Fallibilism, allowing for uncertainty, is not self-refuting, but the statement that all claims are ultimately arbitrary appears to be. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In fully agreement with this quote, and considering the metaphysical issue of truth's occurrence:

Let truth be here tersely understood as: awareness’s conformity to that which is ontically certain—hence, that which is ontically, rather than psychologically, fixed or unvarying (such that this fixedness of being can be fully relative to a set of changes within a temporal and spatial fame; e.g., a ball having moved from A to B is ontically certain, i.e. ontically fixed and unvarying).

Argument/assertion: There is no such thing as ontic certainty; therefore, there is no conformity to ontic certainty to be had by any awareness.

Rebuttal: Were there to in fact be no such thing as ontic certainty, then this in and of itself would be ontically (rather than psychologically) certain; resulting in the following logical contradiction: at the same time and in the same respect there both a) is no ontic certainty (entailed by there occurring no ontic certainty whatsoever) and b) is ontic certainty (entailed by there occurring the ontic certainty stipulated in (a)).

Conclusion: either 1) dialethism is valid or else 2) there needs to be some ontic certainty/certainties to which awareness can either conform to or deviate from. Moreover, if (1) is stipulated to in fact be the case, then one would likewise stipulate (1) to of itself be an ontic certainty—thereby either again falsifying the argument/assertion provided contra the occurrence of truth(s) or else resulting in a total disarray of thought.

Fallibilism does not affirm wrongness but the ever-present potential of being wrong (such as on account of not being omniscient). As such, although one in principle could be wrong in upholding the occurrence of truths, because there is no valid reason to doubt either that ontic certainty/certainties occur or the occurrence of awareness (which can of itself be one ontic certainty), an epistemological system of fallibilism can then only uphold there in fact being such as thing as truth(s).

And this conclusion, of itself, in no way contradicts constructivism in many, if not all, of its forms.

For science, phenomena are more than enough, and they are by no means inferior to the noumena (on the contrary). — Jamal

Though I’m not sure how to parse this in Kantian terms, awareness per se is in no way phenomenal: it has no look, no smell, no sound, etc. But then nor is it strictly or primarily “an aspect of thought” as noumena are here primarily described. Contingent on metaphysical construct, it could however be deemed a thing-in-itself (here being very liberal with the term “thing”, this by contrast to the notion of “nothing”).

That mentioned, the OP seems to express the following gist:

The indirect realism* which the empirical sciences confirm—and of which Kantianism is one version of—in no way undermines the validity of scientific knowledge.

Yes: true.

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* For general reference:

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.[3] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism

The question of the esoteric, may involve so much about the contexts and framing of meaning. — Jack Cummins

Which is why I find the esoteric can only always be fallacious by default to those who fall back onto the belief that they live in a fundamentally meaningless world. Here is one example to help illustrate the point:

All the various empirical sciences would unravel into worthlessness, into lack of authority, were the notion of objectivity to be eliminated from their practices—scientific knowledge at that juncture becoming nothing more nor less than yet another person’s or cohort’s purely partial and biased opinion regarding that which is inductive. And yet, the very notion of objectivity—of a complete lack of partiality and bias—is itself an esoteric subject: It is an ideal striven for in the sciences, in journalism, in jurisprudence and the very act of judging cases (this at least in democracy-aspiring societies). Yet what this ideal of a completely objective awareness or of a completely objective judgment (both of which pertain to the inner workings of consciousness rather than to a commonly accessible physicality) is supposed to be—for emphasis, an ideal of objectivity toward which we can then either be closer to or further from—is anything but exoteric knowledge. Yet I don’t see how one can in the same breath uphold in non-contradictory manners that a) objectivity as concept/ideal is a meaningless construct and that b) the empirical sciences are any form of genuine authority regarding the physical world.

How one frames the meaning of the term “objectivity” will then greatly determine how one discerns good from bad (or pseudo-) science, good from bad journalism, and good from bad judges (etc.).

Yet, for lack of better terms, the notion of objectivity as here mentioned remains strictly applicable to spiritual rather than physical realms: to the psyche and many of its so far esoteric aspects—to include the potential of ego becoming completely impartial and unbiased awareness and, thus, fully egoless. (As an apropos: which can for example bring to mind esoteric notions such as that of ego-death.)

Trying to reorient this from the quagmire of defining genocides which have yet to be fulfilled …

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Israel paints Palestinians as 'animals' to legitimize war crimes: Israeli scholar

This seems to be common knowledge to all but us Westerners. But, then, this portrayal of Palestinians as animals far precedes the current conflict, and is old news. For example:

Ben Dahan has made controversial remarks about Palestinians. While discussing the resumption of peace talks in a radio interview in 2013, Ben Dahan said that “To me, they are like animals, they aren’t human.” — https://www.timesofisrael.com/new-deputy-defense-minister-called-palestinians-animals/

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It shouldn’t be forgotten that the extermination of animals is not to be confused with the extermination of humans. Animals, be they technically human or otherwise, are after all by definition sub-human. Lest it becomes forgotten, “Untermensch” was the term commonly used prior to WWII, and it means no more and no less than “subhuman”.

Can one commit genocide against animals? Definitely not. So say those who deny other humans the claim to an authentic humanity.

Irrespective of what’s now taking place being genocide, attempted genocide, or something other, it’s still unjustified mass killing of a peoples sponsored by supremacist views, if not outright ideology - which as history shows can only lead to calamity if not nipped in the bud sooner or later. Such as in the unpleasant possibility of a WWIII … in which quite blatant genocides might readily occur (this, at least, according to those who are and will remain humanists).

