A nice summation. — Janus

Thanks.

So we have a group of distinct, though not unrelated items: actual, real, existing, being...

Possible worlds give us a neat way to talk about what is actual. In the space of possible worlds there is one that is of particular interest, because it is the one in which we happen to find ourselves. But of course, actual is an indexical term, like "here" or "now". It picks out the world of the speaker in a given context. For someone in another possible world, actual refers to their world.

Propositional calculus gives us a neat way to deal with "exists" using quantification. " to be is to be the value of a bound variable" and so on. "Unicorns have horns" vs. "There exists an x such that x is a unicorn and x has a horn." There are not actual Unicorns, yet unicorns have horns. The question "Do unicorns exist?" drops by the wayside.

An account of what is "real" was given earlier in this thread. It's not real, it's counterfeit; it's not real, it's an illusion; and so on. Unicorns are not real, they are mythical.

Numbers exist, since we can quantify over them. U(x)(x+0=x).

Are they actual? well, there are numbers of things in each possible world, even if that number is zero. They do not seem to be within possible worlds so much as a way of talking about the stuff in possible worlds. Like the law of noncontradiction, they are part of the framework in which possible and actual are set out.

Are they real? Some of them. Others are imaginary.

Yep. Some folk - @Wayfarer might not mind me including him here - make a leap of faith to some spiritual position or other. To my eye it's unjustified, and not needed.

We can just get on with it.

The question I have right now (which may be resolved after reading the article) is this: if we want to say there is a logically possible world in which water is not H2O, on what other basis could it be said that it would count as being water? — Janus

This is the question of reference? How is it that "water" refers to water, and nothing else?

The big change in thinking that was consequent on Possible World Semantics was the rejection of the previously ubiquitous description theories of reference. These held that a name refers to an individual in virtue of some description that serves to pick out that individual and no other. This approach was found to be indefensible in the face of modal interpretations, because whatever description was offered, it had to work even in those possible worlds in which the description failed to pick out the relevant individual.

And example might help here. Supose that all we know of Thales is that he was from Miletus and claimed that every thing was water. Then on the description theory, "Thales" refers to whomever is the philosopher from Miletus who believed all was water.

But supose that in some possible world, Thales went into coopering, making barrels of all sorts, and never gave a thought to ontology. But some other bloke, also from Miletus, happened to think that everything was made of water.

Then, by the description theory, "Thales" would not refer to Thales, but this other bloke.

There are numerous other examples. The upshot is that most philosophers who care now reject description theories.

So there is no basis for such reference, and instead there is talk of a chain from our use of "Thales" to refer to Thales, back through time to when Thales said such odd things, but not dependent on what he said or any specific facts about him. You and I refer to Thales becasue the people we learned about him referred to Thales; and they in turn referred to Thales because the people they learned from did so; and so on back to when Thales was a lad. "Because", hence this is called the "casual" theory of reference.

Now there are subtleties involving reference to kinds, such as water, compared with the individual in the example given, but the principle is much the same. We can talk about water because we learned what water is from our teachers, and they in turn from theirs. And so the reference to "water" is independent of any description, including finding out that water is H₂O.

On this account, the basis is a casual chain stretching back through time rather than any particular attribute of water.

Something like that.

...the issues of locker rooms... — Jeremy Murray

Yes! Poor locker room design is the issue. Why do we have locker rooms that force us to differentiate on the basis of our genitalia? If the issue is modesty, why not have individual cubicles?

not to lear — Banno

Same question: puzzling that other folk should have a say in which loo someone chooses to use at all.

I blame urinals. They are the reason the cue is so much shorter for the men's, but one needs the appropriate equipment to use them.

Ban urinals, I say! More space for cubicles, no need to differentiate rooms on the basis of the contents of folk's underpants.

And teach people not to leer.

I went back over the thread in order to work out why we are talking about modal logic when the topic is "What is real?".

There were posts from many folk: , , , , the usual suspects.

I found this:

Perhaps the very urge to ask “why is there something rather than nothing?” is a kind of metaphysical craving that misunderstands the role of explanation. Explanations work within the world—given that things exist, why does this or that happen?—but they break down when we try to apply them to existence as such. The impulse isn't deep; it’s a confusion of category. — Banno

and then this:

...if any role for intuition and understanding is ruled out and reason is 100% discursive, you have an infinite possibility space of possible "games" and no reason to choose one in favor of any other. The authority of reason itself rests on intuition and understanding. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Two examples amongst many, but they maybe give an indication of the tension that has kept this thread going . So I'll restate my line of thinking here. The question is "What is real?"; and the answer suggested is that "real" is a term that depends on it's contrary in order to achieve meaning - it's not real, it's counterfeit; it's not real, it's an illusion; and so on. The response is something like "No, I don't mean that, I mean what is really real, in an absolute sense". And the reply is that it is not clear that "what is really real" makes any sense at all, and if it does, then it's sense needs explaining.

