As for the idea of political correctness as a 'horror show', I am wondering who determines what the horror is exactly? I am not saying that I am in favour of the rigidity of political correctness in language, but I do think that language sensitivity matters in day to day life. — Jack Cummins

Political correctness as concept has always been problematic for me. This because it can be all too easily used in Orwellian manners by antisocial people to further uphold their antisocial behaviors and creeds. Here’s one definition of “political correctness”:

1. (uncountable) Avoidance of expressions or actions that can be perceived to exclude, marginalize or insult people who are socially disadvantaged or discriminated against. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/political_correctness

While it is certainty true that it is impossible to enforce via coercion a commonly upheld ideal of closer proximity to a peaceful, loving, and understanding society, the converse of this very ideal would be closer proximity to a society of unending conflicts, hatreds, and misapprehensions. And without some societally imposed constraints, the latter could well overtake a society in a short enough timespan.

In one parallel, without societal constraints on the killing of other humans, murderers would greatly increase in number at the detriment of the society’s wellbeing in general.

No, insulting, laughing down upon with malice in one’s heart, or else dehumanizing a minority does not equate to a murdering of the minority in question. But, then, what is the difference between the boogieman of political correctness and a social decency enforced via non-legal means by a majority of the societies citizens?

Here’s one concrete example: There is no law (in the USA, at least) against a white person terming an African American a n*gger. But it’s decent not to do so. And this decency, at present at least, tends to be emphasizes as a good to be held onto by the majority (as well as via most of current media, political norms, etc.)—such that not following this decency is greatly frowned upon and (as can be the case with saying this term during employment) can at times lead to disciplinary actions by institutions (such as, depending on the business, being fired from one’s job).

Is this cultural indictment of calling African Americans n*ggers (despite many calling themselves this term, such as in many a song, etc.) a “horror show” or else a “tyranny upon one’s liberties”? And, if so, are we to understand liberties as including the right to dehumanize and disenfranchise humans form society simply on account of, for one example, their minority status—such as by actively labeling other groups of people subhuman animals that ought to be lynched?

Regardless of answers, the pronouncement of not calling African Americans n*ggers remains a prime example of that which is termed “political correctness”—be this same dictum of itself deemed a “horror show” or not.

Ciao, then.

Not what I quite explicitly stated. — javra

Yeah, it was. — Banno

Wait for it ... Nope, it wasn't.

As a refresher:

such that what we empirically experience as occurring at time X actually occurred prior to time X. — javra

Does not translate into:

Any event we see occurred in the past, therefore we never see any event. — Banno

And you haven't answered the question I asked regarding the science. Somewhat disingenuous.

Any event we see occurred in the past, therefore we never see any event.

How's that again? — Banno

Not what I quite explicitly stated. Do you disagree with the linked to science?

As I so far understand the positions held, to me the issue of direct v. indirect realism is misplaced—not because it’s not important or else handwaving, etc.—but because they both occur at the same time yet this from different vantages. To have some terminology to express these two different vantages cogently:

a) Intra-agential reality; aka intrareality: that set of actualities that strictly apply to the one agent concerned; akin to an agent’s umwelt.
b) Equi-agential reality; aka equireality: that set of actualities that strictly apply in equal manner to all coexisting agents in the cosmos; what is commonly understood to be reality at large.

I'll use the issue of the present time to try to change focus on what—if I understand things well enough—is the exact same issue:

From the vantage of (b), everything empirical that we experience occurring in the present is known by science to in fact occur some fractions of a second prior to our conscious apprehension of it (with some estimates having it consciously occur nearly .3 seconds after the initial stimulus onset (1)) —such that what we empirically experience as occurring at time X actually occurred prior to time X. This, then, to me is accordant to indirect realism.

From the vantage of (a), we all experientially know that everything empirical which we experience occurring in the unitary perception of the present’s duration (2) strictly occurs in a present moment of which we are consciously aware, one that is differentiated from occurrences which occur before (even if this “before” is itself within our unitary perception of duration) and those yet to occur—such that, here, there is no time lapse whatsoever between what we empirically experience and our awareness of it (as one example of this to further this point: when we engage in a heated conversation with another agent face to face, the two agents’ awareness of the present moment—in which they each act and react in response to the other and their words—is fully identical relative to the conscious awareness of both agents … with no time lapse that we are in any way aware of). This, then, to me is accordant to direct realism.

From here, things can of course get far more complex when analyzed. For one example, we can only come to know about (b) strictly via (a).

Nevertheless, to stick to the thread’s subject, I find that both these realities (the indirect one and the direct one) necessarily co-occur. The same co-occurrence of the two can just as well then be specified for our seeing that purple shirt there yonder (I've used "purple" because colors from purple to magenta don't occur as a wavelength, being only real in sense (a) and not sense (b)).

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1)

Based on empirical and simulation data we propose that an initial phase of perception (stimulus recognition) occurs 80–100 ms from stimulus onset under optimal conditions. It is followed by a conscious episode (broadcast) 200–280 ms after stimulus onset, — https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3081809/

2)

Direct, unitary perception of duration occurs up to a maximum period of approximately 1.5 to 2 seconds from the beginning to the end of a continuous sensory stimulus. — https://www.britannica.com/science/time-perception/Perceived-duration

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Edit: I also think of things in terms of inter-agential realities (intersubjectivities), such as the human-relative intersubjectivity of all non-blind and non-colorblind people commonly seeing the same purple ... but for the sake of keeping things simple I've only specified those two reality types of (a) and (b).

These contradictions are producing further contradictions, — Leontiskos

I hope I didn't give the impression that perplexity-views such as your own are beyond the pale. I think they make a certain amount of sense given the complexity of the moral landscape. — Leontiskos

To keep things short, I don't find that my account of ethics would make any sense whatsoever were it to in fact incorporate "contradictions", which I do not find my account to incorporate: At no juncture in my account can there ever be something that is both right and wrong at the same time and in the same respect. I instead find that the nuances (in respect to ends pursued) in my account make these “different respects” sufficiently evident. But I have little doubt that disagreements would yet continue, and, at the end of the day, maybe this is neither here nor there.

Thanks for the interesting conversation. :up: — Leontiskos

Ditto!

Nevertheless, the data so far acquired from modern physics will remain and need to be accounted for in whatever scientific developments regarding category (b) that might eventually result. Making the going "back to a highly mechanistic picture of the world in scientific education/philosophy" highly inappropriate. — javra

On the contrary we already do this modern return to mechanism except it's not called mechanism.

It's called physical analogue modeling. [...] — substantivalism

Are you equating these models to what science in essence is? If you are, you then seem to disagree with my appraisals of what empirical science consists of. No biggie, but I am curious.

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When I stated that the data remains, I was addressing the verifiable results which are for example obtained from the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment—which pose serious problems either for classical notions of causation, for classical notions of physical identity, or else for both. And I so far understand both these classical notions to be requisite for any mechanistic account, even more so for any "highly mechanistic" account of the world in scientific philosophy.

The replicable data obtained from this experiment, then, will yet need to be accurately accounted for regardless of the implemented models, mathematical or otherwise; regardless of the philosophical explanations which inevitably make use of metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of space, time, and causality; and so forth. As to the mathematics involved, it is directly related to the data—such that were the mathematical system implemented to be contradicted by empirical test, it would hold no scientific value. Here, for example, thinking of the classic tests which were accordant to Einstein's theory of general relativity; were these test to have not so been, the mathematical system/theory would not have held water. (Related to this, because string-theory is currently not falsifiable via tests, this mathematical system is argued by some to be non-scientific—even if other speculate that M-theory can be further developed into a unified theory of physics.) At any rate, while explanations and models for the acquired data can change, the data nevertheless remains.

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But going back to the issue of a highly mechanistic picture of the world:

To be clearer, by “mechanistic” I so far understand a model, system, process, thing, etc. that incorporates a classical billiard-ball-like understanding of causation and, thereby, entails the classical Newtonian understandings of space and time required for such causation’s mechanical occurrence. Do you have something else in mind in your use of the term?

If not, and if you know of any “highly mechanistic” model (regardless of its technical name; regardless of it being strictly mathematical or else in any way analogously representational) that can accurately account for results such as from the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment, I’d be grateful for a reference to it. (The closest I can currently think of is the MWI of QM, but this fully deterministic understanding is not accordant to “mechanistic” as I’ve just described it.)

