We do have a positive reason to create good (though that might be mitigated by other factors) just as we might have reasons to not create harm. — DA671

Question begging. Harms can be deserved or non-deserved. If a harm is deserved, then we have reason - or can have raeson to - to create it.

I could benefit you right now by sending you some money. Do I have a positive reason to do that? No, right? I could if I wanted - it is not immoral of me to do it. But I don't have a positive obligation to give you some money. That benefit - the benefit I could create by sending you some money - is non-deserved.

Your argument implies that one needs to have done something good in order to deserve happiness, but if that's the case, then one could also say that they need to have done something worthwhile in order to deserve the prevention of harm (and the people who would have valuable lives need to have done something harmful if they apparently deserve to not experience potential joy). — DA671

I am appealing to self-evident truths. One can say that 2 + 1 = 90, but it has no self-evidence to it at all. Whereas that 2 + 1 = 3 does.

Now, it is self-evident that any harm that befalls an innocent is undeserved.

It is also self-evident that any benefit that befalls an innocent is non-deserved.

Again, I am going to assume that you are innocent. Well, if I just punch you, then I have visited an undeserved harm on you - I have done something wrong, something I had positive reason not to do. But if I send you some money, then I have visited non-deserved benefit on you. I have done something good, but not something I had positive reason to do. Yes?
It's not the case that you deserve not to be punched and deserve to be sent some money. No, you deserve not to be punched, but you are non-deserving of being sent some money.
We all recognize this at some level - rights language can be used to express it. You have a 'right' not to be punched by me, but you have no right to be sent some of my money.

Regarding the ""asymmetry", it doesn't make sense to suggest that people who haven't done any good/bad don't "deserve" to suffer (which is why it would be good to prevent harm, which in turn would imply that they "deserve" to not suffer), but they somehow don't deserve to be happy (since they haven't done anything that justifies not creating that good) — DA671

I don't follow you. Which claim of mine are you denying?

It's true that only the existent can experience goods and bads. — DA671

That's not what I said. I said that in order for something to be good, there has to be someone for whom it is good, for moral value requires a valuer. That's not at all the same as what you just said. Lots of goods and bads are not experiential, but they can still exist. It is just that the goodness of them, or the badness of them, would be 'for' someone insofar as there would be someone valuing or disvaluing that non-experiential state.

Anyway, you have focussed on antinatalism, not the asymmetry I was criticizing. Focus.

Here is, it seems to me, a much better way to explain the asymmetry in our intuitions between the happy-life case and the miserable life case. Better, that is, because it appeals to claims that are self-evident to reason.

When it comes to benefits and harms we can distinguish between the undeserved and the non-deserved.

When a harm or benefit is undeserved, it is bad. And any action that promotes undeserved harm or benefit is an action that we have some moral reason not to perform by virtue of this fact about it. (Note, an undeserved harm could also be construed as harm you deserve not to suffer).

When a harm or benefit is non-deserved, then though it is good if it is a benefit and bad if it is a harm, we do not have any moral reason to perform the action that generates it.

So far, so self evident.

Intuitively, if you have done nothing and nothing has been done to you, then any harm you subsequently suffer is undeserved.

However, equally intuitively, any benefit that subsequently accrues to you is non-deserved. That is, if you have done nothing at all, and some benefit accrues to you, that is good, not bad (if it was undeserved, it would be bad, not good).

So, harms that befall someone who has done nothing or had nothing done to them are undeserved harms that we have reason to prevent. But benefits that befall someone who has done nothing or had nothing done to them are non-deserved and thus are benefits we have no moral reason to create.

This explains why we have moral reason not to create a miserable life - the misery is undeserved harm and thus is harm we have reason not to create - and it explains why we have no positive moral reason to create the happy life - the happiness is non-deserved and is thus happiness we have no reason to create.

It is an asymmetry, but unlike Benatar's it is intuitive and thus explanatory. And it does not generate the problems that Benatar's does. For it makes no difference whether a person pre-exists or not, other things being equal.

Incidentally, it also implies antinatalism. For the benefits contained in a potential life turn out to be non-deserved and thus benefits we have no positive reason to generate. By contrast, the harms contained in a potential life are undeserved and are thus harms we have positive reason not to create.

I think Benatar's asymmetry holds water — Cuthbert

Why? Do my criticisms of it fail - in what way?

Note, this thread is not about the credibility of antinatalism, but about a particular asymmetry that Benatar appeals to in arguing for antinatalism. So if you say "the asymmetry is correct, but it does not imply antinatalism" then you're not focussing on what this thread is about - which is the credibility of the asymmetry, not the credibility of antinatalism.

It doesn't imply suicide. The whole point of it is to show that there's a world of difference in the moral importance of benefit and harm between the existent and non existent. Only the existent can commit suicide, but by doing so they would be depriving themselves of some pleasures.

