No, for you think God is a potato. Now answer mine.
What's a robust modest incompatibilist and now does one of those differ from a modest incompatibilist? And how do both differ from agent-causal incompatibilists?

How do you know he isn't exercising it? What evidence can you present? — ZzzoneiroCosm

The truth of the law of non-contradiction is evident to reason. That is to say, our reason represents it to be true.

To 'know' something is to have a justified true belief. Justifications are made of normative reasons. And we are aware of normative reasons via our reason.

Why don't you now ask me how I know that, and then to my answer ask 'and how do you know that'. And I can keep giving you the same answer. And we can keep doing that until we die. How about that?

So the law of non-contradiction can be violated. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Well, it wouldn't really be violated. It would simply no longer obtain.

You could insist, if you want, that by 'God' you mean 'a potato' and that's fine - then your concept of God would be the concept of a potato. But then this thread wouldn't make much sense, would it? Because then it'd be "Does a potato have free will?" So, only a total idiot would think that 'God' in "Does God have free will" denotes something non-personal.
There are a host of philosophical questions to be asked about God - does God have free will? Does God exist? If God exists, why is there evil? These are questions that have vexed philosophers for millennia. However, these questions - 'does a potato have free will?', 'does a potato exist?' and 'if a potato exists, why is there evil' - have not, because only a total idiot would wonder about such matters or think that God meant 'a potato' or that those debating whether God has free will are wondering whether a potato has free will.

No. He has the power to be dead and alive at the same time. But he is not exercising it. He's alive and not dead. Jeez, I said 'up your game'. Up!

Ah, "how can it be known?" - the cry of the fool. It's what's called a 'conceptual truth'. The concept of God 'just is' the concept of a person who has certain properties. Someone who doubts this is what philosophers would call 'conceptually confused' and what others would call 'a spanner'.

I did. We know the law of non-contradiction is true. And if that law is true, then God is either dead or alive, not both. Now, answer my questions. And if you are not going to, do at least try and say something funny as this exchange is very dull. I have found that discussing philosophy with arrogant idiots can be very stimulating and/or amusing. This is neither. Now, up your game and say something funny or philosophically interesting please, as I am a busy man.

God is a person. What do you think God is, then? A potato?

Because we know that the law of non-contradiction is true.

Have you heard of that law? Who first articulated it?

No? Don't know? It states that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. And Aristotle is credited with having first expressed it.

And we know it is true in the same way that we know 1 + 1 = 2 is true - it is manifest to the reason of virtually everyone.

Some doubt it is true - what are they called and can you name one?

Do you have anything philosophical to contribute?

This thread is about God and free will.

Now, tell me, what's the difference between a modest incompatibilist conception of free will and a robust modest incompatibilist conception of free will? And can you name me some contemporary defenders of each kind?

And what is a hard-line compatibilist? And can you name me a defender?
And what is semi-compatibilism - and can you name me a defender?
And what is agent-causal incompatibilism - and can you name me a defender?
And what is hard-incompatibilism - and can you name me a defender?
And what is a soft-line compatibilist - and can you name me a defender?

God doesn't denote a person, but a being, a being which is the living universe, which meets the criteria of the definition of God. Jesus is sacrilege. — theRiddler

No, it denotes a person who has the properties of omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence.

Have you had anything published in the philosophy of religion in a peer reviewed venue?

If the answer is 'no', then shut up and be schooled.

Yes. He 'can' be. He hasn't killed himself, though. He can. He hasn't.

Yes, he 'can' be simultaneously God and not God. But he isn't. He's just God. How do I know? Because the law of non-contradiction is true. The law of non-contradiction says that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. Thus if God is God, he is not also not God. Again: 'can' doesn't mean 'is'. This is something the average 6 year old can grasp.

Can God simultaneously be and not be omnipotent - yes, see above answer.

Question begging.

So, you think 'can' does mean 'is'? You 'can' think a little more before posting. But are you? No. See?

According to Bartricks definition of omnipotence god can simultaneously kill and not kill himself. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes, he 'can' do that. 'Can' doesn't mean 'is'. See? So, it's not an 'actual' contradiction. There are none of those.

Also, what is your objection? Where is the contradiction involved in pointing out that someone who can do anything, can do anything? That's not a contradiction.

