Alright. Thanks

I suggest listening to part 1 and 2 of the podcast for more background. — schopenhauer1

Since I'm short on time, I'll try to listen to those podcasts if they provide an alternative evolutionary theory for how grammatical language developed - instead of merely being naysayers in respect to universal grammar theory.

Do they provide such an evolutionary theory alternative to how grammatical language developed?

Rather, many biologists think that language occurred drawn out over species, probably starting with Homo erectus, and for social needs, not as a unique, all at once event for internal self-talk or mentalese. — schopenhauer1

OK, to make use of some of that armchair stuff called reasoning, first off, when we address "language" what are we referencing: A) communication or B) a grammatically sensible series of symbols?

Bees have outstanding communication skills, to not yet address the great apes or even monkeys for that matter. (Or else trees, but I'll leave this last one alone.) Communication of course evolved among different species of hominids, most of which died out.

But when it comes to language as grammar-dependent communication, the issue drastically changes. You are, I presume, familiar with the mitochondrial eve notion. In parallel, when it comes to grammatical language, one hominid's beneficial mutation which granted it the capacity for grammar who, as such, was immersed in a population wherein no other was endowed with it just might have held a significant evolutionary advantage. Why can only be best speculation, but it could have included the ability to think in greater abstractions (self-talk as you term it). Still, whatever the reason, this one individual might then have had more mates, leading to reproduction of these genes, leading to an initially small population of grammatical-language speakers, eventually leading to us.

I'm not here trying to make a case for particulars. But, unless the same thing happened multiple times via analogous evolution which later turned into convergent evolution - highly unlikely to say the least - then our current species-wide grammar adaptation is then on a par to how all humans are descendants of some mitochondrial eve. Only that in the former, there was a significant mutation involved (in our brains, of course) which facilitated grammar usage.

Ok, then let me clarify. What I meant by this is that for Chomsky this new feature was not adapted for, but came by accident "all at once". This is him, not me talking, so I am not sure what you want to call that. — schopenhauer1

A mutation (which happened to be beneficial).

He seems to believe the notion that it was basically just a feature of a brain that developed a certain way for various happenstance reasons not related to enhancing that feature (of language use) and out of this change in brain architecture that happened, language appeared on the scene. — schopenhauer1

Of course. There was no grammatical language before grammatical language was. Its a quantum leap of sorts on account of a mutation, one that fits a punctuated equilibrium model of evolution.

See article above for one. — schopenhauer1

Can you help me out in pinpointing it by giving a specific quote from the article.

And I am just holding the empirical tradition to its own need for empiricism. — schopenhauer1

You are aware that nucleic acids, neurons, and brains don't fossilize - much less behaviors. Which leaves us with best inferences when it comes to the evolutionary history of psychological attributes such as human language.

There are some, Chomsky comes to mind, who are both naturalists, but not evolutionists when it comes to language origins. Using simply his powers of incredulity, he supposes language came about in one major exaptation (not adaptation) via a massive rearrangement of brain architecture or some such. — schopenhauer1

This is a somewhat cringe-worthy statement.

The process is called punctuated equilibrium - a well respected theory of evolution which is perfectly capable of accounting for a relatively sudden exaptation of a universal grammar among humans in our evolutionary timeline.

Also, exaptations are adaptations - !?!?! - just that that which is addressed is adaptive due to a secondary function relative to that function it initially had when it first emerged. Wings used for flight are one example of this. But one doesn't claim that this major exaptation is not adaptation.

As to evidence for universal grammar, there's plenty. Pinker's book The Language Instinct, for example, is a work that makes a very good case for it.

According to [Chomsky] of course, he needs no evidence. — schopenhauer1

Interesting. Can you provide some reference that substantiates this otherwise vacuous claim.

I, in the present, still hold 'myself' responsible responsible for a reprehensible thing 'I' did in 1978: but it cannot be made good by the present I, only acknowledged and, perhaps, entered as a debit on a ledger where moral credits are also claimed. — mcdoodle

Speaking in generalized terms, the same applies here. As to regret, in keeping with some of Nietzsche’s writings as I best interpret them, regret that causes dysfunction, any form of paralysis of being, is unhealthy and should be done away with. Having said that, regret still serves an important purpose in the here and now—even if full atonement for the past deed(s) cannot be obtained—in that it plays a rather crucial role in one’s not repeating past mistakes/wrongs in the present and in the future. If there is no regret for X, one will again willfully do X whenever conditions allow. With regret, however, one is often left with (re)paying things forward, so to speak. Although I don’t mean to be preaching to the choir here. But yes, regret is one aspect of psychological being that directly points to the continuation of one’s psyche over time. :up:

That is conveyed in the rather poetic Buddhist term of the 'citta-santana', the mind-stream — Wayfarer

Thanks for the link. :up:

So I guess that, beyond functionality (final cause in Aristotelian terms), spatiotemporal continuity is also important? — Lionino

Aye. If one gets into the mindset outlined, and if, for example, here tersely outlined, one chooses to understand space as distance-between identities and time as a duration-between a) causes produced by identities and b) their effects/consequences—further deeming that space and time when thus understood are logically inseparable—then, spatiotemporal continuity is part and parcel of there being coexistent identities (in the plural). No coexistent identities—as is said of Moksha or of Nirvana without remainder or, in the West, of the notion of “the One”—then, and only then, one would derive there being no spacetime. Here isn’t an issue of which came first or of which is more important but, rather, that coexistent identities logically necessitate spacetime (when understood as just outlined, and not necessarily in a physicalist sense).

Are we gonna die in the next second, or is our conscious experience persisting across time?, is basically what is being asked. — Lionino

Addressing this via analogy to Theseus’s ship, if one for example replaces one plank on the ship, the ship itself continues through time unchanged (it currently seems to me uncontroversial to so stipulate). In parallel, if one as a conscious being experiences a new percept, one as the conscious being addressed will itself continue through time unchanged. My affinities are with process philosophy, so to me it is a continuation of ontic being as regards both the ship and one’s consciousness. This instead of identity consisting of individualized quanta-of-identity that are perpetually obliterated and (re)created over the course of time.

Did you have something else in mind other than the bifurcation of possibilities just specified?

Also, I quite liked your art. The way you use gaps and separation on the canvas is something that I have never seen before. — Lionino

Ah, this gave me a very good blush. Thanks for so saying.