Anyway, I made criticisms of the argument that you are simply ignoring.

You have described the argument, as did I, but not addressed my criticisms of it.

It's like arguing with farmyard chickens. Here's a nuanced view about the harmfulness of death. "Cluck cluck cluck cluck cluck". Nothing you've just said addresses anything I have argued.

Other than that, I don't think that unsubstantiated claims about the badness of death can be accepted. — DA671

It's a 'conclusion' not an unsubstantiated claim!

I am not denying it would be good if no one was experiencing pain. The point is that it would be good for someone, namely the person whose valuing of something constitutively determines that it has moral value.
Benatar is assuming that there can be moral value in the absence of any and all valuers. And that makes no sense.

Perhaps it is open to Benatar to concede that there does indeed need to be someone for whom a good state of affairs is good in order for it to be good. Yet he could argue that this person - the source of moral value - values a universe in which there is no suffering, but is indifferent to the absence of pleasure when there is no one from whom it is absent.

Yes. The point, though, is that it would be good for someone. That is, there would be someone who is valuing the absence of anyone experiencing pain.
Or are you asking if absence of pain would be good even if no one exists? In that case, no - for the reasons given in the OP.

I have argued that death is a great harm and that its harmfulness consists in what it does to you, rather than what it deprives you of. It takes you to hell - to a world worse than this one, anyway.

Most people, if asked, would agree that they do not know for sure what happens after we die. Yet most people think that it is one of two possibilities - that death is either the cessation of our existence, or a door to heaven. I have shown that neither of those is remotely plausible - I mean, they just have nothing to be said for them at all and are, I would suggest, wholly a product of wishful thinking and/or a total lack of any thinking at all. The truth is that death takes us to a worse place. But even if you think - because you're a confused little chicken - that I have not put the matter beyond a reasonable doubt, the fact is it is a possibility. That is, even if you want to wrap yourself up in the whole 'how do we know anything' silly scepticism that infects most of those whose capacity to think clearly is severely limited, you should accept that though we do not know what happens after death, one possibility is that it takes us to a worse place.

Now, if you accept that it is distinctly possible that death takes us to a worse place - and you should - then you should also accept that it would be culpably reckless to expose an innocent to that possibility.

Our predicament is that we are all heading inexorably to hell. Well, antinatalism is a no-brainer if that's true.

But even if we do not know whether we are heading inexorably to hell, or to nowhere, or to heaven, antinatalism is still a no-brainer. For it is immoral to expose an innocent to the risk of an inexorably journey to hell, and that's what you're doing if you procreate. You can hope that we're all going to heaven, or nowhere, or that there's just more of the same the other side of death - you can hope those things. But those hopes do not justify you in summoning an innocent into existence here so that they have to run the same gauntlet you've been made to run.

Until we know - know beyond a reasonable doubt - that death is a portal to heaven, or perhaps to nowhere - one should accept that it is immoral to procreate.

Many "mediocre" lives can also have value — DA671

But I did not deny that! Jeeez. However, clearly whatever intrinsic value they have, we nevertheless have overall reason not to start them. And this is plausibly because they harm their liver. It can't be 'becasue' they have intrinsic value - that'd make no real sense. Rather it is because 'despite' their intrinsic value, they harm their liver.

And when such lives are underway, we do not have reason to end them. Why? Becuase killing the liver would harm the liver even more.

Any intrinsic value the life may have is playing no role in these explanations. So you can keep pointing out that life has - or sometimes has - some intrinsic value, but it's beside the point for I am not denying it and it clearly plays no fundamental role in explaining why we have reason not to kill ourselves.

I haven't claimed that all lives are worth creating due to their "intrinsic value". — DA671

I never said you did. You've missed the point. If it makes it easier, just assume I think that all lives have some intrinsic value, other things being equal. The point is that moderately miserable lives are lives we ought to refrain from creating (if we know they'll be moderately miserable). Now, it would clearly be stupid to try and explain that by citing their intrinsic value! "We ought not to create them because they're intrinsically valuable". That's dumb. No, any plausible analysis of why we ought not to create them is going to mention their harmfulness to their liver. That is, we have a duty - normally - not to create harm and thus not to create harmful lives. And that duty plausibly eclipses any putative duty to create intrinsic value. And thus that is why it is wrong - or is part of the story about why it is wrong - to create moderately miserable lives. It's the same story we'd give about incredibly miserable lives. They harm their liver.

Yet such lives are being lived. And if you are living one, it would be irrational for you to kill yourself. Now the reason for that cannot be that your life has intrinsic value, for that is already acknowledged and we know already that such value does not eclipse in importance the importance of sparing you the miserable life. Thus, the reason you have not to kill youself is that killing yourself will make your situation - which is already bad - much, much worse.

