Note it’s not a question of “whether” you’re speaking garbage, for that is so obviously the case, — khaled

Question begging.

No a troll is someone who speaks nonsense. Like yourself. — khaled

Oscar Wilde look out!

You’re always the first one to get mad. What does that say about you? I never get mad talking to you. Just bewildered at how someone can be so sure while speaking so much garbage. — khaled

Well, that's question begging.

Er, what?

Well, you haven't thanked me. But okay, yes - you were wrong. That's what I said before and then again and then again. Here again, for the slow witted: the claim that God's existence is compatible with antinatalism does not, for its truth, require that God actually exist.

Now, try and say something half-way sensible that addresses the OP.

So you live in poverty? — Sir2u

Ah, some wit.

No though. I'm well paid.

Please learn to explain. — Sir2u

First thank me for explaining the blindingly obvious to you thus far. Like I say, I explain things for a living, but I'm not going to give you free lessons in such tediously elementary matters until or unless you thank me for having done so thus far.

It is not unsolvable.

If we grant that God is omniscient and omnipotent, then it follows obviously and incontestably that we did not create ourselves — spirit-salamander

That does not follow. Obviously we did not create ourselves (nor did God create himself). But it does not follow from God's omnipotence and omniscience that he created us. If we, like God himself, exist with aseity, that is consistent with God being omnipotent and omniscient and omnibenevolent.

Problem solved. God does not author sin, we do.

I merely stated that for there to be any compatibility there would need to be a god. — Sir2u

Yeah, that's false. Is the existence of a unicorn compatible with antinatalism? Yes. Does that mean unicorns exist? Er, no.

Oh dear, and things were going so well between us, and with apologies to Frank Sinatra, "then you go and spoil it all by saying something stupid like:

As I said from the beginning, your statement is based on the fact that there is a god.

Supposing that there was one, what would its purpose be? — Sir2u

The claim that God's existence is compatible with antinatalism does not assume that God exists. Obviously.

Supposing that there was one, what would its purpose be? — Sir2u

Read the OP. It is explained.

Then we agree. And thus presumably you would agree that God and antinatalism are compatible? Or do we need to go through why you should?

What are not the same? Bloody hell, learn to explain properly. — Sir2u

Assuming the truth of that which one was trying to show is not the same as assuming too much, for one can do the latter without doing the former.

I explain things for a living. You're getting it for free. Thank me.

Back to the OP: do you think omnipotence involves having created everything?

You think there are more?

Assume the truth of something, especially the very thing to be proved.

You assume to much — Sir2u

Those aren't the same. And it is 'too' much, not 'to' much.

Er no. Cast your mind back to when you were doing philosophy at woodwork college in 1812 with the 'respect philosopher' and try and remember what 'question begging' means.

Question begging.

I probably studied this stuff before you were born. Not to sound too old but I went to college before most people had color televisions. Maybe that's the problem, I have forgotten too much of it. No, that's not true. — Sir2u

You have got to be freaking kiddin mate. No one I know would have anything philosophical to say about the load of bollocks you wrote.
How the hell did you ever come up with such bullshit anyway? That would most likely be a more interesting thing to talk about. — Sir2u

Hmm, by my calculations you were at college (presumably woodwork) in the 1970s, so that would make you in your 70s today, or perhaps your 60s. Yet you write like an adolescent and seem to have the wit of one too. Methinks you lie, sir.

Sorry again, that p's and r's — Sir2u

No, it's ps and rs. Not p's and r's.

Now, once more, anything philosophical to contribute?

But you see the first argument as
p
q
Therefore p — Sir2u

Er, no. That's valid.

This was the form your first argument took

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore R. — Bartricks

And that's invalid because it is invalid.

I probably studied this stuff before you were born. — Sir2u

Yet you don't know it. Not a good student then.

Not to sound too old but I went to college before most people had color televisions. Maybe that's the problem — Sir2u

Why does it matter when you went to college or whether anyone had color televisions at the time?

Anyway, do. you. have. anything. philosophical. to. say. about. anything. in. the. OP. Grandpa?

But what I really don't understand is why you think the second one is invalid. — Sir2u

The same reason the first isn't. It doesn't conform to any of the 9 rules of inference that you don't know but are currently looking up.