Compare this to you. You think that a person who can do anything can't make a rock too heavy to lift. That's an actual contradiction. So if you're so anti contradictions, stop affirming them.

Reason. Just consult your reason.

God denotes a person who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent.

It doesn't mean 'the sum total of what exists'.

If it did, then no one would dispute that God exists.

You could also ask people what they mean by 'God'. They don't mean 'the sum total of what exists'. Jeez.

The problem most of you have is that you think good thinking is thinking that echoes your own. But anyway, take me to school and show me the error in my reasoning.

It doesn't mean 'very great' - it means 'all powerful' (omni means all).

There's what it means and then there's what problems it might generate. It means 'all powerful'. And, like I say, the debate is over whether being all powerful involves being able to do all things logically possible, or anything whatever.

And again, like I say, neither of those conceptions of omnipotence would generate a problem in respect of suicide. You'd need to argue in addition that God exists of necessity. Then that would mean it would be logically impossible for God to cease to exist.

Yes I do.

The sum total of what exists is not equivalent to God. The sum total of what exists is just that: the totality of what exists. God is among the existent things. But if you are using the word 'God' to denote the sum totalof what exists then you are misusing the term. After all, that would mean everyone believes in God, for everyone agrees there's a sum total of what exists. The disagreement is over what that includes.

Yes I do. It's a requirement of my job (as opposed to your job, the only qualification for which is, I imagine, that one have hands). Now, are you going to do any philosophy or is nay saying all you are good for?

I do have a PhD in philosophy. You don't. If you did, you'd know I had one.

Now, how about 'doing' some philosophy? Answer my question. Or do you not have justifying reasons for your blurtings? In which case why are you on a philosophy forum?

Omnipotence means all powerful. There's no dispute about that.

The dispute is over what, more precisely, that involves. Does it involve being able to do all things it is logically possible to do, or does it involve being able to do anything at all, including the currently logically forbidden?

I think the answer to that one is obvious - to be able to do the logically forbidden is to have more power than one who is bound by logic. Thus omnipotence involves it.

But either way, God could commit suicide.

If you want to argue that God cannot commit suicide, then you would need to argue that God exists of necessity. But that claim seems incompatible with being omnipotent.

PhD.

Now answer my question. Why do you think God can't make a stone too heavy for him to lift? Have you thought about it at all? What thought process led you to think that an all powerful person would lack the power to do that? What reasoning got you to the conclusion that being able to do anything must involve being unable to do some things? It's such an obvious contradiction.

Do you also think that, say, if A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C, then A is smaller than C?

Ad hominem. It's all you do. Just 'Bartricks is mean, therefore his arguments fail' with a big dollop of odious condescension for good measure. Total inability to distinguish between the argument and the arguer.
Now, I can assure you that God can create a stone too heavy for him to lift, as I explained. Indeed, I have trouble understanding how anyone can think otherwise. What thoughts lead to it? What dumb inferences might make someone think God couldn't do such thing? "God can do anything, therefore he can't do this". I think if the manifestly contradictory nature of that does not scream out to you, then you really are not cut out for philosophy , just as one is not cut out for painting if one paints with the pointy end rather than the bristly one.

You think that reply was not pompous? Self awareness: zero. Anyway, enjoy mooing with the other unqualified farmyard animals.

You sound preposterous to me - just truly ludicrously magnificently irrevocably confused. Enjoy! — ZzzoneiroCosm

That is how the wise seem to the ignorant. The average peon does not know how to distinguish between a diamond and paste.

If I am confused, locate the point of confusion.

I know exactly in what manner you are confused. This is how you think: bachelors are, by definition, unmarried. Therefore, a bachelor is incapable of having a wife. Should a bachelor be asked by a woman for his hand in marriage, the bachelor will have to reply "no, for I am a bachelor, and bachelors are by definition unmarried, and thus much though I would love to marry you, I cannot, for I lack the ability to do so. Do you see?"

That's how you think about God and God's omnipotence, is it not? You think "God is by definition omnipotent. But were God to create a stone that he could not lift, then there would be something he would be unable to do. Yet God is by definition omnipotent. So, were someone to ask God to create a stone too heavy for him to lift, he would have to reply "no, for I am God, and God is by definition omnipotent and thus much though I would love to create a rock too heavy for me to lift, I cannot, for I lack the ability to do so - I am condemned to be all-powerful by the power of a word. Do you see?"

