Well, why do you think the criticism is considered so damning? Moral norms appear to be immutable. I agree that they're not, but they do appear to be, I think.

Imagine that Tim smacks Susan in the face for a laugh. That act is wrong, right? Now imagine there is another planet exactly like this one - I mean, exactly like it in every physical respect. It contains twins of us, for instance. And in that world Tim's twin - Tim2 smacks Susan2 in the face for a laugh. Now, is that act wrong too? Don't change the scenario in the twin world - don't imagine Tim2 having different motivations to Tim1. No, it is the same act performed with the same intentions, it is just performed by Tim2 not Tim1, a person who is in every way identical to Tim1 except that he is not numerically identical.

Doesn't it have to be wrong too? If Tim1's act of hitting Susan1 was wrong, isn't Tim2's act of hitting Susan2 wrong as well?

I have read the Euthyphro, but I think you haven't read the OP - not carefully anyway.

This thread is not about Plato's Euthyphro dialogue, but about the famous criticism it inspired.

That criticism is that if moral norms and values are the prescriptions and values of a subject (be they a god, gods or us) then they would not be immutable. They could vary over time.
Yet, in Plato's day as today, moral norms and values appear to be fixed. They are represented to be by our reason. Hence a problem.

Now, if you're not interested in that problem - the problem to do with the supposed arbitrariness that identifying moral norms and values with those of person would confer on them - then simply go to another thread. For this thread is about that problem - the problem contemporary philosophers call 'the Euthyphro'.

Don't dispute that it is called that. It is. But don't dispute it - this isn't a thread about label use and so it will just derail it.

Don't dispute that the criticism is in the original dialogue or tell me what the original dialogue is about. I have read it, I assure you. I have a copy of it - over there, in the bookshelf. But it wouldn't matter if I hadn't.

Just engage with the actual criticism.

Yes, there is a distinct argument for that. Here:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. (That is, being morally valuable must involve featuring as the object of a valuing relation - it is to be the object of a valuing)
2. Only a subject can value something (anything can be valued, but only subjects are capable of doing any valuing)
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject.

That is the argument that refutes all objectivist views - or so I believe (and I would run the same argument for moral prescriptions - so the whole show, moral values and moral norms, are the values and norms of a subject). I don't think it is the only way to refute them - I think the Euthyphro does too - but it is sufficient.

Then I take some arguments that the objectivists standardly use to refute subjectivist views, and use them to refute all bar one subjectivist view: the view that moral norms and values are the norms and values of one subject, Reason.

Possibly that is why so many are finding me a bit bewildering. I am using the other side's weapons.

Respect the appearances. Not my advice; Aristotle's. It is what it appears to be. Like most things.

And it appears to be a thread in which someone is presenting a proof of a god. Deal.

Zinger!!

Look, the insults are not coming out of nowhere. You. Just. Insulted. Me. I politely, efficiently, answered your questions.

You then told me that I had not argued anything.

I had.

You then contemptuously kept sending the same messages when I called you on your ignorance.

I went to the trouble of explaining to you what a 'fallacy' is. I went to the trouble of outlining the argument that you thought was not there. The argument that was there. I numbered it so you could recognise it as an argument.

And now, rather than addressing that argument, you decide - as so many others do - to focus elsewhere. To focus on me. To insult me.

The insults are not coming out of nowhere. They are coming out of you and your attitudes and the attitudes of others.

Now, focus on the argument and either highlight an error in the reasoning or make a case against one of the premises.

You know that's an insult, right?

Why think it is not what it appears to be? Do you often think psychologists are experimenting on you?

I said all those things in my reply to you above, it's just that now I've numbered them so that you can recognise them as an argument.

As Rufoid doesn't know an argument from his armpit, here are the arguments that establish that the subject is reason.

1. Moral values and prescriptions have the same source
2. the source of moral values is a single subject.
3. Therefore, the source of moral values and prescriptions is a single subject
4. if and only if moral prescriptions are prescriptions of reason would it be the case that we would necessarily have reason to do what we are morally prescribed doing.
5. We necessarily have reason to do what we are morally prescribed doing
6. Therefore moral prescriptions are the prescriptions of reason
7. if moral prescriptions are prescriptions of reason and moral prescriptions are prescriptions of a subject, then reason is a subject.
8. therefore reason is a subject

There are more arguments than this - more reasons to think that moral prescriptions are prescriptions of reason, but that will do for now.

