No, from the beginning I have argued that we have 'reason' to avoid death in all but the most extreme circumstances.learn to read and then read the op.

What an excellent point. Yes, definitely the weak point in my argument is my claim that we have reason to avoid death under most circumstances. It's a really controversial claim. Good job.

Jeez, can't you people understand the difference between a normative claim - a claim about what we have reason to do - and a psychological claim - a claim about how we behave? No, it seems.

Now, once more Clarky boy, try and answer the question: do you think we have reason to avoid death under most circumstances?

Don't answer a different question. Don't tell me your recipe for mushroom soup. Don't give me your theory about human psychology. Answer the question I asked.

I'll do it for you to save time - the answer is 'yes'.

Now read the OP again and address something I argued.

What are you on about? Why are you talking about DNA? Try and focus on the argument I made and resist the desire to express controversial and irrelevant theories about what causes us to behave as we do.

No, my argument does not assume the conclusion. It leads to it. That's what arguments do - they extract the implications of their premises.

Now, the premises of my argument are uncontroversial. The conclusion is alarming. But the premises are hard sensibly to deny. That's what makes it a good argument.

Here's one of my premises: we have powerful reason to avoid death, extreme unending agony aside - indeed, we have reason to avoid death even when our lives are so-so or mildly miserable.

That's not a controversial premise - not remotely. Anyone who denies it owes an argument - and their argument better have premises that are obviously true, otherwise they would be rejecting a powerfully self-evident claim on the basis of a less self-evident claim, which is dumb.

Here's another claim: the reason you have reason to avoid death under virtually all circumstances bar extreme unending agony is that it harms you. That is, it is contrary to your interests to die - extreme unending agony aside.

Do you dispute that? There's some room to dispute it - it is a more sensible premise to dispute than the previous one. For it is at least in principle possible that we have reason to avoid death for reasons unrelated to harm. However, once more, you'd need an argument. For on the face of it, death is harmful - that is, the claim that death is harmful seems no less self-evident to reason than the claim that we have reason to avoid death. Note as well that a whole range of attitudes towards another's death would be irrational if death was, contrary to what our reason tells us, not harmful.

The best explanation of why we have reason to avoid death under most circumstances is that it harms us.

Now the gravity of that harm must be immense. If we have reason to avoid death even when our lives are mildly miserable - and show no prospect of being anything other than mildly miserable - then it is clearly really harmful. And not just a one off harm either.

That's all I need for the antinatalist conclusion. For if death is such an immense harm, then it operates to make lives that feature it - that is, all lives - not worth starting.

So, just to be clear, you are claiming that, in general, we do not have reason to avoid death? That is such a lame and absurd objection - you're welcome to it. You're denying a premise that is obviously true. It's just silly.

No, you're not getting it.

I am not arguing that it is reasonable to avoid death. That'd be like arguing that 1 + 2 = 3. It is self-evident to reason that we have reason to avoid death.

I am then extracting the implications of this.

If you resist my conclusion by denying that we have reason to avoid death, you lose.

Yes, although it is the other way around. Suicide is intuitively irrational under most circumstances. That's not a conclusion, but a premise. So, it is clear to our reason that it would be irrational to kill oneself to avoid mild discomfort - irrational to kill oneself to escape a so-so life here. We have reason to avoid death until or unless our lives become unbearably painful and undignified. These are not claims that I am arguing for, rather I take them to be self-evident. (Any argument for them would have premises no more plausible than the claims themselves and Aristotle counselled against arguing for the more certain by means of the less).

The best explanation of why we have reason not to kill ourselves (and others) under all but the most extreme circumstances is that death is exceedingly harmful. And furthermore, that it is not a one-off harm whose gravity can just be factored into our utility calculations, but rather that it permanently changes ones condition for the worse.

Thus, our reason tells us, in so many words, that death is a portal to a worse world.

Suicide was always irrational under most circumstances - but now we have an explanation of why: if you kill yourself, chances are you will be making your situation worse.

And feeling sorry for those who have died or been killed (not just feeling sorry for oneself) - which was always rational - can now also be explained: those who have died have been made worse off. Things are going badly for them.

And feeling moral outrage at killers - which was always rational - also makes sense: they have made their victim's situations much worse.

And of course, now it is clear that procreation is wrong - among the most wicked things one can do. For it is to bring another person into our unenviable predicament.