We do have an "infinite possibility space of possible games", and we can choose whichever suits our purposes.

Note the "we". Not "I". It's about a conversation, not about what you do in private.

Asking "What is really real" supposes that there is One True Answer, rather than a whole bunch of different answers, dependent on circumstance and intent and other things. There doesn't seem to be a good reason to hold such a monolithic view.

Definitely simpler. — frank

Cost a lot less?

Taken up less time?

Been less of an embuggerance?

Doesn't it seem odd to you that in "our" culture, issues of manners are taken to the highest court?

Why this lavish interest in the contents of other people's underwear?

Don't you find it unsettling that this issue needed to go to your highest court to be settled?

Might have been simpler if folk just butted out of other people's business, don't you think?

I learn best by trial & error, and question & answer, and self-teaching methods. — Gnomon

yet...

but I'm not familiar with Kripke, and Modal Logic is over my head. Aristotelian Logic is more like common sense (the actual world) to me. — Gnomon

You said that you are not willing to put any effort into understanding modal logic.

So...

Like Multiverse and Many Worlds models of abstractly logical possibilities, his Modal Reality does not seem to be in danger of empirical falsification or actual contradiction — Gnomon

...misunderstands modal logic, but in order to see why, one needs first to understand modal logic. And you have said that you are unwilling to do so.


Ok. Cheers.

, I remain puzzled as to why other folk should have a say in which loo someone chooses to use at all.

The reasons given so far are peripheral.

You've made your mind up about modal logic, before you understood it. As a result you are "unavailable for learning".

Not much point in my continuing in an attempt to to teach you, then.

So I'll just leave it at "that's not how it works".

The point is that nothing is the same in different worlds. — J

...on the counterpart interpretation. If one accepts rigid designation, then there are things that are the very same in different possible worlds. Which is the advantage of Kripke over Lewis - when we ask "what if this post had been about the weather?" we are talking about this post, in the actual world and in another possible world.

Hanover clearly agreed with me, — Metaphysician Undercover

Not so much, it seems.

But also, if what I have said erroneous, as you supose, then they are not my errors, since all I have done here is present the Kripkean view that is the established interpretation of modal utterances.

So my my view, but that agreed to by the body of people who have looked into such issues.

Some of them even read books about logic, unlike you.

We don't know where, say, that the value of G (6.6743 x 10^-11 m³ kg⁻¹ s⁻²) may have been slightly different, sits in the diagram above - a logical possibility to be sure; but not logically necessary, one presumes? So Metaphysically necessary or physically necessary? I don't see how either follows.

The appropriate response is that we lack sufficient information.

The fact that it is logically possible that those ratios and standards might be different only goes to show the emptiness of pure logic. — Wayfarer

Why?

I wonder how much more rain will be needed until the Nats and their supporters realise there is a climate problem.

I can’t seem to make you believe that I think there are non-theological ways to understand and act on, faith. — Fire Ologist

I never though otherwise. I wasn't aware that this was a potential bone of contention.

...why is it that everything else you bring up about faith has to do with fathers murdering their children and fools acting without evidence or reason? — Fire Ologist

Simply becasue that is the argument I was pursuing.

So - how is faith “neither good nor bad” as you said before? — Fire Ologist

I'm not going over it again. Good to see you struggling with the conceptualisation, though. Keep going.

Right, I wouldn't say it's always religion, but it's always ideology, which includes religion. Ideologies are like religions in that they are faith, not evidence, based. — Janus

There's a lot in this. An ideology is another example of a belief that is not to be subjected to scrutiny.

Don’t you see how none of what you just said addresses what I asked? — Fire Ologist

That might be down to the what your question was phrased, since Janus/ answer seemed quite relevant.

Religious people, generally, are softies, to the core. Lots of moms and dads, loving their kids. Not many thoughts like you are all having. — Fire Ologist

Pretty fucking rude. So atheists are none of them "moms and dads, loving their kids"?

Imagining impossible worlds — Janus

Might be worth a new thread. Recently, in another thread, @Hanover drew attention to a SEP article on the topic. But as many folk - present company excepted - are having trouble with possible worlds, impossible worlds might be too much.

I have no doubt a physically impossible world could be imagined — Janus

Yep. But we are going to have to introduce more terms. There's a hierarchy of possibilities:

So physical possibilities are metaphysically and logically possible. Metaphysical possibilities include all physical possibilities and a few other possibilities, and are all logically possible. The space outside the logical possible is that of the logically impossible.