As far as the death penalty is concerned, I don't think that there is much confusion here. Since the convict could still have a decent life, the loss of their life/the pain they would feel would certainly be a harm for them. I feel that the latter is more relevant, but the larger point is that both of these points make more sense than some unjustifiable idea regarding the intrinsic badness of death. — DA671

You haven't engaged with the argument I made, you've just resurrected the deprivation account of the harmfulness of death - a view I keep, keep, refuting. It's like arguing with goldfish!

Look, first, a mass murderer's life doesn't have any intrinsic value. They're a mass murderer! They've lost their value by what they've done. That's the first thing and even if you disagree, it's a pretty damn plausible claim. Yet death still harms them. So, the harmfulness of killing a mass murderer doesn't consist in it robbing the world of some intrinsic value. I mean, I explained this and you've just blithely ignored that argument.

And you can't plausibly claim that it harms the murderer himself by depriving him of something - for what does it deprive him of? A life in prison? It harms him because it is harmful.

Again, I have refuted the deprivation account of the harmfulness of death about 100x now, yet you and others just keep invoking it.

If the deprivation account is true, then death isn't harmful to a person living a mildly miserable life.

It is though, isn't it!?! They have reason to keep living.

So, what follows logically from that? This: the deprivation account is false.

If P, then Q
Not Q
Therefore not P.

The deprivation account is false.

Sarah wants to go to the cinema. She falls over in the bathroom and breaks both her legs and spends the evening in agony. Now, how has Sarah been harmed? What's the main way in which those broken legs have harmed her? Is it that they deprived of an evening at the cinema?? Er, no. She has been deprived of that, no question. But it's stupid to think 'that' is the core explanation of why Sarah's broken legs are a bad thing for her. They're bad for her becasue they've pitched her into agony.

Deprivation accounts of the harmfulness of death are every bit as stupid as deprivation accounts of the harmfulness of Sarah's leg breaking incident.

Don't now switch to talking about intrinsic value - I refuted that view too above. Don't be a goldfish.

These possibilities seem demonstrably false.

For example, imagine you know - thanks to a pocket oracle or something - that any child you have will have a life of moderate misery. No great highs or lows, just hum drum misery and boredom. Ought you refrain from procreating if other things are equal? (So don't muddy the water by imagining you really want to have a child, or that your own welfare depends crucially on you having a child, for you need someone to go down the mine for you when you are old - exclude all those sort of considerations).

Seems clear you should refrain So, that life isn't worth starting. Maybe there's some kind of intrinsic value to being alive, but not enough to make starting that life and subjecting someone to a lifetime of moderate misery a moral thing to do.

There are plenty of such lives being lived. Yet those living them do not have reason to kill themselves. That can't plausibly be to do with the intrinsic value of life, for otherwise it would be equally clear that these are lives worth starting. Yet it seems they are not worth starting, however once started they their lives have reason to stay.

Another example: the death penalty. There's a debate over whether it is justified, but there's no question it is a penalty (the debate is over whether this is a penalty it is moral to serve to someone). Now, if it was the intrinsic value of life that explains why we have reason not to destroy it, as opposed to it being predominantly to do with the harm it visits on the person who dies, then the death penalty wouldn't be a penalty. I mean, a Rembrandt painting has some intrinsic value. So imagine the 'penalty' for murder is that we will destroy the Rembrandt. Well, that's crazy. Yes, we will have destroyed something of intrinsic value, but what's that to the murderer? The death penalty would be like that if the rationality of death was a matter primarily of its intrinsic value as opposed to it being about harm to the one who is to be killed. Note I am not denying life has intrinsic value, I am just pointing out how implausible it is to think that it is at the heart of why we have reason not to kill ourselves and others must of the time.

Consider too that plausibly a mass murderer's life does not have any intrinsic value. Yet it seems clear that death still harms mass murderer. The harmfulness of death, then, seems to have little if anything to do with the intrinsic value of life, for it harms us even when that value is absent.

Another example to illustrate the point. Sarah is very beautiful, andbeauty has intrinsic value. Now imagine there's a machine that you can put your face in and it'll scrape away your features with knives. Now it seems obvious that Sarah has reason not to put her face into that machine. Why? Is it primarily because if she did that she would no longer be beautiful and thus would have destroyed something of intrinsic value - the beauty of her face? Or would the main reason be that it'll be absolute agony and seriously affect her life for the worse? The latter, right? After all, even someone who is ugly has reason not to put their face in it.

Well, that's what the harmfulness of death seems to be like. Life may have some intrinsic value, but death's harmfulness to us seems to have nothing to do with it. And it is its harmfulness to us that seems to be what provides us with reason to avoid it, extreme agony aside.

