:cool:

See above. Extensionality is not a theory of reference.

@Count Timothy von Icarus
Extensionality was introduced in this discussion because the theory that a name refers to whatever it's speaker intends it to refer to is not extensional.

Extensionality is not a theory of reference.

That you suggest this might be understood to indicate a lack of familiarity with the argument. No.

Have another look at https://medium.com/@ranjanrgia/thought-experiment-1-gavagai-70ae1bfc792a

So "insect" unproblematically refers to the set of all insects? But then "gavagai" can just refer to the set of all rabbits. And "the rake in this room" just defines a set with one element. Hardly inscrutable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, "gavagai" refers to the set of all gavagai. Quine was asking whether that set is the very same as the set of rabbits. That's the bit that is inscrutable.

On to the next bit of §5.

There's a bit of waffle about Catholics being able to talk about pagan gods.

Then Klima concedes the point made earlier concerning his argument, citing Aquinas as his authority: "...no inconsistency is involved in being able, for any given thing either in the intellect or in reality, to think something greater..."

See this post.

So, if anything we might quantify over is possibly necessary then everything is necessary? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why include "qualify over" here? The axiom is 5:◊A→◻◊A, where A might or might not be a quantification.

If you want us to consider "Floridi", then link to the paper, or set out the argument. The bald assertion appears unconnected to S5.

Modal logical systems model how we might talk coherently about modal topics. That's how they are useful in our metaphysical considerations. They show us were we might be going wrong.

Again, this seems to me, quite honestly, to be all over the place. So this:

I haven't. I pointed to what makes organisms and life distinct. If you have an objection to the idea that life is goal directed and that life forms can be more or less self-organizing, or self-determing, feel free to make it. Some people do deny these things, they claim they are entirely illusory. If you have an objection to the idea that lifeforms come in different types, feel free to make it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why are we now talking about life? Is your position now that essence is something only living things have?

Or this:

You seem to be hung up on: "if the word 'essence' or 'nature' is employed anywhere it must mean something like rigid metaphysical superglue." — Count Timothy von Icarus

The piece you quote is your phrasing, not mine. I think a proper name is best treated as a rigid designator, since doing so allows us to deal coherently with modal contexts, int he way Kripke and others have shown.That is, a proper name can be used to refer to the same individual even if the attributes of that individual change. Your phrase "metaphysical superglue" is both pedjorative and misguided.

Or this:

Yes, you did point out these problems vis-á-vis your misunderstanding of essences. Now you are ignoring them when you try to explain extension. You seem to think referring to extension this way is unproblematic, but that it would be problematic for whatever you suppose and "essence" must be." Why? If we can grab distinct sets with discrete members with our words, what's the problem with what you seem to think "essence" refers to in the first place? — Count Timothy von Icarus

That paragraph rambles. I've repeatedly asked for you to set out what it is your think an essence amounts to. Your answer is something like "what makes a thing what it is", which is pretty useless. If I am to understand what an essence is for you, then you will need to explain how this is supposed to be of any use. Extension is a pretty simple idea - two sets that contain the same items are the
same sets. If you see it as problematic, set out how it is problematic. If you want it to be compatible with essences, set out what an essence is so that we can see how it is compatible.

Or this:

Anyhow, you're still leaving out the ant missing a leg and letting in non-insects. The ant with a birth defect is out, the rare human born with extra limbs is in. Etc. This method of defining extension won't do, not least because word's referents change with context. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I quite specifically dealt with this here.

It would be nice if we could step back from this mere acrimony, and try to get a handle on what the difference is between our positions. So, yes, there is a problem with communication here. So let's try to set out what it is you are claiming.

Am I right in understanding that you think essences are necessary to fix the referent of a proper name?

Can you explain why or how?

And what does any of this have to do with whether things are self-organising or not?