Do you think that modern physics, or even philosophy in general, has gone off the rails with regards to non-visualized poetry/metaphor and abstract obsessions? Or is there some way to lean into non-visualization through metaphor or mathematical modeling but without an occultist taste to it? Should we go back to a highly mechanistic picture of the world in scientific education/philosophy regardless of what those analogue models may specifically be? — substantivalism

It seems to me it's been written from a perspective of a kind of disillusionment, by someone who formerly believed that the role of science was to develop a true picture of the world, but has now come to see that this seems increasingly remote. — Wayfarer

You are not wrong in that assessment. In my life I have few interests and fewer things to be proud of in their stability as well as their personal meaningfulness. However, the deflationist and deconstructivist views of others upon all philosophy, but especially scientific thought, has resulted in a rather bitter view to it all. — substantivalism

In my own, maybe all too imperfect, intentions to be of help, I’ll express my own views regarding the many at times contradictory, and often non-intuitive, perspectives that have emerged from that one empirical science of modern physics.

Speaking for myself, I try not to mistake, or else equivocate, between a) the empirical sciences as enterprise and methodology and b) the conclusions, be they popularly upheld or not, which this same enterprise has resulted in and continues to produce.

I deem (a) to be grounded in the intent of an ever-improving, psychologically objective appraisal regarding that which is commonly actual to all and thereby empirically verifiable. For the science of physics, this then is the very nature of the physical world at large. Of emphasis here is the intent just mentioned and the use of the scientific method as an optimal means of bringing this same intent to fruition. Everything from falsifiable hypotheses, confounding-variable-devoid tests of such hypotheses (or as near to such tests as we can produce), replicability of these test’s results by anyone who so wants (and obviously has the means) to so test, and the very important peer-review method (which in its own way serves as a checks and balances of biases) by which the validity of all such aspects that the scientific method utilizes is optimally verified, hence optimally safeguarding against these same aspects being endowed with mistakes of some kind.

(A) might not be perfect, but we so far do not know of a better methodology for ascertaining that which is in fact actual relative to all agents irrespective of what agents might individually believe (this actuality to me being physical reality), this in optimally impartial manners.

In turn, I deem (b) to always be fallible in its nature, never in any respect presenting a definitively proven absolute truth. Yet, due to (a), (b) shall then tend toward what is in fact less partial, or biased, in comparison to beliefs held by individual agents. I’m more interested in neurology and related sciences so, using this as example, about half a century ago it was more or less generally upheld that an adult brain’s physiology was generally static, or hard-wired, for the individual’s life (that synaptic connections did not change in any way other than by either becoming stronger or weaker - for one example, the neuroscience professor in a lab I worked in as a tech after graduating college held onto this view quite stringently). Today, via the same implementation of the scientific method that led to this generally accepted belief, we’ve now generally come to accept that neural plasticity in the adult human brain remains an occurrent phenomena (for example, that new synaptic connections can at times be made or else can at times decay to such extent that they no longer are). The commonly accepted appraisal of what the data informs us of has changed—this due to newly acquired data that disproves the adequacy of former beliefs—but the science as methodology via which this data is acquired has nevertheless remained wholly unchanged.

As to the mathematical modeling (of the acquired empirical data) you mention, I generally place it within category (b). When it comes to the application of maths in category (a)—such is the case with statistics—issues become philosophical in nature, rather than scientific.

As just outlined, I then don’t view modern day sciences as being in any way undermined by views such as those you’ve mentioned. Science as category (a) remains wholly undefeated in relation to its purposes.

As to category (b) in respects to modern physics, I personally find it useful to remember that, because we don’t have a unified theory or everything physical, either the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, or else both are then in some ways wrong—irrespective of their strong predictive value. This in parallel to how Newtonian physics is now known to be inaccurate—despite its predictive value yet being accurate enough for most purposes. When a theory of everything physical will be obtained, things will then click into place far better. Till then (if not even beyond), I find it best to not hold onto any so far well established physicist theory (ToR and QM included) as portraying an absolute truth—but as fallibilistic accounts which are known a priori to be in need of significant, maybe even foundational, tweaking. Nevertheless, the data so far acquired from modern physics will remain and need to be accounted for in whatever scientific developments regarding category (b) that might eventually result. Making the going "back to a highly mechanistic picture of the world in scientific education/philosophy" highly inappropriate.

I am hoping this might be of some help—even if it will not resolve all concerns (but, then again, such would be quite the utopia indeed :grin: ).

Or perhaps the more pertinent question is, "What happens when we encounter unforeseen dilemmas?" — Leontiskos

I see that I was addressing many presumptions which are not shared. This for instance. By "obstacle" I naturally assumed that that which stands in the way and thereby impedes is/was unforeseen. Otherwise I'd simply view it as part of the terrain to be traveled. If I see a house between me and the house's backyard to which I want to get to, I don't then discern the house to be an obstacle in my path. But if I expect the backyard gate to be unlocked when in fact it is, this I might then consider something that impedes my intended progress.

What are the two ends?

Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible.
Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible, in ideal circumstances. — Leontiskos

Every voyage toward a destination is, consciously or unconsciously, idealized to go as expected or planed, i.e. for the circumstances to be as one best foresees, and thereby idealizes, them. If I take a flight from A to Z, unexpected weather conditions might have it that I get detoured and delayed. Or that I never arrive. Nevertheless, I will take the flight expecting to arrive on time as per the ideal circumstances of so arriving as scheduled.

So I so far disagree with this division into two ends where considering the analogy I've provided.

Again, I see two ends, and in this case I think both are simultaneously aimed at:

1) Do not commit violence (because violence requires treating the object as a means)
2) Survive as a community


These are both involved in the goal to, "Arrive at a Kingdom of Ends."

But in this case it seems that (2) is given precedence over (1), and I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"?
Obviously the alternative would be strict pacifism: giving (1) precedence over (2). — Leontiskos

"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. So I again find the presented dichotomy of ends to be inappropriate.

Aside from which, as stated (1) gives the impression of an absolute commandment. ... Whose goodness or rightness as such would be itself justified in which manner?

Moreover, the "strict pacifism" mentioned would leave all peace aspiring people to die at the hands of violent people, thereby resulting in nothing but violence-loving people to populate the world in its entirety. How might this bring about or else be in the service of a "Kingdom of Ends"?

Hearkening back to the OP, my difficulty is the way that you are apt to class exceptions as non-human acts. — Leontiskos

Aside from certain parts of the second counterexample I've provided, where have i done so?

If you wish to continue, it seems to me that we would need to discuss this issue of moral perplexity. It seems that on theories such as your own, which admit of perplexity, one must either transgress duties or else redefine those duties as being in some way non-obligatory. — Leontiskos

I am now getting the sense that you might uphold a moral code of duties via systems of deontology that traditionally have made little sense to me. Namely, those which uphold a strict duty or obligation to absolute oughts and ought nots irrespective of consequence. If so, I would rather not continue this conversation, being fairly confident that it will result in disagreements without resolution.

:up:

What puts the final nail in the coffin of determinism is the reality of the decision not to choose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think hard determinism can have a mind of its own, meaning that it could find justification even for this. But yes, I'm in general agreement with you.

I’ll for now address the following last portion of your first reply since I see this as pivotal to most all of the other replies I might myself give. I know there is a lot left for me to address, but, before I do, please let me know if the following is something that you find fault with. If this leads to an insurmountable difference of perspectives, then I doubt you’d find any of my other further replies cogent.

Regarding your X, Y, Z analysis, I would want to say that if X is necessary to achieve Y and Y is necessary to achieve Z, then X is necessary to achieve Z. In fact this would seem to prove that it is false to claim that, "[X] does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z." Or am I underestimating the work that your term "optimally fitting" is doing? (Note that if, as you seem to say, Z precludes X, then it cannot simultaneously be true that X is necessary to achieve Z) — Leontiskos

Via one analogy (which as analogy can only go so far), say that one strives to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible so as to win a prize. Were it at all possible to do so, one would then rationally follow a straight path from point A to point Z, this being the shortest path to travel. But there is an intractable obstacle in the way at point K.