The issue of identifiying something as that which undergoes change is for me a very deep issue that involves, among other things, mereology and semantics.
Because of that, I summon Theseus' ship. I ask you: is it the same ship? — Lionino

In keeping with what a few others have mentioned:

Not that the Ship of Theseus has been satisfactorily resolved by anyone to date, but one way of looking at things in general is that any given’s identity is constituted of context-relative functionality. The ship remains the same ship in terms of context-relative functionality if the parts replaced relate to each other in such manner that the ship’s context-relative functionality is unchanged. I say “context-relative” because two different ships will hold the same functionality as ships, but their functionality will not be the same in terms of their immediate spatiotemporal contexts.

This, however, can get very abstract in the details of analysis.

All the same, as a thought experiment, I find that the sci-fi notion of teleportation operates on the same basis of identity just mentioned, this in fiction. Or, if a person were to lose a finger, for example, they would remain the same person X; but if a person were to so drastically change in terms of context-relative functionality, we will often state that they are not the same person they used to be, as is sometimes the case for extreme cases of dementia. Or else as can be the case when someone claims “he’s been a completely different person since he joined that click”.

This notion of identity seems to me particularly important to any version of a process philosophy wherein everything spatiotemporal, without exception, is in perpetual change. But then, in this interpretation, identity isn’t anchored to material particulars, being instead anchored to, again, a context-relative functionality.

With this perspective in mind, more directly addressing the OP, a person’s identity as a context-relative functionality can then be construed to persist subsequent to corporeal death, such as via reincarnations—granting both extreme outliers and continuity between these, such as in the same person’s life commencing with birth as an infant and possibly ending corporeal life with extreme changes in psyche. And, just as a river rock will be relatively permanent in comparison to the rushing waters that surround it, so too can one appraise that some core aspect of a psyche is relatively permanent in comparison to the percepts, etc., it experiences. This core aspect of psyche (which, for example, could conceivably persist from one lifetime to the next) can then be appraised as "that which undergoes changes". I however will emphasize: this does not then entail that there is such a thing as an absolutely permanent soul which thereby withstands any and all changes for all eternity.

This isn’t an argument I want to spend significant time in here defending. It would be quite a doozy. But it is the outline of a perspective that, notwithstanding the many details that would yet need to be ironed out, currently makes sense to me.

Later in the same post, you went on to clarify the distinction between "strong-like" and "unity of being". This wasn't your attempt at an exhaustive list, and I'm confident there are many more distinct perspectives on love that you could bring up, but even so, you effortlessly brought up so many.

Isn't that true? It's confusing to be asked whether love is "an abstraction...", you should know that there's more than just one. Explain your thoughts on this. — Judaka

As relates to the English term "love", I so far maintain that it can only bifurcate into "unity of being" of various types and into "strong-liking-of", which again can come in various types. Both seem to me to belong to the umbrella concept - itself an abstraction - of "affinity" but that, whereas "love" can be a verb, "affinity" cannot - to my mind partly explaining why love can in English be used in both senses.

As to more than just one type of unity of being, yes, of course. Greek comes in handy in distinguishing philia, from storge, from eros, from pure agape, for example. But all these different types of unity of being shall yet be a unity of being. Else expressed, all specific types of love (in the sense of a unity of being) shall yet be love (a unity of being). This just as there are many different types of animal but, from fish, to birds, to amphibians, etc., all are yet animals (here, at least, going by the science-grounded definition of "animal" ... a little more on this below).

Certainly love, be it understood as a unity or being or more broadly as affinity (wherein strong liking can be incorporated), is globally distinct from envy, for example, to not once again express the attribute of malice. As such, all variations of love will share a commonality.

To my mind, it is this commonality which the question of "what is love" seeks to better explore.

You've agreed with me that ethics plays a role. This alone destroys any chance for love having consistent properties. Think about it, how can ethics influence our interpretation of an intensely personal feeling? The same feeling could exist in two scenarios, classified as love in one, and not the other, because of how we interpret what makes a relationship toxic or unhealthy. Are these the properties you're referring to? — Judaka

I myself don't situate thing in terms of ethics playing a role in love, but of love playing an integral role in ethics. I'm coming from the vantage that love, unity of being, is ethical - in so far as being good, if not what's sometimes been termed "the Good" (neo-Platonic notions of "the One" for example come to mind, wherein the One is a literally absolute, hence complete, and perfected unity of being). It is then our all too human deviations from love - such as the inclination toward possessiveness in romantic love, or of domination in parental love (to list just two among innumerable examples of how love can go wrong, which will also include the opposite of holding laissez faire attitudes in either type of relationship just mentioned) - which leads to the unethical, i.e. to that which is bad. The more we deviate from the ideal of love should be, the worse, and so more bad, the situation becomes, despite the feelings held. And it is in this latter case alone that institutionalized ethics, morality, then influences our interpretation of intensely personal feelings. But I grant that this plays into an ontological interpretation of love which doesn't fit that of it strictly being a biologically evolved set of emotions or feelings. And it might be this which we at base actually disagree on (?).

If there's even a single truth condition that's dependant upon interpretation then the properties you refer to include factors that differ by person. — Judaka

I so far find the same can be said of consciousness, for example. Yet I'm not one to entertain thoughts that one's person's consciousness is another person's cauliflower. :wink: More soberly, I do maintain that something which the term "consciousness" tacitly references is universally shared by all conscious beings, regardless of culture and so forth, and this despite what it exactly is not yet being adequately defined.

The parable of different blind men interpreting what an elephant is based on their strictly localized experiences of its body comes to mind. One will define it by its trunk's properties. Another by its tail's. But the elephant remains and elephant all the same. Same I think can be said of consciousness, as well as of love.

That's what gives a term like "animal" its universal attributes, they're universal because they do not differ by person. Each organism that qualifies to be an animal must have these properties. — Judaka

When it comes to the term's scientific definition, yes. But in everyday life most certainly not, and here the scientific interpretation is just one variant among many. Most will maintain that a coral, for example, is not an animal. And many adamantly hold that humans are not, this on the opposite side of the spectrum. To give just two examples of how "animal" doesn't hold universal attributes as abstraction among all people that utilize the term. (Even the typical scientist won't like it much if termed an animal by some other.) But yet when looked at more impartially, what an animal is can be pinpointed with relative stability, this as biology does. Of course, a main difficulty here is that love, unity of being, is not biological in any empirical sense but psychological and intangible. This, though, I argue does not make love either unreal or else unimportant (immaterial in this sense). As to its common property, I tried to already speak to this; namely, all forms of love will be a unity of being, differing in the specifics of between whom.