Even if death does not end our consciousness, it does not mean that it would be better for one to not exist. — DA671

I provided an argument for that very claim. You are just ignoring it.

Obviously it is possible for death to benefit us. If death is a portal to heaven, then it benefits us. I said this! But then we would not have reason to avoid it, would we? And we do have reason to avoid it under virtually all circumstances. Even if our lives are moderately miserable and show no sign of improving, we still have reason to avoid death. So, it isn't a portal to heaven, is it? It is a portal to hell.

Then you propose a deprivation account of the harmfulness of death - an account I refuted in the OP.

I'll do it again. If the deprivation account of the harmfulness of death is correct, then if your life is so-so and you die, then your death is not a harm and you have no reason to try and avoid it (for it would be depriving you of nothing worth having). Yet if your life is so-so, you still have reason to avoid death. If death is something you have reason to avoid - and thus is something harmful (for that is the best explanation of why we have reason to avoid it) even when it deprives you of nothing worth having, then it does not harm you by depriving you of anything. It harms you by altering your condition - for the worse.

And again: if the deprivation account is correct, then death can never be the lesser of two evils. Yet it is often the lesser of two evils - if someone is in unending agony, then it is best that they die. But their death is still a harm. Yet if the deprivation account is correct, it would not be a harm at all under such circumstances. Again: so much the worse for the deprivation account.

Yes, but I didn't say that - i asked you to provide a quote and you couldn't. You don't seem to understand the difference between saying 'you have a reason to do x' and saying 'you fear doing x'. The first is a normative claim, the latter a psychological one.

Anyway, I suggest you re-read the OP and try and discern the argument contained in it. Then try and challenge a premise.

So, just to be clear, all you are saying is that if my argument is sound, then it is sound?

What's the point in saying that? If the earth is flat, then it is flat. If it is spherical, then it is spherical.

All you are doing is, in effect, just playing the tedious "How do we know anything?" card, card that one plays when anyone makes any argument for anything.

Now do try and engage with the argument. Understand that if you can only resist it by challenging whether we know anything at all, then the argument is a strong one. Similarly, if you have to insist that we have no reason to avoid death - a claim so obviously false it is akin to insisting that 2 + 3 = 8.6billion - then you have lost the argument.

Is that because it would harm you?

I asked if you had 'reason' to avoid death. I did not ask about our instincts. Crikey.

If eating x will kill you, do you think you have reason not to eat it?

Focus.

I said that we have reason to avoid death.
Do you agree?

Quote me saying any of those things.

No, an irrelevant piece of research that in no way challenges anything in the OP. As I explained.

So far I've had one person tell me that it is Vikings - not reason - who hold the key to understanding how things are with the universe. And now, it seems, that it is not Vikings, but the Americans that we should be consulting.

Quality stuff.

How do you justify your claim with respect to the Vikings? — I love Chom-choms

I direct them to the argument in the OP.

Note, if one 'believes' that death is the door to a better land, then of course one will believe that one has reason to die. But believing something doesn't make it true.

Now, is death the door to a better land? How does one figure that out? Does one ask a Viking? Do you believe that our main source of insight into how things are with the world are 'the Vikings'? You think a good way to learn about the world is to consult ancient people with batshit crazy worldviews?

Reasonable people use their reason to figure out what's what. And our reason tells us that death is a harm - that we have reason to avoid it. That's why people were frightened of vikings - they killed people. That's why they ran away rather than saying 'ooo, vikings! We're all going to die - woohoo!!'

So, it's harmful - really harmful. It wouldn't be if it was a door to a lovely land of milkshake rivers and chocolate bar trees. So.....it isn't a door to a lovely land of milkshake rives and chocolate bar trees.

It's a plughole to hell.

And you're being told, in no uncertain terms, to try and not go down it - to delay it as long as possible unless you're in untold unending agony.

So, if you're clever, you'll conclude that the plughole doesn't go to a nice place. Plughole goes nasty place. Plughole bad.

If someone is screaming at you - and everyone else in the giant sink - 'for christ's sake, try not to go down the plughole!!! Fight, fight, fight the current. Fight for all you're worth!' - do you conclude "that plughole must go to somewhere great! That's what the Vikings thought - and they were the wisest people of all time!"

