It's the question at the heart of philosophy and you think it's best avoided. Good job!

specifically, what did you mean?

well done for not addressing the OP. Not one for philosophical reflection are you?

er, what?

er, what?

No, your approach is all wrong here. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Highly unlikely.

If I believe it's raining and you believe it's sunny, it is, therefore, true that you hold a belief that it is sunny and also true that I hold a belief that it is raining. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes. From which it would be fallacious to infer that therefore weather itself is subjective. Which is the same fallacy that those who appeal to variation in moral belief across space and time commit when they blithely conclude that morality is individually or collectively subjective.

It is not an objective opinion, but rather a subjective one. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Now you're just abusing language and/or confusing a belief with its contents. There is no such thing as an 'objective' opinion or belief. All beliefs are subjective, because beliefs are subjective states. But some beliefs are about objective matters - such as the belief that it is raining - and some beliefs are about subjective matters - such as my belief that I am believing something, or my belief that Jane is enjoying the donut.

If I say a "x is immoral", I am making a statement analogous to saying "vanilla is my favorite flavor." Notice that the analogous statement is not an objective one, such as "vanilla is the best flavor" but rather as a subjective one "to me, vanilla is the best flavor." It is the same with moral statements or other normative statements. If I make the statement "stealing is wrong" what I actually mean to say is "to me, stealing is wrong." — Cartesian trigger-puppets

No, you're very confused. If you believe stealing is wrong, what exactly do you believe about stealing? That is, provide a translation for that word 'wrong'.

I have not argued that immaterial minds are caused by the brain. Consciousness is a state of mind, yes? It's not a thing. It's a state. A state of a thing.

Minds are immaterial. There's a ton of evidence that they are, and none - I stress, none - that they are not.

Sensible events clearly have affects on our minds. They often alter what conscious state they are in. The wine in the glass in front of me is a sensible substance. If I down it, this will affect my conscious states.

My decision to drink the wine is a mental event. It causes - or seems to be causing - my arm to raise the wine to my face. The drinking of the wine is also a sensible event. And the improved mood that the wine induces is mental.

You can perform these experiments yourself. Indeed, one is happening right now - for these words are appearing on a sensible computer screen and you're seeing them and thinking about them. Your visual sensations and your thoughts are mental states.

Clearly then, a quick survey of how things appear to be reveals that there is plenty of causal interaction between the sensible and the immaterial.

Do I have to explain how that occurs? Nope. Not sure what an 'explanation' would be in this context. But anyway, one is not owed. One does not have to be able to explain how something is the case, before one has evidence that it is the case.

My typing on the keyboard is clearly affecting what appears on the screen in front of me. I have excellent evidence for this. Yet I haven't a clue how it is happening.

The One True Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church is extended in space - it's in Italy, Canada, Brazil - how odd that you should deny this. — Banno

This is getting tedious as it is beside the point. But no, it isn't extended in space, because what you're talking about is a set of beliefs - yes? - and they're not extended in space. Coz they're mental states - states of mind - and minds aren't extended in space.

Or you're talking about the bodies of the believers - yes, those are extended in space if, that is, material objects exist (which they don't).

Or you're talking about the churches the bodies of these people go and hang around in. Those are extended in space (if material objects exist, that is, which they don't).

They're not extended in space. They're not objects and they're not extended in space (unless you meant actual churches - as in the buildings - they are, of course).

No.

...so, European Autonomy is a material thing?

The One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church is a material thing?

The traffic code of New South Wales is a material thing? — Banno

No, I refer you to my earlier answer.

I agree; but cups and chairs do. — Banno

Yes, not really the issue though.

No, because that's not right. The cup is more than just what I sense. Calling them such prejudges their existence outside sensibility. It won't do. — Banno

Well, we're not going to have a profitable conversation then, are we? I am going to call them sensible objects because in that way no questions are begged.

Not obvious at all. Seems to me that you are stuck with an unhelpful sundering of the mental from the physical. I offered you a way to mend the break. — Banno

No, you're just an amateur. The direction of help is me to you, not you to me.

assuming the system is closed. — khaled

By 'closed' do you mean to exclude immaterial objects? If so, then you are begging the question.

