I see truth as more than propositional truth. — Sam26

Sure you do. But of course that means you can't say what that more is. And yet you seem to claim to.

The "more" is something like what we do, including what we show. But that can be put into proposition form.

The world is all that is the case. Truth is built in and assertable. Having "hinges" outside of propositions breaches this basic and central tenant, this most central of Wittgenstein's hinge propositions. Here, he is not making a mere observation or assertion but setting up the philosophical game he played throughout his life. He is setting out the extent of the world. Now you want things that are outside the world, that are the case but not true, or true but not the case.

That's inconsistent.

Such accounts seem to head towards the mystical and the murky realm of ineffability. — Tom Storm

This ought be the central point. The way to avoid the "mystical and the murky" is to remain silent about what cannot be said.

But that won't happen.

I don't see anything here resembling an argument for sufficient reason. Perhaps some things just are the case, unexplained and unexplainable. The supposed principle is then no more than wishful thinking.

Similarly, the supposed "laws of nature" might simply be arbitrary. There is no need at all to suppose them to be necessarily true, and so invoking modal collapse is muddled.

Perhaps the supposed laws are simply descriptions of the consistency we find around us.

There are good reasons to think physics is not "determinate".

Basic theistic bullshit. Confirmation bias dressed as philosophy.

Yep. Note especially

The truth is shown in the actions. — Sam26

Truth is propositional, hence actions are propositional - which is to say no more than that we can talk about what we do.

The problem is, how can I know about something that is independent of language when I can only know about it within language? — RussellA

Why would you supose you only know things within language? No wonder.

yep. And being a hing proposition is a role taken on in the course of setting up a language game. While playing the game it cannot be doubted. And some games are always being played.

Do you have a conclusion? What you are saying makes no difference to the hundreds of thousands of head of cattle that are presently drowning in Queensland.

Cool.

Now that change in climate was fast - a half-million years or so.

The present change in climate is more like instant.

You don't follow the post where I referred to OC 205, 206? I'll try to clarify. — Sam26

No. I couldn't make sense of Russell's post - the confusion is legion - but nothing to do with you.

Your confusion towards propositions is apparent. I suspect it derives from too much veneration of propositions and beliefs.

A proposition is one action amongst many. You can show that there is a hand by using it to pick your nose or by saying "Here is a hand"; much of a muchness.

Almost all beliefs are beliefs that... That is, they are propositional.

What makes a hinge proposition different is that for the purposes of the game in which it is a hinge proposition, it is taken to be true. Your seem to want something more, but what, remains unclear.

In other games, the hinge may be doubted.

It's a bit wet up north. An area in Queensland, the size of France and Germany together, is presently flooded.

The second "once-in-a-century" flood in six years.

Sea surface temperatures are higher than ever, leading to a very later monsoon season and hence to the inundation. Pretty direct causal link, as these things go.

And there is more to come.

I guess they will have to stop raising cattle and move into rice production.


https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/apr/05/bigger-than-texas-the-true-size-of-australias-devastating-floods#img-1

There could be 1.2 billion climate refugees by 2050.

I wish you were right. You're not.

Heat and health

Risk of heat-related deaths has ‘increased rapidly’ over past 20 years

On average, the researchers attributed just over one-third of heat-related deaths across all countries to climate change. Note that this is not a third of all temperature-related deaths, just the ones related to warm temperatures in the warm season. This differed across countries, as the chart shows. As you can see in the chart, climate change deaths as a share of all warm season deaths was lower in more temperate climates across Europe and North America and higher – sometimes more than 50% – in Western Asia, Southeast Asia, and South America. — What share of heat deaths has already been attributed to climate change?

And so on. Plenty of data, for those who take a look.

The Coalition leader also accused Labor of running a scare campaign concerning the proposed changes.

"Why do they want to scare women when the policy doesn't affect anybody except for public servants in Canberra?" he said.

Shock revelation! Apparently there are WOMEN working in the public service in Canberra!! Who knew?? Certainly not Dutton.

I've not been able to follow that post.

Trump is more Pompey than Augustus. He's showing the right how to undermine the judiciary and legislature. I doubt Vance has the wherewithal to take the next step. Musk is too unpopular. In the wings, someone is biding their time, to move to "save" the US from the coming economic disaster.

But the one to watch, the one who might be "little boots", is "X"; entitled nose-picking critic of The Orange Emperor.


Still 1.05.

So what you are calling for is an imbalance in the world's economy, such that a smaller population in the "West" has a larger part of the production...

Decreased government spending and tax cuts will certainly offset the cost of tariffs to the American public. — NOS4A2

Can Trump replace income taxes with tariffs?:

No, and trying would be regressive and harm economic growth.

Also

In sum, Trump's tax proposals entail sharply regressive tax policy changes, shifting tax burdens away from the well-off and toward lower-income members of society while harming US workers and industries, inviting retaliation from trading partners, and worsening international relations. — Why Trump's tariff proposals would harm working Americans

These headlines are explained in the article mentioned...

