Is there a way we could distinguish between laws of thought being laws of nature, and 'laws of thought' being incorrigible intuitions related to language and regularities in nature, that have developed in us from a young age? — wonderer1

I will answer yes: rationally. If laws of thought develop from physicality, then, prior to their development, physicality would not be in any conceivable way bound by them. I'm here primarily thinking evolutionarily. This would then differentiate them from laws of nature.

Yet, in favor of the point I intended to initially make regarding some form of idealism, we nevertheless require that physicality in total be intelligible via laws of thought in order to infer that laws of thought in any way develop from physicality.

The arguments for physicalism as the OP asked are best when we simply limit the definition of existence to only something material. Concepts, language, ideas, mathematics, logic, all of that can then simply be said to be something else. Perhaps true and logical, but not something that exists.

Of course some can argue that this just is circular reasoning and isn't very useful as we do need all those concepts, models etc. to say anything relevant about what does exist materially in our universe. — ssu

I view things to go deeper than that.

Question: In what way can the basic laws of thought either rationally or empirically be evidenced to not in and of themselves be basic laws of nature writ large—such that that which is logically impossible is then deemed to be part and parcel of physical reality?

If laws of thought govern all that is physical, then it is irrational to hold that these very laws of thought emerged (via supervenience or otherwise) out of that which is physical. Instead entailing that the physical itself is contingent on the occurrence of laws of thought—with laws of thought being commonly taken to not be in and of themselves physical unless they were to emerge from the physical.

This then directly points to some form of idealism (an omni-this-and-that deity not being in any way required for its occurrence).

(Quantum weirdness—such as the delayed-choice quantum eraser—is no man’s land in terms of proper interpretations. And these interpretations commonly regard what is metaphysically possible rather than logically so. So quantum weirdness in itself will not evidence what I’m here asking for.)

I get the sense there is an assumption at play that has not been articulated with physicalism that you are concerned is problematic? — NotAristotle

I'm not sure it's worth debating, merely provided you with an answer to your initial request. But as to this second question, I have addressed it here:

It’s worse than circular reasoning: it’s reasoning that the cart pulls the horse forward. — javra

... where the cart is the ill-defined "the physical" and the horse is the very laws of thought and value-structures previously addressed which are prerequisites for any conclusion.

Can someone spell out to me what is being reduced and why this is a bad thing? (Because if the answer is subjective experience, I don't see in what sense physicalism is a "reduction"). — NotAristotle

Off the top of my head, all things pertaining to laws of thought and to all aspects of value theory (including the metaethics of what “good” is) is in physicalism reduced to the physical—this when laws of thought and value per se (such as one’s valuing of truths or of correct reasoning or of objectivity—or else not) are prerequisites of arriving at any conclusion whatsoever, including that of physicalism wherein everything is reduced to the physical. Moreover, a clear definition/demarcation of “the physical” is wanting to begin with. It’s worse than circular reasoning: it’s reasoning that the cart pulls the horse forward. I’m a great supporter of the scientific method, but science (when thus understood) cannot address these issues in principle.

Let's assume for the sake of the argument that 'finite' is not included in the definition of 'person' (henceforth also called 'subject', so that it may also imply supernatural beings), so it does not figure a logical contradiction. If an infinite subject is that which encompasses the whole universe, it is metaphysically possible that this subject exists. If by infinite however we mean something that spans not only its world but all worlds, then it is not metaphysically possible because we know at least one world which he does not span: ours. However, I would say that by then, the definition of infinite is twisted to mean something that actually reflects "necessary (in all possible worlds)", after all. — Lionino

Infinity itself is a tricky concept. I once started a thread on the topic and got brutally pummeled by less than charitable mathematical folk for the terminology I employed. So I’ll here employ different terminology for it.

We often enough think of infinity in terms of quantity. Even Cantor’s Absolute Infinity, for example, is postulated to a number bigger than any other quantity. Going back to its roots, though, infinity signifies that which is devoid of limits and boundaries. In this sense then, to be bound, for example, to any aspect of space (distance), time (duration), or number (quantity) is to be finite, this rather than infinite. The Ancient Greek notion of Anaximander’s Apeiron gives one example of this latter notion of the infinite.