So don't bring anyone else into the water because anyone in the water goes down the plughole eventually. Fight the current, but have the decency to do it alone and don't make your problem someone else's.

Why are you talking about DNA? I am not talking about what people actually do or making any claim about what causes them to do it. I am talking about what we have reason to do.

We have reason to avoid dying under all but the most extreme circumstances. That's not a controversial claim. Denying it would be - extremely so.

And death is a harm whenever it occurs. That's not controversial either. It may sometimes be the lesser harm (as when a person is in agony and can't escape the agony apart from by killing themselves), but it is still a harm.

So, we have reason to avoid death under virtually all circumstances, and reason to avoid it even when our lives are just so-so and there is no prospect of them being anything other than so-so.

What does that tell us about death? It tells us it changes our condition for the worse. It doesn't tell us that it eradicates us or benefits us.

And what does that mean - it means we're all going down the plughole to hell whether we like it or not. Some may be in more tepid water than others - some may be having a lovely swim. But we're all going down the plughole nevertheless. Is it moral to bring an innocent child into the water with you?

It's not true of me. — T Clark

That wasn't my question - for all I know you might be on fire, in which case you may well have reason to exit. Death may not be contrary to the interests of lots of people (which only adds to the case for antinatalism, incidentally). But it 'is' contrary to the interests of most of us, most of the time. My question was whether we generally have reason to avoid death - and the answer to that is an obvious 'yes'. It's why we generally try not to kill people - it's why wars and deadly viruses are bad. They kill people. Which is harmful, yes?

And do people whose lives are just so-so have no reason to avoid death? No, they too have powerful reason to avoid death. Agony with no prospect of an end, yes - death is now plausibly in one's interest. A so-so life with no prospect of it being anything other than so so - no, they still have powerful reason to avoid dying. (This refutes 'deprivation' accounts of the harmfulness of death - death is harmful even when it does not deprive one of anything worth having).

And as for those whose circumstances are such that death is in their best interests, it is still a harm, is it not? It is the lesser of two evils. But it isn't beneficial. When a person jumps out of a burning building to spare themselves a horrific and slow death, their death from the fall is not good for them, but bad for them - just not as bad as the alternative.

Yes, to avoid missing out on a good life, and to avoid causing grief to our loved ones. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Do you have reason to avoid death if your life is mildly miserable (or just so-so) and you have no loved ones?

If you kill such a person - and lets face it, there are loads of them around - has no harm been done?

Your point about the after-life potentially being worse is something I've gave serious thought about before. I see it as an equal possibility to the alternatives. — Down The Rabbit Hole

But you hadn't encountered my argument above before - it does not imply that it is just one possibility among other equally likely ones. It implies that it is the most likely possibility.

Consider: if death is the end, then it is not harmful at all and we have no reason to avoid it.

And if death improves our situation, then it is not harmful at all and we have no reason to avoid it.

My claim is that we have reason to avoid death under virtually all circumstances. Are you challenging that claim?

I am sure most Americans believe they're going to heaven when they die and that's why they're not afraid. These are psychological matters of no interest to me. (Ask most Americans if killing yourself is a good idea to avoid the pain of having a root canal done, and they are going to say that no, that's not a good idea, but a really stupid one. So even if they're not afraid of death, they recognize the stupidity of seeking it out and employing it as a solution to mild problems).

What do Norwegians think?

Most people would agree, would they not, that we have reason to avoid death under all but the most extreme circumstances? That is why if you tell someone that eating x will kill you, they will generally avoid eating x. And so on.

Consider this exchange:

Jack is stuck down this cave and it is filling with water. We need to go down and there and pull him out!

"Why? He'll only die."

It is undeniable that we have powerful reason to avoid death (and by extension, powerful reason to help others avoid it). The interesting philosophical question is why, exactly, we have reason to avoid death, not 'whether' we do.

Note, if you reject my conclusion by rejecting that we have reason to avoid death (extreme circumstances aside), then you have rejected my conclusion on the basis of a ludicrous claim. If those are the lengths you are driven to, I have made a very powerful case.

Do you think you have reason to avoid death?

Gibberish.

First, it is a category error to conflate the mind and consciousness. Consciousness is a state. The mind is an object. Consciousness is a state of mind.
My cup has a shape. But it is not itself shape. It 'has' a shape. Shape is a property of my cup.
Similarly, consciousness is a property of my mind. It is not itself my mind. That's just confused. Minds 'have' consciousness, but they are not themselves the consciousness.

