Is "burj" supposed as an example of a qual?

I'd understood that a qual was this sensation, here, now, present to me... that sort of thing. That the qual I have on looking at the red folder is not the same as the one I had looking at the folder yesterday - the light, the position of my head, being slightly different...

And so since "burj" occurs on multiple occasions, it is not a qual... perhaps it is a sensation, or a memory, or a pretence, but not a qual.

But that's the problem, isn't it? It remains so unclear what a qual is.

I doubt I can improve on 's reply, but since seemed to have trouble with transitivity, I'll throw in a bit more.

A relation is transitive if, for that relation, if A relates to B, and B relates to C, then A relates to C.

Identity is taken as being transitive.

If A=B, and B=C, then A=C.

Identity is also taken as reflexive, A=A, and as symmetrical, if A=B then B=A.

Indeed, taken together, this is a classic definition of identity. This holds in classical and most intuitionistic logics. One exception is Geach's demand that identity always be related to a sortal, which was pretty explicitly an ad hoc defence of his Catholicism. It is very rarely used outside of theology.

My previous comments kept the modal context in order to show that modal collapse ensues from denying transitivity to identity. But this is simply a result of those modal systems having accepted predicate logic, and so transitivity.

To that we might now add that Geach's logic risks in modal collapse. It seems to require that all possibilities are necessities in order to avoid contradiction.

And again, the overarching observation that the task folk here set for themselves is not to see where the logic goes, but to invent a logic that supports the Christian narrative. Even if that means dropping basic principles of classical logic, elsewhere held sacrosanct.

Shall we say that thinking you can derive the trinity from first principles is... ambitious? And this supports the contention from the OP, that there is much tht is problematic in the Christian Narrative.

Nice.

Yes, that's a much clearer approach than a reliance on the merely physical.

I don't see how my argument is pseudo-logic because it uses analogical reasoning. — Bob Ross

I didn't say your argument was pseudo-logic. I said Peirce's was a pseudo-logic. But analogically reasoning cannot be put into deductive form without ceasing to be analogical.

With respect to S5, possibility collapses into necessity because they are using the possible world theory. — Bob Ross

This is not so. I explained why. Any system in which ◇□p →□ will no longer be able to differentiate between possibility and necessity. Collapse occurs at the syntactic level, not at the semantic level of possible worlds.

If something is possible IFF it exists in at least one possible world and necessity is to exist in all possible worlds, then it logically follows that a possibly necessary being must exist. — Bob Ross

Only if you presume S5. Which is of course to beg the question. And there's no need for the possible world interpretation, since you conclusion is presumed.

So what. Even if you are correct, it would not help. Augustine's Trinity involves a metaphysically mysterious unity-in-distinction that explicitly defies normal logical categories. Peirce's semiotics involves functionally distinct elements in a process. These are categorically different kinds of "three-ness." nails the core issue.

Bob Ross is still trying to deduce the Trinity through invalid modal reasoning that leads to modal collapse. Tim's historical scholarship might be interesting for intellectual history, but it's irrelevant to the logical critique provided.

Donald Davidson who has been mentioned and about whom Banno knows a lot, is an example of non-reductive physicalism. — Wayfarer

It'd require it's own thread. For Davidson, while mental events are identical to physical events, there are no strict laws governing mental events in the way there perhaps are for physical events. It's to do with their being different descriptions of the very same thing. There's a lot of background.

The point concerning analogically reasoning is that it is invalid - one is not obligated to accept the conclusion of an analogical argument, in the way presumed in a deductive argument.

S1 through S5 are syntactic systems, not interpretations. S5 is the semantics that allows nesting of modal operators. The modal collapse that ensues from Anselm is a result of the syntax, not the interpretation. It's got nothing to do with possible worlds.

Basically, the Anselm's proof wants to move from god's being possible to god being necessary. But any system in which ◇□p →□p is true collapses possibility into necessity - everything would be necessary.

I was expecting the transitivity version of this — Bob Ross

That is transitivity. Just drop the modal operator if that helps you.

The overarching point remains - you have your conclusion and are looking for a logic that supports it. To that end you might indeed be better served by the pseudo-logic of Peirce's semiotics. However Peirce's semiotics (sign-object-interpretant) was developed in a completely different intellectual context from Trinitarian theology. Retrofitting it to "explain" the Trinity is exactly the kind of post-hoc rationalisation I've been criticising. Peirce's triadic structure is about how signs function in communication and cognition, not about the metaphysical structure of divine being - finding three-ness in both doesn't establish any meaningful connection. Even if you accept the semiotic framework, there's no logical bridge from "signs work triadically" to "God exists as three persons in one substance." It's the same invalid leap I been pointing out in your modal arguments. This kind of move - taking a fashionable 19th/20th century theoretical framework and using it to rehabilitate ancient doctrines - has become common in certain theological circles, but it's more about appearing sophisticated than actual logical rigour.

