Hear, hear.

Most especially, "Attempting to use purportedly reliable scientific knowledge to support a claim that we have no reliable knowledge of distal objects is a performative contradiction."

There is an alternative, which is to reject the juxtaposition of direct and indirect experiences entirely, and admit that we do sometimes see (hear, touch, smell...) things as they are; and that indeed this is essential in order for us to be able to recognise those occasions in which we see (hear, touch, smell...) things in the world erroneously. — Banno

Indirect realism is the prevailing view of our time. — frank

The most accepted vies is representationalism, which is neither direct nor indirect. The issue is no longer "Do we perceive representations (indirect realism) or do we perceive objects (direct realism)" since it is understood that we perceive by constructing a representation, which is better described as neither direct nor indirect.

Essentially, the whole argument of this thread has been bypassed since Austin.

Folk are misled by physiologist saying silly things like "we don't see the tree, we see the representation of the tree". They are wrong, and should know better. We see the tree by constructing a representation of the tree. Hence, we see the tree.

Well, generally speaking, on realist accounts, statements are either true or false. What admits to degree is not truth value, but belief. And what we know, we also believe.

So if one denies that there is a difference between knowledge and belief, one also drops realism.

@Janus has consistently taken a more restricted view of "belief" than that which I think more typically found in philosophical discussion. I'd characterise it using propositional attitudes, roughly, as follows: I take "Adam believes P" as simply that Adam holds P to be true. Janus takes "Adam believes P" as both that Adam holds P to be true and has consciously assented to its being true.

That's what seems to sit behind his notion of "active" belief. It seems this leads Janus to being unable to deny what is before his eyes; that being before one's eyes somehow amounts to the sort of conscious assented he requires.

At least, that's how I have understood some of his comments.

I can go on an on... — Chet Hawkins

Yep.

We are still left with the question of why certain beliefs are more privileged compared to others and why? — substantivalism

Presumably, because they are true; not because they are certain.

Confusing these two is the reason this thread is at page 14.

A “completely general” logical principle sounds like confused jargon for “absolute” logical principle; or it refers to a principle being general, which doesn’t lend support to the claim. — Bob Ross

Well, it's from Gillian Russell, so I'll take it as legit. But I went too quickly, and lost you. Russell's approach is to highlight cases where what are generally considered logical laws fail - I gave a few examples, more can be seen in the linked literature on Logical Nihilism. These cases serve to verify the second premise, that there are no general laws, and hence logical monism. We are left with deciding that there are no laws of logic, or that they do not apply with complete generality.

Hence, the laws of logic fashion discrete, related languages within logic.

When can you validly disregard the law of non-contradiction, for example? — Bob Ross

The Law of non-contradiction, ⊨ ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ), need not be true in a Klein logic, I believe. This would add a line to the truth table where if φ is neither T or F, so is ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ). Non-contradiction applies only to those logics which are biconditional, and hence not to all logics.

These logical theories are not separate from each other, but share at their core the fundamental (classical) logic. — Bob Ross

It does not follow that there are logical laws that apply in all cases. Indeed, one of the games played in doing logic is to see what happens when a supposed law is denied. Nothing need be held constant throughout the whole enterprise - just as no individual thread need run the whole length of a rope.

for — Bob Ross

If that is the case, then it should be easy for you to demonstrate this: choose something else (or multiple concepts) to be simple, and comprise ‘being’ from it. — Bob Ross

The trouble here is that "being" is not one thing, but a group of things. I tried to explain that by setting out the various logical parsings of "is".

Treating several notions as if they are one is a sure way to extend a discussion indefinitely.

Cheers.

...the concept of a triangle is just the inter-subjectively agreed upon word ‘triangle’. There must be an underlying concept of a triangle at play here. — Bob Ross

Note my bolding: not just.

Alpha, Beta and Gamma Triangulum form a triangle in the night sky. If one adopts a realist approach, that triangle will still be there when unobserved. Such an approach can be understood as supposing a binary logic - that the triangle is either there or it is not: "There is a triangle" is true, or it is false. An antirealist approach might be understood as adopting Klein Logic, such that "There is a triangle" is true when observed, and neither true nor false when unobserved.