All this not so much in attempts to convince but more in keeping with sharing perspectives.



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I think you just present a false dichotomy or odd straw man. — schopenhauer1

I don’t. Although I don’t want to here get into a debate on how deontology’s sole justification is consequentialist in nature, consequentialism, which includes eudemonism, certainly enters the picture. And the perspective addressed is not that of some abstract notion of “harm to anyone”. As one example of how this dictum is often ill-fit, sustaining equality of rights FORCES direct harm onto tyrants—but this doesn’t justify a morality in which tyrants are given the freedom to tyrannize.

The perspective is simply that of an individual subject’s reason for choosing between future acts of malice and future acts of love—this when both are deemed to hold the same bad consequence of suffering for the individual subject in question.

But I get the impression that we’re on very different wavelengths here. Pity in a way, since I believe that the topic of love and suffering is rich with nuances and, indeed, with exceptions—thereby justifying the prescription of love over malice. But so be it then.

For about two days now you’ve touched upon just about anything and everything but the core issue I’ve raised in every post I’ve made to you.

I’ll try one last time, but, if you again evade the issue and don't provide an answer, I’ll then be convinced you’re doing it intentionally on account of not having a rational answer to give:

• If suffering is to be deemed bad, and if all endeavors inevitably lead to suffering regardless of their quality, effort, and means—as Schopenhauer and you maintain—then on what grounds are love-antagonistic endeavors, such as that of becoming a mass murderer, to be proscribed in favor of love-cherishing endeavors, for both endeavors will share the exact same attribute of resulting in suffering, making the first category of endeavors just as preferable as the second.

(To spell things out a little clearer, what I’ve been repeatedly asking you is a morality question of how any ethical ought can be obtained given the premises you uphold. And yes, most will in simplistic terms maintain that love (be it pure agape or else agape-endowed storge, philia, or eros) in general is a good, whereas malice in general is a bad. But, again, why should this generalization be upheld when both necessarily result in the same bad outcome? It’s a simple enough question regarding reasoning.)

Do you disagree that love is an abstraction abstracted from, ultimately, concrete particulars?

If it is, then as abstraction it will hold its own properties which equally apply to all subspecies of love, each its own abstraction, which in turn will each hold properties applicable to, ultimately, concrete particulars.

Via analogy, animal is an abstraction of, for example, mammals, reptiles, invertebrates, etc., with each such subspecies of abstraction ultimately being abstracted from concrete particulars. As such, the abstraction of animal will hold properties applicable to all subspecies of abstraction and, ultimately, all concrete particulars it is an abstraction of. And an animal is utterly distinct from a plant, or fungus, etc.

Love, then, would be endowed with a fixed set of universal attributes relative to what it is an abstraction of in like manner to how animal, for example, is so endowed.

No I agree with you. That doesn't negate that it causes suffering nonetheless. I never said "thus we don't need eros". Rather, it is part of being alive as a human. Even ignoring, downplaying, or eradicating love from one's life (or attempts thereof), is having to deal with love, but in the "negative" sense of negating it. One is still contending with it on sociological and personal level. — schopenhauer1

I’ll try to simplify my perspective: granting that suffering is unwanted by the sufferer(s), if all paths in life end up being “just another avenue toward suffering” then: 1) that some path is just another avenue toward suffering makes no difference whatsoever in respect to the path’s worth in comparison to any other path and 2) the intent to minimize suffering in oneself and in others would then become warrantless, for this too would then in itself be just another avenue toward suffering.

This digs its heels into a much broader issue than that of love. To me something is very wrong with this outlined reasoning. (The only out that I so far see is if some paths in life were to lead to liberation from suffering in principle—at the very least to a far better extent relative to other paths. This as in the overly simplified affirmation that "only love can conquer hate", wherein love is deemed to be such a path toward liberation from suffering. But this is something I so far presume you disagree with.)

This stipulated wrongness however, whatever it might be agreed to be, then directly applies to the affirmation that love (even if strictly understood as eros) is just another avenue toward suffering. It’s then a difference that makes no difference whatsoever. But underlying this is the far broader issue just mentioned.

All this being relevant to the issue I initially raised, which I summed up in my last post as that of:

why one should prefer an unloving life to a loving one (or else a loving life over an unloving one) - irrespective of the type of love addressed. — javra

:up: — schopenhauer1

Well, OK, thanks, but it doesn't answer why one should prefer an unloving life to a loving one (or else a loving life over an unloving one) - irrespective of the type of love addressed. I deem this to be a rather important question. But maybe its just me.

The distinction between agape and eros is all fine and well. But it doesn’t satisfy the issues posed.

First off, while agape can certainly be had in the absence of eros, eros devoid of any form of agape … well, many adjectives can be used, but I’ll keep to the point and say is dehumanizing, or else dehumanized. Rape as a good example of this. It’s never been my thing so I’ve never personally partook, but from what I’ve gathered from others and from reading, even threesomes and orgies – from ancient to modern - typically contain some form of agape, however minuscule – as in compassion for the other’s being (such as via respect for the other’s limits of comfort despite maybe depriving one of fully satisfying one’s own cravings) – if they’re not to be dehumanizing at best, violent rape-fests at worst. Ditto for some presence of agape in masochism (if one actually studies one’s fair share of anthropology and doesn’t go by pre-judged cultural stereotypes).

An interesting issue, actually: When one mentions “eros” does one strictly mean “sexual gratification”, so that one construes rape to be a form of eros? Something about this to me is utterly wrong – so that eros necessarily implies some measure of agape. But maybe others disagree?

But then the same to me applies to philia and to storge: devoid of any agape whatsoever they become meaningless. Then again, agape is itself fairly hard to define.