That's the deprivation account again. And the problem with it is that death is clearly a harm even when our lives have ceased to be worthwhile.

So, again, if you are in agony, then death may be rational. But it is not good, is it? It is the lesser of two evils. If your only options are razor blade soup or shit soup, then shit soup is better. But it's still shit soup.

The disvalue of death is not a function of the value of the life it terminates.

If you are in the restaurant and not really enjoying it as every dish you've been served is grey mush, is it a good idea to order the shit soup and leave (remembering that you can't leave without eating the vat of shit soup)? Well, what does the waiter say? The waiter says no - better to stay and continue eating grey mush for as long as possible. If you get served razorblade soup- yes, now it is sensible to order the shit soup and leave, not otherwise.

Your example had nothing to do with anything I was arguing, at least so far as I could see.

What point were you trying to make with it?

Ah, I see, so you have precisely no point whatsoever to make with your restaurant example, you were just talking about restaurants. Excellent. Just excellent. Why the hell did I just waste some peep juice reading it then!? Bartricks is illustrating his point with a restaurant example. I know! I'll say some things about restaurants. Restaurants sometimes have nice things on the menu. My favourite restaurant is the canteen at my day centre. It serves ice cream on thursdays. I like ice cream. If we go to the canteen and order ice cream and like it, was that worthwhile? Do tell me Bartricks, for it is very relevant to the argument you have made. Oh, you have run off into a field to scream at some horses and pull large clumps of your own hair out. Oh well, each to their own.

Relevance? Every time someone visits a restaurant for the first time they don't know whether they want to be there or not. That doesn't stop them from entering. Even if they are forced in the restaurant, they can still enjoy their meal. — pfirefry

Back at you: relevance? I don't understand what point you are making. I have described a situation analogous to the one we are in. All you have done is describe one that is nothing like it at all. What moral can we possibly extract from your version of the example? I don't see how you're engaging with the point my example is making at all.

So, kindly explain to me what point you were trying to make with your restaurant example and what, exactly, you think it challenges in the argument that I have made.

Is your point that there are some nice things on the menu??? Is that it? Er, I know. Nothing I have argued implies otherwise.

Engage with the example. I did not deny that there are nice things on the menu. I pointed out that shit soup is on it and furthermore you have to have shit soup eventually, and the waiter - which in case you didn't realize it, is modelling what reason tells us about death - tells us that shit soup is worse than everything else on the menu, including things you really don't want to eat, except broken razorblade soup.

So, read the example again and try and understand what it is doing - for you clearly haven't a clue at the moment.

Since it's possible to come into a restaurant, enjoy a meal and leave without facing anything disgusting, it should also be possible to come into life, enjoy what it has to offer and leave without being induced any major harm. — pfirefry

I don't see how that follows - the situation you describe is not remotely analogous to our situation.

First, we do not voluntarily enter the restaurant. We do not choose to be here, but were made to come here - or, summoned into existence here - by the acts of others.

So, first, we're at the restaurant whether we want to be or not.

Second, we don't get to choose the courses, or at least we can make a choice, but whether we get it is not wholly determined by that choice, but all manner of other factors (though our choice often influences what we get). So, you can ask for tomato soup, and you may get it, but you may get razorblade soup - it depends as much on what's going on in the kitchen as it does on your choices. (Although if you order shit soup, that does fairly reliably arrive).

So, when you force someone - and it is force - to join you in the restaurant that you yourself have been forced into, you don't know what they're going to be served.

Third, everyone gets shit soup at the end. Everyone. Shit soup is death, remember? You don't know what anyone you force to join you here is going to be served in the meantime, but you do know this - their meal will end with a giant serving of shit soup and they have to eat it all. Everyone in the restaurant has to eat shit soup in the end (and then you leave). All you can do is delay it. But you will - absolutely will - eat shit soup if you're in the restaurant. And you can leave the restaurant early, but you have to order the shit soup and eat it before you can do so.

And the waiter has told you - and tells everyone else in the restaurant as well - not to order shit soup, that shit soup is worse than virtually any other dish on the menu, bar razorblade soup.

That's our situation. It's not remotely like the scenario you describe.

Now, if that's our situation, is it not wrong to force someone to join you in the restaurant? Yes, obviously it is wrong. It is bad enough that you have been forced into this restaurant. But you should make the most of it - for there is nothing else you can do - and try and order the best dishes and hope that you will actually be served them and try and forget that, whatever you get served and no matter how delicious it is, you are going eventually to have to eat a huge vat of shit soup. That's what you should do. What you should not do is press the button on the table that brings another diner to your table without their prior consent.

