And I ask you again, what do you think a refutation of moral objectivism would look like? Or can't there be one? Is there nothing - no form of argument whatever - that you would accept has demonstrated objectivism to be false?

Anyone who's read a fair bit of moral philosophy knows the name of that thesis, for it is one of the few theses in moral philosophy that nearly everyone agrees is true.

Consider yourself owned.

No it doesn't, it looks like you haven't.

What is the name of this thesis:

If two worlds are identical in all non-moral respects, then necessarily they are identical in all moral respects?

Not at all. As I said, what begs the question is a premiss that already entails the conclusion by itself. A proper syllogism requires both premisses in order to entail the conclusion. — aletheist

No premise does that. Wishful thinking on your part. Indeed, you've explained why it does not. An objectivist can, in principle, accept premise 1 and reject 2. They can identify the valuer with an object. I mean, it's utterly insane to do that. But that's, you know, the problem. That's why, if you're reasonable, you'll conclude - with me - that moral values are not objective.

But again, neither premise by itself entails the conclusion.

Or do you think that moral values are not invariable across time and space?

if so, what do you do with all those widely corroborated rational intuitions that represent them to be? Just reject them?

That's not what I said about 'the good", nor is it what Plato said about 'the good". — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, what do you say about it, then? If moral truths are invariable across time and space, how does identifying them with the emanations of a Form explain why that is so? Explain without stipulating.

No, it is exactly how it is used in moral philosophy. You're the one using it incorrectly.

Most moral philosophers think that if an act - let's pick an obviously bad one, such as setting fire to an innocent person -is bad in this world, then it is wrong in all non-morally identical possible worlds.

That's a thesis that my kind of view has problems explaining - or appears to, I should say.

No, now you've made all syllogisms question begging just by dint of their nature, which is absurd.

The first premise says only that to be valuable is to be featuring as the object of a valuing relation. It says nothing about the nature of that relation. And thus this premise does not beg the question against the objectivist about value,

the second premise says that only subjects of experience - minds - can bear attitudes towards things.

Minds do things like hope, desire, sense, intend, value. And it seems that they have a monopoly on doing those things.

That's what the second premise asserts. Now, does that beg the question against the objectivist? No, because it says nothing about moral value. The first premise does, the second just says something about the nature of valuing attitudes.

Now, of course in combination those premises entail that objectivism about moral value is false. Well, so much the worse for objectivism about moral value. That's what its being demonstrably false looks like.

I mean, if moral objectivism is false, how would you find out? What do you think a refutation of it would look like? The above?? If not, what do you think a refutation would look like - or is moral objectivism an unfalsifiable thesis?

I have a lot in common with those who believe in the Platonic form of the good - far more than I have in common with individual and collectivist subjectivists (so although I am a subjectivist, I retain all the spirit of an objectivist, just without the insanity of supposing objective things can value and prescribe).

Really the only difference between my view and that of a Platonist is that on my view the Form of the Good is a person: Reason. She's a single person whose values constitute moral values, and whose prescriptions constitute the prescriptions of reason, among which feature moral prescriptions.

So there is still one source of all goodness - Reason. And moral value is no more in our gift than before.
What's morally valuable is what Reason values, not what you, I, or Peter Singer does.

But yes, I admit that if this person - Reason - does not exist, then nothing has any moral value. But you'd surely have to admit that too, albeit about the form of the Good - you'd have to admit that if that thing did not exist, then nothing would have any moral value.

You might reply that the Form of the Good cannot not exist - that it exists of necessity, or exists more certainly than anything.

But I think by whatever licence you say those things about the Form of the Good, I can say them about Reason, for Reason is simply the Form of the Good made personal.

Why don't you just answer the question? If you value raping someone, is it necessarily morally good for you to do so?

Yes, it is question begging to assume the truth of the thesis you are trying to prove. I haven't done that. No premise asserts the thesis. The thesis is expressed in the conclusion, not the premises.

What is question begging is to reject a premise on no better grounds that it conflicts with your thesis, whatever that thesis may be.

So, if you reject a premise because your thesis - rather than any self-evident representation of reason - is inconsistent with it, then you are begging the question.

Again, I am not begging the question. If you say otherwise then show me which premise asserts the truth of my thesis (not entails it - asserts it).

Why on earth would I replace moral values with moral principles??? that makes no sense at all.

the issue is what are moral values. that is, what are they made of. Now, if you think moral values are not 'values', then you have the burden of proof. Discharge it. I think moral values are 'values'. Why? Because that's what they're called.

We are already familiar with values - we value things. Is there some other kind of valuing - a kind that does not require a subject? Provide an example, and don't make it 'moral' values, for that's question begging.

I am using 'necessary' to mean 'cannot not be the case'. Most moral philosophers think that it is impossible for two worlds to be identical in every way apart from morally. So, two circumstances that are non-morally alike, must - of necessity (they think) - be morally alike too.

