The same way we know anything - if Reason represents the content of my mental state to be the same as yours, then I have evidence that we are in the same mental state. Not numerically the same, of course, but the same content-wise.

I am unclear of the relevance

And so what you are doing, so far as I can tell, is focussing on a feature of moral values that is orthogonal to the issue at hand. The issue at hand is whether they are subjective or not.

if it helps, note that nothing stops me from valuing universally - indeed, I do. I value everyone being kind. So my valuing is universal. It mentions no names. And I can issue universal prescriptions as well. here: everyone be kind!!

But nevertheless, my values and prescriptions, whether they are applied universally or not, are not - not, not, not - moral values and prescriptions.

They do share features in common with moral values and prescriptions though. For one, they are values and prescriptions. For another, they are being born by a subject.

Hence why I conclude that moral values and prescriptions - regardless of their universality - are the values and prescriptions of a subject.

That's what I denied above. I've thought about it a lot and am unclear why you assume I haven't. Moral values are not essentially universal. Most are, in fact, valuings of us all being certain sorts of people. But that is not an essential feature of them.

Like I say, it doesn't matter though, for the subject of this thread is whether moral values are subjective, not whether they are universal.

And I have presented a deductively valid and apparently sound argument demonstrating that they are subjective - they are the valuings of a subject who is not me, or you, or anyone else apart from herself.

I am entirely unclear why you are finding me unclear.

Me: Someone has killed Janet. Not Janet herself or an object, but someone. A killer.

You: Mr Killer?

Me: no, not Mr Killer - he works at the grocery (I mean, he could have done it, I suppose, but I am not saying he did - I am saying that a killer killed Janet, not that Mr Killer specifically killed her). Again, I mean 'a killer'.

You: which killer?

Me: the one who killed Janet.

You: Well, there have been lots of killers over the ages. Which one of them is it?

Me: why do you think it has to be one of them? It is Janet's killer. Janet's killer is Janet's killer and not another person.

You: why are you being so vague? Do you think such vagueness is really fitting in this kind of police work?

No, for I think a value that applies to some and not others could still be moral - but I am perfectly happy to accept that there are, in fact, universal values and that most of the values we call moral do, in fact, apply universally.

Take me and my valuing of kindness (which is not, of course, a moral valuing but it serves as a model). I value kindness in others in a basic way. And I value others being kind regardless of whether they want to be kind. So I do not value others being kind just when or if it will serve their ends or satisfy their desires to be. No, I value others being kind just for the sake of it.

But let's say there are just some people that I do not value being kind. That is, bizarrely, I value tall people being kind and tall people alone. Well, now my value is not universal but it seems to me that were the subject - Reason, Trisha, she who is utterly herself - do value kindness in this kind of way, then kindness would still be a moral value.

So the universality of moral values, though an apparent feature of most of them, is not, I think, an essential feature of them.

But really it doesn't matter, I think, because the arguments still lead where they lead.

Traditionally her name has been Reason, but you can call her Trisha.

She is who she is. Again, you keep doing this - keep assuming that we need to identify her from among a list of suspects of your invention. She is who she is, and who she is is the one whose values are moral, epistemic, prudential and aesthetic values, and whose prescriptions are the prescriptions of moral, epistemic, prudential and aesthetic normativity.

So I do not deny that moral values differ from other kinds of values - from epistemic, aesthetic and prudential - but I think that what can be said of moral values can also be said of them as well.

So take the epistemic value of truth. Well, truth is valuable regardless of whether I happen to value it. And thus the epistemic value of truth does not have me as its bearer. I do value truth, but my valuing of it is not what makes it valuable, though it does give me insight into what actually makes it valuable, namely its being valued by someone.

And take the aesthetic value of beauty. Well, beauty is valuable regardless of whether I happen to value it. And thus the aesthetic value of beauty does not have me as its bearer. I do value beauty, but my valuing of it is not what makes it valuable, though it does give me insight into what actually makes it valuable - namely, its being valued by someone.