On a realist account there are triangles even when folk are not around to see them.

What this shows is that "Triangle" is both a way of using words and a way of talking about how things are. And because "Triangle" is about how things are, "Triangle" goes on even when there are not folk to talk about it.

That's probably not as clear as I'd like it to be. That is, language games are not just about words, but about the stuff around us. That's what is "at play" here, not mental furniture.

There's a short bio in Philosophy Now.

The (women) are presently receiving quite a bit of attention:

...the key idea shared by the members of the Quartet is to place the concept of life at the centre of philosophical attention. This commitment has at least four dimensions: (i) an interest in the ordinary; (ii) a focus on virtue, goodness and human flourishing; (iii) an affirmation of our animal nature; (iv) recognition of the normative landscape that structures our lives. — Bakhurst, David (2022). Education for metaphysical animals. Journal of Philosophy of Education 56 (6):812–826.

...a worthy antithesis to the crap that occupies some folk on this forum.

It’s just free market principles at play. :wink: — Mikie

:up: . Neoliberalism explains everything... for mental midgets.

What is outstanding, and ongoing, is that over eight pages these three men have managed to say so little about what Midgley actually wrote.

This is Midgley's analysis: — Fooloso4

Well, part of it; right after she mentions how the great philosophers were kind to their cats. Perhaps her facetiousness jokes were missed.

Mental Midget — Lionino

Not so small as some denizens of this forum, as is evident. Not new. There's a thread about Midgley and Dawkins somewhere hereabouts:

Genes cannot be selfish or unselfish, any more than atoms can be jealous,
elephants abstract or biscuits teleological. — Gene-juggling

Isn't it wonderful that a dead, diminutive elderly woman can cause so much angst! I thought this thread would be lucky to reach a page!

Any hegemony in a field like philosophy is due to simply better ideas. — Lionino

:rofl:

"To date, I’ve not encountered any direct racism or sexism in academia..." — AmadeusD

Not selective at all.

She probably is, though, given this is 2024 and not 1954. — AmadeusD

Indeed, things have been so much better since the patriarchy was dismantled.

, so you back away from your defence of Descartes only to be oddly antagonistic towards Midgley.

At the least, there might be some philosophical merit in considering the place of those who are not reclusive white bachelors.

Or will you deny this, too?

Oh, I agree. I don't see that @Fooloso4 has carried his case. Yet even if he had, it does not count against Midgley.

She gives a standard textbook reading of him which in my opinion does not hold up under scrutiny. — Fooloso4

Even if Midgley has misconstrued Descartes, her misconstrual is shared by others. So I'll go back to a point I made earlier, that even if she is wrong about what Descartes said, she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy.

That is, what you have said here in your many posts is irrelevant to the argument Midgley presents.

But yes I am asking "what is true". — Benj96

So do you supose that there could be an algorithm, a method, that gives us truth in any given case?

I hope you don't lump me in with Corvus, who's understanding of logic is... problematic.

For example, we cannot properly express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english; but this is just a linguistic limitation. I can only say "a non-spatial entity would exist 'beyond' what is in space", but the concept of a non-spatial entity's relation to space as 'beyond' it is perfectly sensible albeit linguistically nonsensical. — Bob Ross

It seems to me that you do here what you claim to be unable to do - to express how a non-spatial entity relates to space in english.

The concept of a triangle is still such even if we have no language capable of conveying it. — Bob Ross

Which is to say nothing more than that there are triangles even if there are no folk around to talk about them - that is, to accept realism.

Conceptual analysis is surely restrained, to some extent, by language (as you are correct that we convey concepts with language) but they are not thereby themselves reducible to language — Bob Ross

Sure. Concepts can be shown, by our acts, as well as said. Indeed saying is just another act. The point being that concepts are not fundamental to mind, actions are. Concepts are just a way of explaining acts.

A child understands "3" by taking three lollies, by holding up three fingers, by taking one toy from four, and so on; not by having a something in her mind. Further, using the word "three" is tertiary to these other acts.

...there are many theories of logic; and to that I say that there is only one, — Bob Ross

But see this argument for logical nihilism:

To be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality
No principle holds in complete generality
____________________
There are no laws of logic. — Gillian Russell

and

Logical laws are supposed to work in every case. Modus Tollens, non-contradiction, identity - these work in any and all cases. A logical nihilist will reject this...

