I should add, phenomenal panpsychism would not be symptomatic of a serious mental disorder if panpsychism is actually true. But it isn't, as my arguments demonstrate.

Yes, thanks, I had sometimes forgotten to press that buton.

Panpsychist is normally reserved for academic philosophers (many of whom are insane, incidentally) who've arrived at their conclusion via careful - though in my view, very bad - reasoning, rather than because it seems to them that their tea is thinking. If it seems to you that your tea is thinking, then I assure you that you're insane. There's what we might call 'rational' panpsychism and then there's 'phenomenal panpsychism'. The former is a philosophical position that some perfectly sane, but not especially rational philosophers hold. The latter is symptomatic of serious mental disorder.

Premise 1 has an 'other things being equal' clause. It isn't met in the case of the morality of procreative acts. It is met in this case, however. Premise 1 can't reasonably be denied. For if you've got an argument for its falsity, then you just confirm it.

One thing is 'evidence' for the truth of a proposition only insofar as it appears to be providing us with some epistemic reason to believe that other thing, which is something only our reason can tell us about. Hence why the principle is true. If you deny it, you'll find you don't have any evidence for anything.

Your last point commits a category error. I am talking about the mind - the object, whatever it may be, that is bearing our conscious states. You're conflating conscious states with the object they're the states of.

If the reason of most people represents a proposition, P, to be true, then that is good evidence that P is true.

Does that make it easier to understand? And do you see why it is not open to rational dispute?

Me: if the reason of most people represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case.
You: "so you mean that if Mr Most People represents something to be the case, then it is the case?"

Me: "No, I said if the reason of most people represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case"

You: "Oh, so you mean if Mr Most People's reason represents something to be the case, then you'll have a cup of coffee and a cake".

I'm saying what I said, not what you said or are saying.

Me: "I would like a cup of tea",

You: "so, you mean, an arbitrary person would like a cup of coffee?"

Me "er, no, I am saying that I would like a cup of tea".

You: "so you mean that if an arbitrary person would like a cup of coffee, then you'll have a cake?"

Me "er, no... don't worry about it"

Why do you keep changing my premises? What is the word 'arbitrary' doing in there?

The premise I am appealing to has a name. It is called the "principle of phenomenal conservatism". It says "if something appears to be the case, that is prima facie evidence that it is the case".

I know that someone people like labels and think they count for something, so now, perhaps, you'll start to take it seriously. For all I have done is take that principle - a principle presupposed by ALL rational inquiry - and apply it to the representations of our faculties of reason.

Why do you assume there's an error? Clearly you're someone who thinks they know what's what BEFORE inspecting the evidence. I only hope you're not a detective.

What error are you showing me? Which premise are you challenging? 1 or 2?

is your little brain hurting?

That premise - the one you're having such difficulties even writing accurately, never mind understanding - says that if our reason represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case.

Now, baby steps....so, someone who denies it will have to insist that if their reason represents something to be the case, that is not good evidence that is the case, yes? Now, how....will.....they......ARGUE....for that claim....without....appealing.....to......REASON?

Over to you. You tell me how to argue for something without using an argument. I'm all ears. Take me to school daddio.

I am working with you.

I don't think you understand the argument. Here it is again:

1. all extended objects can be divided
2. My mind cannot be divided
3. Therefore my mind is not an extended object.

It's logically valid - that is, its conclusion (3) is necessarily true if the premises (1 and 2) are.

So the only issue is whether they're true.

1 is true for the reason I just explained. If an object is extended then, by definition, it takes up some space. Any region of space can be divided. Thus all extended objects, by their very nature, are divisible.

But now you ask me why I think that the mind CAN be divided - but I clearly stated the precise opposite. My mind cannot be divided. That's premise 2!

If A can be divided but B cannot, then A is not B, yes?

Yes, that's what I wrote. But you changed it to "if most people represent something to be the case, then that's ood evidence that it is the case". Can't you see the rather big difference between those two?

The one I wrote is true, the one you wrote is obviously false.

Why is my one true? Because you can't argue for anything - anything at all - without presupposing its truth.

Just to be clear, for I fully imagine you won't grasp this: all evidence, all arguments for anything, presuppose its truth. So it is as true as it is possible for anything - ANYTHING - to be.

I don't accept that premise- it is not a premise of any of my arguments. It is one you wrote. Copy and paste one of my premises - don't rewrite it, you'll mess it up - and ask me why I accept it and I'll tell you. But don't write something of your own and then ask me why I accept it - that's crazy.

