On the possibility of a good life I don't think that's a charitable interpretation of my argument. I said a complete representation of a good life will forever remain a mystery. — darthbarracuda
You can spin it however you like, the fact remains that what you tried to do is exclude the possibility of a good life based on our inability of forming a good enough conception of it. If you don't remember this, here it is:
"2. There is no complete conception of what a good life is, but only partial representations of what may be considered a good life, and such a complete conception will probably never be known, i.e. a complete conception of what a good life is will forever remain a mystery.
3. Therefore, it is not possible to have a justified true belief that one has a good life.
4. Therefore, it is not possible to have a good life."
Your "partial representations" are not enough for forming a JTB and a JTB is (according to you) a presupposition of recognizing a life as good. Therefore, the reason that we can never recognize a life as good is that we can't have a good enough conception of it.
Again, spin it however you like, that's what your argument says, so I don't think that my interpretation is uncharitable.
Again I don't think that's charitable and I sense you have not understood my argument. When a bad life is conceived as that which is not a good life, then if a good life is impossible, all lives are ipso facto bad lives. — darthbarracuda
I'm not sure you understand the arguments. When two terms have definitions that depend on each other, then, if one of the definitions is untenable, the other one is ipso facto untenable too.
Well, I would say that meaning in life is necessary for having a good life, but it's not obvious to me that it's sufficient. — darthbarracuda
You clearly don't understand what is being said. Meaning is not necessary for having a good life. It is necessary for having a meaningful and therefore a justified life. No need to bring the "good life" in this, since it's such a failure of a term.