Again so soon? You'll get a blister.

Right. Well now that you've done what you needed to do, know that a 'fallacy' is an error in reasoning.

You don't commit a fallacy just by asserting something. For instance "I want a cake" is not fallacious.

It is an assertion. But it is not a fallacy.

"If I want a cake, then I want some tea. I don't want a cake. therefore I don't want some tea" is a fallacy.

I have not committed any fallacies.

I have argued - using valid arguments, not fallacious ones - that moral values are the values of a single agent, an agent who is reason.

Bye. That was thoroughly unpleasant.

You are asserting that reason is the source of moral prescriptions with no argument to support it. — Rufoid

no, that's false. I am 'concluding' that reason is the source of those things. Now, you don't know things.

What is a fallacy? Say what you understand that word to mean.

So, what is the fallacy? Because, like I say, I don't think you even know how to use that word.

I have made arguments. My reply to you contained arguments. You just don't know what an argument is, or what a fallacy is. Yet, bizarrely, you're confident you do. Odd. Are you, by any chance, thick?

I find that those who just label things fallacies turn out not to know what they're talking about.

So, without invoking a label, say what you mean.

First, moral values are demonstrably - that is, provably - the values of a subject.

If that subject values something, necessarily it will be morally valuable.

Who is this subject? Well, moral values have the same source as moral prescriptions, don't they?

And the same argument applies to them. That is, moral prescriptions are demonstrably the prescriptions of a subject.

And as the source of moral prescriptions must be the same as the source of moral values, it is the same subject who is the source of both.

And moral prescriptions are among the prescriptions of reason, are they not? For instance, if an act is morally prescribed, then we necessarily have some reason to do it, don't we? Well why? Because for an act to be morally prescribed just is for it to be being prescribed by reason, and what it is for us to have reason to do an act is for reason to be prescribing it.

So, if moral prescriptions are the prescriptions of a subject, and moral prescriptions are just a subset of the prescriptions of reason, then the subject is reason. Reason is the subject.

Hence why we virtually all recognise that when it comes to getting insight into what's right and wrong, good and bad, it is to our reason - our faculties of reason, faculties that give us insight into what Reason herself prescribes and values - that we must turn.

Note, if moral values were our values, then it would be by introspection, not reason, that we would gain insight into moral matters.

And if moral values were the values of our community, then it would be by sociological surveys that we would gain insight into moral matters.

But as is clear to all right-thinking folk, it is by rational reflection - not surveys and introspection - that we gain moral insight.

If that were not so, then moral philosophy would not even exist as a subject.

That, then, is why if Reason values something necessarily it is morally valuable. Reason is the subject, a person. And she determines what is good, bad, right wrong, true, false - everything.

From here I can't see the connection with God. If reason determines morality why have a god at all? After all reason has the upper hand right?

Isn't this Euthyphro's dilemma?

Does god determine what's right or does reason determine what's right? — TheMadFool

It is you - not I - who keeps mentioning God. My argument leads to the conclusion that moral values are the values of a subject, Reason.

She is a god. Why? Because she's Reason. It's that way around. She's a not a god and so she's Reason. She's Reason and so she's a god. 'A god' not 'God'. Again, it is you - your ears - that are hearing 'God' every time I say 'a god'. It derails things as it invites a discussion of religious matters not relevant to my case.

I am interested in what's true. I am interested in what moral values and prescriptions are. I have simply discovered that they are the values and prescriptions of a person. And because moral prescriptions are just a subset of the prescriptions of Reason, I have discovered that Reason is a person.

That person, precisely because she is the one whose values constitute moral values, and precisely because she is the one whose prescriptions constitute the prescriptions of reason, is a god. I mean, she determines what's morally valuable. We have reason to pursue our own interests because and only because she says so. And what's true seems to be constitutively determined by her as well. For what is truth apart from what Reason asserts to be the case?

So Reason, this agent, this subject who is herself and not anyone else, seems to me to be omnipotent. She can make anything true. She can do anything. So, I think it is beyond dispute that she's a god. But 'God'? Well, I don't know and I don't care. But 'a god' certainly.

And as for the Euthyphro question, well I have started a thread on it as it is the only concern that, in my view, is capable of raising a reasonable doubt about my case's soundness. Ultimately it fails to do this, I think, but for not-immediately-obvious reasons. On its face, then, it seems like a good objection.