Most infinities we can think of are thereby in some respects bounded and only in some others unbounded. For example, Cantor’s Absolute Infinity is yet bounded to, and hence limited by, quantity. For the sake of convenience, I’ll here label these bounded infinities, or else the boundedly infinite—and contrast these to unbounded infinity, or else the boundlessly infinite. A line, a geometric plane in Euclidian space, and Cantor’s Absolute Infinity are all then bounded infinities; whereas the Apeiron is one example of that which is boundlessly infinite.

Given all that, what then does the phrasing of an “infinite subject” intend to imply?

I presume that “a subject” entails being a subject of awareness, which I further take to entail being aware of other. If so, all subjects are boundedly infinite in some regard—for one example, their/our awareness can, I think, be safely deemed infinitely divisible in principle. For instance, I see a rock + background: the rock has infinitely many aspects I could address in principle (variations in color, texture, curvature, etc.; relations between these; similarities and dissimilarities to other things I could be aware of; etc.)—given that I don’t get bored in so doing and that I would so address for all eternity. And this is not to yet get into the rock’s background.

We might by the just stated then affirm—in a rather bizarre formulation—that all subjects (of awareness) are thereby infinite at all times for as long as they occur. This on grounds that their awareness of other, by which they are principally defined, can only so be. (I might add, I can’t yet fathom of anything spatiotemporal that can’t be deemed to be boundedly infinite in at least one respect; as one example previously mentioned for an “infinite dog”, the mapping of anything physically spatial via geometric points leads to an infinite quantity of geometric points constituting whatever it is that is being addressed, thereby making the thing boundedly infinite. But if all items in a set of items are infinite in the same respect, this characteristic ceases to be any difference between them: an infinite apple then equals a plain old apple, so there then is no reason for the adjective of “infinite”.)

So no, when thus understood, an infinite subject would not be a logical contradiction—thereby allowing for metaphysical postulates wherein infinite subjects of awareness are interpreted to hold an awareness that encompass this world or that. (Don’t we as subjects of awareness in at least some ways encompass the very possible worlds we are aware of?)

But so construing all subjects of awareness to be infinite is intuitively odd. We typically by “infinite” want to convey something more. I venture that oftentimes (if not always) this something more will turn out to be logically contradictory: as I find to be the case with an omniscient, else omnipresent, else omnipotent subject (of awareness).

At any rate, the notion of “a boundlessly infinite subject” can only be a logical contradiction: at the same time and in the same respect that addressed is a) bounded to being a subject of awareness (entailed by being a subject) and b) is in no way bounded to being a subject of awareness (entailed by being boundlessly infinite). To use the same example I previously mentioned, the Apeiron cannot logically be a subject of awareness which thereby is cognizant of things which are other than itself—for, if for no other reason, this would then limit the Apeiron to so being a subject of awareness, which contradicts the Apeiron being perfectly limitless in all respects. (While I question Anaximander's notion of the Apeiron on logical grounds, another possible to conceive of boundless infinity is that of Nirvana without remainder, this among yet others, such as the Ein Sof; none of which are subjects of awareness that thereby dwell in a duality between self and other)

(In a bit of hurry at present so I’m not double checking the just written. If there’s glaring mistakes in it I’m sure someone will let me know.)

Got it. Just wanted to reply to with a :grin:

I'm saying that 'substance' is a poor choice of words, for the reasons I gave. — Wayfarer

Aristotle himself made use of the term ὑποκείμενον (hypokeimenon) and demarcated it in the following way:

Aristotle defined a hypokeimenon in narrowly and purely grammatical terms, as something which cannot be a predicate of other things, but which can carry other things as its predicates.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon#Overview

The term "hypokeimenon" can well translate into fundamental, or else metaphysical, “substrate” - which could be interpreted to be synonymous to “substance” as it's now commonly used but avoids the issues which you’ve addressed in regard to the latter term’s technical philosophical meanings.