Thanks much for the reply.

Amen my Daoshi brother or sister or they, choose your delusion. — Chet Hawkins

:grin:

I’m myself a perennialist, meaning I choose to belief that most mystical experiences—from the globally shamanic to those strictly contextualized by either Western or Eastern thought—and the multitude of various religions these have often enough brought about, address a universally applicable but hard to express truth, what has sometimes been simply termed “the Real”. And that interpretations of what’s been said of these experiences often enough get polluted by inappropriate projections—such as can be exemplified by Westerners construing the light and dark of the yang and yin to signify goodness and badness, respectively. To not here get into the unscrupulous use of such esoteric knowledge (or, maybe better yet, understanding … either way, this being an aspect of direct awareness) for authoritarian purposes by others that lust for power; needless to add, this without having the given awareness concerned: wherein unscrupulous ignorants present themselves as infallible authorities regarding such knowledge, infallible authorities which deem that they are to be blindly obeyed at risk of an otherwise incurred grave pain and suffering. (To me, one blatant example of this is that JC the peace-loving mystic in comparison to too many a pope and priest serving the role of the unscrupulous ignorant who lusts for authoritarian power.)

Perennialism is quite the expansive topic and, ever the fallibilist, I don't claim to have any infallible knowledge regarding it. But getting back to the quote, while I don’t mean to here argue for perennialism, this nevertheless being my chosen belief, I view Daoism as one more path upon the same mountain toward the mountain’s universally applicable zenith—this traveled toward zenith at the same time being the very ground which all religions have in common, though each religion/path interprets this same zenith in sometimes vastly different manners.

Basically, while I acknowledge Daoism, I don’t deem myself to be a Daoist ... in the strict sense of the term at least.

And as to my label for my own gender, I’ll add that I'm an old-school “male”. :smile: Closest I can get to more modern libertarian views on gender in regard to my own self is to consider myself a butch lesbian stuck in a male’s body. :wink: No complaints with that. :razz:

Maybe all this is much ado about nothing, but I thought it worthwhile to express all the same. :grin:

Still, any arrangement of the entities is fine so long as real wisdom is the goal. — Chet Hawkins

:100:

Question for you (and anyone else):
How do you see the relationship between good / evil… and Yin / Yang? :chin: — 0 thru 9

From what I take to be the Taoist perspective, or at least my own take of it, the good is found in harmony between yin and yang which then serves as a return to Wuji—Wuji being in the Taoist cosmology the nameless Tao which produces the One, from which is produced the Two, from which is produced the Three, from which all things are produced. Bad, and by extension evil, for me is then a discord, or disharmony, between yin and yang.

To say that good is a harmony between yang-as-good and yin-as-bad, or similar takes, to me so far makes no sense. As though too much good is then bad? But good is a balance between them?

And I so far interpret these latter type of interpretations to be heavily influenced by western or else westernized thought: wherein light (hence yang) symbolizes good and shadow/darkness (hence yin) symbolizes bad.

But consider snow blindness—or, more technically, any condition where one would witness only whiteness/light in the complete absence of darkness/shadows. This creates an inability to see just as much as complete darkness does. So understood, neither light/yang nor darkness/yin would of itself be bad when balanced with the other: in balance, they are good together. This while both become bad (and by extension maybe evil … such as in causing temporary blindness) when out of balance with its dyad.

Sorta gets back to the notion of the metaphors one lives by.

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I see this is in rough agreement to 's comments.

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ps. made a number of typos in haste. Corrected what I've found.

Wisdom is the most esoteric mystery that there is. — Chet Hawkins

Interesting. I find this in some ways directly speaks to what “love of wisdom” – i.e., philosophy – was initially intended to be about. I can also relate to a number of other concepts you’ve evoked. But I won’t now get into discussing them.

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Aldous Huxley makes a distinction between knowledge and understanding. Here's and overview:

Knowledge is acquired when we succeed in fitting a new experience into the system of concepts based upon our old experiences. Understanding comes when we liberate ourselves from the old and so make possible a direct, unmediated contact with the new, the mystery, moment by moment, of our existence. The new is the given on every level of experience — given perceptions, given emotions and thoughts, given states of unstructured awareness, given relationships with things and persons. The old is our home-made system of ideas and word patterns. It is the stock of finished articles fabricated out of the given mystery by memory and analytical reasoning, by habit and the automatic associations of accepted notions. Knowledge is primarily a knowledge of these finished articles. Understanding is primarily direct awareness of the raw material. Knowledge is always in terms of concepts and can be passed on by means of words or other symbols. Understanding is not conceptual, and therefore cannot be passed on. It is an immediate experience, and immediate experience can only be talked about (very inadequately), never shared. Nobody can actually feel another’s pain or grief, another’s love or joy or hunger. And similarly nobody can experience another’s understanding of a given event or situation. […] — A. Huxley

In relation to this, to me, something like the Jeopardy show illustrates a great quantity of knowledge regarding the world that does not exhibit, nor necessitate, any significant understanding regarding the world. The two are not the same.

Won’t contribute much due to time constraints, but I thought this distinction between knowledge and understanding fits in rather well with what you’ve expressed.

Does that mean that at least some of what you claim [the Buddhist claims] the Buddhist knows about reality that the rest of us do not know is not something known by the Buddhist after all? — Fooloso4

In trying my best to understand this question, I'll say yes: Fallible knowledge can be wrong in principle. But this question strikes me as addressing the epistemological issue of fallible vs. infallible knowledge. And, although it currently seems to me to be the elephant in the room to all this, it is not a topic I currently want to engage in.