The answer to the Euthyphro question is, of course, not open to negotiation - the god determines what's right. I mean, that's just the view.

The 'problem' that this raises is that it means that moral values and prescriptions (and the other prescriptions of Reason) will be variable.

I don't think that is a problem, but I admit that it appears to be.

For two reasons, first communities can't value things (only the members of communities can). A community is a community of subjects. But it is not itself a subject.

Second, even granting that communities can value things (and they can't) the same argument applies:

1. If moral values are the values of my community, then if my community values something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If my community values something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. therefore moral values are not the values of my community.

And what the hell does

sensu lato — Isaac

mean? Eurgh. Just use English. If you can't express your meaning in that language I will never ever understand you.

You say, in your lofty way, that a 'subset' view may well be plausible. Oh really? Go on then. Let's go out to the car park and sort this one out, shall we?!

Say which subset of your values you want to identify moral values with and we'll take it from there.

And don't use Latin or I'll start throwing in Ukranian phrases and see if that helps things. "Сперечатися з дурнем - це як кричати на корів: спокусливо, але безглуздо" as my mother says.

No, no 'charity', it is just valid. Anyone with basic English language skills understands that "if moral values are my values" or "if moral values are my valuings" (which is how I originally expressed it) doesn't mean "if some moral values are some of my valuings" or "if all moral values are some of my valuings".

So, no charity at all. Just valid. And I haven't put 'necessarily' in the wrong place. You did in your rewrite. The original is fine. Absolutely fine. Valid and sound. The problem is that no-one wants to concede that in its entirety. I have to have made 'some' mistake. I haven't - the argument is find as it is. It is expressed properly. It is valid. It is sound.

Then you point out that all my argument does is refute individual subjectivism.

That's what its bloody purpose was!! I mean, I know!! That's what I was seeking to refute with it.

When you take your car to the garage to be fixed, and they fix it, do you say "well, don't be so proud of yourself, all you've done is fix my car". Or when you go to a baker, do you say "well, I don't know why you've put all these cakes in the window - all you've done is bake some cakes and now you're just trying to sell them".

The purpose of the argument - the argument that is perfectly well expressed and that is valid and sound - was to refute a certain kind of subjectivist view. That is, the view that moral values are one and the same as my valuings (or yours, or some subset). That view. That view was the one being assessed.

I have already established, by means of another equally valid and sound argument, that moral values are the values of some subject or other.

Now I have established that they are not the values of me or you.

Conclusion - they are the values of a subject who is not me or you.

Now, tell me that doesn't follow!

It does.

Moral values are the values of a subject.

Moral values are not the values of me.

So moral values are the values of a subject who is not me.

Moral values are not the values of you.

So moral values are the values of a subject who is not me, not you.

Agree?

Oh I'm getting somewhere am I - blimey! You could power a small town with all the patronising condescension you're giving off.

No, I am not getting anywhere at all. The original argument was valid. You - you - are slowly, dimly, starting to see that. Well, no you're not, your own arrogance is going to prevent that. You're going to have to cast it as you taking me - me - on an intellectual journey.

The original argument is valid and you've got nothing to say about it. You actually need to address a premise, but you can't do that. So all you're going to do - and prove me wrong - is keep generating different arguments to mine and saying 'modal' and 'transitive' a lot, words I take to be synonymous with "I don't know what I am talking about, but I'm not letting that stop me".

Not sure why you felt it necessary to bellow 'ITALICS MINE', but then I imagine you bellow things randomly quite a lot. How about addressing my argument - the one in the OP - rather than just talking vaguely of dichotomies. Strut your continental stuff.

Here's an argument. Is it valid? Don't categorise it. Resist the urge to use words like 'modal' and 'transitive'. Stick with proper English - by which I mean English that we would use down the pub. Just say whether you think it is valid or invalid, nothing more:

1. if being loved by Superman is one and the same as being loved by me, then if I love you necessarily Superman loves you
2. If I love you Superman does not necessarily love you
3. therefore being loved by Superman is not one and the same as being loved by me.

Don't, don't, don't, change anything. Don't offer an alternative and tell me your view about the alternative. Don't say 'ah this is a special case - one involving superheros, and there's a special logic for superheros.

Just say whether you think it is valid or invalid.

I do not need the objections explained to me. When expressed in English, I understand them. And I understand that they are poor.

Maybe stop assuming my argument is invalid and trying to diagnose why. It isn't. It is valid.

