Comments

  • Can God do anything?
    It does mean that they can't do things like destroy each other though. So they wouldn't be omnipotent.
  • Can God do anything?
    Look up normative reasons or normativity (actually, try using a properly edited book and not the internet). Laws of Reason are normative. That's fancy for 'they are directives to do and believe things'.

    Then look up Dunning and Kruger and then ask yourself why you might be finding everything I say a bit nonsensical.
  • Can God do anything?
    This thread is about....well who knows what it is about now!
    There will not be more than one omnipotent being. This is because otherwise one could frustrate the other and thus neither would truly be omnipotent.
  • Can God do anything?
    They were on different topics - one was an exploration of what being all powerful involves and the other was about something's existence. Each debate was focused, but this is now a mess. It's like merging a thread about moral nihilism with one about moral relativism just because they're both about different aspects of morality.
  • Can God do anything?
    No, Wayfarer, it means the opposite. Stop being obtuse.
  • Can God do anything?
    no. How does that follow? The exact opposite follows.

    You are no doubt conflating arbitrary with 'capable of change'.
  • Can God do anything?
    well, I show why reason entails God in the OP- the OP that no one can now find due to the merging.

    The imperatives of Reason are imperatives and thus require a mind to issue them.

    Hence this premise is true:

    1. If there are imperatives of Reason, there is a mind who is issuing them.

    And as the imperatives of Reason exist beyond all doubt, this premise is also true:

    2. There are imperatives of Reason.

    From which it follows

    3. There exists a mind who is issuing the imperatives of Reason.

    And that mind will have the properties of omnipotence, omniscience and omni benevolence. Thus it will be God.
  • Can God do anything?
    yes, but scornful is. I mean what, exactly, was your criticism then?
  • Can God do anything?
    Why can't it be our minds "...whose laws are the laws of Reason"? Why does it have to be God's mind?TheMadFool

    It doesn't 'have to be' God's mind. It 'is' God's mind. Why? Because the mind whose imperatives are imperatives of Reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (see argument in the OP for why that would be). God is in the conclusion, not the premises.

    Now, are you omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent? No. So you are not the mind whose imperatives are imperatives of Reason. And that goes for me too, and for all minds bar one - the one whose imperatives 'are' the imperatives of Reason.

    But certainly, the way most of you argue I can see that most of you do indeed consider yourselves to be the minds of Reason, for most of you seem to think that if you think something is so, then it must be! So most of you here do seem to think of yourselves as arbiters of truth. You're not though. Thank goodness!
  • Can God do anything?
    So the upshot is, no reasonable person could disagree with you, or, put another way, anyone who disagrees is being unreasonable.Wayfarer

    No. The upshot is that God exists. That's what the argument demonstrates. Does that mean that no reasonable person could disagree with me? No. There are all manner of ways in which a reasonable person might, while remaining reasonable, disagree with me. The evidence is that God exists, but it isn't always reasonable to follow the evidence, and the evidence isn't always well understood.

    But then, according to you, God can arbitrarily designate what is reasonable and what is not.Wayfarer

    No, not 'arbitrarily'. For something to be 'arbitrary' is for it to be 'without reason'. So God does not designate arbitrarily, for God's will constitutively determines what is and isn't arbitrary.

    A proposition can only be true according to God’s will. Yet somehow this can be discerned through reason.Wayfarer

    Yes. Describing my position in a scornful tone does not constitute a refutation of it.
  • Can God do anything?
    It does apply to them. But I don't say that truths of Reason are imperative, I say that there are imperatives of Reason and that there can be truths about them. If I order you to give me all your money, then "give me all your money" is the imperative, and it is a truth about an imperative that I am ordering you to give me all your money. So, it is true that Bartricks is ordering you to give him all your money. But that doesn't mean that the imperative I am issuing is 'a truth'. It's not a truth, it's an imperative (imperatives can't be true or false; they can be followed or flouted).

    The imperatives of Reason are demonstrably imperatives of a person, God (as my argument demonstrates). That person is omnipotent precisely because it is up to this person - to God - what the imperatives are. And so that means that no truth about what the imperatives are is a necessary truth.

    So God is not bound by the imperatives of Reason, because they're God's imperatives. And no truth about those imperatives is necessary.

    What is true will itself be under God's control, for when will all reasonable people be satisfied that a proposition is true and that all that has been done has been done to establish its truth? Well, when it is manifest to their reason that Reason desires them to believe it is true for its own sake. For evidence that a proposition is true itself consists in a proposition being one that Reason directs us to believe for the sake of it.