And so on. So all those values and prescriptions that some say are personally subjective, or inter-subjective, or objective, I say are the values and prescriptions of a subject who is not me, or you, but utterly herself.

I do think there is something in what you say, however, but it seems to me that you are saying something about what may characterise moral values as opposed to other kinds of values (such as, say, epistemic, aesthetic or prudential values).

My arguments assume nothing about what distinguishes moral values from other kinds of values apart from being distinct from our own values.

So, for instance, I value other people behaving in certain ways and instantiating certain character traits. And I value such things not because in doing so I perceive any of my interests to be being served, but just because. They are brute valuings. If someone asked me, for instance, "why do you value kindness in others, including in others you will never meet?" I would say "I just do".

I think moral values are those kinds of valuings - valuings that concern the conduct of others and that concern how others are affecting others, or how the world is affecting them - but that do not have either me, or you, or any of the rest of us, as their bearer.

No, I would not accept that characterisation. When you value helping the unfortunate you value something that is morally valued. But your valuing of that activity, though it accords with what has moral value, does not itself constitute a moral value.

This, I think, is easily demonstrated. For though you may value helping the unfortune, it is surely clear to our reason that it is morally valuable to help the unfortunate regardless of whether you happen to value it?

that would be impossible if your valuings are moral values. So therefore your values are not - and will never be - moral values. Your values may be morally valuable, of course, but that's different.

Where I say that it implies a god exists? Why? If you're genuinely interested in what's what, then you should just follow arguments where they lead, not decide in advance what is true and then refuse to follow arguments that suggest you're wrong. So I'm quite confused by your approach and attitude.

I don't think you understand what the 'other things being equal' clause means - it means compare forcing sex on someone with another act that is otherwise identical apart from that it does not involve sex but something else.

So, let's say I go up to a stranger and stick my finger up their nose. That's wrong, certainly. But not as wrong as I stuck my finger elsewhere, yes?

Perhaps the latter will cause more long term psychological trauma than the former. But there is no necessity to that, so just imagine that I have a short-term memory-wipe spray, and I spray this into the person's face such that she will forget immediately what I just did. I do this in the nose case and in the other case. So now the psychological fallout will be the same - namely, non-existent.

Still, it is worse to do the latter than the former, isn't it?

Why? Both acts involve the same degree of assault, both involve insertion. And in neither case will the affected party remember what happened. So, the difference in their moral wrongness cannot be attributed to any of those features. What, then?

Me: it is someone, not Mr Someone. The evidence at the crime scene tells us, unequivocally, that someone - not Janet herself or some non-agential object, but a subject - killed her.

Detective Janus: the problem with you is that you don't listen. It is Mr. Someone - it has to be, because I can't imagine how it could be anyone other than Mr Someone and I'm so narrow minded and stuck in my ways I think others are not listening to me when they contradict me - and Mr Someone can't have done it because Mr Someone is on holiday. And nobody killed Janet anyway, because you haven't yet told me why my killings don't qualify as Janet killings, even though you did repeatedly and I ignored you. So there.

No, the problem is that you're not addressing my position or my arguments.

you don't actually know what the Euthyphro problem is - that's clear from your description.

And you don't actually know what position my arguments have led to - that's clear from the fact you keep talking about God and gods and not the view that the evidence supported.

It is 'someone' not Mr Someone.

It is 'a god' not 'God'.

She's a god because her value are moral values, rather than her values being moral values because she's a god.

Now, I can explain this to you again and again and urge you to address the actual evidence that supports this view. But you do have to understand and not switch what I've said for some codswallop that your criticisms are designed for.

Relevance?

Tell you what, to move things along I'll suggest what the supposed problem may be, and you can just confirm that it is as I say it is.

The problem is that if moral values are the values of a subject, then they can change over time. What's morally valuable at one time, may not be at another. For after all, we know from our own case that what we value can alter. I may value sunshine at one time, but not at another. Tastes can and do change.