It is not clear to me which premise you are disputing, for you mention a premise but then address yourself to a different one.

So, here is the argument:

1. All extended things are divisible
2. My mind is not divisible.
3. therefore my mind is not an extended thing

I think you're trying to challenge premise 1, but it is not clear to me how you are doing so. You mention trees and you note that they are divisible. Well, trees are extended objects. So that's no challenge to premise 1. To challenge premise 1 you need to describe an object that is both obviously extended, yet equally obviously not divisible.

That seems impossible for a very simple reason: any extended thing occupies some space, and any region of space is infinitely divisible.

Try attacking a premise of my argument, rather than a premise that you wrote and that I didn't.

Nothing. The premise says "if the REASON of most people represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case, other things being equal".

I do not understand why you are quoting the bible at me. I could not care less what the bible says about anything. It has no probative force. I am only interested in what reason says, not what some crazy book written by people who know less than we do says.

Yes, you can mean them metaphorically - and that's how a charitable person would interpret you if you said "how heavy is Beethoven's fifth" or "what does the pizza think like?"
That's completely beside the point, though. For the point is that sensible objects cannot literally think anything, just as Beethoven's fifth cannot literally weigh anything. Thus my mind cannot literally be my brain (or any other sensible thing).

I suggest that you read my arguments and try and challenge one.

the ceteris paribus clause is in there because there are circumstances under which we have good reason to think a rational representation counts for nothing. For instance, imagine that I have a drug that induces in anyone who takes it the powerful rational intuition that 2 + 3 = 6. I then give that drug to everyone. Well, now everyone will have the powerful rational intuition that 2 + 3 = 6, yet it doesn't count as any kind of evidence that 2 + 3 = 6. Why? Because the best explanation of why we are getting that intuition is not that it is true, but that we ingested a drug that induces it.

Anyway, putting aside cases like that, if our reason represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case.

Why is that true? Well, because you can't argue for anything without presupposing its truth. Try it. Try arguing against it without using an argument - that's obviously impossible. Yet that's what you would need to do in order to challenge it, for an 'argument' is an appeal to a representation of reason (how do we know that this kind of argument - if P, then Q; P; therefore Q - is valid? Well, because our reason represents it to be).

So although you can say that you don't buy it, you do - or you do if you reason about anything at all.

So you think that it is so obvious that procreation is ethical that any argument that leads to the contrary conclusion must have a false premise?

Okay, but what if the best explanation of why most people get the rational impression that procreation is ethical has nothing whatsoever to do with its actual ethics? I mean, there's a pretty obvious explanation of why virtually all humans get the impression procreation is ethically fine - only those whose ancestors got that intuition would breed.

That's similar to the intuition, again widely felt, that there is something immoral about homosexual relations. Why do many people - often people with homosexual dispositions - get that impression? Well, because it would be adaptive. If you have a homosexual disposition but also think it would be wrong to act on it, and bad to have it, then you'll try hard not o act on it and to focus and cultivate your heterosexual dispositions (and acquire all the standard heterosexual attributes, such as a partner of the opposite sex and lots of offspring). Hence why the intuition that homosexual sex is immoral gets selected for, and why we find it associated with possession of homosexual dispositions.

Now, does that show that the intuition should be taken seriously? Does it show that homosexual sexual relations are, in fact, immoral?

No, the opposite - it discredits such intuitions. It does not vindicate them, it debunks them. Likewise with the intuition - widely felt - that procreation is morally fine. It's pretty obvious why most people get it: anyone whose ancestors did not get it would not have procreated.

I do not follow what you are saying. I have said what I mean by the terms 'mind' 'soul' and 'conscious state'.
Note, conscious states are not minds (as you imply in some of what you say). They are 'states' of mind. It is a category error to confuse a state of a thing with the thing itself. My desk is brown - that's a state of my desk. but my desk and brownness are not the same. Likewise, my mind is conscious, but my mind and consciousness are not the same.
Anyway, I have presented three arguments in support of the soul - three pieces of evidence. I know of none in support of the thesis that the mind is the brain. I am still waiting for someone to present me with some or to show me what's wrong with my arguments.

I addressed the stupid and fallacious argument that "what goes on in our minds is determined by what goes on in our brains, therefore our minds are our brains" argument in my opening post. It is, I repeat, extremely stupid.