Of additional note: the Wikipedia page specifies "material substrate" but, going by Aristotle's definition alone, one could also conceive of a mental substrate - or else some other type of metaphysical substrate as might be the case with neutral monism.

As to usage (this as most will commonly interpret things nowadays): Mind - or else, maybe, something mental, such as consciousness - is the metaphysical substrate in idealism; matter is the metaphysical substrate in materialism; and both are metaphysical substrates of equal importance in Cartesian dualism.

Do you see any flaw with the term “metaphysical substrate” as it’s just been made use of?

Edit: in my haste, I replaced "substratum" with "substrate". But they are synonymous, and the second does sound better to my ears (so far at least).

Does a causation chain have being? It does if there is a dog at its end. — jgill

Yup, philosophical issues 101. Which some will doubtlessly want to be spelled backwards, no less.

Because contemplation is passive. — Banno

We inhabit two very different minds. I'm always active in what I contemplate. You claim not to be. OK.

You know, Einstein and the moon. — jgill

Ah shoot, gonna turn this thread into one about best understandings regarding an objective idealism ontology?

I'll pass on that for now. All the same, the piece of wood or metal can well occur were all humans to somehow disappear this very instant, as would the moon - as would also persist the signs we humans would leave behind, as in both a) lines representing the idealization of a perfect inch and b) the word "money". These physical things would yet occur but - in granting no other equally or more advanced intelligence in the cosmos - these physically occurrent things would be utterly devoid of the meaning we deem them to hold. They would be utterly meaningless to dogs, bacteria, etc. But again, I don't want to turn this thread into one regarding ontologies.

They still lurk, but haven't posted in months. — Banno

One again wrong in your presumptions. Tis me (formerly "evolog" on the old website, don't you know).

It might be better to think of inches and dollars as something we do rather than something we contemplate. — Banno

Because contemplation is not something we do?

Does an inch exist on a ruler without someone looking at it? — jgill

An inch no more exists without anyone contemplating it than does any word (such as the word “money”) exist without anyone contemplating it. In other words, it doesn’t. It is 100% a socially constructed and established unit of measurement - whose actuality as such is fully contingent on that cohort of minds (and their individual process of thought) which accept it as commonly established construct. Same is true of a centimeter, and so forth.

Long ago, one of the regulars here insisted that Mount Everest did not have a height until it was measured. — Banno

And I bet they still maintain this bit of advanced philosophical thought.

At some point it becomes worthless to continue such discussion. — Banno

agreed in full

The example I gave was the height of a hill with regard to distance from the peak. The height changes over distance, not over time.

I don't know how to make this any clearer. — Banno

You're gonna have to be inventive and/or cogent.

Is the hill itself changing (say due to some volcanic eruption)? I presume not. Does the hill's measurement require processes of mind? I presume it does.

There is no such thing as "change over distance" when the temporarily of mental processes that start at the hill's peak (an event) and move toward the hill's base (another event) are removed from the analysis.

There is no change over distance period, but always change over time.

Yes, the sign does not change. But the value of y may well change with a change in x, yet without t.

I don't think you have followed this, but perhaps we'd best leave it there. — Banno

For my part, no, I see you not having followed the very points I just made.

In what way can "y may well change with a change in x" in which there does not occur a before and after the addressed change?

If you agree there is no conceivable way, then in what way can there be a differentiation between "before and after" without time occurring?

There is a difference between the two, the former being mere stipulation, and the latter being supported by empirical evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

:100: I would only add: "supported by experience, of which empirical evidence is one form of" (this in the modern sense of "empirical").

Such folk are introducing ad hoc excuses not to see that their metaphysical view is false.

But anyway, may I ask again, if there is no change apart from time, how do you understand δxδy? You must, I presume, claim that it is not a change? — Banno

Your former expressed, very slanted (if not utterly incorrect) biases should be addressed by this answer:

In short, you are (most likely unconsciously) reifying the sign "δx/δy" into the meaning it conveys for you and everyone here that can comprehend it in like manners:

There is no change whatsoever in "δx/δy" as sign, just as there is no change whatsoever that occurs in a static image for as long as it remains static. And both will require certain processes of mind to be interpreted in any meaningful way. (If not interpreted in any meaningful way, the argument can well be presented that they might not even be cognized as objects of awareness to begin with. But I won't here argue for this tangential.)