At any rate, in reference to my previous post, love as agape (say, one devoid of eros, of philia, and of storge) can and does most often incur the very real risk of suffering on account of the agape held. Minimally in the form of disappointment. If, for example, one holds agape for humanity, and humanity behaves like a bunch of shortsighted lemmings about to drown themselves in the ocean (say, for example, by ever-accelerating climate change), one will experience dire disappointment on account of the agape held. Which would never have been in this agape’s absence. Not to even mention the possibility that one such fellow human might commit violently unjust crimes against the agapeist in question, or something to the like.

Furthermore, agape too has its often felt ideal it pursues, one that many of us will proudly gripe and whine about being an unrealistic future only idiots believe in. (As though this is what children should be somehow taught by us jaded adults so as to live more ethical and upright lives. Apropos, sarcasm 101, if it needs to be translated.)

Agape, as with eros, will far more often than not lead to suffering. Exceptions occur in both cases, yes, but it is not the norm.

So then what makes pure agape a more preferable love to maintain and pursue than an agape-consisting eros? For, in the first place, both can equally be almost guaranteed to result in suffering on account of being held or pursued and, in the second place, as the individual persons we all are, most of us stand a far greater chance of gaining more eudemonia from a sustained, agape-consisting eros than via an agape alone. The ideal romantic relationship in the extended moment is persists – this, for some, being well over 50 years of loving marriage (with personal relatives as examples, if nothing else) – can enrich one’s life with both warmth and wisdom gained from the other’s perspectives far more than can a universalized compassion for mankind, for example.

There’s no reason why one can’t have both; Noam Chomsky as one well enough known example of this. But if one is to draw a line in the sand between agape and eros, why should the likely suffering to be incurred by the former be prescribed while that to be incurred by the other be proscribed? After all, both can be addressed by your previous affirmation of being “just another avenue toward suffering.”

(And, for the anti-natalists out there, the bringing forth of offspring is not essential to the occurrence of a romantic relationship: the latter can well be held just fine without the former.)

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BTW, since you were getting into a little bit of anthropology, just wanted to mention as an aside that polyandry has also been known to occur in addition to polygyny. Irrespective of polygamy type, though, compassion and the like are inextricable from such sexual relationships if they are to be in any way happy for those involved. (Most polygamies in our history as humans don’t revolve around kings or emperors. If this needs to be said in general.)

My main idea is that "love" (similar to Schopenhauer's view) is just another avenue for suffering. — schopenhauer1

And since suffering is implicitly deemed bad, the only logical conclusion that I so far find to this affirmation of supposed fact is that love in all its variations is a bad thing to maintain or pursue.

The ethical ramifications of this logical deduction from your given premise being what exactly? That Hitler and Stalin are good guys on account of their unlovingness but the Dalai Lama and Mother Teresa are bad? So it's said, both camps suffer/ed in life (the present Dalai Lama still kicking it), but in utterly different ways and for utterly different reasons.

In short, given the premise you've affirmed, what then makes an unloving life preferable to a loving one?

Darwin saw a parallel, with "Selection" by human minds, in the workings of Nature. Both are Natural in the sense of A> a teleological act by a physical organism, and B> a mathematical computation of inputs & outputs. — Gnomon

In his "On the Origin of Species", I don't recall Darwin mentioning natural selection to necessarily incorporate "a teleological act by a physical organism", or by any other type of psyche whatsoever for that matter (this being strictly limited to artificial, rather than natural, selection). One can find arguments such as this paper presents that Darwin was in fact utilizing teleology (one can simply read the article's abstract and conclusion for the general idea), but Darwin was by no means one to believe in a global-watchmaker-god sort of mindset as concerns any of the teleological processes involved in natural selection. Nor does he anywhere mention anything close to "a mathematical computation of inputs & outputs" - Malthusianism is certainly not that, for example. To the extent that I find the quote above rather jarring.

I would be interested in an update, that attempts to explain Natural Selection on a cosmic scale. — Gnomon

Yes, so would I. My own criteria for accepting any novel idea in this regard to me seems rather simple: does it manage to ontologically explain how life and its biological evolution evolved from nonlife and its here assumed cosmic evolution - this rather than merely supposing that it somehow did. If yes, then I'll bite.

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ps. "On the Origin of Species" is a very worthwhile read. And one can arguably find heavier leaning on teleological reasoning - i.e., explanations in terms of ends, or objectives, etc. - in his third book "The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals", which to me is an essential read for the field of psychology (and this coming from a present non-physicalist).

Apropos, what would your take then be regarding this generalized proposition: every "ought" translates into "an optimal means" of actualizing some future "is" (i.e., some conceived of future state of being that can in the future become reality) which is desired.

Of course this in part leads into the question of "desired by whom"; still, as a statement of fact all the same, do you find reason to object to this just offered proposition being true?

Okay, so we have propositions about what will be that can be true or false. But that isn't the same thing as saying that future states of being or of the universe are false, and a relevant telos is a goal with what I would presume to be a state of being as its end - something that I now grant can be false when referenced against what is actually possible - even if fictitious, and not to make a proposition true. But I get what you are saying now. — ToothyMaw

Awesome. It's good to know. Thanks.

I could go on but to summarise, without specificity, we're wandering aimlessly. That's completely unlike "animal", and especially the "grey rat". Grey rats aren't fundamentally changed by context or circumstance, nor who is speaking and how they interpret the term. — Judaka

Although @Count Timothy von Icarus already addressed this, I wanted to also point out that "grey" and "rat" (I did say mouse, though) are both abstractions as well: grey comes in many different shades; rats (or mice) come in many different sizes, shapes, hews, personalities, etc.; so both terms convey abstractions; abstractions the most definitely can change by context, circumstance, speaker, and interpreter. To that effect, as far as I can discern, all of our linguistic thought - i.e., all which can be conveyed via language - is strictly composed of abstractions, be they of things, processes, or otherwise. Concrete particulars are only what we immediately experience, like our perception of "that grey mouse over there", but then, in the nitty gritty, even such immediate perceptions are in part there due to pre-established abstractions which we already hold that, furthermore, at least hold the potential to perpetually evolve given novel experiences. Its a very complex topic to me. And, to me at least, language only strongly accelerates but is not foundational to such abstract cognition; otherwise no lesser animal could, for example, discern such things as "prey" from "predator", language-less though they are. And all this without introducing the concept of universals.

But this sure seems to deviate from the thread's intent.