The argument - the argument in the OP - makes clear that we're talking about valuing relations.

The argument that everyone is getting their knickers in a twist about, seeks to assess the thesis that moral values - all of them, not just some - are one and the same as my values. That is, the thesis under considering is whether I am morality- whether I am the source of the good.

My argument demonstrates that that thesis is false. And it works for any subset too. It works when you identify all moral values with all of my valuings. It works when you identify all moral values with some subset.

Here it is again with a subset:

1. If moral values are what-I-value-when-I-am-sitting-on-the-toilet, then if I value something when I am sitting on the toilet, necessarily it is morally valuable.

2. If I value something when I am sitting on the toilet it is not necessarily morally valuable

3. Therefore, moral values are not what-I-value-when-I-am-sitting-on-the-toilet.

That is, 'being morally valuable' is not one and the same as being 'valued by me when I am sitting on the toilet".

It is valid.

This argument:

1. If my toilet has depth, then I am sat on it.
2. It is Tuesday
3. Therefore I have wet myself

Is not valid. And it is also nothing like my argument.

i thought you'd read a lot of moral philosophy? Seems you haven't.

It is the basis of the Euthyphro criticism.

I jolly well have!

First, I don't want to prove a god exists, I want to establish what moral values are.

Second, I have proved it and no-one has raised the least reasonable doubt about any premise at all.

Moral values are valuings. That is, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be the object of a valuing relation. What else could it consist in? Nobody has said anything to suggest this premise is false. At best some have simply pointed out - as if I didn't know - that some objectivists may want to reject this. Well, yes. But want away. Wanting or needing to reject a premise is quite different from raising any reasonable doubt about its truth.

I then pointed out that only subjects of experience - minds - value things. Anything can be valued, but only subjects of lives value things. So, though anything can the object of a valuing relation, not anything can be a valuer. In fact, one thing and only one kind of thing can be a valuer - a subject.

I then pointed out - and this seems to have been the main bone of contention in this thread thus far - that moral values are self-evidently not my values or yours. Any of them. I cannot make something morally valuable just by valuing it. My valuings - all and any of them - do not constitutively determine what's morally valuable. And that goes for any of us.

So, though being morally valuable involves being the object of a subject's valuing attitude, it manifestly does not involve being the object of any of our valuing attitudes.

I am led by this - as will anyone else be who follows the argument - that being morally valuable involves being the object of the valuings of a subject who is none of us, but is Reason.

And that subject is a god.

And as some things clearly are morally valuable, that subject - the god - exists.

So there: I bloody well did prove it. :razz:

And my argument is a damn sight stronger than the standard moral argument for a god.

For it applies to the prescriptions of Reason.

And no-one can intelligently deny that the prescriptions of Reason exist.

There are some moral error theorists out there. And I think moral error theory is manifestly false, of course (because it is). But whatever we think of moral error theory, the fact is any argument for it is an argument - an appeal to Reason - and thus even moral error theorists must, if they think there really is reason to believe there theory is true - accept that prescriptions of Reason exist.

And thus everyone - but everyone - must accept that Reason, the subject, the mind, 'She', exists.

So again, I blood sodding well have proved it. :razz: And I did it without any symbols or without saying 'modal' once.

I doubt whether 'neurophilosophy' for example, which also questions 'logical thinking' can be be deemed to be 'continental' — fresco

I have no idea what that might be, and I am not sure I want to know. Sounds like it will be second-rate philosophy combined with second-rate neuroscience, but perhaps I'm cynical.

I use the term 'continental philosophy' to mean 'bullshit' and 'continental philosopher' to mean 'failed analytic philosopher who has now decided to try and impress young people in bars and lecture halls with bullshit and can only be employed by English and Media studies or some other Disney discipline'.

I use 'analytic philosophy' to mean 'philosophy'.

Am I misusing these terms?

What you've done there is change my argument to a different one to fit your agenda - the agenda of showing my argument is invalid at any cost.

What was the thesis that my argument was addressing? Was it the thesis that 'some' moral values are 'some' of my values?

Nope.

What is the thesis that moral values and 'some' of my valuings - my values - are synonymous?

Nope, although I did address that one too for I have said time and time again that the same argument can be run for any subset, just as it can be run for your values as well as it can be for mine.

It was the thesis that moral values are my valuings. That is, that being morally valuable involves nothing more than being valued by me.

That thesis.

