Doctors usually treat anybody even people who brought the illness upon themselves. But when you don't have enough of them to care for everybody, it would be fair that at least the ones who took more risks would get treatment last. However, there's no way to keep track. — Vince

So? You're not addressing or recognizing the point.

Again: if I decide that I am going to treat you if you get ill (I didn't ask you - there's no agreement between us - I have just decided to treat you if you get ill) am I now entitled to regulate your behaviour? Am I now entitled to insist you stay indoors if a virus is on the loose?

The answer is obvious. It's 'no'.

In an atomized population your argument works. — Bitter Crank

Which is another way of saying "it works". I do not know what you mean by an 'atomized' population. You're just clutching at straws.

So, Tim is allowed to stop us meeting if Tim happens to have voluntarily decided that he'll treat us if we get ill?! How does that work, exactly?

So, I shall just decide, without asking you, that I will treat you should you get sick. Right - does that now give me the right to regulate your behaviour? No, obviously not.

How is the drink driving case analogous? It's like responding 'oh, so we shouldn't arrest murderers?'
Imagine there are three people in existence: you, me and Brian. I don't know if I've got a deadly virus, but I know it is possible. And that is also the situation for the rest of you. And we all know this. Well, if I nevertheless want to meet Brian and brian wants to meet me, then you have no right to stop us, yes?
If we want to visit you but you do not wish us to, then you do have the right to stop us visiting you. You can lock yourself on your property. But if brian and I want to meet you are not entitled to lock us in to stop us, correct?
Now just change the numbers, realize that's what lockdowns involve, and learn not to be so bossy and impose your lifestyle choices and values on others!! As Shaw said, do not do as you would be done by, for others may not share your tastes!

What about starting a business? That's really bad for your health. There's a very good chance that you'll go bust and go bust through bad luck alone. And if you don't go bust, that'll just inspire others to start businesses - and a lot of them will go bust through no fault of the business owners. So if we allow people to start businesses there will be an epidemic of bad luck bankruptcies. So we had better stop people doing that.

Imagine that among us there are a small minority of people who lack sufficient self control to be able to resist acting on their sexual urges (you don't need to imagine it - it's outside your window). Now, does this mean that everyone should be made to wear burkhas when in public so as to minimize the number of sexual assaults?
No.
Why? I mean, there's no question such a policy would reduce such assaults. So why would it nevertheless be unjust?

You have ignored the argument I made and your example of HIV works against you.
My argument works regardless of the numbers of deaths involved. It's about one's right to take risks with one's own life if one wants. Imagine everyone apart from you gets an illness that can easily be cured, but no one wants to take the cure and would rather die. Well, that's everyone's right, yes? Are you entitled to make them take the cure? No. Yet in that scenario everyone apart from you dies.
My argument is not about numbers. It works just the same if the risk of death is 100%.
As for HIV- presumably you think that sex should be banned until we can cure it, yes?

You can lock yourself down if you want. If you don't want to be exposed to a risk of getting a virus from innocent carriers, don't go out. No one is making you associate with others.
Most people would rather keep their jobs than avoid being exposed to the risk of infection. Evidence: if there were no lockdowns, most people would still go to work rather than locking down personally and losing their jobs. Now who are you to decide that no, despite this they should be forced to lockdown even if it costs them their jobs? Lock yourself down if the virus risk worries you that much, but don't insist others do the same. Let people decide for themselves bossy boots

Your reply seems incoherent and doesn't address anything I argued.

It is a point that Descartes made: when you can't separate existence out from the rest of the concept, then one can be certain that the concept has something answering to it in reality.

So, the concept of a strawberry is one I can entertain without having to take strawberries to exist.

I can't do that with the concept of 'an existent strawberry', but nevertheless in that case I can separate out the concept of the strawberry from its being existent.

But when it comes to - Descartes' famous example - the concept of myself, I cannot separate out existence from it. To entertain the concept of myself, is to take myself to exist. And thus I can conclude that the concept of my self has something answering to it.

And this seems also to be the case with the concept of God. For God is morally perfect and an existent morally good being is better than a non-existent one. That is, an existent morally virtuous being is better than a non-existent one. And thus the concept of a morally perfect being includes existence. Conclusion: a morally perfect being exists.

Not endorsing that argument, just noting that it has something to it.

