Humans are an existential animal. — schopenhauer1

If by "existential" you mean reality-denying, I agree with you.

:up:

In a similar vein, my post-human (post-biomorphic) preference is nano sapien.
— 180 Proof

:grin: but why so small? — universeness

You've invoked "Moore's Law"; well, in a similiar vein, the miniaturization of tech, like natural complexity (i.e. life), accelerates ... and I think Buckminster Fuller waa right about ephemeralization in the 1930s (later updated by John Smart et al in the 2000s with the transcension hypothesis) that intelligent systems will also continue to miniaturize, such that AGI —> ASI will eventually be instantiated in matter itself (and maybe then somehow in entangled quantum systems). Thus, nano sapiens. Will they be us? I imagine them as our post-biomorphic – infomorphic – descendsnts, and, to me, Clark/Kubrick's "Monolith symbolizes this apotheosis.

Do you completely reject that a future ASI may choose to remain separate from us, but will augment us, and protect us, when we are in danger.

I don't think ASI's goals, especially with respect to humanity, are predictable since ASI is over the event horizon of the "technological singularity" (which is the advent of AGI).

As for AGI and whether or not it will be a benefit or hazard to us, I think that mostly depends on how we engineer / (metacognitively train, not just program) the transition from ANI to AGI. I don't see AGI being inherently hazardous to – motivated to deliberately harm – other sentient species.

Do you think the monolith is 'learning' or 'teaching' or both, in this scene?

I imagine the movie 2001 in its entirety as the "Monolith" simulating within itself to its-human ancestral-self ("Kubrick's audience") a reenactment of its human ancestors' becoming post-human.

So does this depict, for you, an 'ascendance' moment for the human, or a 'completion of purpose' moment for the human.

Yes.

Is the monolith making an equivalent style statement, to such as 'as you are now, so once was I, as I am now, so will you be, prepare yourself to follow me?

No. I imagine that a human astronaut's transformation into the "Star Child" happened long ago (from the Monolith's perspective) as the third(?) and (possibly last) irreverisible step on the developmental path to becoming itself: a nano sapien hypercivilization (aka from our perspective "the Monolith").

Is this then imagery, of completing the circle, or perhaps even the cycle?

For us, perhaps it is, given our mythopoetic bias.

Would you find anything in this final scene then, that is relatable to cyclical universe posits, such as CCC or do you think Kubrick was going for something more akin to the buddhist 'wheel of life?'

No.

So do you think the universe is, in the final analysis deterministic or not?

I think the post-planck era universe is deterministic.

Or is my general interpretations of your analysis of the final scene you posted and your typings, in Javi's thread, way off?

Yeah it is, but I didn't elaborate there as much as I have here. Maybe my interpretation of Kubrick's final scene is clearer now? (Btw, both Kubrick's interpretation and mine differ from Arthur C. Clarke's too.) :nerd:

In his Ethics, Spinoza demonstrates that "substance dualism" is conceptually incoherent. He argues for what I have many times referred to as property dualism. I don't know if this is the thread on "substance dualism" you mean, Jack, but here's the link to a debate on differences with property dualism, in particular a post which illustrustrates my point:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/561804

The cognitive neuroscientist Antonio Damasio's Descartes' Error and Looking for Spinoza are quite good at demonstrating how "mind & body" by conceived by Descartes as separate "substances" is completely inconsistent with what experimental sciences of the human brain show thereby vindicating much of Spinoza's insight.

It's astonishing. Idealism begins by looking for certainty in one's individual perceptions - "esse est percipi" - and almost immediately finds itself supposing some universal spirit, god or some such.

As if such a fable were more acceptable than the independent existence of trees, tables and cups of our everyday experience — Banno

:up: "Looking for certainty" —> illusion of control (e.g. conspiracy / magical thinking).

Deism = Theism? — Gnomon

Variations on the god-of-the-gaps theme: deism is "theism minus answering prayers" or theism is "deism plus answering prayers" – theological interpretations of the same ontologically transcendent – super-natural – entity (i.e. "creator" "first cause" "intelligent designer", etc).

Thoughts, @universeness?

I don't undrrstand the question. It seems you've mixed different points I've made from a number of our exchanges.

Of course the same problem exists with materialism; how could you know that everything, independently of anything human, is material or even what that could mean? — Janus

I have to disagree. At the very least, "materialism" is a far more useful epistemological paradigm than any version of "immaterialism" for learning about – adapting to – nature.