Processes of mind are processes (to state a triviality). Hence, time is requisite to them.

Any possible changes that the sign "δx/δy" can evoke - in one's mind, if this needs to be added - will then occur in processes of mind that, for instance, use the abstraction of variables (in this case, "x" and "y") to abstractly understand that when one variable changes (which requires time in before and after the given change) the other variable will also change (requiring the same abstracted frame of time) in manners established by the given sign as equation. This (mental) understanding of change is not itself static but dynamic; it is not a state of mind but a process of mind.

In what conceivable metaphysics is the sign "δx/δy" changing as one looks at it without in any way shifting one's focus of vision? Else, in what conceivable metaphysics can processes of mind occur in the absence of duration (which is always a temporal extension, or else temporal length, between two events)?

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To be blunt, your quoted biased conclusions so far look to me to amount to a pile of BS, to put it kindly - to not get into the psychobabble of "projections". As a recommendation that you are of course free to not take: it might be better to engage in discussions and debates on a philosophy form without insulting your interlocutors' intelligence or character by presupposing them to be far more idiotic than you yourself happen to be. Hey, no one here or anywhere is omniscient and hence perfectly intelligent, so I say this as one relative idiot among other non-omniscient beings that are thereby fallible.

Funny reply, but OK.

It's true that the colour changes over distance, whether you discern it or not. — Banno

To be taken seriously, show your reasoning. For instance, in what theory or truth that you wish to uphold is truth not partly dependent on one or more observer’s discernment of what is real (i.e., actual or else ontically occurrent).

And here we are off into realism against antirealism, and the thread goes on... — Banno

Are you now labeling yourself an “antirealist”? If not, that ought to address this issue.

May I ask, Javra, where the insistence that change requires time comes from? Why is it important to preserve this idea? this by way of trying to understand why folk seem so adamant about something that to me seems obviously wrong. Thanks. — Banno

It’s a matter of semantics: To me, the term “change” can only denote and connote “to become something else”, “to replace one thing for another”, “to make into something else” and related phrasings and synonyms. All these entail the occurrence of one or more processes. With “a process” being understood as a series or else sequence of events, hence entailing that some event occurs before some other event that occurs after the previous one. And this, thereby, entails time.

Since this to you "seems obviously wrong", what semantic for the term "change" do you hold in mind wherein change is, or else can be, fully independent of process(es)?

(To answer this by pointing to static images or to mathematics is fully counterproductive due to the very disagreement between us.)

And this is exactly the point. There is a change over distance. — Banno

That, again, requires an observer's changing/moving mind to discern.

May I ask, Javra, where the insistence that change requires time comes from? Why is it important to preserve this idea? this by way of trying to understand why folk seem so adamant about something that to me seems obviously wrong. Thanks. — Banno

I'll get back to you on this early next year my time. :smile:

This is not a proof for God argument. — Philosophim

For my part, the issue is that existence can only be rationally concluded absurd in so far as its being is, and can only be, a-rational (beyond any form of reasoning). If infinite causality, then the entire thing in total cannot itself have a cause, but is instead, for lack of a better word, magical in its so occurring - this with all the natural laws, etc., it encapsulates. If, however, one assumes a causal determinism with an initial starting point, then the same issue applies to existence in total: its occurrence is absurd (for the reasons just specified).

This can be an unnerving existential reality/realization for some but, all the same, I see no other rational conclusion to be had.

The OP assumes "a first cause to existence" instead of concluding in the position of absurdism - this as pertains to existence's being as a whole. This, to me, is the pivotal aspect of the disagreement - either with or without the notion of a first cause as God. (And yes, for the record, I deem myself a philosophical absurdist in this specific regard.)