But if that still bothers you, let's use this definition instead: a simple quality which is absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express. — Amalac

No, that's entirely unclear too. Like I say, you're just playing with words. Of course definitions have to come to an end, but they should come to an end with terms denoting concepts that can be grasped, not just hot air. I have literally no idea - none - what you mean when you talk about a 'perfection'.

Now I gave you a perfectly clear definition of what a perfection is: it is something that makes something good. And to be perfect is to be maximally good.

And I gave an argument demonstrating the plausibility of this definition: if something is perfect, it is incoherent to think of it as also being less than good. And if something is bad, one is confused if one also thinks it is perfect.

So, perfect means maximally good. And this is not a question-begging definition, for it facilitates a version of the ontological argument.

We have the concept of a morally perfect being, for how else do we recognise that others fall short of being such a being? Thus, we have the concept. And it is better if a morally perfect being exists than not. Thus, our concept of a morally perfect being is the concept of a being who exists. That is, the existence of such a being cannot be separated-out from the rest of the concept. And when a concept is like that, we are justified in concluding that reality contains something answering to the concept.

Only if you hold the dogmatic view that yours is the «true» definition of omnipotence, does «but the word can no longer be used to characterise God» follow. — Amalac

No, it isn't dogmatic. A being who has more power than another, is more powerful, yes? Now, you can use 'omnipotent' to refer to the less powerful if you want, but now you're not talking about the most powerful being, are you?

You're just playing with words. It's easy to prove God if you do that. Here: I understand 'omnipotent' to mean 'able to do all the things one is able to do'. I am omnipotent according to that definition. It's a silly definition. But let's not be dogmatic.
I understand 'omniscient' as 'knowing all the things I know". Now I'm omniscient. Silly definition, but again, mustn't be dogmatic. I understand 'omnibenevolent' to be 'approved of by me'. And as I fully approve of myself, I am omnibenevolent. Silly, but don't be a dogmatist. Now it turns out that according to those definitions of the terms, I am God. And as I clearly exist, bingo - God has been proved.

That's what you're doing. You're using 'omnipotent' to denote a being who is less than all powerful. And then running an argument that would be unsound if God exists - an argument that, if it worked, would establish the non-existence of God.

And when it comes to perfection, you are using that word in no clear fashion. I have given you a definition of it that clearly makes sense: to be perfect is to be maximally good. But you're not using it to mean that - you're using it in an all-purpose way to plug gaps.

That is one possible conception of God, yes. But many philosophers would not accept it. For instance, Aquinas would retort that it makes no sense to say that God is constrained by the laws of logic, because God didn't «create» the laws of logic, he is those laws, just as he is, literally, truth (once again, according to Aquinas and other philosophers). — Amalac

Yes, but those philosophers are confused and did not have the benefit of being exposed to my argument. I have been exposed to theirs, but not they to mine. And mine is better, is it not?

Plus I have Jesus and Descartes on my side. Who's got the better army?

But anyway, the point stands, does it not? Surely no reasonable person can deny that an all powerful being cannot lack a power that I, a far less powerful being, possess? I mean, how is that not a contradiction?

I have the power to destroy myself. So, God - being all powerful - also has the power to destroy himself, otherwise he'd lack a power i possess and so could not sensibly be called 'all powerful'.

Thus, God does not exist of necessity. For he exists by his own grace and thus exists contingently (as does all else, of course).

And note, you cannot say "ah, but Aquinas disagrees" because Aquinas is not here and hasn't read what I just said. I think there's a very good chance he'd agree if he was!

True, but all one needs to do to avoid equivocation is to clarify the meaning of the terms used. — Amalac

Yes, so God is 'all powerful', and that is one meaning of the word 'omnipotence'. And thus God is omnipotent in that sense of the word.

Now, if someone comes up with another meaning of the word omnipotent - such as 'being able to do all things it is logically possible for one to do' - then that's fine, but the word can no longer correctly be used to characterise God.

Similarly, if I say "God" just means "the sum total of what exists" and then argue that as the sum total of what exists exists, God exists, then although I have proved God, the God I have proved is just "the sum total of what exists" and not an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being.

I don't believe free-will is compatible with materialism. — RogueAI

No, nor me. But his experiment does not show us that materialism is true or do anything to show us that materialism and free will are incompatible. They are incompatible, I think, but nothing in his experiment draws our attention to that.

How are they going to set up an experiment that involves me talking to multiple people, collecting huge amounts of data, and then making a final decision? That's a process that can take months. — RogueAI

Beside the point. It could be done in principle, and it's implications would be the same. So the idea that his experiments challenge our free will for 'simple' decisions, but not more complex ones is simply baseless.