I am clearly conscious. That is, I am in a conscious state. To be aware of anything at all is to be in some kind of conscious state.

Anyone who argues that consciousness is an illusion is just plain confused. For really to be 'arguing' something is to be expressing some beliefs. And beliefs are conscious states, or dispositions to be in conscious states. And thus all genuine arguers are in conscious states.

As it is manifest to reason that conscious states cannot exist absent a mind to bear them, we can also conclude that minds exist.

There is no good case for the non-existence of either conscious states, or minds. For any argument that seeks to show that one or the other is illusory, will have a premise that is far less plausible than the reality of consciousness and the minds that bear it. Indeed, any argument - to be an argument - needs to be the argument of some mind or other. So it is entirely hopeless to try and argue for such views. At best all one can do is point to the metaphysical possibility that no minds or conscious states exist. But metaphysical possibilities are not evidence.

A1) If nothing in this world has intrinsic value, then the following follows;
A2) Intrinsic value is entirely subjective. — Shawn

You have asked what has intrinsic value, but then you've proceeded to argue that intrinsic value is subjective, which is a claim about the nature of intrinsic value, not what has it.

Anyway, it doesn't follow that if nothing has intrinsic value, then intrinsic value is subjective. How does that follow? If intrinsic value is subjective, then it almost certainly exists. Indeed, most of those who deny that intrinsic value exists, do so because they believe intrinsic value is 'objective'. It is just that they also think the universe is not metaphysically exotic in the way that it would need to be in order for objective value to exist.

I am a subjectivist about morality and so a subjectivist about intrinsic value. But I think lots of things have intrinsic value. To say that intrinsic value is subjective, is to say something about the manner of its existence (when or if it exists). It is to say that it exists 'as' the subjective states of someone or other.

I can - and do - value things. Some things I value as means to an end (money, for example). Other things I value as ends in themselves - that is, I just value them, but not for any further purpose. That is to value intrinsically.

Moral intrinsic value is not, of course, equivalent to what I intrinsically value, for it clearly does not follow from me intrinsically valuing P, that P is therefore intrinsically valuable. Moral intrinsic value is determined by some other subject's attitudes, not mine. But the point remains that for something to have intrinsic value, is for it to be being valuing intrinsically.

Omniscience is coherent.

You can be omniscient and not know that you are omniscient.

To be omniscient is to be in possession of all knowledge. This is typically confused with being in possession of all true beliefs. But the two are not synonymous. A belief, to qualify as an item of knowledge, must not just be true, but also justified. It is entirely possible for there to be truths that are not justified. And thus one can be omniscient, yet be ignorant of some truths.

I think God does not know he is omniscient, for God is all good and thus is humble. And a humble person does not believe they possess all knowledge. Thus God does not believe he possesses all knowledge, despite the fact he does. And that is entirely consistent, so far as I can see.

God is the arbiter of justifications, and so as God does not approve of anyone - including himself - believing that they are in possession of all knowledge, then the belief that one is omniscient is one that, even when true, will not be justified. Thus, the belief in one's own omniscience is a belief that is inevitably unjustified. But that is entirely consistent with it being true.

I have literally no idea what you're on about. There's no excuse for being lost - I presented a deductively valid argument. You seem to want things not to make sense.

What?

I think we passed by here before already. "Change is a sensation" isn't an informative conclusion. At best an imprecise way of speaking. — Cheshire

No, it is a substantial conclusion. It is not an imprecise way of speaking. Some things are not made of sensations - minds, for instance. And some things are. And change, I have shown, is one of them.

I agree a change might be known by a sensation. I don't think this is helpful in defining or understanding the notion of change; because it is so general as to nearly apply to anything. — Cheshire

But if you agree that we are aware of change by sensation, then this - once it is acknowledged as well that sensations can only resemble sensations - establishes that change is a sensation.

You seem to think that if that applies to other things too, that somehow refutes the analysis. How? That's like arguing that water is not made of molecules, because any case that seeks to show water is made of molecules will apply to all manner of other things too.

I don't understand you.

The example of the portrait was to show you how resemblance works. The portrait would not, for instance, give us any insight into what Rembrandt sounded[/i] like, because a visual sensation does not resemble a sound.