That's how you reason. And it's bad. Really bad.

Now, given that you are hoping I am 8, take me to school and explain to little snotty Bartricks what stops God from creating a stone too heavy for him to lift?

He divests himself of power so that he's no longer god and therefore no longer omnipotent? Can he become god again? How does he become god if he isn't omnipotent. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes, an omnipotent being can divest itself of power - so, it can, if it so wishes, cease to be omnipotent.

Why do you think an omnipotent being can't do this? It's obvious! Even little old me can divest himself of some power if he wants to. Do you think an omnipotent being is unable to do things even i can do?? What are you working with?

Can a formerly omnipotent being become omnipotent again? Yes, I think so. Do you think not? Why? You seem frightfully confused. Can you become less powerful than you currently are? Yes. Can you become less powerful and then regain the power you divested yourself of? Yes. You're seeing problems where there are none. I had a watch on my wrist a moment ago. So a moment ago I was able to tell the time just by looking at my wrist. But I took my watch off. And so now I am unable to tell the time just by looking at my wrist. Can I regain that ability? Yes. How? I could go and put my watch back on.

What are you having trouble with? Note too, if God ceases to be omnipotent, he would not thereby cease to be omniscient. So he'd know how to regain the omnipotence he's divested himself of, wouldn't he?

Also, while god isn't god, what is he? — ZzzoneiroCosm

What sort of a question is that? A person. A person who isn't omnipotent. Dur.

Most importantly: what makes you think you know so much about god? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Reasoning. Try it.

Let me help you: an omnipotent being is able to do anything.

If someone is able to do anything, are they able to divest themselves of some power?

Yes. Why? Because...if...they...couldn't...do....that....there....would....be....something....they....could....not.....do.

So god creates a rock so heavy he can't lift it?Then god lifts that rock? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes, that is one possibility for God. God can make it the case that he is unable to do something he is able to do.

That's a contradiction. And contradictions are currently false. That is, if you are unable to do something, you are not also able to do it. However, God can do anything and thus God can make a contradiction true.

Note: God can also make a rock too heavy for him to lift and be unable to lift it. He would not be God after having done so. But that's not a problem, for God has the power to divest himself of power.

So, there are at least two options available to God in respect of the rock - he can create a rock too heavy for him to lift and thereby render himself no longer God. Or, alternatively, he could create a true contradiction by creating a rock too heavy for him to lift and yet retain the ability to lift it.

Neither are problematic.

No and yes. No, if he has decided to stop being omnipotent (and creating that rock was his method). Yes, if he has decided to create it and to continue being omnipotent.

Bachelors are unmarried, yes?

Can bachelors get married?

Not and remain bachelors. But a person who is a bachelor can get married, it is just that afterwards he'll no longer be a bachelor.

An omnipotent person can create a rock to heavy for himself to lift. He will no longer be omnipotent if he does that. But he can do that.

Although as God has the power to do anything, God can, in fact, both make a stone too heavy for him to lift and then lift it, for God has the power to make contradictions true. But God can also, if he so wishes, create rock too heavy for himself to lift, and be unable to lift it. For God has the power to stop being God whenever he wants. He wouldn't be omnipotent if he was stuck being God, would he?

You have argued that as God is uncreated and better than the universe, the universe does not need a creator. I do not see how you're getting to that conclusion - there seem to be some missing steps.

We can all agree that there must exist some uncreated things. That's not evidence that everything is uncreated.

Complex things need creators. Simple things do not. Indeed, to ask what created a simple thing is simply to manifest a failure to understand the nature of a simple thing. For a simple thing has nothing from which it can be created.

So, if there exist complex things, then there must exist some simple things. And the ultimate creators of complex things are simple things.

Clearly, then, one cannot get from "simple things are uncreated" to "complex things are uncreated". And the universe is a complex thing, and God is a simple thing.

So your case must rest entirely upon the claim that God is 'better' than the universe. But I don't understand how you get from the claim that God is better than the universe, to "therefore the universe does not need a creator".