But let's say they did and they saw some "readiness potential" before the actual final decision was made. That's OK. I'll just claim 90% of the decision was me consciously counting up the costs/benefits over a matter of weeks, and the final 10% was my subconscious nudging me towards a final decision (the "readiness potential" that the EEG shows). — RogueAI

This doesn't explain how his experiments challenge one kind of intention and not another. So, I form the intention to flex my wrist. Somehow his experiments are supposed to challenge the free will of that. I form an intention to buy a house. Well, they'd challenge that just as much. And if the latter was preceded by lots of other intention-formings, well, the same would apply to all of those. So I just fail to see on what rational basis one could say 'ah, but more complex intentions are immune".

«a simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.» that's the definition I use, Leibniz'. Existence is only one among other perfections, and certainly does not mean the same as that. — Amalac

I have no idea what that means. "Positive" - what does that mean? Does it mean exists, perhaps? I juts don't know what that definition means.

That's perfect but bad makes no sense, right? Can something be maximally morally good and not perfect? No. So, perfect really means morally good.

If you think otherwise, can you provide an example of something that is perfect yet bad, or fully good yet imperfect?

I don't see that. I just don't see how you arrive at that view at all.

Just to reiterate: they don't do anything at all to challenge the idea that we have free will. I mean, absolutely nothing. For instance "there's a tree outside my window". Does that observation challenge the idea that we have free will? No, not in the least. It's just an observation about a tree and its relation to my window.

Well, Libet's observations are relevantly analogous: they don't do anything to challenge the idea that we have free will.

But let's say that they somehow do, becuause - as some seem to think (bizarrely) - they show our conscious decision making processes to be causally inert by-products of brain processes. Okay, well if that's what they show - and they don't - then free will would be undermined for all decisions, no matter how complex.

So I do not see why you think that 'if' they challenge free will they only challenge our free will where simple decisions are concerned. I mean, he could just run the same experiments for extremely complex decisions, presumably. It would just be rather time consuming.

If you define omnipotence like that, then that is obviously correct. But in order to inquire epistemologically into the most coherent and logically viable notion of God (and also to abide to the principle of charity), we should look at all notions of omnipotence that seem as plausible as possible. For instance, one may define omnipotence as the ability to do anything except what is contrary to the laws of logic. — Amalac

Well, what's in a word? Let's dispense with the word omnipotence and just talk about being all powerful instead - or, what amounts to the same thing, let's talk of him being able to do 'anything' (which is how Jesus put it, I believe) - as that is the feature God has.

A being who is constrained by the laws of logic is less powerful than one who is not. Thus an all powerful being is not constrained by the laws of logic. An all powerful being makes the laws of logic what they are - for how else could such a being not be constrained by them?

Thus, God, being all powerful, is not constrained by the laws of logic. He can do anything, including destroying himself (and making square circles and such like).

Note how absurd it would be to suppose that I have a power that an all powerful being lacks. I can destroy myself, but an all powerful being cannot? That is a contradiction, surely, as plain as day.

No good simply noting that some 'define' omnipotence in such a way that a being who is unable to do things that I can do qualifies as omnipotent. After all, I can define omnipotence in such a way that I turn out to be omnipotent. Here: an omnipotent being is a being who is writing this post. Well, that's me. I'm omnipotent according to that definition. I mean, I can't do anything - there's very little I can do, in fact - but I'm still omnipotent according to that definition. And I can define omniscience and moral perfection in ways that will guarantee that I am those things too. And thus, bingo, I am an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. And furthermore, I clearly exist. But that is patently not a way of proving God exists, it is rather just to play with words.

So, God is all powerful. And as an all powerful being he can do anything - which is just to say the same thing again. And as he can do anything, he can destroy himself and anything else. Thus nothing exists of necessity. And thus Plantinga's ontological argument and any other that appeals to a necessary existent fails.

When you say the subject of all perfections does not exist, — Amalac

I think God exists. But what exactly are you talking about when you talk of a 'subject of all perfections'? It seems to me that you are simply using this word 'perfection' to mean 'exists'.

For something to be perfect, is for it to be good. I mean "that's perfect, but bad" sounds incoherent.

For something to be good is for it be valued by God.

So, certainly for any perfections to exist, God needs to exist.

And as God will value himself (for he's omnipotent and if he disliked any aspect of himself he could simply change so as to be as he wants) then God himself will be maximally perfect.