Again: I stress that the same argument can then be run for any subset of my valuings, and the same argument can be run for your values (and any subset of them). And again for any groups valuings. And it was precisely by going through this process that I ended up at the conclusion that therefore moral valuings are valuings of just one subject. I mean, how else did I get to that conclusion!?!

But again, the thesis being considered in the argument we're focussing on right now, is whether ALL moral values are synonymous with being valued by me. Not 'some' valuing activity of mine, but just 'being valued by me'.

Now, the word 'valuings' is ugly, I know, and some pointed this out, but I used it on purpose - to convey that what we are considering is whether the valuings constitutive of moral valuings are synonymous with my valuings - that is, my valuing activity.

So, are moral values - moral valuings - identical with my valuings? To express it a different way: is 'being morally valuable' synonymous with 'being valued by me"?

Well, if being morally valuable and being valued by me are synonymous, then if I value something, necessarily it will be morally valuable.

That's true. Obviously true. Do I really need to explain why? If "being morally valuable" is one and the same as "being valued by me" then if I value something, it is "being valued by me", which - by hypothesis, is what "being morally valuable" is being supposed to consist in. I don't know how to make that clearer. The thesis is that 'being morally valuable" and "being valued by me" are synonymous. The same. Identical. One and the same. Samey samey sameingtons. The same. And if they are, then it follows - obviously follows - that if I value something, it will inevitably be morally valuable because 'being morally valuable' just is to be being valued by me. Nothing more, nothing less.

Put some symbols in there if you want, and use terms like 'modal' too if you like - but just realize, as any competent English speaker surely would (if, that is, they were not fanatically obsessed with my argument turning out to be invalid) that what I am saying is that if moral values and my values are one and the same, then if I value something it must be morally valuable, because 'what it is' to be morally valuable just is to be being valued by me. I mean, that's the thesis under consideration (a thesis I reject, of course, before someone decides I endorse it).

So is that clear? Is premise 1 now clear?

Premise 1 says "If P, then Q"

P says "if moral values (all of them, not some of them) are my values (so, if being morally valuable is one and the same as being valued by me).

Q says "if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable"

It is true. Not false. True.

Now what about premise 2?

Well, what is 'not Q'? If Q is "If I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable" then what is the opposite of that?

This: "If I value something, it is NOT necessarily morally valuable". And that's what premise 2 says.

Premise 2: If I value something, it is NOT necessarily morally valuable"

It follows from those that "being morally valuable" is not the same as just being valued by me.

That is, the thesis that for something to be morally valuable it is sufficient that I be valuing it, has been demonstrated to be false.

Now what about a subset of my values? What about things I am valuing on Tuesday, or things I value and value valuing? Well I said - umpteen times in fact - that the same argument can be run for any subset of your valuings that you care to identify. Any subset. Any at all. Could moral valuings be identified with what you value when you're wearing green? Nope - same argument will be valid and sound for those. Could moral valuings be identified with what you value on Tuesdays alone. Nope - same argument will be valid and sound for those too. Just run them. But you don't need to, do you - it is obvious that it is going to work just as well for any subset.

And what goes for my valuings - all of them and any subset - will go for yours. The same argument with your valuings or some subset of them - will be valid and sound.

How else did I arrive at the conclusion that moral values are the values of a single subject - someone who is not me, not you, not anyone other than herself - apart from by this winnowing process? Put in any of your values - any of them - and the same basic argument will demonstrate that moral values are not identical with them.

All you have done is change my first premise and then show me how arguments with different first premises are invalid. What was the point in that?

So you are rejecting my argument as part and parcel of rejecting analytic philosophy - okay!

The rest of what you said was ignorant gibberish. Continental philosophy is where you belong!

I don't know what you mean. Define 'meaning' first, then perhaps I'll understand you - although I think I will probably be asking you for a definition of whatever terms you use to define meaning. And those. And those. And those. But first please define for me every word you've used so far, because I don't know what you mean.

I do not understand you, as ever. And what I am doing is not easy. If you think it is, just construct a refutation of my argument.

I am confident that if I were to construct such an argument, you would immediately reject it by denying one or both of the premisses. As I keep saying, the disagreement is about the premisses, not the arguments. — aletheist

Why not test that thesis? Note, I don't just deny things, I argue them. Unlike you Argue!!