One sees the image as a whole, not only by scanning it — Banno

As a whole, nothing of the image changes. It is only within it that changes occur form one part of it to another.

and Hook's law does not assume a block universe. — Banno

I'll look into it.

2024 must be almost everywhere by now...? — Banno

Not on the pacific side of the Americas ... still procrastinating in preparing for the folks that will show up :grin:

Almost forgot:

The absence of an icon next to your name makes it difficult for old folk such as I to spot your posts, as I scroll up and down on my laptop. — Banno

I'll try to work on it after the new year comes around in my neck of the woods. :wink: :razz:

It changes from yellow to white over distance, not time, you see. — Banno

This, however, fully ignores the reality of the observer's gaze moving in time from one spot of the image to another so as to discern the change addressed - without such a temporal motion of gaze, no change occurs.

And then Jgill pointed out that

A derivative can describe a rate of change with regard to a non-time variable: dy/dx — jgill

That should have been an end to it. — Banno

It so far seems to me this will only hold if one upholds the ontology of a block universe, i.e. the eternalism take on time. If so, here, all perceptions that involve time are fully illusional - and these encompass all that can be empirical, rendering all that is empirical to be strict illusion.

Otherwise, it again appears to me that the non-time variable which changes will again require an temporally-changing observer's mind (where time is, for example, minimally defined as a series of befores and afters - here, regarding givens such as ideas) to discern there being any change whatsoever.

If I have understood your post, you would like to define a sub-class of causes, which after Aristotle are to be called efficient causes, and which require change over time. That's fine, but it does not follow that all causes occur over time. — Banno

You've understood my post, yes. And I'm in agreement with your conclusion. In Aristotelian terms, formal and material causations are themselves change/motion-independent and hence not directly dependent on time. This as one example of causation-types not requiring change over time. But the pertinent question for philosophical clarity, if not rigor, will then remain: what is it that one then refers to when using the term "causation"?

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BTW, from what I recall, Aristotle species efficient causation to necessitate not merely change, but a change in motion, including those of its commencing and of it stopping. Unlike the notion of change of itself, motion (movement of anything in his terms, which can well be of psychological process, and not merely physical motions) will then appear to entail duration between befores and afters and, hence, the occurrence of time when so generally understood.

I can get that, and I did jump into the discussion without reading most of the previous posts.

Make of my reply what you will. To me it does evidence the occurrence of moral realism.

Yes, correct. — Leontiskos

:up:

Is it a moral fact? We're discussing moral obligations, not non-moral obligations. — Michael

It directly concerns what the alcoholic ought to do despite what anyone might want, or like, the alcoholic to do. I fail to understand how this specific "ought" wouldn't be a moral - or, better yet, ethical - fact: one that thereby regards the notion of the good.

As to obligations, I'm not involving myself with them. The question can always be placed: why ought one honor one's former promise ... and with an innumerable quantity of possible scenarios, some can be found wherein it is morally good for one to not honor one's former promise.

I'm explaining that if ethical non-naturalism is true then being moral has no practical benefit. — Michael

I starkly disagree, here granting that this ethical non-naturalism concerns moral realism. But I'm not here to present a thesis on the subject. I'm here only addressing your quoted proposition and my reply to it.

That they should become sober is not an objectively binding moral obligation. It is a pragmatic suggestion, like telling someone that they should brush their teeth. — Michael

It not a statement of suggestion that one gives to another - for in the example all who know the alcoholic want him to continue drinking. The example I gave was given as a statement of fact. That aside:

1) Does your reply then make the statement untrue? If so, how?

2) Why presume that morality is independent of pragmatics?

Is this premise true?

1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X

According to moral realists it's not. — Michael

A) The alcoholic (who thereby self-destroys themselves via alcohol consumption) should become sober, this despite B) the alcoholic and all which surround him wanting the alcoholic to continue drinking alcohol (for whatever reasons, with these possibly ranging from that of wanting the alcoholic to continue being their merry self in the company of others when drunk to that of wanting the alcoholic to die).