Do you disagree with any of that?

Is 'existence' a perfection? No, not necessarily. For what it is for something to be perfect, is for it to be maximally good - maximally approved of by God. Yet the non-existence of many things could maximally be approved of by God, could it not? And thus we cannot say that existence is always and everywhere good, for it is good for some things not to exist. (And so we cannot say that existence is always and everywhere a perfection, given that a perfection is a good quality).

Does God exist? Yes. But I don't think we can get to this conclusion by just noticing that we have the idea of a maximally good being.

Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. — Amalac

I don't see how that follows. God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. So he's 'morally' perfect.

Well, it is easy enough to imagine that there is no morally perfect being. After all, not existing is not a vice, is it?

It seems to me that you are simply using the word 'perfection' as a synonym for 'exists' and then pointing out that if X does not exist, then X's non existence is a perfection (which only follows because you're using the word perfection in that strange way).

But then all you're arguing is that things that exist, exist.

Ontological arguments have always struck me as a bit fishy. I think this is how they strike most, isn't it?

First, why would it be impossible to conceive of God's non existence? God is morally perfect. But one might think that a God who is morally perfect would not be responsible for having created anything less than perfect - such as this world - and so conclude that God does not exist, and conclude this 'from' his moral perfection.

But even if that kind of reflection is confused and properly conceiving of God does involve conceiving of him existing - which seems quite dubious - that would not conclusively establish his existence, as it is possible to conceive of things that are impossible. For instance, when I mistakenly think that 4 x 93 is 374 I am conceiving of something impossible (for it is not possible for 4 x 93 to equal that figure).

As I understand it, the currently most popular version of the ontological argument is Alvin Plantinga's. I am not too familiar with it, but I think it assumes that God is a necessary existent. And then it exploits this by noting that if we accept that it is metaphysically possible for there to be a necessarily existent God, then such a God must in fact exist. I think that's quite right, but the problem is that God is not a necessary existent, for God is omnipotent and thus can do anything, including taking himself out of existence. Thus those who - like me - believe in God, must conclude that nothing exists of necessity. Which undercuts this kind of ontological argument.

Well, once more you a) fail to engage the argument of the thread and b) pronounce confidently on something you know nothing about. They do not 'show' what you say, they presuppose it. And it doesn't show that our brains are elephants and us riders atop them. If you think it does show this, show it without presupposing it.

I must disagree. The point of Libet's little experiment is to demonstrate an, here physical, event that has bearing on free will, happens before the relevant intention forms. This would blow the notion of free will out of the water as there's a causally relevant brain activity that precedes the formation of intent. — TheMadFool

But that wouldn't blow free will out of the water - it wouldn't touch it. If the point is just that there is a brain event - P - that occurs slightly before the mental event of intention forming - Q - then all it is doing is drawing our attention to something that we all knew already and that didn't need a brain monitor to establish. Namely, that our intentions have causal antecedents. Again, the event of Libet saying 'form the intention to flex your hand' is one of those. It is an event; it causes the formation of the intention (it's not pure coincidence that the subjects formed that intention subsequent to him telling them to form it); and it occurs prior to the formation of the intention.

When it comes to whether we have free will or not, the central issues seem to be whether our mental states trace entirely to external causes, and/or whether the causation in question is deterministic or indeterministic. Those issues are in no way settled - in no way settled - by the Libet experiments. That is, Libet's experiments do not, for instance, somehow show us that incompatibilism is true and that determinism is true (a combination which would indeed entail that we lack free will).

So again, contrary to widespread belief (widespread belief, that is, among non-philosophers - most philosophers are going to agree with me, because they can think straight), Libet's experiments imply precisely nothing about whether we do, or do not, have free will. It is utterly bizarre that so many think they show we lack free will and reflects, I think, just how little thought most people give these issues and how eager they are to accept the judgements of hacks over experts.

Let's say I am in the process of deliberating about what to do next - have a cup of tea, or a cup of coffee?

Now imagine that the universe is deterministic and, as such, it is determined that at 3pm I will decide to have a cup of tea.

Now imagine instead that it is indeterministic whether I will be alive or dead at 3pm. And thus it is now indeterministic whether I will decide to have a cup of tea at 3pm or be dead at 3pm.

Does the fact it is indeterministic whether I make the decision to have a cup of tea at 3pm magically mean that I am now free in respect of it?

How on earth does that work?