Yes, the question asked admits of a straightforward answer: yes, God has free will.

God is morally perfect. If he lacked free will, then he would not be morally perfect, for then he would not be morally responsible for being morally perfect. So the question is akin to "does a bachelor lack a wife?"

And God's possession of free will generates no puzzles. Is God free to commit suicide? Yes - he wouldn't be free if he couldn't. Is he free to make a rock too heavy for him to lift? Yes. Is God free to cease to be God? Yes. And so on. To any "Is God free to..." the answer is 'yes'.

Almost invariably, those who think there are puzzles here are just confused.

That is interesting particularly because Benatar makes the same (I think) point:

“While we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives, we have no duty to bring into existence those who would lead happy lives”
— Benatar — Cuthbert

I know! As I said in the OP, Benatar seeks to justify his asymmetry as the best explanation of our intuitions about the happy life and miserable life cases.

I then argued that he fails. For his asymmetry is no explanation of the asymmetry - as his asymmetry (unlike the one it is supposed to explain) has no independent intuitive appeal and so explains nothing. And it gets worse: Benatar's asymmetry has positively counter-intutive implications, such as making the ethics of procreation turn crucially on whether we pre-exist or not. Finally, we can explain the asymmetry between the happy life and miserable life by appeal to some self-evident truths.

I don't think Benatar is/has to explaining/explain the asymmetry. — Agent Smith

He is - his justification for the asymmetry he is positing is that it is the best explanation of our asymmetrical intuitions about the happy life and miserable life case (and some other similar cases) (see p. 31 of Better Never to Have Been).

It is no explanation of why my watch works to say "it is an instance of a working watch". And it is no explanation of the asymmetry in our moral intuitions about the happy life and miserable life cases to say "this is an instance of an asymmetry between benefit and harm". Yet that is precisely what Benatar is doing.

An explanation has to show how that which we want explained - the explanandum - is an implication of something self-evidently true. Otherwise we have not really gotten anywhere.

That's what my explanation does. It is self-evident that undeserved harm is harm we have positive moral reason not to create. And it is self-evident that non-deserved benefit is benefit we have no positive moral reason to create. I have moral reason not to hurt you, other things being equal. But I do not have moral reason to benefit you - it would be generous, kind, nice, supererogatory of me to benefit you, but the mere fact that I can benefit you, does not generate positive moral reason for me to do so, other things being equal. And even if someone disputes this and insists that we have 'some' moral reason to benefit others if we can, it is clear that we have much, much, stronger moral reason 'not' to create undeserved harm. If, for instance, I can only benefit you by doing some undeserved harm, then it is more important that I not create the undeserved harm than that I promote the non-deserved benefit.

Futhermore, it is also self-evident that someone who has done nothing and has had nothing done to them, would be suffering undeserved harm if they suffered any harm. And if they received benefit, the benefit would be non-deserved.

That explains why we have positive obligation not to bring into existence the suffering life, but no positive obligation to create the happy life. That's a real explanation. Benatar's is a pseudo explanation. He posits an asymmetry that has no self-evidence to it - that really is like saying "the watch is working because watches work" or some such.

Preexistence doesn't affect Benatar's asymmetry. The same argument applies to all instances of existence. — Agent Smith

I do not follow you. If we pre-exist, then procreative acts do not create us. Benatar reaches his antinatalist conclusion from the asymmetry he posits because in assessing the morality of procreation we should compare existence with non-existence. But if we pre-exist then we would have to assess it by comparing how much benefit and harm it would be reasonable to suppose the pre-existence life to contain versus life here. Suppose that the reasonable supposition is that pre-existence lives contain none of either, we would not get to the antinatalist conclusion if lives here contain more benefit than harm - for then it would be better to exist here than not.

So it makes a world of difference if we pre-exist or not (implausibly). It shouldn't, of course - it is immoral to procreate regardless of whether we pre-exist or not, other things being equal.

Your 1st point: No explanation for Benatar's asymmetry. — Agent Smith

I am saying that Benatar's asymmetry is no explanation of the asymmetry between the happy life and miserable life cases, for Benatar's asymmetry has no self-evidence to it.