The ideal means of arriving at Z remains that of traveling a straight path. A straight path toward Z then remains the ideal right, or ideally correct, or the ideally good means of arriving at Z in optimally short time—this in ideal circumstances. Anything that deviates from this ideal right, or correct, or good means of arriving at Z will, then, by default not be the ideally right/correct/good means of arriving at Z: In and of itself, traveling perpendicular to the ideal path will never allow one to arrive at Z—for if one perpetually so travels perpendicularly one can only ever-further oneself from the sought destination. Because of this, traveling leftward/rightward will, in and of itself, be a wrong/incorrect/bad means of arriving at Z in ideal conditions.

Still, now the conditions are not ideal due to the obstacle. If one dutifully maintains one’s ideal path, one will thereby fail in one’s attempts to win the prize. So now one must travel perpendicularly for a while, thereby engaging in what will in ideal terms be a wrong/incorrect/bad means of arriving at Z in optimal time. One, instead, must now do what is not ideally right, or correct, or good: one must circumvent the obstacle by being antithetical to that which is ideally right/correct/good and now distance oneself from Z by traveling leftward or rightward along the obstacle’s boarder till the obstacle ends.

Traveling straight toward Z is nevertheless necessary for arriving at Z. It’s just that due to the obstacle in the way, one must now do otherwise that travel straight toward Z till the obstacle is circumvented, thereby furthering oneself from Z, subsequent to which one then again proceeds to travel straight toward Z. Given the obstacle, only by so doing will one arrive at one destination of Z and win the desired prize.

Is it wrong/incorrect/bad to not travel straight toward Z at all times? In an idealized setting, it is: for so doing will at the very least always increase the amount of time it takes to arrive at Z, thereby making the time span less than optimal, and at the very worst so doing will make arriving at Z logically impossible.

Yet, given the less-than-ideal reality of the obstacle in the way, is it then wrong/incorrect/bad to deviate as little as possible from traveling straight toward Z at all times so as circumvent the obstacle? No: it is right/correct/good to so deviate as little as is required to circumvent the obstacle. This even though one will be disgruntled (rather than take pleasure) in so doing, for one knows that so doing furthers the time required to reach Z.

That which is right/correct/good in an idealized setting is then that which I previously termed “ultimately right/correct/good”—here, traveling straight toward Z—for it is that which is ultimately required to obtain Z. And from this same vantage of ultimate right/correct/good (which might also be termed “the ideal good”), traveling perpendicular to this trajectory is an ultimate wrong/incorrect/bad way of going about things—this as far as ideals go—again, because it can only further one form one’s desired destination irrespective of quantity or degree to which it is done.

Yet, sometimes this very same distancing from Z—i.e., that which is ultimately bad or wrong—will be the only possible way of further approaching Z when the scenario is less than ideal, and this only unlit this same ultimate bad can be dispensed with and that which is ultimately good or right can once again be implemented toward arriving at Z.

In so being, this “means of optimally approaching Z by minimally furthering oneself from Z so as to circumvent the obstacle” will not be that which is ultimately good (going toward Z in a straight path) but, instead, that which I will for now term “pragmatically good”. Of note, though: for something to in fact be pragmatically good it must still best approximate—or else minimally deviate from—that which is ideally good so as to obtain Z given the less-than-ideal circumstances to be had.

Now equate Z with (here a fully non-deontological notion of) Kant’s Kingdom of Ends. If this is too obtuse, then a yet to be global society wherein people don’t commit violence against each other of their own free accord—a yet to be global society I will here for brevity term “utopia”.

In ideal settings, violence will here always be a wrong (i.e., the wrong/incorrect/bad means of obtaining ends)—for violence will always further one from this Kingdom of Ends / utopia, i.e. from one’s destination of Z. Furthermore, one can never (not even in principle) actualize Z in perfected form via violence’s application. This because one cannot actualize a loving peace of mutual understanding amongst mankind via the use of violence (e.g., placing a gun to a person’s head and telling them you’ll shoot if they don’t become your best friend, which would at minimum be psychological violence, will not result in the other’s genuine friendship toward you).

Nevertheless, when someone unjustly attacks your personhood or those of fellow Kingdom-of-Ends/utopia-aspiring others, not stopping the assailant(s) via force when needed—and hence via use of some measure of violence—will further everyone from an actualization of the Kingdom of Ends / utopia. Wherein stopping the assailants, though antithetical to Z’s occurrence due to the very violence required, will however optimally allow for closest proximity to Z in long-term appraisals for those concerned.

Yet violence is here still not that which is ultimately right; it is still something that in ultimate, or else ideal, terms is a wrong—this as determined by Z itself. But the application of this means—given the obstacles that befall one in less than ideal circumstances—can yet be that which is the only pragmatic good to take. This so long as that which is pragmatically good optimally approximates—else minimally deviates from—the ideal good of never engaging in violence.

To then ask whether violence is moral or immoral will depend on the vantage taken: relative to the very actualization and thereby eventual actuality of Z, it will always be immoral. Yet relative to what is on occasion pragmatically needed to best approach the actualization of Z, it will in certain circumstances be moral. As was illustrated, this strictly contingent on—not its application per se—but the intention(s) with which it becomes applied. (edit: Hence, were the intention to be that of optimal approach toward the non-violent utopia of Z, then the application of violence as means toward the end of Z (if ever needed) will strictly occur with maximal self-constraint against any and all unneeded violence—this, in short, because the means used shall themselves be in large part teleologically determined (or else driven) by the end which is pursued. Much like wanting to arrive at location Z of itself as telos determines that in ideal setting one ought to travel a straight path toward Z, and that one optimally approximates this ideal whenever obstacles in the way require one to travel perpendicularly to this same ideal straight path.)

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I’ve already written a fair sum. So I’ll stop short for now to see if you find fault with what was just mentioned.

For what its worth, it might be cumbersome to explain, but I all the same so far find it conformant to the living of a virtuous life (this as best one can, with the occasional mistake granted).

I was clarifying what is meant by "hunger". And, rather than being sophistical, I was exposing your sophistry. When we say that someone has "the desire to eat", we recognize the generality of the supposed "object" by showing that what is actually desired is a particular type of activity, "to eat". — Metaphysician Undercover

Only in an attempt to further your argument:

Hunger is a physiological sensation or pang. The experiencing of hunger, though, does not even necessitate a person's conscious "desire to eat". Case in point: a person who is on a diet (or else fasting, such as for religious purposes) might well at times experience what is relative to the person extreme hunger ... yet the (conscious) person might nevertheless in no way intend to eat anything, thereby having no such desire.

However, when the conscious will concerned aligns, else assimilates, itself with their experienced hunger, then, and only then, will the person consciously desire to appease this physiological sensation which goads: the very appeasing of this physiological sensation then being the immediate object (or maybe better, objective) of concern. And this appeasing of the sensation as a now primary telos will then occur via a very generalized secondary telos of eating something. The specifics of what is to be eaten yet being a matter of choice between available alternatives. Only once this choice between available alternatives is made will there then be a concrete and specific object (or objective) to be realized ... this so as to satisfy the primary (consciously held) telos to all this, which is that of alleviating the underlying pangs of hunger.

As an aside, Peter Simpson has a paper related to a similar issue, "Justice, Scheffler and Cicero." — Leontiskos

I skimmed through the paper. The principal example given - that of killing one person to save five - has always been irksome to me due to its ambiguity/non-specificity: ought one kill a Mother Teresa to save five Hitlers or, else, ought one not kill one Hitler and allow five Mother Teresas to die instead? Or, as per the trolley problem, if all six are of exact same moral worth, why kill one of them to save the five instead of choosing to jump off the bridge oneself in a blaze of glory (... all lives considered being equal in moral worth and all)? But getting back to your reply ...

Also, your book looks interesting! — Leontiskos

I could deprecate it galore, but thanks for so saying.

I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" — Leontiskos

I'm thinking I didn't present the hypothetical sufficiently well. The hypothetical is strictly aiming to illustrate the possibility of a person being attributively responsible for deed X without however then being morally responsible for deed X. Here, let attributive responsibility for X be understood as "being the primary cause for X" and let moral responsibility for X be understood as "being answerable for the goodness or badness of X".

I might be wrong, but I'm thinking this definition of moral responsibility will hold in all cases.

