, , Better perhaps to think of Davidson, like Wittgenstein, as rejecting the realism/antirealism dichotomy, than as compatible with either.

I'm not sure there's a philosophy which aims at understanding as opposed to knowledge. — Moliere

There's an obvious equivocation between understanding and knowledge, but natural language philosophy does pretty much seek understanding before knowledge. “Understanding” in this context often refers to a kind of clarity—seeing how language functions, how confusion arises, and how philosophical problems dissolve when we attend closely to our forms of life and linguistic practices. It’s not about accumulating true propositions (knowledge in the epistemological sense), but about achieving perspicuous representation.

Given the ubiquity of the methods of natural language philosophy, in practice if not in name, seeking understanding is found throughout.

Perhaps the divide, isn’t between traditions that aim at knowledge vs. those that aim at understanding, but between those who recognise this methodological humility and those who think philosophy can deliver substantive, positive theories in the mode of science. The accusation of scientism runs both ways.

Apparently Banno's answer is, "I want to do philosophy purposelessly. I want to do philosophy aimlessly!" This is deeply confused. — Leontiskos

And deeply misrepresentative. Your standard practice, when you don't like an argument, is to misreport it.

If meaning is use, then use must have an end. — Fire Ologist

The phrase "If meaning is use, then use must have an end" equivocates on “end.” It reads “end” as telos—as if every use must aim at a final goal or fixed purpose. But that misrepresents the point of saying meaning is use (as in Wittgenstein). “Use” in this context refers to the way expressions function in language-games: in asking, asserting, commanding, joking, praying, etc. To say meaning is use is to locate meaning in those practical, varied, rule-governed activities—not to suggest that every instance of use must point toward a singular purpose or culminate in some definable outcome. So no, use needn’t “have an end” in the teleological sense. It need only have a role—a place in a practice, a regularity, a way it makes sense to respond. Saying that meaning is use does not bind us to the idea that use must be goal-directed in some ultimate or final way. Instead, it resists that very assumption by inviting us to look at the variety of language’s functions—how words are used in actual human life.
The quote imports a metaphysical constraint (an “end” to use) that Wittgenstein’s insight was meant to avoid.

To even call a metaphysical claim "misleading" instead of simply "ugly' is to suppose to there is something to be properly "lead to." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, no. And this seems to me to suffer the same error as your argument in the Two ways to Philosophise thread. “To call a metaphysical claim ‘misleading’” doesn’t require that there is something to be properly led to—it only requires that the claim presents itself as if there were. “Misleading” is a pragmatic evaluation of the function or effect of the claim, not necessarily a commitment to metaphysical realism or a teleology of inquiry.

One can say that a metaphysical claim is misleading because it invites a way of thinking or framing that leads us into confusion, pseudo-questions, or circular debates—even if one doesn’t think there is any final “truth” about Being or substance or whatever at the end of the metaphysical road.

Well, there is the possibility of working out how to answer a question, if you don't know. — Ludwig V

Fair point. So how would that work? I'd suggest Cartesian method, breaking the question down into sub-questions, answering each, and putting together an overall solution, as one possible path.

That is, one might work out how to answer a question by asking answerable questions.

The expectation is that students will be enabled to create new work by developing a critical judgement from those examples. — Ludwig V

This works for me. The reason for reading the cannon is to improve on it. But in order to "improve" on it, one does not need already to have an idea of the perfect or ultimate item.

I quite agree with what you have to say about propositions. Best set aside. Did you suppose I thought otherwise? If so, where?

But not for his idea that there is only one such hierarchy — Ludwig V

I am a bit down on Aristotle at present, mostly becasue his ideas are being used broadly and badly in the forum. But on this, at least, we might agree.

Anyway, the usual mischaracterisation is occurring here (not by you), so I'll go back and re-trace some of what I've said. What I am suggesting is that there need be no explicit overall goal for ontology - or any other study - prior to or in virtue of which that study proceeds. No "essence" of ontology. This is a pretty commonplace point, since Wittgenstein. It's misrepresented by others here as my asserting that there can be no overall goal, no essence of ontology, but that's not what I suggested. Of course folk can stipulate a goal, if they so desire. There's just no need to do so, in order to get on with the work.