If the system includes them, then two-way interaction between the material and the immaterial will not violate the law.

But anyway, you now allow, clearly, that one thing can cause another without transferring any energy to it, yes?

No, your position is unreasonable. You're taking to be good evidence what is in fact clearly very weak evidence. Dreams are actually better evidence - by your own lights - for what they represent to be the case (namely another realm in which radically different laws of nature operate and to which we are transferred by going unconscious) than NDEs are for an afterlife.

DNA evidence that Jones's hand was on the knife is good evidence that Jones killed Susan. That Jones has a bit of a shifty look about him is not.

The problem is that materialism cannot explain how consciousness can arise from non-conscious stuff (e.g., working brain) when that stuff is put together a certain way. It can't even hint at the framework of a possible explanation. It can try and avoid the problem by claiming consciousness is illusionary, or other such non-sense, but that era is almost over.

The explanation is that consciousness cannot arise from non-conscious stuff. It's an absurdity. Since we know consciousness exists, therefore, we know there is no non-conscious stuff.

Now, what do you think the mind-body problem is, and how was it solved? — RogueAI

If the mind is an immaterial object and not a material object, then one does not have to explain how consciousness arises from material substances, does one? It doesn't.

So, 'how can material objects be conscious?' They aren't. Consciousness is a property of an immaterial thing, not a material thing. As one will see if one attends to the evidence - the evidence provided by Plato, Avicenna, Descartes and the like.

This is how you get the mind/body problem: you 'assume' that the mind is the body, and then you have a problem. Silly, isn't it?

It's like me just assuming that my partner is not in the garden lopping down branches and then thinking "how is it that branches are just magically dropping from my trees, all neatly cut?".

You - you - think that material events cause immaterial ones, yes?

So explain how that is consistent with the physical laws you're mentioning. Do. It.

I didn't say otherwise. — Banno

That's why I said "yes?" just to confirm that you agree.

"Material thing" - what's that , then? Is temperature a material thing? Light? — Banno

Something extended in space.

A 'thing' incidentally, is a bearer of properties. So, if something is extended in space, then there will be a boundary between the space it occupies and the space it doesn't. Therefore it will have a shape. Shape is not a thing, but the property of a thing. Temperature would also be a property of a thing.

I don't think material things exist - I don't think they make sense - but 'if' they exist, then I think there's no problem with them interacting with immaterial things. Immaterial things, btw, are things that are not extended in space.

Let's drop that word, for fear of it leading us astray. Instead, go back to: — Banno

Fine by me - I call them 'sensible objects'. Let's call them that, for that term is neutral between materialist and immaterialist interpretations of them. Plus there is no dispute that my arm is a sensible object.

One event. — Banno

No, obviously not. My decision is a mental event. No doubt it was caused by a sensible event. But it is a mental event. And it causes a sensible event.

It may be the case that while experiencing a dream we believe it to be real or veridical, but most people who awake from a dream do not confuse the dream with reality. — Sam26

Contrary to what you say, this commonly happens. "Did I remember that, or dream it?" is a common refrain.

But anyway, even if most of those who have NDE think they're real, there are obvious explanations for this. We are used to dreams and used to explaining them away. We also have no vested interest in them being anything other than, well, dreams. By contrast, the very nature of NDEs is such that we can expect to experience them once, if at all. And furthermore they occur under traumatic circumstances, ones likely to motivate people to re-evaluate everything, including their worldviews. It is simply implausible, then, to think that people under these kinds of circumstances are objective assessors of their experiences. That is not to say that these experiences do not constitute evidence, it is just to say that, as evidence, they are very weak indeed. If I was making a case for an afterlife, I wouldn't even mention them, just as, for an analogy, a detective who is trying to build a case for thinking that Jones did the murder wouldn't throw in 'he also had a bit of a shifty look'.

For example, people who are experiencing an NDE in a hospital setting (say in an operating room) are able to describe what is going on in the operating room in detail. — Sam26

These sorts of cases - if accurate (and that seems highly debatable at the moment) - seem to provide evidence for the immateriality of the mind, rather than an afterlife.