You then go on to point out things I am clearly aware of and that have no bearing whatever on my argument. For instance, it is no premise of my argument that resemblance is the only way in which we can come to understand something. A book about Rembrandt does not, for instance, resemble Rembrandt, yet I can learn about Rembrandt from it. My argument requires merely that when it comes to sensations, they give us an awareness of what they are sensations 'of' by means of resemblance.

Imagine that the external world bore no resemblance whatsoever to any of our sensations. Well, in what possible sense would we be perceiving the world by means of them? We would conclude not that we are perceiving the world by means of our sensations, but rather that we are subject to a systematic hallucination of a world that is no actually there.

So, when it comes to sensations, if they are to be 'of' a real external world and not a hallucination of one, then the world they are 'of' would have to resemble them. And as sensations can only resemble sensations, the external world would therefore be made of sensations too.

Among the sensations we have are sensations of change, and so the same applies: change is a sensation.

So far as I can tell, you have made no real objection to my case.

Why? What is the argument? Can you show your point with an example other the sensation of change? — neomac

No, you owe the argument - what, you think that you can 'only' sense something that isn't a sensation? On what basis do you think that means of awareness have to be made of distinct material from that of which they give us an awareness?

But I can provide one, even though I do not owe one. It is by introspection that I am aware of my own mental states. Yet introspection is by mental states. And so, when we introspect, we are aware of mental states by means of mental states.

By your logic, of course, introspection is impossible. Which is absurd.

We don't infer the "sensation" of it being yellow though; I don't see something brown and infer the fruit was previously yellow by some retro sensation experience. Even saying change 'can be' a sensation seems to confuse a thing with the sight of it. Do we then suppose all sensations are changes? That might improve the case. — Cheshire

I don't know what you're on about now.

It is sufficient for my argument to go through that we have a sensation of change. I do not need it to be the case that we can only know of change through having a sensation of it. We often infer that change has occurred without having any sensation of it (which underscores that change itself is not made of any sensation of ours).

Now, do you agree that we have a sensation of change? If no, why not? Can we not get the impression a change has occurred when no change has occurred? That is, can we not suffer illusions of change? Of course we can - we often do - and yet that illusion would have to be made of false impressions, else in what sense is it an illusion?

And if there is a sensation of change - and there does appear to be - do you agree that sensations can only resemble sensations and nothing else?

n what respect do they resemble and in what respect do they differ? And if your conclusion is that change is a sensation then why would I need a sensation of a change (actually a sensation of a sensation, a second order sensation) to detect it?! Or are you saying that change is a sensation that is not sensed? Which doesn’t make sense (pun intended!) — neomac

Those seem like confused questions.

We are aware of a world via some of our sensations. It's why we call it 'the sensible world'.

Now, I have argued that we have a sensation of change.

And I have argued that sensations give us an awareness of the sensible world by resembling it. If you think that's not how sensations give us an awareness of the sensible world, please say how you understand matters to work on that front. My account is perfectly straightforward. Do Rembrandt's self-portraits give us any insight into what Rembrandt himself looked like? Yes, insofar as the sensible image they create in us resembles the sensible image looking at Rembrandt himself would create in us. Do you not agree?

Now, consider your questions in that context. I say that a portrait of Rembrandt - or to be tediously accurate, the image it creates in us - gives us some insight into Rembrandt's appearance by resembling the image that looking at actual Rembrandt would have created in us. So, in this case it is an image of an image of an image. Would you raise the same questions? Would you ask me "in what respects does the image accurately resemble the image that looking at Rembrandt himself would have created in us?" No, for that would be beside the point. Similarly, would you ask "why would I need a portrait of Rembrandt if the image it creates resembles the image looking at him would create in me?" - no, for it makes no sense. Sensations don't answer a 'need' in us. It's just confused.

And as for asking "Or are you saying that change is a sensation that is not sensed?" no, I am not saying that. Where have I said that? All sensations are sensed. I explicitly stated that it is their essence to be sensed. So as change is a sensation, then it is sensed. We are aware of change via a sensation that is not itself constitutive of change, though resembles it. Change itself is a sensation, and it too is sensed, but not by us, but some other mind.

I presented an argument that appears to demonstrate that it is a sensation.

It is sufficient that there is a sensation of change to establish that change itself is a sensation. I have not claimed that the only way we can be aware of sensation is via a sensation.

