way of discerning the difference between a) the self/ego which knows (aka the transcendental ego) and b) the self/ego which is known by (a) (aka the empirical ego)? And this even in principle?

In virtue of what logic do you affirm this truth? And this contra to what Kant, James, and Husserl affirmed as a known.

When people for example say "I am tall (at least relative to ants or some such)" we know ourselves to be tall but also know that we as the consciousness/awareness or else mind which so knows cannot of itself hold the property of tallness. Whereas "my body is tall (therefore I am tall)" can be cogent, "my awareness/mind is tall (therefore I am tall)" can't. Or is this something we could have no way to know about as well.

Which is an idea I personally find quite lovely. — Tom Storm

OK, sure. For what it’s worth, personally, I too for my own reasons find the notion of nothingness after this life more appealing than any other (nice and interesting to be here, but enough with the metaphorical headaches after one entire lifetime of them has gone by). All the same, whether there is or isn’t something for us after our death to this world is not something derivable from—or even necessarily in tune with—our affinities, or else that which we emotively find most comforting. Rather irrational to assume that it is.

The issue I here responded to was of a difference that makes a difference between physicalism and non-physicalism. Nothing of your statements dispels the apparent reality that physicalism entails nihilism whereas non-physicalism does not. And to most people out there, this logical difference between the two is both sharp and substantial ... as well as bearing some weight on the issue of how one ought to best live one's life.

As to the natural vs. the supernatural/transcendental:

If nature consists of that which is visible and measurable in quantifiable ways, then is the mind and, more specifically, that which we address as I-ness which is aware of its own mind and its many aspects (thoughts, ideas, intentions, emotions, etc.) not natural? For the latter is neither visible nor measurable in quantifiable ways. Hence notions such as that of the transcendental ego.

As to the difference between physicalism and non-physicalism:

I so far find that far more important than any sense of the esthetic is materialism’s/physicalism’s seeming entailment of nihilism—in so far as this stance is that wherein no intrinsic meaning occurs in anything whatsoever.

While I don’t find non-physicalism to be univocal in what is upheld as an alternative to physicalism, physicalism does in all its variants entail nothingness in the sense of non-being upon mortal death, as well as before the commencement of life. Such that all life thereby culminates in this very nothingness. (Can there be any variant of physicalism that doesn’t directly necessitate this?)

How, then, can physicalism be understood to allow for the possibility of a meaningful cosmos, hence a meaningful existence, and, by extension, of a meaningful life (be it in general or in particular)?

And this for many is indeed a differentiation that makes for quite a substantial difference—one’s individual aesthetic appreciations aside.

OK, you win, I'm an idiot. — unenlightened

Never mind that I've done that before and it doesn't lead to meaning or value or anything you mention. — Darkneos

“I’m a staunch nihilist, because my impeccable reasoning /slash/ faith makes me so. Prove to me that there is any worthwhile meaning which can occur in a meaningless world! Agape as meaningful, btw, can only be irrational and thereby idiotic in the world I live in.” To which, anyone who opens their mouth can only be an idiot for not agreeing with nihilism. Come to think of it, this line of reasoning sort of has the same vibe that arguments for solipsism does - which in a way is the ultimate valuing of the existence of self.

So, being just such an idiot myself though maybe with a different flavor, anyone ever seen the movie Wristcutters: A Love Story?

Yes, yes, as a movie it’s about upholding societal norms via the partial plot of romantic love – only that it ain’t. No absolute wrong to killing oneself in the movie’s story. Besides, it nicely touches upon the “taboo existential topic” of suicide in sometimes poignant manners with a good deal of humor. Here’s a trailer to it:


But again, it hinges on death not being the end, which is contrary to nihilism, which, as all nihilists will attest to, is idiotic. Funny in a way how certain nihilists can entertain possibilities from solipsism to an infinite number of universes but not in any way the possibility of an existence after death.

The argument against suicide is that it is a permanent solution to a temporary problem. — LuckyR

Since this discussion hasn’t been so far closed …

I’ve never much understood why permanent solutions to temporary problems ought to be shunned. It’s only temporary problems that have solutions, not the permanent ones. And does one not want one’s solutions to problems to last and thereby be permanent? How then is this supposed to assuage those who are suicidal and have no doubts regarding there not being an afterlife?