Where have I said that? — Fooloso4

Where have I said that you said it?

Actually my questions are in response to the question you asked. — Fooloso4

Yes, but they do not answer the question I asked.

If that worldview is based on knowledge of reality then why not a single unified view or description of reality? — Fooloso4

Because the knowledge of reality the worldview is based on (this being different than being equivalent to) will not be perfectly comprehensive of all aspects of realty and, by my appraisal, it certainly can’t be infallible. As a brief justification, this because no human can be omniscient, if this notion is even logically cogent to begin with.

Nothing in science is infallible or perfectly comprehensive, and scientific paradigms – from the theory of relativity to the theory of evolution – have variations within them. Yet we don’t thereby conclude that scientific paradigms are not based on (fallible) knowledge of reality.

How can the question of whether there is sufficient justification that it might be when there is divergence with regard to what it might be? — Fooloso4

See the above mentioned.

Unless I misunderstood you, you argued in favor of the benefit of holding "the Buddhist worldview." My point is that there can be different worldviews that are beneficial. — Fooloso4

This is, or at least can be, part and parcel of an outlook termed perennialism. And it does not contradict all such different views being founded upon incomplete and fallible knowledge of a singular reality, superficially incommensurate as these different worldviews might be.

Again, in answering these questions I’m not presenting an argument for why esoteric insights into reality should be accepted by you but, instead, arguments for why it is unwarranted to dismiss the possibility in such a manner that one then claims irrational others who find the possibility viable. And yes, I find that it boils down to underlying suppositions of physicalism vs. non-physicalism. Neither of which can be conclusively evidenced, much less upheld with infallible knowledge.

Lots of questions that don't address the question I asked.

What is that worldview? Is it individual or common to all Buddhist monks? What are we to make of divergent views within and between Buddhist schools of thought? — Fooloso4

That worldview is Buddhism. Just as physicalism is an umbrella concept to many a variety, so too is Buddhism.

What do they say about the nature of reality? Why should we accept that what they describe is actual knowledge into the nature of reality? — Fooloso4

What Buddhism in general upholds. My previous post was not about you accepting it; it was about sufficient justification to uphold that it might be, if not in fact being. Hence, justification which presents the case that while you can uphold your rejection, others can be quite warranted in accepting the possibility.

That a worldview has benefits for those who hold it only shows that holding this worldview has benefits, not that the worldview corresponds reality. An unrealistic or false worldview might also have benefits. — Fooloso4

Something fishy about this affirmation. Many, if not all, unrealistic or false worldviews, or views in general, will lead to unwarranted suffering if not untimely deaths (the issue of climate change comes to mind as just one example of this). It to me is what generally makes unrealistic or false perspectives unfavorable. But this can open wide a can of worms, which I don't currently want to get into.

Currently short on time so I'll leave it at that.

That they can do this is not merely a theoretical possibility. They can demonstrate their ability to do this. How does one demonstrate that there is a realm of Forms that they have knowledge of? — Fooloso4

Addressing this via the more general issue of insight into deeper levels of reality and with the following in mind:

Brain scans of Buddhist monks exhibit a variety of unique features, including enhanced neuroplasticity. — Pantagruel

If a Buddhist monk’s worldview is in no way comprised of actual knowledge but only of arbitrary imaginations which are thereby devoid of any rational justification and, hence, rational grounding; then the empirically verifiable benefits of their upheld worldview upon their Central Nervous System would by entailment be nothing more than a wild coincidence devoid of any explanation. This then gives warrant in either accepting that a) at least some Buddhist monks have actual knowledge into the nature of reality (edit: this as they by in large claim to have) that others don’t grasp or else b) utterly inexplicable coincidences (which are by definition devoid of any meaningful connection) occur not only very commonly but with very predictable regularity between worldview upheld and its effects upon quality of life and CNS.

Does scenario (b) hold a significantly greater justification than scenario (a)? (And yes, I take it that both scenarios could well be deemed absurd from different vantages.)

No infallible proof to be had by this either way. But to me it does illustrate a sturdy enough justification for upholding the possibility, if not outright actuality, of some people’s insights into reality which others by in large lack. Insights that are in no way “secret” – for most Buddhists desire to be as transparent about them as they can be - but are nevertheless esoteric in that most others find these insights difficult to comprehend.

I don't care what you think, — Janus

Duely noted.

Moreover, were consciousness perceivable then the philosophical problem of other minds would not be a problem of any kind. — javra


"The philosophical problem of other minds", seem to me to be more a problem that some people have that is caused by philosophy rather than something to be taken very seriously.

Yes, we can't very reasonably say we perceive other minds, but I certainly have plenty of good reason to think that I recognize other minds. I.e. that minds have recognizable signatures. Don't you have good reasons to think so as well?

Isn't the performative contradiction rather obvious? — wonderer1

Aye. In many a way its right up there with p-zombies and brains in a vat. But these are only a problem in practice if one is in search of infallible knowledge. Otherwise, such philosophical problems, or issues, in and of themselves give no warrant whatsoever to doubting one’s fallible knowledge of reality at large, which includes other minds.

But that does not then dispel the philosophical, or more specifically epistemological, problem of other minds. "Problem" because that is what the issue is traditionally termed and known by. For example:

Here granting that an AI program has the capacity to become conscious, how would one (fallibly) know when it so becomes? One certainly can’t perceive its consciousness or the lack of. So it would be an inference based on its behaviors. And yet how can we so infer the moment that it becomes conscious?