I think they are wrong to think that, but I think that they are quite right in thinking that this does appear - rationally appear - to be the case.

You mention the Platonic form of the good - okay, so if this strange obelisk values things (a notion I can make no sense of whatsoever), why is it the case that it could not disvalue the things it values?

Consider those who might make the subject 'God'. They might try and address the Euthyphro criticism by pointing out that God has an immutable nature. But this, I think we can agree, does nothing whatsoever to address it. For the whole point is that if the source of moral values and norms is a person, then independent argument aside, there is no reason to think the person in question could not change their attitudes. All the 'God' person is doing is stipulating, not showing.

Well, that's true of you too if you just stipulate that this Platonic form of the good has an immutable nature and always values the same things across time and space.

For an analogy: take any physical object. It has a shape. But it can have a different one, can't it? Any physical object can have a different shape. No physical object has its shape of necessity. Anything spherical can be square, and so on.

Simply saying "ah, but the Platonic form of the good is not like that - it has the property of disvaluing X, and it can never do anything other than disvalue X" is like saying "ah, but there are some cuboid objects that cannot be anything other than cuboids".

Well, that seems prima facie false.

No, it does not make any more sense to me.

Perhaps you can just say if you consider this argument to be valid:

1. If Superman's love is Bartrick's love, then if Superman loves something, necessarily Bartricks loves something.
2. If Superman loves something, Bartricks does not necessarily love something
3. Therefore Superman's love is not Bartrick's love. — Bartricks

You and I can agree that some things are morally valuable.

And I take it by 'inherent' moral value, we mean moral value that does not derive from the thing's usefulness as a means to securing some other end, but moral value that it seems to have in its own right. That is, when we say that something is inherently morally valuable, we mean that it is morally valuable for its own sake, or something like that.

Well, we can agree that some things are morally valuable in that way too. And nothing in the argument I gave implies otherwise. Something will be inherently morally valuable when the subject values it for its own sake rather than for some other sake.

So, the existence of things possessing inherent moral value does not constitute a counterexample to any premise in the argument, so far as I can see.

But perhaps you mean by 'inherent moral value' something more than I said above. Perhaps when you say that something is 'inherently morally valuable' you mean, in addition to being valuable for its own sake, that it is 'objectively' morally valuable.

Okay, but now you have begged the question. Whether inherent moral value is subjective or objective is the issue under discussion, so one cannot just assume it is objective at the get go.

Note, my argument does not assume that moral value is subjective. It's subjectivity is asserted in a conclusion, not a premise.

My argument assumes that for something to be valuable in any sense is for it to be the object of a valuing relation. And my argument assumes that only subjects of experience - minds - are capable of adopting attitudes towards things.

An objectivist must either deny the first premise or the second. Note, to deny the second what is needed is an example of a genuine valuing attitude that is not being borne by a subject of experience. You cannot use moral values as your example, as that's question begging - it is to assume moral objectivism is true, not show it to be. We need an example in which a) it is clear we have real valuing going on, and b) the valuer is not a subject of experience.

Now, I don't believe there are any such examples. But perhaps there are, I am just unaware of them. Plus it does seem that my reason, anyway, represents anything that is not a subject of experience to be positively incapable of having any real attitude towards anything.

I don't know about all this DeMorgan stuff. But what you've said seems plainly false.

Q says "if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable"

The negation of Q is not "if I don't value something, necessarily it is not morally valuable". That's not the opposite of Q at all, but Q again.

The negation of Q is "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable"

So, I still don't see why you think my argument does not instantiate this valid argument form

If P, then Q
Not Q
Therefore not P.

Can you give an example of an argument like mine, in which it is clear that the conclusion is not entailed. I mean, in those examples of Superman's love it seemed to me that the conclusion clearly did follow from those premises. It seemed no less clear than if we were talking about water and gold, for in all of these cases we are exploring the possibility of two things being identical, be it either water and gold. Superman and me, or moral values and my values.

If Superman and I are one and the same person, then wherever Superman is, I am. And if being morally valuable and being valued by me are one and the same property, then if I value something it will be morally valuable. I mean, that strikes me as obviously true. Can you explain in English why, if being morally valuable is one and the same as being valued by me, it would not be true that, were I to value something, it would not necessarily be morally valuable?

Still not seeing it.

valuings are relations, so let's take an example that involves valuing relations, just not of the contentious moral kind.

1. If Superman's love for Lois Lane is Bartrick's love for Lois Lane, then if Superman loves Lois Lane, necessarily Bartricks loves Lois Lane.
2. If Superman loves Lois Lane, Bartricks does not necessarily love Lois Lane
3. Therefore, Superman's love for Lois Lane is not Bartrick's love for Lois Lane.