The Age, Melbourne's and Nine Entertainment's main paper, has as it's headline

Trump just dressed up ethnic cleansing as a real estate opportunity, and blew up ‘America First’

Continuing with

The leader of the free world advocates ethnic cleansing and dresses it up as a golden real estate opportunity. Here’s the dire, if hardly surprising, place we find ourselves just three weeks into the second Trump administration. — The Age

It doesn't look like Trump's gambit will carry much support here. What might be interesting is how Dutton, who has been pushing for more support for Israel, will step on this. maybe the Trump election will not play into Dutton's plans.

For one, that definition would exclude caterpillars, larva, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't that a bit petty? Ok, adult insects have six legs. I've already pointed to this short coming, and how it doesn't seem to help those who think in terms of essence.

You still haven't made clear what an essence is. Are you now saying that they are "discreet wholes"?

How can an essence be called upon to explain change unless we are clear about what an essence is? Is it what stays the same when all the other properties of something change? Then in modal terms it is the name of the thing that changes... If you refuse to set out what you think an essence is, then there is nothing here to which others might respond.

I find it very difficult to make anything much of what you are trying to argue.

Sorry. If I'm to be candid, the post looks to be hand-waving.

This is to make language into first philosophy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, no it isn't, but if it were, then that might be a good thing.

Each of the three points you list is fraught with complexity. As such, they will not be of much help in showing any problems with the contention at hand. And each takes us further from Quine. Remember Quine? This is a thread about Quine. But also, you have neglected to explain how these three count against the suggestion.

Something has to exist in order to be a cause. Even if this is accepted, how does it count against meaning as use? Names are pretty arbitrary. So what? Why does every language refer to different species? Becasue it is useful to us to do so. Again, so what.

Some first Australia tribes had names for a half dozen seasons. Are you saying that they were wrong? What are you saying?

All this by way of pointing out that it is very unclear how the first part of your post even addresses the ideas of the last few pages.

https://chatgpt.com/share/67a2daa7-2c28-800f-a827-6ca73e18cb24

Interesting approach.

Davidson: Oh. But you have to assume that reference is fixable in order to communicate at all. — frank

I'd suggest rather that Davidson would say reference has a function only within broader theories of truth (or meaning), and there can be no coherent theory of reference per se. Reference is not free-standing.

It's just another realestate opportunity...

If anything is necessary, then everything is necessary? — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's a misrepresentation of the argument. In S5, if there is a necessary being than every being is necessary.

You can find the argument online, or ask your friendly AI to run up a version.

The thread became entangled in animal intelligence, a garden path, to my eye.

Where are you now? Any thoughts?

So the new plan is to turn the Gaza Strip into a 'Mercan playground for the rich?

Shit's gonna fly.

I actually agree with you on that. — Janus

:up:

I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on. — Janus

I agree with that. The point is that the questioner succeeds in picking out Socrates uniquely, and this despite not having a definite description available. They don't know who Socrates is, and yet demonstrably they can talk about Socrates. They can say "I don't know who Socrates is" and that can be a true sentence about their knowledge of Socrates.

Contingent temporal beings that come into and go out of existence depend on Nature or God (Deus siva Natura) for their existence, Nature or God is eternal, does not come into or go out of existence and depends on nothing. — Janus

I don't see what to make of this except as saying that there is stuff. So, yes. And folk want to say more, but as soon as they do, there are all sorts of problems. So I'll leave it at that.

It's not a matter of not understanding the meaning of some reference to Socrates when one has no idea who the name 'Socrates' refers to, but of not knowing who or what is being referred to — Janus

But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no?

I have trouble seeing a connection between dependency and modality.

logically the question is about Socrates — Janus

Yes, it is. SO the question is clear, and the referent fixed - the question is about Socrates. It would be odd to answer "But since you don't know who Socrates is, I don't understand your question".

And again, it is clear that reference is a communal activity. Hence, a private "speaker's meaning" is problematic.