But since no one can infallibly prove any metaphysical system of beliefs, physicalism/materialism very much included, there is then a quite viable existential possibility that mortal death is in no way the known of a permanent solution. Namely, that known solution which takes the form of an everlasting non-being. But is instead an open-ended unknown in which awareness persists.

One then not only has to deal with the inadvertent suffering self-murder causes in others within this world, impressionable strangers potentially included, but with the possibility of experiencing things such as regret for the deed well after the act of self-murder is committed. Thereby compounding an already bad case of one’s own experienced suffering in some form of hereafter.

In which case, self-murder then becomes only a temporary solution to a permanent problem of suffering - permanent in that this problem of suffering could survive one’s death to this world, one’s death in the next world, and so forth.

This being one possibility of a Sisyphean reality in its broadest sense.

That said, I endorse this in relation to the OP:

This discussion doesn’t belong here. You should talk to a therapist, not listen to a bunch of socially awkward, pseudo philosophers. You won’t find appropriate answers here and the consequences could be serious. — T Clark

:100:

I think javra is making a solid point. — Wayfarer

Somewhat belated, but thank you.

If life is bad and non-being is good, this as antinatalism advocates and disseminates, then there is no surprise that many out there will come to infer that the only logical conclusion to the unpleasantries of life is to commit suicide. Even though an antinatalist will not advocate for suicide per se, the message they send via their tenuous reasoning directly works toward this effect, most especially for those who believe death to equate to non-being. — javra


This to me is a load of bullshit. So yeah I don't follow the reasoning. — schopenhauer1

Since I've now got some spare time, I'll try again:

In the sense of what Shakespeare asked by the question "to be or not to be?", do you or do you not uphold that being (to be) is bad and non-being (not to be) is good?

If you do not uphold this underlined part, how would your held onto position not contradict all moral arguments if favor of antinatalism?

If you do uphold this underlined part, how then does this upheld position not rationality endorse the obtaining a state of non-being via any action one can accomplish toward this very end? And if corporeal death is taken to equate to eternal non-being, how would suicide not be just such an action?

WTF are you talking about? You are strolling into troll territory. You accuse my argument of emotional sentimentality. This is just a provoking sentimental provocation right there.

Why is it unethical absurdity to your sensibilities? — schopenhauer1

You might not “follow the logic” but ….

Suicide rates increased 37% between 2000-2018 in the US and is one of the leading causes of death.

If life is bad and non-being is good, this as antinatalism advocates and disseminates, then there is no surprise that many out there will come to infer that the only logical conclusion to the unpleasantries of life is to commit suicide. Even though an antinatalist will not advocate for suicide per se, the message they send via their tenuous reasoning directly works toward this effect, most especially for those who believe death to equate to non-being.

There’s more to it than this, but you already expressed that you don’t follow the logic to it, so why bother to further address it.

All the same, last I checked, disseminating views that end up encouraging others out there to ponder, if not commit, self-murder is unethical. Hence the absurdity of positing such views to be in life’s best interest and hence ethical. I figure one’s “existential self-awareness” ought to make this amply clear, but apparently not.

This is the classic theist trope about why atheists wouldn't just wantonly kill and murder and do bad things because of not believing in a god. It assumes that moral behavior is contingent on divine oversight, ignoring the fact that many atheists and secular philosophies advocate for ethical conduct based on various ethical frameworks or sensibilities such as rights, empathy, or even rational self-interest, rather than fear of punishment or promise of reward. — schopenhauer1

I don’t have the time to fully unpack this. But it is sheer emotion/sentimentality devoid of any rational exposition. As though atheists don’t operate by rewards and punishments. Or as the The Good is some godly oversight. But I’ll cut this short.

Strawmanning is not a great way to argue. — schopenhauer1

I agree, so why are you doing it?

Sorry, not following that logic. — schopenhauer1

As is readily apparent, this in rebuttals such as the following:

But anyways, not believing in an idea of "non-being" doesn't lead to the desire to see nuclear destruction. — schopenhauer1

Ok, then.