...there are two ways to deal with this argument.

A logical monist will take the option of rejecting the conclusion, and also the second premise. For them the laws of logic hold with complete generality.

A logical pluralist will reject the conclusion and the first premise. For them laws of logic apply to discreet languages within logic, not to the whole of language. Classical logic, for example, is that part of language in which propositions have only two values, true or false. Other paraconsistent and paracomplete logics might be applied elsewhere.

A few counter-examples of logical principles that might be thought to apply everywhere.

Identity: ϑ ⊧ ϑ; but consider "this is the first time I have used this sentence in this paragraph, therefore this is the first time I have used this sentence in this paragraph"

And elimination: ϑ & ϒ ⊧ ϑ; But consider "ϑ is true only if it is part of a conjunction". — Banno

I'll go with logical pluralism. Logic itself depends on what one is doing. It's the grammatical structure we choose for the purpose at hand. It cannot therefore provide the "simple" you desire.

I am not seeing how the concept of ‘being’ is merely being ‘held constant’ for us to ‘move other things’ — Bob Ross

Then may I commend again Philosophical Investigations, §48? We choose what is to count as a simple in the diagram, be it colour, or shape, or letter, or position; and each can in turn be defined in terms of the other. Here Wittgenstein is undoing the enterprise of the Tractatus, which is very much the same enterprise you suggest in your other thread, constructing the world from logical atoms.

Moved to https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/896568

With the exception of your posts, I'm afraid I haven't been following this thread.
Folk engaged so closely with Cartesian views may have difficulty with externalism about the mind. The discussion here remains in the quiet solitude of Descartes' warm room, not in the noisy, busy Kitchen. So it remains both privileged and irrelevant, and produces no sustenance.

Do you have any arguments to offer against Midgley’s thesis, or are you just upset that she spoke against a philosopher you are fond of? — Leontiskos

I shouldn't complain, I supose, that a thread about Granny has achieved seven pages of historical exegesis. But I would have liked to read more about plumbing.

For example, those who know better than I, than to waste time on narcissitic guru wannabees. — wonderer1

Yep.

The rest is dross.

Do you know where that post is in the thread? — Bylaw

Fear as an emotion is rooted in the need for comfort and certainty. And certainty is absurd. Sp, by pandering to that fear, we cause more problems than we really solve. Fear is always, when served in this fashion, a cowardly short-cut to wisdom, to truth, that is a lie, a delusion, an immoral mistake. — Chet Hawkins

This IS cowardly Pragmatism writ small, again and again. It is a short cut. It is greatly immoral in its aims. — Chet Hawkins

As for anger, well, take a look at this search. I've not been able to follow what is going on. There is something a bit unbalanced here.

Yep. It's the relativism of the right wing. If there is only belief, then no situation is better than any other. Consider the criticism as against Feyerabend - if "Anything Goes" then everything stays; if there is no correct method, then we have no reason to do science this way instead of that way, astrology is as good as experimenting. Hence there is no need to do anything differently to how we have been doing it, no potential for improvement. If Chet were right, then we may as well settle for oligarchy as democracy. Indeed, if there is no knowledge, we have no way to make things better.

Or consider the relation to Frankfurt's philosophical bullshit. If there is no knowledge and truth doesn't matter, then all that remains is bullshit: speech intended to persuade without regard for truth. Which is seen in Chet's posts.

It's Chet who's position is immoral.

Something like that.

I think Midgley makes a profound point. — ENOAH

Cheers. The ideas she expresses were also found in others of that period. There was a general realisation that doubt cannot be the whole of philosophical method.

Yes, to an extent. @Chet Hawkins sets up an absurd standard only to complain that it cannot be met. He is forced by this ideology to ignore the very many examples of things we do know - he doesn't address the examples, but instead merely repeats the assertion that we cannot know anything, and that therefore the examples are supposedly in error. That's the approach of a dogmatist. As is the contention that those who do not accept his ideology are evil - that those who think they know things are angry and cowardly.

And its this that makes his ideas distasteful. We've had enough of dogmatism masquerading as liberalism. His confusion is gross.