But of course, that's what I would say. So go and do as you will.

I very much appreciated your rendering this in terms of aesthetics.

But I've found it's all up to what you value... — George Harrison

I'm reluctant to say much more. @Hanover and I have had this chat before, but it repeats, like not-quite-right fish. I don't think Hanover has quite got the point of the private language argument down, mis-presenting it somewhat. But it seems we talk past each other, since here it is again.

Dennett, you will note in all of these "intuition pumps," makes the attempt to remove qualia from meaningful talk by reducing qualia to contextual affairs of meaning making, in which a quale is precisely not accessible, by definition. — Astrophel

I don't think that quite fair. Have another look at the first few paragraphs of Quining Qualia. Dennett is trying to deal withe the notion as it is presented by those that use it, but running in to the difficulty that they themselves do not agree as to what qualia are. Dennett is pointing out the consequences of their own usage.

them as well. And their dinner.

that art is meaningful all the way down. — Jamal

Not just art.

Very much enjoying the forum at the moment, there are many very interesting discussions, and I'm learning a lot. — Wayfarer

Curious. I'm in a discussion about the present nadir of quality threads. In desperation I even contributed to the Shoutbox.

The urge to devour and assimilate what is not oneself. — Jamal

Jack adopted this form of life. To be fair, when a kitten he was hit by a car or bike and lost for a few weeks, only to be found emaciated and wounded. He was eating the maggots on his legs.

After that he ate everything.

Returning to his goatish essence.

That a simple puzzle such as this can go for twelve pages explains so much about the forums.

I didn’t really follow this: can you elaborate with an example? — Bob Ross

I see two key logical issues here. The first is the use of an existential predicate in first order logic. The second is modal collapse.

Existence is usually dealt with in first order logic by treating it as a quantifier - the familiar "∃" in "∃(x)...". You'll have heard the standard existential arguments for the existence of God at the response that existence is not a predicate? This is the sort of thing that results from the use of a first order logic; that's kind of why most of it comes from Bertrand Russell.

Folk try to get around this by making use of an explicit first order predication, usually written as "∃!". The results are mostly dealt with in what has been called free logic. However, one of the conclusions found in free logic is that one cannot conclude from an argument that something exists. However, one of the conclusions found in free logic is that one cannot conclude from an argument that something exists. Existence seems to have to be presupposed by the argument.

Put simply, if your argument concludes “and therefore this thing exists,” but the existence of the referent is not already presupposed, then your inference is invalid.

This presents problems for things popping into existence at God's will.

This is a genuine issue. See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-free/#inexp

For example, consider

• God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
• Therefore, He must exist.
• Therefore, He must exist necessarily.
• Therefore, He must be pure act, or simple.

At each step, a move is made that runs contrary to the inexpressibility of existence conditions. It's invalid.



The second issue is not unrelate. Modal collapse will occur when necessity and possibility are rendered the same, when what could be is the same as what must be. The problem of intransitivity, related previously, that the Father is god, and the Son is god, but the Father is not the Son, results in the distinction between necessity and contingency collapsing.

☐(Father = god)
☐(Son = god)
And so
☐(Father = Son)

But the assertion is, instead,
~☐(Father = Son)

And we have a contradiction.

Also, this last is identical to ◇~(Father = Son) with which you would doubtless disagree.

Some theologians resort to non-classical logics in an attempt to avoid these issues. Doing so looks rather ad hoc.

Now we are getting somewhere! — Bob Ross

I don't think so. The analogical reasoning you employ - arguing that because two things are similar in some respects, they're likely similar in others - is not up to the task of providing a proof. The best you might achieve is an understanding of what you already take as true, along the lines that Tim is suggesting.

I don't see that what you have added avoids the critique already made. It repeats the same errors.

I remain sceptical. But this is impressive.

Excellent stuff.

This sets up a novel enquiry into an odd phenomenon, which even a sceptic such as I might find interesting.

There's a long way to go, but you present an interesting starting point.

... and that maybe makes a dozen or so different definitions given here...

"Parts of consciousness"...?

Folk here are almost desperate for qualia to make sense.

Credulous.

"We made up the name 'qualia', therefore there must be qual..."

The point about first-person experience is that it is not a thing. — Wayfarer

And yet this is the danger of talk of qualia.

being' is a verb — Wayfarer

Well, yes, a gerund, that's the point... a veritable reification.

Being conscious is something we do, rather than a property; similarly, seeing red is something we do.