The fact is that those who think that Libet's experiments pose some kind of challenge to free will are just confused. They don't show anything remotely interesting or challenging where free will is concerned.

Like I say, either they show that our intentions have causes (something we surely don't need any experiment to show us, for it has been known for as long as people have been forming intentions) or they show (on the false assumption that brain events and mental events are identical) that the thought 'I am forming an intention' itself takes a bit of time to form, and thus will represent the intention itself as occurring later than it actually does. Either way, we do not have even the beginning of a proof that we lack free will. And thus those who think otherwise - and engage in any debate over free will and it is only a matter of time before someone raises Libet's experiments - are simply confused.

Not sure I follow you. If the only point Libet's experiments make is that our intentions have causal antecedents, then we could establish this without any help from the brain monitor. For those who formed the intention to flex their hands did so because Libet told them to. So that event - the event of Libet telling them and then them subsequently forming such intentions - would be sufficient to disprove that we have free will. That is, the headline could read "neuroscientist asks people to form an intention, and they do, and thus no one has free will". Which, of course, is absurd - for that in no way shows that we lack free will. Yet that, it seems, is all Libet's experiments teach us.

1. R = The brain recording of an intent (to flex a hand) as observed by the experimenter

2. I = The intent (to flex a hand) as reported to the experimenter — TheMadFool

That description just assumes that the mind is the brain and that mental events are brain events.

What is recorded is a brain event.

It is then noted that the participant reports thinking that they formed an intention at a slightly later time than that brain event occurred.

Okay - how does that imply we lack free will? That's what I'm wondering.

Libet saying 'form an intention to raise your hand' is also an event and it is also causally responsible for the subjects forming such an intention. Does that somehow demonstrate that they lack free will? Surely not, as just about everyone would admit. So why does showing that a brain event precedes our intention formation magically show that we lack free will?

What if the brain event 'is' the intention to raise the hand? It isn't - but let's just assume it is.

What would this show? Well, just that we're not very accurate when it comes to judging when, precisely, certain mental events occur. Which again, is hardly surprising (I'd have thought it was virtually inevitable, given I'd have not just to form the intention to flex my hand, but the additional thought "I am forming the intention to flex my hand", with the latter being subsequent to the former) and doesn't imply anything re free will. I thought I formed the desire to X at time t2, in fact I formed the desire to X at time t1. Ok. Why does my mistake imply I lack free will?

Haha, from someone who demonstrably doesn't understand the experiment.
You. Haven't. Read. The. Article. Right? Yet you think you understand it. Dunning and Kruger.

Me: here's an experiment that many think disproves free will. But it doesn't, because at best all it shows is that our intentions have causal antecedents, which isn't remotely surprising, doesn't require any brain monitoring to establish, and doesn't imply we lack free will.

You: the experiment is about CATS and their number of legs. Which is three.

Me: Er, no it isn't (and cats have four legs, not three - but meh). Can you provide a reference for that?

You: Just put 'cats' into the internet. You'll find lots of information. And you'll see they have THREE legs.

Me: No, a reference to the article in which the experiment is described - a reference showing me that the article is in fact about cats.

You: you clearly aren't interested in discussing the experiment in question. Oh well.

Libet's experiment was discussed in the FreeWill thread — Gnomon

Yes, very confusedly. So?

Note : even Libet did not claim that his experiment disproved freewill. — Gnomon

Yes, I know. I said many have taken his experiment to disprove free will. I didn't say Libet did.

Are you disputing that many, many, many, people think Libet's experiment disproves free will?

Or are you implicitly suggesting that it is the person who performs an experiment who has final authority on what its implications are (and thus as Libet did not think it disproved free will, that is sufficient to establish that it doesn't, and so my criticism of those who think otherwise is surplus to requirements)?

Ah, - so you don't have a reference for it, because that's not what the experiment is about. You haven't read the original, right?

So, once more, it is 'not' about prediction. The brain event triggers the recording.

It's as I described it. And the inference is absurd. Like I say.

You: yeah, but there are other experiments demonstrating other things. So there!

Okaaay. Reference for that? (A reference from the famous Libet article in which the experiment I am talking about is described and on whose basis the inference made......so, not just a random reference, but from that article in the journal of consciousness studies).

Second: relevance? You did think of a red tomato, yes? Have I just proved - by that - that you do not have free will?

I predict that if you are reading this you will now think of a red tomato.

Therefore you lack free will.

Bartricks proves we lack free will.