That's valid, yes?

or, perhaps better,

1. If Superman's love is Bartrick's love, then if Superman loves something, necessarily Bartricks loves something.
2. If Superman loves something, Bartricks does not necessarily love something
3. Therefore Superman's love is not Bartrick's love.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. I don't value something nor it is necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore it is not the case that moral values are my values"

I am afraid I do not know how to express things symbolically, so I must sick with English.
But I don't see how the above can possibly be my argument.

Surely the argument is this:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore, moral values are not my values.

I don't see why that's not valid. Q says 'if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable". Q is false if, were I to value something it would not necessarily be morally valuable. And that's what 2 says.

So how does the argument fail to have this form:

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P?

I am not seeing it. It seems to have exactly that form, and thus to be valid.

I think it is just as evident that my values are not moral values as it is that I am not superman.

Do you think my values are moral values? Do you think yours are? Just asking.

And yes, you're quite right that any objectivist worth their salt had better deny premise 1 of the OP argument. That is, they have to deny that being morally valuable involves being the object of a valuing relation.

But I think you're operating with too broad a notion of what it is to beg the question. It is not question begging to refute a view with a deductively valid argument all the premises of which are extremely plausible. To deem arguments of that kind question begging simply because they have some premises that the proponent of a certain view is logically committed to deny is to render all refutations of all views question begging - which is to have stopped being 'question begging' from being any kind of vice.

The credibility of objectivism, then, rests on just how plausible that opening premise is.

So let's assess it then - first, do you value anything? And if you do - and you surely do - is it not true to say that whatever you value is valuable to you? And doesn't something's being valuable to you just consist in it being the object of a positive attitude of yours, whatever else it may involve in addition?

Well, if all of that is true of 'values' when we use that word in relation to ourselves, what reason is there to think that the word 'value' in 'moral value' denotes something quite different?

I cannot see any reason to think that, apart from that our own values are clearly not moral values. But that's beside the point, for that is not evidence that our values are different in kind to moral values, anymore than the fact it is clear I am not you is evidence that you and I are different kinds of thing.

OF course, an objectivist might reject premise 1 because accepting it would mean their theory will turn out to be false. But that - that - is question begging.

Well, I am aware that some people here seem to be working with different systems of logic.

Yes, I have been collecting modal cars for years. Joke. No, I am not sure exactly what it means, which is why I don't use it. I've getting from its use here that it means something like "I am about to confidently start talking nonsense". Is that right? That's how I interpret it. You, for instance, are about to talk nonsense, I think.

Anyway, do you think the argument is valid? The superman one. Is it, or is it not, valid?

so do you think a person does need a body to have a gender? You've asserted that minds cannot exist apart from bodies. I think that's false. And anyway, we can conceive of the possibility of minds existing apart from bodies.
So, again, can minds have genders or is that only something that physical bodies can have?

I am inclined to think minds by themselves lack genders - there is no such thing as a female or male mind anymore than there are, say, blue or green minds. Not sure though.

yes, the argument is valid so the conclusion must be true if the premises are. Therefore a competent critic will take issue with a premise. And it has to be premise 2 because 1 is a conceptual truth.

The problem is that premise 2 is self evidently true.

what you take out of q you have to take out of q throughout, obviously. So if you take the word 'necessary' out of the firstime premise it has to come out of the second too.

Anyway, let us indeed take a step back, as you recommend. Do you accept that this argument is valid:

1. If superman is Bartricks, then if superman is in the grocery necessarily Bartricks is in the grocery.
2. If superman is in the grocery Bartricks is not necessarily in the grocery.
3. Therefore superman is not Bartricks?

Are you claiming I am wrong?

Yet I recognise that your argument was invalid and you don't. You know, the one that went if P, then Q; not R, therefore not P. Hmm. What does that tell us?

Nope. Not a clue.

It isn't valid as it stands, as you'd know if you knew anything about how to argue.

My answer to your question: depends. For instance, this argument is valid and gibberish: If squirt, then flimsy, not flimsy, therefore not squirt.

But your one was gibberish and invalid.

But can something that lacks any physical features have a gender? or do you have to have a physical body to have a gender? That is, can a mind alone have a gender?

Answer my question and I'll answer yours.

Hmm, I think bringing God into it muddies the waters. What I'm sympathetic to is Descartes' idea that being omnipotent involves being able to do anything at all.

Imagine a person who can do anything logically possible. Well, that person has a lot of power, to be sure. But they do not have as much as one who can also do the logically impossible. So I think true omnipotence involves the latter.

I thought mine was better. At least I wrote it myself rather than quoting a Victorian paedo.

No, second premise is gibberish. But well done for trying. Should say "If Bartricks says P is self-evident, P is not necessarily self-evident", not "If Bartricks says P is self-evident, not necessarily P is self-evident". Then it would be valid, yes. Do you agree?