    If all reasonable people will be satisfied that a proposition is true when it is clear to them all that Reason directs them to believe it, then that itself constitutes our best evidence that truth itself is that property: that is, 'what it is' for a proposition to be true is for God to want us to believe it for its own sake.

    Thus once more we can see that there will be no necessary truths, for truth itself is now a function of God's will.
  • Can God do anything?
    I couldn't care less what you think. I care only what you can show by means of a reasoned argument. But given you are convinced that I, who have argued all the way through, am making no arguments for anything, I think you don't understand what I do by an 'argument'. So this is pointless.
    You're just going to have to deny that there are imperatives of Reason. You're going to have to deny that normative reasons exist. And that's fine - deny away. The view is one for which, by the nature of the beast, you cannot defend, for either you think there's reason to believe it is true - in which case norms of reason exist - or you think there's no reason to think it is true, but think it is true anyway (in which case you're irrational).
    As to your unargued for assertion that we ourselves are the source of any and all imperatives that there may be - well, my argument proves that to be false, for if you were the source of the imperatives of Reason, then you'd be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, which you're clearly not.
  • Can God do anything?
    A valid argument extracts the implications of its premises. So unless one of my premises asserts God's existence - and none do - the argument is not question begging.

    To put it another way, you can't accuse an argument of begging the question just if its premises entail its conclusion, for that would make all valid arguments question begging and thus would render the charge vacuous.

    My first premise says

    1. If there are laws of Reason, then there is a mind whose laws they areBartricks

    Subsequent premises - each independently supported - entail that the mind in question exists and is God. So it certainly doesn't beg the question.

    I also provided an argument in support of it. First, imperatives of Reason, norms of Reason, call them what you will, are imperatives - directives, instructions, prescriptions. That's why they're called 'imperatives' and why they're called 'norms' and why the word 'reason' that can sometimes be used as a substitute for them is called a 'normative' reason. That isn't controversial.

    Then there's my claim that imperatives need a mind to issue them. That's a self-evident truth. It's hard to argue for a claim as self-evidently true as that one, for one almost invariably ends up appealing to other claims that are less self-evidently true than the claim one is trying to argue for (which is why Aristotle advised against it). But I illustrated its self-evidence by pointing out that if I was discovered to be a bot, none of this would be a real communication, precisely because these words would not be expressing the desires or thoughts of a mind.

    So, my first premise does not beg any questions. Its truth is entailed by truths that are beyond dispute. And, in conjunction with the other premises - which have the same status, I think - it entails that God exists.

    If you believe it already, then there’s no need to prove it, but if you’re determined not to believe it, then the argument is not going to be persuasive; someone who wishes not to believe it will always find a way to justify themselves.Wayfarer

    That's false. I believe in God on the basis of the argument. I didn't believe in God before I reflected on the argument. I did afterwards, and I did precisely because I could not find any grounds for a reasonable doubt about any of its premises.

    Those who think arguments are impotent to persuade people reveal, I think, something about themselves: namely that it is they themselves who have decided what's true in advance and are not interested in following Reason unless Reason tells them what they want to hear. They then tar everyone else with the same brush so that they do not have to feel too guilty about their self-indulgence. But we're not all like that.

    But anyway, the fact is it is also irrelevant. A proof is a proof. It doesn't have to persuade. What's persuasive to people is a function of the psychologies of people, not a function of what's true.

    Why the upper case R - it is to indicate that it is now being used to refer to the source of the imperatives, including the source of all reasons to do and believe things (the latter having a lower case r)
  • Can God do anything?
    As far as moral imperatives are concerned, these don’t need an abstract ‘mind’ to underwrite them. Suppose you believe that all harm you do to others will be returned to you. Then it will be rational not to harm others, without believing this imperative is issued by a mind.Wayfarer

    And as for that, moral imperatives do need an imperator because they're imperatives and imperatives require an imperator. But you know, deny it if you want. (And it isn't an 'abstract mind' - what on earth is one of those?? - but 'a mind'; and it doesn't 'underwrite it' but is the 'source of it').