Here’s another more unavoidable example: At which point in the chain of life does consciousness first occur? Some say that only humans are conscious beings, such that, for example, dogs and cats are not. While I take the opposite view, I have been unable to successfully argue for dogs and cats being conscious beings so as to convince those who disagree. Again, we cannot perceive consciousness, nor the mind which is contingent upon it. We can only infer it from behaviors. And there so far is no established principle(s) by which this inference can be made in impartial ways that thereby resolve the disagreements among humans. (And there are related issues, such as that of whether lesser animals experience emotions, but I'll cut this short.)

In sum, unless one is in search of infallible certainties, I don’t find any performative contradiction in acknowledging the issue - this, for instance, as it was presented in the two examples just provided - while at the same time not in any way doubting one's fallible knowledge of other minds. Goes hand in hand with fallibilism.

I don't think consciousness is outside the range of human perception; you perceive yourself to be conscious, no? — Janus

A different topic altogether, but I wanted to comment: If perception necessarily addresses the apprehension of phenomena, then no, one as consciousness does not perceive owns own consciousness. Moreover, were consciousness perceivable then the philosophical problem of other minds would not be a problem of any kind.

Am I not allowed to argue for what I believe can and cannot be coherently philosophically investigated? — Janus

You sound victimized. Let's refresh.

We can know nothing whatsoever about whatever might be "beyond being". The idea is nothing more than the dialectical opposite of 'being'. Fools have always sought to fill the 'domains' of necessary human ignorance with their "knowing". How much misery this has caused humanity is incalculable. — Janus

You view this as "an argument for what you believe" whereas to me it is nothing more and nothing less than an emotively expressed authoritarian assertion: one which wants to disallow me from thinking freely.

A difference of options.

(Just saw that Wayfarer stated something similar, but will post this anyway.)

Further to this, and apropos of the issue of esoteric philosophy. The following is a comparison of a passage from Parmenides, who is generally understood as the originator of classical metaphysics, and an esoteric school of Mahāyāna Buddhism called Mahamudra. — Wayfarer

Nice. Both passages you quote strike me as coming from folk that have tried to “express heretofore inexpressible insights” via prose and, as such, I can find an aesthetic appeal to both.

Of course, when concepts are poetically expressed, their successful conveyance will in part greatly depend on an already established background of implicit yet commonly shared understandings with the audience. This as can be said of most any poetic expression.

Tangentially brings to mind a poem by S. Crane that addresses the issue of all knowledge being opinion:

Once there was a man --
Oh, so wise!
In all drink
He detected the bitter,
And in all touch
He found the sting.
At last he cried thus:
"There is nothing --
No life,
No joy,
No pain --
There is nothing save opinion,
And opinion be damned."

Which I in part interpret as presenting the case that the more aware one becomes of one’s own lack of perfect knowledge in respect to anything, the more one will long for grasping the firmness of some unwavering truth or truths. Which I find to be Socrates’s predicament. But when one thinks one holds perfect knowledge in some respect or other, such longing does not occur.

At any rate, in Nietzsche’s phrasings (although I gather you’re not enamored with his works), there’s the Apollonian approach and then there’s the Dionysian.

Apollo represents harmony, progress, clarity, logic and the principle of individuation, whereas Dionysus represents disorder, intoxication, emotion, ecstasy and unity (hence the omission of the principle of individuation). — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollonian_and_Dionysian#Nietzschean_usage

If the analytic is Apollonian in its clarity, then the more poetic - such as the two quotes you’ve provided - will be Dionysian, filled with greater life.

It strikes me that, at least traditionally, the notion of “a unity of being” (such as can be said of "the One", for an additional example) has largely been expressed in Dionysian manners. And it is these very Dionysian ways of expressing and, maybe, even of being that strikes many as “esoteric”, difficult for most of us to comprehend.

If not 'being' then what do you suggest it means in this context? — Fooloso4

BTW, I should add to the just posted that, as per Neo-Platonism wherein the One is equivalent to the Good, one can interpret that only the Good is a perfectly fixed constant. Other Forms, such as numbers, etc., while far more permanent that others, would yet not be "a perfectly fixed constant" on which all else is dependent. Obvious speculation on my part as to what Socrates/Plato intended, but again it so far seems plausible to me: Only the Good is beyond what Wayfarer describes in the formerly given quote in an absolute and perfect sense, whereas all other forms are not - despite some of these other forms being far more permanent than others.

Added this just to clarify my current best assumptions.

If not 'being' then what do you suggest it means in this context? — Fooloso4

Although I'm not sure, something along the lines of Wayfarer's suggestion currently seem quite plausible:

My interpretation of 'beyond being' is that it means 'beyond the vicissitudes of existence', 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away'. That idea is made much more explicit in Mahāyāna Buddhism than in Platonism, but I believe there is some common ground. — Wayfarer

In the Seventh Letter Plato says: — Fooloso4

I find that passage you quote itself open to a wide enough range of interpretations. And so I can't make heads or tails as what type of reply it's supposed to be - this to the question of whether you yourself find the Socratic dialogs are reputable, or else worthwhile, philosophy.

The term in question is ousia. — Fooloso4

I'm aware of that. While I do not speak Ancient Greek, from my studies the word in Ancient Greek can convey different meanings or else sub-meaning. Here is one reference to this. It can be noted that while etymologically derived from "being" and, in turn, "to be", the term does not have "being" as its one unequivocal meaning.

Again, that the Good is not - this on account of being beyond being (as "being" is understood today) - is something I find nonsensical; and, hence, extremely unlikely to have been what was intended by the text.