At the revenue-maximizing tariff rate of 50 percent, customs revenue peaks at about $780 billion, less than 40 percent of what income taxes bring in

If tariffs are maximized, lower- and middle-income Americans would lose greater shares of after-tax income with little to no offsetting tax cut benefits

the dollar’s exchange rate would rise, hurting us exports

This all-out embrace of higher tariffs is dangerous. It is bad fiscal policy, since tariff revenues will fall far short of candidate Trump’s tax cutting ambitions, and switching the fiscal burden from the income tax toward tariffs harms most Americans, benefiting only those at the top of the income distribution. Beyond these fiscal effects, high tariffs are likely to worsen macroeconomic imbalances, harm exports, diminish economic growth, and create new economic shocks, including higher inflation.

You are being shafted. Enjoy.

Here's another analysis, of the sort perhaps not being seen in the US.

New modelling reveals full impact of Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs – with the US hit hardest

The nation that suffers the greatest reduction in GDP in both scenarios is the US.

Curiously, Australia and a few other countries - Brazil, New Zealand - receive a small benefit from the Stupidity of the Orange Emperor. So, thanks.

Overall, the world economy will decline.

But to this damage to the US GDP, add the breach in trust...

...the fanfare surrounding the announcement masks a much larger gamble. What’s really at stake is trust – America’s long-standing reputation as a stable and predictable destination for global investment. And once that trust is lost, it’s incredibly hard to win back. — Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs are the highest in decades − an economist explains how that could hurt the US

Yep. We are being told what is the case, and perhaps not asking what ought be the case.

Yes, all that.

But why shouldn't half of the world's population produce half of the stuff and get half of the profits?

So what. Why wouldn't you expect half of the world's population to produce half of the stuff and get half of the profits?

There's a certain madness lurking here. You answered my post. Therefore you read it, understood it and responded. Or can you coherently doubt that you are reading this sentence?

In order to doubt something, you have to hold other things as indubitable.

This ignores labour conditions, EH&S regulations, environmental regulations, etc. that are at the basis of the absence of a level playing field. — Benkei

Well, so what. Again, wouldn't you expect half of the world's population to produce half of the stuff and get half of the profits?

Deary me. You are certain of all sorts of things. You demonstrate that certainty in your actions.

An explanation of how the tariff rates were calculated can be found at Wondering how Trump's new tariffs were calculated? It will shock you

According to him, since the US exported only US$143.5 billion (A$229.5 billion) worth of goods to China in 2024, but it imported US$438.9 billion in goods from China, China is obviously imposing a 67 per cent tariff on US goods.

Further, for Australia, which enjoyed a goods trade surplus with the US (cars and delivery trucks, apparently), he simply set an arbitrary rate of 10%.

Yes, even thought we have a trade surplus, we get a minimum 10% tariff.

The net effect of course is that the US is simply removing itself from the global market. Twits.

OC 205 seems to indicate that the true/false idea shouldn't be used with hinges — Sam26

205. If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, not yet false.

§205 is about grounds. You understand that to mean that it is about hinges. Look at §204:

204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

Hinges must be both propositional, and an act.

Hence, they are not propositions that set out how things are in the world, but propositions that set out how we are to talk about the world. They are the rules that set up and constitute our language games. They don't represent the world; they set the terms on which representation takes place.

This is the imbalance that needs correcting. — Punshhh

Is it?



Wouldn't you expect half of the world's population to produce half of the stuff and get half of the profits?

Nuh. Aversion, like Madonna.

Or triple JJJ…


Might be too local.

Yep. That aversion to those who spend the most time on these issues, and who teach others about them... it's fucked. Like anyone can do that fe-low-so-fee stuff well, 'cause it's just makin' shite up. Might do me some now.

*1. aversion - a new recording of an old song.
*2. teach - that larnin' stuff is for kids.
*3. Shite - it somehow looks clever with the "e".

It seems that Wittgenstein agrees that there is a world but never specifies exactly where this world exists. — RussellA

He does, very specifically: The world is all that is the case. Show us where he retracts this, if you like. But it seems to be his starting point. And of course, what is the case is what is true - true sentences. So the world is what is said by true sentences.

Asking where the world exists is inappropriate. Games of "where" occur within the world.

My understanding is that in a sentence such as "here is one hand and in the hand is a mug and in the mug is an elephant", not only is every part a hinge proposition but also every part can form a T-sentence. — RussellA

Well, there's your problem.

In a T-sentence, what does "true" mean? — RussellA

Very little. "S" is true iff S holds under an extensional, compositional interpretation. A rigid and tight definition. It is not substantive, and not only a correspondence or coherence theory. As it stands it does not assume metaphysical realism, nor systematic consistency of beliefs.

The T-sentence assumes a proposition’s truth is about whether the content matches reality, but hinges aren’t evaluated like that. — Sam26

Well, no, T-sentences are not just a reinvention of correspondence. The sentence on the left might not have any correspondence at all, and yet the T-sentence would be true:

"The goat is a democracy" is true IFF the goat is a democracy

Usually a T- sentence is treated extensionally. That's probably enough for here. There are however, intensional treatments that use them. in Montague semantics this is fairly straight forward, but in constructivist treatment it would be more interesting - something like "S" is true ↔∃p(p is a proof of S), perhaps
_____________________
The trick is to avoid saying that hinge propositions are not truth apt while at the same time saying that they are true... as here:

Wittgenstein says the ground (hinges) isn’t true or false—it’s just the ground. — Sam26

then

it’s true because it’s a hinge — Sam26

See the problem? And the answer is the role take on by the hinge...