    To be 'rational' is to be following reason - yes? Following Reason's imperatives.
  • Can God do anything?
    "Imperative" can mean 'important', but 'an imperative' is 'a command'. Commands need commanders and away we go.
  • Can God do anything?
    Yep, whatever. You've certainly got me. Embarrassingly next door's dog has also just refuted my argument as decisively as you did - it went 'woof woof'. I mean, of course - woof woof, therefore my argument fails! I can see that now. I'm so ashamed.
  • Can God do anything?
    Well, your plea is accurate but your request is insincere. So, that's a big fat 'no'.
  • Can God do anything?
    No. How in blue blazes does that follow?
  • Can God do anything?
    By ratiocination. That's why you're having trouble.
  • Can God do anything?
    Might this not be an argument from ignorance? In our experience, the laws of reason are associated with minds, namely, our own minds, which are what detects such laws. But it doesn’t necessarily follow that they are the product of a mind;Wayfarer

    That was not my argument. I did not argue that as our minds detect the imperatives of Reason, therefore the imperatives of Reason depend on a mind to issue them. That would clearly not follow.

    My argument was that imperatives require a mind to issue them. That's self-evident to our reason.

    My example: imagine I'm a bot. Or imagine that hail stones are hitting this keyboard and by purest coincidence they are causing these words to appear. In other words, imagine that no mind lies behind these words (or 'words'). Well, are we having a conversation? No. Is this "give me your money!" an order? No, of course not. Why? Because no mind is behind it.

    So, the reason why imperatives of Reason must be imperatives of a mind has nothing to do with the fact minds detect such imperatives, and everything to do with the fact that minds have a monopoly on issuing imperatives.

    It is not an argument from ignorance, then, but an argument that appeals to a self-evident truth of reason - one whose truth most would happily acknowledge in other contexts.
  • Can God do anything?
    'God' does not mean 'existence' - that's why we can intelligibly ask whether God exists.

    But yes, God can do anything so God can make himself disappear. That is, he can make something become nothing. Impressive, huh?

    How do you think God would feel about people who keep insisting he can't do things?
  • Can God do anything?
    He has the power to be.

    Look, this is about omnipotence and what it involves. It involves being able to do anything. Those who think it involves less than this need to provide non-question begging arguments for this - which is going to be somewhat hard, because all they're going to be able to do is point to ways in which being able to do anything would involve being able to do things that flout the laws of logic. Which is, of course, something that someone who can do anything can do.
  • Can God do anything?
    You're just contradicting yourself. God can do anything, so God can destroy himself.

    I can destroy myself. If God can't destroy himself, then I'd have a power God lacks. I don't, because God can do anything and so anything I can do, God can do too.

    I suggest that you heed your own request and
    engage with sincerity to truth and reasonPhilosopher19
  • Can God do anything?
    Yeah, that's all false though isn't it - I provided arguments in support of those claims.
    If you think there's reason to think there are no imperatives of Reason, that's because you're just confused. For a 'reason to think' something is a 'normative resaon' - that is, it is itself an instruction of Reason. And my argument only requires that there be some.

    But, you know, if you want to just ignore arguments and insist that I am just asserting things, that's fine. I mean, in making an argument I am asserting things, the thing to consider is whether the assertions are correct. And in my case, they are.

    Anyway, I don't see anything in the rest of what you said that merits any further wasting of finger energy on this keyboard.
  • Why am I me?
    Why are giraffes?
  • Can God do anything?
    Er, none - I think you've lost the plot. I'm arguing that God can do anything. I'm not arguing that I can do anything, or that anything God can do I can do. I am arguing that anything I can do, God can do, because God can do anything.
  • Can God do anything?
    God can make predictions. That doesn't mean he does, just that he can.
  • Can God do anything?
    Yes, I didn't say that I have the power to make God commit fallacies, I said that I have the power to make myself commit fallacies.

    So, 'one has the power to make oneself commit fallacies'. That's true of me - I have that power. And as I cannot have more powers than those of an omnipotent being, then an omnipotent being also has that power - he can say truly, as truly as I can, that "one has the power to make oneself commit fallacies'. Yes?
  • Can God do anything?
    In the example I gave, a desire not to be checkmated, my understanding of the rules, and my ability to model the consequences of my actionsInPitzotl

    Yes, I know - it's an example from Judith Jarvis Thomson, I think - and I addressed it.

    I have my own reasons for bothering with the thread, one of which is that there is always the chance someone will come up with a telling objection.
  • Can God do anything?
    God can make you commit fallacies.Philosopher19

    Correct, of course.

    You can't make God commit fallacies.Philosopher19

    Also correct, of course.