"Effing the ineffable" is the job of art and poetry, not rigorous philosophical discussion. — Janus

Though we disagree in some respects, ↪Fooloso4 beat me to it in the example he provided to the contrary. — javra

My example is not to the contrary. It supports it. — Fooloso4

To be clear, do you by this intend to express that the Socratic dialogues by which Platonism was established are not rigorous philosophical discussions - this on account of often being poetically expressed?

If so, we then hold a difference of opinion as to what reputable philosophy can consist of.

As to the quote from Plato, It is fragmented and out of context (from Wikipedia) so I don't want to comment on it. — Janus

Here's a translation I found online:

[509b] the similitude of it still further in this way.1” “How?” “The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation.” “Of course not.” “In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence2 in dignity and surpassing power.” — Plato, Republic, (509b)

What is here translated as "essence" is in some cases translated as "being", and it was interpretations of this that I was addressing. (you can skip backwards and forwards in the link for further context)

Of course, people may have opinions, but those opinions cannot be informed opinions if what they are about is something outside the range of human perception. — Janus

As just one example among many, consciousness is "something outside the range of human perception". Yet to proscribe philosophical investigations of consciousness seems a bit authoritarian.

So, it is not dogma, but presents a valid distinction between what can be tested and what cannot. And no, I have not said that ideas that cannot be tested have no value, but that they cannot coherently function as claims if there is no way to for the unbiased to assess their veracity. — Janus

What then do you make of value theory in general? Ought it not be philosophically investigated? Meaningful tests regarding, for example, the very validity of dichotomizing intrinsic and extrinsic value are certainly not yet available, if ever possible. Does this, according to you, make the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value something that "cannot coherently function as a claim"?

Where are the thought police? All I'm seeing is critique, not suppression. — Janus

... Critique regarding what should and should not be philosophically investigated. More precisely, this all started with your stern "critique" of my inquiring into what Socrates/Plato meant by the Form of the Good being beyond being. As in, according to you, this should not be looked into. I take that to be suppression.

"Effing the ineffable" is the job of art and poetry, not rigorous philosophical discussion. — Janus

Though we disagree in some respects, beat me to it in the example he provided to the contrary.

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Well said.

I do not affirm that it is true, but I think it is an accurate description of what the text says. — Fooloso4

What any text says can only be understood via interpretation of the said text; namely, of what was intended by the text's author. Plato's writing is no exception to this.

Is what is beyond being something that is or something that is not? — Fooloso4

As I thought I already made clear, to me what is beyond being is by entailment not being, hence it is not.

As to the example you've given, it is nonsensical to me. Hence my opinion that something might be lost in translation of "being" from that era and language to our own. You have not yet addressed my question of whether "neither X nor not-X" is sensible to you.

I haven't read the entire thread. Since Socrates and Plato are not participating in this discussion perhaps you could provide a quote from the latter which unambiguously states this. — Janus

Plato identifies how the form of the Good allows for the cognizance to understand such difficult concepts as justice. He identifies knowledge and truth as important, but through Socrates (508d–e) says, "good is yet more prized". He then proceeds to explain "although the good is not being" it is "superior to it in rank and power", it is what "provides for knowledge and truth" (508e).[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Form_of_the_Good#Uses_in_The_Republic

BTW, if you tack on questions to me after you've made a post, I might not see them. But maybe you already knew this?

Anything that is beyond human perception and judgement...that is anything purportedly "beyond being" or transcendent...God, rebirth, karma, heaven, hell...need I go on. — Janus

And how are any of the examples you've given "beyond human judgement"? Plenty of people judge these notions all the time. Some favoring these notions and others opposing their validity.

Scientific hypotheses are not arbitrary imaginings but are abductive inferences as to what, consistent with the overall body of canonical human experience and judgement, might be the explanation for this or that observed phenomenon. This is an entirely different kettle of fish to religious dogma or esoterica. — Janus

Many who will uphold religions and essoterica will of course disagree with the dogma that they are "arbitrary imaginings". You seem to have some superior knowledge to the contrary. Care to share?

OK, now you seem to be speaking as though that proscription is a right and good thing. I had thought you were railing against it. So, which is it? — Janus

I'm against any proscription of thought regarding reality. Hope that's blunt enough. The thought-police ought not prevent others from thinking freely as they will. As far as I see things, the ideas which result thereof can then be in part judged by natural selection.

I meant an example of someone being unjustifiably proscriptive as to what others are allowed to think. — Janus

Yea. Any suppression of free thought regarding any existential topic will serve as an example of "unjustifiabley proscriptive". Scary to me to think otherwise. But repressive regimes are not unheard of.

But some do affirm that those who are thought (by themselves and others) to be enlightened are capable of ineffable knowledge. So, I am trying to understand whether you are one of those who affirm such things. The other question, even if you do affirm such a possibility, is whether you think it can be part of philosophical discussion. — Janus

Dude, knowledge of what a sublimely aesthetic experience is felt to be shall often enough be ineffable ... other than by saying something like "the beauty of that there is beyond words".

But that aside, why should attempts at effing the heretofore ineffable be off limits?

But then we may be stretching the term "external" a bit. It would be perhaps more accurate to say, these people's thoughts are hidden from me. — Manuel

That's fine by me. But then when you stipulate "external" what are you saying "external" in reference to?

If there are areas in regard to which humans are necessarily ignorant (which I believe is unarguably true) — Janus

Given an example of such "necessary ignorance" which should remain off limits to investigation?