204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

It's what we do.

Notice the difference in direction, the change from word-to-world to world-to-word. The world is changes so that "hand" refers to this, so that bishops only move diagonally, and so that "P" is true only if P.

Notice also that what we say is amongst the things that we do. Saying, and hence propositional knowledge, is a sub-class of doing, and hence know-that is a sub class of (parasitic on...) know-how.

Notice also that what we do can be put into a propositional form - usually first-order. Hinges can be put into propositional form, and also have a realisation in what we do. Hence, again PI§201 - there is both a way of saying that this is a hand and a way of doing with hands.

The language game of hinges is different. — Sam26

There is no "language game of hinges". Being a hinge is a role in a language game, it's what we do in order to be able to "play".

"The Earth has existed for more than 10 minutes" — Sam26

This is a hinge becasue we assume it in order to continue on with the game - to deal with the Earth in our usual way, "the Earth" counts as something that has been around for a very long time. So the car you recall parking in the garage will be found in the garage. "Objects don't vanish randomly" might render as "to count as an object is to have relative permanency" - and the role here is to rule out some things as objects...

We treat hinges as true for practical reasons. — Sam26

Yes; and moreover, we only get to do stuff becasue we take certain things as indubitable. The alternative is solipsistic catatonia.

Hinge propositions are extra-linguistic, even they they are part of the language game. — RussellA

But all language games are embedded in the world; the counting of apples involves apples and charts, the building involves blocks and slabs. It is not peculiar to hinge propositions to be about how things are - all propositions do that.

No. Quite distinct.

Might be interesting to do a thread on Davidson's approach to meaning. I'll think about it.

The use of "true" with the lowest common denominator is that given by a T-sentence.

Being a hinge proposition is a role in a language game. Doubting is a language game or a part of a language game. Being a hinge proposition is being unavailable for doubt in the language games being played. Language games are not discrete - does that need saying?

Some hinge propositions are of the form "...counts as...", and as such their role is in setting up the language game. "The piece that only moves diagonally counts as a bishop"; "This counts as a hand"; "'P' counts as true if and only if P". These sentences set up being a bishop in Chess, being a hand in ontology, and being a true sentence in epistemology.

Are all hinges of this form? I'm not sure. You decide. Have a look at propositions you think are hinges and see if they fit, and if they do not, ask if it is because they are not analysable as "...counts as..." or becasue they are not hinges.

Notice that one can form a T-sentence for any proposition, hinge or otherwise. There is no special nature of truth peculiar to hinge propositions. Again, being a hinge proposition is something we do with a proposition when we use it to set up a language game.

This is how truth and hinge propositions work.

Be thankful for proportional voting. Here's what the alternative looks like, in a nation not too dissimilar to Down Nunder.



See the ad at 2:35 for fairvote.ca - that's that, then?

New Yougov data.

Take a look at the projected vote share. Add ALP, greens and half the independents together. 61.3% chance of a hung parliament.

For once, and pleasingly, the two-party preferred vote is at present irrelevant.

You can check out your own electorate. Bean will stay ALP.

...Helen Haines... — kazan

Just below Esperance in WA... sorta floating in the air...

I see you found her.


Keep in mind that most electorates are outer city...

Could be dangerous this time round. — kazan

On reflection I can see quite a few advantages in a hung parliament. Bring it.

Here are the recommendations.

Aspects of Australia’s supermarket sector, which is dominated by Coles and Woolworths, are not working well and this is leading to poorer outcomes for consumers and suppliers than would be expected in a more competitive market.

I'd like to see the two largest broken into four.

Albo - supermarkets already are taking the piss.

The Conversation's Policy tracker

That's a start. more like, consider a bit of code compared to a description of what happened in physical terms in the chips of your phone. These two descriptions describe the same thing. They are not metaphors. And we can look at it in terms of intentionality rather than physics and code...

If you have access to Philosophical Investigations, read form §118 through to about §130, but instead of thinking about it in terms of perception, think in terms of understanding or conceptualising. Then conceptualising something is not to arrive at a static mental image or predefined set of attributes, but a dynamic process that involves engaging with rules, practices, and contexts in a flexible way.

But this is waffle, syrup or no, and needs plenty more sorting.

You're saying the intentional is not physical. — Patterner

No. I'm suggesting that they might be about the same things, under two different descriptions.

You’re reducing Wittgenstein to a slogan. — Wayfarer

Not I. Don't look to the meaning, look to the use.

The trouble is that the topic is waffle, and specifically it is waffle because it tries to mix two different types of language games - the physical and the intentional.

Is the idea just physical? That's the point at issue. The physical reductionist says yes; the idealist - mental reductionist - says the physical is just the mental - @Wayfarer does this sometimes. I'm suggesting that they might well be the same thing under two different descriptions, two ways of speaking rather than two substances.