Now, do you have anything vaguely philosophical to say about the OP?

Did you not read what I said? — Sir2u

Yes, unfortunately I did waste time doing that. And you asked to be shown why your arguments were not 'valid'. We did not mention their soundness. But you do not quite know what these terms mean and you are learning on the hoof, yes, by looking stuff up on Stanford and Wikipedia, yes?

I think you need a little guidance here. All you have stated here are the patterns of arguments. P, Q and R are only shown to represent something, as in the argument I posted. By themselves they have no meaning at all.
To disprove the arguments validity you have to show why either the premises are not true or that they do not add up to the conclusion. Which do you think is wrong and why? — Sir2u

No, 'you' need guidance. You do not have to show that an argument's premises are 'false' to establish invalidity. An argument is invalid when its conclusion is not implied by its premises. The point of an argument is to 'extract' the implications of the premises.

This was your first argument:


1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore R.

That is not valid. Why? Because 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. That is, 3 does not tell us what the combination of 1 and 2 create. There are some basic rules of inference - 9 from memory - and this argument conforms to none of them.

This would be valid:

1. P
2. Q
3.Therefore P and Q

But this:


1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore R.

Is not.

Now, how about actually addressing something I argued in the OP? I can happily keep saying that for 45 more posts if you wish.

Oh, change the record you whiny creep. You're the bully. You're obsessed with 'me' and getting me - so far as I can tell the only proper philosopher on here - banned. Pathetic. Try saying something philosophical for once: engage in some reasoned argument and grow a thicker skin. If you can't do that or don't like it when people refute your arguments, go elsewhere! Jeez. You come onto my threads and make no attempt - none - to make any kind of philosophical contribution. You actively try and annoy. That's literally all you do. So just don't engage with my threads. Easy, yes? Stay away and stop coming in and saying things designed to do no more than needle.

He’s the site troll. — khaled

Included in the definition of a troll, according to the internet anyway, is "someone who intentionally....tries to instigate arguments in an online community". Philosophers use reasoned argument to try and figure out what's true. That's literally the point. So, yes, I am indeed a troll and the title is surely a badge of honour in a philosophy forum! Socrates was one too.

Perhaps this is why you and so many others have a problem with me - you actually have a problem with philosophy. That is, with the very project. You think, no doubt, that this is not a philosophy forum, but an 'express yourself' forum - a kind of therapy session where you come to be heard, not have your views assessed. But when a nasty philosopher comes along and subjects your views to scrutiny, or presents his own and then defends them to the hilt, you get all upset because he's not validating you or something.

I bloody do.

As a moral subjectivist, I am committed to three propositions.

1. Moral statements are truth apt.

2. Some moral statements are true.

3. The truth aptness of moral statements are dependent upon the subject in which they are indexed next to. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

No, that's not correct. 1 is true. But 2 is false - you are not committed to realism. I mean, admittedly it'd be quite odd to be a subjectivist and think that morality is unreal (though one could, for it is metaphysically possible that there are no subjects, or that all the subjects that there are are not in the subjective states that constitute the truth-conditions of moral propositions). The point, though, is that 'realism' is not an essential element of subjectivism (or non-naturalism, or naturalism, or super-naturalism). You keep making this mistake. It's like insisting that incompatibilists about free will believe we have free will. No, incompatibilism is a view about what free will requires, it is not a view about whether we have it or not. Likewise for compatibilism. And likewise for subjectivism, naturalism, non-naturalism, supernaturalism, and non-cognitivism. They're not - not - views about what exists.

I gave you an example that you seem to have ignored. The view that milkshake is made from milk and flavouring is not equivalent to hte view that there exists milkshake. I have just told you my theory about what milkshake is made from. I have not told you that I have some milkshake.

3 is misleading. I think what you mean is that the truth conditions of a moral proposition would be some of the subjective states of the subject. That is essential to subjectivism - it is what makes it subjectivism. A moral subjectivist is something who thinks that moral norms and values are made of the prescriptions and values of a subject (a 'subject of experiences' that is - a mind). And individual subjectivism, which is the view that no serious philosopher defends because it is has even less to be said for it than naturalism or non-naturalism or expressivism, is the view that the subject in question is ourselves.