This is why the God of Plato and the Patristics "all loving," as opposed to being indifferent, jealous, or wrathful. Hatred involves being determined by that which is outside of one: — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up: Nicely said. Although I'll be currently shying away from embellishing this on account of it getting into non-physicalist ontological notions of "unity of being"--of which the sensations of love which we emotively feel, both the pleasures and tribulations, could be deemed a microcosmic expression of a macrocosmic force, or impetus, as universal as that of gravity. The topic of Stoic/Heraclitean Logos partly comes to mind here. But no doubt its one of them out-in-the-left-field notions that's bound to get easily misconstrued. So, having said my peace on this issue, I'm shushing up about this possible vantage of love/unity-of-being. :razz: Back to the issue of love as we experience it.

Lots of questions and issues. Thank you for them. In my defense, I did mention that the post would likely be wanting of sufficient justification and only a rough outline, or something to the like, this in my post’s opening sentence. Also, it’s not intended to be about morals, which are prescriptive, but about meta-ethics, which is purely descriptive.

I'm sorry, what? How can a state of being, even unrealizable and future, be false? — ToothyMaw

I’ll for now only try address this issue of truth and falsity as these pertain to teloi, aka, aims/goals/ends one pursues in hopes of fulfilling said aim/goal/end as a future reality.

Any proposition regarding future states of affairs can either evidence itself “conformant to the reality of what will be” and thereby true/right/correct or, otherwise, “to lack conformity to the reality of what will be” and thereby be false/wrong/incorrect. For instance, the proposition that “the sun will rise again tomorrow” can either be true or false, as will be evidenced in the span of the subsequent 24 hours.

If this is generally agreed upon, then: teloi are not propositions (at least not normally) but will nevertheless hold the same general property: either they can be accomplished, as one consciously or unconsciously believes they can when they are actively held, or they cant. Take a hypothetical madman who aims to jump so high as to land on the moon and who proceeds to so jump on account of this goal being actively held. We’d label him a madman because we know that this goal he momentarily holds is unrealizable in principle, and believe that a sane person should know better than to hold such an aim. The stated aim here does not conform to the reality of what can be. It is a false hope, so to speak. And, in so being, it is then a fully fictitious, and hence false, presentation of what will be given the invested effort and means.

Regardless of aim—from that of scratching one’s nose to that of interstellar travel, etc.—the aim could either be realizable in principle or, else, it might not be. Any unrealizable aim will then be pure fantasy concocted by our imagination, devoid of any reality in terms of being an end that is actualizable given the invested effort and means. In this sense alone, the unrealizable aim/goal/telos will then be false, deceptive, for although one aims X one will never obtain X even in principle. However, if the aim toward X conforms to the reality or fact of X’s obtainment upon given effort and means, then it will be true that X can be obtained given the required effort and means: making the telos/aim/goal true in this sense alone.

What I was saying, however, goes beyond this. But on seeing the many complexities and misunderstandings you find in what I previously wrote, I’ll leave all that for some other time. All the same, let me know what you think of what I've just written if you disagree. But again, there are more valid senses to truth and falsity than those that strictly apply to propositions.

Does God qualify for "interpersonal" love? — Judaka

Under the conviction that God = Love, interpersonal love will be one aspect of God. Else, of being closer to God than otherwise.

What do you mean by imbalanced and unharmonious? On what basis does this love "typically result in psychological pain..."? — Judaka

Though more complex than this, it boils down to being in a toxic relationship, be it romantic, filial, or any other, wherein on loves the other. As to the second question: On the basis that at least one party gets abused and/or betrayed in some manner.

There are many cultures around the around that don't practice monogamy, that have arranged marriages, that are patriarchal and practice other forms of imbalanced or unharmonious relationships. Opposition to such structures is generally ethical in nature, as opposed to spurred on by a philosophical view of love. Ethical stances should be the best predictors of how one views this subject of imbalanced love. Do you agree? — Judaka

Regardless of relationship (arranged, polygamous, etc.) it could be toxic for those involved to those involved, or it could not be.

Also, in one way or another, I also find (nontoxic) love to be inextricable from issues of ethics. Compassion, for example, is one form of love (unity of being). What would ethics amount to in the absence of compassion?

I for one fully agree with (authentic) love being a drive to maintain and increase unity of being, a "transcendent unity" so to speak. — javra


Another linguistic issue. Do you appreciate that you're the one who judges the love that qualifies as authentic? Your reasoning separates authentic love from inauthentic love, because your reasoning determines authentic love from inauthentic love.

It's understandable one might resist admitting the importance of ethical or value-based elements, but the correlations will always be striking. Those who despise homosexuality won't recognise love between same-sex couples as "authentic". Those who despise pedophilia won't recognise romantic love between adult and child as "authentic". We probably wouldn't describe love borne from Stockholm syndrome as "authentic". Most won't want to label either a very jealous, toxic love or a possessive, controlling love as "authentic".

What's your opinion on this? — Judaka

You're here focusing on a sense of "authentic" unrelated to the one I made use of in this context: love as unity of being as being authentic love, with strong-liking being inauthentic love.

Unity of being occurs in homosexual marriages/relationships irrespective of whether others approve. Pedophilia, to me, is sexual in nature, and there need not be any sense of unity of being for sex to occur, as is evidenced in rape. If there were a unity of being between adult and child that would be romantic in some sense, I can only imagine the adult would want better for the child than that the child engages in sex, especially with an adult. As to Stockholm syndrome, it might be twisted, but if it were to result in a unity of being between the abductor and abducted, then it would be a unity of being. Ethical judgement calls on this being a different matter, typically revolving around the toxicity involved.

Lastly, a very jealous, toxic love or a possessive, controlling love most always does not have both parties valuing the other's worth on a par to one's own, this as more or less occurs in a unity of being between parties. Otherwise there would be enough respect for the other to not engage in such toxic/controlling love wherein the other suffers (incurs psychological pain), but instead always granting the freedom of the other. So no, here the love would not be a balanced/nontoxic unity of being.

my argument that "love" is a concept we invented, not a thing to be understood or discovered. — Judaka

It's an assertion more than an argument. One on par to asserting that "pain" is a concept we invented, but not an aspect of our reality as psyches to be understood or discovered. As though everything psychological concerns concepts we invent rather than aspects of our own ontological being we discern introspectively (?).

