Oh, yes, I noticed your selective quote.

If you are really interested, as opposed to just a poor attempt at baiting, set out for us what it is you think 's argument was, and my reply.

Becasue I do not think you have understood it.

I concluded... — Leontiskos

That's you, not I. You have misunderstood - again - the logic of the argument.

Love you too. If you are going start by misrepresenting what was said, there's not much point in chatting with you. Of course, it is entirely possible that you do think that a reasonable interpretation of what was said... if so, explain what it means for truth to exist. Do you just mean that there are truths?

This is clearly committing to the view that truth exists where no minds do. — Leontiskos

There it is.

For me the strangeness of Banno's position is the claim that truth can exist where no minds do. — Leontiskos

Yep. Oddly phrased. It's unclear what it would mean for a truth to "exist" - it's not going to be the value of a bound variable. Nor is truth the sort of thing that occurs at a particular place, although particular things might be true at a particular place.

Given Leon's history of misrepresenting folk and his incapacity with logic, I'm not too hopeful here.

So the sense in which I question the reality of 'mind-independence' is that whatever we assert, about gold in Boorara or whatever, relies on this cognitive framework - that we can't stand outside of that faculty to see what is outside of or apart from it. — Wayfarer

Sure, whatever we assert relies on our cognitive framework. But the gold in Boorara doesn't. It'll be there, asserted or not.

Which neither you nor anyone would ever know — Wayfarer

It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara.

And further, from this argument, we know that there would still be gold in Boorara.

So we do know stuff. Again, what you say doesn't work.

That was never at issue, — Wayfarer

Well, yes it was... that there are still facts even when no one is around.

But as I said, that is the case for any empirical fact whatever. — Wayfarer

Well, no, the facts concerning life would presumably have varied somewhat... but for the others, yes, and this only serves to show how much we would know about such a universe. It doesn't work in your favour.

You're loosing sight of what 'mind independent' means if indeed you ever had sight of it. — Wayfarer

Perhaps I've shown that "mind independent" is not so clear as you seem to think. You tried to show a case of mind-independence, and instead of what you wanted, it shows that we can still talk of truths.

Yours is basically the argument from the stone. — Wayfarer

A succinct and powerful rebuttal of Bishop Berkeley's "ingenious sophistry" in my opinion; a precursor to Moore's 'Here is a hand".

Here it is again, since you seem unable to provide a rebuttal. It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara.

...but whatever existence it possesses would be unrecognisable to human intelligence. — Wayfarer

Well, no. There would still be gold in Boorara. That is quite intelligible.

but that is still not the point at issue. — Wayfarer

Yeah, it is: Are there truths when no one is around. You tried for a counterexample, but it doesn't work.

Here we go with the defence of Kant yet again.

...and you slide again. Try to stay on a topic.


There is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed... your hypothetical, not mine... by the definition you gave, there would still gold in Boorara.

Ground control to Major Tom...

Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed.

Then there would still be gold in Boorara. It would be true that there was gold in Boorara.

Moving from the topic at hand onto something less tractable, and derailing the line fo argument. Meh.

You seem to be moving around a lot. Apologising for Bergson?

Kantian bullshit. So you now admit to idealism, of the transcendental sort?

...space and time exist only in the subject as modes of perception...

...Einstein disagrees.

It just seems to me that you are saying it wrong. The bit were a truth is a single-place predicate but a saying, acknowledging, seeing, maintaining and so on are relational. And a fact is what is true. SO we set up (even construct) a language in which we set out the state of the ground around Boorara in a specific way. But doing that does not change what is the case at Boorara. Stating (using, believing...) the fact is dependent on the language used, and how we divide Boorara up. But that does not change how Boorara is.

Again, the realist/antirealist dichotomy is muddled.

And this is the bit where you say "quantum".

But they're not things until they're cognised. — Wayfarer

What could that mean? I think, as I just described to , that it is better - clearer, more coherent - if we do exactly the other. So the gold at the new Boorara gold project near Kalgoorlie in Western Australia was there before it was discovered. It did not come into existence at the discovery.

I never use the word. — Wayfarer

You never use the word. Nevertheless it plays a big part in your thinking.

You don't have to pick, though. — frank

Yep. As I said ways back, it's about choosing how best to talk about medium-sized small goods. Better to supose that they do not cease to exist when you forget about them.

~

Physics has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the purported fundamental constituents of material reality do not have a meaningful existence outside the act of measurement which specifies them. — Wayfarer

A little ambitious. You jump from that to there being a mind to do the "measurement", which is not justified. "Measurement" is a loaded term.

Cognitive science understands that what we construe as objects comprise a synthesis of sensory data and judgement — Wayfarer

And yet they do not doubt that there are things that provide that data.

You presume spirit and then see it everywhere. But if one does not presume spirit, the evidence is less convincing.

the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. — Wayfarer

Remember when we went for a walk?