I have presented three arguments - each one deductively valid and each one with premises that are far, far more reasonable than their negations - in support of the soul. Either challenge a premise or show that the arguments are invalid.

I am not guilty of any wishful thinking - it is you who is guilty of that, for you just wish my arguments were fallacious and think that's sufficient to establish that they are. And I don't have any religious beliefs, so that's got nothing to do with it either.

I read a story recently about someone who was forced to rape members of his own family as he was told that unless he did that he, and they, would be killed. I don't know what happened - I read no further as it was too disgusting to contemplate - but it seems plausible that he'd be justified in raping them. Now, does that mean that I am not vehemently opposed to rape? No, obviously not, it is seriously wrong in virtually all circumstances - but even here there are ghastly exceptions. The real world turns up such situations with alarming regularity - a world you think it is fine to bring innocent children into. Shame on you.

No, quite wrong. I just think that what's moral depends on the circumstances. What would be atrocious in some circumstances is perfectly reasonable in others.

I don't have a definition of a conscious state apart from to say that there is something it is like to be in one.
But occurrent thoughts, desires and sensations would all be states of consciousness.

So 'the mind' is any object that can be in a state of thinking, or desiring, or sensing (not that those are exhaustive).

It is a matter of debate what kind of an object the mind is. And I am arguing that all the evidence is that the mind is not a material object (so, not something that is extended in space).

Admittedly the word doesn't have a stable meaning across time (as I understand it, in the 17th century it was synonymous with 'mind' and had no metaphysical baggage).

But I would use the word 'mind' to denote the object, whatever it may be, that has conscious states.
And I would use the word 'soul' to denote a mind that is not material. That is, not extended in space.

So, if my mind is my brain, then it is not a soul, and if my mind is a soul then it is not my brain

I don't think you are interested in that, otherwise you'd address my arguments and tell me which of their premises are false (you need to do it with all of them.....and I've got a lot more too, because unlike you I really am interested in this).

That's certainly another possibility. Although if the god is half-way decent, you'd think she'd look out for us - unless, that is, we have done something to deserve her contempt.

Physicists do not speak with one voice. Plus it wouldn't matter what they said on this topic as it is not a topic in physics, but metaphysics. What next - are you going to tell me what bakers would say about it?

As you seem to prefer to talk about turtles, here is my question again: is it turtles all the way down, or does there have to be a bottom turtle who is on something else - something that is not a turtle?

Yes, in those sorts of scenario we'd have to weigh the importance of not imposing a life on another person versus the good of preventing someone who already exists from starving to death.

I am not an absolutist. There are no doubt all kinds of scenario we can dream up in which procreation would be ethically justifiable. For instance, if someone held a gun to my head and said "procreate or I kill you" I think it would be within my rights to procreate.

The point, though, is that 'other things being equal' it is wrong to procreate. There may be some who depend on having offspring for their own survival - in their case I don't think the 'other things being equal' condition is satisfied. But in our case - certainly my case - it is satisfied and thus it is wrong for me to procreate and others who are relevantly similarly situated.

Yes, so time is not a dimension, it is just that some treat it as such (mistakenly, but perhaps usefully).

And as you are more concerned with who defends a view rather than the defensibility of the view, perhaps it would interest you to know that defenders of my view would include Plato, Descartes, Locke and Berkeley (and a whole host of others - I mean, most of the canon, frankly). Those good enough for you?

oh, and I don't think those philosophers who defend rival views to me are stupid or insane. I never said that either. I think someone who thinks their cup of tea thinks something is insane. And I think the view that our minds are brains is stupid. But you have to be very clever to defend it.

Oh, and self-evident doesn't mean 'most popular' (and I never said it did - learn to read). Nor does it mean 'impossible to deny'.

I have read a lot about the topic. Tell me which premise you are disputing. Be clear.

I don't think time is a dimension. Dimensions are infinitely divisible. But nothing can be infinitely divisible. Therefore, no dimensions exist. Time does exist. Thus, time is not a dimension.

You are imposing on the person you bring into existence. They exist. Crikey, how can't you see this?

It can't be turtles all the way down - that's the point. My point, not yours. My word!

That's you - you're that lady. Don't you realize?

Now this means that our reason declares, loud and clear, that our minds are not sensible objects. That is, they are not our brains or any other sensible thing.

That's an inconvenient thing for our reason to say in an age in which it is widely assumed that the intellectually respectable view is that our minds are our brains.

But there it is: do you go with intellectual fashions, or reason?