This is not even remotely similar to the human tendency to simply "make shit up" in the face of the unknown. — Janus

Ha. Scientific hypothesis are "made up shit in the face of the unknown" which can be empirically tested for.

What "proscription of thought, debate and investigation" is going on here in your opinion? — Janus

See my first question. If we are necessarily ignorant of X than there is an implicitly affirmed proscription of thought, debate, and investigation as pertains to X.

Perhaps you could offer an example which is not merely the expression of a different opinion. — Janus

Funny. All I have are opinions of various strengths, some of which pass a threshold beyond which I term these opinions fallible knowledge.

The other point is that once one starts to talk about "ineffable knowledge" one has entered a realm where argument simply cannot go. Do you think that can that be counted as "doing philosophy"? — Janus

Where have I affirmed "ineffable knowledge" in any of this debate?

Did someone say that the Good is beyond being? — Janus

You haven't been following the discussion too closely, then. Yes, Socrates/Plato stated that the Good as Form is beyond being.

I think it ironic how often Socrates' claim of ignorance is ignored. As I read them both Plato and Aristotle are skeptics is the sense of knowing that they do not know. — Fooloso4

Socrates's being aware that he does not hold infallible knowledge of anything whatsoever does not equate to a state of him ignoring that which is the case (this act of either willfully or unwillingly ignoring being the state of ignorance). Quite the opposite. Otherwise one runs into equating wisdom to ignorance - wherein one again deems ignorance to be a virtue.

but when we do not know what we do not know and believe we do know we are no longer even in the realm of opinion but ignorance. — Fooloso4

Here we agree in full.

Were Socrates/Plato to have understood "being" within the linguistic and cultural contexts of their time as consisting of that which comes into being and goes out of being, then the affirmation that the Good is not that just expressed would make sense.

By comparison:

It too is something other than what is and what is not. — Fooloso4

You affirm this conclusion as though it is true, or else as though it is the truth of what Socrates/Plato intended. Yet how is this affirmation not equivalent to the nonsensical statement that a certain given is neither X nor not-X? Or do you find this affirmation in any way sensible?

I wasn't gonna comment, but:

Fools have always sought to fill the 'domains' of necessary human ignorance with their "knowing". — Janus

We seem to either be suffering from an absence of mirrors in which to see our own selves and conducts on this forum or else from a self-righteous arrogance of somehow being beyond foolishness. Or maybe both.

Because science and its paradigms does not seek to accomplish the exact same feat? Or any other field of human knowledge?

The proscription of thought, debate, and investigation on a philosophy forum by some is telling.

How much misery this has caused humanity is incalculable. — Janus

Pales by comparison to the view that ignorance is a virtue.

We can know nothing about whatever might be "beyond being". — Janus

The issue was how does one define, else understand, being - this, specifically, in terms of Plato's affirmations.

The idea is nothing more than the dialectical opposite of 'being'. — Janus

I happen to agree. Hence my contention that there is something lost in translation in saying that "the Good is beyond being". This would entail that the Good is not. Which is contrary to Plato's works.

If we cannot know the good then we cannot know that it is beyond being, or that it is the cause both of things that are and knowledge of them. — Fooloso4

As I previously mentioned via analogy of gravitational singularities, this conclusion is erroneous. Here's another example, Kant knew that he did not known what things-in-themselves are but nevertheless knew that they are, that they are not phenomenal, and that they are a necessary cause for our perceptions of objects. As this again evidences, to not know X does not mean that one does not know of X's occurrence and of at least some of X's properties (by which it can be differentiated from not-X).

My interpretation of 'beyond being' is that it means 'beyond the vicissitudes of existence', 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away'. — Wayfarer

:100: And I'm in agreement with your post in general.

So, we are still left with the issue, what is external? — Manuel

Not an easy issue, but it does revolve around “external to what?” Here’s an outline of my current take on this: Suppose idealism. Fine, but even here my mind will be located within that body of percepts (both extrinsic and intrinsic; with no pun intended) which I immediately know to constitute my physical body to which, for example, this keyboard I’m now typing on is external. But then what if the cosmos is all a dream? Fine, but even here the conscious minds of those who I perceive to inhabit different bodies to my own will hold contents (intentions included) that are foreign, external, relative to my own mind. Here, maybe we all share a foundationally common, universal unconsciousness from which the dream of the cosmos in large part results but our conscious minds will yet be other relative to each other. So, even if there were to be no notion of physicality—though physicality is intrinsic to the objective idealism of CS Peirce, for example—there would yet be other conscious minds external to my own with which I interact. But how can I know that they are in fact conscious? They apprehend what I do and at times react to what I do: this then signifying conscious agency, one apart from and independent of my own. I can at times imperfectly predict as best I can what their contents of mind will consist of, but I cannot know what their contents of mind have, do, or will consist of. These other minds, then, inhabiting what is relative to me the external world, i.e. the world which is external to my own conscious mind.

I know there likely are questions/issues that could be raised of the just stated outline, and I'll be grateful for hearing of them. But if one is in search of infallible certainty, I’m as certain as I can be that such does not occur. For anything and at any time. (This likely being a different issue regarding fallibilism.)

If there is a Form of the Good but we do not know what the Good is, what can we say about it that we know to be true? It is not that it is difficult to know but that if only what is entirely is entirely knowable and the Good is beyond being, beyond what is, then it cannot be known. — Fooloso4

That A cannot know what X is does not imply that A cannot know of X's occurrence and of certain properties by which X is delineated.