It's not the existence of such "unseen realities" that relies on a perspective. That's your step too far.
Yes, "whatever judgements are made about the world, the mind provides the framework within which such judgements are meaningful" - All you can conclude here is that the judgements are mind-dependent. I agree.

Can't really prove that he's wrong, though. — frank

And by the same argument he can't prove he is right.

What we have is a choice between ways of speaking, and hence between ways of understanding.

But the instant I ask the question 'what stuff do you mean?' or 'what do you have in mind?' then your argument is lost... — Wayfarer

But you already agreed that there is stuff you don't know:

Plainly - I don't even know most of the people in my street. — Wayfarer

There's a difference between it being true and being able to "name it, indicate it, bring it within the ambit of experience".

You've agreed with this.

I try not to be too strident about it. — Wayfarer

'Everything exists within experience' ~ Wayfarer

...this is where we came in.

A limping authority that derives from pop physics.

Nowadays it's common knowledge... — Wayfarer

Not a proud phrase.

the mind is not yours or mine. We are all part of a community of minds - biological, cultural and linguistic. Consciousness in that sense is collective. — Wayfarer

So far so good. Then you go off on a mystical tangent, and try to drag physics along with you. For me that's an unjustified overextension.

As I recall, you avoid solipsism by partially adopting realism. Roughly, everything is mind-dependent except other people.

I don't even know what (3) is. You won't explain it. — Michael

Did you ask? Seems pretty straight forward. It just says that something is the justification for P. If P is justified, then something is the justification for P.

As it stands, my position is simple: (1) is true and (2) is false. And that's it. — Michael

Sure, something might be (as yet) unjustified and yet could be justified. In which case, since it could be justified, there is something which counts as it's justification.

It woudl help considerably if you explained what you think a justification might be. I've already pointed out that mere logical entailment will not do.

And then you seem to go: — Michael

No. Rather, you wish that "all truths are justifiable" while maintaining that there can be truths that do not have a justification. I can't see how to make that work.

You want (1) not to entail (3).

(1) entails (3). (2) entails (3). I don't know the truth value of p. Presumably it is either ⊤ or ⊥.

What is the difference between "is justified" and "has a justification"? — Michael

This is your game. you get to decide, I supose. I have asked you to tell me what you take a justification to be. Presumably "is justified" means we have the justification to hand, but perhaps not so for "has a justification".

That simply does not follow. — Michael

Only if you do not wish to allow for justifications in other possible worlds. Hey, you are the one who wants to introduce modality... I think quite unnecessarily.

"can be justified" does not entail "is justified — Michael

Sure. But "can be justified" entails "has a justification". The alternative would be to supose that some truth can be justified yet has no justification, which is absurd.

Your other analogs do not work.

No we can't. Dropping modality changes meaning. — Michael

Sure. Do you really want to say that if a proposition is true than in some possible world there is a justification? Fine, then for you every truth has a justification.

1. All truths are believed and justified
If every truth is justified, then every truth has a justification.

2. All truths are believable and justifiable
If every truth is justifiable, then for every truth there is some justification.

They have the same implication, that every truth has a justification. Straight forward stuff. But not every truth has a justification. Hence not all truths are believed and justified, and not all truths are beleivable and justifiable.



Your understanding of logic has been repeatedly shown to be lacking. There's no reason to take you seriously on such issues.

If, for antirealists, as you say, all truths are believable and justifiable, you can drop the modality. p→Jp

If a truth is justifiable, then for that truth there is some justification.

Otherwise you are saying that there might be truths with no justification. But that would contradict you "all truths are believable and justifiable"

It says that if something is mortal, then there is an something which is the death of that thing. Pretty plain.

Not I.

The set of true propositions is on your account a proper subset of the set of propositions with a justification.

Hence a proposition can only be true if it has a justification.

But not all true propositions have a justification.

Unless you are saying that to be justified is to be the consequent of some implication, in which case, trivially, any true proposition is justified.

Hence my question - what is it to be justified?

2. Something can only be mortal if it’s dead — Michael

No. I'm saying that somethign can be mortal only if it has a death.

I don't really understand what you're asking. — Michael

Yeah, you do.

If, for antirealists, as you say, all truths are believable and justifiable, then for any given truth there is some justification. On your account, a proposition can only be true if it has a justification.

Which is not so.

(On Tone's account) ...your idiosyncratic application of your definition of validity... — Leontiskos

Tones is the one being idiosyncratic... :grin:

But that's not the point — Wayfarer

It was my point.

You appear to believe that I must insist that nothing can exist outside my knowledge of it... — Wayfarer

You introduced constructivism, as

Constructivism emphasizes the role of human activity, interpretation, and social practices in constructing knowledge, reality, and meaning. — Wayfarer

I maintain that there is stuff that is true even if we don't know, believe, or whatever, that it is true.

Do you agree?

If so, then constructivism is not the whole story.

Sure, all that; and yet we also have surprise, error and agreement. So the world is not completed by experience.

I would take that remark seriously if you demonstrated any grasp of the point I'm making.