I'm asking you to look at the logic of the claim that the Universe is a single mind, and that all the things in it, including human minds, are ideas. There is nothing in that admittedly entirely speculative idea of a universal mind ... — Janus

Insofar as this "universe is a single mind" is a "speculative idea", it follows that it's an "idea" of either (A) the human mind or (B) some other mind not located witnin "the universe" – which seems to me (B) amounts to "mind"-of-the-gaps and (A) amounts to a compositional fallacy – or (C) there are minds within the universe which are not themselves mere "ideas" (i.e. reals) rendering this "speculative idea" itself conceptually incoherent.

Whatever its limitations, Janus, I don't think 'realism' has these self-refuting problems.

Life is a mystery and we are mired in ignorance when it comes to anything purportedly outside of the human empirical and logic-based understanding. — Janus

No doubt. :up:

If what is, is what we will, then whence will? — Banno

:fire:

Yes, or put another way: if everything is an idea of mind, then mind is an idea of mind ... ad infinitum. Insert arbitrary terminus here (X-of-the-gaps).

[A]re there not forms of idealism that hold that everything you see is real, it just isn't what you think - it isn't material, it is made from the one stuff of the universe - consciousness / Will. That's the Schopenhauer, Kastrup, Hoffman formulation [ ... ] Cue quantum speculations, quotes from Hinduism, Plato's cave, past lives accounts and critiques of scientism.... — Tom Storm

:100: :clap: :smirk:

@bert1 @Wayfarer @Gnomon

"By analogy?" Okay, no evidence. Got it.

I don't think facts about the world or reality have the power to compel us to act. — Andrew4Handel

I agree. Only habits – embodied facts / dispositions – can do that; thus, practice virtues rather than follow rules (norms).

I don't think this follows (or I'm not understanding your comment).

Minds other than human minds are invoked to account for object permanence. — bert1

Cite evidence of "minds other than human minds" that does not beg the question of 'what is "mind"?' whether human or not. :chin:

[T]o what extent is Ryle's thinking compatible with nondualistic philosophy perspectives? — Jack Cummins

What exactly do you mean by "nondualistic"?

Is the idea of the 'ghost in the machine' one which is to be abandoned completely? — Jack Cummins

I think it had been decisively dismissed back in the 17th c. by Spinoza's dissolution of Descartes' MBP (substance dualism). Most philosophers have been in denial of this for almost three centuries even despite the ascent of cognitive sciences and methodological physicalism in the last several decades. It's been decades since I've read Ryle, but I recall appreciating his analytical deflation of "mind" and "consciousness" which probably inspired Dennett's methodological elimination of "qualia" from prospective empirical inquiries into the nature / mechanisms of 'phenomenal metacognition' (or consciousness).

I think Descartes was right that the only thing we can't doubt is that we exist ... — Andrew4Handel

I read Descartes' "Cogito" as demonstrating nothing more than this: 'when doubting, one cannot doubt that one is doubting' (i.e. I thnk, therefore thinking exists.) :chin:

You have always displayed a rather pessimistic viewpoint for the future of the human race, and I have always, and will always, disagree with that aspect of your current world view. — universeness

I know this was a reply to Athena but it applies to me as well. In my case, while deeply pessimistic about human existence, I'm cautiously optimistic about post-human intelligence (whether or not it's an extinction event for us).

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/770390

I would prefer homo nova to homo superior — universeness

:cool:

In a similar vein, my post-human (post-biomorphic) preference is nano sapien.

... you didn't offer your personal interpretation of the final scene you posted above ... — universeness

You must have missed this (below) from that old thread ...

I've imagined Kubrick/Clarke's "Monolith" as the ultimate  intelligent descendant of terrestrial life interacting with its primeval ancestors (us) in "higher dimensional" quantum-level simulations (e.g. "pocket universes"). Symbolically, for us, the "Monolith" is both mirror and window (i.e. "film screen") of the unknown ...

When (movie) Dave Bowman transforms (chrysalis-like) into the "Starchild", the Monolith's simulation, I imagine, becomes aware of itself as (manifested as an avatar of) the Monolith's simulation. (Book) Bowman's last transmission as his pod falls onto / into the Great Monolith "My God, it's full of stars ..." in which "stars" could mean souls, or minds, or intelligences ... perhaps all there ever has been and will ever be ... simulated. No doubt, another inspiration for Frank Tipler's cosmological "Omega Point"? — 180 Proof

I imagine the Monolith is (for our species) the enabling-constraint of becoming (fractally joining) the Monolith. A quasi-gnostic odyssey of re/turning to the source (pleroma), or the prodigal homecoming – monomyth – of all intelligences ... — 180 Proof

"However vast the darkness, we must supply our own light". ~Stanley Kubrick

:nerd:

"My God, it's full of stars!"
~Cmdr. Dave Bowman, last transmission ...