What’s missing here for a satisfactory account of moral realism is the reason for why (A) is valid despite (B). Notwithstanding, to me this scenario presents an intuitive truth that I presume is universally shared. If so, then the proposition you’ve offered is not true - this, as you claim, just as the moral realist affirms.

WW2 history must turn you into a quivering wreck. — RogueAI

Well, unlike some others, there indeed is something about concentration camps that I deem wrong. This especially when they turn into extermination camps. No quivering on my part, but sorrow, yes - this mixed with some anger at those who don't give a fuck.

In now long-gone history, this concentration camp turned extermination camp thing was once done by the Nazis toward the Jews - in case some have not heard. But this is only meaningful to those who care, of course.

In the present moment, this concentration camp turning into extermination camp is being directly done by the Israelis with the Palestinians - if not strictly via direct killings then via intentional starvation and disease. But this is also strictly meaningful to those who have a heart and thereby care.

The past is unalterable. The present, however, is. But I somehow already know your reply: almost 10,000 children killed in a few months time, to not mention those maimed both physically and psychologically ... boo-fuckin-hoo you privately reply, because you just don't give a fuck.

And no, I don't shed tears for people that hate children.

The genocide — oh, sorry, I mean that very just “war” on innocent children — continues. Eight thousand dead and counting.
— Mikie

Boo hoo — Merkwurdichliebe


What a truly repugnant response. — Mikie

@Merkwurdichliebe's “boo hoo” reply makes me envision someone eating popcorn with a brewsky in their hand in front of their TV set while joyfully laughing out loud at every instance of a child being maimed or dying, and always drooling at the mouth for more children’s blood being shed.

There's a chance this might not be Merkwurdichliebe, but such is the image his comment produces.

In my experience, such individuals have no guilt and can do no wrong, irrespective of what their actions might be. They’re in their own eyes pure angels - angels that want for others to be ruthlessly obliterated with as much bloodlust and spin of reality as is required to do so.

Honest observations from someone who knows himself to be no angel - of the type just addressed or any other. :naughty:

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The numbers you talk about alone sometime bring me close to crying rather authentic tears. But then, this turns into anger - which can in principle be put to good use.

Basically wanted to second your comment.

The idea of 'causation' presupposes time, because a cause is defined as prior to its effect, and causation is a temporal process. — unenlightened


The bowling ball causes the depression in the cushion.

Cause is not always prior to effect. Indeed sometimes it is impossible to decide which event is the cause and which the result. — Banno

This will be fully dependent on what is interpreted by the term “causation”. That causation expressed in the phrase, “my aim of expressing the ideas of this post was the cause of me writing the words in this sentence,” is not today taken by most philosophers and scientists to be a valid instantiation of causation—even though it is a valid form of Aristotle’s final causation in his framing of causal pluralism. And even though the expressed sentence makes cogent sense (just as much as does the statement of a ball causing a cushion’s depression).

I'll argue that Kant’s rebuttal to Hume in claiming that simultaneous causation occurs in many instances of efficient causation—which the ball and cushion example epitomizes—misses the entire point of what efficient causation is supposed to be. Here’s one reputable source’s definition:

The efficient cause or that which is given in reply to the question: “Where does change (or motion) come from?”. What is singled out in the answer is the whence of change (or motion). — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/#FourCaus

There is no motion or change taking place in a bowling ball’s state of rest atop a depressed cushion. Hence, here, there can be no efficient cause to an effect (of change or motion), for no such effect occurs.

Then again, the ball’s being in a state of rest on the cushion causes the cushion’s given curvature just as much as the cushion’s given curvature causes the ball to be in a state of rest. Both are equally viable from their different, respective vantages of interest. Here, then, the ball's state of rest on the cushion is a simultaneous cause and effect in relation to the cushion's given curvature, which is also a simultaneous effect of and cause to the former. This relationship, then, produces so much havoc in our understandings of (efficient) causation as to render the term useless and, thereby, meaningless.