If you think of being conscious as an activity, it becomes problematic to ask what it's intrinsic properties are. What are the intrinsic qualitative properties of walking or breathing? Breathing and walking are activities or processes, not entities that have properties in the usual sense. So to ask what their “intrinsic qualitative properties” are risks a category error — as if you were treating walking like a chair, or breathing like a pebble. Properties are generally ascribed to things, and more specifically to substances or states, not to doings.

The responses here are credulous rather than critical.

Nothing here says that we do not have experiences.

From the Latin qualis, roughly "what kind?" It apparently goes back to Aristotle, in a different use:

When Aristotle was translated into Latin by the medievals, the values or nodes in the pyramidical structure that are the ingredients of an essence were called ‘qualia’ — Chris Barnham

The very entomology asks what kind of thing an experience is, and so presumes the finite qualitative nature which we might categorise or identify, and which I am questioning.

As always folk claim Pierce as a precedent, but Lewis appears to be the main precursor, although he used it for properties of sense-data themselves, not properties of experiences. It's just an extension of the very old sense-datum muddle, or an attempt to introduce phenomenological analysis into analytic discourse.

The term imports metaphysical commitments about the structure of experience that should be questioned, not assumed.

Some stuff from the thread Nothing to do with Dennett's , and referring to Quining Qualia

Intuition pump #1: watching you eat cauliflower.
There is a way this cauliflower tastes to you right now. Well, no. the taste changes even as you eat it, even as the texture changes as you chew.

Intuition pump #2: the wine-tasting machine.
As a tool for convincing those who disagree, this strikes me as singularly useless. Dennett will say there is nothing missing from the machine description; advocates of qualia will say that there is...

Except that they cannot say what it is that is missing; qualia are after all ineffable. But this never stops their advocates from talking about them...

Intuition pump #3: the inverted spectrum.
Undergrad speculation.

Intuition pump #4: the Brainstorm machine. Qualia gain no traction here, either.

Intuition pump #5: the neurosurgical prank. Back to Wittgenstein: how could you tell that your qualia had been inverted, so that what was once blue is now red, as opposed to say, your memory had changed, so what you always saw as red you now recall, erroneously, previously seeing as blue? Intuition pump #6: alternative neurosurgery

Intuition pump #7: Chase and Sanborn. They have the same decreased liking for the coffee they taste; but is it the coffee that is faulty, or is it the capacity to taste that has changes? The difference between this example and 4-6 is the removal of memory as a participant.

Whence the boundary of the white triangle? In the perception or in the judgement?

Hence, intuition pump #8: the gradual post-operative recovery; is the recovery in the quality of the qualia or in the judgement that ensues? And if you cannot tell, then what is the point of introducing qualia?

Intuition pump #9: the experienced beer drinker. This is similar to 7 & 8 in playing on the supposed difference between the qualia and the judgement of that qualia. What is added is a seeming rejection of a spit between the taste of the beer and the appreciation of the beer...

Intuition pump #10: the world-wide eugenics experiment. How to make sense of the qualia of secondary properties... Someone who says phenol-thio-urea is tasteless is not wrong.

Intuition pump #11: the cauliflower cure. The cauliflower tastes exactly the same, but is now delicious...

Intuition pump #12: visual field inversion created by wearing inverting spectacles. The point here seems to be that even if there were qualia, they need not count as intrinsic to consciousness. Needs more consideration.

Intuition pump #13: the osprey cry. There's danger here of following Kripke rather than Wittgenstein. However the point must stand, that recognising the rule one is following consists at least in part in being able to carry on with the rule; but nothing in a single instance allows for this. Hence, if a qual (singular of qualia) cannot by its very nature recur, there can be no grounds for claiming that some rule has been followed; if that be so, there can be no basis for differentiating a qual; hence, no qual and no qualia.

intuition pump #14: the Jello box. This seems to be about the information content of the notion of qualia; if I've understood it aright, one side of the Jello box are the ineffable qualia, the side other, corresponding exactly, the effable, public content of our everyday discourse. But if the content are identical, what is pointed at by the notion of the qualia of say the taste of coffee that is not also pointed at by the usual conversation about the taste of coffee? What additional information is to be found in qualia?

And intuition pump #15: the guitar string. Arguably we have here three qualia; the first open E, the harmonic, and the second open E. Is the point here that as the ineffable becomes the subject of discussion, the qualia is less ineffable...?

Here's my question for those who would have us talk of qualia: what is added to the conversation by their introduction? If a qual is the taste of milk here, now, why not just talk of the taste of milk here, now?

The pretence that Qualia are a given is misguided.

This definition is used in academic philosophy, especially in A-level and university-level discussions of consciousness and the mind — Ulthien

Sure - it's questioned therein. See for example the Stanford article, were four differing uses are listed, each with variations and qualifications. It is not universally accepted that the term makes sense. Yours is an appeal to authority.