What are you on about? Mental events appear to cause sensible events, yes?

I decided - mental event - to raise my arm, and my arm raised - sensible event.

If all the evidence is that my mind is an immaterial thing, then what we have there is evidence that immaterial events can and do cause sensible events.

If you think there's evidence that the mind is a material thing, provide it.

First, what do you understand the problem to be, exactly?

So, just to be clear, you think the mind is immaterial, and that there is causation between material and immaterial - that material events in the brain cause immaterial events in the mind. You just arbitrarily believe that though material events can cause immaterial events, the reverse is not true. You cite conservation of energy. But a) nothing in the idea of material/immaterial causation violates those laws and b) if it did, then your view involves a violation of them as well. For how, exactly, does a material event cause an immaterial event without that involving a transfer of energy? And when you provide an answer to that, that answer should also satisfy you that immaterial events can cause material ones.

I said an immaterial thing cannot cause material movement. The other way is fine. — khaled

So causal interactions can take place between material and immaterial entities.

If a physical event can cause a non-physical event, why can't a non-physical event cause a physical one? Odd. Seems entirely arbitrary to believe that, given we have equally strong evidence for the latter as for the former.

Anyway, must go to bed now - but how? Doors can only be pushed. They can't be pulled. Dammit. I'm stuck in my study.

False. Energy disappeared in the first step. Then new energy came in. — khaled

That would be.....Question Begging.

Your brain caused the mental event. And your brain also caused the arm to move. — khaled

So the brain interacted with the mind. On your view. You think the mind is immaterial. Mental events are events of the mind (in case you didn't know). So, if your brain....material thing....causes a 'mental event'...an 'event of the mind'.......then.......wait for it......wait.......you have a material thing, causally interacting with an immaterial thing.

Which you think doesn't happen.

Only you also think it does.

Must be good being able to do that - being able to just think all these contradictory things at once. I spend ages trying to avoid doing that. What a waste of time!

You're getting it for free. You should be grateful. Free scorn.

Minds are immaterial, yes, for like the 4th time. — khaled

Right. So when I decided - a mental event - to raise my arm, and my arm raised, what happened there?

Your view must be that it was pure coincidence that my decision to raise my arm was followed by my arm raising.

Which is too silly for words.

And when I eat food and feel satisfied, that feeling was just coincidental.

Silly, silly, sillyingtons

Or do you, perhaps, believe there was causal interaction after all?

Now, once more: event A - sensible event - causes B - mental event - which causes C - sensible event.

No new energy coming in. Everything's being nicely conserved. It's just a pipe with an immaterial section.

Yes, you're confident. But apparently ignorant. For rather than present any kind of challenge to any of the arguments I have made, you have scoffed and said I sound like I am on another planet. Scorn, not refutations is all you have offered. You have much to learn.

What's your position - are you a materialist or an immaterialist about the mind? Say which, and then we'll go from there. Because either way you're going to have energy being passed to your mind.

Well, you just stipulated that the laws apply to physical things alone. That's question begging.
If the laws in question govern the totality of what exists, then that includes immaterial souls. And there is no violation involved in mind/body interaction (anymore than there would be if minds were material).

Does your mind gain weight too if you don't exercise? — khaled

No. Your body will. Not your mind.

Unless you're not an immaterialist about the mind. In which case, yes. It will.

So, you're either a materialist about the mind or your not, right? If you're not, then you're with me. And as there is clearly causal interaction between the mind and the body, whatever that involves occurs.

Or you are a materialist about the mind. In which case the same is true.

"Energy" has a very specific meaning in physics, you can't just randomly apply it to something that is by definition outside of the scope of physics. — khaled

Ah, there you go - begging the question again. You really don't understand, do you? There's no violation of those laws. You have to add to those laws physicalist assumptions to get a violation - but that begs the question.

Wow that's wrong on so many levels. I really feel like we're on different planets. We're so far apart further discussion seems pointless. It's time for bed. Nice chatting, let's do it again. — GLEN willows

Odd that for someone who describes themselves as a philosophical rooky you are so confident about these matters. Methinks your humility was b/s, yes? I am not a philosophical rooky, btw.