Suffering has more weightage than joy; people want to get rid of pain more than they want to acquire joy. Put simply the priority, first objective, is to end pain (at all costs); only after that can we discuss pleasure. — Agent Smith

That's not Benatar's asymmetry. Benatar says that absent harm is good even when there is no one for whom it is good, whereas absent benefit is not bad unless there is someone for whom it is a deprivation.

He's not saying 'eradicating pain is more important than promoting pleasure'.

I am saying something similar to that (though not quite that). I am saying that it is intuitively obvious that we have reason not to create undeserved harm, but no positive reason to create non-deserved benefit. And, when someone is innocent and has not yet had anything happen to them, then any harm visited upon them will be undeserved, whereas any benefit that befalls them will be non-deserved. I take these things to be self-evident and thus explanatory. And these self-evident truths 'explain' why we have no positive obligation to create happy lives, yet we do have positive obligation not to create miserable lives.

So, Benatar does not 'explain' the asymmetry between our intuitions about creating happy lives versus creating miserable ones. All he does is posit an asymmetry! That's no explanation at all. By contrast, I have 'explained' the asymmetry, because I have shown how our intuitions reflect some more self-evident truths. To use my watch example, the question is 'why does this watch work?'. Benatar's answer is 'it is a working watch'. My answer is 'look - if we take the back off we can see how the hands' movement is a function of the movement of these cogs'.

I mentioned suicide as evidence. People don't mind/even prefer nonexistence to pain and this basically proves Benatar's asymmetry: absence of pain is good even when there's no one to experience it + the absence of pleasure is bad only when there's someone who exists and experiences that absence. — Agent Smith

Benatar's asymmetry does not imply that suicide is rational. Indeed, he himself emphasizes this. If it did, that would be a highly counter-intuitive implication.

Because the antinatalist conclusion is itself counter-intuitive, it is important that the case for antinatalism should not have other counter-intuitive implications. A case for antinatalism that implied suicide was rational under most circumstances would be a weak case. I am an antinatalist, but I would argue that suicide is irrational under most circumstances and that nothing in my case for antinatalism implies otherwise.

Your 3rd point: Preexistence nullifies the asymmetery. I'm afraid that isn't correct. Benatar's asymmetry applies to all existence involving suffering and the ability to opt out (suicide). — Agent Smith

No, that's simply incorrect. Benatar's whole point is that non-existence is better than existence! (Unless you already exist, that is) That's precisely why he thinks that procreation is wrong. So, if procreation does not create us but simply transfers us from elsewhere - as well it might - then Benatar's case would be beside the point: it would not apply to our situation. Now, I would say that's implausible.

I think the asymmetry is this:

Scenario A. Person exists: Presence of benefit = good, Presence of harm = bad
Scenario B. Person does not exist: Absence of harm = good. Absence of benefit = not bad

By not procreating we can prevent suffering without depriving anyone of good. So there is net benefit. — Cuthbert

I am not disputing what it is. I am arguing that it lacks justification.

"The asymmetry cannot be properly explained and it is a special case of a more general asymmetry." — Cuthbert

That's not a quote from me!! Where did I say that? If you put quote marks around something you're saying it is a quote - but you wrote that sentence, not me!

But if he can establish that the asymmetry also exists in the special case then that is enough for the argument to work. — Cuthbert

No, he is positing his asymmetry as a 'best explanation' of our intuitions about particular cases - the happy life and miserable life cases. So, it is not in dispute that we have a positive obligation not to create the miserable life, other things being equal, and that we have no positive obligation to create the happy life, other things being equal. What he's saying is that the 'best' explanation of those intuitions is the asymmetry he appeals to.

But that asymmetry is 'not' the best explanation. Why? Because a) it isn't an explanation at all, as all he's doing is saying "let's suppose it is an instance of a more general asymmetry" - how's that an explanation of the asymmetry? It is, as I said, like me asking "how is this watch working?" and being told "well, it is just an instance of a working watch".
And b) because Benatar's asymmetry makes it central whether we pre-exist or not - yet whether procreation is moral or immoral should, intuitively, be unaffected by such matters.
And c) because we can explain the asymmetry by appeal to self-evident truths of reason about desert.. The explanation of why we have no positive obligation to create the happy life is that the happiness in question is non-deserved and thus we have no positive reason to perform an action that generates it. By contrast, we have positive obligation not to create the miserable life because the misery is undeserved and we have positive reason not to perform acts that create undeserved harm.