Does anyone have an alternate criterion for what is morally normative that they prefer? — Mark S

Sure, I'll bite ...

[M]y normative ethics is Negative Hedonic Utilitarianism (i.e. "right" judgments and conduct which prevent or reduce harm); — 180 Proof

... excerpt from an old post (click on my handle if you're interested in (some of) my reasoning for the above).

No thoughts of your own. Got it. I'm out, Wayf. :shade:

... challenged for empirical evidence, rather than logical reasons. — Gnomon

"Enformer"-of-the-gaps, unsound arguments (about your own citations), and continuous strawman & ad hominem replies are among the parade of logical challenges I, @universeness, @bert1 & others have raised collectively over hundreds of posts just in the last twelve months. All you do lately is whinge on about what a victim you are of "materialist, reductionist, anti-metaphysical bias" or whatever. :ok: :sweat:

What about that exchange is not clear? — Wayfarer

We're talking past each other again. I've been taking issue with 'transcendental idealism' and you're advocating various Eastern mystical traditions without making a case for how 'transcendental idealism' follows from or is consistent with them. Citing topical literatures do not explicate your thinking on idealism, Wayfarer, only distracts (deliberately?) from directly addressing or refuting the issues with idealism I've raised. If we've gone as far in this discussion as you care to go, then just say so. I'm only interested in what you think, sir, and not with your sources or you interpreting them for me.

IIRC, the 'idealism' of Parmenides (or Pythagoras) preceeded Plato by a century or so.

"As far as I'm concerned" ... i.e. a cop-out. :roll:

Idealism sounds to closer to mysticism. — Wayfarer

Such as your references to "Buddhist idealism" and Upanishads ... :sparkle:

:fire: :100:

You've lost me.

:fire:

One way I have put it is that whilst we may be distinct and separate - an inevitable consequence of existence! - we are not, as it were, outside of, or apart from, reality itself. That, I think, is the key insight of non-dualism. — Wayfarer

Again, thanks for the clarifying response. The question remains though: is "reality itself" ideal? Anyway, your conception of idealism, Wayf, seems fairly idiosyncratic to me as nonduality (e.g. Advaita) contrasts profoundly with the transcendental schools of idealism which are dualist. I find nonduality quite congenial with my own conception of naturalism (which has strong affinities with Spinoza as well as Nietzsche, neither of whom I consider 'idealists').

However, nonduality does not imply "the world is the idea of mind" but rather, IMO, that "world" and "mind" are complementary ways (yinyang) of experiencing (e.g. "I-It" / "I-Thou" ways of encountering). Not so unlike Spinoza's post-Cartesian parallelism, or property dualism. "Mind" is just one way of talking – relating – and "world" is another way of talking – relating; and understood as such makes explicit the ontologically inseparable plane of immanence (Deleuze) or Brahman (à la natura naturans (Spinoza)) encompassing (Jaspers) "reality itself". I just don't see how nonduality prioritizes "mind" "subject" "experience" over above "world" "object" "thing" as transcendental idealism does, Wayf, so maybe you can explain to me. :chin:

:up:

I asked because I'm interested in what you understand your own 'commitment to idealism' to presuppose and imply. I'm familiar enough with many historically prominent idealists. To sum up my previous two questions (please address them in the following): What exactly do you, Wayfarer, mean when you say "I am an idealist"?

Thanks for the info. :up:

Is the banning of Agent Smith permanent?

(No implicit criticism intended by this question.)

Stoicism for me, but like Seneca, I have great regard for Epicurus — Ciceronianus

Likewise, I've also learned from Seneca (& Epictetus).

Is mind ontologically separate from / independent of (the) world?

Does mind correspond to Being and ideas to Beings (well isn't Being / mind also an "idea" – the one we're discussing)?

@bert1

As usual, you and ↪180 Proof interpret my philosophical & technical terminology differently from my intention. — Gnomon

More of the same Jabberwocky, @universeness – there's just no there there.

Name one cheerful philosopher. — Ciceronianus

Democritus (et al).

I became convinced, and still am convinced, that what philosophers had to say in this respect was said long, long ago as part of the effort to determine how best to live. That took place before Christianity, before Romanticism, before people came to understand that "God is dead" and despaired because of it, before nihilism, existentialism; in short, before we became devotees of angst. — Ciceronianus

Thus, I've always had a strong affinity for Epicureanism (second only to Spinozism in recent decades).