Is there any logical reason why there could not be just one necessary being? — Janus

Well, in S5 that would lead to everything being necessary. Much as Spinoza concluded. But that's not a theistic god. It seems pantheism is more logical than theism... :wink:

But does the widespread agreement not come about due to many descriptions that form part of the causal chain? This would seem to be inevitable if there were more than one Socrates and question like 'Which Socrates are you referring to?" or 'I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?'. — Janus

You'll be familiar with the examples. Who is the question "I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?" about? I suggest it is about Socrates, despite the speaker perhaps not having anything available with which to fix the referent. It's not that there are no definite descriptions, but that they are not needed in order for reference to work perfectly well.

Dragging this back to the OP...

There need not be some property understood to apply to and only to Gavagai in order for the word to be understood and used effectively. More broadly, there need not be some fixed, agreed and understood referent in order for the word to be used in the community being examined, and the anthropologist need not have such a fixed referent at hand in order to set out the use of "gavagai" in that community.

Goose.

You are hung up on that word "description," — Leontiskos

That was Kripke. He kinda used the word a whole lot.

Meanwhile, the elephant sits patiently, waiting....

Banno keeps asserting things without argument. — Leontiskos

You made that claim, then immediately quoted and addressed my argument.

:smile:

, you two need to talk... :wink:

Presuming we may now talk about §5,

Parasitic reference to each other’s thought objects between people not sharing each other’s beliefs seems to be a ubiquitous phenomenon.

Returning to 'parasitic' reference, which is apparently where the fool refers to the thought object in the mind of the saint. (I've asked Leon several times if he agrees, but so far as I am aware he hasn't responded.) It was a while ago that I pointed out that there is no way to check the thought-object in the mind of the saint, to see what it is about; there is no way to verify that the thing in the mind of the saint is the thing being referred to by the fool. How do we know that when two people use the same words, they are referring to the same thought object?

Indeed, the very idea of a thought object is opaque. Presumably the aforementioned thought-object Porsche is parasitic on the "real" Porsche... Or will we say that the thought-object Porsche existed prior to the "real" Porsche, in the collective minds of the various designers at Volkswagen? It is after all just a rich man's beetle.

The notion of god is inconsistent.

Anything follows from an inconsistency.

Therefore Jesus is God.

Good question. I've no idea. I can see arguments for, as well as against. — Arcane Sandwich

And we might well chose to go either way. There is no fact of the matter, only how useful it is for us to talk one way or the other. I'd be inclined to suggest that a ten-legged fruit fly would still be a fruit fly, and so choose to count it as an insect. That'd be to remove having six legs as a necessary attribute of insects. Some other fact might replace it, perhaps a genetic marker or a different morphological characteristic. But whatever is chosen, at some stage that too might come into question.

What's salient is that over time we might well change what we regard as the essence of insect, but that each time we do this we are changing something about the use of the word, not about the beasts. That is, essence is about word use, rather than ontology. We are not discovering that characteristic that determines what is an insect and what is not, but deciding which characteristic determines our use of the word "insect".

I think this is in line with Kripke's discussion of essences.

Compare the discussion of simples around Philosophical Investigations, §48.

I don't see these responses helping much.

A metaphorical use is different to a literal use. Calling your ex an insect works becasue of the literal use. We could have a discussion of the best way to define 'literal', but that'd be yet another step away from Quine.

The extension of a predicate is the list of individuals to whom it applies. In your example, the set of animals having six legs is an insect, and it's not correct to say of something without six legs, that it is an insect. That is, the set of animals that have six legs and the set of animals to which the word "insect" applies are the vey same. they are extensionally equivalent. (Part fo the problem here is the one mentioned much earlier, where it remains unclear what you think an essence is, especially in extensional terms).

We do not find out what an insect is by looking only at the use of the word, but finding out what an insect is, is the same as finding out how to use the word "insect" coherently. The example of "fish" is informative here. Whales were once called fish, but as we refined the use of that word it became clear that there were considerable differences between, say, teleosts and Cetacea; too great to justify the use of the common name. The word "fish" dropped out of use for Cetacea. More recently it has been suggested that there is nothing that is common to all and only fish; that there is no essence of "fishness". That's what prompted Stephen Jay Gould to joke that there was no such thing as a fish. If you insist that there must be an essence of fish in order to justify our use of the word "fish" you will be defying the science. Of course there are fish, which is to say nothing more than that it is useful to have that word at hand to talk about some of the animals that live in water and cook up nicely. It does nto imply, as you seem to think, that there must be an essence of fishness for us to be able to use the word at all.