Here is one possible alternative understanding of how the resting ball causes the cushion’s depression: teleologically, rather than efficiently. In short, the ball’s set of teloi (including that end of being optimally proximate to Earth’s center) interacts with the far more malleable cushions’ set of teloi so as to result in an equilibrium wherein the ball is at rest and the cushion is depressed. This equilibrium (which, of itself, is changeless) is thereby teleologically caused by the ball just as much as it is by the cushion—this since it results from an interaction between both teloi-driven things. Utterly foreign to our modern ears, but in no way illogical.

As @unenlightened specified, for efficient causation to hold, the occurrence of the cause will then need extend prior to the occurrence of the effect—which does not happen in the ball and cushion example. With this traditional understanding of efficient causation, however, one can then validly affirm that, “the person letting the bowling ball slip from their hands (efficiently) caused the change in the form of the cushion that lied just underneath,” for the first occurrence as (efficient) cause extends prior to the time-span of the second occurrence as effect (despite the teleology previously mentioned remaining intact—to here not address the formal and material causes which could also be argued to occur). And, from a different vantage, one can then also validly affirm that “the cushion’s placement caused the falling bowling ball to come to its specific state of rest” for, here again, the cushion’s placement, as cause, necessarily extends prior to the bowling ball’s state of rest as effect.

But, again, a ball resting atop of cushion does not efficiently cause the cushion’s depression. This for the same reasons that change in temperature does not efficiently cause change in barometric pressure.

Since this issue of causality is of interest to me, I’m curious to see what disagreements there might be with the just expressed.

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To contribute to the OP: where there to be no disagreements, this would then make the argument expressed in ’s post quite valid.

Did 'the law of the excluded middle' - a basic logical principle - come into existence as a result of evolution? Or rather, did we evolve to the point of being able to grasp something that was always already so? — Wayfarer

If the first scenario, then: Before the evolution of life came around, there was no requisite identity to anything at the same time and in the same respect, so there was no such thing as logical contradictions not being possible—rocks all over the universe were at times both rocks and not rocks in the same respect simultaneously (to not start addressing atoms and fields, etc.)—and, so there were intermediate states of being between being either X or not-X (this at the same time and in the same respect) all over the cosmos. BUT: ever since the evolution of life came around, we literally can only conceive of the past as being accordant to the principle of identity, the principle of noncontradiction, and the principle of the excluded middle (for the first principle entails the other two)—thereby gravely misinterpreting all aspects of what the real ontic world was like before life came around (and possibly of what it continues to be with life present to it). Ergo, one then can only rationally conclude that, in this first scenario, what we contemplate as being the past is, and can only be, an idealization of what in fact was—necessitating that the world we know of is one of idealism in all respects. Thereby making physicalism an impossible stance to justify in any other means than via the idealizations of an idealistic, epistemically held onto reality … an idealism strictly concocted from the way life happened to evolve in its psychology.

On the other hand, if the second, then all I can presently affirm is that physicalism must be false.

Conclusion: regardless of scenario, physicalism is unjustifiable when logically appraised.
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Maybe I should say “my bad”: had a good private chuckle at this and I wanted to share. :razz:

Happy New Year’s irrespective of ontological stance all the same!

There are different ontological theories; there is one ontological subject and object of study, which is existence. Having different ontological hypotheses doesn't alter the nature of the real. — Pantagruel

Of course: one ontic reality (whatever it might in fact be) and many ontologies (each with its own proposed metaphysical laws) trying to accurately map it - often enough in manners that end up being contradictory to other ontologies.

I just finished Deacon's Incomplete Nature, which is an excellent framework for re-integrating the fundamental aspects of intentionality across the entire physical spectrum though morphodynamics and teleodynamics. — Pantagruel

I'll put it on my list of books to read. Thanks for mentioning.

If you have an alternative understanding, I'd be happy to hear about it. — Janus

My take was stated in this post in the thread, which is itself based on this SEP entry (you can quickly look at the SEP entry's section 1's two definitions of metaphysical possibility).

I'll say that, if by no other means, then via acquaintance with there so being different ontologies out there, all of which are metaphysical possibilities regarding what the actual world in fact is. These are all metaphysically possible rather than physically possible in the same way that a possible world is metaphysically possible rather than physically possible - only that in the case of ontologies, one of them might be a more accurate mapping of the actual than the others.