So, whether "X is morally right" is true or not is constitutively determined by some of my own subjective states if, that is, individual subjectivism is true. Which is absurd of course - as absurd as individual subjectivism about teapots.

That's not correct. Naturalism and non-naturalism are are not theories about what actually exists.
— Bartricks

That was not the point I was making at all. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

But you said something straightforwardly false. It is clear from my OP that I am addressing naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism. They are 'not' forms of moral realism. The question of whether morality is real is a distinct one, but you are confusing what's already a confusing matter by introducing it.

So again: naturalism and non-naturalism are views about the ingredients of morality, they are not existential theories about what exists. And expressivism is the view that morality doesn't have ingredients because it is not a feature of reality that we observe and respond to, but an activity we engage in. But none of those theories carries with it any commitment to this or that existing.

(Argument 3 supporting P2: Argument 2)

1. If moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes, then they express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject.

2. Moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.

3. Therefore, moral statements express propositions about the attitude of an individual subject. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

What work is the word 'cognitive' doing? I only ask, because a) I do not know what it means and b) most metaethical discussion seems to be made needlessly complex by this kind of technical vocabulary.

Anyway, 1 seems obviously false. Yes, moral statements are about propositional attitudes, but why on earth does that mean that they are about the attitudes of the utterer?

If I say "Cartesian trigger puppets wants me to shut the door" that is about a proposition attitude. But it is not about my attitudes, but yours.

So that first argument is clearly unsound and flagrantly question begging. Premise 1 just asserts the truth of individual subjectivism - a theory that appears to be false, not true - and then you just deduce from it the truth of individual subjectivism.

1. If moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are objects of belief, then moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes.

2. Moral beliefs are cognitive evaluations and propositions are the objects of belief.

3. Therefore, moral statements are cognitive expressions of propositional attitudes. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

That argument is very confused. First, the conclusion does not seem to describe individual subjectivism, but expressivism (although I don't know what 'cognitive' means, admittedly). But to 'express' an attitude is a different linguistic activity to 'describing it'. "Hooray" expresses an attitude, and "I am ecstatic" describes one.

But in addition to being an argument for a view distinct from the one you were seeking to defend with it, it is also unsound, for premise 1 is once more simply false and question begging.

None of the monotheistic religions is in favor of (absolute) antinatalism. — baker

So? I am interested in whether an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent's existence is consistent with antinatalism, and whether it positively implies it. That's a philosophical matter, not a religious one.

Will you argue that you have better knowledge of God (in general, or in particular in reference to antinatalism) than they do? — baker

I really don't know - look, I'm not religious, so I just don't care and i don't know on what basis any religious person claims to know what they know because I don't hang around such people or read their works. So I don't know or care. Why not just address something I argued in the OP rather than focussing on me??

They have millennia of sacred texts, some of which are said to have been dictated directly by God.
Your dictionary definition of the term "God" is derived from those monotheistic texts, but the rest of your premises about God are merely your own inferences. — baker

Oh good grief!! Just engage with something I argued in the OP!

No bloody way mate, I am waiting to see who cracks first.

Who wants to bet that he runs in the next 50 posts or less? — Sir2u

Yes, you're a troll. You - like most of the others above - are not remotely interested in anything in the OP. Oh well, ho hum.

No bloody way mate, I am waiting to see who cracks first. — Sir2u

Haha, nobody, but nobody, is going to take that bet....you have no idea what you're up against.

Because I did not make it up. It comes from a very respect person in the area of philosophy and he thinks it is valid. — Sir2u

So just to be clear - you're claiming that the following arguments come from a 'respect person' in philosophy. And he thinks they're valid? Where did you find him? In an earlier stage of our evolutionary development? These:

The rational intuitions of my philosophical mind leads me to the following conclusions but not necessarily beliefs:
1. god created mankind
2. god's guide to living says that mankind should worship him
3. therefore god needs mankind to worship him

1. if god needs mankind to worship him the mankind must reproduce to continue worshiping him
2. some people think that not reproducing is a morally correct thing to do
3. therefore either god does not decide what is moral and is not omnipotent OR some people are wrong about their ideas — Sir2u

Are not valid. Here is the first:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore R.