And thus, though - for example - pain seems to be in generally something that is morally bad, nothing stops it from being the case that in the future pain might be morally good. For the subject-whose-valuings-constitute-moral-values - let's call her Trisha for convenience and so that you don't keep calling her God - may value us suffering in the future even though she currently seems to disvalue it.

Why is that a problem? Well, because, as most contemporary moral philosophers agree, moral truths appear to be necessary truths. Just as it is necessarily true that the conclusion of this argument will be true if the premises are -

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P

likewise it is necessarily true that sadism is morally bad, when it is bad.

The above argument does not just happen to be valid at the moment. It is always and everywhere valid. Its validity does not alter. It does not have a best-before date.

Likewise for substantial moral truths. Such truths may be very complex and sometimes hard to discern - like the answers to complex sums - but whatever they are, they are necessary truths.

So, expressed as an argument, the problem the Euthyphro draws attention to is this:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then what is morally valuable will be contingent, not necessary.
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a subject

Fair enough?

It is not clear to me from what you have said what the problem is supposed to be. You are talking in general terms and not addressing the view that my arguments have led to.

Once again you keep talking about 'God' despite God not being mentioned anywhere in my argument. I said that the subject whose values constitute moral values would seem to be a god, just in virtue of the fact their values constitute moral values. You don't seem to get this and keep substituting 'a god' for 'God' (or gods). This is just bizarre. The analogy again:

Me: it looks as if someone killed Janet

Detective Janus: So you're saying Mr Someone, the local bank manager, killed Janet. Well, there's a problem there because Mr Someone has an alibi - he's overseas.

Me: No, not 'Mr Someone', I said 'someone'.

Detective Janus: yes, Mr Someone, right, he was away overseas.

Me: The word 'someone' just means some subject or other, it isn't someone's name. Mr Someone is someone's name - he works at the bank and is currently overseas. Mr Someone is a someone, of course. And perhaps we'll discover that he's not actually oversees and that he killed Janet. I haven't ruled him out entirely. But nevertheless, the important point is that the evidence we currently have available to us tells us that 'someone' - not Mr Someone - 'someone' did it.

Detective Janus: Mr Someone is overseas though.

Me: someone, not Mr Someone

Detective Janus: yes, Mr Someone. I get it. he's overseas.

Me: Not Mr Someone. Someone.

Detective Janus: there's good evidence Mr Someone is overseas.

And on and on and on.

Moral values are the values of a subject. God, if God exists, is a subject. But all we have evidence for, at the moment anyway, is that moral values are the values of a subject. We do not have evidence that moral values are the values of Mr God.

So, again, what is the problem that the Euthyphro raises for my thesis? Not some other thesis that you're familiar with, but the thesis that the evidence is supporting.

in fact, I'll go one better - I'll refute all views that aren't mine using the Euthyphro. How about that?

You gesture at the Euthyphro dilemma, but unfortunately it is not a dilemma as the answer to it is very straightforward: an act is right if and only if the god prescribes it, and something is morally valuable if and only if the god values it. These things the argument I gave demonstrates.

Describing a theory does not amount to refuting it. So, kindly say in more detail what the problem that the Euthyphro raises is, exactly, for I don't see it.

I think the analogy works well - I mean, it is barely an analogy at all - but I can see why you don't like it.

I have provided deductively valid arguments with premises that seem undeniable in support of every claim I have made.

You, by contrast, have said nothing to challenge any premise at all.

Detective Janus: You are not understanding me. When I kill someone, it isn't Janet. And when others down at the office kill people, they're not Janet either. Now, you've said that the evidence shows that Janet has been killed. And you've also said that the evidence is that Janet's killer is not me, or anyone down the office, but some mysterious stranger. That isn't helpful at all. And my question is, given that when I kill someone it isn't Janet, what is it about Janet's killer that makes his or her act of killing a killing of Janet?