So to me, you wish to remove any emotional content within rational thinking or you are defining the term rational thinking as being devoid of human desire. — universeness

No, the point rather is that neither impressions of reasons to do things, or reasons to do things themselves, are desires of ours. And thus to get the impression that there is a reason to do something is not equivalent to getting the impression that one desires to do it (anymore than getting the impression of a tree is equivalent to getting the impression that one desires there to be a tree). And reasons themselves are not desires of ours.

Note as well that an impression of a tree is 'evidence' that there is actually a tree there by dint of the fact it generates a 'reason to believe' that there is a tree there corresponding to the impression.

So, all appeals to evidence are really appeals to reasons to believe things. And among the reasons to believe things that there are - and that our faculty of reason tells us about - are reasons to avoid death at almost all costs.

Our reason is our guide to reality. It is precisely because our reason tells us to believe that there is an external world resembling our sensible impressions that we have 'evidence' for an external world.
And our reason tells us - tells virtually all of us - that we have reason to avoid death under all but the most extreme circumstances.

Why might that be? What would it be 'reasonable' to believe about death, given what our reason is telling us about it? That it is pleasant? That it benefits us to die? That it is a portal to a better place? Those would be utterly unreasonable - as unreasonable as thinking that as the waiter has been imploring you not to order shit soup and recommends ordering almost anything else other than shit soup bar broken razorblade soup, that shit soup is delicious and something to look forward to and to seek out and not to avoid at all.

Ok, let's say you are correct. Is that the end of the debate for you? — universeness

It would be the end of the debate for all reasonable people - for if I am right about what our reason is saying our predicament is, then it is obvious that it is wrong voluntarily to make it anyone else's predicament. For if I am right, then our predicament is terrible - orders of magnitude worse than most people assume it to be. Most people assume either that death is the end, or that it is a portal to heaven. Neither of those views is remotely sensible - neither of those views is implied by reason and I defy anyone to show me otherwise. Now, if we're all going to hell in a handbasket - and if that is the inevitable fate of anyone here - then voluntarily to bring an innocent person into our predicament to share it with us would be a wicked thing to do. So it would indeed 'end the debate' in that it would make procreation about as obviously immoral as, say, rape.

You have not read it at all carefully. I made no claims about human desires. I did not say - and would not, for it is stupid - that we desire not to die and therefore a hell exists. How on earth would that make sense?

I said it is clear to our reason - which is a faculty - that we have reason to avoid death.

It is clear to anyone who stands where I am stood that there is a tree 10 yards in front of this location. Have I just said 'everyone wants there to be a tree 10 yards in front if this location'? No,obviously not. I said that, visually, people get the impression of a tree, and that's evidence there is actually a tree there. That's quite different to the unbelievably idiotic view that we desire there to be a tree there and this somehow makes the case that there is.

Now, again, slowly. Our reason - which is a faculty - gives us the impression (rational, not visual) that we have reason not to die under most circs. 'Reason not to' - that doesn't mean 'desire not to'. It means 'reason not to'. That impression is evidence that we really do have reason not to die in mist circs, unjust as the visual impression of a tree is evidence for a tree.

And then I argued that the best explanation of why we have that reason not to die is that death is a portal to hell.

Anyway, I do not know why you are asking me about the origins of the sensible world. By hypothesis, death ends our stay here in the sensible world. So why are you asking me about its origins? Which premise in my case is it relevant to?

No, neither of those follows.

Have you read the op? Clearly not. Focus on the argument in the op.

A good test for BS is whether you can say the opposite and it sound just as profound to a Buddhist. Apply it to everything you have ever said. So,

A soul cannot exist without a state. It's state is itself — Gregory

Hmm, "A soul can exist without a state: it is itself, not a state". Yep. I think we can safely say that your average Buddhist would go 'ooo' to that one just as readily as to the reverse.

a soul implies the person is divided between two principles as it's essential components. That is not something, though, that is experienced in life. Identity is unity — Gregory

"A soul implies a person who is not divided between two principles as its essential components. That is something, though, that is experienced in life. Identity is not unity". Yep. You could just as easily have said that, right?

Anyway, do try and focus on the issue at hand. There is an afterlife. All the evidence implies there is one. Minds are indestructible, bodies not. So when our body is destroyed, we continue living. And it harms us to lose these bodies. So there's an afterlife, and it's hell.

Buddhist.

I am going to go and explain this to a horse now, as that would be a better use of my time. Tara.

I don't publish is journals, no. But this is a forum for everyone — Gregory

I know you don't. I do though. And you don't know what you're talking about. 'Consciousness' is a 'state'. It's not a 'thing'. Not an 'object'. It's a 'state'. And what it is a state of.....is called 'a mind'.

There's a big debate about what kind of a thing 'a mind' is - is it a material thing or an immaterial thing. But it is a thing, not a state.