However, in terms of my own personal feelings about love, and I'm no exception, I also define what is and isn't love by my values and ethics, I strongly agree with you. Love, for me, in the contexts I imagine you to be using, entails this kind of prioritisation and importance you describe. This is completely different from the "strong-like" one has towards something like ice cream. — Judaka

On what rational argument or via what data do you find reason to doubt that this rudimentary distinction between unity of being and strong liking is a human universal?

I reject the entire question of "What is love", and view it as a misunderstanding of language. — Judaka

I get that. But if "words are not concepts" then words will convey concepts, and concepts are nothing more then abstractions (e.g.,"animal") of concrete givens (e.g., "that grey mouse over there"), with concrete givens including the states of being we experience as psyches.

So, in English (not to forget that different languages occur, both at the present time and in the past) the word "love" can either convey different types of "unity of being" or, otherwise, types of "strong liking". But I maintain that just as one is not sincere in the literal stance that an ice-cream cone is "to die for", so too will one not be sincere in the literal stance that one "loves" the ice-cream cone. It's right up there with food being "fun" to eat. This despite all three expressions being used commonly enough in our society to express concepts nonetheless.

I'm here not analyzing words but two different subspecies of states of personal being which in English are expressible by the same word.

Lots written. But in sum: We so far seem to basically agree on the difference between unity-of-being and strong-liking-of. I don't much want to engage in a debate regarding the nature of language. Again, I basically intended to make the case that the two sense of the word "love" are distinct. And that when we love another, we typically hold a unity of being with them, rather than a strong liking of them (although of course the latter can overlap with the former, the two nevertheless remain distinct states of psychological being).

There are no worthwhile goals. — unenlightened

Damn, this so far feels like some really melancholically pessimistic stuff. Maybe it’s not. Maybe you’ve obtained a state of being devoid of both needs and wants. In which case, bravo and keep it up. Still, in my experience, day to day wants such as that alleviating thirst, or hunger, or an itch, or of getting sufficient sleep sure amount to worthwhile aims when held for good reason, and generally pleasure-producing when the goals are not obstructed.

Here’s two poems for you, whose vibe I generally hold only in the best of times, but they seem a worthwhile state of mind to express all the same:

-----

A SAIL

White is the sail and lonely
On the misty infinite blue;
Flying from what in the homeland?
Seeking for what in the new?

The waves romp, and the winds whistle,
And the mast leans and creaks;
Alas! He flies not from fortune,
And no good fortune he seeks.

Beneath him the stream, luminous, azure,
Above him the sun’s golden breast;
But he, a rebel, invites the storms,
As though in the storms were rest.

(by Mikhail Lermontov; translated by Max Eastman (I like this translation but can’t find it online))

-----

“Let me live out my years in heat of blood!
Let me lie drunken with the dreamer’s wine!
Let me not see this soul-house built of mud
Go toppling to the dust a vacant shrine!”

(by Jack London, from the opening of his book, Martin Eden)

-----

Potentially noble and thereby worthwhile goals, I say. At least, if one’s into this kind of thing.

My point was that an eye for an eye response to life is inconsistent with Jewish thought regardless of ratio — Hanover

Reading this charitably, I already knew that. "Do not commit undue harm" to me seems more in keeping with the Jewish thought I've been primarily exposed to. But this does not nullify the validity of heuristic I've previously expressed.

as if to imply an [the current] Israeli response is inconsistent with Jewish morality — Hanover

I, personally, uphold this to be true. See, for example, the aforementioned.

I've perused the link offered. Why should I take this interpretation of monetary compensation as authoritative?

After all, given what I've gathered in my life, the dictum, though metaphorical, makes plenty of sense at multiple levels of interpretation: generally, when someone does you unwarranted wrong retribution should be in like measure (even if in a different form), but going beyond this leads to you then doing unwarranted wrong against your opponent (as in, fully blinding him when he did not do that to you) ... and thereby leads into a downward spiral of wrongdoing, since your opponent is the justified in seeking retribution against you.

More mathematically speaking, this very strategy has been evidenced to be the optimal means of assuring reciprocal altruism. As a brief synopsis:

Game theory

Tit-for-tat has been very successfully used as a strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The strategy was first introduced by Anatol Rapoport in Robert Axelrod's two tournaments,[2] held around 1980. Notably, it was (on both occasions) both the simplest strategy and the most successful in direct competition.

An agent using this strategy will first cooperate, then subsequently replicate an opponent's previous action. If the opponent previously was cooperative, the agent is cooperative. If not, the agent is not. This is similar to reciprocal altruism in biology. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tit_for_tat

I can expand on this at some later time, but I'm still interested in an answer to my initial question.

I see a lot of materialism consuming, polluting, and destroying. I don't see a lot of "materialist conservation." I do see a lot of spiritually motivated conservation efforts, people who are aware of the significance of the health of natural systems in a cosmic sense. — Pantagruel

I’m in overall agreement here. Indigenous peoples the world over, all of which are spiritual, come to mind as frontliners against the destruction of the ecosystem (of "Mother Earth"); with many of them having been unrighteously (if that needs to be said) terrorized and assassinated for their convictions and generally peaceful actions. Materialists the world over not so much, by general comparison of populaces at least.

Wanted to add: as per Buddhism, for one example, there is no need for an absolute creator deity belief to uphold that corporeal death is not the end of the road.

Secondly, any belief system which deems one “saved/liberated/freed” from all suffering after corporeal death—fully including i) conviction that death is a transcendence into absolute nonbeing and ii) conviction that death results in an instantaneous beam-me-up into a suffering-devoid eternal Heaven—will generally give no rational warrant to be moral/ethical, this despite many such people persisting to be moral/ethical. The typical atheist might yet feel a kinship to life, or at least one’s own species, in general (I know I used to, at least, back when I was a materialist). The typical theist might yet deem deeds to surpass faith as that which determines one’s Abrahamic abode after corporeal death. Yet, those who mass murder their own families and then commit suicide, for example, only do so due to the belief that death is a cessation of being (to not address those atheists who hoard wealth via offshore means at expense of the general community’s wellbeing, etc.)—activities which become logically rational given the end addressed. Likewise, those who deem themselves necessarily saved strictly on account of holding unwarranted convictions regardless of how they act couldn’t give a damn about stewardship of the plant (etc.) for humanity at large.