Alternative (b) was provided so as to force the person into freely choosing of their own will between (a. i) and (a. ii) - such that the choice between (a. i) and (a. ii) is in no way constrained by threats or ultimatums (unlike the choice between (a) and (b) - which, due to being made under extreme duress, the person can be argued to not be attributively responsible for). In this second, non-coerced choice between the given wrongs, the person of their own liberty then chooses what they deem to be the lesser of two wrongs (or evils as you say), and thereby commits a relatively minor transgression of mores.

But the issue to this hypothetical, within its own context of argument, is as follows: must the person in this case then be answerable for the goodness/badness of the deed they brought about?

In other words, are they in any way morally responsible for their choice (a choice which they now are attributively responsible for)? Specifically, this for having insulted a stranger rather than having done a far worse bad/evil/wrong against this same stranger.

To either celibate or deride the individual for his choice so far to me makes little to no sense. And, if so, the person is not morally responsible for their (in this example) freely willed choice - a choice which was thereby a human act (which the OP affirms to always be a moral act).

It's not about the choice or deed being excusable due to the duress - there was no duress in the two alternatives of the second choice that was taken (there was only a necessary choice between a fixed set of alternatives, with complete liberty to choose either). It's about the individual not being answerable for the goodness or badness (depending on perspective) of the choice of insulting a stranger rather than beating them unconscious. (In contrast, were the person to choose not to insult but to instead beat the stranger unconscious, then they would be morally responsible for their choice - for, in this case, they would now be answerable for the goodness/badness of their choice.)

So the hypothetical presents a human act that, as per the OP, is a moral act, which the given agent is nevertheless not morally responsible for (this by the very definition of moral responsibility provided). A choice for which the agent is attributively responsible that is nevertheless amoral in its characteristics - here strictly meaning that it is beyond the realms of moral responsibility wherein the agent can be either praised for taking a good choice or blamed for taking a bad one.

Lots of explaining done. If you still feel that the example is not of significant interest, I'm more than willing to let this one possible counterexample go in the context of this thread.

I was not expecting to receive this level of engagement in the thread! — Leontiskos

I'm myself finding it a good means of honing my reasoning skills (or lack thereof :smile: )

For Aquinas (as for Kant) it is not permissible to lie even in this case. Here is what he says in an article entitled, "Whether every lie is a sin?":

[...]

Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). — Aquinas, ST II-II.110.3.ad4 — Leontiskos

Myself, I so far find the idealizations of what should be which are presented in this reply contrary to "deliberate reason ... directed to the due end" which Aquinas also makes mention of. Were this due end, for example, to be that of completely obeying or else holding duty to a set of rules set up by some supreme rule-maker, this might then make sense to me. But consider this hypothetical: either one tells oneself a white lie (say, that today the appearance of one's clothes is decent when, in reality, one does not feel this to be so) or, else, all of humanity perishes (one can affix whatever daemon scenario on pleases to this). If the end pursued is absolute obedience/duty to the rule-maker's rule that one does not ever lie, then it might be correct, or right, to destroy all of humanity by not lying. Yet - not only does this intuitively seem very wrong - but, in changing the end one directs one's actions toward to that of, say, maximal eudemonia, it would then necessarily be rationally incorrect, or worng, to do so as well.

As I believe this illustrated, the issue pivots on what one's ultimate goal is - via which one's current best choices are teleologically determined, and via which one can rationally appraise the rightness or wrongness of one's actions. To this effect:

Would you object to my characterizing your view as (a robust form of) consequentialism? — Leontiskos

This is not an easy question for me to answer. But I'll try. My own views on morality are thoroughly teleological. And, in so deeming, find that this outlook can well be concluded an emphatically complex form of consequentialism just as readily as it can be concluded a form of deontology (wherein one holds a duty to best approximate or else actualize that ultimate long-term goal which is itself of pure intrinsic value). For example, for Kant, this ultimate goal one ought to dutifully pursue to the best of one's ability is the Kingdom of Ends - wherein at least every human is deemed of intrinsic value and never viewed as instrumentally valuable for the benefit of any one human or cohort of these. Maybe I could also point out that, absent any such goal, deontological duty loses meaning (other than, again, duty to obey some other psyche's already made rules ... yet such latter obedience too holds an at least implicit goal in mind, such as that of being rewarded rather than punished by the rule-maker).

That said, any system of consequentialism that does not look upon such literally ultimate long-term goal but, instead, focuses one merely intermediate goals will, to me, necessarily be less than moral. One here deems eating candy a good due to the intermediate goal of satisfying one's sweet-tooth despite so doing leading to tooth decay and the loss of one's teeth ... sort of mindset. And I don't find that typical utilitarianism holds any such ultimate long-term goal in mind - just a generalized heuristic that might or might not eventually lead to such goal (depending on its interpretation and administration).

Perhaps one of the most fruitful entry points is linguistic. First, to nitpick a bit, is the bolded an accurate depiction of your view? "Good and thereby moral"? — Leontiskos

Yes, language is important, and I was clumsy in how I applied it. To try to better explain, an important synonym for good is "beneficial", which can be interpreted as being of proper fit. One then can further interpret good as that which is of proper fit to one's goal, or telos. There are always different teloi we actively hold at the same time: some proximate, some distal, some intermediate (and, in my own musing, as per what I mentioned above, one's ultimate telos, which I shall here address as "the Good"). That which fits the Good is always good/right in an ultimate sense. That which is antithetical to the Good is then always bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. Then, if one's actively held ultimate goal "X" is antithetical to the Good, one's intentions will always be bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. This even if, to further approach or actualize goal X, one needs to engage in acts that are of themselves a proper fit to the Good. Example: one wants to sadistically destroy humanity at large but finds that in order to do so one needs to rescue an innocent baby from drowning; one than is compelled to save the baby from drowning (something one would not have otherwise done) in order to destroy humanity and then so proceeds to do. The deed of saving the baby is good, for it of itself as deed is fit to the Good, but the intentions with which this deed is done are bad, for as intentions they are of proper fit to goal X. Otherwise expressed, the saving of the baby does not hold intrinsic value to the saver or the baby - as it would for anyone whose ultimate telos is the Good - but, instead, is strictly of instrumental value in allowing for goal X. In brief, the deed of a saved baby is of itself moral but the intention with which it was saved is immoral.

What's philosophically interesting here is that, according to your position, it would seem that a bad end/goal vitiates a good deed, but a bad deed does not vitiate a good end/goal. — Leontiskos

I would most definitely not express things as they are in the boldfaced text. Rather, I'd say that a good end/goal vitiates those bad deeds mandatory for [edit: one's optimal proximity - given all contexts and available alternatives - to] the good end's/goal's actualization [edit: for the given good end might not be at all actualizable via these very same bad deeds, this despite these bad deeds being mandatory for one's optimal proximity to the good end, all things considered ... with an example of this provided below as pertains to Ukraine's engaging in war]. To me it makes for a world of difference. My beating some complete stranger to a pulp strictly out of the pleasure to do so directly estranges my from the Good. However, where I to be aiming to remain optimally aligned to the Good, and were a horrendous attack on an innocent to occur right in front of me, my then beating to a pulp the assailant so as to prevent the innocent's death (were I to be so capable of doing and were this to somehow be the only viable alternative to take) would be vitiated as an intentionally performed bad/evil/wrong. Here, (were I to be so capable) I would be proud of risking my own life to save the innocent despite the violence I willfully engaged in - and would feel very deep shame and guilt, i.e. profound culpability, where I to do nothing while the innocent died right before me with me doing nothing about it (though, in the latter case, I would not have engaged in any violence myself).

I know things can get more complex, but maybe this serves as good enough explanation?

In other words to advise X such that X non-hypothetically ought to be done is incompatible with X being wrong. Hence the commonly accepted idea that the end will "color" the means (e.g. If Y is necessary, and X is necessary in order to achieve Y, then X becomes necessary). What do you think of this? — Leontiskos

You are right, it's not easy to phrase these disparate notions of wrongness in common speech. But to try to clarify my position: X is not a wrong (an incorrect or else unfit) course of action to take as a necessary means of achieving Y which is itself optimally fitting to an eventual achieving of the ultimate good goal Z - this even though, in direct respect to ultimate good Z, X can only be ascertained as ultimately being a wrong (this because it does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z). More concretely, let Z = Kant's Kingdom of Ends; Ukraine's engaging in war against an unjustly invading Russia is then something that cannot of itself directly achieve a Kingdom of Ends and, so, is a wrong in this ultimate sense (I do have trouble calling Ukraine's war of self-deference an evil, though, even when termed a "lesser evil"); nevertheless, Ukraine's engaging in war is necessary to achieve Ukraine's maintaining of autonomy, which is itself optimally aligned to an eventual Kingdom of Ends. As regards common speech: although we all know that war is ultimately bad, it is good for Ukraine to engage in war against an unjust invader rather then allowing itself to be decimated by not engaging in such war.