Minds 'have' consciousness. They aren't themselves the consciousness. That's as confused as thinking that as water is wet, water is the wetness.

But anyway, this is pointless as, like I say, you're far, far too confidently wrong to be able to be aware of it.

Have you published anything on the philosophy of mind? It's just you're bizarrely confident for someone who clearly doesn't know what they're talking about.

How many meditations did Descartes publish again? 5 or 6?

Our "reason" does not tell us that death itself alters our being or is a terrible hellish dimension. Perhaps yours do, but that's a separate matter. — DA671

Do pay attention: that's a 'conclusion'. Our reason does not tell us it directly. We have to 'infer' it.

Once more, my restaurant example. The waiter in this example is playing the part of your faculty of reason. You're in a restaurant. You have to order something from the menu. There are lots of things on the menu - some things you like, some things you know will make you a bit ill, and some that are mysterious and you've never heard of before. One of those is 'shit soup' and the other is 'razorblade soup'. You ask about these. The waiter - who is bit cryptic - insists that you really shouldn't order shit soup. He doesn't tell you what's in it, but he insists that virtually anything else on the menu would be better. You say "but what about mushrooms - I am allergic to mushrooms and if I eat them I'll be sick for a week.....would mushrooms be better than shit soup?" The waiter says "yes, certainly - you're even better off ordering the mushrooms than the shit soup". Now, what is the waiter implying? That shit soup is great? That shit soup is so-so? Or that shit soup is really, really horrible?

Really horrible, yes?

The only - the only - dish the waiter says shit soup would be preferable to, is razorblade soup, which the waiter does explain is a soup full of broken razorblades.

Now, if shit soup is something the waiter is recommending you avoid at all costs bar razorblade soup - a soup that is full of broken razorblaes - and is recomending you avoid even at the cost of eating mushroom soup instead - a soup that will make you sick for a week - then shit soup is really foul and really bad for you, yes? Even someone with an iq of 70 could see that.

That's what your reason is telling you about death.

Your reason could be corrupt.

But it's what virtually everyone else's reason tells them about it too.

Their reason could be corrupt to.

But if you think your reason and everyone else's is corrupt on this issue, but not on others, then you need to justify that belief.

And what is your argument? Or do I once again have to remind you that you're not God and you don't get to determine what's what?

Construct an argument in which 'minds are complex' is the conclusion and then we can see what premises you needed to generate it. If those premises are not self-evident truths of reason - or themselves derivable from some - your argument fails.

Where's the argument. You define a soul then assume it's existence from it's definition. Is it an ontological argument? — Gregory

I don't think you know what an argument is.

Consciousness means mind — Gregory

Have you published on the nature of the mind?

Except that not all intuitions are rational. — DA671

Again, we're getting into general issues. Most people have the intuition - which is a term of art that I, like most philosophers, am using to refer to a representation of our reason - that we have reason to avoid death under most circumstances.

The default is that an appearance is accurate, not inaccurate. That's called the principle of phenomenal conservatism and without it you're not going to be able to argue for anything at all - you're just going to be a lazy sceptic.

So, our reason (which is a faculty) tells us that we have reason to avoid death. That's evidence that we do have reason to avoid death.

If you think it isn't because there is the brute possibility that what our reason tells us, and what is actually the case, can be distinct, then you're just saying 'how can we know anything?'. And you lose.

So, if you think that these particular intuitions and not all representations of our reason are false, then provide an argument for that claim. That is, show me that there are other representations that our reason makes that contradict this representation and that we have as much or more reason to trust than the one I am appealing to.

If you could realise that your own argument is premised upon people's intuitions and attitude towards death — DA671

No, it appeals to people's intuitions - their rational intuitions - which is what any argument for anything does. So, you know, if that's a problem, then we better stop all intellectual investigation and just make shit up instead. (Not 'and attitudes' - that's just you and others who don't seem able to read or understand English).

Stop being so amateurish in your approach. It's what those who can't reason do in response to any argument for anything they dislike: they reject the entire project of arguing for things.

Now, I have indeed appealed to rational intuitions. If you think the rational intuitions in question are false, provide an argument. Lay it out.

If you think the intuition that we have reason to avoid death (and remember - remember - it is by reason that we find out about what we have reason to do and believe....so don't go dissing reason as a method of finding out about the world...that's what dummies do) is false, then argue that it is false. Lay it out.

And if you end up questioning how we can know anything at all, you lose.

This is a philosophy forum. Do some. Don't just state things.

Consciousness is not a subject -that's gibberish. Consciousness is a state. It is a state of mind.

And it is minds that are indivisible and thus exist with aseity.

And we do have souls, for souls are immaterial minds and minds are immaterial, for minds are simple and no material thing is simple.

Those were all arguments. An argument - good one - extracts the implications of some self-evident truths of reason. What Gregory does is just express his views.