This to illustrate that it isn’t so much about what you’ve specified as Transcendentalists but about not having an absolute conviction that corporeal death is an end to all conceivable suffering (something that can apply to theists just as much as to atheists).

Your literalist, four corners reading isn't consistent with how those who actually use that document for moral guidance interpret that passage of Leviticus. — Hanover

So how ought it to be properly interpreted? You take out one of my eyes and I take out both of yours, kind of thing? Or something else?

But an eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth could be freely and even positively interpreted to not retaliate in kind. — Vaskane

:100:

As a slight interlude: The ethical dictum of "an eye for an eye" strictly upholds a 1:1 ratio of retribution as moral. So both a 100:1 or a 10:1 ratio would be misaligned to it, and thereby immoral.

Just wanted to say it.

I think that you as well as I are certain people should not be harmed, and that also explanations do have to end somewhere. I just like to discuss meta ethics as it is really interesting to me. — ToothyMaw

This will likely to be very incomplete reasoning, but I’ll give outlining my current idea of metaethics a best shot:

First, consider that all ethics results first and foremost from what one oneself wants to obtain in the future given a) that one as agent is compelled in an ontologically fixed manner to optimally minimize one’s own present and future suffering (a premise which I grant can get very complex when looked at in detail) and b) that one is not alone in the cosmos as an agent described by (a) but that, instead, all coexistent agents in the cosmos are likewise described by (a).

Any conceivable end, or telos, that satisfies (a) given (b) will then be that which is good for oneself. One can of course envision more than one such possible future state of being. Yet some such envisioned future states of being will be unrealizable and, thereby, false. Pursuit of such a false state of future being will not minimize one’s own suffering but intensify it, thereby being a wrong notion of what is good. To pursue such false ultimate telos would then be to do what is wrong, or else bad, for oneself.

Here tersely outlined, (a) given (b) is first off taken to be an objective fact. Addressing just this part, one then gets into the riddle of how no matter what one does one can only be in pursuit of the good. Next addressing that telos which, ideally, perfectly satisfies (a) given (b), one can again likely obtain more than one conception of what it might be. Given that these alternatives will be mutually exclusive, were any one alternative to in fact be fulfillable as a telos/goal in principle, it would then be the objectively true good, with all other alternatives then necessarily being objectively false, hence wrong, hence bad goals to pursue. Here, then, some things one could do to satisfy (a) given (b) will be objectively good (for they approach the objectively true telos just specified) and others will be objectively bad (for they approach objectively bad teloi at expense of the objectively good telos). Furthermore, because of (b), that which is the objectively good end to pursue for yourself will then likewise be the objectively good ends to pursue for all others.

Indulge for the moment that the dictum of “liberty, equality, and fraternity for all” serves as a steppingstone toward one conception of what this objectively good, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 1”

Also indulge for the moment that, as an alternative to this trajectory, the dictum of “It’s good to be the absolute ruler over everyone and everything other” serves as a steppingstone toward another conception of what the objectively true, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 2”.

The two will be mutually exclusive and thereby contradictory: one cannot gravitate toward both at the same time and in the same way. One will be objectively good and the other thereby objectively bad. If one were to figure out which of the two just mentioned teloi is the true objective good, one then would furthermore figure out an existentially fixed (though non-physicalist) “is” via which “oughts” can be established.

Next, take the ought that “people should not be unduly harmed”.

Were telos 1 to be objectively true—hence, an existentially fixed telos that is actualizable in principle and that awaits to be fulfilled—then it would substantiate the just addressed dictum rationally, thereby making the proposition that “people should not be unduly harmed” an objectively good ideal/goal/telos to pursue, for it as such satisfies closer proximity to telos 1. However, were telos 2 to be objectively true, then “people should not be unduly harmed” would be unproductive to bringing oneself into closer proximity to telos 2—thereby signifying that this ought is an inappropriate and thereby bad ideal/goal/telos to pursue.

At core issue would be, not so much what most people deem to be good or bad (hence, current normality) but, instead, which ultimate telos specified is actualizable in principle and which is not. The former will be the right telos to pursue—what some in history have termed “the Good”—and the latter will be the wrong telos to pursue.

All this as an exceedingly terse outline of how I so far approach the issue of metaethics. And, of course, none of this makes any sense in a world wherein no teleological processes (and, hence, wherein no teloi) occur.

And, as a reminder, metaethics isn’t about prescription but about description. If telos 1 were true, it would justify the given ought. If telos 2 were true, it would not justify the given ought. The issue, again, is which conceived of ultimate telos is true and thereby conforms to what in fact is.

While I respect the overall sentiment of your post, I disagree in war never being an act of self-defense.

One could address the issue via individuals or via groups of such. War, or course, consists of the latter. But since addressing individuals is far more simplistic:

If person A is walking home and person B assaults and batters person A, person A can either do nothing and potentially end up dead or could defend themselves for as long as person B persists their aggressions. This, I believe, would be a just use of aggression on the part of person A. What would be an unjust use of aggression would be for person A to then assault person B beyond what is needed for person B to stop their unprovoked violence. (To not here also address person A's aggression toward non-aggressors as being unjust.)

Same, I so far believe, can be said for groups of people - where the term "war" can become appropriate. If group B assaults and batters group A, then group A is justified in using aggression in the same manner as person A is, and this to the same limitations: no more aggression than is required to desist group B's aggression, and no willful aggression toward non-aggressors.

Would you disagree with the examples just given?

In term of tribalism/patriotism there is a vague case here maybe. Vague though. — I like sushi

Short of immorality in willfully killing innocents, can you spell out the "vague case" here. I'm so far having a hard time understanding it.

You have 2 competing rules:

1. You have the right to defend yourself.
2. You are forbidden to kill the innocent.

Your question is what happens when the killing of the innocent is required to defend yourself, which is often the case in war. — Hanover

Required? The "Fog of War" syndrome is working overtime here. Mistaking an innocent for an aggressor is one thing in war, but one being required to kill non-aggressors so as to defend oneself from aggressors is incredibly topsy-turvy reasoning.

Person A holds an innocent child in front while holding a loaded gun at person B. Person B is not thereby required to shoot the child. Person B has options; the more forethought, the more options available given the particular context. And if person B were to have no other option while being an upright individual, person B's then murdering of the child (the newspeak Orwellian language of "collateral damage") so as to save their own life would weigh heavy on person B's conscience. For why ought person B judge their own life more valuable than that of the child's?