Absolute truth would refer, in your terminology, to anything that is considered true with absolute certainty; and 'absolute certainty' would refer to a level of certainty which cannot be doubted legitimately (e.g., a tautology) as opposed to what one doesn't have good reasons to doubt. — Bob Ross

Well, is the following a tautology?

That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles.

It depends on what one is doing.

What of this:

Φ∨¬Φ

Which Intuitionist logic denies; or this:

Φ,¬Φ⊢Ψ

which paraconsistent logic denies?

Again, we can do surprising things by bringing into doubt that which can not be doubted.

That is not quite the point I would make, though. That relates to your thread on unanalysable concepts. Both "absolute" knowledge and "absolute" simples depend on context. They depend on what one is doing. Some things are held constant in order for us to be able to move other things. Some things are held indubitable in order for us to doubt other things. Some things are held to be simple in order for us to be able to analyse other things.

And we sometimes change what we hold constant in order to change something else.

The over-used example is a bishop remaining on its own colour for the purposes of a chess game, but not for the purposes of putting the pieces back in the box.

Interestingly this also relates to the nearby discussion of what an "object" is in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. That's not surprising, since that book is a failed attempt to ground analysis and hence knowledge. The "simples" there were "tractatrian objects", the nature of which is famously enigmatic. The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was engaged in much the same exercise as you, seeking a foundation for analysis and knowledge, only to find such an approach unworkable. The Philosophical Investigations gives an account of why this "logical atomism" will not work.

I'm not reading that the way you are. I take the use of "measurement" rather than "observer" to be quite deliberate.

See. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v1wqUCATYUA

15:23
So, in summary. A) That consciousness causes the collapse of the wave-function is a possible
Summary interpretation of the mathematics, but it’s as problematic as all other interpretations of quantum mechanics. B) One can formulate a collapse model based on this idea which is a testable modification of quantum mechanics. But in all honesty, I think if they test it, they’ll just rule it out. C) The idea that you can influence the collapse of the wave-function by thinking is pseudoscience. And D) none of that is what Penrose and Hamaroff are on about, which is another story entirely.

I don't think she is making the claims you want her to.

listened to Hillary Lawson interview Sabine Hossenfelder yesterday, and she says her main research interest, aside from her very successful youtube channel, is somehow eliminating 'the observer problem'. — Wayfarer

I couldn't find anything of that sort in the interview... "observer" does not come up in the transcript.

This?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6xGwdUCYzgw

However, “is” is linguistic, not conceptual. I am asking what it means ‘to exist’, not how we use the term ‘is’ (or similar words). — Bob Ross

Well, that's the point at issue. If you know how to use the word "being", and related words such as "exist", "is", and so on - what more is there to the meaning of "the concept of being"?

I'll contend that the notion of "concept" is an hypostatisation of word use. After all, if the concept gives the meaning of some word, and the meaning of a word is its use in a language, then the concept is pretty much just the way a word is used.

The common alternative is to consider concepts to be pieces of mental furniture, the "stuff" we have sitting around in our minds. This picture is fraught with inconsistencies. How, for example, can the concept of "existence" in your mind be the same as that in my mind? In the same way that the armchair in your lounge room is the same as that in my lounge room? But you could come and see my lounge chair - you can't inspect my concept of exists.. all you have access to us the way I use it...

And so on, with all the machinations of the private language argument thrown on top of the notion of simples.

Existential quantification presupposes, and does not answer itself, what it means ‘to exist’. It is a way to quantify existence (in a way). E.g., by claiming “there is something that is green” in the sense that there exists something green, presupposes the concept of what it means to exist—so it can’t itself being a proper analysis of ‘to be’. See what I mean? — Bob Ross

I think that there are a number of ways of using these words, and that we can sort them out much more clearly than the mysterious use of "being" fond in so much ontology. Parsing talk of existence forced logicians to confront these distinctions, and to come up with the clarificationI described in the previous post - at least three differing uses of "is".

The grain of truth in what you are suggesting might be seen in etymology, where to "ex sistere" is to "stand forth". To exist is to be differentiated from the stuff around you - a notion not so far from "to exist is to be the subject of a predicate", and so different to the stuff that is not subject to that predicate.