Take yellow. We are aware of yellow by sensation. Yet we can infer that an object is yellow despite never having seen it.

Likewise, we can infer that there has been change without having any sensation of change. But we can also sense change directly, and that's sufficient for my argument to go through.

1x1 = 1 isn't really an argument in any normal sense. So, 1x Change = Change doesn't bring anything new or make a statement; which seems to be partially conceded in your reply. — Cheshire

I don't see how that relates to my argument. My conclusion is that change itself is a sensation. That's a substantial conclusion. And it is certainly new. Who else has made such a case?

Secondly, people deduce change long after it has occured. — Cheshire

I am talking about what change itself is. You are talking about when people infer it. I am talking about the 'it' they are inferring.

Your objection is that I am confusing a means of awareness with an object of awareness - an objection I anticipated in my OP and explicitly addressed. Our sensation of change is not itself change. It is 'of' change, by which I mean that it is a vehicle of awareness, not the object of awareness. Change itself is the object, but because sensations can only resemble other sensations, change itself can nevertheless be concluded to be a sensation.

Ironically it is you who is committing a fallacy - for you are clearly thinking that as it is a mistake to confuse a vehicle of awareness with an object of awareness, then objects of awareness and vehicles of awareness cannot be made of the same material. That's patently false.

Now, to sensations. No sensation by itself 'refers' to anything. Agents refer to things, sensations do not. Sensations are just a kind of mental state. (Philosophers sometimes talk of mental states that have 'representative contents' - but this is really nonsense as that states themselves do not 'represent' anything to be the case, for 'representing' is an exclusively agential activity).

But by reason we know or are told that some of our sensations 'resemble' a world. And it is in this way that we - we possessed of reason - come to the conclusion that there is a sensible world. The sensible world 'just is' the place our sensations give us some awareness of by resemblance.

Now, as a sensation can only resemble another sensation, then a sensation of change can only resemble another sensation. And as the word 'of' there means no more or less than that the sensation is resembling some aspect of the sensible world, we can conclude that change itself is a sensation.

So, once more, I am not committing the fallacy that you are trying to attribute to me. I am abundantly well aware of the fallacy, as a careful reading of the OP would tell you. And I have not committed it. Our sensation of change is not constitutive of change itself. It is 'of' change, by which I mean precisely that it is a means of awareness, not an object of awareness.

What you are doing is reasoning that as it is a fallacy to go from vehicle to object, then no object can be made of the same material as the vehicle - which is fallacious.

Because the question I am addressing is 'what is change?'

Do you have any objection to the argument?

A sensation cannot 'tell' us anything - sensations do not have little mouths or little notepads on which they might write things. Insofar as our sensations give us some awareness of something other than themselves, they do so by resemblance: that is, our reason tells us that there is a world out there that our sensations (some of them) are resembling.
— Bartricks

I disagree. I think you can sense something new correctly the first time. Even if it's novel. Otherwise, there's no basis for constructing this reference for resemblance. — Cheshire

That doesn't engage with my point. A sensation cannot literally 'tell us' something, for then it'd have to be a little person, yes?

Sensations are either just sensations and tell us nothing at all, or they resemble something and we can be told, by our reason, that they are doing so and thus in this way can learn about a world that is not itself made of our sensations.

If the latter is true - and it is, of course, for the sensible world just is the place that our sensations resemble - then change is a sensation if, that is, there is a sensation of change.

I don't know what you are talking about. If an event was future and is now present, then it has changed - changed in its temporal properties. It has a property - now-ness - that it did not have.

Now, it is hopeless to analyse change itself in terms of such a change, for it is a change and thus one will have said no more than change is when change happens (which is true, but uninformative).

I have presented a case - an apparent proof, if you will - that change is a sensation. You need to refute that case by challenging a premise.

I said of those who try to analyze change in terms of time, that their analysis will either be circular or no analysis of change at all.

If you are subscribing to a static view of time, then you are providing no analysis of change at all. That is, if a thing does not 'go from' having a property at one time to not having one at another, then you're not talking about change at all. The circular account at least has the merit of being true - even though it tells us nothing about what change itself is - but if you think time does not pass, then your view does not even have that merit.

But anyway, you persist in just ignoring the case I made for change being a sensation. Until or unless you can refute my case for change being a sensation, we do not need to worry about whether a temporal analysis will be circular or not.