I believe in evidence. I believe in observation, measurement, and reasoning, confirmed by independent observers. I'll believe anything, no matter how wild and ridiculous, if there is evidence for it. The wilder and more ridiculous something is, however, the firmer and more solid the evidence will have to be.

I think appealing to physics for human choices is to fantastically stretch the scope of physics. — Manuel

Does Quantum Mechanics Rule Out Free Will?
Superdeterminism, a radical quantum hypothesis, says our “choices” are illusory

March 10, 2022

A conjecture called superdeterminism, outlined decades ago, is a response to several peculiarities of quantum mechanics: the apparent randomness of quantum events; their apparent dependence on human observation, or measurement; and the apparent ability of a measurement in one place to determine, instantly, the outcome of a measurement elsewhere, an effect called nonlocality.

Einstein, who derided nonlocality as “spooky action at a distance,” insisted that quantum mechanics must be incomplete; there must be hidden variables that the theory overlooks. Superdeterminism is a radical hidden-variables theory proposed by physicist John Bell. He is renowned for a 1964 theorem, now named after him, that dramatically exposes the nonlocality of quantum mechanics.

Bell said in a BBC interview in 1985 that the puzzle of nonlocality vanishes if you assume that “the world is superdeterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined.”

[ ... ] — John Horgan, SciAm_Opinion

In any case, IMO, Dawkins embarrasses himself with such unnuanced and shallow misreadings of philosophy as well as (biblical) theology, and is not taken very seriously outside of evolutionary biology. — 180 Proof

In my view, the key development is secular rationality, escape from superstition. — Pie

'Idealism' seems to be parasitic on some notion of the real world (in which there is a vat of some kind) even as it attacks this notion. — Pie

How is it that an idealist can conclude that there are other minds?

Either idealism entails solipsism, or it doesn't. If idealism does entail solipsism, then idealism is merely one form of solipsism. Hence, in order to show that idealism is not merely a form of solipsism, any mooted idealist must show that other minds exist. — Banno

If the rain comes
They run and hide their heads
They might as well be dead
If the rain comes
If the rain comes

When the sun shines
They slip into the shade
And sip their lemonade
When the sun shines
When the sun shines

Rain
I don't mind
Shine
The weather's fine

I can show you
That when it starts to rain
Everything's the same
I can show you
I can show you

Rain
I don't mind
Shine
The weather's fine

Can you hear me?
That when it rains and shines
It's just a state of mind
Can you hear me?
Can you hear me?

Sdeah reiht edih dna nur yeht
Semoc niar eht fi
Niar
Senihs nus

There are no sages, only lesser fools! — Agent Smith

Try Rawls, Hobbes, Rousseau. — Benkei

... philosophy [is] about folly (i.e. being unwise) – how to reduce foolery, how to unlearn foolish habits. — 180 Proof

The 4 cardinal virtues:

1. Sophia/Prudentia
2. Fortitudo
3. Iustitia
4. Temperantia

Are these 4 virtues internally consistent? — Agent Smith

So what's a skeptical atheist to do? — GLEN willows

All solipsism is a form of idealism, idealism need not be solipsist at all. — Manuel

Idealism holds that for a statement to be true it must stand in some relation to mind - observed, known, believed, or whatever. So is "There are other minds" true for idealism? If it is true, then it stands in some relation to mind... but which one? If it stands in a relation to a mind other than one's own, then that is profoundly problematic for idealism. Hence the need for god to hold things together.

Idealism's relation to truth is... incoherent. — Banno

By idealism I understand 'only minds and ideas (or what we is known) are real.' Ontology reduced to epistemology. (Related to 'antirealism', 'essentialism' (e.g. universals), immaterialism / nonphysicalism / supernaturalism, 'social constructionism', 'common sensism', 'moral subjectivism / relativism / nihilism', ''finalism', 'existentialism', metaphysical libertarianism, etc.)

By solipsism I understand 'only my mind and my ideas (or what I know) are real.' Ontology without epistemology. (Reductio ad absurdum of idealism)

For example, once certain people decided that the way to end their suffering was to kill all the Jews. — baker

Why was that maladaptive? Why were they mistaken? — baker

Short-term efficacy – scapegoating, genocide – at the expense of long-term sustainability (i.e. forming habits / institutions for 'othering' even their own because (some believe) "that is a way to end their suffering"). — 180 Proof

One non-explaining activity of the philosopher is just that of calling attention to this or that aspect of world. — Pie

Never argue with an idiot. They will drag you down to their level and beat you with experience. — Mark Twain

As I understand it, lots of philosophers simply make what is already going on explicit. They foreground what in retrospect was haunting the background. — Pie

An object is composed of parts to the degree they could be elements located elsewhere. An event is composed of parts to the degree they could be located elsewhen. — apokrisis

Democrtius' reason told him over two thousand years ago that divisible extended things are made up of tiny indivisible extended things and that therefore extended things are not, as it is possible to imagine they are, infinitely divisible. — Janus

The truth is, we do not know the truth of what happens when we die, and so Socrates turns to myths. The myths are intended to "charm away" their fears and to persuade them to live just lives. — Fooloso4

What do events reduce to?I — Josh Alfred

If mind is indivisible, how come I am one, you, the reader, are one, so on and so forth? — Agent Smith

Typically, objects change their states by rearranging their parts in some way. But for a partless immaterial soul, I'm struggling to understand how such a thing could support different states. How can it change? — bert1

2. My mind is not divisible — Bartricks

From the fact that one can be affected by two or more desires simultaneously, he infers that the soul (psyche) cannot be unitary, since it is impossible for the same thing to act in opposite ways at the same time (there are obvious affinities here with the logical principle of non-contradiction, which Plato learned from Socrates [c. 470–399 b.c.e.]). Accordingly, in the Republic he identifies three distinct parts of the soul (psyche) — reason (nous), passion (thumos), and appetite (epithumia) — and posits these as the source of conflicting desires (IV, 439d–e). Reason rules over the soul with wisdom, but opposed to it is appetite, the irrational part of the soul "with which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter and titillation of other desires" (439d).

Since philosophy is abour truth ... — Agent Smith

You mean self-contradictory? — Agent Smith