By analogy, we know that no one knows what takes place within a gravitational singularity and, hence, of what a gravitational singularity thereby in this sense is. Despite this, we do know via inference that gravitational singularities occur - with one such occurring in the center of the Milky Way - and likewise know of certain properties by which they are delineated (e.g., black hole event horizons that lead toward the black hole's gravitational singularity wherein all notions of spacetime break down). A gravitational singularity of itself is thereby an entirety which is not entirely knowable.

Suppose Socrates/Plato in fact had no inferential knowledge of the Good's occurrence as Form (which is other than having knowledge, of any type, regarding what the Good is as Form). Do you then take all of Socrates/Plato's accounts (dialogues) regarding the Form of the Good to be entirely BS (if not outright deceptions)?

As to the Good being beyond being, while I don't speak Greek, much less Ancient Greek, there seems to be something lost in translation. For example, when appraised via modern English, in claiming that "the Good is beyond space and time" the Good is nevertheless postulated to be (although this not in any manner requiring any type of distance or duration).

This latter aspect, however, might just remain a matter of disagreement. But if you can evidence to the contrary, I'd be interested in the evidence you'd have to present.

I'm not entirely sure what point you're making. — Tom Storm

I’ll give it one last go: We all appraise ourselves as being better than some others in some respect, including that of comprehending something which these others seem hindered in grasping; but this does not entail that we thereby deem these others’ lives as being of lesser worth to our own or else in any way beneath us. This lack of entailment will then likewise apply to those philosophers - previously quoted - who have grasped something which the average man has not; something which is thereby esoteric to the masses. Hence, that a person A deems themselves better than person B in some respect doesn’t then necessitate that A finds themselves to be superior relative to B (such that B is then deemed inferior to A by A). In short, being “better than” does not entail being “superior to”. And we often want others to be better than us - this while likewise wanting that they not put themselves above us. Socrates, for example, was better than the masses in many respects but this does not then mean that Socrates found himself to be superior to the masses. The manner of his attested to death speaks to this. And, in for example addressing the Forms, Socrates had a lot of esoteric knowledge which he did his best to impart: by all appearances, he comprehended things which the average man was hindered in grasping.

So, yes, some philosophers are better than us in knowing things which we do not - things we have a hard time in grasping - but this betterness does not then necessitate they they're pricks which deem us as being beneath them.

Between what is entirely, the beings or Forms, and what is not, is becoming, that is, the visible world. Opinion opines about the visible world. But the good is beyond being. It is the cause of being, the cause of what is. It too is something other than what is and what is not. — Fooloso4

Can you expand on this? It so far seems to me to be contradictory: From my understanding, the Form of the Good is supposedly the most real of all givens that are or could be. As such, irrespective of how difficult the Form of the Good might be to know, the Form of the Good necessarily is and, hence, necessarily holds being (although of course not of a physical kind). This seems to me in part evidenced by your previous statement:

But as any reader off the Republic knows the Forms are presented as the fixed unchanging truth. — Fooloso4

It feels to me as if people in the past had some modicum of honour. It was possible to respect, and even love, those that wanted you dead, because you also wanted them dead, so it was that history pitted us against each other. Or maybe I am romanticising the epics of the past. — Lionino

Hard to say how much truth there is to its scenes of battle, but I greatly liked, and still greatly like, Homer's Iliad on this very count.

↪Fooloso4
I hear you; for a lay person this just sounds like a more academic version of, "I'm better than you because I know secrets". Essentially this:

Philosophers are traditionally and for the most part elitist. They regard mankind as children that they must hide the truth from. — Fooloso4 — Tom Storm

I’ll exaggerate this to make the intended point clearer: Who among us does not presume themselves better than all lesser animals in knowing something that is unknown by leaser animals? Be this something systems of mathematics, conceptual understandings of reality, the capacity to experience sublime beauty in life, or so forth.

Appraising ourselves as being better and worse than others in some respect is, it seems to me, intrinsic to our being.

Now, where the sh*t hits the fan, does one then equate being better than another in respect X to being of greater value than the other addressed?

Speaking for myself, if one can excuse the immodesty, I once risked my wellbeing by aggressively driving away an adult bulldog with no leash in a playground from my at the time puppy which the bulldog wanted to kill. (At hearing the scuffle, the owners came and took the bulldog away and that was that.). But my point being, I didn’t then deem my dog worthless and expendable on account of me knowing maths, holding conceptual understandings of reality, having the capacity to experience beauties, etc., all of which my dog was and could only forever remain fully ignorant of.

Tom, I doubt that you deem your views to be on a par in value to those views you vehemently disagree with and thereby are averse to. Neither do I or anyone else. But this being better than another (here addressing humans) on account of knowing something the other doesn’t does not necessarily entail that one then deems oneself as superior in value as a life relative to the life of those one debates with.

Neither ought this to be the case for a parent relative to their children, nor ought this be the case for a teacher relative to their students, nor ought it to then be the case for one of them elitist philosophers that @Fooloso4 was addressing relative to their audience of folk who don’t yet get what the philosopher supposedly gets.

Of course, what often enough does happen in reality-bites scenarios is not this stated ideal but a sense of authoritarian entitlement, wherein one does then deem themselves superior in value relatively to others who lack those insights which one personally has. This leads to bad parents, bad teachers, and to what I’d then appraise as bad philosophers. Same can also be said of bad scientists, bad leaders, bad doctors, bad presidents, etc. I'll even say bad pet owners, at least when it comes to more intelligent pets.