No, it is not about predicting behaviour. The brain event triggers the recording. (Although, of course, if you put something in capitals then it is definitely true).

Anyway, even though you're wrong and it is not about predicting behaviour, even if it was, how would that show that we lack free will?

For instance, I predict that very shortly I will be told I am an idiot and don't understand anything. When that happens - and it will happen any moment - will I have shown that the person who says this lacks free will?

Here's another prediction. When Libet said, at 3pm, please form an intention to flex your hand, I predict that the subjects to whom he gave this instruction will form the said intention. Does that show that free will doesn't exist? Have I just done what Libet did but without hte need for costly equipment?

I have no doubt though that people are not free in flexing their hands in those situations although they think they are — Gregory

Oh, well, okay then. Good point!

Oh, okay. Carry on.

like I say, pure unashamed b/s. You're a wannabe guru and you want people to accept your authority over that of Reason. First step - invite people to agree that reason can only take us so far (which most will happily take as it means they don't have to try and be smart and can just make shit up). Then persuade them that happiness is the most important thing and that material possessions are an encumbrance and so they better give them to you for safe keeping. Then persuade them that the key to happiness is not thinking as that way they hopefully won't recognize that you are a b/s merchant and you've got all their possessions.
It's helpful to achieve these ends to wrap yourself up in the garb of some eastern religion or tradition (but not essential), as people will think you are in touch with the ancient wisdom of people who knew less about the world than a contemporary 10 year old.

Life in itself has no meaning. Life is an opportunity to create meaning. Meaning has not to be discovered: it has to be created. — Anand-Haqq

Well, top marks for a) contradicting yourself within two sentences and b) pronouncing rather than arguing.

What is it with you people? You seem to think you already know the meaning of life. No proper investigation. No reasoned reflection. Just pronouncement, as if the world and its purpose is in your gift. You won't learn anything if you start out thinking you know it all.

The contradiction first: you have said life has no meaning and then you have said it has a meaning. Good job!

And the rest is just more of that stuff creeps say to try and impress people in bars. Again, my b/s detector is giving a 'pure' reading.

First, what on earth does it mean to say that life's meaning is to give it meaning? That's a meaning, right - a purpose. So who gave it that purpose? You? How? Did you create my life? No. So how did you give it that purpose? did you create your own life? No. So how did you give it that purpose. Think. It. Through.

So, no, life's purpose is not to give it a purpose, for if that were life's purpose then we wouldn't have to, becasue it'd already have one. Plus you'd owe us an account of how it got to have that purpose (you pronouncing that it does ain't that account).

And you cannot give your life a purpose, for it's already too late as its up and running already. Your life's purpose is the sole preserve of its creator, not you.

So to Barondan, I'm quoting these other people for emphasis. There's a generic tendency to equate predictability of choice to lack of choice; but there's something mightily suspicious about this tendency. — InPitzotl

I'm not doing that - where have I done that?

I make decisions. The decisions are mine. I have made them. That's the default. Causes must have origins. I originate my decisions.

What would deprive me of free will? Accurately predict my decisions? How would that work?

I have a coffee every morning. That's a free decision I make. But its predictable.

Let me say that I think there is nothing anyone - save God - can do to deprive me of free will. For to deprive me of free will you would need to make me into a created thing, rather than an uncreated one. How are you doing to do that?

As we are in a prison, then death is removal from the prison. But that could occur for all manner of reasons. If someone kills themselves, then they have escaped the prison. But that was foolish, because this is God's prison so they obviously won't get far and will simply have to start over. If, instead, someone is killed by something or someone other than themselves (and of course, there will be grey cases), then presumably they get a parole hearing where it is determined whether they have served their time and no longer pose a danger, or haven't and so must go back to the prison. After all, I don't think God is going to spend much time thinking about us while we're doing our time - I mean, why would he? We don't deserve the attention. The world is a place created, I suspect, to dump us in - to place us away from his concern, where what happens to us is determined not by God, but by chance (which is what happens when God turns his concern off). And - again, speculation, but informed speculation - I suspect that God does not turn his attention to us and assess us until we leave the prison. Until that time, we are left to our own devices to stew among those who have behaved as abysmally as ourselves.

Presumably. We do, don't we? That is, we recognize the justice of releasing someone after they have done their time - that is, after they have received their just deserts - provided they no longer pose a risk.

yes. There are prisons within prisons, are there not? We are all in prison, but some are in human-made prisons in the God-made prison.