Why ask such a question?

We don't know what is metaphysically possible, — Janus

As a friendly reminder, we do know that different ontologies are metaphysically possible.

Although we also know logically that contradictory ontologies (e.g., that of physicalism vs. that of idealism vs. that of substance dualism) cannot all be accurate models of the physical, or better yet actual, world (needless to add, this at the same time and in the same respect).

Since the different gravitational forces would not make for much of a difference, — Janus

The example I just gave of GPS evidences the significant difference between the gravitational force that a satellite is in and the gravitational force that a Earth-bound human is in. But I guess considering what is a "significant difference in different gravitational forces" would embark us too far astray.

and hence significant differences in aging probably remain in the realm of fiction or fantasy. — Janus

... and in the realm of metaphysical possibility, which this thread is in part about.

And in general, when we talk about the age of anything, existing things which came into being earlier than other existing things are considered to be the older. On this criterion a daughter could never be older than her mother while they are both still alive, although of cause the daughter could live to a greater age. — Janus

I've already agreed to this, upheld it even before you mentioned it. But I don't see how this then contradicts the theory of relativity as regards a person potentially holding two actual ages in different respects - given the circumstances previously specified.

So that we're on the same page in terms of the theory of relativity's reality:

How does this connect with General Relativity and GPS? As predicted by Einstein’s theory, clocks under the force of gravity run at a slower rate than clocks viewed from a distant region experiencing weaker gravity. This means that clocks on Earth observed from orbiting satellites run at a slower rate. To have the high precision needed for GPS, this effect needs to be taken into account or there will be small differences in time that would add up quickly, calculating inaccurate positions. — https://www.nasa.gov/image-article/einsteins-theory-of-relativity-critical-gps-seen-distant-stars/

The theory of relativity does operate in terms of Earths own otherwise general time frame. So if travel even between different solar systems were to be possible, it would operate in these circumstances as well.

And yet the claim is that the Universe began around 14 billion years ago. — Janus

Unless I'm mistaken, there is no other way that estimate can be established other than via the theory of relativity - coupled, of course, with empirical evidence. So instead of contradicting the relativity of time, it will be one derivation from it.

This puts me in mind of some of Kant's CPR i've gone over in the alst couple of days.
The relation of time is individual in that an external impression of another person doesn't exist in their time, it exists in the perceiver's time. I would think that this means we can just see any subjective notion of time as legitimate. It only exists as a relation, so there's no other benchmark. — AmadeusD

It is commonly enough known that we perceive time in subjective manners (the linked Wikipedia article gives a nice presentation). This I think fits into part of what you are saying. But this can’t then be the only benchmark for time, otherwise there would be no way of discerning between time which is subjectively perceived (and which can vary by individual) and that time which is objectively occurring (and is equally applicable to all causally interacting, or else causally entwined, observers).

As concerns objective time, however, the same dichotomy between a relativistic time and cosmically absolute time will present itself. With all indications now pointing to time being relativistic rather than absolute. So, in extreme time dilation scenarios, for one example, an individual can still have two distinct ages that are both objective (and hence not subjective) by breaking away from a commonly shared time frame (for example, the time frame that Earth dwellers more or less all inhabit (though minor forms of time relativity still apply here on Earth)) and then subsequently rejoining it.

To illustrate the distinction between subjective and objective time via a simple example: In a given conversation, time might by going slow for one individual and might be going fast for the other (this due to each individual’s separate chronoception) but will nevertheless be commonly applicable (hence, impartially applicable and, in at least this sense, objective) to both individuals in terms of the back-and-forth dialogue of the conversation - e.g., both will know who said what prior to whose reply, etc., thereby facilitating the possibility of a conversation. And if there were a clock present to both during the conversation, both could potentially pinpoint at which commonly shared, objective time a certain statement was made in durational relation to some other - this despite the differences in chronoception between the two individuals.

Its a very complex topic, this metaphysics of time. But that's my best answer so far.