So, here's an argument:

1. Minds are indivisible (self-evident to reason)
2. Only simple things are indivisible (for a complex thing can be divided into its component parts)
3. Therefore minds are simple things

Here's another, building on the last

1. If minds are simple things, then they can neither be created nor destroyed
2. minds are simple things (see argument above)
3. therefore, minds can neither be created nor destroyed.

Don't just say some stuff. Engage with the arguments by constructing an equally valid argument that has the negation of one of those premises as a conclusion - then we can inspect the premises and see if they have any self-evidence.

And does that reason not compel us to avoid death? Your wording in the OP is "bids us". — Down The Rabbit Hole

No. This: "you have reason to avoid death" does not - obviously does not - mean the same as "you are compelled to avoid death". It also doesn't mean "there's some chicken in the fridge" or "our car is on fire".

And if I bid you do something, does that mean you're compelled to do it?

Look, you're just reading sloppily - you're just totally misunderstanding perfectly regular English sentences. I have not said and would not say that we are 'compelled' to avoid death.

Do you believe in evolution? I — Down The Rabbit Hole

Yes. Focus. Re-read the OP carefully. Read my words and stop - stop - exchanging them for words of your own that don't at all mean the same thing.

No, we've been over this; focus! It only undermines beliefs that have no reasoning apart from feeling self-evidently true. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Er, no. You're committing the genetic fallacy. I'm not going to explain why again, for explaining things to someone who doesn't understand what words mean is a waste of finger energy.

This self-evident truth is starting to look more like religious faith. — Down The Rabbit Hole

I don't have any religious faith. Nothing you think is correct.

Why does it matter how angry a thesis makes you? Do you think reality cares? Are you 6?

There's life after death whether you like it or not.

First, death is a harm. Yet death would not be a harm unless we existed at the time, for one surely cannot be harmed by something if one does not exist to be harmed by it. Thus, if death is a harm, then we exist when we die. But if death was the cessation of our existence, then we would not exist at the time. Thus death is not the cessation of our existence - and thus we live after death.

Second, our minds are indivisible. You either have a mind or you do not. There is no such thing as half a mind.

If our minds were complex objects then they would be divisible. But as they are indivisible, they must be simple.

Simple objects exist with aseity, that is they are self-existent and have neither been created - for there is nothing from which one can make them - or deconstructed - for there is nothing into which one can deconstruct them.

Thus, our minds are immortal. And as minds are always in some kind of mental state, and to be alive is to be in a mental state, then life does not end.

Your OP says even those with a bad life are compelled to avoid death — Down The Rabbit Hole

No it doesn't. Sheesh. It says that we have 'reason to' avoid death. Reason to. Reason to. Reason to. Reason to. Not 'will'. Reason to. Not 'will'. Not 'desire to'. Not 'fear'. Reason to.

I replied pointing out that this is because we are hardwired to do so — Down The Rabbit Hole

Yeah, irrelevant. False. And irrelevant.

you then responded to others and me that it is "intuitive" and "self-evident" that we have reason to avoid death - I reiterated that it feels intuitive and self evident because of our hardwiring. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Again, false and irrelevant. It's called the genetic fallacy- the fallacy of thinking that if a belief or impression has a cause, then that automatically discredits the belief or impression. It works for any goddamn belief or impression of anything at all - so it's a really dumb argument. You keep making it. Draw the inference.

Let's cut out the middle bit, — Down The Rabbit Hole

You mean you want to rewrite my premise so that it is something different and then attack that one, yes? Why not rewrite it so it is a recipe for pesto and then tell me that I left out parmesan? No, don't cut out the middle bit - don't do a damn thing to it. Attempt to show it - it, not some other premise of your own invention - is false.

As you have indicated that death would be best for those in agony, the "we" would only be the majority of people. Therefore death would only harm and permanently alter the condition of the majority of people for the worse. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Er, what? No, I have argued that death harms everyone.

I'll try and take you through it (utterly pointlessly) by means of some examples.

Sarah and Jane both want to go to the cinema to see a film. Now, if Sarah sees the film, she'll really enjoy it. But if Jane sees the film, unbeknownst to her, she'll be kidnapped and tortured for years in a crazy person's basement. Okay? That's what happens if they go to the cineman: Sarah have good time; Jane have very bad time.

Now, they're both getting ready to go to the cinema, but unfortunately the ceiling of their house falls on top of them and painfully pins them to the ground and breaks many of their bones. So, rather than going to the cinema, they both spend the evening in agony under plaster and wood.

Have both Sarah and Jane been seriously harmed by the ceiling falling on top of them? Yes. They're both in agony with broken bones. They're both screaming in pain. It is not 'good' to have a ceiling fall on top of you and break your bones. It is not good for Sarah and it is not good for Jane.