I'll reply to the second post later on.

Just wanted to say I'm in agreement with what you've expressed. ...Including your accolades regarding @Count Timothy von Icarus's posts. :up:

Here is a hypothetical wherein the choice made is concluded to be amoral (this strictly in the sense of being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy) despite a) the available alternatives not being of equal moral import, b) being an act of consciously made volition and, thereby, a human act, c) being a non-hypothetical ought-judgement and, hence, per the OP, a moral act, and, to top things of, d) the choice taken being a known wrong a priori.

It's an excerpt from something I've already written regarding our free will. (If the moderators disagree with my posting this, or else with my providing a link in the quote for possible context, please inform me and I will delete the post and/or link.)

For reasons just given, I find this example to be pertinent to the thread/OP. And I would greatly appreciate any criticism you might have of its conclusion or contents.

Consider, for example, the following hypothetical—wherein shall be held that it is a moral wrong to insult a stranger:

I am the summoned subject of a tyrannical and mad king who, simply for his own amusement, informs me upon my arrival to his citadel that a) either i) I insult a greatly starved, and thereby physically weakened, stranger that also stands before the king in my presence or ii) I beat this same starved stranger until the stranger becomes unconscious or, else, b) the king will insure that everyone I’ve grown close to will be brutally raped and tortured till they die. Granting that I have no reason to doubt the veracity of the king’s imposition, my first-order choice between alternative (a) and alternative (b) might be considered so coercive as to virtually grant me no choice [...] whatsoever, allowing me only one viable option: that of choosing alternative (a). In then granting this, I nevertheless am in no way coerced in my choosing between alternative (a. i) and (a. ii)—for, other than a potential harm to my conscience, neither alternative possess any significant negative repercussions to my personhood—and I happen to be capable of successfully implementing either alternative. I, in being indifferent to which alternative I presume would please this mad king most, then freely choose what I take to be the lesser of the two wrongs—and I thereby proceed to insult the stranger.

Given my alternatives, do I or others then find me culpable for the wrong of having insulted this stranger in front of the king?

While the answer to this question will be contingent on numerous variables (such as, for example, the given stranger’s, and others, degree of empathy for the conundrum into which I was placed through no fault of my own), it is fair to presume that everyone (including the stranger) will be aware that at least the second-order choice I made was freely made by me, was thereby an outcome I intentionally brought about, and, hence, was an outcome I am attributively responsible for. Furthermore, given that I have a generally goodhearted nature, it is also likely fair to presume that everyone (including the given stranger) will nevertheless neither find me blameworthy for my resulting transgression nor praiseworthy for so choosing it over its alternative (considering this outcome the only decent option to be had given the circumstances I was in).

If so, this case illustrates how an [ego or I-ness; i.e., the first person point of view] which is attributively responsible for an outcome commonly deemed a moral wrong—that of insulting a perfect stranger—might neither be blameworthy nor praiseworthy for said outcome, and, hence, how this [ego] might not be morally responsible for an outcome it is nevertheless attributively responsible for. — www.anenquiry.info / Chapter 11: Validating Our Free Will / Section 11.3.2.

Fingers crossed. If this example holds, as I believe it does, it then illustrates how one could have a human act of conscious choice making which, as per the OP, can be defined as a moral act (for it involved non-hypothetical ought-judgements) that is nevertheless amoral in so far as being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy. And, furthermore, this amoral quality of the act is upheld despite the committed wrong of insulting a perfect stranger.

First off, thanks for the thoughtful reply. Your views are much appreciated.

So according to your earlier statement which I quoted* (and assuming we have no other choice), the act would be amoral. Here it seems like you want to say that it is simultaneously amoral and wrong. Or perhaps more accurately, the act would be amoral and yet in so acting we would be "committing a wrong." There is thus an interesting way in which immorality and wrongness are separating. — Leontiskos

Ah, well said. Yes, I find there is distinction to be made between immorality and wrongness. I will be later posting an example that I find far more pertinent to the topic but, in general: there are actions which even the most mildly moral folk know to be wrongs. Telling lies and engaging in violence as just two examples. Especially from the viewpoint of what can be termed "the Good", these will always be wrongs in an ultimate sense. Notwithstanding, given the myriad complexities of life, there will be times when engaging in these very wrongs in the short-term will be necessary for optimizing that which is right, or good, in the long term. As one example, were a WWII Nazi to knock at the door to inquire as to whether there is a Jew in your house (granting that the latter would be greatly harmed unjustly by the former via the telling of truths, and that there are Jews in the house), here it will be right/good to lie to the Nazi - thereby resulting in the moral praiseworthiness of having committed what in ultimate analysis is a wrong in the short-term (telling a lie) so as to avert a far greater wrong in the long-term (unjust injury or even death befalling innocent people). The same can be said with physical violence undertaken in self-defense against an unjustly aggressive assailant. Or even in the act of partaking in a just war as a soldier.

Due to life's complexities, in these and like examples we in my view then act morally by engaging in lesser wrongs for the sake of preventing greater wrongs (given caveats such as that no other viable alternative in preventing the greater wrong is available to us).

Because of this, I do deem that on occasion being moral or else immoral is separate from the committing of wrongs. One can likewise appraise someone who does something good and thereby moral due to intentions that are ultimately evil - in so far as having been committed so as to result in the realization of an evil long-term goal. Here, given the overall situation, doing a right/good act can well be nevertheless appraised as immoral (as one possible example, such as when a liar reinforces their nefarious lies via the telling of truths in what is often enough termed "spin").

For Aquinas the moral decision of which foot to begin walking with is, I think, not a human act. This is because there are no rational criteria upon which to deliberate. Because the reason has nothing to act on, therefore it cannot be an act that flows from reason. The act could only become rational (and moral) if perchance the agent fastened upon some aspect that could support rational deliberation. — Leontiskos

In having thought about this, it yet seems to me that, in order for a human to consciously discern that there are no moral differences in the two alternatives available, the human must necessarily to some extent deliberate between the two alternatives - thereby consciously judge and weigh their differences and differing consequences via their reasoning faculties. So doing will itself be a consciously rational act. So, I presently believe that the very act of consciously discerning that the two alternatives have equal moral import can only be a human act - for it requires conscious rationality. Once this active deliberation between the alternatives arrives at the conclusion that the available alternatives are of equal moral import, then ... I'm thinking one could still make a reason-based conscious choice as to which alternative to act on (for example, choosing to start with the right foot with the aim of maintaining consistency were this scenario to ever befall again - thereby keeping the harm to a minimum (I know this is iffy, but its the best I've got at the moment)) or, else, one might at this juncture simply allow one's strongest unconscious impulse to precipitate a first step with whichever leg it might be - or else abide by the flipping of a coin. If the first, it would then still be a reason based conscious act. If the latter, then not.

All the same, in terms of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness, the individual's act would be beyond either. Given no other available alternative to choose from, in this sense alone the person's act of walking would then be amoral - despite resulting in an equal wrong regardless of alternative acted on. Yet the discernment of the act so being (both on the part of the individual or any onlooker) would then be fully rational - for the individual here was not negligent; he/she took to time to deliberate the situation so as to arrive at the rational discernment of being forced to commit an equal wrong regardless of what is chosen.

I'm hoping my reasoning here is explained well enough. In short, I yet see it as a human act (i.e. a rationally conscious act of volition) on grounds that the person reasoned the equivalency of the two alternatives - thereby deciding that there is no best and worst alternative to choose between. The person then in one way or another acts in accordance to this deliberation-resultant reasoned conclusion.

But do let me know if you find fault with this.