Note too that for hundreds - literally hundreds - of posts now I have been saying time and time and time again that the argument is valid and that one needs to attack a premise. If you have only just cottoned on to that, well done. But yes, to refute the argument you need to attack a premise. Not just nay say. You need to construct a valid argument with the negation of one of my premises as a conclusion and then what I'll do is see if your premises are more prima facie plausible than mine. If they're not - and I'm currently confident they won't be, but am perfectly happy to end up with egg all over my face - then your argument fails to challenge the soundness of my argument.

And as for all of those 'question begging' accusations I made above - we both know what begging the question involves, yes? It involves assuming the truth of the thesis you are trying to prove. So, if you just blithely assume that moral value is objective, then you have 'begged the question'. And that's what you did. You just said "an objectivist will say this". Yes, defend it though.

If you think that something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation, show it. Give a non-moral example of it. Can a cup value being full of tea, for instance?

If you give a moral example you've - guess what - begged the question. YOu need to 'conclude' that moral value is objective, not assume it.

My premise says that being morally valuable involves being the object of a valuing relation. Now it is beyond question that valuing relations exist, and beyond question that when something is featuring as the object of one it is being 'valued'. Hence why the burden of proof is on you if you think there is some other way in which something can get to be valued. Again, don't invoke moral values as your example - why? Because it'll be question begging!

If you think that something other than a person can have an attitude towards something, then provide a non-question begging example. I've got plenty of examples of persons adopting attitudes. You give me a non-question begging example of something that is not a person valuing something.

Don't mention moral value though - don't use that as your example. For that'll be - you guessed it - question begging.

And if you can't do those things, then that's because my argument is a proof. It proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that objectivism about moral values (and prescriptions) is false. If you don't believe me, try and refute the argument.

I don't understand what objection you're raising. I am not attacking a straw man - I am attacking moral objectivism, a view subscribed to by most contemporary moral philosophers.

I also don't know what you mean by the 'objective/subjective' straw man dichotomy. Are you claiming that moral values are inter-subjective? That is, are moral values like, say, the value of money?

If I rejected your argument by simply claiming that I could not make sense of it, what would be your response? — aletheist

At first I would charitably take you to be being dishonest, for someone who cannot see that the argument is valid is quite stupid in my opinion. I know you think I'm quite stupid - but I think anyone who thinks the argument is invalid is quite stupid.

Likewise, if you don't know what a valuing relation is, then I would ask you to notice that you value things - that if asked "do you value anything" you would, in other contexts, answer "yes" - and ask you to notice that those valuings are valuing relations.

At that point even if you don't think that moral values are valuing relations of that kind, you could not longer pretend that you do not know what I am talking about.

And if you didn't know what a subject of experience is, I would ask you to inspect yourself, for you are one.

Probably none of that would work and by that point I'd have peppered what I said with little insults here and there as payback for subjecting me to your dishonest attitudes, and you'd be all uppity and tell me what a terrible person I am and give me some advice on how to be a better person, and that would make me even more angry and it would all end badly.

All of that is hypothetical, of course.

Rather, as I have stated repeatedly, an objectivist rejects #1 because "being valuable" does not entail "being valued." — aletheist

Question begging.

An objectivist would claim instead that to be valuable is a quality that an object possesses in itself, thus requiring no valuing subject. — aletheist

Question begging.

In any case, again, the objectivist denies #1 because actually being valued (by a subject) is not necessary for something to be morally valuable. — aletheist

Same here. Exactly the same. It is necessary, as the argument demonstrates. Question begging.

So, construct an argument in which the negation of one of my premises is the conclusion and then let's look at the assumptions you need to make to get to it (they'll be batshit crazy, I reckon)

You're telling me 'about' objectivists, but you're not actually explaining anything.

For instance, look at what you say here:

An objectivist would counter that there is a relevant sense in which something can be valuable without being the object of a valuing relation; i.e., regardless of whether any subject actually values it. — aletheist

What sense? I mean, literally 'what sense'? Make sense of it. I can't. I mean, there's a clear and distinct sense in which I can value something. But it isn't that sense, is it. So, what sense? And explain without begging the question.

look up 'Socratic fallacy'

no, there's more than one way to be an objectivist. They could reject premise 1, or they could reject 2. Sheesh!! Not sanely - that's why the argument is sound. But it shows it is not question begging.

Now, if you are an objectivist which option do you go for? Either explain why being morally valuable does not involve being the object of a valusing relation or explain how something objective can value something.