    God can't make God commit fallacies.Philosopher19

    Yes he can. I can make me commit fallacies, yes? So God can make God commit fallacies if he so wishes, otherwise I'd have a power that God doesn't have, namely the power to make oneself commit fallacies.
  • Why am I me?
    You ask why you're you. That's not a coherent question unless you mean by it "why do I exist?" I then explained why that question only makes sense on the assumption that you have been created. I then showed you in two ways how, by rational reflection, you can see that you have not been created and thus that your question is misplaced.

    Now you are suddenly asking me about God and religion, but I am not sure why.
  • Can God do anything?
    I'm having problems understanding whichever of these things are true:

    (a) That "Are you slow? The. Imperatives. Of. Reason. See argument above." is an example of an imperative of reason requiring an omnipotent mind.
    (b) Why you bothered to waste my time replying to me if you're uninterested in a conversation with me.
    InPitzotl

    Of course you are (see a).

    As for b, I have my reasons.
  • Can God do anything?
    You saying it doesn't make it so, but even assuming this:khaled

    No, but I have provided you with arguments for thinking them so. So it's you who, rather than addressing or acknowledging the arguments, just persists in insisting that they're not directives.

    Anyone giving directives on how you should reason becomes omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent by your premises.khaled

    No, that doesn't follow. If I order you to do X, you do not thereby have a reason to do X, right?

    So, my instructions are not the instructions of Reason.

    Whose instructions are the instructions of Reason? Why, the mind whose instructions they are.

    And that mind will, by dint of that fact, be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (see argument above for the explanation).

    Another way to make the same point: the mind whose instructions are the instructions of Reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (see proof above of that). I am not omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Therefore I am not the mind whose instructions are the instructions of Reason.
  • Can God do anything?
    Give an example of an imperative of reason that requires an omnipotent mind.InPitzotl

    Are you slow? The. Imperatives. Of. Reason. See argument above.

    Let's say I'm playing chess. I "ought" to avoid moving my knight, because that can lead to a checkmate. I "ought" to consider other moves that improve my position. Those oughts are prescriptiveInPitzotl

    Yes, I know they're prescriptive. If you want to win the game, you have reason to move your knight. That reason is called a 'normative reason'. It's what 'oughtness' is made of.

    Now see the rest of my argument to see why a) the existence of normative reasons can't rationally be denied and b) why they entail God's existence.
  • Why am I me?
    Your thought is incorrect. I don't think you're God and you don't either (I hope) and nothing in what I said implied you were God. What I said showed you that you exist uncaused. That is, nothing brought you into being. Thus the question 'what brought into being a thing that was not brought into being' is confused.
  • Can God do anything?
    They are directives. And you ought to believe them. And that's a description of a directive.

    So, they are directives. There are directives of Reason, and no one who knows what they're talking about can deny it. Obviously you can deny it - but in denying it you go against a directive of Reason not to deny it.

    And it does follow that they are directives of God, for that's precisely what the argument I presented establishes.
  • Why am I me?
    I went to the bathroom and had a sort of existential epiphany.Ori

    I hope you cleaned it up.

    So why am I me?Ori

    Are you asking why you exist? I mean, if you exist then you're bound to be you. So I can only assume that you are asking why you exist.

    Well, by the light of reason we can know that all things that exist have either been caused to exist, or they exist uncaused.

    So now you know that you have either been caused to exist or you have not been caused to exist. If the former, then your question has an answer. If the latter, then it does not and is ill formed.

    As you will recognise if you reflect, you are not divisible. There can be no such thing as 'half' of you. You are whole and indivisible.

    Well, if you are indivisible then you have reason to believe that you have not been created, for you have no ingredients that are not you. The ingredients of you, is you alone. Thus there is nothing from which you could have been created.

    You can know this by another route as well. Again, if you listen to your reason it will tell you that you have free will. And it will tell you as well that you would not have free will if you were the creation of alien forces, for then you would not be responsible for anything you did or thought.

    Thus, your reason tells you, if you care to listen to it, that you are not the creation of alien forces.

    So, you have not been caused to exist and thus your question "why am I me?" is confused as it presupposes that you have bene caused to exist.

    Enjoy your pizza!
  • Can God do anything?
    They are directives and simply saying they're not won't alter that. But it doesn't matter, because I take it that you agree that you ought to believe them and that if you do not you are irrational?

    So, you are bid believe them and you are bid believe it by Reason which is why, if you do not believe, you are irrational. That is, you are going against Reason or ignoring her instructions.

    And yes, you could force the horse's muzzle into the water - it's just a saying - but you 'ought' not, yes? Becuase there are things we ought to do, and things we ought to believe.