That's not valid. I think the technical term for an argument of that form is 'stupid'. (In a sentence: "the respect philosopher has 'stupidly' inferred 3 from 1 and 2").

Here is the second:

1. If P, then Q (you wrote 'the', but I'll charitably assume you meant 'then', and no doubt the 'respect person' in philosophy meant 'then')
2. R
3. Therefore, either S or T

That one is not valid either. I think the technical term for an argument like that is 'unbelievably stupid'. (In a sentence: "the respect person in philosophy was unbelievably stupid to infer 3 from 1 and 2".

Anyway, rather than explaining to you why those various arbitrary collections of claims do not constitute arguments, why not address something I argued in the OP? (I know 'you' won't, but this isn't really addressed to you, but those with some genuine philosophical nous and a thicker skin)

I mean, they weren't philosophically uninteresting. I have claimed that omnipotence does not essentially involve having created everything and explained why. That's quite a big claim and one that those with some philosophical spirit would consider worth exploring.....

Are you suggesting you resolved millennia of theistic disputes and figured out who or what "God" is? — baker

'God' denotes an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. There's no dispute over that. And anyway, I stipulated that this is how I am using the term. But yes, if you are asking me if I am claiming to have proved God exists, then yes, I absolutely am.

But as with most people on this forum, you seem to have the focusing abilities of a goldfish. This thread is not about whether God exists, it is about the compatibility or otherwise of God with antinatalism and whether God's existence positively implies antinatalism.

No, of course they're not valid. And you didn't know that, did you?
— Bartricks

Oh dear, could you possible explain why they are not valid? It seems to me that they are perfectly valid. — Sir2u

He hasn't answered my questions? — Sir2u

The clue to why lies in the conclusion of this valid argument:

1. If someone thinks Sir2u's arguments are valid, then that person is too dumb for fun
2. Sir2u thinks Sir2u's arguments are valid
3. Therefore....

By whom? — Pfhorrest

God.

how does that differ from what you say no divine command theorist in their right mind would say: that calling something good is saying that we are being told (by God) to do it? — Pfhorrest

Water is made of tiny molecules, yes? That doesn't mean 'water' means 'tiny molecules'.

This thread isn't about divine command theory, but the stupidity of the alternatives. But when I claim that moral prescriptions are prescriptions God is issuing to us, I am not telling you the meaning of the term 'morally right', anymore than when I claim that water is tiny molecules I am telling you the meaning of the word 'water'.

If I judge that an act is morally right, I am judging that it is 'to be done', yes?

I am not saying "do it!"

This: "there is an instruction to do X" does not mean the same as "do X!"

This "Xing is right" does not mean the same as "do X!"

I mean, if it did, then 'who the hell do you think you are?' would be an appropriate response, wouldn't it? But it obviously isn't. Why? Because when we make moral judgements, we are not ordering people around. As most of us recognise, because even if we think the judgement "Xing is right" is incorrect, we recognise that "who the hell do you think you are?" doesn't make sense as a response (this is an invitation for the normal parade of pillocks on this forum to chime in and say 'yeah it is!').

Anyway, back to your view - what is it?

To be honest, replying to you isn't worth the hassle as no matter what I say, you seem hell bent on telling me that I've said something else, and then I have to just keep correcting what you say, and then you do it to the correction, and on and on it goes. You don't seem to be able to grasp certain distinctions, such as between prima facie evidence and evidence; prima facie evidence that a proposition is true and the truth of the proposition itself; mental states and their representative contents. Anyway, like I say, I can't be bothered.

If "good" just meant "commanded by God", then there would remain the question of whether or not to do what is commanded by God, and why or why not. — Pfhorrest

No divine command theorist in their right mind would say that 'good' 'meant' 'commanded by God'. It is an analysis of what a moral goodness is, not what the word 'good' means.

Likewise, if the meaning of any moral assertion is akin to a command more generally, there remains the question of whether or not to obey each command, and why or why not. — Pfhorrest

Note: I am not defending the view that moral assertions are akin to commands. This is a moral assertion: "Xing is right". That's 'not' a command. I think those who think it is a command are stupid (as, of course, do naturalists and non-naturalists). If I say "Xing is right" I am not telling you to do it. I am telling you that we are being told to do it. This "we are commanded to do X" does not mean the same as "do X!"