To sum things up, I damn well want my parents, my teachers, etc., and the philosophers I read to be better than me in terms of what they have, or had, to teach. And they ought to confidently known this before attempting to impart lessons to me. But if any were to think of me as an inferior in terms of the value of my life, they could then stick it where the sun don’t shine as far as I care. And I expect no less from those I interact with on this forum and whose views I at times disagree with.

A maybe messy and touchy topic, but there it is.

Thanks.

Metaphor, however, is not synonymous with esoterica. — 180 Proof

Metaphors we all commonly know, like being "lighthearted" or like having "feelings", will in one sense not be esoteric to us. In other ways, because their precise meaning (which we all typically get intuitively) will be difficult to express in literal manners, this in a philosophically satisfactory manner, they can yet be appraised to hold hidden (and in this sense esoteric) meanings.

Other metaphors - the ouroboros comes to mind as an example - will be esoteric in that we do not feel comfortable that we intuitively grasp what they, as metaphors, intend to convey. Or, as is the case with the ouroborous, at least what they intended to convey in past times when they were quite commonly utilized and portrayed in certain populaces.

That said, sure, metaphor is not equivalent to esoterica. But I do find that the two are entwined.

Metaphorical thinking may sometimes be dismissed at the cost of deeper understanding. Some may see the basics of logic as the most encompassing understanding, but it may lead to its questioning, and what are its limitations? — Jack Cummins

I'll venture to say that those who so dismiss metaphorical thinking can only be hypocrites, for - as per my initial post - they live and breathe in metaphorical thinking just as much as anyone else does. As to basics of logic, these to me strictly consist of the laws of thought, which by their very nature we all abide by whether we like to or not. These same laws will hence apply to metaphorical thinking just as much as they will to literalist thinking.

I get what you're saying, and in many ways I agree. As one example, in the absence of transparency and clarity, many who are unscrupulous will use the very notions of authority which they find others heed toward self-serving and unscrupulous ends. But this will apply as much to religions as it will to the sciences - with politics making use of both. I've too often heard of the label "scientifically proven" employed in circles which have no idea what the empirical scientific method is (being inductive, for one example, science always further evidences but does not ever conclusively prove, although it can conclusively falsify) ... and, as a result, a selling and buying of snake oil ensues. And of course, religion is often used as a facade for gaining advantage over those one dislikes or else deems to be in some way weak, etc.

That said:

The esoteric can on the whole not be tested so how do you propose we demonstrate its efficacy and how do we determine the good from the fallacious? — Tom Storm

The same will apply for a plethora of other things: ranging from the more ubiquitous notions of goodness, and justice, and the aesthetic to far more concrete things such as whether the romantic partner that states they love you in fact so does.

Not finding these many other issues either inconsequential or else somehow unreal, I then don't find this test-based reasoning to be sufficient in justifying a renunciation of the esoteric (in any of its various senses).

Its like saying the world should denounce all fables because on the whole we cannot test their contents and moralities, we cannot demonstrate their efficacy as guides to morality and how life should be best lived, and we cannot determine those that are good in this regard from those that instill fallacious morals and ideas.

Metaphor runs deep in our thinking: from being light-hearted to being on top of, and hence superior to, to having feelings, these not being tactile but instead being emotions one touches upon in one’s own total self rather than actively enacting as a consciousness (e.g., feeling a pang of envy rather than being envious)—a very long list, actually, with many examples not being as easy to express—all these convey a deeper sometimes hidden (esoteric) meaning relative to that which is literally affirmed.

As with the arts, some sometimes find metaphors to be the optimal means of conveying deeper, sometimes hidden (esoteric) truths. This then works well for conveying these truths to others who already are of a common enough mindset in many other respects. But it will backfire whenever others hold different foundational semantics, for the latter will at times drastically misinterpret what was intended to be conveyed.

Then there’s the analytic approach to philosophy. The leading benefit to this method of conveying truths is an improvement in clarity as to what is being addressed. But this comes at the cost of dryness, which serves as a big impediment to conveying what was intended. And, unlike the former method, it also limits what is conveyed to concepts that are already commonly known, making it that much more difficult to convey new ways of understanding or else realities that are not already publicly accepted and acknowledged. Here, then, the metaphors employed will be static in already being common standard, rather than being dynamic and new.

They mythical (and, by extension, much of the religious) can thereby be interpreted as the metaphorical, with Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell coming to mind in this field of study. Hence, as attempting to convey deeper, and at times hidden, truths or else realities.

These are my preliminary thoughts on the matter.

aiming to achieve the absolute emptiness, viz Absolute Nothingness, — Corvus

Again, our semantics are too different for me to engage in meaningful discussions with you on this particular topic. But I will point out that there is a distinction in Buddhism between annihilation (which I would again myself term nonbeing) and Nirvana as absolute bliss (which I would myself term being and, hence, not nothingness).

In annihilation, there is no bliss to be had; in Nirvana, however, this absolute bliss does occur.

For those going in different directions on this question I suspect the OP wasn't in the proper form to begin with as he calls it oxymoronic and contradictory. — Mark Nyquist

Well, to affirm that, "nothingness once was" is a contradiction in terms when nothingness is equated to nonbeing.

The term "was" is the past tense of "to be". Hence, the affirmation then claims that there in the past was a time when "lack-of-any-type-of-being held a type of being". Which can be logically contradictory contingent on semantics: At the same time and in the same respect, both a) nothing is/was (entailed by lack of any type of being) and b) something is/was (entailed by their being or once being a state of nothingness).

The only contention here would be if this is strictly due to our linguistic constraints of speech which do not accurately capture metaphysical possibilities or, else, whether our linguistics accurately conveys a logical contradiction in any such metaphysics.