However, Sarah has been deprived of a nice evening at the cinema, whereas Jane has been deprived of years or torture. So, Jane is 'better off' than she would otherwise have been, whereas Sarah is worse off.

Your logic tells you that it was good for Jane to have the ceiling fall on her. No it wasn't. It was bad. It was just 'better than' the alternative. 'Better than' does not mean 'good'. This distinction is, of course, too subtle for the internet.

If you're in agony with no prospect of it ending, then death may well be the better option. 'Better'. That doesn't mean it is good. It is not good to have a ceiling fall on you and cause you agony. It may be 'better than' many things, but it is not 'good'.

If you go to a restaurant that serves food all of which is foul, but you happen to order the least foul thing on the menu, that does not mean you had a good meal. You had a bad meal, but it was better than the alternatives.

So, if option a is better than option b, that doesn't mean option a is good for you. Death is better than some things - better than a life of unending agony. But that does not mean it is good. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely it is good, for we are told that it is the 'worse' option under almost all circumstances - the only kinds of circumstances under which it is the 'better' option are ones in which you're in absolute agony with no prospect of the agony ending so long as you remain here.


Death is an immense harm to everyone. Everyone. That's why we use it to punish people. Punishment isn't punishment unless it harms. The death penalty is a 'penalty'. It is a a harm. Death is a harm. A big one. For everyone.

How big? Well, you gage that by looking at how much harm you need to be suffering or prospectively suffering before it becomes rational to seek death. And the answer is: a lot of harm. And even then, if the harm you are undergoing will end soon, death seems irrational as a means to avoid it. So, if I can save my life by sawing my arm off, I seem to have reason to do that even though that'll cause me about as intense an amount of suffering as one can conceive of. So long as I stand a decent chance of surviving and not living in agony for the rest of my life, it makes sense to saw my arm off.

Going back to my restaurant example, imagine that there's a dish on the menu called 'shit soup'. Now, the waiter tells you that virtually everything on the menu is better than shit soup, even after you tell the waiter that several of the other items are ones that, if you eat them, will make you ill due to your allergies. The waiter says 'ah, yes, but shit soup is still worse than that - better to have stomach cramps for a week than eat the shit soup'. But then there's razor soup. The waiter says "ah, shit soup is better than razor soup". Now, do you conclude that shit soup is a nice soup? The waiter has told you that virtually anything else on the menu is better, including items that the waiter knows will make you ill. The only item the waiter says is worse than shit soup is razor soup - a soup filled with thousands of broken razors. What do you conclude about shit soup? That it is good?

So death is a whopping great harm, and furthermore it seems it alters our condition permanently, otherwise why is the rationality of suicide affected mainly by how likely it is that the harm you are using death to escape will come to characterize the rest of your life here, or will pass?

THus, the reasonable conclusion is that death is a portal to hell.

To return to the restaurant once more, imagine that anyone who enters this restaurant 'has' to end their meal with shit soup. No matter what you order, you have eventually to eat a bowl of shit soup. Everyone. You don't know what other dishes you'll be served - you may get served the finest truffles and venison and ice cream or you may start with razor soup and then more razor soup - but no matter what other courses you get served, you will be served shit soup at the end. And it is not a little bowl either, but a giant vat. And you have to eat it all. If you're half way decent, are you going to recommend visiting that restaurant? Are you going to take a friend to it?

Again, stop the blithering and engage with the argument. Start by understanding it. Then try and see if you can construct an argument that challenges a premise. Resist the urge to talk about human psychology. None of my premises make any claims about motivations or fears. This is getting painful now.

You have found your level.

I take it there is universal agreement that if death really is a portal to hell, then it would be seriously wrong to procreate? That is, I take it that antinatalism is a moral no-brainer if our situation really is that we - that is, anyone and everyone here - are heading inexorably to hell?

The primary dispute was regarding the "best explanation part" (A1:P1) since as I have said innumerable times, the explanation is not the "best" one once we realise that the true reasons why people find death to be bad (pain, avoidance of a supposedly horrible void that we are implicitly made to believe in by our environment, the pursuit of valuable experiences) do not have as much to do with the reality of death as they do with our motivations and partial misconceptions — DA671

So here you are saying that we do not have reason to avoid death, because there are explanations of our fear of death (something I did not mention). Er, what? I claim 'x'. You reply 'but we can explain y'.

Then, having - in your view - provided some kind of argument against my claim that we have reason to avoid death under most circumstances (which you didn't do at all), you then say:

Of course, this does not mean that we do not have a reason to avoid dying. — DA671

So do we or don't we? You seem profoundly confused. Then there's just more blather that doesn't engage with anything I have argued. You really don't seem to understand the argument I have made at all.