Frankly, I wouldn’t mind your believing that a possible state of non-being is better than being and should thereby be prescribed - but for your trying to convince all others of this suicidally unethical absurdity. Greatly comforting to your own state of being though their agreement would be.

Simply the Suffering of life, our separation from the kind of being that other animals have, and the fact that we can prevent suffering for future people. There isn't much more realization I am talking about here. — schopenhauer1

I find that suffering, much like understanding, comes in nonquantitative magnitudes - rather than in a binary of on/off. An animal will understand friend from foe, and an animal will suffer when its understanding is found to be erroneous. Humans have the capacity to understand far more than any other lifeform, yes, and this opportunity comes attached to the cost of potentially far greater magnitudes of suffering. One can affix to this the proposition of, “the more I know, the less I understand,” and like expressions.

Otherwise, I’m in general agreement with this quoted statement.

Where we so far greatly differ is in the resolution to the suffering addressed: everything from the stance that ignorance is thereby bliss to the stance that, since existential being is entwined with the capacity to suffer, the resolution is then the obtainment of (or the eternally perpetuating state of) non-being - this so as the fix the problem.

But I think I get it: short of an otherwise termed “mystical” account of reality that is not only rationally justified but rationally justified so as to disallow for any other justifiable alternative, those such as yourself will refuse to entertain the possibility of The Good / The One / Brahman / Nirvana as soteriological end in any serious way.

As for me, I’m doing my best to present what I hope to eventually be, fingers crossed, a roughly equivalent thesis to the one just described. But guess what: it ain’t easy – the time constraints and such of living one’s life here placed aside. And if it’s a fool’s errand, then I acknowledge being such a fool.

Nevertheless, I look at the alternative of “non-being as soteriological end else soteriological reality” - such that one deems all suffering to not be in this metaphysically possible state of non-being. And I become existentially appalled at the consequent results: if we all obtain this end of non-being upon our corporeal death, why not lie, cheat, and steal (or worse) as much as we can while living so as to maximize our profits till our inevitable non-being results? Due to other’s suffering? Just like us, the quicker they die, the quicker they too obtain their absolute salvation from any and all suffering. Besides, the more unempathetic we ourselves become, the less we ourselves suffer on account of what occurs to others. Yay. That these human behaviors are directly causing the Holocene extinction worldwide as we speak? All life benefits by its cessation to live via the resultant obtainment of non-being - this being its sole means of being free from suffering - and so the global destruction of life and its myriad species is in fact doing all life a big favor. Nuclear weapons detonated? Even better. And if we manage to obliterate all life in the cosmos - here assuming all life in the cosmos is located on our planet Earth - then we will obtain the very cessation of life ever being birthed to begin with. Never mind then evolving over time into forms of life with greater capacity for understanding and suffering than that currently held.

All this is a bit villainous. “Evil incarnate” some might express. With a good pinch of materialism, in the colloquial sense, thrown in for flavor.

It would not be philosophy then, but merely coping. — schopenhauer1

Philosophy (the love of wisdom) is about coping. Be it the "highest" form of coping or the "deepest" form of coping, it's coping with suffering all the same.

It is indeed, as Zapffe would explain, be an example of "distracting or ignoring" as a mechanism to deny the reality. — schopenhauer1

You certainly come across as believing yourself to be endowed with the "accurate appraisal" you've made mention of. To be precise: A distraction from, or an ignoring of, what reality? It certainly can't be the ultimate reality of The Good / The One / Brahman / Nirvana - for you take these notions to be a farce.

The reality of nothingness? But then what on earth is stopping one from obtaining this envision "reality" - nothing except one's own self.

The issues become a bit more challenging when addressing an obtainment of the The Good / The One / etc. ... which in certain circles do in fact sometimes get expressed in terms of "absolute love". All the "boo to love" in the world notwithstanding.

The man who joins the monks for a bit and returns. — schopenhauer1

Yea, as ascetic as I might have unwillingly become at certain points in my life, this is antithetical to me and my outlook. Experience is for experiencing, just as life is for living. Philosophy - with all its philosophical problems and analysis - is worthless outside of a means of theoretically appraising how one might best experience and live (this being something that I find applicable to even pessimists/nihilists such as yourself). The latter not being theory but praxis.