Is there a possible world in which water is not H2O? — Janus

There's a logically possible world in which water ≠ H₂O. But there is not a metaphysically or physically possible world in which water ≠ H₂O. That water=H₂O is a metaphysical fact, not a logical fact. It should be apparent that once we agree that water=H₂O, we rule out the possibility that water ≠ H₂O.

In order to consider worlds in which water is not H₂O, you have to reject ☐(water=H₂O), or reject the rigidity of those terms. That is, you are working outside the circle of metaphysically possible words.

Formally, this sort of thing is dealt with by access relations. So you from logically possible worlds we can get to metaphysically possible worlds, and from there to physically possible worlds, But not so in the other direction.

When you imagine a world with round squares, you are imaging something outside the circle of hat is logically possible. Sure, you can't bring to mind an image of such a thing, but we might be able to world out some of the consequences that would follow from there bing a round square, if we had at hand a suitable counterpossible logic; if there is such a thing.

The Stanford article from which I stole the image has more on this sort of thing. It takes tome to grasp these ideas, however the result is a consistent picture of nested possibilities and impossibilities.

Keeping us on the main page highlighted the calibre of the brilliant folk on this thread, no doubt leading many casual visitors to become members.

But it is comfortable in the Lounge, if a bit out of the spotlight.

The conditions and policy directions accepted in these negotiations may tell us more about which scenario will out.

We've been moved to the Lounge. Less people, more comfortable chairs?

Apparently the Libs and Nats are back together again already.

Until next week?

That is a misrepresentation of what I have said. I have pointed out that religious ideas can lead to evil acts. I've argued that theology deriving from Scripture has no place in a philosophy forum. I have questioned the moral standing of those who believe in eternal damnation. But I have not argued that all religious folk are morally decrepit.

It has such poor resolve I find — Hanover

Yes. And this interpretation stands. Indeed, the two interpretations are not obviously mutually exclusive.

You might also find intolerance of atheism hereabouts, if you look. It won't be hard to find.

Yep. He's been misrepresenting you throughout this discussion and elsewhere, as is his habit.

See what I mean? — frank

Not so much.

I've avoided mentioning Islam in this context becasue of the knee-jerk prejudicial reaction... and your account is exactly what I'd expect; that Muslims are moral and understand such nuance.

Indeed, I think I'll drop the topic.

Take it to PM if you wish to follow up.

My understanding, and I may well be wrong, is that it is a prime influence on Islam; Absolute Submission.

Maybe you are incapable? — Fire Ologist

That would be easier on you, I presume. But supose that I have understood all you had to say, and yet still reject theism. What's the appropriate response?

Seems that some of the faithful will "other" me, call me an atheist and attribute all sorts of odd beliefs and acts to me. You can see this in this very thread. It's implicit in "Maybe you are incapable?".

One alternative might be to reconsider your own beliefs, in the light of my startling response. I'm not expecting that.

Then there is what might be called a liberal view, where we will disagree, and move on.

Already on Solar.

Can you show me where I did that? — Fire Ologist

I'm not that interested.

Why?

Even so, it remains that the story is understood by many as advising one to maintain one's faith even if one believes that god is asking for an abominable act.

And here we go again...

You seem to have covered that adequately. So far as I can see, this thread is finished. And was, long ago.

Not at all. — Fire Ologist

But

First, because people end up offending others without realizing it and holding on to a sort of subtle bigotry. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I had understood that being offended was a symptom of being woke.

Well put.

Is the argument being presented here now that in a philosophy forum, when asked specifically about faith, we should not entertain or discuss the negative aspects of faith for fear of offending the faithful?

Keep in mind that they do not have to be here.

Just to be sure, the Binding of Issac is understood as an exhortation to faith, especially in adversity.

A quick search on ChatGPT:

The Binding of Isaac (Genesis 22), or the Akedah, has often been interpreted as a test of faith, with emphasis on maintaining belief and trust in God despite extreme adversity or incomprehensible demands. Below are several examples across traditions and thinkers where the story is understood as a call to maintain faith despite adversity:

1. Classical Jewish Interpretation – Rashi and Medieval Commentators
Rashi, the medieval Jewish commentator, frames the Akedah as a test not only of Abraham’s obedience but of his steadfast faith in God's justice and promises (e.g., the promise of descendants through Isaac).
The adversity here is internal conflict: Abraham must reconcile God's command to kill Isaac with the divine promise that Isaac will carry on his line. Despite this apparent contradiction, Abraham continues in faith.
This sets a precedent in Jewish tradition that faith includes trust in God's plan even when it seems paradoxical or painful.