Me: Well, he killed Janet. The killer of Janet is Janet's killer. And that killer is not you, or anyone down the office, but someone else. I can't yet tell you much else about her killer, apart from that he/she killed Janet and that he/she is not you or anyone down the office. But, er, have you and the others down the office been killing people?

Aw, but I like my analogy. I would like to continue with it a little longer, if it is all the same to you.

Detective Janus: I am not asking who killed Janet, but rather I am asking what kind of a person could make Janet be dead just by killing her. All I can think of is God. God killed her. Case closed.

Me: well, I don't see why you're going straight for God - I mean, we're not even sure God exists. We're sure Janet has been killed by someone. And you ask what kind of a person could make Janet dead just by killing her, and I have to say I don't really understand what you're having difficulty with - the person who killed Janet made Janet dead by killing her.

Detective Janus: Well, once more that is just a tautology - you're just saying the person who killed Janet is Janet's killer. But I just don't see how anyone apart from God could have killed her. I mean, if it isn't me or anyone I know, or 'society', then it must be God. And that, of course, raises problems of its own. I mean, is she dead because God killed her, or did God kill her and that's why she's dead?

Me: er, is everything alright at home, sir?

To continue my analogy:

You "but what use is that? How do we know who it was?"

Me "well, aren't we interested in what happened to Janet? And now we've discovered someone killed her. That's very significant, no?"

You: "No, not at all, all you've told me is that Janet was killed by a killer who is not me, or anyone I know. Big deal. What's the use"

Me: "Well, we didn't previously know that, did we - and it is very significant, as it means there's a killer on the loose".

You: "Well, what's the use of that if we don't know who they are?"

Me: "You're a detective!!! You're supposed to be interested in trying to find the killer, not just throwing up your arms at every opportunity. I mean, if we know there's a killer on the loose, then perhaps we can look at other suspicious deaths and try and figure out if the same killer was responsible. And so on".

The argument - the argument - tells us that moral values are the values of a subject, a mind, who is not one of us. And she exists because moral values and norms exist.

You seem to think that unless I can identify the mind with some other mind of our previous or independent acquaintance then my arguments show nothing. That is so confused it hurts.

An analogy: Janet is lying dead on the floor and a careful inspection of her body reveals that she has been killed by someone. She has not killed herself and she has not been killed by something non-agential. She's been killed by a subject.

Your response? "Who, then?! Who has killed her? Was it me - no. Is it someone else I know?" Me: "no, we can rule out that it is you, and we can rule out all of those people you know. Someone else killed her". You: "Who?" Me: "Er, the person who killed her". You "that's a tautology - all you are saying is that the subject who killed her, killed her. We have learnt nothing. So, perhaps she was killed by an object or killed herself, or me, someone I know, yes?" Me: "Er, no - she did not kill herself, that's been established. And no, you did not do it, that's been established. And no one you know has done it either, that's been established. But we haven't learnt nothing - we've learnt something quite significant, namely that she's been killed by someone!!

I am not equivocating. It is clear what I mean by 'subject' - a mind, a subject of experiences. After all, I defined 'objective' as meaning 'exists outside of minds' or 'exists as something other than states of mind'. So clearly by 'subject' I mean 'a mind' (as opposed to, say, a topic of inquiry).

And it means the same in every premise. So there is no equivocation.

An argument like this clearly equivocates:

1. Subjects can value things
2. History is a subject
3. Therefore history can value things

But my argument does not.

What you said about society valuing things didn't make any sense to me - yes, we can say that society is founded on moral principles, but it is exactly what moral principles (and values) are that is the topic of inquiry, so whether society is or is not founded on them is neither here nor there. The point, though, is that a) either 'society values p' is elliptical for 'the majority of the subjects constituting a society value p' in which case no premise is challenged, for subjects can value things, or b) society itself, distinct from the subjects composing it, can value things, in which case society is itself a subject and, once more, no premise is challenged.