"We might pre-exist and suffer harm from not being brought into existence." — Cuthbert

Where did I say that? If you quote someone, you have to use their actual words (obviously!).

True, we might, but it's a big assumption and we have no way of telling whether it's true or false or how happy or unhappy pre-existent persons may be. So it should not figure in our calculus of happiness. — Cuthbert

That's the point! So, whether we pre-exist or not should have no bearing on the morality of procreation. It would if we knew what pre-existence-here life was like, but we don't. So, given we don't, it should make no difference to the morality of procreation. Benatar's asymmetry makes it matter though. Thus, Benatar's asymmetry is unreal. That's one of my arguments.

1. If Benatar's asymmetry is real, then it makes crucial difference to the morality of procreation whether we exist prior to coming into existence here or not, other things being equal
2. If other things are equal, it makes no difference to the morality of procreation whether we exist prior to coming into existence here.
3. Therefore, Benatar's asymmetry is unreal

I gave a reason why the asymmetry, despite being valid in consideration of people as consumers of pain and pleasure, fails when we add their role as producers. The pain of a childless couple can be mitigated in one way only. — Cuthbert

Irrelevant. That's not a criticism of the asymmetry.

My second argument was attacking the asymmetry indirectly. If asymmetry is sound, then nihilism follows. We already reject nihilism. So we can reject the asymmetry without even knowing in detail what might be wrong with it. — Cuthbert

First, you're misusing words. 'True' or 'real', not 'sound' (soundness is a property of arguments).

And 'nihilism' is the view that there are no norms of reason - that is, that we have no reason to do or believe anything and thus no moral reason to do or believe anything.

An antinatalist thinks we ought not to procreate. Thus an antinatalist thinks it is more important, morally speaking, not to procreate than it is to maintain the species. So all you're doing is saying that the asymmetry must be false becasue it implies the truth of antinatalism.

I have explained why prior non-existence has nothing to do with it. One of the flaws in Benatar's argument is precisely that it makes it all hinge on it - which is absurd. Note too that the miserable child that the couple could create does not exist yet - yet they are obliged not to create it.

Your view is that there is no self-evident asymmetry between what an innocent person deserves, other things being equal. So, your view - for which you have provided not a scintilla of evidence - is that an innocent person is as deserving of benefit from others as they are deserving not to be harmed by others. That is, if act a creates a benefit for another person, and act b creates a harm for another person, I have as much reason to do a as not to do b. That is highly counter-intuitive. That view has the upshot that, other things being equal, I have an obligation to bring into existence a happy person if I know that by procreating I can do so. I have as much obligation to do that as I do not to create a miserable person if I know that by procreating I will do so. That's absurd - that's the very result we're trying 'not' to generate. You're just happily generating it.

Don't - don't - point to other considerations, such as how much sacrifice I would have to make to do one rather than the other. There is an 'other things being equal' clause in there! Stop ignoring those. THey mean something. It means that all those other things - such as the amount of cost it will incur for me or not - are being held 'equal'. So, if the costs to the actor are the same, we have positive reason not to visit harm on others, but no positive reason to provide positive benefit to others. The latter would be 'supererogatory' not 'obligatory'.

Anyway, again: the issue here is how best to explain the asymmetry between our intuitions about these cases. Intuitively, I have no positive obligation to create a happy life, but I do have an obligation not to create a miserable one. Other. Things. Being. Equal. That's in the bank. That's not up for dispute. What's up for dispute is how best to account for it - Benatar's way or another way? You have proffered a view - supported by no intuitions - that implies there is no asymmetry in our obligations in respect of the miserable and happy lives. Thus, your view is false. We need to account for the asymmetry, not deny it.

I have explained why I think Benatar's way of 'explaining' the asymmetry is not a good way (see OP). I have then offered an alternative way of explaining the asymmetry that appeals to apparently self-evident truths and so is intuitive in a way that his way is not.