2. The Epistle to the Hebrews (New Testament)
Hebrews 11:17-19 in the New Testament explicitly praises Abraham’s faith:
"By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac… He considered that God was able even to raise him from the dead..."
The focus is on Abraham's unwavering belief in God's goodness and power, even when commanded to sacrifice his son.
In Christian thought, this is a call for believers to maintain faith in God's promises even when circumstances are dire or absurd.

3. Søren Kierkegaard – Fear and Trembling
Kierkegaard's Abraham is the “knight of faith”, a figure who obeys the absurd with full trust in God.
The “adversity” is radical: Abraham must sacrifice what he loves most, yet believes by virtue of the absurd that he will still receive Isaac back.
For Kierkegaard, the Akedah dramatizes the leap of faith, where reason fails and faith endures without justification.

4. Maimonides – Guide for the Perplexed
Maimonides sees the Akedah as the highest form of prophetic obedience, representing the ultimate test of trust in divine wisdom.
The adversity is ethical and emotional—being asked to violate moral norms.
Abraham is praised for not letting moral confusion or emotional pain shake his trust in God's will.

5. Modern Jewish Thought – Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik
In his existential reading, Soloveitchik sees Abraham’s test as a crisis of religious identity, where one must affirm faith not in comfort, but in the face of horror or paradox.
He uses it to frame the experience of Jews through suffering (e.g., the Holocaust), where the Akedah is seen as a metaphor for holding faith in the shadow of death.

6. Liturgical Use – Rosh Hashanah Readings
The Akedah is read on Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year, when God's judgment is central.
It's understood liturgically as an invocation of Abraham’s example: just as Abraham stayed faithful under trial, so too should Israel—and they ask to be judged mercifully in that light. — ChatGPT

It's not as if this were an uncommon interpretation. Indeed, I had not heard the "Admonition against human sacrifice" interpretation until you presented it in these fora.

Leon calling this a "hostile" interpretation is plainly absurd - it is an interpretation used by theists.

Seems we have broad agreement.

if you could show me where I am wrong — Metaphysician Undercover

I, and others, have. You can't see it. Indeed, you have quite explicitly refused to see it.

Not our problem.

The qualification "might have been" seems to imply that the imaginary "things" did not come to be (to exist), hence not ontologically real — Gnomon

Not always. They might come to pass. They do this when the possible world is the actual world.

I like dumb jokes. Sometimes.

If water was not H2O in Aristotle's day — Count Timothy von Icarus

Water presumably was H₂o in Aristotle's day.

But I'm pretty sure Aristotle never called it "water".

And if water were not H₂O in ancient Greece, then water would not be the very same thing as H₂O. So Water would not be H₂O in every possible world - Ancient Greece being an example of a possible world in which this is not so. So then, being H₂O would not be a necessary characteristic of water.

Note the couching of these in hypothetical sentences... "If... then...". That's the bit where we are looking at the logic of the situation, leaving aside the science, which philosophers do so poorly.

BOOORRRRRINNNNNNNG! :D — Moliere

Well, you can ask folk to burn there books, which would make your life more interesting.

Yep.

That's all very curious, , but where does it get us?

I guess I’ll have to respond to each item.

• Yep, all cats are cats. Whether a cat can be a dog would be an issue for the taxonomists, I suppose. I think they would say "no".
• "What sorts of things have essences" will depend on how you use "essence". Individuals, picked out by a rigid designator, may have properties in every possible world that we could call their essence; same for natural kinds; It's a topic of some discussion.
• And we might agree that being hot is a necessary property of hot things, while also agreeing that individuals can be hot at one time and cold at another. Not sure this gets us very far.
• If a black cat ceases to be a black cat when painted, then being black is just not a necessary property of black cats. But again, this seems to be a result of how we choose to use the words "black cat".
• I doubt if there is something common to all chairs or to all tables in every possible world, so I doubt there is an "essence of table" if that is what is had by every table in every possible world. That’s kinda what family resemblance addresses.
• The terms "accidental" property might be fraught with ambiguity in PWS, so that we might not be able to agree on a suitable use; you are welcome to try.
• If someone denies that water is essentially H2O, arguing instead that water is only essentially clear, potable, and wet, then that's their prerogative, and all we might do is point out that others disagree or use the terms in different ways. There need be no correct use, in any absolute sense. If that's not much of a theory, so be it.

Now what?

IS there some conclusion that you would like to draw from all this?

Edit: No response, so I've edited the block of text to hopefully make it more readable.