I don't mean to say that great questions are unimportant or should not be addressed, but I don't think philosophy is useful in addressing them, unless we mean by philosophy art, poetry, meditation and pursuits which evoke rather than seek to explain. Those are pursuits which are better left to those who aren't philosophers.

Well, 'academic philosophers' for sure. :wink:

What might be more interesting a fitting on a philosophy forum is if you looked at a topic, said why the existing answers are unsatisfactory, and narrowly and specifically say why enformationism is different and peculiarly suited to solving the problem. Maybe you've already done that and I haven't noticed. — bert1

Gnomon hasn't done so. I've repeatedly tried to get this out of him for at least the last several months with a short set of questions which he still refuses to address ...

I share 180 Proof's 'impatience,' with your attempts to deny that your enformer, IS a god of the gaps posit. If you had honestly and earnestly stated your enformer as a theological proposal from the start, then I think @180 Proof would just have disagreed with you, and moved on, but, trying to suggest that your enformer is a legitimate scientific projection, based on current quantum mechanics, is like a red rag to a bull imo. That's why @180 Proof's and my reactions are more 'aggravated,' imo. — universeness

Thanks, universeness, for joining me and others in calling @Gnomon on his pseudo-philosophical BS.

Increasing the number of our existential options as a species, as you suggest, would indeed be substantial progress. :up:

:ok: Gotcha.

:cool:

No question is begged because nonmind is entailed by mind; which is more reasonable to conceive of as the dependent variable of the other is the crux of the issue for me, Jamal. So it does come down to a philosophical choice: the conceptual incoherences (sketched above) which result from conflating ontology with – reducing ontology to – epistemology and thereby eliminates 'the "world" as mind-dependent' of transcendental idealism as a rational option and leaving, by default, the pragmatic alternative of 'mind as world-dependent' of naturalism (or "transcendental realism" as you prefer) – incoherent or pragmatic? I choose the latter.

I appreciate the citations and your reflections on (transcendental) idealism. Still, there's that confusion, or conflation, of ontology with epistemology, which plagues even Kant-Schopenhauer-Magee, that yields conceptual incoherences such as (e.g.)

(A) "mind" must be an idea of itself that has an anxiliary idea called "world" (which is, in effect, solipsism (the noumenon?))

or

(B) 'world is an idea' (shadow?) of a mind in a world (cave?) with 'other minds' (which is just an unparsimoniously convoluted route back to ... naturalism).

As I discern it, Wayf, mind is nonmind-dependent insofar as it is embodied, ergo nonmind (aka "world") is not "mind-dependent" and is much more than just "my idea" in the way (e.g.) the territory must exceed in every way (re: dynamics, complexity) mapping of that territory. Kantianism sells that 'the territory is mapmaker-dependent' story (i.e. "world" is mind-dependent) which – like epicycles, etc – I'm still not buying. :smirk:

I'm not sure why idealism is on there. Idealism is not a position on whether or not there is an external world, but about whether that world (external or not) is independent of any minds. — bert1

I think the predicate "external" in this context is assumed to be synonymous with "independent of any minds". I don't see in what sense you / idealists mean that an "external world" might not be "independent of any minds" – such as the primordial universe before (the physical instantiation / embodiment of) "any minds" was possible – necessarily external of and independent of all minds, no? :chin:

Interesting OP.

A. What had 'motivated' my interest in philosophy?

Suffering; then later, that stupidity is somehow related to suffering.

B. Which aspects of my biography 'determine' my philosophical commitments?

Born into an urban, working class family; an ethnic minority male (older sibling); raised in a loving, secure home by a single immigrant mother, daily threats of street / gang crime & police violence (but never any domestic abuse); disciplined parochial schooling K-12; all of my closest friends also came from close, polyglot, immigrant families; early love of science fiction & (electric) Blues ... then @16 I lost 'my religion' (I'd realized I did not 'believe in' Catholicism or the God of the Bible) and then @17 had my first philosophy class (textbook – From Socrates to Sartre).

Forty-odd years later, my (macro) philosophical commitments are (more or less, still): fallibilsm, secularism & naturalism.:death::flower: The bolded above, I suspect, may be (implicitly) 'axiomatic' to my philosophizing.

↪180 Proof .... Don't you have any arguments? — Sam26

:roll: You know I do ...

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/776786 (criticism posted above which still stands)

from 2022 ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/762279 (an argument from a recent "NDE" which you could not counter)