More like: Look for questions that look answerable, or at least for which you have some way of recognising the answer.

My classes did not begin with broad statements of what metaphysics is, but proceeded by doing metaphysics, self consciously, examining what we did as we proceeded.

Becasue we do not start with a definition—we start in the middle. We do not start with a definition becasue we are not only teaching a body of beliefs, but also providing a set of tools.

Nice rhetorical move on your part.

Well said.

The advantage of the question What is bread made of?" is that there is a pathway to answering the question, that we might well answer the question. You have the answer when you can make bread.

Seems pretty direct.

The aim of philosophy...

Teleology.

We need not assume that meaningful discourse requires a teleological structure. - that we must have an aim. I don't grant that assumption—it's a relic of an Aristotelian metaphysics that I'm not committed to.

Teleology is metaphysically extravagant and misleading. Galileo, Descartes, and Newton sought mechanical rather than final causes. Hume warned against inferring purposes from observed regularities. Darwin replaced natural teleology with natural selection. Wittgenstein urged philosophers to describe how things are used in practice, not to seek hidden purposes or essences. So today, to speak of ends in the Aristotelian sense is to reinvigorate a discredited metaphysical picture. Best left alone, unless one explicitly defends that framework. As, indeed, some do.

Why are the only alternatives "true" or "false" — J

They're not. The point is that the scope of the "⊢" takes in all the propositions, so as to maintain extensionality - and this is so whether we understand "⊢" as "It is true..." or as "I judge..." or as "perhaps..." or even "quite likely...".

Why must we insist that the only sincere use of "to assert" is in a case when we believe there is no possibility whatsoever that the sentence is false? — J

But this is not what is being pointed out. Someone might go ahead and assert that the cat is on the mat despite it being blatantly obvious that the cat is not on the mat. What we are entitled to conclude from their assertion is not that the cat is on the mat, but that they hold it to be the case that the cat is on the mat, provided we take them as sincere.

I'm really not seeing the problem.

Moliere and I were talking about the norms of analytic philosophy, and I don't think either one of us ever mentioned it. — Srap Tasmaner

It seems to me that you are advocating absolute norms while @Moliere (and I) advocate relative or comparative norms. I may be mistaken.

I don't think there's a standard measure of how clear a proof is. — Srap Tasmaner

Yep. There need be no absolute measure. But if you and I agree that this proof is clearer than that, then we might proceed. A comparative measure.

My point right here will be that, once again, clarity is a means, not the goal. — Srap Tasmaner

For you, sure. But why shouldn't clarity also be a goal, if not for you, then perhaps for others? And so an aesthetic.

What I hope my example shows is that working with small, clear questions may lead to progress on big, vague questions.

This used to be called "analysis".) — Srap Tasmaner

And hence analytic philosophy... dissection over discourse.

Mary Midgley, perhaps?

This is where my view is at odds with that of Williamson. I am on the side of the doubters at the philosophy conference in Presocratic Greece, rejecting the discourse of Thales and Anaximander in favour of dissecting the bread.

Good stuff. I hope you are enjoying this, too.

Perhaps it might help if I went back to this, regarding the philosophy conference in Presocratic Greece

My response: Those who jump too quickly to an answer to "what are things made of?" fall; not water, not fire. The doubters have it right: we can intelligibly ask what bread is made of, but not, at least amongst the presocratics, what everything is made of. It is a step too far to ask what things in general are made of. It was exactly by answering questions like "what is bread made of" that we were able to progress towards the broader question. The answerable questions have a large part in this progress. Understanding the nature of grain and water and heat, and how they interact, lead by degrees and indirectly to the questions of chemistry and physics that constitute our present start of play. — Banno

The trouble is, "What are all things made of?" is not as clear as "What is bread made of?". I'd suggest that progress came from iterating clear questions: "What is φ made of?" - "what is bread made of?"; "What is water made of?"; "what is Hydrogen made of?"; What are protons made of?" And that this has proved more agreeable than just-so-stories about water and fire.