If other things are equal - don't ignore that clause - an innocent person who has done nothing and had nothing done to them (so again, don't change that and decide they're good or they're bad or whatever) does not positively 'deserve' benefit. They are non-deserving of it. By contrast they are positively deserving of not being harmed. That's an intuitive asymmetry. And it explains why - other things being equal - we have no obligation to create happy lives, yet we do have an obligation not to create miserable ones. And it does so in a way that does not generate the problems I have identified with Benatar's account.

I have said multiple times that just because we have a reason to help someone, it doesn't mean that we have to do it. — DA671

If other things are equal, then it does. Other things are equal in these thought experiments.

Just because we believe something, it doesn't mean it's true. — DA671

Why are you saying that? Where have I said otherwise? I am appealing to rational intuitions - taht is, representations of our reason. That, as I have said before, is what all of philosophy appeals to.

If this were the case, then I suppose one could summarily dismiss antinatalism on the basis that most people do believe that having children is good and so is the preservation of the positive aspects of life. — DA671

That's why a case for antinatalism needs to be made. I accept that most people have the rational intuition that antinatalism is false. And that, I think, is the best - and I think only - apparent evidence that it is false. But it is not cast iron, for the rational intuition that procreation is morally ok is hardly powerfully self-evident in the way that, say, 1+ 1 = 2 is. And furthermore, there is good reason to think it is false, given that it would be selected for by evolutionary forces.

You're missing the point. It is still good to benefit me. — DA671

I explicitly said that it would be good!! To receive a non-deserved benefit is 'good'. Not bad. Good.

To receive an undeserved benefit is 'bad'.

To receive a non-deserved benefit is 'good'.

But some goods generate positive reason to perform the acts that will create them, whereas others do not.

And the point is that non-deserved goods do not generate positive reason to perform the acts that will create them.

So, I have a positive obligation not to hit you. I have no positive obligation to give you $1,000.

Now, on your view, according to which there is no asymmetry and we have as much obligation to benefit as not to harm, I have as much obligation to benefit you as to not harm you. And on your view, I have an obligation to procreate. I could create happy children - so I ought to. That's what your view says. I ought not to create miserable children. But if I know that any child I have will be happy, I have a positive obligation to create that child. Yet by hypothesis I do not. I mean, that's precisely the kind of case that Benatar is appealing to and that I am saying his asymmetry does nothing to explain. So it is not up for grabs - it is a fixed point in this debate that we do not have a positive obligation to create happy children, but we do have a positive obligation 'not' to create miserable ones. The question is how best to explain this, not 'whether' it is true.

That view is not supported by our intuitions. That is, it is not self-evident. It's just a view. But a view that cannot call on support from self-evident truths of reason is just that: a view. We have no reason to think it is true and it explains nothing at all.

You just ignored the other things being equal clause.

Do I have as much reason to benefit you as harm you?

The answer is 'no', right?

So, you don't positively deserve any benefit from me - it'd be nice if I benefitted you, but it is not obligatory.

By contrast, I do have an obligation not to visit a harm on you.

This is intuitively obvious. It is asymmetrical. But it is intuitively obvious.

So, other things being equal, an innocent person does not positively deserve benefit - they are 'non' deserving of benefit (not 'undeserving' but 'non-deserving'). But they do deserve not to be harmed.

And note, this 'explains' why we have no positive obligation to procreate even if we know that the life we create will be a happy one, and explains why we do have a positive obligation not to procreate if we know the life we create will be an unhappy one.

It isn't question begging. I am only pointing out that there isn't a sufficient reason to treat the harms and benefits differently. — DA671

So, just to be clear - you think you have as much right to have others benefit you as you do to have them not harm you? Because, you know, that's absurd and you don't really think it and no-one else does either.

It is intuitively obvious that, other things being equal, you deserve not to be harmed by me. And it is equally intuitively obvious that you are not entitled to have me visit a benefit on you.

The claim that seems to imply that we do not deserve happiness because we haven't done anything moral, but we somehow deserve the prevention of suffering even though we haven't done anything good to justify that either. — DA671

On what basis are you disputing it? Do you have the same right to have me visit a benefit on you as you do not to have me visit a harm upon you?

Note too the ambiguity of the view you attribute to me. To say that we 'do not deserve' happiness is ambiguous between being non-deserving of it and being positively undeserving of it.

I would say that we are 'non-deserving' of happiness when we are innocent. So, not undeserving of it, but non-deserving of it.