I am not suggesting that word use determines what something is. Nor is it true that what something is determines word use. I said previously that such a juxtaposition is fraught. I am pointing to the interplay between word use and our interactions with the world. We divide the world up not on the basis of some prelinguistic ontology, but on the basis of what works for us.

This is not to "collapse the distinction between sign and referent" but as Davidson phrased it "In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false."

Well, yes, as I said, it's not a great example. We might get out our CRISPR and re-arrange the genetics of a fruit fly so that it has an extra body segment and two more pairs of legs. Is it still an insect?

I'm suggesting that this is as much a question of word use as it is of entomology.

...there is also nothing essential to insects? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sticking to the example, which isn't a great one, insects have six legs. Now will we count that as a bit of ontology, in that having six legs is a special feature of insects, or will we count it as a bit of language use, as in it's not correct to say of something without six legs, that it is an insect?

How are these questions distinct? Extensionally, they are identical.

And there is no such thing as a fish.

So you do think insects existed prior to anyone deciding what counts as an insect? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure. I've argued similar points at length, elsewhere. There is gold in those hills, even if no one knows about it.

"What counts as an insect" is much the same question as "How should we use the word insect". There's books about that, if you are interested.

If your philosophy of language forces you to ho and hum and deflect away from questions like "did cockroaches not exist until humans decided to 'count' them as such?" then yes, that seems like a rather major defect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yeah, it sure would be., Who says that?

Kripke argued that the essence of a gold atom is the property of having an atomic number of 79, which is the number of protons in the nucleus of a gold atom. — Arcane Sandwich

Yep.

Tim seems to be advocating some form of species essentialism, in which species are static groups with inherent essences. See the conversation with @Apustimelogist.

Kripke advocates a modal essentialism, such that certain properties of object and kinds are essential. The properties he has in mind are those that the object or kind has in every possible world. So Gold has the property of having 79 protons in its nucleus, because that's what the word "gold" refers to. See the thread Kripke: Identity and Necessity. There's a fair bit involved.

Must we pretend? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Pretending isn't such a bad thing. This counts as a 'dog' - let's pretend. It gets us by.

Use is pretty ubiquitous - not just a "key use"; we don't just refer with word, we question, demand, command, name, promise.

Sheep are an "organic whole" only until they reach the abattoir. What counts as a whole depends on what you are doing.

Your essentialism is showing.

It doesn't say anything about it; it says that when a speaker's does use a description, the "speaker's reference" is that to which they think it applies. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps that was his speaker's intent - that might explain the foux pas. But it would still be a mistake, as the example shows - and as Kripke argues - semantic meaning might well take priority. Sarah believes she is referring to Kripke when she is talking about Kaplan.

It will not do to reply that her speaker's reference is to Kripke, because the indicative picks out Kaplan.

Yeah, but I want to talk about meaning and reference :D — Moliere

Well, there's your problem, right there... :wink:

so why do you think. ...implies anything to the contrary? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't understand. The first says that Kripke does not think a description is needed in order to fix a referent. The second, that Kripke thinks the speaker has at hand a description in order to fix the referent.

What you talk'n 'bout?

Sure, some ways of divvying don't work.


We can juxtapose two views, that either the dog is an whole regardless of language, or it is a whole in virtue of language. Then we can pretend that the one must be true, at the expense of the other.

But perhaps the juxtaposition is fraught with problems. We might treat the trout as a whole while catching it, becasue that's what works. Then we filet it, treating it as a compound, then serve it along with spuds, greens and a béchamel as a part of a meal. What counts as whole or part is a result of what we are doing.

And language is a part of the stuff we do.


Meaning is not found, it's made. Or better, drop meaning and reference altogether and talk instead about use.