None of this business about absolute or relative clarity was at issue. — Srap Tasmaner

Odd. Seems to me the very point of contention.

Is making things clear, to whatever degree, the goal of mathematics? — Srap Tasmaner

A goal, at least.

Great. They have enough clarity to get on with what exactly? Making other parts of mathematics clear? And in the meantime of what? Of making set theory even clearer? — Srap Tasmaner

Yep.

Given two proofs, the clearer is preferred. On that we agree?

Right, that was more or less my point. It's not a logical entailment or something that's true by definition. We have to agree on it. — J

Call it a performative entailment, rather than a logical entailment, if you like. If you assert something that you think is false, or judge to be false, your assertion misfires - it is insincere.

Good old Austin.

So if I merely assert the sentence, without you and I stipulating what an assertion is going to mean, are you able to come to a conclusion about whether I think it's true, or only quite likely to be true? — J

I'm not sure what "without you and I stipulating what an assertion is going to mean" is doing here.

But I do think that if you make an assertion, we are entitled to conclude both that you think what you assert is indeed true, and that you have judged it to be so.

This does not mean you cannot assert something tentatively, or for the sake of argument - but again, the issue is one of the scope of the assertion.

I don't know whether Williamson is closer to my view or yours. — Srap Tasmaner

Neither do I.

But yours is a provocative post. I think maybe we might look back to the difference between an absolute and a relative measure - to being hot or cold. Do we need an absolute criteria for clarity? Perhaps not. Perhaps we might do with a sufficiency, enough to be getting on with.

A mathematical proof is never completely clear - there is always more to be said, more for the mathematician to clarify. There is still work being done on ZFC. But there is enough clarity for mathematicians to get on with other questions in the mean time.

And while what is clear to one mathematician may not be clear to another, it may be clear enough for them to agree and move on.

There's more here, that could be related back again to PI §201. We reach a point in our explanations at which we stop asking questions and just act.

I've heard of the judgement stroke, but no-one has ever explained to me what it does before. Thank you for that. — Ludwig V

Cheers. See A challenge to Frege on assertion for a bit more, if you are interested. Frege set the force of an utterance aside so that we could look to other aspects of it's structure. As I said there, the "a" in

is the same in both occurrences. This is how Frege might represent ∀A∀B(A→(B→A)), reading from bottom to top, something like "we judge that in all cases "a" gives us that "b" gives "a"". Notice that the whole expression sits within the scope of one judgement stroke, the "⊢" on the first line - that's the force of the utterance, the judgement or belief or what have you. The "⊢" is nowadays reduced to "it's true that..."

All this talk of assertions is making me think about speech acts. — Ludwig V

Yes, good point. The issue seems to be what Searle called the "sincerity condition", which requires that the speaker genuinely possesses the mental state expressed by the speech act. In this case making an assertion involves the speaker in committing themselves to the mental state of holding what is asserted to be true.

Could we not say that clarity has more than one value? — Ludwig V

I'll go along with that. We could fill in the details of how an aesthetic value relates to an obligation, and I'd also agree that we have an obligation to each other to be clear enough to be understood. Taht was part of what is behind @Moliere's thread on aesthetics, I believe.

Added: This might be a better account: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/931997

"Yes, I'm saying this, and it's most likely true -- close enough that I'm willing to assert it." — J

Can you do this without therewith judging that it's most likely true -- close enough that you are willing to assert it?

Yes and no. An analytic philosopher can talk *about* values, the roles they play in discourse, all that sort of thing, but by and large is determined not to offer a "wisdom literature." So it might be able to "clarify" (hey Banno) that it's the values at stake in a dispute, rather than something else, but it's not, as a rule, espousing a set of values. — Srap Tasmaner

Seems to me that we can posit clarity as an aesthetic value. As something that we might preference not becasue of what it leads to, but for it's own sake.

Seems @Moliere agrees, but perhaps you do not. That's fine. Perhaps at the least we might agree that some folk value clarity, and not just as a means to an end. Then we might wonder if Williamson is one of them.