[...] self-preservation is of the highest priority, meaning you have the right to kill the innocent to save yourself, meaning I prioritize #1 over #2 when there is a conflict.

[...] The concept of self defense being a duty (not just a right) also has roots in secular Western philosophy, meaning pacifism for the sake of protecting the innocent among your enemy is itself immoral. — Hanover

So what, then, makes it immoral for one or more of those innocents you speak of to hold the same exact views toward their assailants (e.g., in regard to their assailants’ innocent loved ones) in the name of “self-defense”, and to then act accordingly in return?

Very much appreciate the Nietzsche quotes. Its been a very long time since I read him with zeal, and I've forgotten much of the details, but reading these aphorisms is heartwarming to me.

To me, love seems to be about wanting the best for a person, but also a sharing in that goodness through a transcendent union. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Love is just a word and how similarly it's being used in different contexts isn't necessarily indicative of anything. What does it say if certain aspects of love between parent and child weren't present in how one loves food? Surely, the answer is close to nothing. Is the love felt towards one's parents only truly what you can also say about how one loves music and food? — Judaka

It’s often been said that “love is nothin’ more than chemicals in the brain”. But then, what of anything cognitive—percepts, convictions, thoughts, disdains, etc.—that relies upon the brain’s operations doesn’t consist of neurotransmitters? So then why do so many out there want to downplay love by insisting on a difference that makes absolutely no difference whatsoever?

Not that frivolous a question to me. Since antiquity love has been deemed by some to be “supra-physical”, so to speak, and far more important than a mere emotion to add to the collection. One form of this which is relatively commonly known to moderners being that of “God = Love (this rather than an omnipotent and omniscient male psyche somewhere up in the skies)”. No one doubts that imbalanced, or unharmonious, interpersonal love typically results in psychological pain to one party if not to all. Yet, in so affirming, the implicit issue becomes that of what a perfectly balanced, or perfectly harmonious, love would be—and it is the latter which idealistic youngsters (to name a few) typically aim for. All the same, the notion of a non-physicalist interpretation of love can get exceedingly complex even when only addressing the animate world of agents and our interactions. So, I won’t further pursue this ontological issue.

I for one fully agree with (authentic) love being a drive to maintain and increase unity of being, a "transcendent unity" so to speak.

I here mention the qualifier “authentic” because love as extreme liking is readily discernable as, well, intense liking but not as authentic love (regardless of form the latter might take): When one loves another sentient agent, aspects of the other’s being become an integral part of oneself for as long as the love persists, and, in due measure to the love experienced, one will be readily willing to risk personal suffering and corporeal death so as to aim at preserving the love which is, if such risk is required. When one loves raspberry ice-cream, however—this contextual expression here conveying “strong liking” and not “authentic love”—one does not intimately experience an emotive union with the raspberry ice-cream’s being. An English speaker can even state that the ice-cream is "to die for", but one would in all likelihood be pathologically disturbed to hold authentic love for the ice-cream cone which one is about to eat—such that one feels the death of a part of oneself with the eating of the “loved” ice-cream, or such that one will be readily willing to die in a conflict/war for the wellbeing of the love, the unity of being, between yourself and the ice-cream cone.

Mainly want to make the point that there is a substantial ontological difference between love as unity of being and love as strong liking of. The two are distinct.

Doubtless to me that the equivocation in semantics which many hold between the two senses of the word, despite the different contexts of use, is in large part resultant of an ongoing materialistic/physicalist worldview.

-------

Ps. As long as I’m at it, here’s an affirmative stance irrespective of one’s views regarding the ontological nature of love:

Love (in the strict sense of: an either conscious or unconscious drive to maintain if not also increase unity of being) is perpetually present and inescapable for any lifeform which perpetuates its own life, this minimally in the form of self-love (although one need not also like oneself for this self-love to be). In contrast, its opposite of hatred need not be experienced in order for love (at minimum, self-love) to occur and, furthermore, will always be contingent on the presence of self-love (for oneself or one’s cohort, of which one is a member) when experienced.

Due to this, there is therefore no necessary dyad between love and hatred: while the later will always be dependent on the former, the former can well occur in the complete absence of the latter.

Maybe "cosmic evolution" would have been a more appropriate term to use? The concept itself is that every "thing" within the universe/cosmos evolves via some form of selection that is fully natural. Back in my twenties, I upheld physicalism and causal determinism with a "naturalistic pantheism" worldview - held for ontological reasons. Things have since then changed for me. But the concept I've just outlined intrigued me back then - as it still does, though now within a different ontological frame of mind (one of non-physicalism and of a partially determinate indeterminism).

I'm currently not antagonistic to to Chardin. But, back then, I couldn't have cared less.

Hope that clarifies things.

so again, it is an weasely way of framing that question because the history went hand in hand with an Israel as reality and the Nakba.

I'll answer the rest later.. I haven't looked at it sufficiently yet.... — schopenhauer1

Your answer does not answer the question. But why even discuss with someone who's "weaselly" to begin with.

I've been more than forthright all along. Have a good one.

BTW, used to contemplate the notion of universal evolution a lot in collage days. . . . . At any rate, a universal evolution would help explain how life evolved out of nonlife, but its mechanisms would need to be ironed out properly in order to be taken seriously, or at least so I find. — javra

By "universal evolution" are you referring to the theory of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin*1? — Gnomon

In relation to what I said, most definitely not.

As I understand it, such a teleological process is directed by divine Will (intention ; orthogenesis ; programming ; elan vital)*2 — Gnomon

I'm in agreement with here.

Is there a Final Form toward which the world is enforming? — Gnomon

Most all cosmologies speculate on what the "final form" of being might be. Here fully including those cosmologies of eternal return that postulate no final form whatsoever. As to the commonly accepted variants that can be currently found, there's a big freeze, a big crunch, a big rip, etc. And then you have the big bounce which fits an eternal return model.

Teilhard's final form, what he termed the omega point, is most certainly non-materialist in nature. As can also be said for notions such as those of Moksha or Nirvana. But that doesn't mean that materialists uniformly reject there being a final form of the world.

So the question is not as esoteric as some might make it out to be, this even from a materialist's pov.