Here is a related quote from Aquinas:

And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. — Leontiskos

Nice quote! To me, again, the individual, in judging the merits of the two alternatives via deliberation, arrives at the conclusion that there isn't a more moral alternative to take via the use of "deliberate reason ... directed to the due end [of minimizing harm / maximizing eudemonia]" - and their action will then be accordant to this very deliberate reason directed to the due end. It just so happens that, on these very same grounds, the conclusion is that there is no alternative which is better/worse than the other. So, due to their faculty of conscious reasoning, they then know that they have no choice but to necessarily commit an identical wrong irrespective of which available alternative they choose. And, because in this hypothetical they must choose among one of the two alternatives, their either consciously made or else unconsciously resultant choice is then neither in any way blameworthy nor praiseworthy.

Ha - very interesting! Aquinas follows Augustine, and for Augustine evil is a privation of what ought to be, which dovetails nicely with some of this. Further, as you may have noticed from the above, for Aquinas irrationality and immorality are closely related. — Leontiskos

Precisely! :up: :smile: Nice to see your evaluation of it.

I'll post the initially mentioned hypothetical I have in mind separately, this just in case the moderators might want me to delete it.

Concepts are crucial to cognition and to understanding of that perceived, but are in themselves extra-empirical. — javra

And still contain no information which is beyond observable reality. — Vera Mont

Humans throughout history have conceived of many different possible worlds. Not all these possible worlds which exist among humans as concepts are within the boundaries of observable reality. For one example of this, the monads of Leibniz’s monadology are non-observable. Yet the concept of monadology still holds (non-observable) information.

will necessarily exclude many if not most elements which the concept itself encompasses.

This, I understand not at all. — Vera Mont

Perceptually focus on any exemplar of animal. Once this exemplar is visualized (or heard, smelled, touched, etc.) either via the imagination or otherwise, it will exclude all other possible exemplars of animal which the concept of “animal” by its very definition encompasses. For example, if the visualized exemplar of “animal” is a bird, this will exclude all dolphins, all insects, all reptiles, etc. Because of this, the concept of animal is itself non-observable, for it includes all individual exemplars of the concept that can be individually observed all at once. And such a thing cannot be seen, nor heard, nor smelled, etc.

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EDIT: p.s., The same non-observability will apply to all concepts, even those that are far more specific. For example, the concept of a “red apple” will by its very delineation include all possible hews of red, all apple shapes and sizes, and all apple species (which can be in any way any shade of red) all at once—thereby making the concept of “red apple” non-observable when one gets into the nitty-gritty. And any given visualization of a red apple we might find ourselves holding will, then, necessarily exclude all the other possible exemplars of a red apple which the concept necessarily encompasses.

To emphasize: when I previously mentioned that we think and understand perceptions via concepts, but that concepts are in themselves extra-empirical (else non-observable), it is this analysis of concepts that I held in mind. Controversial though I know this can be.

my asking what information is there in the extra-empirical? — Vera Mont

Concepts are crucial to cognition and to understanding of that perceived, but are in themselves extra-empirical. One for example does not perceive the concepts of "animal" or of "world" or of "number" but simply understands them - this when perceiving signs, for example - and any perception we might have of an animal or a world or a number (be it of the imagination or not) will necessarily exclude many if not most elements which the concept itself encompasses.

Nice exposition of Zeno!

Abstract space (as opposed to physical space) cannot be discrete because any minimum unit you propose can be halved. — keystone

[...]

The discreteness that ↪Metaphysician Undercover
↪Michael
are looking for is not in space but in measurement/observation. — keystone

Yes, I’m in agreement with you as to the non-discreteness of space.

Good thoughts! Suppose an evil genius (or maybe an evil non-genius :sweat:) rigs up a scenario where he will murder one of two people given a decision you make. As you are standing still, he tells you, "If you begin walking with your left foot I will kill person A, and if you begin walking with your right foot I will kill person B." You know nothing about either person beyond these simple facts. According to your argument, "because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral."

What are your thoughts about this? I don't think this alternative scenario necessarily undermines your reasoning, but I am curious what you would say. — Leontiskos

Thanks!

Tricky counterexample. My current best thoughts:

Unless the individual will then walk with the explicit intention (and pleasure) of killing some stranger, I wouldn’t term it “murder”. All the same, in this scenario, unlike the first, irrespective of which choice we make we know that we will be committing a wrong beforehand. This will then be a crucial difference.

Because we are committing a wrong, we then will most likely not walk without care but, instead, search for additional alternatives prior to walking: maybe choosing to skip on two legs to where we need to go, or maybe choosing to not move but debate with the evil genius/daemon in hopes of tricking it into stopping its imposition.

If, however, no other conceivable choice were to be available, then we’d literally have no choice but to knowingly commit the wrong of killing some unfortunate stranger via our actions. In which case, because a) we hold no choice in the matter of so doing despite the two alternatives available to us and b) the two alternatives are morally identical in impact to the best of our knowledge—were we to not then so step with the explicit intent and pleasure of killing a stranger—I’d then conclude that our walking either via a first left step or a first right step would be amoral. We would be attributively responsible for (i.e., we’d be a/the primary cause for) the killing of a stranger but we’d not be morally responsible for it (EDIT: here meaning in any way either blameworthy of praiseworthy for the action taken and its consequence).

To me this so far makes ethical sense.

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Apropos, as to the evil genius being not so genius: It is interesting to me that in Romanian there are two adjectives for the English word “bad” (with no adjective for “evil”); one is rău, which can just as well mean either “sick” or “mean spirited”; the second is prost, which can just as well mean “stupid” or “idiotic”. (The only relatively close proximity to the term “evil” is the noun form of rău, but, again, it doesn't occur as an adjective). Which when literally translated into English to me at least presents the connotative understanding that the property of badness could be interpreted as “the stupidity of being mean spirited and, thereby, psychologically sick”. Your expression somehow reminded me of this. :grin: Though, of course, so understood the concept can only apply to agents.

I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with Bob Ross. — Leontiskos

I neglected to give @Bob Ross a mention in my previous post, but yes, the primary focus was the debate between the two of you.

On second thought, scratch the example I just gave of Achilles and the tortoise in finite quanta of space. While I still see deeper problems with such interpretation of motion, I've realized it can be addressed mathematically via ratios - and I don't want to get into debates regarding the nature of time and space. It was a case of me talking before thinking. I won't delete my previous post, though.

If movement is continuous then an object in motion passes through every 1nm marker in sequential order, but there is no first 1nm marker, so this is a contradiction. — Michael

To the best of my understanding, not within process philosophy.

I’ll first try to better explain my own current stance:

It's the the very marker you address that I take to be the conceptual measurement imposed: In process theory, there is no beginning nor any permanent thinghood, only continuous becoming. Like with quantum mechanics, wherein everything is a wave till measured. Whenever we measure, we quantify (and vice versa): one given, quantitative parts of that one given, multiple whole givens, and so forth. But the movement of whatever we quantify remains purely continuous, wave-like in this very limited sense.

We thereby quantify there being one arrow that is being projected. Likewise we quantify there being one target it is going to penetrate. Yet, as per process theory, both are otherwise merely processes of becoming themselves, that are forever in flux in manners devoid of any absolute beginning. We furthermore empirically know (this by imposing measurement/quantity) when the quantified arrow first starts its motion toward the target, we know that if travels through air via certain placements in space, and that it eventually hits the target whereupon the arrow stops its motion. But when we then try to quantify this very (here, by analogy, wave like) process of the arrows motion what we end up with are quanta of space that appear to be infinite in number. These, in turn, then facilitate Zeno’s paradox of the arrow.

I don’t know how to address this properly with the arrow paradox, so I’ll use Achillies and the tortoise instead:

Here suppose motion occurring in a finitely divisible (hence quantized) space. For the sake of argument, say this finitely divisible space from point A to point B has only ten divisions. The tortoise is at the fifth division of this space while Achilles is at the second division of this space—both moving toward the tenth division of space. How would conceiving of space in such finitely quantized manner change Zeno’s paradox so as to allow Achilles to catch up to the tortoise?

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I so far can’t apprehend a coherent way demonstrating logically (non-empirically) that Achillies can catch up with the tortoise in such a scenario.

And this because at the very least physical motion (if not also any psychological change) seems to me to be completely continuous in its ontological nature. This again, as per core concepts of process theory. A continuous change which we measure/quantize and thereby impose upon the notion of fixed beginnings and fixed thinghood—which, in an ontology of flux, don’t in fact occur.

