Well, in pure set theory a and b are sets too, because it's sets all the way down. — litewave
a and b are sets too? — litewave
We'd have to look into Wittgenstien's analysis of simples here, and ask if the chair or the leg or the table set is the individual.Chairs are collections too. — litewave
I spoke a bit about how we might define "abstract" here - that we have a and b and then add the abstract item {a,b} without adding anything to the domain - it still contains just a and b, but we can talk as if there were an abstract thing {a,b}."abstract" objects — litewave
Cool. Too many words, too many crossed discussions. The aim might be to be clear about what the individuals we are talking about are.I was responding to your post in which you used the phrase "reified metaphysical entities". I understood them simply as real entities. — litewave
There's a whole new barrel of fish.Chairs are collections too. — litewave
Sure. Just not in the way you interact with chairs. Different domains.I interact with collections of objects all the time. — litewave
I have always treated sets as real metaphysical entities. So if properties were sets, then properties would be real too. If properties are not sets, I am not sure if properties are real, but I tend to think they are. — litewave
So instead think about these issues in terms of sets, with all the clarity of the formal apparatus that invokes, and just drop the use of "property", or use it as an anachronistic approximation.So if properties were sets, then properties would be real too. — litewave
What does it mean to say they are real? What more can we do with real properties that we can't do just with properties? Or much better, with talk of sets or predicates?If properties are not sets, I am not sure if properties are real, but I tend to think they are. — litewave
What's curious here is how "the property of..." serves to confuse things. The very grammar of "the property of..." encourages us to think we're talking about entities when we're really just manipulating linguistic constructions. — Banno
This is the legacy of syllogistic logic. Since it can only deal in terms of "All S are P", "Some S are P", and so on, it obliges the user to think in terms of substances having properties. It squeezes the world in to an ontology of things and properties. Scholastic metaphysics elaborated on this logical limitation by inventing essences, accidents, substance and so on.
We now have better logical tools for dealing with all of this stuff. The answer on offer to ↪litewave is not to identify properties with sets but to drop talk of properties for talk of sets and predication and extension. Indeed, that is probably the intuition behind the OP.
a day ago — Banno
Yes, because my attempt to treat the set and the property as one and the same object seems to have failed. — litewave
And so long as you do not expect to bump in to them as you walk down the street, that's fine, isn't it? What is needed is to keep track of which domain is which.That sets are objects in the ontology of set theory. — litewave
Mary Tiles (a philosopher of math) says she can imagine mathematicians ditching set theory someday. — frank
I wanted to say that the set is the common property of its elements. — litewave
Me, too.I thought this was what Banno was pointing out to you 4 years ago? — bongo fury
What does this mean?But in set theory, sets do add to ontology. — litewave
That's the next logic textbook cuz of you :D — Moliere
I wasn't so much thinking of statistical laws as the basic equations of physics....statistical laws... — Ludwig V
Yep.But I can see that it is a very different model from the Aristotelian model. — Ludwig V
I wouldn't know. There are other more obvious parallels - an enthusiastic amateur league, for one. And I am given to understand that there is a ready market for watching sex workers doing what it is they do, even as for cricket and athletics and swimming. Perhaps the missing ingredient is nothing more than finding suitable sponsorship deals....whores usually don't go in for a lot of batting practice — BC
Aristotle — noAxioms
Really! Who knew? — BC
This leads pretty quickly to Russell's paradox. Consider "the property of being a property that doesn't apply to itself."I didn't know there could be the property of having a property, so I learned something. — frank
For example, let's take property red or redness (X = red): The property of "being in set red" is the same as the property of "having property red", which is the same as the property of "being red", which is the same as property red. So, the property of "being in set red" and property red are one and the same property. — litewave
See the summary I provided above for Moliere. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It's like because its trite, immature and ignores the specific criteria that causes prostitution to obtain. — AmadeusD