And all this is by way of showing that we can have a reasonably clear analysis of existence, and that in such circumstances "existence" is not a simple.

Anyway, this is an offer of a different way to see the issue. Take it or leave it.

In terms of whether it is absolutely true that I am writing this reply, I cannot afford an answer. — Bob Ross

Failure to commit? No, rather "absolutely true" is like "solicitous chalk" or "oligarchic sandwich"; putting two words together doesn't necessitate that the result makes sense. You perhaps can't afford an answer because "absolutely true" is a nonsense.

There's something incongruous in Chet being so certain of his lack of confidence.

He is in effect asserting that his claim that there are no truths is true. Such self-defeating nonsense should not overly concern us.

The claim that knowledge is only belief ignores the simple point that the things we know are true. To know some statement, that statement must be at least a true belief. The things we know are a proper subset of the things we believe, differentiated from our other beliefs by being as at least true.

What is the litmus test in the realm of discourse with others which may be either just as misinformed or very much astute and correct? — Benj96

You are asking: "what is true?"

My proof-reader took the day off. — Fooloso4

...happens to the beast of us.

This thread would not have come to be had the lenghty discussion about Descartes in the "100% centainty" thread not taken place. — Lionino

Well, thank you for your continuing contribution.

Sure.

...a whole paragraph... — Lionino

That much.

Midgley is wrong when he says that other people's existence had to be inferred. — Fooloso4

I had to read that twice, eventually deciding that "he" must be Descartes - Midgley is, infamously, of the female persuasion.

It is no more necessary for him to conclude that others exist than it is for a child to exist others do. — Fooloso4

Mmm. Perhaps not as clear as was thought. :wink:


, I find it curious that folk are so defensive of Descartes. Granny Midgley is obviously using him as a rhetorical device.

I mentioned Descartes was wrong: ‘a person is a person through other persons’ before. Have a quick look and tell me what you think. It's an argument that seems to me to have some merit.

I will not disagree, but wishing to make the logical point that doubt requires us to hold something certain, I'll accept pro tem that anything might be doubted...

Ryle's solution to it is basically beaviourism — Wayfarer

Beaver-ism?

I should be the last person to draw attention to typos.

...essentially behaviourist. — Wayfarer

Well, no. See the entry in the SEP, and allow him some subtlety.

I agree with you on this, but I wonder whether you think that those things we hold certain are in any degree fallible. Do you think they could ever be falsified? — Janus

One can presumably construct games of doubt about anything. Whether these are to be taken seriously is probably a function of one's credulity. But in constructing such games, other things must be held to be undoubted.

I've said a few times that whilst perhaps anything can be brought into doubt, everything cannot coherently be doubted. Is that too subtle a distinction? One doubts this or that by holding something else firm.

Of course I don't hold with that, I think such doubts (like 'brain in a vat') stupid, phony, pointless and toothless. — Janus

You left out "vapid". :wink:

What is your claim? That the whole of analytic philosophy is infected with ghosts? Including Ryle?

You do understand that in your quote, Ryle is setting out his target, not defending a doctrine.

You posts often do not come up in mentions and are not flagged. Something to do with the way you are editing them, at a guess.

To exist is to be the subject of a predicate.

This doesn’t refer to being at all.

If ‘to exist’ is ‘to be the subject of a predicate, then Unicorns exist because “Unicorns are red”. This obviously doesn’t work.

You aren’t capturing what it means ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’ itself in your definition. Likewise, it is circular, as indicated with the underlines. — Bob Ross

Yeah, it does talk to being. It does it by clarifying the confused notion of "exists" or "is". It's a result of the development of formal logic after Russell and Frege. Three clear sense of "is" were identified, the "is" of equality, "=", "superman =Clark Kent"; the "is" of predication, f(a), "that tree is green"; the "is" of existential quantification ∃(x)f(x), "there is something that is green".

You aren’t capturing what it means ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’ itself in your definition. — Bob Ross

Actually, what is happening is that you are not recognising that there are at least three differing senses of "to be". It doesn't follow from "the unicorn has four legs" that there are unicorns.

Likewise, it is circular, as indicated with the underlines. — Bob Ross

Look again.