I acknowledge this train of thought deviates from the thread’s intent. But, to cut things short, I don’t yet understand how a finite quantization of space or of motion is interpreted as resolving Zeno’s paradoxes (as per my example above)—this given what we empirically know to be (Achilles can catch up with the tortoise).

The solution, similar to my proposed solution above, is that movement is not infinitely divisible (either because space is discrete or because movement within continuous space is discrete). — Michael

I'm not yet comprehending this to my liking. To my current understanding, an infinite series is the very thing which makes something otherwise perfectly continuous discrete. It's, for one example, the difference between a perfect circle and an apeirogon with equal sides: the first is perfectly continuous, the second discrete.

Due to this, I've so far always assumed the resolution to Zeno's paradoxes is that movement is not infinitely divisible precisely because it is perfectly continuous while it occurs. Such that it's our imposed conceptualizations of measurement upon an otherwise immeasurable process which makes Zeno's paradoxes possible.

Either way, one ought not use the same brush. — Fooloso4

Funny, I previously assumed that to be self-explanatory. But now that you've pointed that out, yes, sure, of course.

You could, of course, expand the moral sphere by eliminating space for such amoral acts and judgements, but they could never be fully eliminated, I think. — ToothyMaw

Here's a concrete example that might help out: In one's morning routine, ought one brush one's teeth before brushing one's hair or, otherwise, brush one's hair before brushing one's teeth? Whichever alternative one chooses, the action one will engage in will in this example be a fully conscious volitional act (in contrast, for example, to haphazardly touching one's beard in unthinking manners). Yet, because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral.

Nice thread and OP!

The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect. — Leontiskos

Nah, I don't think I have conflated this once in the entire thread. For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral (and in both of these cases the term "moral" is meant in the sense of praiseworthy or morally good). This is standard language, where a cause can be named according to its effect (see, for example, my "corollary" above). — Leontiskos

I myself find the issue of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness to basically reduce down to the issue of causation—as in, what cause is to blame/praise for a given effect/consequence.

I first want to mention that, as with all others, the English language has its own idiosyncrasies via which possible conceptualizations find themselves limited to certain linguistic expressions. There is no one word in the English language with addresses this generalized state of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness in impartial manners. I think the closest English comes to it is in the word “responsibility”—this in the strict sense of being the primary cause for an effect/consequence (rather than, for example, in the sense of being accountable, or answerable, for an effect/consequence). As is also the case with at least the Romanian language (which I also speak fluently), existent words also overwhelmingly tend to emphasize the wrongness of effects/consequences: e.g., what or who is at fault for, what or who is to blame for, or culpable for, etc.

That said, when considering the goodness or badness of an effect or else consequence—via what I will here specify as “responsibility for” in the strict sense just mentioned of being the primary cause—the responsible cause can either be in any way accountable, or answerable, for the given effect or not. If the primary cause is deemed answerable for its responsibility in having brought about the effect, then we likewise deem the same given cause’s future effects to be alterable (or else reinforceable) via rewards or punishments. This first broad category of cause-types then subsumes that category the thread addresses as moral evils.

Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does).

This outlook I then find can be itself reduced to a dichotomy between (a) agent-caused effects (with individual agents being, as I believe you’ve previously mentioned, in at least some ways causa sui originators of the effects they willfully produce) and b) effects caused by non-agential causes (which are then basically deemed fully deterministic in their nature). [edit: just as I take your own arguments to generally be]

For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)

Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils.

:blush: Cheers!

But he seems completely unaware that his polemics, as distinct from his science writing, are aimed at methodically destroying any idea of there being a higher purpose or higher life. — Wayfarer

Having read much, if not most, of Darwin’s works, I judge that just as Darwin was opposed to the notion of what become known as Social Darwinism, he would have also been staunchly opposed to the notion of the selfish gene. I’ve mentioned this before on the forum: there are very well argued (both empirically and rationally) opposing views, with The Genial Gene being one such example.

As to “a higher purpose or higher life”—to fan the flames a bit—we all live by this credo as undoubtedly as we all know in our heart of hearts that solipsism is frigging joke (if it even warrants laughing at). All evolutionary biologists know that, when objectively addressed, all life without exception is equally evolved from predecessors. But no evolutionary biologist thereby holds that the eating of lesser lifeforms somehow equates to a form of cannibalism, or that the killing of weeds equates to the killing of humans. We all (sanely speaking) know that the value of a human life far exceeds the value of chickens’ life, to not even mention that of grass as a lifeform. We all sanely know that humans are more evolved than chickens, which are more evolved than weeds or grass. And we thereby hold more compassion for chickens than we hold for grass. Yet, unlike in the first sense of evolution wherein all coexisting life’s intrinsic value is identical, in the second here mentioned sense of evolution—wherein some lifeforms are more evolved than others—we as a sapient species appraise the value of a chicken’s life to be of greater worth than that of a weed’s. Not because we dislike weeds per se, but because we recognize that the chicken’s degree of awareness is far more advanced than that of the weed’s. This second sense of evolution—without which we might starve to death or else might become more depraved than any lesser lifeform has ever been—directly speaks of an evolution toward greater sapience.

This evolution toward greater sapience, then, to me directly speaks of the “chain of being” you are making mention of. Something we, again, innately acknowledge in our day to day living of life but which physicalism/materialism cannot easily, if at all, account for—other than, maybe, by the proclaiming of absolute relativity when it comes to values … the very same values by which physicalism/materialism is upheld … making the physicalist’s position sort’a self-defeating. Something like the notion of "the Good", on the other hand, can account for this very type of evolution toward greater sapience.

Science has no inherent moral orientation, it is concerned with facts, not oughts (as per Hume and the is/ought division.) — Wayfarer

Here addressing pure empirical science--rather than scientism: I find that science and scientists in general are at times voraciously interested in discovering the ever-truer nature of reality and that, just as with the best of philosophy and philosophers, this interest is deemed to be a good in itself, i.e. of intrinsic value. As such, it is not facts per se that are of concern but greater and deeper understanding regarding the nature of reality, maybe ultimately of being itself ... which to me again speaks to an evolution toward greater sapience, this via desire to so become.

Wolves and groundhogs have rules of behaviour - they just don't make a big verbose fuss about it: if somebody misbehaves, they snarl or snap at him; they don't put him on the rack or cut out his tongue. — Vera Mont

Right! They're not moral, nor immoral. — Wayfarer

I'll try no to belabor this issue much. We humans are on average far more familiar with domesticated animals than with wild ones. As such, anyone who has had a dog will know that dogs give good enough indications of experiencing shame and guilt at things they know they ought not have done (according to their owners). And some dogs have been known to be quite altruistic. This isn't any proof of lesser animals having some awareness of right and wrong (and, hence, a far less evolved sense of moral judgment by comparison to the average human) ... but then, neither is there any definitive proof of lesser animals being anything else but automata. :wink:

Looks like misrepresentation to me. Citations? — wonderer1

“We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” Daniel Dennett said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?”

Examples could be multiplied indefinitely. — Wayfarer

Yes, per Dawkins, chickens are literally nothing more than an egg’s way of replicating itself. Hence, all phenotypes (both physical and psychological) are utterly unimportant biologically other than for their capacity to replicate genotypes—more specifically, the immortal selfish genes from which genotypes are constituted.

And this, then, seems to me too to essentially result in an exceedingly biased valuing of the four “Fs” addressed in terms of biology. Which, btw, I often hear echoed in many a layperson who proclaims that the sole purpose to human sexual intercourse can only be that of reproduction (to me utter BS, but this would be a different topic).

That said, it is however to be acknowledged that Dawkins also tells us:

“We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

… Which to me, sure as the earth I walk on, directly entails there occurring some form of Cartesian dualism between biology and the biology-resultant human … ego(?). This being something that no monist would accept.

-------

Personally, while I fully acknowledge the exceedingly large gulf between humanity and all other, hence, “lesser” lifeforms, biological evolution necessitates that all life is constituted of the same stuff but in different ways and in different measures (here specifically thinking of humans' capacity for sapience)—this irrespective of whether this stuff of life is understood to be in any way spiritual (such as Buddhism and Hinduism can, for example, uphold) or else strictly material. Hence, if our highly evolved consciousness is contingent on the workings of our complex CNS, then animals with less complex CNSs would necessarily be endowed with less evolved forms of consciousness. … For example, such that dogs are more sapient than are ants.