Moral semantics (what do the words mean?) is different from moral ontology (what makes those the correct words to utter, i.e. what makes them true?) — Pfhorrest

Er, yes. I know. You seem to be the one who doesn't. You seem to think you can get out of trouble by fiddling about with labels. You can't.

Now, once more, describe your view in a way that doesn't make it susceptible to my criticism.

Then describe your view in a way that does not make it susceptible to the criticism I have just made.

That is, read the OP. See what I said about expressivist views. It applies to your view. Call your view whatever you want - insist it is not an expressivist view. Doesn't matter. It applies to your view, becusae you have made 'you' the prescriber or whatever.

If you think otherwise, describe your view in a way that shows it not to be susceptible to the criticism.

I mean, imagine someone starts a thread on the Euthyphro criticism of divine command theory and I reply "ah, but my view is called divine prescriptivism, therefore the criticism does not apply". That would be silly, right? That's what you're doing.

Labels. Don't cavil over labels. Call your view a version of tomatoism if you want, my criticism applies. If you don't care about the credibility of a view but just like wrapping yourself in labels and identifying with this or that tribe, then yes, there is no point in us discussing it further. But your view is confused and rather than defend or describe it accurately you pass the buck to others.

That's not what expressivism is. Saying "don't do X" isn't just an expression of desire about someone not doing X. It's a command. My view is much closer to universal prescriptivism, but not identical to it. — Pfhorrest

Potato potarto. Labels don't matter. Prescriptivism is a form of expressivism, at least as I would use the term, for a prescription, to qualify as a prescription, expresses an agent's desire or will or some such. (Expressivism, non-cognitivism and non-descriptivism can all be used interchangeably). But let's not cavil over terms, for you can't save a theory by relabeling it. And the simple fact remains that if you are the prescriber, or expresser, or what have you, then the view is grossly implausible. It just has nothing to be said for it. Moral norms do not - absolutely not - appear to be emanating from me. I cannot make an act right by barking an order to do it (or by engaging in any other expressive activity), not of necessity anyway.

No, but that's why I say there's a separate question of what makes the claim right or wrong, aside from what the claim is simply saying at all. — Pfhorrest

That's viciously circular. It is moral rightness that a metaethical theory is supposed to be an analysis of. That is, it is supposed to tell us what it is.

The prescription to do X 'is' the rightness. That is, for an act to be right, is for it 'to be done', yes? That 'to be doneness' is the normativity of the moral norm.

Insofar as there is anything attractive about prescriptivism at all, it lies in the fact that prescriptivists recognise this: recognise that morality is essentially composed of prescriptions and valuings. Abandon that idea, and there is precisely no motivation to be any kind of expressivist at all.

So you can't then say 'ah, but you have to issue the command to do X when it is 'right' to do so' for 'rightness' is what you were supposed to be giving us an account of.

To see this most clearly, just imagine the proponent of a theory you do not subscribe to arguing in a like manner. For instance, a divine command theorist says that moral prescriptions are prescriptions God is issuing to us. Imagine, then, that it is then objected that those acts that appear to us to be right appear to be right irrespective of whether God wishes us to do them, rather than 'because' God wishes us to do them. The divine command theorist replies "ah, but that's why there's a separate question of what makes an action right or wrong". You'd reject that reply as viciously circular, yes? Or imagine the divine command theorist says - and this really amounts to the same reply - "ah, well a prescription is only moral when the God is expressing a moral wish" or "ah, well it is only when the God prescribes something morally right, that the God's prescription constitutes a moral prescription". You would - rightly - reject as viciously circular all such accounts, for by helping themselves to what is already right and wrong they cease to telling us about what rightness and wrongness themselves are and become just so much noise. Well, that's what your theory seems to me to be at this point.

“An intelligent hell would be better than a stupid paradise.”
— Victor Hugo — Isaac

No it wouldn't. It wouldn't be a hell if it was better than a paradise, would it?

What's heavier - a ton of feathers or a ton of gold?

You: 'a ton of stupid gold is heavier than a ton of clever feathers' (Victor Numbskull)

There are all the people to whom it seems as though moral norms and values do not have an external source. — Isaac

Just to be clear, you mean the people whose reason tells them that if they order themselves to do X, then necessarily Xing is right?