I'm increasingly unconvinced that Banno is willing to provide his ends at all. — Leontiskos

"Ends" are a figment of Aristotelian framing. So, no.

Question - suppose that the speaker does know that the cat=jack. Then, by substitution, the speaker believes that Jack is on the mat. Is that not the case? — Ludwig V

Sure. Frege's judgement stroke is a way of showing this, by clarifying the scope of the judgement:

⊢(the cat is on the mat, the cat is jack, therefore Jack is on the mat)

but not

⊢(the cat is on the mat)
⊢(the cat is jack)
⊢(therefore Jack is on the mat)

The substitution between seperate judgements is not countenanced.

To me this talk of "ends" appears hollow. If, after Wittgenstein, we should look to use rather than to meaning, you might supose that a use is an end. That's a stretch, "end" drags in to the discussion so much baggage that might not be found in "use". It also does not follow that language must therefor have an end.

...surely there has to be some notion of the end this language is "better for." — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Surely" is a word to watch out for in an argument. It indicates that the conclusion doesn't follow as tightly as he proposing the argument would like.

Adding teleology here is making presumptions of Aristotelian metaphysics. It's already loaded.

I'm claiming that all three statements have different truth conditions. — J

Sure. Does any one suggest otherwise?

J and Banno may be "saying the same thing," but the statements are not. — J

The "that" in both "J judges that to be true" and "Banno judges that to be true" both have as referent "The cat is on the mat". That is why they are "saying the same thing".

I'm puzzled that this is an issue.

...stipulative... — J

That's what I had in mind. I don't see how you could assert a sentence without thereby stipulating that you judge it to be true. Asserting the sentence counts as judging it to be true.

Again, is there something here that is problematic?

"the cat is on the mat" and "Jack is on the mat" two propositions or one? — Ludwig V

I should have been clearer - my apologies. It's if the speaker does not know that jack is the cat's name. So we have

The cat is on the mat
The speaker believes that the cat is on the mat

The cat=jack

And by substitution,

the speaker believes that Jack is on the mat

Which is not the case. I'm just pointing to the opacity of propositional attitudes.

My question is whether "I judge that sentence to be true" ever follows from "That sentence is true"? If I assert the latter, have I also committed myself to asserting the former? — J

The answer is straightforward. From "That sentence is true" it does not follow that "I judge that sentence to be true". Neither does it follow from "I judge that sentence to be true" that "That sentence is true. The context is not extensional.

If you assert "That sentence is true" you have also committed to "I judge that sentence to be true" on the grounds that to assert a sentence counts as to judge it to be true. This is not an entailment but a performance.

I don't think any other discipline has asked for philosophy's help or wants it. — Srap Tasmaner

Philosophers don't wait to be asked...

This is the same issue that bedeviled the other thread, that you need something to dissect. — Srap Tasmaner

There's no shortage, is there? starting with how many legs does a spider have, and working on from there...

Williamson would absolutely agree to carefully examining theories, with the goal of improving them or producing better ones, not with the expectation they'll all be left dead on the dissecting table. — Srap Tasmaner

I suspect that the philosophers now working on metametaphyscis and so on see themselves as working on the same issue, but re-cast as a result of the considerations from, amongst others, Williamson, Chalmers, Dummett and so on.

It's not an autopsy.

I don's see that this is not captured.

• The cat is on the mat.
• J judges that to be true
• Banno judges that to be true.

Indeed, they amount to much the same view... — Banno

I don't think there's any fact of the matter regarding shared nor individual intentionality — frank

Then how do you explain a football game?

It might be worth pointing out that intuitionistic logic is a proper subset of classical propositional logic: everything provable in intuitionistic logic is provable classically, but not the other way around. It’s consistent, and it has a semantics—Kripke models, for example—that is both sound and complete.

What it doesn’t assume is the law of excluded middle or double negation elimination. That’s the point.

Dummett made use of it in his work—especially in his arguments against classical realism about meaning.

If we are tempted to agree with Dummett might give consideration to what it is we are agreeing.