So again, no premise in the first leg is challenged. And as for whether moral values would be identified with the valuings of a society (whether the society itself, or the majority of those composing it), no - clearly not, as the second leg demonstrates.

Once more you ask me something that the argument itself tells us about. We have discovered, via the arguments, that moral values are the values of a subject - of a mind. Not me, not you, but someone else.

Who? Well, that question is confused. I mean, you are a subject, yes? And you're not me, yes? So, now imagine I ask you "so who are you then?" That's confused, yes? You're you. You don't have to identify yourself with someone else - someone I already know. I know you now, via this. And you're you and not someone else.

Now, whose values are moral values? Well, the values of a subject. Which subject - who? Well, the subject whose values are moral values. Her. No one else. Her.

Is she God? Possibly - I don't know, the argument hasn't told us. But her values are moral values which, I think, makes her a god of a kind. It is not that she's a god and so her values are moral values - which seems to be how you're construing things. No, no, no. Her values are moral values and so she's a god. It is that way around.

I mean, suggesting that the alternatives are limited to one of us or God is a false dichotomy if ever I saw one.

I do not see which premise you are seeking to challenge.

When we say 'society values p' we either mean that the majority of the subjects constituting society value p - in which case no premise is challenged - or we mean that society itself, quite apart from its subjects, values p, in which case we must be supposing that society IS a subject in its own right otherwise the valuing is not being done by anything. And again, in that case no premise is challenged.

So, the example of 'society valuing things' does not challenge any premise in the first leg of the argument.

And when it comes to the second, we can use the second leg to put to death the idea that moral values could be synonymous with the values of society. For I can simply exchange 'I' for 'my society' and the argument remains sound. Here:

1. If moral values are the valuings of my society, then if my society values something necessarily what it values is morally valuable
2. If my society values something what it values is not necessarily morally valuable (see Nazi society for more details)
3. Therefore, moral value are not the valuings of my society.

As for what other kind of subject there could be - well, we discover more about the subject by inspecting morality more carefully, given that morality appears to be made of this subject's valuings and prescribings.

'God', on normal usage, is the name of a very particular kind of being. I did not mention 'God' so why are you? God is not mentioned in the premises or the conclusion.

I do not know what you mean when you say that I am equivocating over what it means to be valued by a subject.

Which premise are you denying?

You also seem to ignore entirely the second leg of the argument - the leg that establishes that moral values are not composed of my valuings or your valuings.

Note, it is in the conclusions of my arguments that we get closer to understanding what is necessary and sufficient for moral values. So, it is necessary for a moral value to exist that there be some valuing going on. But that is clearly not sufficient, for I can value something yet that does not necessarily make that thing morally valuable. Thus, it seems that though being the object of a valuing attitude is necessary for possessing moral value, it is not sufficient. This, like I say, is what the arguments establish, not what they assume.

I still don't know which premise you are denying. And when you say I equivocate, where do I do so? The word 'value' means the same throughout. If you think that moral values are not values, then just say that and let's see what you think they are.

I also did not mention God. The conclusion is that moral values are the values of a subject who is not me or you or any other human.

Re independence - my point was that you were conflating existing 'externally' to p with existing in a way that 'depends' on p.

Note too that existing 'independently' of something is not the same as existing 'outside' of it.

For instance, a second storey cannot exist independently of a first storey. But a second storey does exis outside of a first story (first storeys do not contain second storeys).

So one could consistently maintain that moral norms and values exist outside of humans, but not independently of them. Indeed, I would maintain that this is precisely what is the case, at least for moral norms. For moral norms are prescriptions issued to us. They are not our prescriptions - so they exist outside of us - but they are not independent of us, for if we did not exist they would not be being issued.

Where? You need to deny a premise, so which one?

For your convenience, here's the first leg of the case:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. (So, for clarity, for something - anything - to be morally valuable is for it to be the object of a valuing attitude)
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject.