Good job Isaac, you got me. And we have good countervailing evidence that 2 + 2 = 5 too, don't we - because some people think it does as that's what their reason represents it to be. Excellent. Good case.

Stop being tedious. "Appears" to be false, then. The next line says

Moral norms and values appear to have an external source. — Bartricks

Appearances provide evidence in support of what they represent to be the case. There is no countervailing evidence. So the thesis that morality is individually subjective is about as implausible as the thesis that the external sensible world is individually subjective, which is to say not plausible at all.

Or did you mean to say "individual subjectivism seems to have evidence showing it to be false but cannot be determined to be until we've investigated further"? — Isaac

No, that's more Isaacese. All the evidence is that morality is 'not' individually subjective. There is not a scrap of evidence to the contrary. And the matter has been investigated for thousands of years and the bulk of philosophers have reached the same conclusion. For millennia. That's why despite the stupidity of contemporary metaethics, individual subjectivism is simply not a contender. The only people who take individual subjectivism seriously - indeed, are quite convinced it is true - are idiots with no expertise in philosophy whatsoever. So, you know, most people.

So what is true is just that which seems to your to be true, but what is right cannot be that which seems to you to be right? — Isaac

Er, no. I didn't say any of that.

If something appears to be the case, that is prima facie evidence that it is the case. That doesn't mean it 'is' the case, just that it is evidence that it is the case. So, what's true is not just that which seems to me to be true.

And what seems to me to be right can be - and normally will be - that which is right.

Our exchange thus far:

"If it appears to be square, that's default evidence that it is square. It appears to be square. That's default good evidence it is square"

You: "So if it appears to be square to you, then it is square. But what appears to be circular can't be circular?"

"Er, no."

"And you're saying that if I think to myself "it is square", I should assume that because I thought it, it cannot be square. But if I think to myself "What is square seems to be something external to me" I should, on this occasion take that thought to be the absolute truth of the matter?"

"Er, no".

What I suggest you do, Isaac, is learn to read. Then learn to think. Then read what I say. And then don't try and translate what I say into Isaacian, because Isaacian turns sense into nonsense.

The person uttering the moral proposition is the one making a prescription. — Pfhorrest

If you're view is that saying "Xing is wrong" is just a strange way of saying "don't do X", then you're an expressivist. And the view is clearly false. If Xing is wrong, it is not wrong 'because' I don't want others to do it, is it?

it's not about what do moral claims mean to say, but when and why are they right to say so, when and why they are true. — Pfhorrest

That doesn't make sense. They don't have truth-makers if they're prescriptions. "Do X!" can't be true or false.

So your view sounds confused to me. But maybe I have not understood it yet.

perhaps he has been sent by the Lord to test us... — Banno

Yes. You've failed.

What are your objections to individual moral subjectivisim? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

If individual subjectivism is true, then if I tell myself to do X, then necessarily it would be right for me to X (for by hypothesis the rightness of Xing 'is' my instruction to myself to do it). Yet it is as clear to my reason as that 2 + 2 = 4 that if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X (anymore than if I tell myself that 2 + 2 = 5, then it will = 5). Thus individual subjectivism is false. Moral norms and values appear to have an external source.

contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism.
— Bartricks

Naturalism and non-naturalism are the two main theories of moral realism, whereas the latter refers to a branch of non-descriptivism. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

That's not correct. Naturalism and non-naturalism are are not theories about what actually exists. Moral realism is, for a moral realist is someone who believes that at least some moral propositions are true, and thus that their truth-makers exist. There are moral realists who are naturalists, and moral realists who are non-naturalists.

Consider: if I say milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring, I am not thereby asserting that there are milkshakes. The view that milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring is not, then, a form of milkshake realism. It is a view about what it takes for a milkshake to exist, but it is not a view about what exists. That's the same with naturalism and non-naturalism.

As for the rest of what you say, well, it's not a response to the OP, but just you telling me all you know about metaethics. Why?

For instance, what I said about naturalism - namely that it is bat-shit crazy because it essentially involves thinking objective features of the natural world can direct us to do things - applies as much to synthetic reductionism as to analytic reductionism. So what was the point in making that distinction?

They're bat-shit crazy, yes?