Doesn't the effectiveness of classical computers contradict your perspective? — keystone

To be laconic about things: no. But then many an ontological perspective would need to be addressed to back this up - perspectives that would amount either to an objective idealism or, else interpreted, to a neutral monism.

As it is, as previously attempted, I'll try to bow out of this thread's discussion. But it was good discussing with you.

The real question isn't whether quantum mechanics is fictional (an idea that seems absurd), but rather if quantum mechanics employs the infinite-rooted objects themselves or merely the finite descriptions of — keystone

Interesting perspective! My own slant is that in physical reality there can be no absolutely integral physical being as is symbolized by the number one/1 when the issue is addressed more objectively: all individual objects are integral physical things only in relativistic terms, always permeated (by quanta, for one example) and hence entwined with what (we perceive and conceive to be) other and always in flux. Hence, our very understanding of mathematics in full is grounded in conceptual idealizations, rather than physical realities - starting with the idealizations of 0 and 1.

As regards infinities, if you happen to not be familiar with them, you may get a kick out of surreal numbers. They incorporate both infinite and infinitesimal numbers as well as real numbers. (While I'm no mathematician that can properly describe or implement them in mathematical formulations, surreal numbers have always held a rather aesthetic appeal to me.)

[...] it could just as easily have been described purely as a mathematical problem within the realm of abstract mathematical thought. Indeed, when you questioned the feasibility of constructing such a die, it seemed you were addressing the narrative element of the paradox, leaving the core mathematical issue untouched. — keystone

Well, the issue to me was and remains the conflux of pure mathematical thought and empirical reality. There often (although not always) is no tidy cohesion between the two—as exemplified by an infinite-sided die whose individual sides need to be looked at to be discerned. One can simplify the very same issue by addressing the purely mathematical concept of a perfect circle and its nonexistence in empirical reality.

As an aside, I am aware that without the concept of a perfect circle no such thing as quantum mechanics could obtain, for the latter’s uncertainty principle is necessarily dependent on pi, which can only obtain in a perfect circle (that, again, can only be non-empirical). But the basic discrepancy between pure mathematical thought of a perfect circle and its nonexistence in physical, empirical reality remains. This and related subjects, btw, being why I’m on the fence regarding purely mathematical objects of thought being of themselves existents: e.g., if a perfect circle does not exist, then this directly entails that so too is quantum mechanics a fiction … and, yet, QM works rather well to explain what physically, and hence empirically, is. I acknowledge this is a deviation from Cantor, but to me it speaks to the same issue: the relation, if any, between pure mathematics and the empirically perceivable physical world.

Cool. Thanks.

If you believe that infinite sets cannot exist, then I am preaching to the choir. — keystone

Just to be clear: when it comes to the realm of pure mathematical thought, I can see it both ways and so remain on the fence; but when it comes to empirical reality as in the form of a die, a member of the just stated choir I am. :grin:

Interesting way of expressing the issue, btw.

All that's left is a little divine magic to ensure it rolls fairly, and extraordinary vision for the players to discern the minuscule markings on those higher rolls. — keystone

In that case, I’ll let this thread be. But I confess, to me, this conflux of mathematical thought with “magic” and “extraordinary vision” not bound by empirical sight so far equates to the question of: What defined result obtains when one divides three and a quarter invisible unicorns by zero? Just saying.

Is this truly a paradox? If not, why not? [...] This scenario seems to indicate a problem with the concept of an infinite-sided die, possibly even suggesting that such a die cannot exist. What are your thoughts? — keystone

Just as a polygon with infinite sides of equal length would be empirically indiscernible form a perfect circle—this irrespective of how close one observes it, say with a quantum microscope—so too would a die with infinite sides of equal length be empirically indiscernible from a perfect sphere, even when analyzed with a quantum microscope.

Hence, having the numeral “42”, or any other, viewable on any one of the die's infinite sides would be a logical impossibility considering the nature of empirical reality—an empirical reality which both the serpent and Adam utilize to look at the die.

So no, no paradox.

OK. Thanks again.

Right. What you say could make sense to me, as in the two truths are not separate in the world as is but are instead maybe even indiscernibly entwined. But they nevertheless remain two truths or else only one. I'll rephrase things this way:

If Nirvana without remainder (also termed parinirvana) is something that can be obtained, I so far take it to be the obtainment of ultimate reality/truth sans any remainder of conventional reality/truth. I'm currently thinking this is about right - but correct me if I'm wrong. But what you've previously stated implies that upon its obtainment the conventional truth of phenomena (such as of phenomena-dependent pains and pleasures together the our apprehension of selfhood) will also persist in this state of ultimate being - for the two truths were roughly stated to be one and the same. Yet, as expressed, I can currently only presume this to be wrong, for it is contrary to what Nirvana without remainder is described to be. From my readings at least.

Yes, the two truths are understood to be intimately entwined - but if they are not two truths all the same, then Nirvana without remainder could not be obtained within Buddhist doctrines.

... saying this as someone who's enlightened in comparison to ants and such but not enlightened in comparison to many a wiser being (supernal deities/Buddhas included, if such were to occur). :razz:

Thanks for the feedback. I find myself agreeing with much of what you state, but do find currently grave difficulties with what I boldface here:

In the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna, there is 'the doctrine of two truths', the domain of conventional reality, Saṃvṛtisatya, in which all sentient beings are situated, but then the domain of ultimate reality, Paramārthasatya which is the higher truth perceived by the Buddhas. But part of this doctrine is that (1) these are not ultimately two — Wayfarer

There of course are multiple interpretations of the original Buddha's teaching, and various interpretations of the many Buddhist works that followed. But - again, this via a typical Western mindset interested in the reasoning rather than any poetic appeal - the affirmation that there is an ultimate reality and a conventional reality which from the vantage of ultimate reality are one and the same reality can be fairly easily interpreted as a logical contradiction (from the vantage of ultimate reality, at the same time and in the same respect there both a) are two realities and b) there are no two realities but only one). If it is and if this contradiction is to be assumed true, then dialetheism is be accepted as valid. This being something I'm in no way in favor of.

Not sure where you stand in this respect, but if you have further clarification of this one part of the doctrine here addressed, it would be greatly appreciated.

You might find this a useful resource: Nonduality, David Loy, a .pdf copy of his book by that name, based on his PhD. — Wayfarer

Thanks for the reference. I’ll add it to my library. Though I’ve yet to read the entire work, to quote from page 17:

The following types of nonduality are discussed here: the negation of dualistic thinking, the nonplurality of the world, and the non-difference of subject and object. In subsequent chapters, our attention focuses primarily on the last of these three, although there will be occasion to consider two other nondualities which are also closely related: first, what has been called the identity of phenomenon and Absolute, of the Mahayana equation of samsara and nirvana, which can also be expressed as “the nonduality of duality and nonduality”; […] — David Loy

My last post was strictly addressing the ontology of this very “nonduality of duality and nonduality” which, as expressed in English, and as processed through Western filters of philosophical concepts, to my ear can only present an at best incomprehensibility of meaning (and, at worst, utter BS).

What I’m suggesting via English expression which utilizes Western philosophical concepts and reasoning is that, where a non-dualistic ontology to be real, it would then necessarily consist of a duality (rather than of a "nonduality", this as expressed in the quote above) between an ultimately real essence of being (be this understood as Brahman, as Nirvana, or via a different terminology/concept) and the ultimately illusory essence of phenomenal being ... which partitions, or ratios, the first ultimately real essence of being into parts via, for one example, the production of I-ness (which can only be phenomena-relative).

I gather this affirmation of a necessary duality of fundamental essences within a non-dual reality would be a non-Eastern perspective/expression of non-dualism ontology—and in my limited reading I have never come across non-dualism being expressed via a quite literal duality of fundamental essences, this by those who uphold the given ontology.

That mentioned, what I was fishing for here is any rational criticism of the presented necessity that non-dualism, this regarding the world as it’s known, entails a duality between a) a real (or ultimately real) and non-dual fundamental essence and b) a contingent fundamental essence of phenomena (etc.) which brings about duality in the world and which is ultimately illusory in full.