Poetry now?!? Okay, here's one:

"If p, then q. Oh what to do? The argument doesn't lead where I want it to. No matter. No worry. I know what to do: I'll pretend I know stuff when I haven't a clue, and offer condescending guidance and invalid arguments and just generally be annoying and pompous and silly and ignorant and wrong and bad and a git."

the argument didn't mention God. Anyway, I find self righteousness insufferable. Byeeee

I am interested in what it would take for someone to be genderless.

Can, for instance, someone who is immaterial have a gender? That is, can there be non-physical minds that have genders, or is gender something that belongs to physical bodies?

You think it is idiotic to think this argument is valid:

1. If turnip is wife, then if wife at market necessarily turnip at market
2. If wife at market, not necessarily turnip at market
3. Therefore turnip not wife?

Because it seems to me that it would be idiotic to think that it was invalid.

And if that argument is valid - and it is - it would be idiotic to think that this argument was invalid at the same time as acknowledging that the above is valid:

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore, my values are not moral values.

That would be spectacularly idiotic. That would be idiotic by idiot standards. Yet that seems to describe you down to a T. Do you have a secretary who types your replies for you, and cleans your food and excrement off the walls at the end of the day?

To move things on, and because nobody here seems to think there's even a problem called the Euthyphro, I will make another objection to my own view, one that I think most might agree seems to have quite a lot of clout.

This objection is not the Euthyphro, but answering it will show how to answer the Euthyphro.

I have argued that moral values are the values of a god. That is, to be morally valuable is to be the object of a god's valuing attitude.

But isn't it a self-evident truth of reason that whatever is morally valuable, it will be so irrespective of whether any god exists? Surely it is morally bad to torture a kitten regardless of whether there are any gods around? If it is morally bad to torture a kitten, it is bad irrespective of the presence of any gods, not because of one.

Yet if moral values are the values of a god, then that would be impossible. Conclusion: moral values are therefore 'not' the values of a god. That is:

1. If moral values are the values of a god, then if no gods exist, nothing is morally valuable
2. If no gods exist, some things are still morally valuable
3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a god.

The argument is valid and both premises appear to be true.

Er, no. What I need is what I've got.

If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable.

If turnip is wife, then if wife at market necessarily turnip at market

If bag of turnips is wife, then if wife at market necessarily bag of turnips at market

If turnip is wives, then if wives at market necessarily turnip at market

If bag of turnips is wives, then if wives ta market necessarily bag of turnips at market.

And on and on and on.

No equivocation. Nothing but a straightforward deductively valid argument that has a conclusion you, and others, wish were false.

In the land of the blind, the one eyed man will be considered a fool

What have I said that is nonsense? Where have you argued anything at all? All you do is assert and think that's good enough. All filler, no killer.

What's nonsense - to think a) that values require valuers or that b) values do not require valuers?

It's b that's nonsense, isn't it? And what do I believe? a or b? a. I believe a.

What's nonsense - to think that a) only a subject, a mind, can value something or b) that something other than a mind - a chair say, or a stone - can value things?

It's b that's nonsense, isn't it? And what do I believe? a or b? a. I believe a.

What does putting those two together get us? It gets us to the conclusion that moral value, being a kind of value, requires at least one valuer, and that the valuer has to be a subject, a mind.

Now, if you think that's nonsense, then either you can't reason at all - you just don't see how the conclusion follows (in which case I think you're probably entitled to some kind of government benefit to shield you from the worst ravages of the oh so confusing and hazardous world) - or you think one of those bs is true.

So which is it?

Or perhaps you think the objection - the Euthyphro - that this thread is about is nonsense. But in that case you either think the argument is invalid or you think it has a nonsense premise or a nonsense conclusion. Which?

To help underscore how important the word 'necessary' is in the argument and how utterly indispensable it is, could you explain to me why you want it removed? I mean, if it really is doing no work, then its presence is irrelevant and removing it shouldn't affect the argument in the least.

Yet clearly that's false. I mean, let's remove it from the argument and see what it becomes:

1. If superman is me, then if superman is in the grocery I am in the grocery
2. If superman is in the grocery I am not in the grocery
3. Therefore, superman is not me.

That argument is not sound. Premise 2 is obviously false.

This argument is sound:

1. If superman is me, then if superman is in the grocery, necessarily I am in the grocery
2. If superman is in the grocery then I am not necessarily in the grocery
3. Therefore, superman is not me.

Your replacement is not.

So I am at a loss to understand why you think the word 'necessary' is dispensable, given that taking it away would render a sound argument unsound.

So again, here is my argument - an argument that is fine as written, and that is valid and sound.

1. If moral values are my values, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore moral values are not my values.

that is your view. Say it and it will be so. Your view. A view well represented hete. You don't seem to have any arguments for anything. Yet you're not doing philosophy until you argue something.