If we are tempted to disagree with Dummett we might do well to understand the solidity of the foundation on which he stands.

Why do I feel like I just walked into the Meno? — Srap Tasmaner

:razz:

Do you think that "learning" in philosophy amounts to becoming clear about what you already know? Or can philosophy provide us with knowledge we did not have before? — Srap Tasmaner

Isn't becoming clearer about what you already know a way to improve your knowledge? At the least, I'm not convinced that they are mutually exclusive...

I've in mind Midgley's plumbing model of philosophy. We get the plumbing right, and then are we still doing philosophy? I'm suspicious about that. I do think philosophy can to some extent provide a service to other disciplines, fixing the leaks and bad smells.

Back to the demarcation criteria I suggested: philosophy happens when we stop doing things with words and start looking instead at how we do things with words; how those words work. Doing philosophy involves going back and looking again at what we have said, and checking how it hangs together. Dissection.

Now, a corollary of that: it remains undecided if what is left over when we get the plumbing right is still philosophy, or has become something else.

So "learning" in philosophy is at least becoming clear about what you already know, but maybe philosophy might provide us with knowledge we did not have before, after it gets through fixing the pipes. I remain unconvinced.

But "What is a proposition?" would make an excellent thread...

I'd suggest some sort of shared intentionality, social intent, along the lines proffered by Searle. Shared intent as opposed to individual intent. That for a non-extensional account.

Alternately, after Davidson: aren't "the cat is on the mat" spoken by J and "the cat is on the mat" spoken by @frank both true under the very same circumstances? That is, they are extensional equivalent - so what's the issue?

Yep!

Yep. Chalmers et al took themselves to be working on the same problem, as can bee seen in his Ontological Anti-Realism - he's explicitly re-casting the problem as about metametaphysics, and arguing an antirealist case from there. But the upshot appears to have been a move past the realism/antirealism dichotomy, a re-framing of the activity.

Inter-disciplinary work has developed well in recent decades... — Ludwig V

A result of philosophers being forced to pay their way, perhaps - of economics, rather than largess on the part of philosophers.

I'm trying to bring in the 1st person judgment. We can stipulate that we will use "assert" so as to mean that "The cat is on the mat" and "It is true that the cat is on the mat" assert the same thing. Indeed, this is very often how we use "assert." But does this get us to "I judge that the cat is on the mat" or "I judge that it is true that the cat is on the mat"? Are these formulations also meant to say the same thing? How? — J

I'm lost here. We have it that "the cat is on the mat" can have a particular interpretation, understood whether it is true or not; and we have it that "I judge that sentence to be true" is a distinct, albeit not seperate, item.

Is that not so?

But nowhere here are we talking about arguments showing that people actually agree, or argument as a means of clarifying, or any of the things you said and that I was asking about. Are we just moving on? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, the argument did indeed move on. Disenchantment with the global framing of the debate led to the rise of localism, Phil os science moved away from examination of method and towards examining scientific language and culture, and modal theories of causation. Philosophers moved to metemetaphysics, after the book by that title, a sideline of neo-Aristotelian approaches as a reaction against Quine, another sideline on the construction of social reality, and so on. Pholsophers got board with the lack of progress and moved on.

...do you think that clarity tends to dissolve disagreements because it shows most disagreements to have been merely verbal? — Srap Tasmaner

Sometimes, not always. It also can bring out differences in aesthetic, in what the proponents are seeking.

I think Williamson considers the end goal knowledge. — Srap Tasmaner

Ok, lets' settle on clear knowledge... :wink:

But I can't see that "The speaker holds true..." is at all helpful. What's unclear about "X believes that the cat is on the mat"? — Ludwig V

Well, there's the issues of substitution. If the cat's name is "Jack", does the speaker also believe that Jack is on the mat? It seems not. And yet Jack = the cat.

Hence the analysis "The cat is on the mat" and "The speaker holds that true", where that indicates the previous sentence. This has the benefit of separating the belief from the fact.

Davidson was not able to give up the search. — Ludwig V

I missed something.

"Better" in virtue of what? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you have trouble deciding, I'll do it for you.