By causing it. I mean, what do you want by way of an account here?

When it comes to causation - and let's just stick to causation between sensible things - about the best we can do is say that causation happens. That 'what it is' for one thing to cause another is simply for a causal relation to obtain between them.

Now, that may be felt inadequate, but note that it is not a 'problem of interaction', for here we are dealing with causation between sensible things.

Well, if that's all we can say where causation between sensible things is concerned, I fail to see what's problematic about saying the same where causation between sensible and immaterial things is concerned.

But perhaps there is a problem - perhaps objects of one kind cannot possibly causally interact with objects of a fundamentally different kind. I don't see why not, but perhaps.

Okay, let's run with that. Well, I have 14 arguments that my mind is immaterial, and I'm still waiting for one - just one - in support of the materiality of the mind.

So, at this point I have very good evidence that my mind is immaterial. And if immaterial things truly cannot causally interact with anything other than immaterial things, and my mind appears to interact with a sensible world, then the conclusion any rational person will draw is that the sensible world is therefore a mental world and not an extra mental world. That is, the conclusion we reach is not materialism, but immaterialism.

I am an immaterialist, so if there really is a problem of interaction - and there isn't - then all this will do is furnish us with another argument for immaterialism. What it won't do is anything at all to establish materialism about the mind.

Your mind gains energy? — khaled

Yes, if that's what causal interaction requires. Note, this is also what would happen if the mind is your brain, right? So, either way the answer is 'yes'.

But you haven't shown a violation of the laws of conversation. There's no violation.

Yes and yes. And it was solved ages ago. Plato. Avicenna. Descartes. Locke. Berkeley. Read them.

No, you're simply not getting this. You're thinking B causes C out of the blue.
No. A - which is a sensible event - causes B - which is a mental event - which causes C, which is another sensible event.

There's no new energy coming in, just energy transferring from A to B and then to C. It's just that B isn't sensibly detectable.

The thesis is not incompatible with the laws of conservation. If you don't believe me, check out Jose Gusmao Rodriguez's article "There are no good objections to substance dualism" in the journal "Philosophy".

All of the philosophers you mention had several things wrong, you know that right? Specifically dualism, Descartes - epic fail. Have you heard about Elizabeth of Bohemia? — GLEN willows

Er, no - they were right about the immaterialism of the mind. Their arguments are among the 14. No one has refuted them. (You said you were a philosophical rooky. Yet you're confident that these giants were wrong?! Are you aware of their arguments?)

And yes, obviously I have heard about her. And I have read her exchanges with Descartes. Have you? She is hugely overrated. She is credited - wrongly - with having raised the 'problem of interaction'. She didn't. Pierre Gassendi raised it first. And if you've read Descartes' replies to Gassendi you'll know just how thoroughly unimpressed he was by it. But Gassendi wasn't a young princess with a big bank account.

No, this is how it works.

Event A - brain event - causes event B - mental event. Event B causes event C - brain event.

We can sensibly detect A and C, not B.

Now, what in that picture is inconsistent with the laws you mention? Show me the actual argument - for if you do that, then you will have to import an unnecessary premise in addition to the laws you mention, and those premises will be question begging.

How?

Argument? That momentum and energy are conserved? I have none, because it's not a conclusion arrived at by argument. It's a conclusion arrived at by observation. Centuries of it. — khaled

I don't dispute the laws you mention. I want you to show me that they are inconsistent with a premise in my argument.

What exactly do you mean by the mind/body problem? It's not the name of anything very clear.

And yes, I have 14 arguments for the immateriality of the mind (most of them aren't mine, I hasten to add - but the vast bulk of the great philosophers have thought the mind immaterial due to there being such overwhelming evidence in support of the thesis......most contemporary philosophers disagree, but who'd you rather have on your side? A thousand contemporary philosophers, or Plato, Avicenna, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Bartricks... the list goes on). I haven't heard a single good one for the materiality of the mind. Not one.

Yes, I suffer fools crossly.