The point is they are qualities of experience and therefore precisely what eludes objective description. — Wayfarer

You drop this sentence as if it was clear what a "quality of experience" is - and indeed, if it is to serve as a way of understanding consciousness, as if it were clearer than "consciousness".

Here's a definition stolen from Google: consciousness refers to a person's awareness of themselves and their environment, encompassing wakefulness, alertness, and the ability to respond to stimuli.

How is "qualities of experience" clearer than that?

What, in the best of your ability, are whoever you're referencing "confused" about. — Outlander

Qualia.

Do they like coffee, as their behaviour indicate, or do the really dislike coffee, despite their behaviour?

It's a clear comparative, not dependent ton some absolute notion of real...

Puzzled.

I understand you are asking something, but it is not at all clear to me, what.

But what else should we substitute? — J

The issue is more, what is it that is being named by "qualia"?

The idea was that philosophers define consciousness in terms of qualia. The problem is that qualia are no more clearly defined than is consciousness, and so are not all that helpful.

See the present thread for samples of the confusion they incur.

The experienced sensation of it. — Wayfarer

The red in the red light. Yep. We already have a language for that.

And yep, subjective is not objective. But floops are none of them flops, and that does not tell us what floops and flops are. So saying consciousness consists entirely of floops gets us nowhere.

The supposition is that there is a "quality of experience" that we talk about, and that at the same time there is "no ‘third party’, publicly available instance" of that "quality of experience" about which to talk.

How's that?

It admits to an internal referent (Hanover hates coffee), — Hanover

It admits an internal referent? "Hanover's hate of coffee"? No, it doesn't. Very much no.

My liking coffee is in fact mental furniture because it's either there or its not in whatever way things are stored in my brain. — Hanover

The bit where we should keep the physical substrate seperate from the intention. Here, what is the "it"? Some state of your neurones or your intent drink a coffee? It seems a bit early to say they are the very same. None of which says that you do not like coffee, nor that "Hanover likes coffee" does not have a truth value. Language set ontology up; they are inseparable.

Last night I saw upon the stair,
a little qual that wasn't there...

the third prong of Davidson's triangulation roots meaning in truth — Hanover

We should get this sorted. The three prongs are the speaker, the world and the interpreter. If the interpreter has a sentence S that is true If and only if the speaker believes that P, the S gives the meaning of P. The interpreters place is in systematically working out what S is, using the principle of charity and some rigorous maths. So what you said here is not quite right.

Suitably caricatured, Wittgenstein might say that your liking coffee just is your buying it every day and talking about it in glowing terms. Davidson, that "Hanover likes coffee" is true if and only if Hanover likes coffee, hence "Hanover likes coffee" just means that you like coffee.

Neither much make use of your intent. Neither relies on obtuse metaphysics or ontology.

You say you're he's not sure Davidson commits (as Wittgenstein does) to the belief that the actual emotive state of liking coffee (or feeling pain) is not real and is not a referent. But Wittgenstein does no such thing. He says it's not a mental object, not that it is not real. Indeed, he held such things to be of the utmost import.

There's a big difference in our understandings of both Wittgenstein and Davidson that we should address if we are to proceed.

Interesting.

If "qualia" is a collective noun for "red", "loud" and so on, then I've no great problem with it. That seems ot be how it is used in the research named in the OP.

If it is a name for an otherwise private sensation, then I can't see how to make sense of of it.

That is how it is used by some philosophers.


In so far as the title goes, if the claim is that we have managed to measure red and loud, so what. If the claim is that we have managed to measure the ineffable, there are issues to be considered.

Hu?

Sorry, I can't make out what you and are doing.

I've been setting out out for years. Not doing it all again. Read my posts if you are that interested.

You really should find out about Chalmers.

That's how some (Chalmers?) set out the issue.

Are they correct?

I don't know.

Good post.

I baulk earlier in the paper, at

In my colleague Thomas Nagel’s phrase, a being is conscious (or has subjective experience) if
there’s something it’s like to be that being. Nagel wrote a famous article whose title asked “What
is it like to be a bat?”1 It’s hard to know exactly what a bat’s subjective experience is like when
it’s using sonar to get around, but most of us believe there is something it’s like to be a bat. It is
conscious. It has subjective experience.

I'm not sire this framing works.

It might just be that I am hung up on the thing in something. But is there something it is like to be a bat?

Compare: What is it like to be in love? Well, it's not any one thing. In a very real sense there is not a thing it is like to be in love.

I hope it's clear how this relates directly to my hesitancy concerning qualia.

I can't make much at all of that. Sorry.