To deny 3 you must deny either 1 or 2, so which one?

Here's the next leg:

1. If moral values are made of my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore moral values are not made of my valuings

Once again, to deny 3 you must deny either 1 or 2 - which one? Deny 1 and you're conceptually confused; deny 2 and you think it is morally good to rape someone if you value raping someone (which is as self-evidently false as that 2 + 3 = 97)

Perhaps I am wrong, but I really don't see a way of reasonably denying the conclusion of either argument, and together they imply that for something to be morally valuable is for it to be the object of the valuing attitude of some subject other than me, you, and everyone else.

I don't see any equivocation.

As for objectivists not being as crazy as I have represented them to be - on the contrary, that's precisely what they maintain. They can be sorted into either naturalist or non-naturalist varieties. The naturalist kind think that moral values are perfectly at home in the natural world. Well how? First, values are not objects. There are boulders and trees and clouds and giraffes. There aren't also moral values. Values are valuing relations - that is, to be 'valued' is to be featuring as the object of a valuing relation. That's a conceptual truth, yes? So, what, exactly, is doing the valuing according to the naturalist? I'll let them answer that.
Then there are the non-naturalists. They think moral values are moral values and not another thing. Which is just another way of saying that they think moral values just flit about by themselves. Or am I mistaken? I mean, these are cruel characterisations, I admit that, but I think they're accurate.

You also say that my argument is confused. Oh is it? No, it isn't - it is deductively valid (so, its conclusion is true if its premises are). So you need to deny a premise. Which one?

Just to add - but again, not for dispute - 'objective', as I am using the term, is not synonymous with 'external'. 'Objective', as I am using it, means 'exists outside of minds' or, if one prefers, 'made of something non-mental'.

'External' just means 'out there'.

Most moral philosophers agree that morality is 'out there' in some robust sense. And I think that's quite right - it obviously is. But 'out there' does not necessarily mean 'exists outside of minds'. For instance, George Berkeley thought the external sensible world was 'external' - that is, it exists outside of my mind and yours and his - but not objective. For he held that the external sensible world exists as the mental states of a god. Hence why he is called a 'subjectivist' about the sensible world.

Likewise, I am a subjectivist about morality in the same way as Berkeley was a subjectivist about the sensible world. I affirm its outness, but I deny its objectivity.

Again, that was just to clarify how these terms are operating here and to underline that my usage is not eccentric. It was not to invite discussion of the labels.

No, I have said how I am using the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' in the opening post. Precisely because others use them in haphazard and unclear ways, and precisely because I do not want this debate to end up being about labels rather than the positions to which they have been attached, I gave definitions. Those definitions are the ones that apply in this thread. Don't challenge them, start your own thread and use them differently if you find my usage too uncomfortable to adopt. (My usage is, incidentally, entirely conventional - but don't dispute that either, for that's not what this thread is about).

The view I have defended above is subjectivist, not objectivist. I am defending a divine command theory of value - a divine command theorist about value is a subjectivist (in my sense of the term, given above), but a subjectivist is not necessarily a divine command theorist. Indeed, the vast bulk of those who call themselves subjectivists about morality are most certainly not divine command theorists - they're idiots who are (normally) guilty of confusing beliefs and other representative mental states with what they are beliefs about or representations of.

So, most subjectivists - bar divine command theorists - are ignorant fools who know little about morality and can't think straight, or they're ego-maniacs who've mistaken themselves for a god.

By comparison, most objectivists about morality are completely potty (if sincere). Why? Because they think that moral values and prescriptions can emanate from objects, or that they can just dance about all by themselves. It's mad either way.

Or is it nap nap time?

yes, shall we make a big list of things that people can be and arguments can't?

And arguments can't be stupid. People can be, however. Really, really stupid in some cases.

You're confused is what you are. Read. The. Opening. Post. And do the other things. And realize that you don't know what you think you know.